

Notes From  
Buddhist and  
Pali University  
for the 3. year

Copy-written,  
commented and  
edited by ven.  
Czech Sarana

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## INTRODUCTION

I have written this series of books „Notes from Buddhist and Pāli University for the 1. year“, „Notes from Buddhist and Pāli University for the 2. year“, „Notes from Buddhist and Pāli University for the 3. year“ only with the purpose to help the students at the first year, second year and third year as well. Though at the time of first 'CD edition' I am only a student of the first year, I have a kind of belief that it might be helpful to all students of above mentioned grades. It might be astonishing and maybe even astounding that a student of 1. year is helping students of 2. year and 3. year. What is my explanation? I believe, that anyone who has the proper intention, proper skill and proper knowledge can help in the field which is connected with those three. My intention is to help the students, my skill is quick type-writing and my knowledge is English language. As such I could help with copy-writing the notes from English medium for the students of the Buddhist and Pāli University of Sri Lanka. I did it with all sincerity and seriousness thinking about the success of the students. Every monk should help others, if he can and if he does not want to help others he should help himself – to attain the *Nibbāna* (*ayaṃ pana me attano mati*). I spent more than thousand hours preparing this kind of 'help', but still there is much to do and much to improve. Moreover, I take this work as a draft which should be checked, changed and revised for the benefit of students. By this way I would like to ask anyone to contribute in this manner and either contact me on my telephone number – 0778212445 (Sri Lankan number) or e-mail me on [hostov@seznam.cz](mailto:hostov@seznam.cz). Any corrections, ideas, critique or editions are cordially welcomed.

We can understand religion as one angle from which we understand the truth. We all have closed eyes, as we still didn't realize the real knowledge, we still didn't attain the *Nibbāna*. Thus, like people with closed eyes, we try to realize the truth. We are like them, the people with closed eyes, who are trying to understand the nature of an elephant. Like this bunch of people, staying at various places and trying to understand the elephant according to what they perceive by their blind touching by hands, the same way we try to understand the truth either by religion (belief), science (facts realized by our six senses) or philosophy (thinking) as different points of view. But no way of these three is leading to real understanding, like no way of touching the elephant will help the people with closed eyes to understand the elephant. What these people should do, they should open their eyes and just see the elephant as it is. The same way we, if we want to see the truth of the world, we should attain the *Nibbāna* and thus see the world as it is.

First and foremost I should thank to all the students who dedicated their precious time to type their hand-writing and then distributed it among other students (and thanks to that I had the opportunity to compile them in a book-form). I should be thankful to all those who contributed the notes so that I could copy-write them here or who gave me the electronic notes which I have implemented here. Especially I am thankful to ven. Khim Jimmy (Cambodia), ven. Asabha (Myanmar), ven. Bopitiye Samitha (Sri Lanka), ven. Samnang Phy (Cambodia), ven. Nemeinda (Myanmar), ven. Premlim (Cambodia), ven. Maitri (Nepal) and many, many others. I would like to express my great thanks to teachers at the Buddhist and Pāli University of Sri Lanka, apart from those whose ideas are in the notes in these books especially to ven. Mavtagama Pemananda (mainly teacher of Sanskrit) who went to my present residence just to settle all the misunderstandings I had with the chief incumbent there. I should not forget to mention the English teachers who never received sufficient amount of praise from the other teachers at the university – Mr. Svarnananda Gamage, Mr. Ratnasiri and not less Mr. Pradeep Gunasena who encouraged and supported me enormously during writing this work for example by allowing me to work on it in their office (as we still do not have any study hall in our 'modern' university).

I wish all the beings to see the Truth,  
I wish all the beings to attain *Nibbāna*.

Ven. Czech Sarana,  
Vipassanā Bhāvanā Madhyasthānaya,  
Galawilawatta, Homagama,  
Sri Lanka

## BPG. 301 – HISTORY OF INDIAN BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY

A survey, under the following topics of the historical development of the Indian Buddhist philosophy from its inception up to the emergence of *Mahāyāna* is expected here.

- I. Early Buddhist teachings and trends which paved the way for the emergence of *Abhidhammic* traditions
- II. *Abhidhammic* theory of *dhamma* and its off-shoots: *Puggalavāda*, *Sarvastivāda* and *Vibhajjavāda*
- III. The emergence of *Sautrantic* tradition as a reaction to the *Abhidhamma*; critical approach and mind-oriented trends that arose from it.
- IV. *Lokottaravāda* developments of the concept of the Buddha; contribution made thereto by the *Mahāsaṅghikas* and allied *Nikāyas*.
- V. *Mahāyāna* and the impact of Buddhist thought in pre-*Mahāyāna* schools on its emergence.
- VI. The two philosophical traditions of *Madhyamika* and *Yogācāra* and their basic concepts.
- VII. *Tantrism* and its historical background.

\* Special attention should be paid to the germinal teachings embodied in the *suttas* of the *Dhammavāda* of the *Abhidhammikas*; *Sūnyatavāda* of the *Madhyamakas* and *Vijñānavāda* of the *Yogācārins*.

### Recommended Reading:

1. *Abhidhamma Dipika (Introduction)* Ed. P. S. Jaini, Patna, 1959
2. *Abhidhamma Studies* Nyanaponika, Colombo, 1949
3. *Buddhist Analysis of Matter* Y. Karunadasa, Colombo, 1967
4. *The Buddhist Manual of Ethics (Dhammasangani)* Tra. Mrs. Rhys Davids, London, 1923
5. *Buddhist Psychology of Perception* E. R. Saratchandra, Colombo, 1958
6. *Central Conception of Buddhism* K. Stcherbatsky, Calcutta, 1956
7. *Compendium of Philosophy (Abhidhammattha Sangaha)* Tra. S. Z. Aung, London, 1910
8. *Early History of the Spread of Buddhism and Buddhist Schools* N. Dutt, New Delhi, 1980
9. *Guide through the Abhidhamma Piṭaka* Nyanatiloka, Colombo, 1957
10. *Indian Buddhism* A. K. Warder, Delhi, 1980
11. *Philosophy and Psychology in the Abhidhamma* H. V. Guenther, Delhi, 1974
12. *The Psychological Attitude of Early Buddhist Philosophy* Lama Anagarika, Govinda
13. *System of Buddhist Thought* Yamakami Sogen, Calcutta, 1952

## CRITICAL OUTLOOK IN BUDDHISM (2009)

Classification of ancient history into 5 periods by **K.N. Jayatilake**<sup>1</sup>

1. Traditionalism (faith) (first 4(?) and last 2(?))

2. Rationalism (middle 4(?))

3. Experientialism → *Upaniṣadic* period

a) sense perception

b) extra-sensory perception

*saddhā* – didn't accept by **Buddha** (?)

*ñāna* – didn't accept by **Buddha** (?)

The ancient Indian society was a society which is very valuable for the Buddhist studies. Buddhism emerged in India and the founder of this great philosophy, **the Buddha**, preached the *Dhamma* depending on the contemporary situation. At the very beginning, in India the religious activities performed by the people were prominent. According to the traditional beliefs, people obtained what they needed through the practices. The *Vedic* text gives detailed account about the various religious activities. The Pli canon gives details about those activities. The *suttas* such as: *Brahmajāla*, *Ariyapariyesana*, *Kālāma*, *Canki*, *Vīmaṅsaka*, *Aggivaccagotta* etc. state the contemporary religious activity with criticism made by **the Buddha**. The ancient history in which different rites and rituals existed can be classified under 3 headings:

1. The *Vedic* period

2. The *Brāhmaṇa* period

3. The *Upaniṣad* period

During the first two periods the path of action (*karma mārga*) was emerged/accepted(?). During the *Upaniṣad* period the path of knowledge (*ñāna mārga*) was emerged/accepted(?). *Karma mārga* means different kinds of offerings to the gods aiming mundane happiness. Therefore, the primitive people offered different things for the satisfaction of the gods. Through these performances, they wished happiness. Among those offerings the most heinous crime was killing and offering a human being. They did this kind of assassination in sacrificial grounds. This sacrifice was called '*purisa yāga*'.

During *Upaniṣadic* period people became intelligent and they realized that *karma mārga* was useless, resultless path. Through that path people could obtain nothing. Having realized the nature of those practices, they transformed or changed into the 'path of knowledge' (*ñāna mārga*). That was the beginning of philosophical thoughts. By the time people went to the forest leaving their household life and practised the life of celibacy (*Brahmacariya*) and austerities. Through the path they wanted to know the real nature of the world and being. According to the *Ariyapariyesana Sutta* in *Majjhima Nikāya* **the Buddha** as an ascetic practice the knowledge (*ñāna mārga*).(?)

*Upaniṣadic* period was the period where the different sources of knowledge would be available. Accordingly, the ten sorts of traditional sources of knowledge were spread. Considering all the sources of knowledge, **Prof. K.N. Jayatilake** classified them as follows:

1. Traditionalism

2. Rationalism

3. Experientialism

Traditionalists were those who followed the tradition. They accepted what came by the tradition.

Rationalists were those who followed the logic or the logical proposition. They are the logicians. They accepted only what could be proved with the logical statements.

Experientialists were those who depended on experience. As they accepted the experience, sensory perception and extra-

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1 Note that there are only 3 periods mentioned.

sensory perception, rejected both traditionalism and rationalism.

Anyway, whatever they have accepted, traditionalist and rationalist view – if they were main possible with the experience. (?) Here, extra-sensory perception is the higher knowledge (*abhiññā*).

The first two, traditionalism and rationalism were named as authority and reasoning respectively. In the *Kālāma Sutta* of *Aṅguttara Nikāya* the authority and reasoning which are called 'ten sources of knowledge' existed in India during the time of **the Buddha**. The 'ten traditional sources of knowledge' are:<sup>2</sup>

1. *Anussavena* – report
2. *Itikirāya* – tradition
3. *Paramparāya* – hearsay
4. *Piṭakasampadānena* – scriptures
5. *Takka* – logic
6. *Naya* – inference
7. *Ākāraparivitakkena* – reason
8. *Diṭṭhinijjhānakkhantiyā* – reflection
9. *Bhabbarāpatāya* – testimony
10. *Samano no garū* – reverence

**QUESTION:** GIVE AN INTERPRETATION TO 'ABHIDHAMMA' AND DISCUSS THE REASON WHICH LED TO ENGAGING IT AS SEPARATE PIṬAKA. (ORIGINAL BY VEN. SUVANNY)

The Pāli term *Abhidhamma* comprises of teachings which are collectively known as *Dhamma*, the doctrine or the teaching of the Blessed One. '*Dhamma*' is the teaching that can purify the mind from defilement, attachment and craving etc. and can lead to the achievement of the everlasting peace and happiness. And the prefix '*Abhi*' is used in the sense of 'great', 'excellent', 'ultimate' etc. So,

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2 » 'Etha tumhe, kālāmā, mā anussavena, mā paramparāya, mā itikirāya, mā piṭakasampadānena, mā takkahetu, mā nayahetu, mā ākāraparivitakkena, mā diṭṭhinijjhānakkhantiyā, mā bhabbarāpatāya, mā samaṇo no garūti. Yadā tumhe, kālāmā, attanāva jāneyyātha – 'ime dhammā akusalā, ime dhammā sāvajjā, ime dhammā viññugarahitā, ime dhammā samattā samādinā [samādinā (ka.)] ahitāya dukkhāya saṃvattanti''ti, atha tumhe, kālāmā, pajaheyyātha. « - (Aṅguttaranikāya – Tikaniṭāpāḷi – 2. Mahāvagga - 5. Kesamuttisuttaṃ)

the *Abhidhamma* means great, excellent, marvelous doctrine or teaching of the Enlightened One and is the teaching which makes the correct knowledge about the being and the world in detail more explicitly than *suttas*.

By dividing into *citta*, *cetasika*, *rūpa* and *Nibbāna* of analytical system in *Theravāda* is not accepted by all traditions as some teachers they have various arguments. Therefore, *Theravāda* was identified as *Vibhajjavāda*. For instance, *Sarvāstivādins* did not believe in *Theravāda's Abhidhamma* and they had other seven *Abhidhamma* books presented in Sanskrit language. And *Sautrāntikas* also rejected *Abhidhamma* teaching. Therefore, some traditions they did not discuss *Abhidhamma Piṭaka* but they believed in the *Sutta Piṭaka* as their own doctrine.

When we discuss about *Abhidhamma* tradition the *Theravāda Abhidhamma* was with the Pāli *sutta* literature and also the oldest *Abhidhammic* literature because the *Theravāda* tradition is the oldest in Buddhist history. The other *Abhidhamma* traditions developed their *Abhidhamma* literature after forming their schools separately.

The next important thought is that the *Theravāda* teaches the four *paramattha dhammās* and only one *asankhāta dhamma*, but *Sarvāstivāda* accepts the sect(?) for *dhamma* and *citta vippayutta dhammā* and increased *asankhāta dhammā* into three:

1. *Pratisankhya nirodha*
2. *Apratisankhya nirodha*
3. *Ākāsa*

All together, they believed, there are 75 *dhammās*.

Another important thing, *Abhidhamma* literature is named as *Sāriputta Abhidhamma*. Now it is available in Chinese language only, but it is not decided whether it belongs to *Mahāsaṅghika*, *Sammātiya* or *Dhammavuddha* schools as all three sects have *Abhidhamma* literature. According to inscription. the *Mahāsaṅghikas* rejected *Theravāda Abhidhamma*. They had also *Mātikā Piṭaka*, it is said that „The sub-schools *Mahāsaṅghika*, *Gokulika* etc. developed *Abhidhamma*.“

Further, the *Sautrāntika* rejected and tried to solve *Abhidhamma* problem, but according to the *suttas*, we have to accept that they also followed the *Abhidhamma* to some extent. **Vasubandhu** who wrote *Abhidhamma kośa* for *Sarvāstivādins* also accepted the *Sautrāntika dhammā* theory.

besides that *Yogācāra* school has discussed the *Abhidhamma* and accepted theory of a hundred *dhammās*. Therefore, the *Theravāda Abhidhamma* is considered as the oldest, complete and original *Abhidhamma* literature, but the other *Abhidhamma* schools derived from *Theravāda* they analyzed *dhammās* according to their own traditional belief.

666 GIVE AN INTERPRETATION TO “ABHIDHAMMA” AND DISCUSS THE REASON, WHICH LEADS TO ENGAGING IT AS SEPARATE TĪPITAKA?

The Pali term *Abhidhamma* is composed of *Abhi* *Dhamma* The prefix “*Abhi*” is used in the sense of great, excellent, ultimate etc. so the *Abhidhamma* means great, excellent, marvelous doctrine or teaching of the enlightened one and is a teaching which makes the correct knowledge about the beings and the world in detail more explicitly than *Sutta*. Thus it is the higher Doctrine

The analysis of phenomena into *Citta*, *Cetasika*, *Rupa* and *Nibbana* in *Theravada* is not accepted by all traditions as some teachers presented have various arguments. Therefore, *Theravadins* were identified as *Vibhajja vadins*. For instance, *Sarvāstivādins* did not believe *Theravada Abhidhamma* and the them seven *Abhidhamm* Books presented in Sanskrit language. And *Sautrāntikas* also rejected *Abhidhamma* teaching. Therefore, some traditions did not discuss *Abhidhamma Pitaka* but they believed the *Sutta Pitaka* as their own doctrine.

When we discuss about Abhidhamma tradition the Theravada Abhidhamma is in Pali. It also is the oldest Abhidhammic literature because the Theravada tradition is the oldest in Buddhist history. The other Abhidhamma traditions developed their Abhidhamma literature after forming their schools separately. The next important is though the Theravada teaches the four Paramattha Dhammas and only one Asankhata Dhamma the Sarvastivada accepts a new category of Dhamma called Citta Viprayutta Dhamma and increased Asankhata Dhamma into three Pratisankhya Nirodha, Apratisankya Nirodha and Akasa. All together they believed seventy-five Dhammas. Whereas the Theravadins accepted 82.

Another important, Abhidhamma literature is named as Sriputta Abhidhamma now available in Chinese language only but not certain whether it belongs to Mahasanghika, Sammitiya or Dhammavutka schools as all three sects have Abhidhamma literatures. According to inscription, the Mahasanghika rejected Theravada Abhidhamma. They had also Matika Pitaka, it is said “the sub-schools of Mahasanghika, Gokulika etc. developed Abhidhamma”. Further, the Sautrantika rejected and tried to solve Abhidhamma problem but according to the sutta, we have to accept that they also followed the Abhidhamma to some extent and Vasubhandu who wrote Abhidharmakoshha for Sarvastivadins also accepted the Sautrantika Dhamma theory.

Beside that Yogacara School has discussed about Abhidhamma and accepted a hundred Dhammas. Therefore, the Theravada Abhidhamma is considered as the oldest, complete and original Abhidhamma literature but the other Abhidhamma schools derived from Theravada and they analyzed the Dhamma according to their own traditional belief.

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#### 666 DEFINE THE ABHIDHAMMA AND DISCUSS THE FACTORS WHICH LED TO DEVELOP IT AS A SEPARATE PITAKA.

The Pali term Abhidhamma is composed of Abhi, which are collectively known as Dharma the doctrine or the teaching of the blessed one. Dharma is the teaching that can purify the mind from defilement; attachment and craving etc. And can achieve the lasting peace and happiness. And the prefix “Abhi” is used in the sense of great, excellent, ultimate, etc. so the Abhidhamma means great, excellent, marvelous doctrine or teaching of the enlightened one and is a teaching which makes the correct knowledge about the beings and the world in detail more explicitly than Sutta.

By dividing into Citta, Cetasika, Rupa and Nibbana of analytical system in Theravada is not accepted by all traditions as some teachers they have various arguments. Therefore, Theravadins were identified as Vibhajja Vadins. For instance, Sarvastivadins they did not believe Theravada Abhidhamma and the other seven Abhidhamma books presented in Sanskrit language. And Sautrantikas also rejected Abhidhamma teaching therefore, some traditions they did not discuss Abhidhamma Pitaka but they believed the Sutta Pitaka as their own doctrine.

When we discuss about Abhidhamma tradition the Theravada Abhidhamma was with the Pali Sutta literature and also the oldest Abhidhammic literature because the Theravada tradition is the oldest Buddhist history. The other Abhidhamma traditions they developed their Abhidhamma literature after forming their schools separately. The Next important, though the Theravada teaches the four Paramattha Dhammas and only one Asankhata Dhamma but Sarvastivada accepts the sect for Dhamma and Citta Viprayutta Dhamma and increased three Asankhata Dhamma of Pratisankhya Nirodha, Apratisankya Nirodha and Akasa. All together they believed seventy-five Dhammas.

Another important, Abhidhamma literature is named as Sriputta Abhidhamma now it is available in Chinese language only but not decide whether it is belong to Mahāsamghika, Sammitiya or Dhammavutka schools as all three sects have Abhidhamma literatures. According to inscription, the Mahāsamghika rejected Theravada Abhidhamma they had also Matika Pitaka, it is said “the sub-schools of Mahāsamghika, Gokulika etc, developed Abhidhamma”. Further, the Sautrantika rejected and try to solve Abhidhamma problem but according to the Sutta, we have to accept that they also followed the Abhidhamma some extend and vasubhandu who wrote LAbhidharmaghoshha for Sarvastivadins also accepted the Sautrantika Dhamma theory.

Beside that Yogacara School has discussed about Abhidhamma and accepted and hundred Dhammas. Therefore, the Theravada Abhidhamma is considered as the oldest, complete and original Abhidhamma literature but the other Abhidhamma schools derived from Theravada and they analyzed the Dhamma according to their own traditional belief.

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- The word 'Abhidhamma' is found in Digha Nikaya (silakkhandha) i.e. Abhivinaya and Abhidhamma, it is also found in Majjhima Nikaya and Sutta Nipata.
- According to B.C. Law, the History of Pali Literature, the authentic of Abhidhamma is found in Digha Nikaya and Suttanipata. The word Abhidhamma means higher doctrine and Abhivinaya means higher discipline.
- The Buddha's teaching goes deeper step by step, i.e.
  - (1) Anupubbasiccā -- gradual doctrine
  - (2) Anupubbakiriya -- gradual activity
  - (3) Anupubbapatipada -- gradual discipline.
- Abhidhamma is not preached by the Buddha, it is a scholar work by monks.
- Seven books of Theravada Abhidhamma (Sattapakarana) are...and there are three commentaries (Atthakatha) on these seven books.
- What is the function of atthakatha? To clarify the meaning of difficult words in Tipitaka (only words give explanation)
- Tika = Subcommentary; Sangaha = compendium (written including the important teaching of Abhidhamma). The Compendium of Abhidhamma are:
  - (1) Abhidhammavātara
  - (2) Abhidhammattharīkasīni
  - (3) Namarūpasamāsa
  - (4) Namarūpapariccheda
  - (5) Abhidhammasangaha.
  - (6) Abhidhammattavibhāvīni
- Why did they do these works?
  - (1) Any religion philosophy has two aspects:
    - (a) Define the nature of man
    - (b) Define the nature of world
  - (2) Based on that analysis, it recommends a way of life.
 

Philosophy: West - Theory, i.e. define the things, describe how the world is or the nature of man.

East - Theory and practice, i.e. define the world, also gives a way of life.
- Brahmasahavyata -- eternal soul, after death the soul comes to this place.
 

God - Brahma -- creator

Soul - Atma -- the element within us.
- Buddhism -- anatta, paticcasamuppada (causality)
- Buddha analyzed the human personality in four divisions:
  - (a) Nama-rupa
 

What is man? Namarupa, it is anicca, dukkha and anatta. Therefore it is sukha and dukkha.
  - (b) Pañcakkhandā (five aggregates): rupa, vedana, sabba, saṅkhāra, viḥāra. rupa (rupa) the other four is define as nama.
  - (c) Chāindriya: cakku, sota, ghaṇa, jivha and kāya (rupa), the last one mana is nama.
  - (d) Dvādasāyatana (12 institution)

cakkhu-ayatana -- rupayatana (rupa)	
sota-ayatana -- saddhayatana	}
ghanayatana -- ghandhayatana	
jivhayatana -- rasayatana	
kayayatana -- phothabbayatana	
manayatana -- dhammayatana	
	nama

(e) Attharasadhātu (18 elements)

cakkhudhātu --	rupadhātu --	cakkhuvibbanadhātu
sotadhātu --	saddhadhātu --	sodavibbanadhātu
ghanadhātu --	gandhadhātu --	ghanavibbanadhātu
jivhadhātu --	rasadhātu --	jivhavibbanadhātu
kayadhātu --	phothabbadhātu --	kayavibbanadhātu
manadhātu --	dhammadhātu --	dhammavibbanadhātu

Madhupindikasutta of Majjhima Nikaya:

“cakkhubca paticca rupe appajjati cakkhuvibbananaj” base on eye in forms comes the eye consciousness.

- Mind lives in heart -- said by Buddhaghosa, not by Buddha.  
“guhasayaj” (sleep in the cave) -- found in atthakatha.

- Rupa -- 28  
vedana }  
sabba } 52  
savkhara }  
vibbana } -- 89/121

- Sagathavagga of Sajyutta Nikaya explains “Death” in following manner:

“Ayu usmaca vibbanaj  
yada kayaj jahanti maj  
apaviddo tada seti  
niratthajva kalimgaraj

ayu = life-span; usmaca = breath; vibbana = consciousness

- Mulapariyayasutta of Majjhima Nikaya -- Philosophical analysis of sutta.  
i.e. at the end of the sutta, the monks could not understand the sutta and thus unhappy

- How to explain the word “ayu” stated in the above:

In Abhidhamma, rupa is analysis into 28, one is Jivitindriya. Therefore the explanation of ayu is in the term of Jivitindriya.

- In early Buddhism, there are 8 rupa: pathavi, apo, tejo, vayo, vanna, gandha, rasa and oja (nutriment)

.While in Abhidhamma, there are 28 rupa.

- 6 heavens: catummaharajika, yama, tusita, nimmanarati, paranimmita and vasavatti.

- 4 hells: naraka, tiraccana, peta and asura.

Ven. Yanchunlei. Huixian

Lectured by Pro. G.Sumanapala

20/03/2001

Topic 1. Clarify the ethical basis of the analysis of mind in Abhidhamma.

Topic 2. Define the Abhidhammic concept of citta and clarify the difference between citta and cetasika.

Lecture 1. Historical background of Abhidhamma

Lecture 2. Philosophical contact of Abhidhamma with early Buddhism.

In Abhidhamma we say mostly about 4 great matters:

Citta ( mind)

Cetasika (mental concomitants)

Rupa (matter)

Nibbana

During the time of the Buddha, there were 2 main philosophical groups,

1. Sassatavada
2. Ucchedavada

Sassatavada means eternalism, it practices self-mortification – attakilamathanuyoga.

Ucchedavada means Nihilism, it practices self-indulgence – Kamasukhallikanuyoga.

Theory explains what is the nature of the world and practice explains how we conduct according to the theory.

