Epistemology, examination of knowledge (lectured by ven. Vanaratana) 29th of April, 2011
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B.P.G 302 Lectured by ven. Wannarathana, recorded by ven. Mon monk Nai Suriya, 29th of Aprial, 2011
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B.P.G 302 Lectured by ven. Wannarathana, recording by ven. Mon monk Nai Suriya, 27th of May, 2011 and Pragmatism (a)
Epistemology is the subject that decides whether the knowledge we gain is true or false. Accordingly, the way we use for it distinguishes what is correct knowledge and what is the incorrect knowledge.
It is evident, that Descartes was the first western philosopher who made research in the field of epistemology. There is a set of questions discussed in the epistemological sphere.
1. Is genuine knowledge accessible at all?
2. What are the limits of knowledge?
3. From what faculty of the human body, including the mind, does the knowledge originate?
4. Which method should be used to obtain the correct knowledge?
5. How can one justify apriori statements?
6. Where is the boundary of the subjective and objective knowledge?
7. What is the nature of truth?
According to Empiricism, knowledge is a result of a kind of reflection of external objects through sense-organs. It is not based on apriori knowledge. It has to be developed by observation. Plato stated, that ideas have independent existence. Their independent existence is the only reality in the universe. Valid knowledge is caused when mind grasps these ideas. Descartes held the view, that only ideas, which are clear and distinct to the mind represent real knowledge.
Kant attempted to reach the true knowledge with the help of both rationalism and empiricism. Kant understood that it was better to understand what knowledge the human mind is capable of (empirical, rational or any way). Before attempting to solve the problems concerning the soul, God, ultimate reality, etc. Any attempt without proper means of knowledge would become meaningless for achieving knowledge. Kant attempted to combine both empiricism and rationalism in this regard. This is called 'form and matter epistemology'. Kant emphasized, that we should gain correct knowledge of both matter and mind. Kant agreed with rationalism up to a certain extent, but he agreed and also considered empirical knowledge as more informative on the structure of the thought. According to Kant, knowledge is performed in the mind with the help of sense perception. That knowledge uncovers the appearance of objects as we can experience them.
Sense-organs only connect the objects with the mind, therefore it is meaningless to speak about an ultimate reality of the phenomenal world through empirical knowledge. The rational mind always tries to build an unconditional reality that runs behind the empirical knowledge that we gain from the physical world.
Buddhist view on Epistemology A
Buddhism doesn't accept, that the external world is based on metaphysical reasoning, as it appears in Sabba Sutta[1]. Sabba means 'all objects, that are perceived by sense organs. Sabba Sutta explains, that everything in the physical world as sabba. Man builds one's own world through the perception of external world with the help of six sense-organs. According to Kant and Buddhist teachings it is clear, that only objective knowledge can be established in the empirical field.
Buddhism emphasizes, that any attempt to exist empirical knowledge, would lead to transcendental doctrine. As it appears, Kant's arguments on pure reasoning are transcendental and over limits of sense experience. No object is adequate to the transcendental idea possible to find within spiritual exercise. Concepts such as God, soul, rebirth and reality of the universe are considered as metaphysical concepts. All these concepts are beyond sense-experience. It mind tends to make metaphysical judgment through logic and arguments. This can be explained in Sāmaññaphala Sutta as
»Idha, bhikkhave, ekacco samaṇo vā brāhmaṇo vā takkī hoti vīmaṃsī, so takkapariyāhataṃ vīmaṃsānucaritaṃ sayaṃ paṭibhānaṃ evamāha – ‘sassato attā ca loko ca vañjho kūṭaṭṭho esikaṭṭhāyiṭṭhito.«
(Dīgha Nikāya – 1. Brahmajāla Sutta – Sassatavādo – 34)
“Here a certain ascetic or Brahmin is a logician, a reasoner. Hammering it out by reason, following his own line of thought, he argues: “The self and the world are eternal, barren like a mountain-peak, set firmly as a post. These beings rush round, circulate, pass away and re-arise, but this remains for ever.”
(translation from „The Long Discourses of the Buddha – A Translation of the Dīgha Nikāya“ Maurice Walshe)
'Takkapariyāhataṃ vīmaṃsānucaritaṃ' means 'hammering completely by reason' (takka+pari+āhata) and 'accompanying/connecting with experiment/investigation' (vīmaṃsa+anucarita).