1. Sassatavada believed there were some eternal things in the world. E.g. soul, Atma, Brahma and 7 things like, pathavi (earth), apo (water), tejo (fire), vayo (wind), sukha, dukkha and jiva. So their philosophy is called eternalism. They practice their views and those difficulty activities in order to eternalize their soul in the next life. Most Jainism practices this teaching.
2. Ucchedavada thinks that everything comes to the end with death. There is nothing left after death. Among the six heretics 4 are belonging to this theory, such as Puranakassapa, Makkhaligosala, Ajitakesakambala and Pakudhakaccayana. The teacher of the gods called Brhaspati. It is he who produced the theory of materialism on the heaven. He taught Sura about this theory in order to against Asura, because Asura always against the Gods.
3. According to Buddhism, the Buddha preached in his first sermon, he said that we should avoid above 2 extreme. Foreword, he presented his middle philosophy called Paticcasamuppada. It is also called central philosophy. The middle practice is Majjhimapatipada (middle path). The Buddha says everything is conditioned. So we have to practice in the middle way, according to the Central Philosophy. When He explains the nature of the world, he criticizes the former 2 ideas. Buddhism adopts two methods of ways of explaining the world of experience, one is the method of analysis, and another is the method of synthesis. According to Paticcasamuppada, everything is inter-related and everything is impermanent. He analyses the whole world including the human beings into some elements to show everything is impermanent. Such elements are: 5 aggregates, 12 bases, 18 elements and 4 great elements. If only say the impermanence of the world, it may be easy to fall into the extreme way of Nihilism. So the Buddha uses another method of synthesis to explain how the world and elements come into being again and again. And they continued in the world again and again without stopping. E.g. reborn. This theory of continuity is established through the method of synthesis without involving the eternalism.

The Buddha rejected the theory of Eternalism through the method of analysis and its related practice- self-mortification.

Again the Buddha refused the theory of Nihilism through the method of synthesis and its practice –self-indulgence. He presented the law of cause and effect and explains that everything is Dependent Origination.

In Theravada Abhidhamma, we only talk about the 5 matters:

1. Citta ----- 89 – 121
2. Cetasika --- 52
3. Rupa ----- 28
4. Paccayakaranaya – 24 kinds of relations among the cause and effects.
5. Nibbana ---- 1. This is the middle path.

The Buddha explains the citta, cetasika and rupa by using the method of analysis. When he explains the theory of Paccayakaranaya, he uses the method of synthesis.

Lectured by Pro. G.Sumanapala

20/03/2001

Topic 1. Clarify the ethical basis of the analysis of mind in Abhidhamma.

Topic 2. Define the Abhidhammic concept of citta and clarify the difference between citta and cetasika.

Lecture 1. Historical background of Abhidhamma

Lecture 2. Philosophical contact of Abhidhamma with early Buddhism.

In Abhidhamma we say mostly about 4 great matters:

Citta ( mind)

Cetasika (mental concomitants)

Rupa (matter)

Nibbana

During the time of the Buddha, there were 2 main philosophical groups,

1. Sassatavada
2. Ucchedavada

Sassatavada means eternalism, it practices self-mortification – attakilamathanuyoga.

Ucchedavada means Nihilism, it practices self-indulgence – Kamasukhallikanuyoga.

Theory explains what is the nature of the world and practice explains how we conduct according to the theory.

1. Sassatavada believed there were some eternal things in the world. E.g. soul, Atma, Brahma and 7 things like, pathavi (earth), apo (water), tejo (fire), vayo (wind), sukha, dukkha and jiva. So their philosophy is called eternalism. They practice their views and those difficult activities in order to eternalize their soul in the next life. Most Jainism practices this teaching.
2. Ucchedavada thinks that everything comes to the end with death. There is nothing left after death. Among the six heretics 4 are belonging to this theory, such as Puranakassapa, Makkhaligosa, Ajitakesakambala and Pakudhakaccayana. The teacher of the gods called Brhaspati. It is he who produced the theory of materialism on the heaven. He taught Sura about this theory in order to against Asura, because Asura always against the Gods.
3. According to Buddhism, the Buddha preached in his first sermon, he said that we should avoid above 2 extreme. Foreword, he presented his middle philosophy called Paticcasamuppada. It is also called central philosophy. The middle practice is Majjhimapatipada (middle path). The Buddha says everything is conditioned. So we have to practice in the middle way, according to the Central Philosophy. When He explains the nature of the world, he criticizes the former 2 ideas. Buddhism adopts two methods of ways of explaining the world of experience, one is the method of analysis, and another is the method of synthesis. According to Paticcasamuppada, everything is inter-related and everything is impermanent. He analyses the whole world including the human beings into some elements to show everything is impermanent. Such elements are: 5 aggregates, 12 bases, 18 elements and 4 great elements. If only say the impermanence of the world, it may be easy to fall into the extreme way of Nihilism. So the Buddha uses another method of synthesis to explain how the world and elements come into being again and again. And they continued in the world again and again without stopping. E.g. reborn. This theory of continuity is established through the method of synthesis without involving the eternalism.

The Buddha rejected the theory of Eternalism through the method of analysis and its related practice- self-mortification.

Again the Buddha refused the theory of Nihilism through the method of synthesis and its practice –self-indulgence. He presented the law of cause and effect and explains that everything is Dependent Origination.

In Theravada Abhidhamma, we only talk about the 5 matters:

1. Citta ----- 89 – 121
2. Cetasika --- 52
3. Rupa ----- 28
4. Paccayakaranaya – 24 kinds of relations among the cause and effects.
5. Nibbana ---- 1. This is the middle path.

The Buddha explains the citta, cetasika and rupa by using the method of analysis. When he explains the theory of Paccayakaranaya, he uses the method of synthesis.

666 GIVE AN INTERPRETATION TO “ABHIDHAMMA” AND DISCUSS THE REASON, WHICH LEADS TO ENGAGING IT AS SEPARATE TIPITAKA?

The Pali term Abhidhamma is composed of Abhi Dhamma. The prefix “Abhi” is used in the sense of great, excellent, ultimate etc. so the Abhidhamma means great, excellent, marvelous doctrine or teaching of the enlightened one and is a teaching which makes the correct knowledge about the beings and the world in detail more explicitly than Sutta. Thus it is the higher Doctrine

The analysis of phenomena into Citta, Cetasika, Rupa and Nibbana in Theravada is not accepted by all traditions as some teachers presented have various arguments. Therefore, Theravadins were identified as Vibhajja vadins. For instance, Sarvastivadins did not believe Theravada Abhidhamma and the them seven Abhidhamm Books presented in Sanskrit language. And Sautrantikas also rejected Abhidhamma teaching. Therefore, some traditions did not discuss Abhidhamma Pitaka but they believed the Sutta Pitaka as their own doctrine.

When we discuss about Abhidhamma tradition the Theravada Abhidhamma is in Pali. It also is the oldest Abhidhammic literature because the Theravada tradition is the oldest in Buddhist history. The other Abhidhamma traditions developed their Abhidhamma literature after forming their schools separately. The next important is though the Theravada teaches the four Paramattha Dhammas and only one Asankhata Dhamma the Sarvastivada accepts a new category of Dhamma called Citta Viprayutta Dhamma and increased Asankhata Dhamma into three Pratisankhya Nirodha, Apratisankhya Nirodha and Akasa. All together they believed seventy-five Dhammas. Whereas the Theravadins accepted 82.

Another important, Abhidhamma literature is named as Sriputta Abhidhamma now available in Chinese language only but not certain whether it belongs to Mahasanghika, Sammitiya or Dhammavutka schools as all three sects have Abhidhamma literatures. According to inscription, the Mahasanghika rejected Theravada Abhidhamma. They had also Matika Pitaka, it is said “the sub-schools of Mahasanghika, Gokulika etc. developed Abhidhamma”. Further, the Sautrantika rejected and tried to solve Abhidhamma problem but according to the sutta, we have to accept that they also followed the Abhidhamma to some extent and Vasubhandu who wrote Abhidharmakosha for Sarvastivadins also accepted the Sautrantika Dhamma theory.

Beside that Yogacara School has discussed about Abhidhamma and accepted a hundred Dhammas. Therefore, the Theravada Abhidhamma is considered as the oldest, complete and original Abhidhamma literature but the other Abhidhamma schools derived from Theravada and they analyzed the Dhamma according to their own traditional belief.

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666 GIVE AN INTERPRETATION TO “ABHIDHAMMA” AND DISCUSS THE REASON, WHICH LEADS TO ENGAGING IT AS SEPARATE TIPITAKA?

The Pali term Abhidhamma is composed of Abhi, which are collectively known as Dhamma the doctrine or the teaching of

the blessed one. Dhamma is the teaching that can purify the mind from defilement; attachment and craving etc. and can achieve the lasting peace and happiness. And the prefix “Abhi” is used in the sense of great, excellent, ultimate etc. so the Abhidhamma means great, excellent, marvelous doctrine or teaching of the enlightened one and is a teaching which makes the correct knowledge about the beings and the world in detail more explicitly than Sutta.

By dividing into Citta, Cetasika, Rupa and Nibbana of analytical system in Theravada is not accepted by all traditions as some teachers they have various arguments. Therefore, Theravadins were identified as Vibhajja vadins. For instance, Sarvastivadins they did not believe Theravada Abhidhamma and the other seven Abhidhamm Books presented in Sanskrit language. And Sautrantikas also rejected Abhidhamma teaching therefore, some traditions they did not discuss Abhidhamma Pitaka but they believed the Sutta Pitaka as their own doctrine.

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## 666 EXPLAIN THE PHILOSOPHICAL BASIS OF THE THERAVADA ABHIDHAMMA. (931) – 71

Buddhism as a religion or as a science is unique in the importance attached to philosophy and metaphysical inquiry. As such it is often regarded as the most advanced of the philosophic system in India.

In Theravada Buddhism, the Abhidhamma constitutes the results of an inquiry into the nature of human experience, both sensory and extra-sensory. Since the results are stated and interpreted in terms of language and logic, it allows the Abhidhamma the justification to be considered as philosophy. The function of philosophy, if the latter is to be practically useful and ethically edifying, is not to indulge in speculative cogitation or mere intellection but to understand nature. This understanding cannot be obtained or developed without reference to the observation of the world within and around us in the way it actually functions. The principles that govern nature are not made available to sense perception directly except through instances and illustration in one’s daily experience, such as seeing falling mangoes and decaying bodies. They can be discovered only through the philosophic methods of analysis and synthesis. In this regard the Abhidhamma can be introduced as a critical and descriptive philosophy.

During the time of the Buddha almost all religions belief in some sort of soul or self which is permanent, eternal and substantial. In order to make clear the point, Buddha set forth the theory of non-self in Buddhism. Thus, in the teaching of the Buddha, two methods of analysis and synthesis are employed to reject

in view of Eternalism and Nihilism.

**(1) The Analytical method**

Early Buddhism divided an individual composed of nama and rupa. Here the rupa is physical material of earth, water, heat and air; and nama includes the sensation, perception, mental formation and consciousness. These 5 constituents are called the 5 aggregates which are impermanent, all constantly changing. Therefore, what we call a 'being' or 'I' is only a convenient name or level given to the combination of these 5 groups. There is nothing behind them that can be called a permanent soul or atman. In the teaching of Abhidhamma, an individual is analyzed into three main categories as citta, cetasika and rupa. This analysis is based on the early Buddhism conception of 5 aggregates. Among the five aggregates, rupa is analyzed into 28 rupa; feeling, perception and mental formation are analyzed into 52 cetasika. Consciousness (citta) has 89 or 121 sub-derivations.

1. Rupakkhandha – 28 rupa
  2. Vedanakkhandha
  3. Sabbakkhandha
  4. Savkharakkhandha
  5. Vibbanakkhandha – 89 or 121 citta
- } 52 cetasika

**(2) The Synthetical method**

One's individual is the combination of the 5 aggregates and it is produced through causal processes, just as a seed grows because of conditions in the soil. Thus, with the explanation of the existing of the being, 12 factors of paticcasamuppada are formulated. They are:

1. avijja
2. sankhara
3. vibbana
4. namarupaj
5. salayatanaj
6. phassa
7. vedana
8. tanha
9. upadana
10. bhava
11. jati
12. jara-marana

Each of these factors is conditioned by others as well as conditioning others, they are all relative, interdependent and interconnected, and nothing is absolute or independent, hence no first cause or the only cause is accepted. Thereby the eternal soul is rejected.

According to the teaching of Abhidhamma, the compendium of conditionally is twofold, i.e., the method of dependent arising and the method of conditional relations. The first method is explained as the 12 factors in early teachings, the second method are set forth in the Patthana, the last part of the Abhidhamma Pitaka. In contrast to the method of dependent arising, which deals only with the conditioning states and conditioned states and the structure of their arising, the method of Patthana also deals with the conditioning forces (paccayasatti). Therefore, the early Buddhist teaching of dependent origination has been explained as 24 causal relations in the Abhidhamma. They are:

- |                                 |       |
|---------------------------------|-------|
| 1. Root condition               | 因緣    |
| 2. Object condition             | 所緣緣   |
| 3. Predominance condition       | 增上緣   |
| 4. Proximity condition          | 無間緣   |
| 5. Contiguity condition         | 等無間緣  |
| 6. Conascence condition         | 俱生緣   |
| 7. Mutuality condition          | 相互緣   |
| 8. Support condition            | 依止緣   |
| 9. Decisive support condition   | 親依止緣  |
| 10. Prenascence condition       | 前生緣   |
| 11. Postnascence condition      | 後生緣   |
| 12. Repetition condition        | 數數修習緣 |
| 13. Kamma condition             | 業緣    |
| 14. Result condition            | 異熟緣   |
| 15. Nutriment condition         | 食緣    |
| 16. Faculty condition           | 根緣    |
| 17. Jhana condition             | 禪緣    |
| 18. Path condition              | 道緣    |
| 19. Association condition       | 相應緣   |
| 20. Dissociation condition      | 不相應緣  |
| 21. Presence condition          | 有緣    |
| 22. Absence condition           | 無有緣   |
| 23. Disappearance condition     | 離去緣   |
| 24. Non-disappearance condition | 不離去緣  |

The final goal of Buddhism is explained under the topic of Nibbana. In early Buddhist teaching, the attainment of the final goal is explained by walking the Middle path or Eightfold path, and one can end of suffering (dukkha). In the teaching of Abhidhamma, the Buddhist path has been introduced by practicing two

methods of concentration (samadhi) and insight (vipassana). The path, therefore, occupies a very important and prominent place within Buddhist thought. In Buddhism, the path leads from samsara to nibbana has been split up into four sections counted as four paths, i.e., sotapatti, sakadagami, anagami and arahant.

The Abhidhamma is therefore, to a deep thinker, the most important and interesting, as it contains the profound philosophy of the Buddha's teaching in contrast to the illumination but simpler discourses in the Sutta Pitaka. In its most characteristic parts it is a system of classification, analytical enumeration and definition, with no discursive treatment of the subject matter.

Thus, Abhidhamma is the totality of the philosophical teachings of Buddhism. Without a knowledge of the Abhidhamma, the nature and development of Buddhism must ever remain wanting in clearness. 'Things as they really are' is the subject dealt with in the Abhidhamma. By studying the Abhidhamma and turning these studying into personal experience by meditation, we can reach the liberation knowledge that gives 'peace'.

#### 666\* EARLY HISTORY OF THE SPREAD BUDDHISM AND BUDDHIST SCHOOLS

\* Evolution of the schools of Buddhism

Prof: -Elukewala Dhammaratana thera

Noted by Ven. Oeu Sam Ath

The origins of the various story was developed of the t6ime of the Buddha after the Buddha's death there was non who was able to take this place there were high learned followers must of them and cam e from Brahmana families. They knew the Brahmanic philosophy and there were learned members of various religious orders like as the **Jatilas, Jainas, Ajibakasl**. They could not remind with current interpretation of the teachings of the Buddha. They have paid their attention of the specific world of the teachers (Buddha). The leading Buddhist teachers were enable to explain therefore this Buddhist teachers took arguments from the teaching of the Buddha. But all to them agreed with this prepositions.

1-All is momentary (Sarvam Kshanikam)

2- All is suffering (Sarvam Dukkham)

By the time, there arise different opinions both Dhamma and Vinaya with those three agreements. The formations of Buddhist schools most namely to the following factors.

1-The supreme headship of Buddhism of the Buddha's death.

2-**The Gopaka Moggallana sutta (MN)** explains that Dhamma and Vinay will be the support in the sutta venerable Ananda answered the question asked by **Vasska Brahmana**. He asks is thee even one who was designated by the Buddha as your support **Mahaparinibbana sutta in (D.N)**. Buddha has mentioned that Dhamma and Vinaya will be your teacher after my Parinibban. According to the **Samagama sutta of (M.N)** the disagreement arouse in the Jaina community just after the death **Nigantanathaputta**.

Yuan Chwang notices the on auspicious day the Abhidhammika's worshiped Sariputta, the Samadhists worshiped Moggallana and so on. The principles point of resemblance between the follow3ers and their preceptors have given and there were the points for the distinctions among them without any doctrinal differences, it gave right to the full-fledged schools.

According to the school of **Sarvastivadins** derived from Sariputta it was the origina division of abhidhammikas. The **Sthaviravadins**

belongs to Upali, Mahasngikas belongs to **Mahakassapa** and **Sammitiya** belongs to **Mahakaccayana**.

**This** is confirmed that the origin of schools dates back as earlier the first council. These separated groups developed into separate religious schools of Buddhism. Vinayadharas has developed as Theravadins, the Sauttrantikas had developed as Sauttrantikas but all the divisions mentioned about are not developed into religious schools.

As an ascetic, Buddha laid down severe austerities for a few years which could never fulfill his mission in this way austerities crept into Buddhism in early times and the adoption of these led to the formation of schools. The schools of rules of Buddhism that adapted the rituals natural ... apart from other religions. These factors have been generalized during the three and half centuries after the Buddha's death.

When disputes arise among the disciples, the Lord Buddha sent favorite disciples Ananda, Sariputta and Moggallana who settle those disputes. Buddha was of the opinion that the wicked and selfish Bhikkhus introduced new principles to the Dhamma and Vinaya. Every quarrel or difference of opinions among the Bhikkhus was not characterized by the Buddha as Sanghaveda during the Buddha's lifetime. Dissentions of minor character took place in the Buddhist Sangha only two of them attracted his attention. They are called Sanghaveda which is heinous crime. The first dissention was in Kosambi between two monks among **Dhammakatthika and Vinayadhara**. The next dissention was with Devadatta who requested more austere discipline.

Within the period of Buddha's ministry various discourses were already at work for the formation of schools. Therefore, it can well be imagined that in the actions of the great teachers, the monastic order had to give way to the growth of as many as twenty schools or more.

## **2<sup>nd</sup> The early Buddhist teaching and the evolution of Abhidhamma**

Discourses found in the Suttapitaka have namely been classified according to the eternal teacher. When taken as a whole the discourses are given in a conventional form of language though some of them can be considered purely doctrinal and philosophical. The reason for this diversity of the discourses is that they were delivered on different occasions for various purposes on the nature of the audience.

The above mentioned complicated nature of the discourses creates difficulty in understanding them through sense discourse even during the time of the Buddha. A monk called Sati held the view that the consciousness transmigrates from existence to existence. And a carpenter called Pacakanga held the view that there are only two kinds of feelings as to the teachings of the Buddha against the view held by the monk Udaya. The view of the monk is that there are only three kinds of feeling in Buddhist teachings. That is mentioned in Bahuvédaniya Sutta of the Majjhima Nikaya.

At the late period as recorded in **Kathavattupprakarana** misinterpretation of the discourses was a prominent case among the various Buddhist sects. For example some interpreted the term "**Puggala person**" in the discourses as representing an agent out of the five aggregates which transmigrates from existence to existence. The emergence of various Buddhist schools was mainly due to the different interpretations of the Buddha's teachings.

The interpretation of the Buddha's discourses has been a point of controversy since the time of the Buddha. The evolution of Abhidhamma as a separate canon should be identified as a result of the gradual development of the discourses and search of a methodology for accurate interpretations of the Buddha's teachings. The process of Abhidhamma can be basically explained under three headings.

**1-As a process of systematization of the Buddha's teachings.**

2-As a process of searching for a reliable basis for the human factors,

responsibility and rebirth.

3. As a process of searching for a methodology for accurately interpreting the early Buddhist discourses.

The different Buddhist sects interpreted the teachings of the Buddha in various place. These various interpretations and theories are recorded in the **Katavattupprakarana** the seven books of the Abhidhamma.

The definition arises and interpretations of the doctrinal facts by the various Buddhist sects were different from each other. The Katavattupprakarana was compiled by venerable Moggaliputtatissa in order to establish Theravada point of view regarding such controversial points. Further there was no unanimity among the Buddhist sects regarding the number of doctrinal aspects so far collected on classified in a course of time. The collections, classifications and definitions of different sects were preserved as separate canonical texts. And they were introduced by a new term called Abhidhamma. The Sutta and Vinaya are very similar to a certain extent but Abhidhamma collections are very different of each other. It is proved that the Abhidhamma came into beings as process of interpretations of the early Buddhist teaching by different Buddhist sects.

### 666 POINT OUT REASON FOR THE EMERGENT FOR THE VARIOUS VIEWS ON BUDDHA-DHAMMA?

All three councils indicate this aspect of memorization with great effect.

Later it became the way that Buddhist education continue whenever necessary there was discussion but the future generation held by memory .the elder Thera were keen to all the first Buddhist council as there were no chief disciple such as Sariputta, Mogalan or any other Bhikkhuni, they had already passed away. The union of the recently ordained community undoubtedly raised down in the senior monks.

The Tibetan Dulva records the passing away of about one lakh fifty thousand senior Bhikkhus and Bhikkhunis even before the passing away of Buddha; this incident was also one reason for emergent of unorganized view concerning the Buddha-Dhamma.

Individual discipline to be practiced by the realization of the Dhamma was held appreciate then following a leader .this idea was expressed by the Buddha even at the last moment (yovo anandamaya dhammo ca vinayo ca tesito pannatto sova mamaccayena sattha).here clearly the Buddha rejects a personalized leader. It is evident in the very character of the Buddha that one needs to behavior for one own sake. The adverse result of a personalized leader was seen in the time of the Buddha which created some problems in Buddhasana and which cause eruption of personal view.

At that time Nigandhaputta passed away at Bava, the Nigandha that were divided that after his death, used abusive language against each other in disagreement (you do not dhamma and discipline) it is me who knows, it is obvious that the Buddha understood such situation to avoid such as calamity among discipline after his passing away proclaim the four great Apadesas (criterion), (1) one must not accept merely because he heard from the Buddha himself but do accept it if agree with the dhamma and vinaya. (2) do not accept merely because it was heard from the Sangha. (3) do not accept merely because scholar says. (4) do not accept merely because a scholarly monks said.

The situation in the Jain community is seen in a great disappointment due to disagreement the ordain community even the lay community became divided through the lap of direction should be given by elderly monks. At the same time without having the opportunity and skill and necessary understanding to realize the meaning of some terms include in Suttapitaka and Vinayapitaka was also one reason to point out some personalized idea of the relevant scholastic monks, as an Ex. There were Nithadesana which means the meaning and concept include in some terms were not clear when they were not clear some monks interpret them according to their personalize idea which pave the way create variety of view on that personalized idea.

### THE EMERGENT OF NEW SCHOOL, THERAVADA AND MAHAYANA.

After the second Buddhist council held in favor of orthodox monks (clinging traditional teaching). Vajjians were expelled from Sangha community, the monk who oppose orthodox view held another council which approximately ten thousands monks participated, they were named as Mahasanghika, and they taught conformity that their decision was more orthodoxy than Theravadin. In the course of time these two sects caused formation of several schools, eleven sub sects were connected with Theravadin and seven out of Mahasanghika. This development to place within three or four hundred years after the demise of the Buddha

#### Theravadin

According their main characteristic, they seem orthodoxy which means that they did not like to change the basic teaching of the Buddha they wanted to analyze the basic teaching of the Buddha in Abhidhamma philosophy Pali literature include commentary, sub commentary and Pakarana text belong to them. The doctrinal matter included in commentary and sub commentary were not agreed with those of early Buddhist teaching absolutely but the inclusion of this latter additional text ease the understanding as analytical method. At the same time the analysis included in Vishudhimagga and some other scriptures led the emergent various

interpretations connected with Buddh-dhamma.

In addition to doctrinal matter some Theravadin wanted to examine the personalise of the Buddha which pave the way to add new idea Buddhavamsa and Cariyapitaka are included about the superficial characteristic pertaining Buddha life the Buddha as the human being depict human quality but he posses super human quality also.

The teaching of Theravadin it is clear that they wanted to clarify Buddha teaching following simple method as an example always they wanted to interpret how to follow, Sila, Samadhi and Panna in order to describe this matter. Ven. Buddhaghosa compiles vishudhimagga to analyze the verse, silepattathayya sarosa panno which is including Samyuttanikaya. Although Buddhaghosa composes vishudhimagga there were some contradictory ideas when compare with early Buddhism as an example when we analyse the difference between Bhava and Jati and law of causation. There are various views among this scholar.

Anyway vishudhimagga is very popular book among the Theravada Buddhism.

The council of Pataliputta the teaching of this school was Pali source to be those of Vibhajjavada School. The psycho-ethical philosophy of this school is

AbhidhammaSangaha written by Anuthacariya, this psycho-physical formation into four folds, grouped as Citta mind, Cetasika mental property, Rupa material quality and Nibbana. Anyway regarding the four fold division of Abhidhamma when compared with early Buddhism, Citta, Cetasika and Rupa can not be understood as reality because they are also changeable.

\*There are different approaches to the Buddha's elucidation of fact. Such as Anardesana, Vohadesana, Paramatthadesana Vinaya, convention (Samuti) Absolute (Paraamatta) respectively. Also there are two methods as Neyyatadesana (the meaning could be understood through interpretation) and Nitatthadesana (the meaning already have been given. Furthermore Neyyatta meaning those expositions that conducts toward elucidation. Nitattha means those that elucidated critic believe that these two methods have been taken one for the other and the different sects arose as the result all 18 sects admitted the diversity of the absolute Dhamma they differ from each other.

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## 666 HISTORY OF INDIAN BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY

According to the different teaching of various Buddhist sects in India it is possible to divide them into three main divisions as, (1) absolute (2) relative (3) consciousness.

The history of arising of various sects can be traced to about 483 B.C if we consider beginning to be from the date of passing away of the Buddha in 543 B.C there could be a problem. Hence the exact date could be considered after the first break away by Mahasangika in 380 B.C. the first 18 sects that aroused were similar to the extent that they all rejected the permanent soul. Create God etc. The Mahasangika aroused hundred years after the passing away in 483 B.C with the second Buddhist council though it is accepted that the division arouse due to Vinaya question, it can be said that Dhamma itself was really the cause, but they are described as those against Vinaya by Theravadin it must be admitted that this is not soul because Mahasangika are known to protect 100 rules more than Theravadin the ten points of Vinaya controversy are mentioned in Chinese text therefore we may surmise that different sects arose not due to Vinaya but due to Dhamma.

100 years after the arising of Mahasangika 18 different sects arose in 283 B.C the text Kathavathupakarana is an important source book which mentions the presence of the individual self of Samitia sect (puggala uppalopati saccikatena paramathenati) this view was criticized by other Buddhist sects. This view was known as Puggalavada which was regarded as that there was individual transmigration from birth to birth Mahayana arose in first century A.D. the Madhyamika tradition arose in second century A.D under the famous master such as Nagajuna, Aredeva, Sangadeva and some other scholars.

By the 4 century A.D the Vijñnavada of Yogacara arose. At the beginning of the Madhyamika and Yogacara were one and the same. Maitrinatha, Asanga and Vashupandu were the first teachers of Madhyamika philosophy. These 18 sects were presented even in the 7 century is evident in Yuan chuan recorded. He described that the large number of adherence were of Puggala Vada in India at that time.

After the arising of Mahayana tradition all these sects along side, Sarasavadin gave right to Sautrantika and Vaippasrika tradition Madhyamika taught the doctrine of voidness (Sunyata), according to them there is no existence apart from condition relative (sapesakatavada) the Yogacara philosophers maintain that all lives and living is a mentality or mind only (Ciitamatrika). There is no external world, physical world all that exist is only a mental concept the Yogacara and Madhyamika tradition prove parallel till the 7<sup>th</sup> and 8<sup>th</sup> century Tantrayana arose in 8<sup>th</sup> and 9<sup>th</sup> century. Their theory depicts mysteries meaning.

The traditional text show that the various sects arose due to Vinaya disagreement also they say that greedy self seeking. Thinkers of wrong views were instrumental in bringing dissention and sectarianism there is no evidence to prove that their reason are valid the Mahasangika themselves admitted that the ten points of controversy are unethical and against Vinaya, and it is mentioned in their text. It is therefore evidence that these ten points of controversy were not the reason for the arising of sects. Then what is the reason? It is possible to say that the reason lies with the Dhamma according to this variety views they can be categorized as follow:

(1) Mahasangika-transcendental (Bhuddho logy).(2) Sarastivada; existence of phenomena(dhamma in the past present in the future time).(3) Sammithiya; individuality of existence of a self.(4) Sautrantika; acceptance of only Sutra as the source of knowledge. (5)Vibhasika; acceptance of only absolute dhamma(Asangata Dhamma)(6) Madhyamika; acceptance of relativity and conditionality. (7) Yogacara Vinnavada; acceptance of mental phenomena only. All these sects could be described as Buddhist sects because they all have in common the basic teaching such as the rejection of a created god and impermanent of the soul. It could be said that these different sects arose due to the opinion held about absolute realists of existence there is no clear exposition in the Buddha exposition regarding the absolute. What is mentioned is only that all phenomena arise and passed away(Udayappiya) therefore many doubt arose,(1) do phenomena have a quality or special feature.(2) can dhamma has a quality or special feature?(3) how the conditionality or causality interact among Dhamma?(4) what is the life spent of dhamma? These sorts of question appear in Buddha's exposition and each of the teacher advanced theories according his knowledge and understanding to resolve them. Thus we see the cause for the arising of sect as an attempt to interpret the Buddha teaching. According to Theravada source and Mahayana source we can understand that most of the controversy idea erupted because of the various exposition of Dhamma. Tibetan and Chinese source (agama literature reveal much about this controversy.

## 666HISTORY OF BUDDHIST THOUGHT

There are different approaches to the Buddha's elucidation of fact. Such as Anardesana,Vohadesana,Paramatthadesana Vinaya, convention (Samuti) Absolute(Paraamattha) respectively. Also there are two methods as Neyyatadesana( the meaning could be understood through interpretation) and Nitatthadesana( the meaning already have been given. Furthermore Neyyatta meaning those expositions that conducts toward elucidation. Nitattha means those that elucidated critic believe that these two methods have been taken one for the other and the different sects arose as the result all 18 sects admitted the diversity of the absolute Dhamma they differ from each other according to the number of these differences. Therefore critic all the eras of reality philosopher all its era of universality of differentiation Mahayanist argue the Theravadin as uphold of from view they argue that since all phenomena are impermanent and causally arisen the absolute has no existence of its own and can not be described as entity thus they see the contradiction in the Theravada. This universal differentiation of Dhamma was a controversy that continues for more than 500 years. At the end of that era their arose the era of concept of relativity and conditionality of the phenomena ( Sabbekataavada and Dhammavada) these two continue for even 500 years. They based their argument on the logic of causality(Padicasamuppada) they argue if something as the relative existence (depending each other) it can not be regarded as having and independent existence of each own and they prove logically that all is avoided subsequent to this view, came the Vinnavadin. It is a philosophical aspect of Mahayana. Those that accepted the Dhamma said that only absolute Dhamma exist Madhyamika said that even absolute Dhamma did not exist and therefore all his voice they concluded that only mind exist and reject all the other Dhamma. They may use some discourse of the Buddha to prove this theory, thus we can analyze in brief some stage in development of the Buddhist thought. An important thus has been accomplished by the first school as known as Theravadin after the Buddha passing away. The second council was held by the king Kalasoka and third during Dhammasokka and the fourth council was held by king Kanaskal it is accepted that the first three councils were held by Theravadin and fourth was held by Mahayanist this council that were held in India are essential for edification of the students of history of Buddhism. All the events that result various philosophical ideas are very important concerning the Buddhist thought because Buddha did not appoint a teacher as the religious leader after his passing away. There is no evident to prove that there is a record all the teaching and Vinaya rule that the Buddha proclaimed through out 45 years of its ministration. There is also no evident to prove that there is no organize system of compilation of Sutta and Vinaya during his life time. There are no separate sections such as Sutta, Vinaya and Abhidhamma mention. The popular method among Brahman was recitation and memorization. This was the method that was adopted.

### THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF *ABHIDHAMMA* TRADITION (ORIGINAL BY VEN. SUVANNY)

The origin and development of the *Abhidhamma* extended over a considerable period of gradual and systematic historical evolution. The traditional claim, shared alike by the *Theravādins* and the *Sarvāstivādins* ascribed the *Abhidhamma*, both in regard to its historical origin as well as in regard to its literary form, to **the Buddha** himself. The *Aṭṭhasalīni* of the *Theravādins*, which describes **the Buddha** as the first *Abhidhammika*, goes to the length of claiming that the seven treatises of the *Abhidhamma Piṭaka* were themselves uttered by **the Buddha**.

According to them, the *Abhidhamma* was inspired by the earnest aspiration for enlightenment, matured through five hundred and fifty births, realized by **Buddha** at the foot of the *Bodhi* tree, in the month of *Vesākha*. It was reflected upon by the omniscient **Buddha** while he was on the seat of enlightenment during his

weeks stay at the Jewelled Mansion. It was taught in heaven, that is in the Realm of the Thirty-Three Gods. It was received by the gods and it was studied by the venerable seekers after perfection as well as by the virtuous worldly folk.

It is the word of **the Buddha** and it has been handed down by the succession of teachers and their pupils. Through **Sāriputta** it has been successively handed down by **Bhaddaji, Sobhita, Moggaliputta, Revata** and others up to the time of the Third Council and thereafter by their pupils. Through the traditional succession in India it was brought to the island of Ceylon by **Mahinda**. It is generally accepted that the *Abhidhamma* originated and developed out of the *Dhamma*. The term *Dhamma* in its normative aspect bears the widest meaning and comprises the entire teaching of doctrine. The *Dhamma* was capable of being understood and grasped only by the wise especially because of the fact that the greater part of the *Dhamma* was taught in a free style. The rich and varied contents of the *suttas* as the word of **the Buddha** gradually grew into a religion and philosophy professed by an increasing number of people.

The richness of the philosophical content of **the Buddha's** discourses allowed the possibility of divergence of opinion even among the Buddhist monks themselves. That this was actually so is indicated by the early history of the emergence of the Buddhist schools. This process was probably accelerated after the council of Vesālī, which was exclusively devoted to the discussion of ten points of monastic discipline. It was at the council of Pātaliputta, during **Asoka's** reign, that controversial points were settled and incorporated in the canonical texts under the name *Kathāvatthupparāna*. The differences came to be more exaggerated when each school held its own closed sessions to decide the import of the doctrine. The earlier life of settled monasticism and the life of leisure thus secured induced the monks to engage themselves in philosophical and literary pursuits and the geographical isolation of the monasteries resulted in the growth of independent schools of thought.

This explains at once many of the disparities between the various schools in regard to the *Abhidhamma*. In view of the differences among the schools on the subject of the *Abhidhamma* each felt the need for the compilation of a separate *piṭaka* for the special and elaborated doctrine. Even from the point of view of literature, we see the contrast between the *Dhamma* and *Abhidhamma*. We can therefore say that while the *Dhamma* belongs to the period of undivided Buddhism of the earliest days, the *Abhidhamma* belongs to the period of divided Buddhism. From its very inception and throughout the medieval and modern periods, the *Abhidhamma* evolved and developed in the isolation of the separate schools.

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The early Buddhist discourses were delivered for the sake of different characters on different occasions. They are not interconnected as a systematic philosophy. The problems that arose in regard to their definition and internal coherent 連貫的 were solve by the Buddha and its leading disciples at that time. After the Buddha passing away, the perpetuation 永存,不朽 of the doctrine was the most important task that fell into the hands of disciples because the Buddha had clearly expressed that the Dhamma and Vinaya could be the leader of the Order after his demise. Taking these instructions into consideration the Ven. Mahakassapa and other leading disciples determined to hold the first council where they could collect almost all the discourses delivered by the Buddha.

The collection of the discourses initiate the scholastic approach to Buddhist philosophy on cause of time not only the collection but also classification of the discourses took places. Thus collection and classification had been a very important task during the period of first and the second Buddhist councils. The third step of the processes of preserving early Buddhism was to derive the main philosophical aspects from the discourses. The

discourses had been delivered in the common form of language including in them the concept of persons and places, narratives and other form of communication. Because of this nature of language embodied in the discourses they could be interpreted in various ways. The leading disciples understood the danger of such a form of language for the possibility of misinterpreting the discourses. For this reason they made an attempt to abstract the doctrinal aspects from the discourses and composed new sutta which are called Dhamma sutta (the discourses of Dhamma). They included only the doctrines such as five aggregates, twelve bases and eighteen elements listed in technical terms without common interpretation. This Dhamma sutta could be found in the Pali canon itself. The Savgiti Sutta and the Dasuttara Sutta of the Digha Nikaya are but only two clear examples of these. The Savgiti Sutta lists the doctrine of the discourses in a numerical order as follows:

1. The teaching including one doctrine: e.g., Sabbe satta aharatthitika – all beings depend on cause.
2. Two doctrines: namarupa (name and form); avijjabhavatanha (ignorance and craving).
3. Three doctrines: lobha, dosa, moha (greed, hatred, ignorance); alobha, adosa, amoha (non-greed, non-hatred, non-illusion)
4. Four doctrines:
  2. Kayanupassana – contemplation on body
  3. Vedanapassana – contemplation on feeling
  4. Cittampassana – contemplation on consciousness
  5. Dhammapassana – contemplation on doctrine.
5. Five doctrines: Rupa, Vedana, Sabba, Savkhara, Vibbana

Thus Sangiti Sutta presents various lists of the doctrine in the numerical order as follows:

Number of doctrines	Number of sets of doctrines
1	2
2	30
3	60
4	37
5	23
6	11
7	9
8	10
9	6
10	5

When taken as a whole the Sangiti Sutta itself gives a list of about 818 doctrines. The Dasuttara Sutta also includes similarly of doctrines. It is important to know that is two discourses were been delivered by the Buddha disciples after the passing away of the Jain leader, Nigantha Nathaputta, his disciples has disputed among them regarding the teaching of their leader. The Ven. Ananda considering this incident asked the Buddha about the steps that should be taken in the same situation occurs after the Buddha passing away. Following the Buddha's advised Ven. Sariputta delivered this Sangiti Sutta in order to present such dispute among the disciples. This is further confirmed by the recurrent statement of the Sangiti Sutta after each and every lists of doctrines that "all should not make discourse on these sets of doctrines". After composing of a number of Dhamma Sutta there arose a necessity defining and explain those listed of doctrines. If for this purpose the common usage of language is used once again therefore could arose different views and interpretation. Therefore the leading disciples made used of a highly technical form of language to define and explain those doctrines. By the third of Buddhist council, there had been a considerable amount of such

definition and explanation supplied to those Dhamma Suttas. This new literature were different in style from the discourses. Therefore by the adding prefix 'Abhi' to the term 'Dhamma', it was introduced as 'Abhidhamma'. The Ven. Moggaliputta Tissa added Kathavatthupparakana to this literature at the 3<sup>rd</sup> council and finalize Theravadin canon of Abhidhamma which consists of seven texts are as follows:

1. Dhammasangani
2. Vibhavga
3. Dhatukatha
4. Puggala-pabbatti
5. Kathavatthu
6. Yamaka
7. Patthana

- Paramattha defines in Abhidhamma commentary in this term 'Paramo uttamo aviparito attho, paramassa va uttamassa banassa attho gocaroti paramattho. – the four realities become the object of highest knowledge.
- The Abhidhamma analysis five aggregates to the first three realities.

	<u>Theravada</u>	<u>Sarvastivada</u>	<u>Sautrantika</u>	
Citta	89/121		1	rupa – 8
Cetasika	52		46	vedana – 3
Rupa	28	11		sabba – 6
	cittaviprayuktasamkara 14 (non-mental non-material elements)		Savkhara – 20	Vibbana – 6

#### 666SOURCES OF ABHIDHAMMA10/10/97

Here we proposed to introduce in brief the most important original sources of Abhidhamma both in Pali and Sanskrit traditions. The Theravada sources of Abhidhamma are compiled in Pali and printed in many characters, such as Sinhalese Devanagari, Burmese and Siamese. The Theravada canon of Abhidhamma consists of seven texts:

- (1) Dhammasavgaṇi – Specification or Enumeration of phenomena.  
It has 4 sections: cittuppada, rupa, nikkepa and attakatha. Among them, citta and rupa sections analyse mental and material phenomena respectively and the other two sections point out the main doctrines related to a specific terms such as 'wholesome things' etc.
- (2) Vibhavga – The Book of Treatises. It has 18 analysis, such as aggregates, bases, elements, truths and sense
- (3) Dhatukatha – Discussion with the reference to the elements. It explains the five aggregates in various ways, pointing out their connection with the bases, elements etc.
- (4) Puggala-pabbatti – Discription of Individuals. It has 6 sections, dealing with the concept of aggregates, bases, elements, truths, senses and individual. The book is named after the last item because except for the concept of individuals, the other concepts have already been dealt with in the other texts of the Abhidhamma. Here only the concept of individual dealt with in detail. In a given language all kinds of terms referring to realities or concepts come under the category of pabbatti.
- (5) Kathavatthu – Points of Controversy. Which is the only text of the canon ascribed to a disciple. Content 210 controversies connected with the Theravada as well as the other schools of Buddhism such as Puggalavada,

Sabbathivada and Suttantika. The subject matter of this controversy generally belonged to both the philosophical and religious aspects of Buddhism.

(6) Yamaka – Book of pair. In the form of questions and answers dealt with the same subjects such as aggregates, bases and elements pointing out their interconnection. It includes pairs of questions.

(7) Patthana – The Book of Origination. It explains the various ways of religions that exist among the facts of phenomena.

Now, it should be clear that the Dhammasangani, Vibhanga, kathavatthu, Puggala-pabbatti and Yamaka generally deal with the analysis of phenomena, and the Patthana deals with synthesis.

The most important sources are the Pali commentaries and sub-commentaries written in Sri Lanka and Burma. Almost all the Pali commentaries explain the early Buddhist discourses on an Abhidhammic basis. For example, the Visuddhimagga written as a common commentary on the four Nikayas or agamas presents Abhidhammic basic of phenomena and noumenon 本體, 實體 under the topics Samadhi and Pabba.

There are three commentaries written on the canon of Abhidhamma, i.e., the Atthasalini, Sammohavinodani and Pabcapakaranatthakatha. Among them the first text is important as it supplies the detail introduction to the evolution of the Abhidhamma.

There are two kinds of sub-commentaries in Pali literature. One written in the commentaries and the other on Abhidhammic compendiums. As far as the evolution of the Theravada Abhidhamma is concerned, the sub-commentaries of the compendium are more important than the other sources. In the mediaeval period the Theravada Abhidhamma came to be presented in a series of compendium called Sanghaganthas. They differ from the commentary and sub-commentary as they could be understood without references to another texts. According to Burmese tradition, they are 9 such texts known as ‘Little fingers manuals’. They are as follows (reference available in Encyclopaedia of Buddhism I, I, p. 79):

1. Abhidhammavataara – 入阿毘達磨論 Vikasinitika – by Buddhadatta
2. Rупarupanibhaga – 色非色分別論 – by Buddhadatta
3. Namarupasamasa (khema-pakarana) – 名色抄論 – by Anurudha
4. Abhidhammasavgha – 攝阿毘達磨義論 Savkhepanannana, Vibhavitika.
5. Paramatthavinicchaya – 第一義抉擇論 – by Anurudha
6. Namarupapariccheda – 名色差別論 – by Anurudha
7. Saccasavkhepa – 諦要略論 – by Dhammapala
8. Namacaradipaka – 名行燈論 – by Saddhammajotipala (Burmese monk)
9. Mohavicchedani – 斷癡論 by Kassapa (Sinhalese monk)

Among the sub-commentaries on these compendiums the Vikasinitika the commentary on the Abhidhammavataara is of great important as it contains detailed explanation on the fundamental of Abhidhamma. The Vibhavitika the commenatary on the Abhidhammasavgha thought more concise than the above is important in the many other respects, especially in the method of its exposition. The Savkhepanannana another commentary of the Abhidhammasavgha, although very concise is very useful for the study of evolution of the conception of Dhamma.

Paramatthabujusa, the Abhidhammasavghani and the madhutika are the some of the important sub-commentaries on Abhidhamma. Of them, the first is important as it contains many evolutions to the doctrines of the other schools of Abhidhamma. The other have been written in Burma, and are important in respect of the exposition of the theory of Dhamma. Manisaramavyusa, a sub-commentary on the Vibhavitika written in Burma is a very useful source of in clarifying many obscure methods in the Abhidhammasavgha and its commentaries.

The Abhidhammasangaha-sannaya a Sinhalese paraphrase on the Abhidhammasangaha and the Visuddhimaggasannaya as Sinhalese paraphrase on the Visuddhimagga are all of additional details regarding the subject matter of Abhidhamma. As far as Sanskrit sources are concerned, the Abhidhammakowa of acariya Vasubandhu with its Bhasaya, and the commentary on it by Yasomitra, Abhdhammadipa with its commentary Vibhasaprabhavrtti, Abhidhammasamuccaya of acariya Asavga, with its bhasaya by Yosamitra. Tattvasangraha of acariya Santaraksita with its Pabjika by Kamasila are worthy of consideration.

- Theravada = Abhidhammasangaha
- Sarvastivada = Abhidhammakowa
- The course of development of Abhidhamma in Theravada into 3 stages:
  - (1) The seven fundamental Abhidhamma texts.
  - (2) The commentaries on the seven books and manuals
  - (3) Their sub-commentaries.

666 ELUCIDATE THE DATE AND CONTENT OF THE MOST AUTHORITATIVE PRIMARY SOURCES OF THE THERAVADA ABHIDHAMMA.

Abhidhamma is a class of literature which deals with philosophical and theological topics. In other words, it is a highly developed form of annotated texts. It is likely that Abhidhamma originated from matika. It has a long history of development.

Abhidhamma is the third, and historically the latest, of the three “baskets,” or collections of texts, that together comprise the Pali canon of Theravada Buddhism, the form predominant in Southeast Asia and Sri Lanka (Ceylon). Unlike Sutta and Vinaya, the seven Abhidhamma works are not generally claimed to represent the words of the Buddha himself but of disciples and great scholars. Nevertheless, they are highly venerated, particularly in Burma.

These are not systematic philosophical treatises but a detailed scholastic reworking, according to schematic classifications, of doctrinal material appearing in the Suttas. As such they represent a development in a rationalistic direction of summaries or numerical lists that had come to be used as a basis for meditation--lists that, among the more mystically inclined, contributed to the Prajñāparamita literature of Mahayana Buddhism, the form predominant in East Asia. The topics dealt with in Abhidhamma books include ethics, psychology, and epistemology.

QUESTION: SOME DISCOURSES OF EARLY BUDDHISM LED THE WAY FOR THE EMERGENCE OF LATER BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHICAL TRADITIONS. DISCUSS.

Though *Mahāyāna* Buddhism appeared as a new phase of the religion at about 2<sup>nd</sup> or 1<sup>st</sup> century BC along with *nikāyas* dated about 487 BC and compiled from **Buddha's** discourses at the First Buddhist Council, there are however definite traces that **Bhagavan Buddha** had at the back of His mind the philosophical outlook of *Mahāyāna* Buddhism. Lets see how *Mahāyāna* traces in early Buddhism: in the *Mūlapariyāya Sutta* it is stated that a person regards earth as earth and establishes a relation with it. In the

same way he does with the other four elements (*ṣaḍbhūtas*), the different kind of meditation as meditation etc.

Even an *Arahant* regards *Nibbāna* as *Nibbāna* and thinks that he has attained *Nibbāna*. **Bhagavan Buddha** however knows earth etc. but does not establish a relation with them because the *Tathāgata* is free from all ideas or conceptions while an *Arahant* is not, hence, this is the difference that exists between an *Arahant* and *Tathāgata*. In the *Alagaddūpama Sutta* **Buddha** taught that all *dhammā*, the various *sāstra*, even all dedicational practices of a *bhikkhu* are mere aid like a raft with the have(?) of which as well as by physical exertion a person crosses the stream and after reaching the other shore the person throws away the raft. Likewise a *bhikkhu* by means of several ethical and meditation practices becomes a *Sotāpanna* and strives to attain the highest knowledge. In the *Aggīvacchagotta Sutta* **the Buddha** does not give an answer to **Vacchagotta Paribbājaka's** question: *sassata loko* or *asassata loko*; *antavā loka* or *ananta loka* and so forth.<sup>3</sup>

**Buddha** then explained it by a simile: take, for instance, a fire burning of a faggot is exhausted and the fire is extinguished, where does the fire go? Likewise, the *Tathāgata* is composed of *saṅkhāras* and when the *saṅkhāras* are eschewed by Him, He disappears in the unknown, unfathomable. In the *Kevaddha Sutta* in *Dīgha Nikāya* it is stated that all the elements and mind and form are comprehended by an *Arahant* with the help of the law of causation that they are substanceless (*sabbe dhammā anattā*) as this is essential for attaining *Nibbāna*. In the *Majjhima Nikāya* it is stated that those who are in the first stage of sanctification (*Sotāpanna*) have no chance of retrogression from that stage and they are destined to attain the highest emancipation (*sambodhi*).

The other *Mahāyānic* terms, *śūnyatā* (voidness), *animitta* (void of characteristics) and *appanīhita* (absence of desire for worldly objects), which are also non-existent. These terms occur in the *Dīgha Nikāya* and *Majjhima Nikāya*, *Suññatā Sutta*. In the *Samyutta* and *Aṅguttara Nikāya* occurs the statement that the *Suttantas* delivered by the *Tathāgata* are deep, supramundane and closely connected with *suññatā*. In the *Samyutta Nikāya* while giving a discourse on the nature of the unconstituted (*asankhātā*) **the Buddha** said that the Ganges is a large river, carrying on the surface of its water a mass of foam which is useless and insubstantial. Like the foam and bubbles are the material constituents viz. matter, feeling, perception, impressions (dispositions) and consciousness.

In another passage of the same *nikāya* the following words appear: »*Dhammaṃ hi passato maṃ passati, maṃ passati. Maṃ passato dhammaṃ passati.*« - „He who realizes my teaching visualizes me and he who visualizes me realizes my teaching.“<sup>4</sup> These instances distinctly show that there were *Mahāyānic* traces in the *nikāyas*. It should also be noted that *Mahāyāna* Buddhism was divided into two philosophical schools viz. *Sūnyatavāda* of **Nāgarjuna** and *Vijñānavāda* of **Asaṅga** and later it developed into *Vijñāptimatratavāda* – absolute pure consciousness – by **Vasubandhu**.