Buddhist Epistemology B (lectured by ven. Vanaratana) 27th of May, 2011
As it is defined in Buddhist philosophy and philosophy of Kant, metaphysical concepts are based on speculative employment of reason. Kant also accepted sensory experience as insufficient for apprehending the reality. Buddhism mentions that there is impermanence with regards to senses and objects, thus they are like a mirage: »Māyūpamañca viññāṇaṃ.« (Dhammapada) Kant also accepted a similar idea. Although Kant accepted sensory perception is not sufficient to apprehend the reality of the world, Buddhism suggests extrasensory perception (atīndriyapratyakṣañāṇa/atiindiyapaccakkhañāṇa[2]). Buddhism accepts the existence of external objects with the mediation of mind: »mano pubbaṅgamā dhammā« - “mind is the forerunner”. Kant also held similar idea with regards to extrasensory perception, which are not objects of consciousness, but are thoughts as objects merely through understanding. We recognize them as intelligible entities. Thus Kant points out the sphere of an object:
1. phenomenal (knowledge of sense experience of external world)
2. nominal (appearance of an object as it is)
This concept of phenomena is similar to the concept papañca (a kind of knowledge acquired through experience), taught in Madhupiṇḍika Sutta. As Kant understands, concepts like God, soul, heaven are produced by transcendental illusion. But it is mentioned in Mūlapariyāya Sutta, that they may be apprehended through abhiññā. But when we consider the unanswered questions, mentioned in Cūḷamāluṅkyaputta Sutta, we may suppose, that the Buddha also considered the transcendental illusion to a certain extent. The Buddha preached there that what we should be concerned with is actually just the Four Noble Truths. Acinteyya Sutta[3] also mentions, that we should not be concerned with four factors connected to transcendental illusion:
1. »Buddhavisayo acinteyyo.« “The Buddha's matter is unthinkable.”
2. »Jhānavisayo acinteyyo.« “The jhāna matter is unthinkable.”
3. »Kammavipāko acinteyyo.« “The action-reaction is unthinkable.”
4. »Lokacintā acinteyyā.« “The world matter is unthinkable.”
The Buddha advised the Kālāmas that it was proper for them to have a doubt. It has been arisen in a matter.[4]
1. One should not be led by report (mā anussavena)
2. One should not be led by tradition (mā paramparāya)
3. One should not be led by hearsay (mā itikirāya)
4. One should not be led by authority of religious teacher (mā piṭakasampadānena)
5. One should not be led by mere logic (mā takkahetu)
6. One should not be led by mere inference (mā nayahetu)
7. One should not be led by considering appearance (mā ākāraparivitakkena)
8. One should not be led by delight in speculation (mā diṭṭhinijjhānakkhantiyā)
9. One should not be led by seeming possibilities (mā bhabbharūpatāya)
10. One should not be led by teachers (mā samaṇo no garu)
Pragmatism A
It developed in America in 19th century. Charles Sanders Peirce (1834-1914) is considered to be the person, who developed this philosophy. American scholars consider Pierce to be the inventor of philosophy. He tried to find solution for philosophical problems. According to pragmatists, traditional philosophical teachings are not concerned with modern problems. According to them, those theories are like instruments which are not strong enough to solve their problems. The theories, that can solve problems, should have pragmatic values. Their criterion of truth was sufficient theory, as it is only based on experiments.
[1] »23. Sāvatthinidānaṃ. ‘‘Sabbaṃ vo, bhikkhave, desessāmi. Taṃ suṇātha. Kiñca, bhikkhave, sabbaṃ? Cakkhuñceva rūpā ca, sotañca [sotañceva (?) evamitarayugalesupi] saddā ca, ghānañca gandhā ca, jivhā ca rasā ca, kāyo ca phoṭṭhabbā ca, mano ca dhammā ca – idaṃ vuccati, bhikkhave, sabbaṃ. Yo, bhikkhave, evaṃ vadeyya – ‘ahametaṃ sabbaṃ paccakkhāya aññaṃ sabbaṃ paññāpessāmī’ti, tassa vācāvatthukamevassa [vācāvatthurevassa (sī. pī.), vācāvatthudevassa (syā. kaṃ.)]; puṭṭho ca na sampāyeyya, uttariñca vighātaṃ āpajjeyya. Taṃ kissa hetu? Yathā taṃ, bhikkhave, avisayasmi’’nti.« (Saṃyutta Nikāya – Saḷāyatanavaggapāḷi – 1. Saḷāyatanasaṃyuttaṃ – 3. Sabbavaggo – 1. Sabbasuttaṃ)
Translation: “At Sāvatthī, “Bhikkhus, I will teach you the all. Listen to that... “And what, bhikkhus, is the all? The eye and forms, the ear and sounds, the nose and odours, the tongue and tastes, the body and tactile objects, the mind and mental phenomena. This is called the all. “If anyone, bhikkhus, should speak thus: “Having rejected this all, I shall make known another all” - that would be a mere empty boast on his part. If he were questioned he would not be able to reply and, further, he would meet with vexation. For what reason? Because, bhikkhus, that would not be within his domain.” („The Connected Discourses of the Buddha – A New Translation of the Saṃyutta Nikāya“, Bhikkhu Bodhi)
[2] This term does not appear in Tipiṭaka, Aṭṭhakatā, Ṭīkā or Añña. We may find only the term paccakkhañāṇa.
[3] Aṅguttara Nikāya – Catukkanipātapāḷi – Dutiyapaṇṇāsakaṃ – (8) 3. Apaṇṇakavaggo – 7. Acinteyyasuttaṃ
[4] This should be in Kālāma Sutta. But it seems, that in Chaṭṭhasaṅgāyanā Tipiṭaka program there is no sutta called “Kālāma Sutta”. I have found a sutta, which may be the Kālāma Sutta, but it's name is Sarabhasuttaṃ. It is in Aṅguttara Nikāya – Tikanipātapāḷi – Dutiyapaṇṇāsakaṃ – (7) 2. Mahāvaggo - 4. Sarabhasutta.