### 666“SOME DISCOURSES OF EARLY BUDDHISM LED THE WAY FOR THE EMERGENCE OF LATER BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHICAL TRADITIONS” DISCUSS:

Though Mahayana Buddhism appeared as a new phase of the religion about the 2<sup>nd</sup> or 1<sup>st</sup> century B.C., along with a Nikayas, dated about 487 B.C. and compiled from Buddha's discourses in the first Buddhist Council, there are however definite traces that Bhagavan Buddha had at the back of his mind the philosophical outlook of Mahayana Buddhism. Let see how Mahayana traces in early Buddhism: in the *Mulapariyaya Sutta*, it is stated that a person regards earth as earth and establishes a relation with it. In the same way he does with the other four elements (*Shabhutas*), the different kind of meditation as meditation etc.

Even an Arhant regards Nibbana as Nibbana and thinks that he has attained Nibbana. Bhagavan Buddha, however, knows earth etc. But does not establish a relation with them because the Tathagata.

Buddha then explained it by a simile: Take, for instance, a fire burning off a faggot, when the faggot is exhausted and the fire is extinguished, where does the fire go. Likewise, the Tathagata is composed of Samkharas and when the Sangaras are eschewed by him, he disappears in the unknown, unfathomable. In the *Kevaddha Sutta* in *Digha Nikaya*, it is stated that all the elements and mind

3 *Kiṃ nu kho, bho gotama, 'sassato loko, idameva saccaṃ moghamañña'nti – evaṃdiṭṭhi [evaṃdiṭṭhī (sī. syā. kaṃ. ka.)] bhavaṃ gotamo'ti? 'Na kho ahaṃ, vaccha, evaṃdiṭṭhi – 'sassato loko, idameva saccaṃ moghamañña'nti.*

“*Kiṃ pana, bho gotama, 'asassato loko, idameva saccaṃ moghamañña'nti – evaṃdiṭṭhi bhavaṃ gotamo'ti? 'Na kho ahaṃ, vaccha, evaṃdiṭṭhi – 'asassato loko, idameva saccaṃ moghamañña'nti.*

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(*Majjhima Nikāya – Mūlapaṇṇāsapāḷi – 3. Paribbājakavaggo - 2. Aggīvacchasuttam*)

4 This is an unnecessarily rugged translation of the famous saying from *Samyutta Nikāya – Khandhavaggapāḷi – 9. Theravaggo – 5. Vakkali Sutta*: »*Yo kho, vakkali, dhammaṃ passati so maṃ passati; yo maṃ passati so dhammaṃ passati.*« - „Indeed, **Vakkali**, whoever sees *Dhamma*, he sees me; whoever sees me, he sees *Dhamma*.“

and from are comprehended by an Arahant with the help of the law of causation that they are substance less (Sabe Dhamma Antta) as this is essential for attaining Nibban. In the Majjhima Nikaya it is stated that those who are in the first stage of sanctification (Sotapanna) have no chance of retrogression from that stage and they are destined to attain the highest emancipation (Sambodhi).

In another passage of the same Nikaya appear the following words: Dhammam hi Passato Mam Passati. Mam Passato Dhammam Passati (he who realizes my teaching visualizes me, and he who visualizes me realizes my teaching). These instances distinctly show that there were Mahayanic traces in the Nikayas. It should also be noted that Mahamayna Buddhism was divided into two Philosophical schools, Viz, Sunyatavada of Nagarjuana and Vijnavada of Asanga and it was later developed into Bijnapmatrata-vada-absolute pure consciousness by Vasubandhu.

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Even an Arhat regards nibbana as nibbana and thinks that he has attained nibbana. Bhagavan Buddha, however, knows earth etc. but does not establish a relation with them because the Tathagata is free from all ideas or conceptions while an Arahat is not, hence, this is the difference that exists between an Arahat and a Tathagata. In the Alagaddupama Sutta Buddha taught that all dhamma, the various Sastra, even all dedicational practices of a Bhikhu are mere aid like a raft to be used means for crossing the ocean of samsara. In the Aggi-vacchagotta sutta the Buddha does not give answer to Vacchagotta paribbajaka’s question: sassata loka or aassata loka; antavan or ananta loka and so forth.

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666ARISE OF PHILOSOPHICAL SCHOOL.07.05.07 BY HUNNY

The school of Indian philosophy coming up from two or rather original source all traditions the Bramanika system based on the Atman, doctrine of the Upanishad and the Buddhist school on the Nariratmie doctrine of Buddha conceive reality on two distances and exclusive pattern the Upanishad and the system drawing their inspiration from them, conceive reality on that pattern of inner cause called soul immutable and in dependable and on outer religion of impermanent and change to which is unrelated or but loosely related this may be term the substant view of reality in the radical form as in the Advai vedadante.it denies the reality of the

appearance the implement and equity them with the face, the Sangha does not go so far still it incline more two words the substantial the permanent and universal Nyaya with its empirical and pluralistic base accord equal static to both substance and mode not only this system accept the Atman but what is more they conceive all other things too on the substance pattern the Atman is the very high pier of metaphysic, epistemologist and ethic in epistemology substance mark for unity and integration of experience. It explain perception memory and the personal identity better than the assumption the other tradition is represented by the Buddhists denied of substance and all that it implies there is no inner and immutable core in things, everything is changing (Hax). Existence for the Buddhist is momentary, unique it is discontinuous, discrete and devoid of complexity substance is rejected as illusory it is but a thought construction made under the influence of wrong believe this may be taken as model view of reality the Buddhist wrote their epistemology and ethic into full accord with their Nara phisic, their peculiar conception of perception an inference and the contemporary doctrine of mental construction are necessary consequent of their deny of substance heroic attempt have been made to fit in this theory with the doctrine of Karma and rebirth Avidya which is the root cause of pain, is the wrong belief in the Atman. The wisdom is eradication of this belief the term logy employ above is after the base Jana epistemological treatise philosophical view they say are principally two substances view and the model view. Its view carried to the extreme deny the reality of the other and emphasis the universal and the continuous to the exclusion of the changing and the difference and the other hole the opposite view the Davaydanta is cited as the exponent of the extreme from of the substance view and the Buddhism represent the exclusive model view.

### **Rise of the philosophical schools**

The schools of Indian philosophy have sprung from two or rather three original sources or traditions. The Brahmanical systems based on the Atman doctrine of the Upanishads and the Buddhist school on the nairatmya doctrine of Buddha conceives reality on two distinct and exclusive patterns. The Upanishads and the systems drawing their inspiration from them conceive reality on the pattern of an inner core of soul (Atman), immutable and identical amidst an outer region of impermanence and change to which it is unrelated or but loosely related. This may be termed the substance view of reality (atmvada).in its radical form, as in the Advaita Vedanta, it denies the reality of the apparent, the impermanent, and the many, and equates them with the false. The Samkhya does not go so far; still it inclines more towards the substantial, the permanent, and the universal. The Nyaya with its empirical and pluralistic bias accords equal status to both substance and modes. Not only do these systems accept the atman, but what is more, they conceive all other things too on the substance pattern. The Atman is the very pivot of their metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics in epistemology, substance makes for unity and integration of experience; it explains perception, memory, and personal identity better than other assumption. Bondage is ignorance of the self or the wrong identification of the self with the non-self (atmanyatanmadhyasa). Freedom is the discrimination between the two. The other tradition is represented by the Buddhist denial of substance (Atman) and all that it implies. There is no inner and immutable core in things; everthing is in flux. Existence for the Buddhist is momentary (ksanika), unique (svalaksana), and unitary (dharmamatra). It is discontinues, discrete, and devoid of complexity. Substance (the universal and identical) is rejected as illusory, it is but a thought-construction made under the influence of wrong belief(avidya). This may be taken as the modal view of reality. The Budddhists brought their epistemology and ethics into full accord with their nairatmya metaphysics their peculiar conception of perception and inference and the complementary doctrine of mental construction(vikalpa) are necessary consequences of their denial of substance. Heroic attempts have been made to fit in this theory with the doctrine of Karma and rebirth. Avidya, which is the root-cause of pain, is the wrong belief in the atman(satkaya-drstiprabhavah sarve klesah), and prajna(wisdom) is the eradication of this belief and its attendant evils.

The terminology employed above is after the best Jaina epistemological treatises. Philosophical views, they say, are principally two-the dravyarthika-naya(substance view) and paryayarthika-naya(modal view). Each view, carried to the extreme, denies the reality of the other. One emphasizes the universal and the continuous to the exclusion of the changing and the different, and the other holds the opposite view. The Vedanta is cited as the exponent of the extreme form of the substance view; and Buddhism (tathagatamata) represents the exclusive modal view. The Jaina system ostensibly reconciles these two opposed views by according equal reality to substance and its modes. There is no substance without modes, nor are there modes without substance. Reality is manifold (anekantatmaka), it is not of one nature, it is unity and difference, universal and particular, and permanent and changing. The Jaina philosophy shaped its epistemology on this pattern and formulated the logic of the disjunction of the real (syadvada). This view may be said to constitute the third stream of Indian philosophy, lying misway between the two extremes of the (atmavada) and the anatmavada. Seemingly partaking of the nature of both, it was essentially un-Brahmanical and un-Buddhistic. It was un\_Bramanical in that it accepted a changing Atman and even ascribed different sizes to it; no Brahmanical system could ever accept that. It was un-Buddhistic in that it accepted a permanent entity, atman, besides change. As a result, the Jaina found favour with neither. The synthesis of two views is a third view, and is no substitute for either. The Jaina system had comparatively little influence on the course of Indian philosophy, and was little affected by other systems. Jainism has remained practically stationary down the ages.

Indian philosophy must therefore be interpreted as the flow of two vital streams—one having its source in the Atman doctrine of the Upanishads and the other in the anatmavada of Buddha. Each branched off several sub-streams. There were lively sallies and skirmishes, but no commingling of the two streams. Throughout the course of their development they have remained true to their original inspirations. The Brahmanical systems are wedded to being, Buddhism to becoming; the former espouse the existential and static view of reality, the latter the sequential and dynamic, for the one space, for the other time is the archetype. The Brahmanical systems are relatively more categorical and positive in their attitude (vdhimukhena), while the Buddhists are more negative (nisedhamukhena). Again, the former are more domatic and speculative, the latter empirical and critical. Subjectively minded, Buddhism is little interested in cosmological speculations and constructive explanations of the universe. The Brahmanical systems are bound to an original tradition; they all accept the authoritarian character of the Vedas. Buddhism derives its inspiration from a criticism of experience itself. The tempo of development is quicker and intenser in Buddhism than in the Upanishadic tradition.

An opposite view has been advocated by a not inconsiderable section of the schools of Indian thought. They interpret Indian philosophy as having developed out of one tradition, the Upanishadic. Buddhism and Jainism are treated as deviations, rather than radical departure, from the atmavada of the Upanishads. This, however, ignores the sharp differences and exclusive attitudes inherent in these systems. Similarly it overlooks the internal differences within the fold of Buddhism, and considers it one unitary system instead of a matrix of many systems. Nairatmyavada is the genus of which the different Buddhist systems— the vaibhasika, the Sautrantika, the Madhyamika, and the Yogacara—are the species; they are the various attempts to express the same denial of substance. The entire course of the development of Indian philosophy is proof of our contention. No Buddhist system did ever accept the reality of Atman, the permanent and the unchanging. No non-Buddhist system except the Carvaka, on the contrary, could ever reject it as unreal.

It may be said that this state of affairs is true of the later scholastic phase of Buddhism, and not of the original teachings of its master. Reliance may be placed on certain texts affirming the Atman. But we have to consider, as against this, more numerous passages which deny the self in unmistakable terms. It will not do therefore to select those texts that favour a preconceived interpretation and to ignore the others. A systematic exegesis of the texts and a synthesis of the doctrines can alone prove fruitful. Such syntheses have been made by the Buddhist systems from time to time, notably by the Abhidharmika, the Madhyamika, and the Vijñanavada systems. The modern exponent has to take these into account, as prima facie they claim to embody and express the original teachings in the case of Buddhism too, we must accept the law of evolution that the later phases are potentially contained in the earlier. The theory of a primitive soul-affirming Buddhism followed by a soul-denying scholasticism does not solve any problem; it adds one more. In the attempt of bridging the difference between the Upanishads and Buddha we would have immeasurably increased the distance between Buddha and Buddhism. Nor can we find any adequate reason for such a gross misunderstanding of Buddha by his followers.

It may be said that the denial of the self is beset with such insuperable difficulties that it could not have been seriously maintained by any philosopher. The answer is that the doctrine of an entity, immutable and impervious to change (atmavada), is also beset with equally insuperable difficulties, though of an opposite kind. The Buddhist schools have made very consistent and commendable efforts to explain phenomena on their in the opposite direction. The deep opposition between these radical standpoints stimulated the systems on either side; they gained in depth and maturity. It also helped the emergence of the dialectical consciousness, which we find in a systematic form in the Madhyamika philosophy. Dialectic is the consciousness of the total and interminable conflict of the ideas of reason, of philosophical view. It presses towards their resolution in the absolute which is the negation of the opposites (advaita, advaya). The Advaitic turn in the Buddhist and Brahmanical system is a necessary outcome of this.

## 666\* EARLY HISTORY OF THE SPREAD BUDDHISM AND BUDDHIST SCHOOLS

### **\* Evolution of the schools of Buddhism Prof: -Elukewala Dhammaratana thera Noted by Ven. Oeu Sam Ath**

The origins of the various story was developed of the time of the Buddha after the Buddha's death there was none who was able to take this place there were high learned followers most of them and came from Brahmana families. They knew the Brahmanic philosophy and there were learned members of various religious orders like as the **Jatilas, Jains, Ajibakas**. They could not remind with current interpretation of the teachings of the Buddha. They have paid their attention of the specific world of the teachers (Buddha). The leading Buddhist teachers were able to explain therefore this Buddhist teachers took arguments from the teaching of the Buddha. But all to them agreed with this propositions.

1-All is momentary (Sarvam Kshanikam)

2- All is suffering (Sarvam Dukkham)

By the time, there arise different opinions both Dhamma and Vinaya with those three agreements. The formations of Buddhist schools most namely to the following factors.

1-The supreme headship of Buddhism of the Buddha's death.

2-**The Gopaka Moggallana sutta (MN)** explains that Dhamma and Vinaya will be the support in the sutta venerable Ananda answered the question asked by **Vasska Brahmana**. He asks is there even one who was designated by the Buddha as your support **Mahaparinibbana sutta in (D.N)**. Buddha has mentioned that Dhamma and Vinaya will be your teacher after my Parinibban. According to the **Samagama sutta of (M.N)** the disagreement arose in the Jaina community just after the death **Nigantanathaputta**.

Yuan Chwang notices that on an auspicious day the Abhidhammikas worshipped Sariputta, the Samadhis worshipped Moggallana and so on. The principles of resemblance between the followers and their preceptors have given and there were the points for the distinctions among them without any doctrinal differences, it gave right to the full-fledged schools.

According to the school of **Sarvastivadins** derived from Sariputta it was the original division of abhidhammikas. The **Sthaviravadins** belongs to Upali, Mahasangikas belongs to **Mahakassapa** and **Sammitiya** belongs to **Mahakaccayana**.

**This** is confirmed that the origin of schools dates back as earlier the first council. These separated groups developed into separate religious schools of Buddhism. Vinayadharas has developed as Theravadins, the Sautrantikas had developed as Sautrantikas but all the divisions mentioned about are not developed into religious schools.

As an ascetic, Buddha laid down severe austerities for few years which could never fulfill his mission in this way austerities crept in the Buddhism in early time and the adoption of these led to the formation of schools. The schools of rules of Buddhist that adapted the rituals natural ... apart from other religions. These factors have been generalized during the three and half centuries after the Buddha's death.

When disputes arise among the disciples, the lord Buddha sent favorite disciples Ananda, Sariputta and Moggallana who settle those disputes. Buddha was in the opinions that the wicked and selfish Bhikkhus introduced new principles to the Dhamma and Vinaya. Every quarrel or different of opinions among the Bhikkhus was not characterized by the Buddha as Sanghaveda during the Buddha's life time. Dissentions of minor character took place in the Buddhist Sangha only two of them attracted his attention. They are called Sanghaveda which is heinous crime. The first dissention was in Kosambi between two monks among **Dhammatthika and Vinayadhara**. The next dissention was with Devadatta who requested more austere discipline.

Within the period of Buddha's ministry various discourses were already at work for the formation of schools. Therefore, it can well imagine that in the actions the great teachers, the monastic order had to give way to the growth as many as twenty schools or more.

**QUESTION:** EXAMINE THE MAIN VIEW POINTS OF TWO SCHOOLS, *THERAVĀDA* AND *MAHĀYĀNA*

The term *Theravāda* means 'the school of elders'. As the name suggests, it is an orthodox, traditional school. This name was adopted by the traditional senior group of monks after the 2<sup>nd</sup> Buddhist council. It is evident that the *Saṅgha* who remained as a single group divided themselves into two as a consequence of the disagreements that arose at the 2<sup>nd</sup> Buddhist council. The orthodox group came to be called the *Theravāda*. The breakaway group was called *Mahāsaṅghika*.

*Theravāda* Buddhism belongs to the period of sectarian or *nikāya* Buddhism. Therefore, it is not early Buddhism. Scholars point out *Theravāda* as an attempt by the orthodox seniors to interpret early Buddhism in the way they thought was proper.

This *Theravāda* group began to split into numerous sub-groups. By the time of **emperor Asoka** there were 11 or 12 such groups. These included *Sarvāstivāda*, *Sautrāntika* and so on. So, among these schools also there were different opinions. The *Vibhajjavāda* which came to Sri Lanka, is also considered by some as a division of the *Theravāda*.

*Mahāyāna* is the school that arose in opposition to *Theravāda*. The beginnings of some *Mahāyāna* ideas such as *dharmakāya* are traceable to the early *suttas*. The *Mahāsaṅghikas* seem to have provided the

background for the rise of *Mahāyāna* as a separate tradition. In *Mahāyāna* **the Buddha** is raised to a transcendent level. Compassion is emphasized over wisdom. The *Bodhisatta* ideal is stressed. The highest aim of followers was to attain *Buddhahood*. While *Theravāda* upheld the *Arahant* ideal, *Mahāyāna* upheld the *Buddha* ideal through *Bodhisatta* practices.

While *Theravāda* Buddhism possesses *Tipiṭaka*, *Mahāyāna* does not possess a canon as such, though there are certain *sūtras* which are considered important. Thus, the *Mahāvaiṣṭya Sūtra* or the *Nava Dharmas* are considered as very important.

There are two main *Mahāyāna* schools. One is *Madhyamika*. This was founded by **Nāgarjuna**. Its main teaching is *Śūnyatā*, which is generally rendered as 'emptiness'. However, there is much controversy regarding the exact interpretation of *Śūnyatā* doctrine. Some scholars say that *Śūnyatā* amount to nihilism, non-existence of anything, total 'nothingness'. Others maintain that *Śūnyatā* is the denial of the existence of an entity, a permanent substance. *Mādhyamikas* emphasize both *pudgala-nairātmya* (absence of an individual soul) as well as the impermanency of *dharmās* (*dharma-nairātmya*).

The other *Mahāyāna* school is *Yogācāra*, the idealistic school. This arose in reaction to the doctrine of *Śūnyatā*. *Yogācāra* maintained that though everything is *sūnya*, the mind exists as the only real thing. Hence, they came to be called 'mind only' school (*Vijñāptimātra*).

#### VARIOUS ABHIDHAMMA TRADITIONS (LECTURED BY VEN. INDASARA)

*Abhidhamma* is a teaching which makes the correct knowledge about the being and the world. In *Sutta Piṭaka* the beings are divided and discussed as *khandha*, *dhātu* and *āyatana* etc. The aim of such division is to reveal *aniccā*, *dukkha* and *anattā* or three characteristics of existence. Therefore, the *suttas* explained all the *saṅkhāras* as impermanent and all the *dharmās* as soulless. This explanation in *Sutta Piṭaka* is not complete explanation of either being or world, therefore, the *Abhidhamma* explains material things which exist in the world. By dividing into *citta*, *cetasika*, *rūpa* and *Nibbāna* the way of these analyses were used by *Theravāda* tradition. Therefore, they were identified as *Vibhajjavādins*. This analytical system was not accepted by all the traditions. Some of the teachers had various arguments. *Theravādins'* seven books of the *Abhidhamma* were not accepted by other traditions. For instance, *Sarvāstivādins* did not believe in *Theravādins'* *Abhidhamma Piṭaka*. The another seven *Abhidhamma* books were presented in Sanskrit language but although *Abhidhammic* traditions did not come to common theory, they traditionally argued concerning the explanations of *citta*, *cetasika* etc. Therefore, some of the traditions did not discuss *Abhidhamma Piṭaka* and believed in the *Sutta Piṭaka* as their own doctrine. *Sautrāntikas* were one of the traditions who rejected the *Abhidhamma* teaching. When we discuss *Abhidhammic* traditions the *Theravādins' Abhidhamma Piṭaka* is the *Abhidhamma* which was with the Pāli *sutta* literature. The oldest tradition in Buddhist history is *Theravāda* tradition, therefore, the oldest *Abhidhamma* literature is also *Theravādins' Abhidhamma*. The other *Abhidhamma* traditions have developed their *Abhidhamma* literature after forming their schools separately.

Next important *Abhidhamma* tradition are *Sarvāstivāda Abhidhammikas*. Though *Abhidhamma Piṭaka* has been introduced at first time by *Theravādins*, *Mahāyāna* also could not follow the *Abhidhamma*. They also had influenced their *Abhidhamma*. *Theravādins* teach the *Dhamma* of *citta*, *cetasika*, *rūpa* and *Nibbāna* in *Abhidhamma*. *Sarvāstivādins* also accepted the section of *dharmās* and *citta vippayutta dhammā*. They have increased the number of *asaṅkhāta dhammās*. According to Pāli *Tipiṭaka* there is one *asaṅkhāta dhamma* (that is *Nibbāna*), but *Sarvāstivādins*

have three. They have named it as *pratisankhya nirodha*, *apratīsanḥayā nirodha* and *ākāsa*. Altogether they believed in 75 *dhammās* /Citta – 1; *cetasika* – 46, *rūpa* – 11, *cittavippayutta* – 14, *asaṅkhāta* - 3/.

Another important *Abhidhamma* literature was named as *Sariputra Abhidharma*. Now it is available in Chinese language. Only it is not decided whether this *Abhidharma* literature belongs to *Mahāsaṅghika* school or *Sammātiya* school or *Dharmavutika*. All the three sects had *Abhidharma* literature. According to inscription, though the *Mahāsaṅghikas* rejected *Theravādins'* *Abhidhamma* they also had *Mātikā Piṭaka*. It is said that the sub-school of *Mahāsaṅghika Gokulika* and *Bahu Śrītya* have developed their *Abhidharma*. *Vātsīputrīya* school belonging to *Theravādins'* tradition had *Abhidhamma Piṭaka*.

Among the *Mahāyānist Yogācāra* school who discussed the *Abhidhamma*, according to their view external world is nothing but mind made and it is only *Vijñāptimātra*. They did not accept the absolute existence of external world. According to their belief there are 100 *dhammās* /Citta – 8; *cetasika* – 51; *rūpa* – 11; *cittavippayutta* – 24; *asaṅśrta* – 6/.

*Sautrāntikas*. It is true that **Vasubandhu** personally accepted *Sautrāntika dhammā* theory. Today there is no written evidence about *dhamma* analysis of *Sautrāntika* beside *Śivañāna Siddhi* /Name of the book which analysis the *dhammās* into *rūpa* – 8; *arūpa* – 2, *vyavahāra* – 2, *Nirvāṇa* – 2/.

According to scholars there is no disease or exception concerning the *Abhidhamma* teachings of the Buddhist schools. They have analyzed the *dhammās* according to their own traditional belief. The oldest *Abhidhamma* literature is the *Theravādins'* *Abhidhamma Piṭaka*, the other schools' *Abhidhamma* literature was derived from *Theravāda* tradition. *Theravāda Abhidhamma* is considered as complete and original *Abhidhamma* literature.<sup>5</sup>

## 666 WHO IS ABHIDHARMIKA ?

The scope and methodology of Abhidharma

The study and specialized topics of Abhidharmika:-

1. Svabhāva
2. svalakṣaṇa
3. Saṅgraha
4. Saṅprayoga
5. Hetu, pratyaya and Phala
6. Samanvāgama

In brief, these are scope of study of Abhidharma. Svabhāva and svalakṣaṇa are inter-connected. Ultimately svabhāva is equal to svalakṣaṇa. Svalakṣaṇa is that aspect which can be experienced by us or can be observed either directly or indirectly. Directly in the sense, for instance, rūpa – visible, resistance, subject to deterioration. This is the svalakṣaṇa.

There are things which cannot be directly observed. For example, vedanā, saṃjñā, etc. These are forces. They are forces neither mental nor physical, such as, a force of arising (not just a concept). Arising is that force which make thing arise. Of course, in arising of anything, being a Buddhist, you have to understand there must be existence of various conditions. They argued that these assembled conditions are external factor which make possible for the arising of a dharma. That force in the universe is called 'arising'. A thing called arising is a force that exist in the arising of anything at all. Anything arises in the phenomenal world, whenever it arises, there is this force that operates. Likewise there is a force called decay – make a thing deteriorate/vanish. There is also a force called duration – make a thing to stay for a while. Put them together you have forces operating on each and every conditioned dharma making it momentary.

Why is a thing momentary? Why a thing last only one moment? First, the fact that arises in a phenomenal world is due to arising. This dharma abides in their true nature (intrinsic nature) throughout times. That is called arising in space times. There is a force called duration. What we observe is that everything is momentary, then there is a force that make it perishes. When we say a thing perishes, it does not mean that it is totally extinct. It perishes from phenomenal existence, but it continues to abide in its intrinsic

5 This is what is considered by *Theravādins*...

nature. This idea is the powerful concept, or convenient concept for the explanation of various things.

It is mainly this concept that is attacked by Nāgārjuna. This is called svabhāva. There are different names: dravya, svarūpa, ātman, etc.

Svabhāva stressed more on the essence aspect (aspect of a thing in itself.) Svalakṣaṇa stresses more on characteristics that can be perceived directly or indirectly.

## Saṅgraha

It is an extremely important methodology device for Abhidharmika. Saṅgraha means inclusion, sub-ordination, subsumation. Given various things in the universe, there must be a way to classify them, because Abhidharmikas wanted to study things systematically. They must be able to find out the exact nature and put them in the proper places. In fact, Saṅgraha is the method for the study of svabhāva. Given a non-Abhidharmic example, supposing you have one person, who is known by various names, he is called the boss, father, artist, etc. There are various appellations of that person. But all these various appellations refer to one single person. So to study the diversity in names, and we come to conclude that all these can be subsumed /subordinate to one.

Thus, they come to the conclusion that there is a dharma called prajñā. Prajñā means faculty of understanding. But in the sūtra, various terms are used to describe in understanding, for instance, the Buddha says, āloka, prabhā, etc.

There are various different stresses also, but it refers to one substance. They have a very interesting concept called 'akliṣṭa-ajñāna' (non-defiled ignorance). The Sarvāstivāda and other Abhidharmikas think that there is a difference between the wisdom of the Buddha and the Arhat though they both are liberated. There is still a subtle ignorance in Arhat. Look at the Mahādeva's 5 position.

Saṅgraha is the study of the diverse elements in the universe, and find out the specific nature (svabhāva) that is unique. This is how they arrived at the lists of distinct dharmas. Saṅgraha is the study of intrinsic nature of thing. That is called dharma-pravicaya (examination of dharma). Understand the dharmas mean you understand what is its intrinsic nature.

## Saṅprayoga (conjunction/ association/ connection) & Hetu - pratyaya

These 2 concepts are applied to study the dynamic inter-relationships among different dharmas. Whereas saṅgraha earlier, we saw, is applied to study individual thing in themselves. Saṅprayoga in the abhidharma comes to the topic that pertains to the domain of citta-caitta (mental domain) [caitta: what pertains to the mind, i.e. mental factors / concomitants] [cetas + ika > caitasika]

The theory of Abhidharmika is that thought or mind (citta), whenever citta arises, it does not arise alone. It arises with a constellation of mental factors (caittas). Whenever it arises, there is a minimum of 10 associates. Among these associates, one can be dominant. For instance, the function is feeling something, the vedanā is dominant. When the mind is forming the idea/ concept, then saṅjñā is dominant. When the mind is making a will/volition, the cetanā is dominant. This is in brief the citta-caitta topic.

Saṅprayoga refers to the association of the mental factors with the mind and also among the mental factors themselves. Citta is said to be associated with the mind. At the same time, the mental factors are associated among themselves. So there is a study:-

“When I am happy, what happened?”

“When I am angry, what happened?”

This is psychology. They study the mind in minute detail about the mechanism of the mind. Even among defilements, they are divided into primary and secondary defilements. How they are inter-related. This phenomena of inter-relation is called saṅprayoga. We shall see that they talked about certain conditions for you to say certain factor is associated with the mind. For instance, they said one condition is that there must be simultaneous. We can't talk about 2 factors belonging to 2 different moments in association. Next, the 2 factors or the factors must be there on the same object. If I am angry with this person, my feeling is also about this person. My perception is also about this person. All directed at the same person. The perception of object is the same. For that matter, the sense of faculty (indriya) associated is also the same. There must be a single substance, for instance, pleasurable is another feeling, unpleasurable is another feeling, neutral is also another feeling. But at the same time, you have only one type of feeling. In another word, there is a singularity of substance. In this way, they arrived at a set of conditions for factors to be in conjunction with mental association. This is the study specially applied in the field of thought and mental factors.

hetu, pratyaya and phala.

Talking about dynamic inter-relationship among dharmas, yet another important concept called hetu, pratyaya and phala. In their conception, even dharma is a force. They are real. There must be causal efficacies (a force that itself serve as a force produce

something else.) Jñti is a force. How do I arrive at the conclusion that it is a real thing – why? Because associated with that dharma, there is a thing called jñti. So jñti is a force, is also in the sense of cause. The assembly of causal and condition along is not enough.

#### VIBHAJJAVĀDA (ORIGINAL BY VEN. NYĀNEINDA)

**The Buddha** did not call his followers Buddhists and in fact recommended Buddhism to be called as *Vibhajjavāda*, which means „doctrine of analysis.“ The followers would be called *Vibhajjavādins*, which would basically means „analysts“ or „those who analyze.“ The ultimate origin of the word *Vibhajjavāda* is described in the *Subha sutta* of the *Majjhima nikāya*. It is said that **the Buddha** declared himself to be a *Vibhajjavādin* on the question of the relative advantages of the household life and renunciation life. According to this point, **the Buddha** is not an *Ekamsavādin*. Again, in the *Vajjiyamahita sutta* of the *Aṅguttara Nikāya*, it is stated that **the Buddha** criticizes all practitioners of asceticism so he is a *Vibhajjavādin*.

The third Buddhist council, under the leadership of **ven. Moggalliputtatissa Thera** emphasized this analytics (*vibhajjavāda*). But some schools such as *Sarvāstivāda*, *Mahāsaṅghika* and *Sammītiya* did not accept it because they regarded the *Vibhajjavāda* as a wrong view, according to the *Kathāvatthu* ascribed to **ven. Moggalliputtatissa Thera**. After the third Buddhist council, the *Vibhajjavāda* gradually evolved into four groups namely the *Mahīśāsaka*, *Kāśyapīya*, *Dharmaguptaka* and the *Tāmrāparṇīya*.

On the other hand, some sources suggest that *Mahīśāsaka*, *Kāśyapīya* and *Dharmaguptaka* did not evolve directly from the *Vibhajjavāda* but due to their respective *Vinayas*. According to Sinhalese tradition, Buddhism under the name of *Vibhajjavāda* was brought to Sri Lanka by **Mahinda**, who was the son of **Emperor Asoka** in 3<sup>rd</sup> century BC. The *Theravāda* has derived from *Vibhajjavāda* and represented doctrine of the orthodoxy too. In the *Kathāvatthu*, the arguments between *Vibhajjavāda* and *Sarvāstivāda* recorded that some parts of *Sarvāstivādin* doctrines were refused.

From that time onwards, *Vibhajjavāda* was popular in Buddhism. Later on, there were so many scholars to analyze in *Vibhajjavāda* according to their understanding. Among them, as it is said in **ven. Buddhaghosa's** commentary of Ceylong chronicle, that in the account of the third council, *Vibhajjavādins* were declared to be orthodox monks and one of sect in Buddhism. In this passage, the *Vibhajjavādins* were those who spoke after distinguishing because they spoke truly about the *Dhamma*. The **Prof. Paussin** said that position of *Vibhajjavāda* was not different from the original doctrine of **the Buddha** but did not common(?) with the doctrine of the *Sarvāstivādins*, *Mahāsaṅghikas* and others. He added that *Theravādins* preferred to be called *Vibhajjavādins*.

#### SAUTRĀNTIKA

In the Pāli tradition, the *Sautrāntika* is described as the *Kassapika* from *Sankantika* branch of the *Suttavādins*. **Vasumitra** noted, that at the beginning of the 4<sup>th</sup> century AD there was one school named *Sautrāntika* called *Samkrantivāda* too, from *Sarvastivāda*. The name *Sautrāntika* is referred to those who take the *suttas* as valid authority rather than *Abhidhamma*. The founder of this school declared: „I take **Ānanda** their preceptor is **Ānanda Thera**,“ so it seems that *Suttavādins* were identical with the *Sautrāntika*. Monks, who described themselves as *Sautrāntikas* entered<sup>6</sup> the higher ordination from *Sarvastivāda* rite and they were suspecting the *Abhidhama Piṭaka* regarding the word of **the Buddha**.

**Vasumitra** characterizes that *Sautrāntika* is distinguished from the *Sammītiya* sect and opposed to the doctrine of the early Buddhism. In *Sautrāntika*, it is said that the *khandha* does not pass from one existence to another and the original form *khandha* is only one nature. In other words, the five *khandhas* end in the attainment of *Nibbāna*. This view is allied to the doctrine of the *Sammītiyas* that the *puggala* ceases in the attainment of *Nibbāna*. For this doctrine of transference of *khandhas* through several existences, the *Sautrāntika* is also called *Sankrantivādins*.

The present scholars favoring *Sautrāntika* showed the doctrine positions are not identical with

6 Heh, there the author of the original wrote „*Sautrāntikas* interred the higher ordination“ :-D.

ordination lineages and the followers of *Sautrantika* rejected the existence of *dhammā*<sup>7</sup> as the present such as the present *dhamma* exists, the past *dhamma* existed and the future *dhamma* also will exist. However, the *Sautrāntika* took from the *Sarvāstivādins'* idea that the present *dhamma* lies in the *dhamma* exerting its characteristic activity.

Though **Vasubandhu** belonged to *Sarvastivāda* school, in his writing to the *Sautrantika* views, he pointed out the differences between the *Sarvāstivāda* and *Sautrāntika* views:

1. *Sautrāntika* does not accept the *Sarvāstivādins* as authoritative
2. *Sautrāntika* believe, that there is no existences
3. *Sautrāntika* denied the *citta-vippayuttas* as not associating with the mind as mentioned by the *Sarvāstivādins'* view.
4. *Sautrāntika* rejected the view of *Sarvāstivādins* that the past and future exist
5. *Sautrāntika* asserted the existence of the subtle *citta* and explained thereby the working of the formula of causation
6. *Sautrāntika* carried on the *ksanikva*(?) doctrine. As stated above, the *Sautrāntika* plazed an important role in ancient time.

#### SAUTRĀNTIKA (MAY 2009)

1. Inference (*anumāna*)
2. Perception (*pratyakṣa*)
  - a) eyes
  - b) eye consciousness
  - c) object, form

- 1) eye consciousness
- 2) contact
- 3) feeling
- 4) perception
- 5) volition
- 6) one-pointedness

*Sautrāntikas* introduced their own teaching called „theory of momentariness“ (*kṣanavāda*). According to them the momentary things represent their annihilation. That means the destruction of the form of the momentariness which appears along with the thing itself. Everything ceases as soon as it rises, it doesn't survive in the next moment of something existed or stayed on, it is eternal. According to the common theory, the sky or *ākāsa* (space) exist, but causes are actually non-existent in the form of entities and they are devoid of all potentiality. They cannot be called even momentary, because it is like „a son of a barren woman.“

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7 It is important to distinguish between *Dhamma* (the ultimate truth taught by **the Buddha**) and *dhamma* (a phenomenon).

There is a two-fold source, given by the *Sautrāntikas* to realize the nature of the world:

- a) inference (*anumāna*)
- b) perception (*pratyakṣa*)

The perception is accepted even in *Theravāda* tradition. In *Matubindika Sutta* there are given three constituents which must be present for a complete perception:

- 1) The physical eye (*cakkhu*)
- 2) The eye consciousness
- 3) A form

Furthermore, there are given six other processes:

- 1) *Cakkhu viññāṇa*
- 2) *Phassa* (Skt. *Sparsā*)
- 3) *Vedanā*
- 4) *Saññā* - »*Yaṃ vedeti taṃ sañjānāti.*«
- 5) *Vitakka* - »*Yaṃ sañjānāti taṃ vitakketi.*«
- 6) *Papañca* - »*Yaṃ vitakketi taṃ papañceti.*«

*Sautrāntikas* depending on the perception, classify the *dhammās*. Therefore, there are these *dhammas*:

- 1) *Rūpa* are 8 - 4 kinds of subjective forms (*upādāna*) and 4 kinds of objective forms (*upādāya*)
- 2) *Vedanā* are 3 – *sukha*, *dukkha* and *na sukha na dukkha*.
- 3) *Saññā* are 6 – 5 senses and *viññāṇa*.
- 4) *Viññāṇa* are 6 as 5 kinds of consciousness and mind consciousness.
- 5) *Saṅkhārā* are 20 – 10 wholesome and 10 unwholesome.

According to the *Sautrāntikas*, language can do nothing for the perception. Because with the language, we are going to understand something that we experienced. And their view is that we can experience the world without language.<sup>8</sup>

The *Sthaviravādins* or *Theravādins* give the following statement regarding the nature of world:

»*Yaṃ kiñci samudayaṃ dhammaṃ, taṃ sabbaṃ nirodha dhammaṃ*«  
(Anything originated changed)<sup>9</sup>

»*Aniccā vata saṅkhārā, uppāda vaya dhammino.*«  
(All originated things are impermanent, they arise and vanish.)

»*Uppattiyā sahevedaṃ, maranaṃ āgataṃ sadā.*«  
(With the birth it gets the death.)

*Sautrāntikas* have given a statement to explain the nature of the world: „*Kṣānikānaṃ nāsti deshāntaragamanam yatrayivohpattih tattrayiva vinashah.*“ (The nature of vanishing is begun with the origination.) In *Theravāda* tradition there is given a time for the existence. *Intsutarattu Sutta* gives the following question:

»*Tattha rūpaṃ daṇḍa nirodhaṃ garu parivattīti cittaṃ khippaṃ nirodhaṃ lahu parivattan'ti.*«  
The matter is changing slowly, but consciousness (*citta*) is changing quickly.

<sup>8</sup> In short – language is not a part of process of perception.

<sup>9</sup> Any originated phenomenon – all of them are ceasing phenomena.

»Nāhaṃ bhikkhave aññaṃ eka dhammam'pi samanū passāmi. Evaṃ lahu pariyattaṃ yathidaṃ bhikkhave cittaṃ.«

„Monks! I cannot see anything, which changes more rapidly than consciousness.“

As it is given in *Abhidhammattha Saṅgaha*, *Mahā Cittakkhana* has three characteristics:

- 1) *uppāda* (birth, rise, appearing)
- 2) *ṭhīti* (existence, process, being)
- 3) *bhaṅga* (death, destruction, disappearing)

17 such *cittakkhanas* are one moment of *rūpa*'s existence. That means that *rūpa*'s moment lasts the duration of 51 consciousnesses (17 *cittakkhanas* x 3 (*uppāda*, *ṭhīti*, *bhaṅga*) = 51).

### SAUTRĀNTIKA (ORIGINAL BY VEN. SUVANNY)

*Sautrāntika* is one of the sub-sects of *Theravāda* school, emerged around the time of 3<sup>rd</sup> century BC. The *Sautrāntika* school is so named because it gave pre-eminence to the *Sutta* portion of the canon. Its followers trace their school back to **Ānanda**, a close disciple of **the Buddha**. For them, the *karmic* factors are insubstantial and momentary; disappearing as soon as they have been manifested only to reappear again to give rise to a new aggregate. There is continual motion by virtue of which a person passes from one condition to another. Every thought or act is pervaded by a very subtle impregnation that in turn is capable of impregnating the subconsciousness so as to generate new correlated psychic situations. The school is of great importance, because its tenets were precursors of the *Vijñānavāda*.

*Sautrāntikas* don't accept *Abhidhamma* as the **Buddha's** teaching. The rejection of *Abhidhamma* by *Sautrāntikas* was a great challenge to *Sarvāstivāda* who strongly believed in *Vibhasas*(?). As the theory of *dharmā*, *Sautrāntikas* developed *Kṣānavāda*, by this they refuted all other theories which were made by other schools. According to them, everything changes at every moment with reference to the existence of *Dhamma*. Only two things can be considered, they are *utpāda* (*uppāda*) and *vyaya* (*vaya*). Based on this theory of moments, *Sautrāntikas* say that we cannot know the existence of physical world in its ultimate sense, the only way we can know the world is inference.

The *Vaiśvāśika* doctrine of eternal elements is believed to be in consistence with the fundamental teaching of **the Buddha**. The *Sautrāntikas* insist on the non-eternality of the *dharmā* as well. The past and future *dharmā* do not exist, and only those present do. The so-called unconditioned *dharmās* are mere absences, not positive entities. Thus, the *Sautrāntikas* seem to be the only major school of Buddhist philosophy that comes near to regarding *Nirvāna* as entirely negative in their epistemology. Whereas *Vaiśvāśikas* are direct realists, the *Sautrāntikas* hold a sort of interpretations, according to which the external world is only inferred from the mental conceptions that alone are directly apprehended.

This school produced no independent literature; instead they have translated early discourses into Sanskrit. It is believed that there was **Harivarman**, who established an independent tradition called '*Satyasiddhi*'. The *Satyasiddhi* school probably derived from the earlier *Sautrāntika* school, based on the *Satyasiddhi Śāstra*, a work attributed to **Harivarman**, a 3<sup>rd</sup> - 4<sup>th</sup> century Indian writer and known only in its Chinese version (4<sup>th</sup> - 5<sup>th</sup> century). It gave birth to a school in China called *Cheng-Shi*, which maintained that all things were merely designations devoid of reality. Human beings were enveloped in the illusion that either the ego (*puggala*) or the world (*dharmā*) were real, whereas in fact neither was. The past does not exist, the future has not yet come to be and the present as soon as it comes into being it disappears. Hence, the sense of

continuity is illusory.

**Harivarman** like the *Lokottaravādins* postulated voidness, both of the *dharma* and of the ego – no *dharma* of any sort exists. Thought from the point of view of relative truth *dharma* may appear to exist. In China this doctrine was sharply attacked by its opponents as destructive nihilism.

#### 666SAUTRANTIKA SCHOOL OF BUDDHISM

Sautrantika are one tradition of Buddhist thought which come under the Theravada school. As they considered only early discourses except any commentary they are called Sautrantikas. Sanskrit was their medium of language. They were momentarists, among the 18 schools of Buddhism, for the first time we find the name of their schools. Kumaralabha who was a contemporary to Nagarjuna, the founder of Madhyamika tradition is considered to the founder of this tradition. As some places, his name has been mentioned as Kaumaralabha or Kumalatha. Among the great exponents of this tradition, the name of Srilabha, Dharmatrata, Buddhedeve, Harivarman and Yasomitra are often mentioned. According to some historians they were the disciples of Kumaralabha. Harivarman established an independent tradition called 'Satyasiddhi'. The tradition which was pioneered by Srilabha is called 'Drshantika' with the emergence of new tradition, the school established by Kumaralabha was called 'Mula- Sautrantika'.

This school processes no independent literature, instead they have translated early discourses into Sanskrit. The lack of their own literature is one difficulty to recognize what their teachings really were. The later scholars came to know their teachings through the works of other schools. The sub-commentary on Abhidharmakowa which was written by Yasomitra introduces some fundamental aspects of Sautrantika teachings.

Kalpanamanditika-drshtantapanti written by Kumaralabha is one fundamental work in this tradition. Another work called Sautrantika-vibhasa author by Srilabha is another significant work of Sautrantikas. Apart from these theoretical matters faith towards the Buddha have been emphasized in these works, at present only the Chinese translation of above works remain.

Sautrantikas don't accept Abhidhamma as the teaching of the Buddha. According to them, Abhidhamma is not necessary to understand the teachings of the Buddha. The teacher has preached enough for the liberation. Therefore, the commentarial explanation do not serve any purpose as far as the liberation is concerned. The refusal of Abhidhamma by Sautrantikas was a great challenge to Sarvastivadins who strongly believed in Vibhasas. As the theory of Dharma, Sautrantikas developed Khanavada (the theory of moments). By this they refused all the other theories which were made by other schools. According to them everything changes at every moment with reference to the existence of the Dhamma, only two things can be thought of, they are Utpada and Vyaya.

Based on this theory of moments, Sautrantikas say that we cannot know the existence of physical world, in its ultimate sense, the only way we can know the world is inference. This theory by Sautrantikas was directly put against the Dharma theory of Sarvastivadins. The characteristic of a Dharma sthiti and jaratta as explained by the Sarvastivadins were denied by Sautrantikas. Dharmas have no an existence during all the three phases of time, they exist only in the present. The past and future according to them are only concepts. They are made by our thought. The existence of the world is only an illusion. If there is no arising, existence, decaying and ceasing, the idea of physical world cannot occur. Sautrantikas presented subtle arguments against the Vaibhasikas dharma theory. When there is no a physical world, the emptiness of it which is discussed by Madhyamika is meaningless. It's like saying that barren 不育 woman has no children.

#### 1. ANALYSIS OF DHARMA BY SAUTRANTIKA TRADITION

The theory of 5 aggregates is common to both Sthaviravadins and Sautrantikas. But their order and

classification differ from each other. According to them, rupa is eye, ear, nose, tongue and their object. The aggregate of vibbana, the process of existence of alaya-vibbana and pravrtti-vibbana.

	<u>Nature/fundamental</u>	<u>very harmful</u>	<u>develop</u>	
Lobha	anunaya		abhijja	asubha bhavana
Dosa	patigha	vyapada	metta bhavana	
Moha	vitakka	micchiditthi	anapanasati	

- the first group (nature) that the mind is healthy; the second group (harmful) that mind is sick.
- vitakka: according to Sautrantika this is the alayavijbana.

Alayavijnana is the idea of 'I' and 'me' which is the basic of consciousness. Pravrtti-vijbana means the functioning of consciousness with reference to physical world.

19/7/99 (continue):

The description of Four Noble Truths which we come across in Theravada literature was not accepted by Sautrantikas, while the Theravadins mentions 4 Noble Truths as Dukkha, Samudaya, Nirodha and Magga, Sautrantikas have given it differently. According to the Sautrantika explanation, the 4 Noble Truths are given as follows:

- (1) Dukkha – suffering
- (2) Dukkhayatana – institution of suffering
- (3) Samudaya – causes
- (4) Magga – path

In their explanation of Dukkha, they have given the description about 5 aggregates. For the 2<sup>nd</sup>, Dukkhayata or the institution of suffering are given 12 in number, i.e., they are 5 indriyas, 5 visayas (objects), manas and buddhi (wisdom). The cause of suffering as Sautrantika mentioned comprises of defilements which are inherent in the consciousness of the being. Raga (lust), Dresha (hatred), mada (intoxicated), mana (pride) are such defilements. All the condition things exist only for a moment. The Fourth Truth Maga was explained as established Vasana (fortune), i.e., sthira vasana: danakatha, silakatha, saggakatha and kamanaj adinava.

In later Abhidhamma literature, Sautrantika contributions in the development of Buddhist theory of atom can be seen. Apart from Theravada and Sautrantika, Sarvastivadins has developed this theory in greater detail.

- Paramana – cannot be divided anymore, even can divided into four great elements.
- Sanghata paramana – collection of other atoms, became bigger. Later science divided the atom into electron, proton, neutron.

In their debates, which Sautrantikas criticized the classification given by other schools, they employed a system of logic based on a theory of their own. According to their views, the truth can be expressed through the common language. The language is made by man based on his experiences, guided by ignorance. It was used only as an instrument, to exchange different ideas among men. Therefore, it does not represent what is ultimately Truth. A system of logic that is used by a scholar comprises of language, therefore no system of logic can be believed in search of the Truth, the logic they built criticized all the existed valid ways of knowledge.

The Sautrantika enumeration of dharma differs from that of others, excepting only two levels of knowledge called Pratyaksha and Anumana (direct and inference). They show 4 fundamentals:

- (1) Rupa
- (2) Arupa

- (3) Nivarna
- (4) Vyavahara (usage)

Unlike the Sarvastivadins, their number of dharmas was very few. All dharmas consist of 43 factors:

(1) Rupa 8 :

- (a) upada (primary) – 4
- (b) upadaya (secondary) – 4

(2) Vedana 3: sukha, dukkha and nadukkhanasukha.

(3) Sabba (sagba) 6: cakshu, sota, ghana, jivha, kaya, vijbana.

(4) Samskhara 20:

- (a) Kusala 10 : body 3, speech 4 and mind 3, i.e., 10 wholesome actions (十善業)
- (b) Akusala 10: ten wholesome actions (十不善業)

(5) Vijbana 6: 六識

During the history of Buddhist thought, many attempts have been done to identify Sautrantikas either as Mahayanists or Theravadins. According to some scholars they belong to neither, they maintained a middle independent position criticized in both Theravada and Mahayana traditions. With reference to their doctrine, it has become a difficult task to categorize them under any group. The fundamental teachings of both schools (Theravada and Mahayana) and their classifications have been totally refuted by Sautrantika, no school they believed to have presented the correct teachings of the Buddha. based on their own logic they presented what they believed to be true.

《Mulamadhyamikakarika》 Translation and Annotations 注解 by David. J. Kalupahana. Another is by kennath K. Indada.

- In Kacana sutta of Sajyutta Nikaya mentioned the name of Nagarjuna.

#### 666SAUTRANTIKAS

Sautrantika is one of the sub-sects of the Theravada school, emerged around the time of 3<sup>rd</sup> century B.C. the Sautrantika School is so named because it gave pre-eminence to the Sutta portion of the canon. Its followers trace their school back to Ananda, a close disciple of the Buddha. For them, the karmic factors are insubstantial and momentary; disappearing as soon as they have been manifested only to reappear again to give rise to a new aggregate. There is continual motion by virtue of which a person passes from one condition to another. Every thought or act is pervaded by a very subtle impregnation that in turn is capable of impregnating the subconscious so as to generate new correlated psychic situations. The school is of great importance because its tenets were precursors of the Vijñānavada.

Sautrantikas don't accept Abhidhamma as the Buddha teaching. The refuses of Abhidhamma by Sautrantika was a great challenged to Sarvastivada who strongly believed in Vibhasas. As the theory of Dharma, Sautrantika developed Khanavada, by this they refuted all other theories which were made by other schools. According to them, everything changes at every moment with reference to the existence of Dhamma. Only two things can be thinking of, they are Utpāda and Vyaya. Besed on this theory of moment, Sautrantika say that we cannot know the existence of physical world in its ultimate sense, the only way we can know the world is inference.

The Vaibhasika doctrine of eternal of eternal elements is believed to be in consistent with the fundamental teaching of the Buddha. The Sautrantika insist on the non-eternality of the dharma as well. The past and future Dharma do not exist, and only present ones do. The so-called unconditioned dharmas are mere absences, not positive entities. Thus, the sautrantikas seem to be the only major school of Buddhist philosophy that comes near to regarding Nirvana as entirely negative. In their epistemology, whereas the Vaibhasikas are direct realist, the Sautrantikas hold a sort of interpretations, according to which the external world is only inferred from the mental conceptions that alone are directly apprehended.

This school processes no independent literature; instead they have translated early discourse into Sanskrit. It is believed that Harivarman who established and independent tradition called "Satyasidhi". The satyasiddhi school, probably derived from the earlier

Sautrantika school, is based on the Satyalidhi-Shastra, a work attributed to Harivarman, a 3<sup>rd</sup>–4<sup>th</sup> century Indian writer, and known only in its Chinese version (4<sup>th</sup> – 5<sup>th</sup> century). It gave birth to a school in china called Cheng Shi, which maintained that all things are merely designations devoid of reality. Human beings are enveloped in the illusion that either the ego (pudhala) or the world (dharma) is real, whereas in fact neither is. The past does not exist, the future has not yet come to be, and the present, as soon as it comes into being, disappear. Hence, the sense of continuity is illusory.

Harivarman, like the lokottaravadins, postulate a void, both of the dharma and of the ego: no dharma of any sort exist, thought from the point of view of relative truth dharma may appear to exist. In China this doctrine was sharply attacked by its opponents as destructive nihilism.

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A philosopher and poet who is considered India's greatest poet and the father of Sanskrit drama. He occupies a unique position not only in the history of Buddhist thought but also in the whole tradition of Sanskrit poetry. According to I-tsing that in his time this beautiful poem was 'widely read or sung throughout the five divisions of India, and the countries of the Southern Sea'. Today, Asvaghosa is known to us as one of the most eminent poets of Sanskrit literature.

## 666SAUTRANTIKA

Sautrantika and Santrativadin were identical. According to Vashumitra, this school believes in Sankranti transmigration of substance from one life to another of five khandha of an individual there is only one subtle which transmigration from birth to birth

this school teacher back every man has potentiality of becoming Buddha and next school is Madhyamika school, Madhyamika and Yogacara school are the real Mahayana school. The Madhyamika system emerge to emphasize the middle path introduced by the Buddha but their interpretation on middle path is somewhat different from that of early Buddhist teaching, Madhyamika describes middle path for the non acceptance of the two views concerning the existence and non existence eternity and non eternity. Its teacher neither the theory of reality nor unreality but merely of relativity. Madhyamika school originated with the teacher Nagarjuna in second century A.D. Arydeva, Buddhapalita, Chandrakirti, and Santibha are the leading teacher of Madhyamika school. *Mulamadhyamikakarika* is written by Nagarjuna which is considered as one of the masterpiece of Madhyamika philosophy which is included Sunyata philosophy the doctrine voice.

#### 666 CLARIFY THE IDENTITY OF SAUTRANTIKA PHILOSOPHY AMONG THE LATER BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHICAL TRENDS.

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#### THE EMERGENCE OF SAUTRĀNTIC TRADITION AS A REACTION TO THE ABHIDHAMMA; CRITICAL APPROACH AND MIND-ORIENTED TRENDS THAT AROSE FROM IT. (LECTURED BY VEN. INDASARA) (ORIGINAL BY VEN. ANIK CAKMA) (JUNE 2004)

Those who have accepted teaching of the *suttas* as most important of **the Buddha's** teaching are called *Sautrāntikas*. They did not accept *Vibhāca*(?) of *Sarvāstivādins*. *Abhidhamma* of *Sarvāstivādins* is not believed to be the teaching of **the Buddha** by *Sautrāntikas*. The *Dhamma*, which comes in *sutta* teaching analysis and as a result of that *Abhidhamma* teaching was formerly taught by *Sautrāntikas*, therefore by criticizing the teaching of the *Sarvāstivādins*(?) The *Sautrāntikas* formed independent *dhamma* concept. They have presented new system of *dhammā* analysis. They paid attention from new mean of knowledge. They identified *pratyakha* and *anumāna* as the means of knowledge. They have divided them into four broad groups as:

1. *Rūpa*
2. *Arūpa*
3. *Nirvāṇa*
4. *Vyavahāra*

Again, they divided *rūpa* into groups as *upādāna* and *upādāya*.<sup>10</sup> *Upādāna rūpa* was again divided into four as:

1. *Paṭhavī*
2. *Āpo*
3. *Tejo*
4. *Ākāsa*

*Upādāya rūpa* was divided into four as:

1. *Rukṣatā*
2. *Akaraśana*
3. *Gati*
4. *Uṣnatā*

There are two *arūpa dharmā* as *citta* and *karma*. The *Nirvāna* was also divided into two – *sopadisesa* and *anupadisesa*. *Vyavahāra* was divided into two as *satya* and *asatya*. This was the *Sautrāntikas'* *dharmā* analysis. When they analyzed *dharmā*, they paid special attention to *kṣanavāda* or 'momentariness'. **The Buddha** explained that everything is impermanent. When **Buddha** explained the world He used the word *aniccā* to explain the impermanency of the things. Whatever the *dhammā* exist in the world as formed, as a result of cause and effect, such *dhammā saṅkhāta* do not remain without change. **The Buddha** mentioned the characteristic of such a *dhammā*: »*Uppādo paññāyati, vayo paññāyati, ṭhitassa aññathattaṃ paññāyati.*«<sup>11</sup> To reveal the impermanency these three characteristics have been taught. These three events have been analyzed as *uppāda*, *ṭhiti* and *bhaṅga*. In **Buddhaghosa** commentaries there is explained how the idea on momentariness developed. *Theravāda* tradition and *Sarvāstivāda* tradition have developed the concept of moments according to their own way. The *Sarvāstivāda* tradition mentions four moments as *uppāda*, *ṭhiti*, *jara* and *aniccatā*.

According to *Sautrāntika* view there is no moment as *ṭhiti*, they believed only two moments – *uppāda* and *vaya* as the characteristics of *saṅkhata dhammā*. They believed whatever *dhammā* appeared as soon as it itself disappeared.<sup>12</sup> The nature of disappearing comes with the existence of *dhammā*.

»*Kṣantikaṇaṃ nasti desanantara gamanaṃ vatraivotpattih tatraiva vināsa.*«

»*Yaṃ kiñci samudayaṃ dhammaṃ sabbaṃ taṃ nirodha dhammaṃ.*«

This is the traditional teaching of *Theravāda*. *Theravāda* tradition also accepted the two moments - »*Anicca vata saṅkhārā uppāda vaya dhammino.*« Further it is explained that *saṅkhāta dhammā* are impermanent because their nature is *uppāda* and *vaya*. In *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta* it is taught how to see it: »*Samudayavayadhammānupassī vā dhammesu viharati.*« They advise us to see the *dhammā* according to the nature of appearing and disappearing - »*Uppattiya sahevedaṃ maraṇaṃ āgataṃ sadā.*« - „With birth the death is also coming.“ *Sautrāntika* tradition rejected the theory of momentariness of *Sarvāstivādins*. *Sautrāntika* tradition faced another problem when they developed the theory of momentariness, because according to their explanation of *saṅkhāta dhammā*, how it is possible to perceive the external object? '*Bahyartha anumeyavāda Sautrāntikas'* introduce the theory of *Bahyartha anumeyavāda* to perceive external world. The external world should be understood according to the inference.

<i>Sautrāntika</i>	<i>Sarvāstivāda</i>	<i>Theravāda</i> (Skt. <i>Staviravāda</i> )
<i>Uppāda</i>	<i>Ṣṭhiti</i>	<i>Ṭhiti</i>
<i>Vaya</i>	<i>Jarā-Aniccatā</i>	<i>Bhaṅga</i>

»*Tattha rūpaṃ dandhanirodhaṃ garuparivatti, cittaṃ khippanirodhaṃ lahuparivatti.*«<sup>13</sup>

*Rūpa* or form slowly change, mind or *citta* change quickly, therefore *ṭhiti kana*(?) of mind and form is not similar - slight duration of time is the difference between each other. In this way they have decided because of early Buddhist teaching. In early

<sup>10</sup> Notice, that *vayo* is missing.

<sup>11</sup> *Samyutta Nikāya – Khandhavagga-pāḷi – 1. Khandhasamyuttaṃ - 4. Natumhākaṃvaggo - 5. Ānandasuttaṃ*

<sup>12</sup> This sounds like a miracle. How can something appear as soon as it disappears? The teacher probably wanted to say that *Sautrāntikas'* belief was that things disappear as soon as they appear.

<sup>13</sup> *Añña – Visuddhimagga – Visuddhimagga-2 - 20. Maggāmaggañānadassanavisuddhiniddeso – Rūpanibbattipassanākārakathā – paragraph 700*

Buddhism: »*Nāhaṃ, bhikkhave, aññaṃ ekadhammampi samanupassāmi yaṃ evaṃ lahuparivattaṃ yathayidaṃ cittaṃ.*«<sup>14</sup> - „There is no *dhamma*, which would change (so quickly) like mind.“

*Bahyartha anumeyavāda*, the theory of inferability of the external object is commented by early Buddhism thus:  
»*Evamevakho bhikkhave cakkhuñca paṭicca rūpeca uppajjati viññāṇaṃ.*«<sup>15</sup>

The theory of inferability of the external object doesn't agree with the *Theravāda* tradition and also doesn't agree with *Sarvāstivāda* teaching of the same, but external object can be perceived. *Theravāda* said, according to *Mathupinḍika Sutta* – because of *cakkhu* and *rūpa*, eye consciousness is there, when these three come together there is a contact, because of the contact there is a feeling, due to that feeling one recognizes the object and then one reasons in it. As a result of reasoning one observes it, then one perceives with desire and one concedes a view. As a result of all those things one perceives the object. *Assutavantu Sutta* explained the different moments of *citta* and form.

According to the *Theravāda* tradition moment *ṭhiti* of *viññāṇa* is shorter than the *ṭhiti* of *rūpa*. In *Abhidhamma* one *citta* moment consists of *uppāda*, *ṭhiti* and *bhaṅga*. Such seventeen *citta-khana* or seventeen mind-moments are similar to *rūpa-dhammās* of existence, that means when mind is equal to *rūpa-dhammā*.(?) *Sautrāntikas* did not claim non-existence of external world. They believed in the external world but it should have been perceived through inference. According to their tradition the teaching about the (character of) language also has taken new concept or notion. According to them language is nothing but made concept through the world; the common characteristics of the things can be explained, therefore, the language is an invented concept of the world. Further *Sautrāntika* tradition doesn't accept (the description of) *Nibbāna* explained by the *Sarvāstivādins*. *Pratisankha nirodha* and *apratīsanakha nirodha*, these two kinds of *Nibbāna* were rejected by the *Sautrāntika* tradition.

### ***SAUTRĀNTIKAS' APPROACH TO 'OBJECT' (JUNE 2006)***

*Sautrāntikas* wanted to emphasize the perception of the object. According to the school the perception is the cognition of the ultimate reality of the *dhammās*. But these *dhammās* are not static. Accordingly, perception is three processes:

1. Perception is a natural process
2. The result is the perceptual knowledge
3. These process take numerous moments

As the first statement, the object comes into contact with the mind. Contacting the mind is the second state and the third state is the cognition of the object. The cognition is no longer in the mind. This is process which goes endlessly. One moment cannot possibly know another moment. Every successful moment is unaware of the previous moments. Therefore, actually moment of perception is left behind. When the following moment emerges, the object is left far behind muchless(?) the knowledge of it. In such a case nothing is known. This is momentariness of thought.

The teaching given by *Sautrāntikas* were helpful for the emergence of *Madhyamika* and *Yogacara* tradition. According to **A.K. Chatterjee** the development of *Madhyamika* philosophy is stated as follows:

„The *Madhyamika* is a very extreme position. The *Sautrāntika* and *Yogācāra* are both speculative systems and are spiritually akin. The *Madhyamika* is champion in their criticism entailing the rejection of all metaphysics. *Yogācāra* is therefore the natural sequence to *Sautrāntika* logic; the interpretation of *Madhyamikas* is an accident, which would/we had been dispensed with.(?) *Sautrāntikas* prepared the ground of the emergence of idealism also in another important respect.“

14 *Āṅguttara Nikāya – Ekakanipātapāḷi* - 5. *Pañihitaacchavaggo* - paragraph 48

15 (*Paramatthadīpanī* - *Saṅgaha mahāṭīkā pāṭha* – *Pathamagāthā-paramatthadīpanī* - [35] *Vibhāvaniyaṃ pana* - paragraph 31)

The *Sautrāntika* school had it difficult when advocating the theory of momentariness, whereas *Madhyamikas* took a very extreme position in declaring that everything is unreal and empty.

These two processes of realistic and critical reasoning really paved the way for the emergence of *Yogācāra viññānavāda*.

*Madhyamika* philosophy rejected always(?) elements of existence (*dhammā*). **A.K. Chatterjee** observes in this connection:

„The denial by the *Madhyamikas* of all metaphysics seems to be unqualified nihilism and barren skepticism and we have the third swining(?) of the whin(?) represented by *Yogācāra* idealism.“(?)

### SARVĀSTIVĀDA (SEPTEMBER 2009)

As we know:

- 1) *Hīnayāna* – *Sarvāstivāda* (developed in *Māgadha*), *Theravāda*, orthodox school
- 2) *Mahāyāna* – non-orthodox school (developed in *Kaśmīr*)

*Hīnayāna* – *Vaibhāśika* X *Sautrāntika*, *Sarvāstivāda*

*Mahāyāna* – *Madhyamika* X *Yogācāra*

According to Tibetan work:

1. *Ārya* – *Sarvāstivāda*
2. *Mahāsaṅghika*
3. *Ārya* – *Sammītiyas*
4. *Ārya* – *Sthavira* (*Theravāda*)

1. *Sarvāstivādins* had a vast(?). Their language, grammar was in Sanskrit.

2. At the council they have added three major texts:

- a) *Upadeśa Sūtra* (to *Sūtra Piṭaka*)
- b) *Vinaya vibhāśa śāstra* (to *Vinaya Piṭaka*)
- c) *Abhidharma vibhāśa śāstra* (to *Abhidharma Piṭaka*)

*Abhidharma Piṭaka* – there were manuscripts; according to Chinese tradition:

1. *Saṅgīti Pariyāya* (**Mahākaustila**<sup>16</sup>)
2. *Dhātukāya* (**Pūraṇa**<sup>17</sup>)
3. *Prajñāpti Sāra* (**Maudyalyāna**<sup>18</sup>)

a) *Vijñānakāya* (**Devaśarman**)

16 This is probably in Pāli **Mahā Kassapa**.

17 This is maybe **Pūraṇa Kassapa**.

18 This is probably **Mahā Moggallāna**.

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- sabbaj atti – dharma exists in past, present, future.
- In Sautrantika, they accepted uppada, vayaya, uppada, thiti

Notes:

In the study of Theravada Abhidhamma, to understand the different stages in which Abhidhamma philosophy developed. Today we have two important Abhidhamma traditions. The first of them is Sarvastivada tradition, their literary medium was Sanskrit, with the patronage of king Kanishka (1<sup>st</sup> century A.D.). This school flourished in northern India. During the reign of king Kanishka, the pioneers 拓荒者 of this school are said to have held a council under the guidance of elder Vasumitra. As that time the text their teachings were large in number. The teachings which they accepted as Sutra, Vinaya and Abhidharma were engrave 刻, 銘記 on sheet of copper and deposited inside a cetiya.

They got the name Sarvastivada as they advocated the view “sarvaj asti”. It means all things exist in all the three phases 時期 of time. This theory they developed based on the original teaching of the Buddha. They like the Theravadins were realists among Buddhist. Sarvastivadins revolted 反抗 against the dominants of the arahants like it was done by Sammitiyas, Vastiputrayas, Mahasanghikas. The transcendental powers which were ascribed to the Buddha and Bodhisattvas by the Mahasanghikas were denied by Sarvastivadins, in this aspect, they agreed with Theravadins. They believed in Antara-bhava and interim 中間 existence between this life and the next. They maintained that the Bodhisattvas were still ordinary people and even the arahants were not freed from the effect of past actions and still had something to learn.

《History of Buddhist Thought》 E.J. Thomas ;

《Systems of Buddhist Thought》 Yamakami Sogeu, culcutta, 1992.

**1. Abhidhamma of Sarvastivada.**

Sarvastivada are also called Vaibhasikas. In their Abhidhamma there are 7 texts. for the each text the author has been given, they are ascribed to the disciples of the Buddha. although the number is similar to Theravada Abhidhamma, the contents of those 7 texts differ from that of Theravada teachings. The 7 texts are:

- (1) Jbana-prasthana / banaprasthana – Aryakatyaniputra.
- (2) Savgiti-paryaya – Mahakaushthila
- (3) Prakarana-pada – Vasumitra
- (4) Vijbana-kaya – Devasharma
- (5) Dhatu-kaya – Purna
- (6) Dharmaskhandha – Aryashariputra
- (7) Prajbaptisastra – Aryamaudgalyayana.

Apart from these primary 7 texts, there is a large number of secondary Abhidhamma texts which are belonged to the Sarvastivada school. The names of some of those texts are:

1. Abhidharmakowa
2. Abhidharmakowa-bashya
3. Abhidharma-mahavibhasa-wastra
4. Abhidharmasamayadipika
5. Abhidharmayyanu-wastra
6. Abhidharmarta-wastra
7. Abhidharmahrdaya-wastra
8. Abhidharmadipa
9. Sajyuttabhidharmahrdayabha-wastra.

A.C. Banerjee has given a detail introduction to the Abhidharma literature of Sarvastivada in his book name 'Sarvastivada literature'.

### Fundamental Teachings of Sarvastivada.

In a study of fundamental teachings of the Abhidharma traditions of Theravada and Sarvastivada will reveal special features that have been developed with in the traditions. As Sarvastivada Abhidharma is of great interest among western scholars, it is significant to understand fundamental differences and the identities of present tradition as well as of others. Following is the summarizes sketch of fundamental teachings of Sarvastivada Abhidharma:

- (1) Citta – 1
- (2) Caitta – 46
- (3) Rupa – 11
- (4) Citta-viprayutta-samskara – 14
- (5) Asajskrtadharmas – 3

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Three moments of things in different schools:

	Theravada	Sarvastivada	Sautrantika
1.	Uppada (birth)	utpada (birth)	uppada (birth)
2.	thiti (stage)	sthti (stage)	vaya (destruction)
3.	bhanga (destruction)	jarata (decay)	anityata (destruction)

According to that two descriptions of dhamma given above, it can be seen that the Abhidharma of Theravadin differs from that of Sarvastivadin. Above mentioned divisions are based on the five aggregates analysis which originally occur in the Sutta Pitaka. Vibbana in five aggregates analysis has come in Abhidhamma as Citta. The words Caitta and Cetasika are used to represent the aggregates vedana, sabba and savkhara. To name the physical aspect of pesonality both the canon and Abhidhamma has used the word Rupa. There is no a division called Citta-viprayuttasamskhara in Theravada Abhidhamma. According to Sarvastivadins 14 Cittaviprayuttasamskhara dharmas neither belong to Citta nor to Rupa. They are name as a set of very subtle forces. This makes clear that these 14 dharmas are extra from 5 aggregates analysis. It is often mentioned in the Suttas that nothing exist extra to the five aggregates. Some dharmas which are presents among these 14 are given in the Theravada Abhidhamma too. But they are included in the 5 aggregates analysis. For example, the two forces prapti and aprapti being included in Bhavanga concept come under the analysis of consciousness. The concept of Jivita has been given as two under the analysis of rupa and analysis of mental-concomitants.

The four characteristics that are explained by the Sarvastivadins: utpada, sthiti, jarata and anityata are included under anipphana-rupas.

In the rupa analysis of Sarvastivadins, five sense organs and their subjects together with Avijbapti rupa have been presented. The first 10 of these 11 are similar to the explanation of early Buddhism. There is no Avijbapti-rupa in early discourses. This has been considered as an unknown dharma which holds the wholesome and unwholesome actions. The 28 fold analysis of matters in the Theravada Abhidhamma has not exceeded the teaching of early discourses.

Cataromahabhuta, pabcindriya, pabcavisaya, bhavarupa, Jivitarupa and ahararupa are given and defined according to the canonical descriptions. Some others which are not real rupas such as akasarupa, kayavijbapti and vaccivijbapti, the four characteristics utpada, sthiti, jarata and anityata and the three kinds of changes: lahuta, muduta and kammayata are included under the anipphana-rupas.

Comparitively, the number of cetasikas of Theravadins is more than that of Sarvastivadins. The Theravada analysis seems to be more tentative and authoritative. For example, Sarvastivadins have given 10 kinds of caitta called cittamahabhumaka caitta. They are associated with all the kinds of consciousness. The 10 are as follows:

1. Vedana – feeling
2. Sabba – perception
3. Cetana – volition
4. Sparsha – contact
5. Canda – desire, will
6. Prajba – wisdom
7. Smrtti – memory
8. Moksa – decision
9. Samadhi – concentration
10. Ekagrata – one-pointedness

On the contrary, Theravadins present 7 cetasikas called sabbacittasadarana which are associated with all the kinds of consciousness: passa, vedana, sabba, cetana, ekaggata, Jivindriya and manasikara. According to the research scholars the Theravada view is more close to Sutta teachings. The addition which are made by Sarvastivadins has been considered as exceeding.

《Central concept of Buddhism》 By Scherbutsky

《Abhidhammakowa》

Under the unconditioned dharmas, Theravadins include only one dhamma i.e., the nibbana. Sarvastivadins have included akasa (space) under the unconditioned dharmas. The other two according to them are pratisamkyañirodha and Apratisankhyañirodha. The latter two are reasonable because they explained them as two stages of attaining emancipation. In the first, one is able to make trshna (tāvha) feeble. In the second complete eradication of defilements take place. Living space under unconditioned dharmas is not reasonable as akasa is only a moment which shows the emptiness according to Theravadins. According to the Theravada analysis aspect of two Abhidhamma tradition as explained above shows the differences of explanation that came into existence in later times.

Apart from that, there are a large number of theoretical facts which make Theravada Abhidhamma exceed away from Sarvastivadins. Sarvastivada means ‘everything exist’ (sarvaj asti vada) i.e., the theory of existence of everything. The dharmas according to them exist thoughly during the phases 時期 of time, i.e., past, present and future. Here dharma means the analysis of mind and matter in Abhidhamma texts. according to the explanation of existence in the dialogues of the Buddha, past is a thing which is already cease to exist, future has not come yet, hence only the present exist. The scholars by comparing the view of Sarvastivadins with the Sutta explanation come to the conclusion that they have given a self-nature to the dharmas.

Among the Sarvastivada teachers who developed the present theory: Dharmatrata, Ghosa, Vasumitra and Buddhadeva are very important. They have developed four theories to prove the existence of Dharmas

truly. The 4 theories are as follows:

1. Bhavanyatavadaya – theory of changing nature
2. Lakshananyatavadaya – theory of changing characteristic
3. Avasthanyathavadaya – theory of changing occasions.
4. Apekkhanyatavadaya (also as anyathananyathavada) – theory of changing due to other causes.

《sphutarthatika》 Yasomitra (four theories is given in detailed in this book)

1. Bhavanyatavadaya – the theory of changing nature, by Dharmatrata. According to him, the nature of a thing changes, still a fundamental nature remains unchanging. They explained this situation with the following similies:

Although what is made of gold changes one from the other such as ring, necklace, the gold nature does not change.

2. Lakshananyatavadaya – every dhamma has its characteristics according to the time such as past characteristic, present characteristic and future characteristic. When that changes from past, only those characteristics of time changed, some fundamental characteristic remain unchanged. They explained with the following simile: A man who is in loved with one lady also likes other women. ??? 查
3. Avasthanyathavadaya – theory of changing occasions. A thing changes only in a particular time, it takes characteristic which belonged to that occasion, still there is a nature unchanged in it according to occasional difference. E.g. a ball (flour or clay) taken as one, it is considered as a single thing, when it is taken as ten, it is considered according to that number.
4. Apekkhanyatavadaya – due to the effect of other causes, all reason things are considered as changed. E.g. a lady to her mother is daughter, to her son she is mother, to her grandson she is grandmother. In this manner, a thing changes due to other reasons.

According to Sarvastivadins, the reason for present thing, the above four theories was that they wanted to explain the function of some fundamental Buddhist concepts. There are three of them which are very fundamental:

- (1) karitradharma – continuous activity of a given thing. According to the Buddhist teachings, a being has a continuous existence. His present life has been resulted from past existence. The future will be decided depending on present behaviour. To prove this continuous existence, excepting the theory that dharmas exist during all the three phases of time is necessary. this necessity has been explained with karitradharma.
- (2) Karmavada – the actions, which a being volitionally performs, bring due results. This as the Buddha explained one has to reap as he sows. To explain this kamma theory, the existence of dharmas has to be accepted according to Sarvastivadins.
- (3) Abhijba (highest knowledge) – when a person develops his spiritually and develops mind to the mind culture, he comes to a state where abhijba called super-knowledge are obtainable. When a person has cutupapatabana, he can examines the birth and the death of people. He will come to know where a certain being is going to be born. By understanding this wrongly, the recluses at the time of the Buddha strongly believed in a permanent soul.

Buddhism too accepts highest knowledges for this, the view of Sarvastivadins was needed very much according to them. As a result of these theoretical interpretations, different division of Sarvastivadins came into existence. Abhidhammakowa records five such groups:

- (1) Kashmira Sarvastivadins
- (2) Gandhara Sarvastivadins
- (3) Mathura Sarvastivadins
- (4) Mula-Sarvastivadins

## (5) Arya Sarvastivadins

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Sarvasavadin are also close to Theravadin but they have some additional interpretation of Abhidhama the literary medium of Sarasavadin is Sankrit because their teaching are to be understood by the scholar who are known as in the high standard of educational field. Vashubandu compiles Abhidhammaghosa in Sankrit language. Vashubandu is the great scholar in this school and he was converted to Mahayana Buddhism under the influence of his brother Asangha, this school developed in India especially in Punca north and west frontier of during the reign of king Kanisaka who was the patron of this school. The 4<sup>th</sup> Buddhist council was held during his rule period it is said that at this council under the patronage of Vashubandu, Buddhist text of Sutra, Vinay and Abhidhama were ordered to be engraved on sheet of Copper and deposited inside stupa which led to emergent of later Tantrayana Buddhism the theory of Saravan Asti is presented by Sarvastivadin which is known as generally called the dhamma are presented in present and future. Theravadin and Sarvastivadin are regarded as realists. They believed in Nairatmya (the absent of permanent soul). In the individual, they believe in Antarabhava concept) intermediate exception between this life and the next.

### ABHIDHARMA OF SARVĀSTIVĀDINS

The origin of *Sarvāstivāda* school is not known. Some scholars believe this school came to be after the Second Buddhist Council. By the time of Third Council this *Theravāda* got division into various branches and *Sarvāstivāda* was one of them. The *Abhidharma* doctrine of this school had much developed along with scholastic Buddhism. This school is considered the most representative of the entire Buddhist schools. Even the *Mahāyāna* schools were influenced by the doctrines of this school both positively and negatively.

Originally, the basic proposition of the *Sarvāstivāda* school was, as its name signifies, the doctrine of '*sarvaṃ asti*' (all things exist). From this popular and plain proposition the school developed a rational and detailed doctrine. The seven *Abhidharma* books as the fundamental *Abhidharma* of *Sarvāstivāda* are:

- |                           |                          |
|---------------------------|--------------------------|
| 1. <i>Saṅgītipariyāya</i> | 5. <i>Dhātukāya</i>      |
| 2. <i>Dharmaskandha</i>   | 6. <i>Prakarana</i>      |
| 3. <i>Prajñāpti</i>       | 7. <i>Jñānaprasthāna</i> |
| 4. <i>Vijñānakāya</i>     |                          |

These seven treatises were divided into three groups: 'early', 'middle' and 'late' according to their doctrinal contents and their form of expression.

(1) Early *Abhidharma* – from the fact that the first three treatises are all attributed to the immediate disciples of **the Buddha**, such as **Sāriputra (Sāriputta)**, **Maudgalyāyana (Moggallāna)**, **Katyāyana (Kaccāyana)**, we should infer that even if they were not the actual authors, early *Abhidharma* was developed from the methods of discourses practiced by those disciples. They were versed in *Abhidhamma* and they were described as the authors of these books, because their discourses provided the prototype for them. The *Saṅgītipariyāya* is a collection of technical terms, arranged in numerical order in exactly the same manner as that of the *Saṅgīti Sūtra* of *Dīrgha Āgama (Dīrgha Nikāya)*. The definitions and expositions are more elaborate and minute and what may be called *Abhidhammic* definition has been adopted. The *dharma-skandha* is a collection of important doctrines and theories of the early Buddhist period as found in the *āgama*. They dealt with the precepts and faith of the lay people, matters concerning the practice and enlightenment of disciples how/or(?) members of the order, and the seven *bodhyaṅgas (bojjhaṅgas)*, thus dealing with the fundamental theory and doctrine of Buddhism.

(2) *Abhidharma* of the middle period – however, we find characteristic which distinguish them from each other. The *Vijñānakāya* and the *Dhātukāya* nature(?) which are the *Abhidharma* books of *Sarvāstivāda* school of the middle period. The *Vijñānakāya* clearly expresses for the first time the thought of 'the existence of phenomena in three states of time'. *Sarvāstivāda* philosophers maintained that not only present, but past and future phenomena also have real existence throughout the three states of time. The *Dhātukāya* concerned with mental attitudes while the subject matter of the *Vijñānakāya* was the mind itself.

(3) *Abhirharma* of the late period – the *Prakarana Śāstra* and the *Jñāna Prasthāna Śāstra* belong to the *Abhidharma* of the late period. Chinese tradition makes **Vasumitra** the author of both of the *Dhātukāya* of the middle *Abhidharma* and the *Prakarana* of the late period. But between these two books we find some traces of development and change. The *Dhātukāya* introduced the problem and gave some kind of solution. The *Prakarana* re-examined them and gave other solutions. The last *śāstra*, the *Jñāna Prasthāna* in

this book, all the topics discussed in the *Sarvāstivāda* school are treated as whole in the eight chapters:

- |                                 |   |
|---------------------------------|---|
| 1. <i>Kṣudrada</i> (miscellany) | 5. <i>Mahābhūta</i> (four elements of matter) |
| 2. <i>Saṅyojana</i> (fetters)   | 6. <i>Indriya</i> (controlling principles)    |
| 3. <i>Jñāna</i> (wisdom)        | 7. <i>Samādhi</i> (meditation)                |
| 4. <i>Karma</i> (action)        | 8. <i>Drṣṭi</i> (views)                       |

### SARVĀSTIVĀDINS' TEACHING ON 'INDIVIDUAL' – WORD & BEING (2009)

According to the *Sarvāstivādins*:

1. The existence of five *dhammās* are:

- a) *citta*
- b) *cetasika*
- c) *rūpa*
- d) *visamprayukta saṅkhāra*
- e) *Asaṅskruta*

2. The being and the objects constituted out of the *dhammās* at a particular time.

3. The being and the objects are subjected to disintegrate.

4. The *dhammās* do not disintegrate.

	<i>Therāvāda</i>	<i>Sarvāstivāda</i>
1	<i>Rūpa</i>	<i>Rūpa</i>
2	<i>Vedanā</i>	<i>Caitasika</i>
3	<i>Saññā</i>	---
4	<i>Saṅkhārā</i>	<i>Visamprayutta Saṅkhārā</i>
5	<i>Viññāṇa</i>	<i>Asavikāra citta</i>

The *dhammās* exist in their subtlest state.

The arguments given in *Kathāvattuppakarana*:

*Sarvāstivādins*: „All the five *dhammās* exist but not always and not everywhere and in the sense of form.“ (This theory is called by *Theravāda* '*Suddhikanaya*' = 'pure logic'.

*Theravādins*: „If the material aggregate does not give up its materiality (*rūpabhava*) then *rūpabhāva* becomes permanent, eternally existing like *Nibbāna*.“

*Sarvāstivādins*: „*Rūpabhava* is different from *Nibbānabhava*.“

*Theravādins*: They asked whether the past (*atīta*) gives up its pastness (*atītabhava*).

*Sarvāstivādins*: „No, it doesn't. When the *atītabhāva* exists, *anāgatabhāva* and *paccuppannabhava* do not exist like *atītabhāva*, when the *anāgatabhāva* exists *atītabhāva* does not exist like *anāgatabhāva*.“

### SARVĀSTIVĀDA ABHIDHAMMA (SHORT NOTES)

- rūpa – 01; cetasika – 11; Nirvāṇa, asaṅkhāta – 3; citta viprautta – 14

- Four views regarding the *dhammās*:

1. *Bhavanyata* (Ācariya Dhammatralā) – the future *dhammās* do not exist continuously
2. *Lakṣanayata* (Ācariya Ghosa) – *dhammās* bear *tri-kāla* (past, present, future)
3. *Avasthānyatha* (Ācariya Vasumitra) – *dhammās* change in *tri-kāla*
4. *Anyatanyata* (Ācariya Bhudadeva) – *dhammās* exist all in *tri-kāla*

### SABBATTIVĀDA (PĀLI)/SARVĀSTIVĀDA (SANSKRIT)

*Sarvāstivāda* was a *Hīnayāna* school with its *Piṭakas* in Sanskrit. The *Sarvāstivādins* adopted grammatical Sanskrit as their literature and they possessed canon in three divisions, namely *Sutra*, *Vinaya*, *Abhidharma*. The *Sarvāstivāda* maintained that the *Dhamma* exists all time in the past, present and future, but the *Theravādins* did not accept it. *Sarvāstivādins* accepted the fundamental teaching of the *Dhamma* such as *anattā* and *aniccā*. They said that the beings and objects were constituted out of the *dhammas*, but *dhammas* always exist in their subtlest states. For instance, *vedanā* may be *kusala*, *akusala* and *avyākata*, so the *dhamma* exists all the time.<sup>19</sup>

The first argument between *Sarvāstivāda* and *theravāda* was the existence of the *dhammas*. While *Sarvāstivādins* said, that the *dhammas* existed all the times, in that sense *Theravādins* did not agree and stated that if the *dhammas* existed all the time, then *micchā diṭṭhi* and *sammā diṭṭhi* should have existed together too. Again they added that if the past and future existed in the same time, existence should have been predicated in the same way at present too. Then *Sarvāstivādins* denied that point and said that the past and the future existed but not exactly in the same form like one would speak at the present.

Moreover, *Theravādins* started second argument, saying that let the present material aggregate (*paccuppanna-rūpa*) exist as one inseparable object. But after that, this material aggregate becomes the past and gives up its presence (*paccuppanna-bhava*). For this argument, *Sarvāstivādins* agreed with the *Theravāda's* view. Nevertheless, *Sarvāstivādins* denied that the material aggregate would give up its materiality (*rūpa-bhava*). They have shown an example, that let a piece of white cloth be regarded as one inseparable object and when this cloth would change its color, it would give up its white color.

Then touching that, *Sarvāstivādins* gave the example of *Sakadāgāmī*, as an illustration. A *Sakadāgāmī* person reduced *rāgallobha*, *dosa*, *moha* to be lesser and his following rebirth continues from the past *dhammas*. Without the *dhammas* in the past, the present does not come to be proceeding. Otherwise, it would be an *Arahant*, who completely free from moral defilements such as *rāgallobha*, *dosa*, *moha*, but according to *Theravādins* these defilements are destroyed forever, whereas according to *Sarvāstivādins* they persist through an effective(?) form. So the defilements may reappear and cause from(?) *Arahant*. As mentioned above, that is the main point for *Sarvāstivāda* in Buddhism.

### SARVĀSTIVĀDA (SHORT NOTES)<sup>20</sup>

It is very important Buddhist school that broke away from the main *Theravāda* school, sometime around 3<sup>rd</sup> century BC. The Buddhists of that time were facing the problem of explaining some of the fundamental doctrines such as rebirth, *kamma*, memory etc. As *Theravādins* accepted the *anattā* doctrine and also held that only the present time is real, it became a problem as to show how past *kamma* gives results in the future, if there is no soul, how is rebirth possible.

19 Here, indeed, a note is needed. The *dhamma* here is any phenomenon, any thing. The *Sarvāstivādins* simply believed, that all things in the world are regardless whether they can be cognized by human senses or not. They assume that all the things are already existing and then, consequently the things just take a form which we cognize.

20 This 'note' was among the notes for second year, but I believe that for third year students it will be more useful.

To explain these problems fractions of monks came up with the theory that not only the present, but also past and future periods are real. On this they explained that everything exists in all three periods of time. Thence their name 'all exist in all three periods of time'.

To show that they are different from soul-theorists they came up with the theory of *svabhāva* (own-nature) and *kāritra* (the functional nature of *dhammās*). On this they explained how *dhammās* prevail throughout their own-nature and how they appear in the presence due to *kāritra*.

This became a very influential school and it is this school that came to be criticized by **Nāgarjuna**.

**666**POINT OUT THE SPECIFIC CHARACTERISTIC OF THE SARVASTIVADA ABHIDHAMMA. (818)

Abhidhamma is a class of literature which deals with philosophical and theological topics. In the past there were many Abhidhamma texts of the various sects. However, only those of the Theravada and of the Sarvastivada remain today.

The number of Abhidharma texts of Sarvastivada is just the same in that of the Theravada, the difference being that the latter collections consists of seven independent works while the former of one principal treatise the Jbana-prasthanawastra of Katyayaniputra with its six padas or supplements. The 7 texts are:

1. Jbanaprasthanawastra
2. Savgiti-paryaya-pada-wastra
3. Dharmaskandha-pada-wastra
4. Prajbapti-pada-wastra
5. Jbanakaya-pada-wastra
6. Dhatukaya-pada-wastra
7. Prakarana-pada-wastra

According to the Sarvastivadins everything exists forever (*sarvaj sarvada asti*). It means that all dharmas exist in the three periods of time, and the emphasis put on the reality (*svabhava*) of dharmas is indicative of the conception that not only their present, but their past as well as future transition, too, represent something real.

The specific characteristic of the Sarvastivada Abhidhamma is that the Sarvastivadins made an entirely new classification in which the whole of existence is treated under the 5 dharmas which exist at past, present and future. The 5 dharmas again sub-divided into 75 as follows:

- |   |   |                              |
|---|---|------------------------------|
| (1) Rupa – matter, divided into primary and secondary → 11  | } | sajskṛta 72<br>(conditioned) |
| (2) Citta – consciousness → 1                               |   |                              |
| (3) Caitasika – mental factors → 46                         |   |                              |
| (4) viprayukta-sajskara – elements which are neither matter |   |                              |

nor mental forces → 14



(5) asajskrtas – immutable elements → 3

asajskrta (unconditioned)

The dharmas are divided into two major groups: sajskrta and asajskrta dharmas. The sajskrta dharmas are those which are caused, conditioned, mundane, impermanence, non-eternal and associated with asravas (taints). The asajskrta dharmas are those which are not subject to cause or condition and therefore are transcendental, unchanging, eternal and free from asravas. According to Vasubandhu, the sajskrta dharmas are real (sasvabhava) while the asajskrta dharmas are not real but a concept (prajbaptisat) only.

The sajskrta dharmas are also called adhva, kathavastu, sanihsara and savastuka.

- (a) They are called ‘adhva’ because they are subject to change.
- (b) They are called ‘kathavastu’ as they are subject to Hetu-pratyaya and the objects of discourses of past, present and future.
- (c) They are called ‘sanihsara’ as they, including the 4 Noble Truths and the Noble Eightfold Path, are subject to annihilation, because not only from the impure dharmas but also from the Noble path annihilation is necessary.
- (d) They are called ‘savastukas’ as they are dependent of causes.

The 75 dharmas, 72 of them sajskrta are divided into four groups: rupa, citta, caitasikas and citta-viprayukta, and three asajskrta being a new class of forces which were not classed as mental or material.

The different classification of dharmas between the Sarvastivada and Theravada Abhidhamma are show below:

	Sarvastivada	Theravada
1. Rupa	11	28
2. Citta	01	89/121
3. Caitta	46	52
4. Viprayukta 14		--
5. asajskrta	03	01
75		170/192

The theory of moment, according to the Sarvastivadins describes as four forces: jati, sthiti, jara and nasa, With the emergence of the conception of substance (svabhava), the Sarvastivadins made full use of this concept to explain the problem of continuity of phenomena, which they analyzed into momentary existences. Four theories were suggested by the four famous Sarvastivada teachers:

- 1. Vasumitra held that a dharma passing through the three periods of time, having come to each state or

condition is called past or present or future. The state or condition is determined by the causal efficiency or causal activity. If the causal efficiency is present, it is called the present; if the causal efficiency is no more, it is called the past; and if the efficiency is not yet manifest, it is called the future.

2. Ghosa propounded a theory of change of characteristics. A past dharma, according to him, is possessed of the characteristic of pastness, but dispossessed of the characteristics of presentness and futurity, like a man who is attached to one woman, but is at the same time unattached to other woman.
3. Dharmatrata upheld a theory of change of existences. He maintained that when a dharma passes through the three periods of time, there is change of existence or state, but not substance. For example, the gold, which may be seen in various shapes or forms, while the gold itself remains unchanged.
4. Buddhadeva proposed a theory of a change of relations. A dharma is said to be past in relation to the present and future, present in relation to the past and future, and future in relation to the past and present. It is like a woman who is a mother in relation to her daughter and a daughter in relation to her own mother.

A mastery survey of the Sarvastivadin's thought was elaborated by Vasubandhu in his *Abhidharmakowa-wastra* and became the basic text for the development of Sarvastivada in China and Japan. He then produced a commentary 'Abhidharmakowa-bhasya', which offered an incisive critique of it from a largely Sautrantika viewpoint.

### 666 ABHIDHARMA OF THE SARVASTIVADINS:

The origin of Sarvastivada School is not known. Some scholars believe this school comes rose the 2<sup>nd</sup> Buddhist council. By the time of 3<sup>rd</sup> council this Theravada got division into various branches and Sarvastivada was one of them. The Abhidharma doctrine of this school developed along with scholastic Buddhism. This school is considered the most representative of the entire Buddhist schools. Even the Mahayana schools were influenced by the doctrines of this school both positively and negatively.

Originally, the basic proposition of the Sarvastivada School was, as its name signifies, the doctrine of "sarvam asti" (all things exist). From this popular and plain proposition the school developed a rational and detailed doctrine. The seven Abhidharma books as the fundamental Abhidharma of the Sarvastivada. They are:

- 1 the Sangitiparyaya, 2 the Dharmaskandha, 3 the Prajnapti, 4 the Vijnanakaya,  
5 the Dhatukaya, 6 the Prakarana, 7 the Jnanaprasthana.

**A** Early Abhidharma: The first three treatises are all attributed to the immediate disciples of the Buddha, such as Sariputra, Maudgalyayana, Katyayana, and this shows that early Abhidharma was developed from the method of discourse practiced by those disciples. They were versed in Abhidharma and they were described as the authors of these books because their discourses provided the prototype for them. The Sangiti-paryaya is a collection of technical terms, arranged in numerical order in exactly the same

manner as that of the Sangiti-sutra of the Dirgha Agama (Digha Nikaya). The dharma-skandha is a collection of important doctrines and theories of the early Buddhist period, as found in the agama.

**B** Abhidharma of the middle period: The Vinna-kayasatra and the Dhatu-kaya. The Vinnakaya clearly expresses for the first time the thought of “The existence of phenomena in three states of time.” The Sarvastivada philosopher maintained that not only the present, but past and future phenomena also have real existence through out the three states of time. The Dhatu-kaya concern with mental attitudes while the subject matter of the Vijnna-kaya was the mind itself.

**C** Abhidharma of the late period: the Prakarana Sastra and the Jnana-prasthanasastra belong to the Abhidharma of late period. Chinese tradition makes Vasumitra the author both the Dhatukaya of the middle Abhidharma and the prakarana of the late period. But between these two books we find some traces of development. The Prakarana re-examined them and gave other solutions. In the last sastra, the Jnana prasthanasastra, in this book, all the topics discussed in the Sarvastivada School are treated as a whole, in the eight chapters of ksudrada (miscellany), samyojana (fetters), jnana (wisdom), karma (action), mahabhuta (four elements of matter), indriya (controlling principles), Samadhi (meditation) and drsti (view).

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### **666(SARVASTIVADA DOCTRINE AND ABHIDHAMMIC TRADITION)27.08.07**

the sarvastivada is a Buddhist school that originated in the period Abhidharma Buddhism, around 2nd century B.C the central of this school that, dharma exist in all the three periods of time, here dharma means sankhatadharma and asankhatadharma(conditionality and unconditionality). at least by the time of Katelyaniputra. this school evolved theory of causality which enumerated five different causes as follow:

1. the co-existence(sahabhu hetu)
2. the conjoint cause(samprayataka hetu)
3. the homogeneous cause(sabhava hetu)
4. the universal cause(saravatra hetu)
5. The retribution causes (vipaka hetu).

of the five co-existences cause of which the conjoint cause is a sub-sect confine to the mental domain represent a doctrine of simultaneous cause relationship this doctrine was of great doctrinal significant for the Sarvastivada among other things it land support to their doctrinal of direct perception .

on the later again reinforce their doctrine pluralistic realism. For the sarvastivadin one can be absolutely certain about the existence external object our five senses directly perceive them.

#### Existence of external object

Thus within a single moment of visual perception. the visual faculty, the object and corresponding visual consciousness all arise simultaneously,

All three functions as co-existence cause just as the five physical sense, the mind too, perceive mental object directly (Manitri and Manovinna) one of the major argument of the sarvastivadin for their theist of tri-temporary existence is that the object of the perception must be existence. they maintain that the power of an object to cause a cognition (bodhi)in us is the trust mark o the real, the fact that the mind can think of past and future object then constitute an important prove for the reality in existence of past and future dhamma.

the sautrantika, another Abhidamika school on the insisted that causality necessary involved a temporal sequent this basic premise couple with the doctrine of momentary (ksanikavada) lead them to an epistemological theory indirect perception if everything is momentary and is a cause necessary percept and effect then the inevitable conclusion is that we can never ever have direct knowledge of external reality.

what we actually perceive is only a mental image left behind in the mind by perceptual object as it arise only to perish within a moment . this sautrantika theory presented a serious threat to sarvastivada realism and contributed significantly to the Mahayana doctrine( around 4th century A.D) of Vijnatrimatrika, that external reality nothing but a projection of the mind but if our perception is necessary indirect and depend on a mental image as the actual object, then the very treasure of the tri-temporary existence of dhamma is as stated or doubtful because it follows among other things that we can not show certain as world the sarvastivadin are object our perception are always and necessary really. the sautrantika hold that the reality of the external object can only being infer(bakya tameya). indeed, a sautrandika views that object of perception may or may not real.

from the a bout outline of the fundamental different in the epistemological position between two abhidhamma school we can readily appreciate how the validity or otherwise of the type of simultaneous causation as educated by the sarvastivadin because dispute more importantly however this doctrine is in dispensable for the fundamental theist of sarvastivada of the four majors argument put forward for the theist it is divided into four parts. (1) uktatvat (2)dveaya (3)sadvisayat (4)phata.

the first is simply and inference from the Budha mention of past and future object, C and D are the only two logical arguments and lost one essential has the same stress as supported by the Buddha on a statement, argue that since the object of any perception must be existence, the fact that the mind can think of past and future object then proof the reality of past and future dhamma and argues that past dhamma must exist since a past Karma is causally, in generally in present vipaka now must know that these two logical argument can not stand unless the simultaneous causality exemplified by the sahabhuhetu is considered , both required the cause and effect be existing simultaneously. at the same time , though they may belong to different time period with respect to their own temporal of reference that is A may be past present of future and B may also past or present of future but they must co-existence where A and B are necessary co-existence, both existence at the same time present moment we have the category known as the sahabhutahetu, in fact in the sarvastivada conception all dharma in their nature have always been existence , it is only a matter of their arising through cause and condition.

(Continue topic)

In conclusion he states that Sahabhutu is not a theory of causation and as part of its definition, in several ability. expressed as usual cause and effect in actuality concerning the dharma can not included in the theory of law of causation.

1. What is the essential nature of sabhava of sahabhutu?

(Answer), all the conditions (samskruta dharma).

2. what is the meaning of sahabhuta?

2. sahabhu means not mutually separate or sharing the same effect or mutually according with one another . This sahabhuta is definitely found in the three periods of time and produce the varies effects

3. What is the conjoint cause?

3. All the dharma which are taught on the thought concomitant (citta and cetasika).

4. Why are the thought and thought concomitant mutually conjoint to one another?

4. Because they are reciprocally cause resent to emerge their mutual nourished, mutual strength, and mutual dependent.

They can accomplish their activity only through mutual dependent, if we were to ask sensation (vedana) without conception (sanna) can use expressed object?

The answer would be known the some question apply to the thought and thought concomitant.

## 666 THE TEACHING OF SARVASTIVADA

Sarvastivada was one of the 4 main branches. Sarvastivadins were the leaders during the 4<sup>th</sup> council of Kanishka. Sarvastivada gave rise to Vaibhasika.

The main theme in their doctrine is “Sarvaj sarvada asti” which means everything exists in three periods of time, and the emphasis put on the reality (svabhava) of dharmas is indicative of the conception that not only their present, but past as well as future transition, too, represent something real. The word ‘sarvaj’ (all) is something beyond the general acceptance. Sarvaj means skandha, dhatu, ayatana etc. According to them all dhammas belong to cause and effect and are existing e.g. namarupa consists of 5 skandhas and are of cause and effect. Sarvastivada considered what is internal and external as dhammas.

According to them, dhamma denotes ‘all’ and they say that it exists truthfully, and they are obvious and realistic. Since they considered all dhammas as absolute, according to them, they can be considered as realistic. Since they are connected with Abhidhamma, they put forward this type of intricate thought.

Sarvastivadins accept an extreme realistic view. According to them, subject and object (senses and sense-objects) are both existing. The Ksanavada (momentary) of Sarvastivadins takes a new outlook. They believe that one can know the outer world by means of realization and understanding. Thus they are against Sautrantikavadins who based mainly on Ksanavada. The Sautrantikas say one cannot know the outer world by realization,

because it is momentary. Sarvastivadins say, through the contact of sense and sense-object, one can understand outward things (dhamma). Sarvastivada accept the lasting (stithi) of dhammas, but not Sautrantikas, and this is their major difference.

The Sarvastivadins give up ‘puggalavada’ while the Sammitiyas tried to prove ‘puggalavada’ on various themes. The Sammitiyas considering memory, the paramitta, good and bad actions, to make ethic fruitful, brought about the puggalavada. They being within anamatvada tried to become puggalavadins. But Sarvastivadins were against them. The Sarvastivadins believe that there is dharma but not a puggala. Therefore, they are called ‘pudgala-nairyatmaka-vada’. The pudgalavadins (sammitiyas) and the Sautrantika who are ksanavada are against Sarvastivada. According to the concept of time, Sarvastivada say dhamma exists in the past, present and future.

Sarvastivadins give a prominent place to Abhidhamma, because it is in Abhidhamma we get the categorization of dhamma. According to Vasubandhu’s Abdihammakosa, abhidhamma is called ‘Amala prajba’, which in term means

Nibbana. Abhidhamma is the path to Nibbana. According to them, there is no nibbana apart from the division of dhamma, which is called 'dharma pravaca'. There is no giving up of defilement without it. Rupa is divided into many ways, namely one's own characteristic, general characteristic, there are divisions as sawrava and anawrava, sajkruta and asajkruta. This has been explained in the Abhidhammakosa.

Sarvastivadins do not accept the division of dhamma in the Theravada. According to the Theravada, the paramatta amount to 4, according to Sarvastivada amount to 5 ( including the viprayukta-samskara i.e elements which are neither matter nor mental).

Sarvastivadins give both:

1. The general characteristic of all dhamma
2. An individual characteristic of one and each dhamma.

Sarvastivadins say that the material world and the mental world are both separated from each other. One does not expect the other, one does not exist because of the other. Critique says that they are accepting both general characteristic and one's own characteristic which are in contradiction.

With regard to Sajsara and nirvana, Sarvastivada accept satvada.

Although they say sarvaj asti, there are arguments about the existence of dhamma with regard to various teachers.

### **1. Bhavayata – Dharmatrata**

The anagata dhammas do not stay there throughout. They come to present, then there is no future characteristic, they are called present. The present soon becomes past, then they are called past, but their root does not changed. Milk becomes curd and though the taste is different but the colour is the same.

### **2. Lakshanyata – Ashvagosha**

Those of the past are of past characteristic but there are also instances of present and future. The dhamma of future has characteristic of future but not devoid of present and past. The dharma of present is of present characteristic there also has

past and future instances. A man who is in love with one woman, is not devoid of affection to other women.

### **3. Avasthanyata – Vasumitra**

According to instances the dhamma of the three colour, (i.e. past, present, future) differs. But the root forms do not changed. The 'aggala' is one but it can be separated into small fragments.

#### 4. Anyathanyata – Buddhadeva

He says that the dhamma when coming to various periods (i.e. past, present and future) they take various names but they only denote the time and it is relative.

### 666 COMPARE AND CONTRAST THE SARVASTIVADA ABHIDHAMMA WITH THAT OF THERAVADA.

Originally, the basic proposition of the Sarvastivada School was, as its name signifies, the doctrine of "Sarvam Asti" (all things exist). From this popular and plain proposition the school developed a rational and detailed doctrine. The seven Abhidhamma books as the fundamental Abhidhamma of the Sarvastivada. They are: 1. the Sangitiparyaya, 2 the Dharmaskadha, 3 the Prajnapti, 4 the Vijnanakaya, 5 the Dhatukaya, 6 the Prakarana, 7 the Jnanprasthanana. These seven treatises divided into three groups: early, middle and late, according to their doctrinal contents and their form of expression.

Early Abhidharma: from the fact that the first three treatises are all attributed to the immediate disciples of the Buddha, such as Sariputra, Maudgalyayana, Katyayana, we should infer that even if they were not the actual authors, early Abhidharma was developed from the method of discourse practiced by those disciples. They were versed in Abhidharma and they were described as the authors of these books because their discourses provided the Prototype for them. The Sangiti-paryaya is a collection of technical terms, arranged in numerical order in exactly the same manner as that of the Sangiti-Sutta of the Dirgha Agama (Digha Nikaya)...

Abhidhamma of the middle period: however, we find characteristic, which distinguish them from each other. The Vijnanakayasatra and the Dhatu-kaya nature which the Abhidhamma books of Sarvastivada school of the middle period. The Vinnakaya clearly expresses for the first time the thought of "the existence of phenomena in three states of time". The Sarvastivada philosopher maintained that not only the present, but past and future phenomena also have real existence through out the three states of time. The Dhatu-kaya concerned with mental attitudes while the subject matter of the Vijnana-kaya was the mind itself.

Abhidharma of the late period: the Prakarana Sastra and the jñāna-prasthanana Sastra belong to the Abhidhamma of late period. Chinese tradition makes Vasumitra the author both the Dhatukaya of the middle Abhidharma and the prakarana of the late period. But between these two books we find some traces of development and change the Dhatu-kaya introduced the problem and gave some kind of solution. The Prakarana, in this book, all the topics discussed in the Sarvastivāda School are treated as a whole, in the eight chapters of Ksudrada K(Miscellany), Samyojana (fettters), Jñāna (wisdom), Kamma (action), Mahabhuta (four elements of matter), Indriya (controlling principles), Samadhi (meditation), and Drsti (view).

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### 666 POINT OUT THE SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE DHARMA CLASSIFICATION OF THERAVADINS AND SARVASTIVADINS. (940)

Sarvastivada detached itself from the Theravada around the time of Asoka (3<sup>rd</sup> century B.C.) selected Mathura as the venue of their early activities. Taking a different tack than the Sthaviravada monks, the

Sarvastivadin scholastics developed their own set of canonical texts which adopted Sanskrit for their literary medium.

The number of Abhidharma texts of Sarvastivada is just the same in that of the Theravada, the difference being that the latter collections consists of seven independent works while the former of one principal treatise the Jbana-prasthanawastra with its six padas or supplements. The Sarvastivada's Abhidhamma exist only in Chinese version. The seven books of both are:

<u><i>Theravada</i></u>	<u><i>Sarvastivada</i></u>
1. Dhammasangani	Savgiti-paryaya-pada
2. Vibhanga	Dharmaskandha-pada
3. Dhatukatha	Dhatukaya-pada
4. Puggala-pabbatti	Prajbapti-pada
5. Kathavatthu	Vijbana-pada
6. Yamaka	Prakarana-pada
7. Patthana	Jbana-prasthanana

According to the classification of Dhamma in the Abhidhamma, the Theravadins classified into four categories or the four ultimate realities as rupa, citta, cetasika and nibbana, whereas the Sarvastivadins classified into 5 categories as rupa, citta, caitta, viprayukta-sajskara and asajskrtas.

The specific characteristic of the Sarvastivada Abhidhamma is that the Sarvastivadins made an entirely new classification in which the whole of existence is treated under the 5 dharmas which exist at past, present and future. However, according to the Theravadins, there is no existence of cosmic elements in the past and future, but exist in the present only.

The different classification of dharmas between the Sarvastivada and Theravada Abhidhamma are shown below:

	<u><i>Sarvastivada</i></u>	<u><i>Theravada</i></u>
1. Rupa	11	28
2. Citta	01	89/121
3. Caitta	46	52
4. Viprayukta 14		--
5. asajskrta	<u>03</u>	<u>01</u>
	75	170/192

The main different is that the Sarvastivadins divided dharma into two major groups, i.e., sajskrta and asajkrta dharmas.

(1) Rupa – matter → 11

(2) Citta – consciousness → 1

sajskrta 72

(3) Caitasika – mental factors → 46

(4) viprayukta-sajskara – elements which are neither matter  
nor mental → 14



(5) asajskrtas – immutable elements → 3 asajskrta

The sajskrta dharmas are those which are caused, conditioned, mundane, impermanence, non-eternal and associated with asravas (taints). The asajskrta dharmas are those which are not subject to cause or condition and therefore are transcendental, unchanging, eternal and free from asravas. According to Vasubandhu, the sajskrta dharmas are real (sasvabhava) while the asajskrta dharmas are not real but a concept (prajbaptisat) only.

## **Rupa**

According to the Theravada Abhidhamma, rupa is the 3<sup>rd</sup> reality. The Theravadins recognize 28 kinds of material phenomena. Four of these are called primary, 24 are secondary. The secondary kinds are dependent on primary. These 28 kinds of rupa are divided into two classes, 18 are real (nipphannarupa), 10 are unreal (anipphannarupa).

The rupa in the Sarvastivada is divided into 11 categories. The first five are called visaya (five sense objects), the following five are called indriya (five sense organs), and the last one is called avijbapti (unmanifested matter).

## **Citta**

The Theravada distinguishes *citta* into a variety of types, are reckoned as 89 or 121. The consciousness is classified under four divisions according to the plains in which it is experienced, they are:

- (i) sense-sphere consciousness → 54
- (ii) fine-material sphere consciousness → 15
- (iii) immaterial sphere consciousness → 12
- (iv) supramundane consciousness → 8

With respect to the nature of the above four divisions, they are divided itself into four classes, i.e. 12 akusala, 8 kusala, 23 vipaka and 11 kiriya.

Unlike the Theravadins who recognized every conceivable instance and aspect of mind as different dhammas, the Sarvastivadins, while accepting the existence of six types of sense-perception, considered citta to be a single dhamma.

## **Cetasika**

The Theravada Abhidhamma lists 52 kinds of cetasikas. One is *vedana*, another is *sabba*. The remaining 50 are grouped together under the term *savkhara*. The 52 cetasikas are classified into four broad categories as follows:

- i. 7 universals
- ii. 6 occasional
- iii. 14 unwholesome factors – first 4 are wholesome universals, the rest 10 are unwholesome occasions.
- iv. 25 beautiful factors – sub-divided into beautiful universals (19), abstinences(3), illimitables (2) and non-delusion (1).

The Sarvastivadins recognized 46 cetasika which are again sub-divided into 6 categories:

- i. mahabhumika – 10
- ii. kusalamahabhumika – 10
- iii. klesamahabhumika – 6
- iv. akusalamahabhumika – 2
- v. upaklesabhumika – 10
- vi. aniiyatabhumika – 8

According to the Sarvastivadins, the 46 caittas of which the first ten present in every moment of consciousness and are comparable to the common cetasikas of the Theravada list. Another ten of kusalamahabhumika are comparable to the kusala cetasikas of the Theravadins. Six are klesamahabhumika which are not always absolutely unwholesome; they are sometimes neutral in the progress towards final deliverance, but are nevertheless always obscured by promoting the belief in the existence of a personality. Two caittas are present in every moment of unwholesome consciousness and are called akusalamahabhumika. Ten are secondary passions called upaklesabhumika, and the remaining eight caittas are capable of entering into various combinations; they are called the aniyatabhumika.

## **Viprayukta-sajskara**

The category of fourteen viprayukta-sajskaras in which 14 dhammas are included in the Sarvastivadins Abhidhamma. There is no such classification is found in the Theravada Abhidhamma.

## Nibbana \ Asajskrtas

Nibbana is the fourth ultimate reality in the Theravada Abhdhamma. In this state, nibbana is unconditioned and it is neither created nor formed which is free from suffering and rounds of rebirth. And this is a state which is not subjected to the laws of birth, decay and death.

According to the Sarvastivadins, the unconditioned state is called asajskrtas, under 3 categories of akasa, pratisajkhyanirodha and apratisajkhyanirodha. This asajskrta being a new class of forces which were not classed as mental or material. In early Buddhism 'asajskrta' meant nirvana, in this state, it came to mean permanent, not-changing entities.

A mastery survey of the Sarvastivadin's thought was elaborated by Vasubandhu in his Abhidharmahidharmakowa-wastra, became the basic text for the development of Sarvastivada in China and Japan. He then produced a commentary 'Abhidharmakowa-bhasya', which offered an incisive critique of it from a largely Sautrantika viewpoint.

**NON-ANALYTICAL CESSATION (APRATISAṆKYA NIRODHA) – NO CONDITIONS FOR THE PRODUCTION OF DEFILEMENTS (2009)**  
*Mahīśāsaka*: „Nirvāna is unconditioned, because the practices established by **the Buddha** were eternal truth.“  
*Sarvāstivāda*: „Though the Nirvāna ... wisdom, **Buddha** really was conditioned and not eternal.“(?)

Unconditioned *dhammā* of *Sarvāstivāda*:

1. *Partisaṅkya nirodha* (analytical cessation)
2. *Apratisaṅkya nirodha* (non-analytical cessation)
3. *Ākāsa* (space)

*Theravāda* – Unconditional *dhammā* – *Nirvāna*

Unconditional *dhammās* are mentioned in *Kaukatika*, *Lokuttaravāda*, *Ekavyavahāya*(?), *Mahīśāsaka*

- |  |  |
|--|--|
| (a) Analytical cessation               | (f) Realm of infinity of nothingness                           |
| (b) Non-analytical cessation           | (g) The reality of neither consciousness nor non-consciousness |
| (c) Space                              | (h) The law of Dependent Origination                           |
| (d) Realm of infinity of space         | (i) The law of Eightfold Noble Path                            |
| (e) Realm of infinity of consciousness |  |

## 666YOGÂCÂRA PRINTED

is a Sanskrit term literally meaning 'practice of yoga' or 'practitioner of yoga.' It most often refers to one of the two main doctrinal systems of Indian Mahâyâna Buddhism, the other being the Madhyamaka ('Middle Way') school. What distinguishes Yogâcâra from other doctrinal systems is its denial of reality to objects external to the consciousnesses perceiving them. All other Buddhist philosophies assert that an object of, for example, a visual consciousness acts as a stimulus to that consciousness and is one of its causes. However, this school rejects such objective causality and says that a sense consciousness and its object occur simultaneously, having been produced from a single internal cause, and are thus the same substantial entity. Liberation will be attained when all objects of consciousness are perceived in this way. Another important Yogâcâra doctrine is that of describing all phenomena in terms of three natures: imaginary, dependent, and absolute. The latter corresponds to emptiness.

The oldest use of the term 'yogacara' is in its literal meaning and refers to those who practice standard forms of meditation -- on such things as the impurity of the body, universal love, and interdependent-arising.

'Yogâcâra' is first seen in its doctrinal use in the title Yogâcârabhûmi, the name given by Asanga to his massive compendium of doctrine and practice. Asanga (ca. 310-390 C.E.) is the founder of the system, although tradition declares him to have learnt it from the Bodhisattva Maitreya and to have relied on the Samdhinirmocana Sûtra ('Sutra Unravelling [Buddha's] Thought') which is ascribed to the historical Buddha Shakyamuni. Asanga is reported to have travelled, having first meditated for twelve years, to the Pure Land of Maitreya, where he received teaching from Maitreya and brought back to the mundane world five books, three of which teach Yogâcâra principles. Asanga's brother Vasubandhu is another major writer of the Yogâcâra persuasion.

Since the main emphasis in this school was the phenomenology of consciousness, their contribution to Buddhism as a whole is in this area. They introduced the doctrine of the transformation of ordinary consciousnesses into enlightened consciousnesses, as well as that of ten stages on the way to Buddhahood. Much of what is later seen in Buddhist Tantra (or Vajrayana) can be traced back to Yogâcâra.

Yogâcâra is often said to be Buddhist Idealism. It can, however, be argued that most Buddhist philosophies are idealist in the sense that they agree that the universe as experienced arises according to the laws of karma. Since karma, according to most Buddhist philosophers, is intentional action, the universe rests, in the final analysis, on mental intention and not on physical matter.

## YOGĀCĀRA PHILOSOPHY (ORIGINAL BY VEN. SUVANNY)

**Ācariya Asaṅga** and **Vasubandhu** were regarded as the founders of *Yogācāra* school who lived in the 4<sup>th</sup> century AD. **Vasubandhu** was an adherent of *Sarvāstivāda* school in the very beginning, then he became a strong supporter of *Yogācāra* Buddhist school. This school refused the *Sarvāstivādins'* 'realistic teaching' and *Madhyamikas'* '*Sūnyatavāda*' and advocated that nothing but consciousness is the ultimate reality in this world – „*Sarvaṃ buddhimayaṃ jagat.*“ - „The whole world is ideal.“ *Vijñāptimatratavāda* of *Yogācārins* came into existence as a result of practical method used by them to examine human mind. This philosophy can be regarded as the result of earlier Buddhist teaching because further it was developed by *Yogācārins* theoretically and practically. This school maintains that only *viññāṇa* is existent and object '*viññeya*' or external phenomena are non-existent. But according to *Sarvāstivādins*, as consciousness is real, the object is also real in such existence.

The *Madhyamikas'* standpoint is that the subjective worlds as well as the objective world are unreal and void. But the above concepts regarding the internal and external world are denied in this school. According to the concept, „*citramatra nidaṃ sarvaṃ*“ clearly they say that only consciousness is real in this world and the other objects are unreal and the creation of our mind. Thus they say that the three worlds (*kāma, rūpa, arūpa*) exist in our mind. Although consciousness is the unchanging reality in this world, various aspects of it can be observed on different occasions. Thus they had divided *viññāṇa* into 8 factors, they are:

- |                  |                        |
|------------------|------------------------|
| 1. <i>Cakkhu</i> | 5. <i>Kāya</i>         |
| 2. <i>Sota</i>   | 6. <i>Mano</i>         |
| 3. <i>Ghāna</i>  | 7. <i>Kliṣṭamano</i>   |
| 4. <i>Jivhā</i>  | 8. <i>Alayaviññāṇa</i> |

All the above kinds of consciousness depend on *alayaviññāṇa*, which is a constantly changing stream of consciousness. Thus *Yogācārins* have explained consciousness as eightfold way when they dealt with the very subtle nature of human mind. According to this school, concepts such as *puggala, satta* and concepts such as *khandha, āyatana, dhātu* are mind made. They are only the results of the constant changing stream of consciousness. In the *Laṅkāvatara Sutta* the knowledge that a person gets through his sense faculties is compared to a dream or mirage. And the concept of *saṃsāra* in Buddhism can be compared to a long dream.

Although *Yogācārins* rejected the '*puggala-nairātmya*' - 'non-existence of self' and '*dharma-nairātmya*' – 'non-existence of things in the world', they advocated the concept of *alayaviññāṇa*, which has a similarity to *Ātmavāda* according to some schools of Buddhist thought. The consciousness which they think existed in reality is of three kinds:

1. *Prautiviññāṇa*
2. *Manaviññāṇa*
3. *Alayaviññāṇa*

*Prautiviññāṇa* is the 'ordinary consciousness' that arises as a result of the contact of relevant sense organs and sense object. '*Manaviññāṇa*' is also called as *kliṣṭamanoviññāṇa*. The *Manaviññāṇa* is the place where the idea of self existed. This school advocates that all phenomena are nothing but the manifestation of seed of *karma* and that all the *karmic* seeds constitute the *alayaviññāṇa* and it is the relinking consciousness of our future birth.

The school teaches that *alayaviññāṇa* is like the stream and it flows changing constantly. Thus until one attains *Nibbāna*, *alayaviññāṇa* flows constantly as the underlined reality in being. This idealistic school analyses the nature of the conceived by the human consciousness into 3 realms. All the objects of world whether they are mental or physical are conceived by the world in 3 ways, they are:

1. *Parikalpita svabhāva* – illusory nature of things or false attribution of an imaginary idea to an object produced by its causes and conditions. This exists only in one's imagination.
2. *Paratantra svabhāva* – that which is devoid of a permanent substance, but is the product of dependent origination.
3. *Pariniṣpanita(?)*: the ultimate reality of being

666YOGACARA TRADITION2/8/99

Arya Asavga is known as the founder of Yogacara tradition. His teacher was Maitreya 'Maitri' according to Mahayana tradition is considered as a Bodhisattva. asavga has written the famous Mahayanic philosophical

treatise, the Yogacarabhumiwastra. Apart from this the authorship of several other works is attributed to him.

Vasubandhu who as a Sarvastivadin in the 1<sup>st</sup> part of his life became later as an exponent of Yogacara school. He is known as a brother of Asavga. For Yogacara tradition, Vasubandhu's contribution was Vijbaptimatratasiddhi. These two (Vasubandhu and Asavga) are recorded as the earliest and foremost teachers of Yogacara tradition.

Dinnaga, Dharmapala, Sthiramati and Shankara are known as the other famous Buddhist philosophers in Yogacara School. Due to the contribution of the above mentioned teachers, Yogacara tradition has a massive literature. All these works are attempts to establish the view that consciousness is primary. This theory is known as Vijbanavada.

According to the scholars who examined the history of Yogacara tradition, vijbanavada is a development of some philosophical teachings which occurred in Lankavatara Sutra. This Sutra is one of the earliest Mahayanic sources.

As it is revealed from the name of this school for the realization of truth, they rely on 2 methods, namely:

- (1) Yoga – concentration
- (2) Acara – tradition

In other words Vijbanavada is a subtle way of thought based on meditation and logical reasoning. By the term 'yoga' it is meant by right concentration. Ascetic monks have developed concentration well are believed to have developed this theory. By the term 'acara', the tradition is explained. 'Tradition' means the text, the theories embodied in early discussion have been developed based on logic. For e.g. in early Buddhism, the Buddha says in the Dhammapada 'mind is the forerunner'.

Vijbanavadins accepted vijbana or consciousness to be the only real substance in the world. Apart from vijbana nothing exist really. Therefore there is no a thing called world. The phenomena we considered is unreal. Bahyadharma – everything except consicousness not be observed in ultimate sense. The only real phenomena is vijbana. It exists in the ultimate sense. Vijbanavada philosophers divided the real substance in 3 parts:

1. Pravrtti vijbana – functional consciousness
2. Manana vijbana – ego
3. Alaya vijbana – subliminal

### **1. PRAVRTTI VIJBANA**

The normal function of the consciousness of the 'being' is described with 'pravrtti vijbana'. It is also called alambana-vijbana. The mind we understand is these feeling, experiences are 1<sup>st</sup> welcome by pravrtti vijbana. According to the explanation given in the Yogacara tradition, pravrtti vijbana can be divided into 6 aspects, they are:

- (1) Caksu vijbana - visual consciousness
- (2) Srota vijbana – auditory consciousness
- (3) Ghana vijbana – olfactory consciousness
- (4) Jivha vijbana – gustatory consciousness
- (5) Kaya vijbana – tangible consciousness
- (6) Mano vijbana – mental consciousness

### **2. MANANAS-VIJBANA**

It is called sattama-vijbana (7<sup>th</sup> consciousness). According to vijbanavadins it is our hidden ego-consciousness. The ideas of 'I', 'me' and 'mine' are engraved in manana-vijbana. It exists between pravrtti and

alayavijbana. The 7 universal consciousness (sabba-citta-sadharana) are arising on manana-vijbana. All the concepts related to self are derived from it (manana-vijbana). Another name given to this is Klistamanovijbana. It prevents the being from realizing the truth excepts arahants to all the others, this consciousness is common.

### 3. ALAYA-VIJBANA

Much of the Vijbanavada commentaries have attempted to explain the nature and the function alayavijbana. With this concept Vijbanavadins explain the theory of action (kamma) and result, and the continuity of the being (rebirth). Alayavijbana is responsible for the continuous of the being. It is also called vipaka-vijbana. It is an unbroken process. to explain this the simile presented was a water source until the being attains the final liberation. It works as the link from one birth to another. Rebirth is caused by alaya-vijbana.

The word alaya occurs in early discourses in another sense. According to the original meaning alaya means 'love' or 'affect'.

### 666 YOGACARA SCHOOL

This school is branch of Madhyamika school founder by Maitrey or Maitray in fourth century A.D. Dinaka, dhammapala, dhammakita and sangrabito are the foremost teacher of the school the appellation of Yogacara is given by Asanga and term vijnavada is given by Vashubandu the term Yogacara means Yoga or meditation and Acara practice which are very effective for the attainment of the higher truth. This school is also named as Vijnavada because vijnata matrika nothing but consciousness is regarded as ultimate reality. Literary source pertaining to various Buddhist school. Buddhist literature origination translation into Pali. Pure mixed and Tibetan Chinese source can be regarded as the primary source Pali tripitaka is the the treasure of the Buddhist literature the commentary and sub commentary connected the Tripitaka text have been written in Pali Sankrit and other language. In addition to this there are canonical literature in Pali such as Malinapanha, Nitipakarana, Vishudhimagga and chronical of srilanka like Dipavamsa and Mahavamsa. Among the work of grammar Kaccayana, Mogalana rupasdhi are also well-known.

Sarvastivadin possessed agama corresponding to seven books of Pali abhidhamma and Mullasarvastivadin possessed vinaya pitaka in sankrit language. The text which belong to Hinayana or Mahayana school appeared a the whole text or as fragment Mahavastu belong to lokutaravadin or Mahasangika but its subject matters is show various that we find in it some sutra corresponding to some in dishanikamadhyamika, Majjimanikaya and the suttanipata as well as story corresponding to palijatakatalitavistra is regarded as unorthodox, describe on form part of Vaipunasutra.

Thousand of Buddhist literature book, written in paliSankrit and mixed Sankrit had disappeared because of some reasons as follow:

- (2) The study of this literature is confined to only monk living in monastery.
- (3) They are preserved only in Manuscript and later destroyed.

*This manuscript are also destroyed with destruction of the monastery most of valuable manuscript that we study come outside India like Srilanka, siem, Cambodia, Burma and Nepal some manuscript are engraved in cope and kept in stupa in Tibet and were meant to worship and not to study.*

### YOGĀCĀRA TRADITION AND ITS BASIC CONCEPTS (NOT COMPLETED)

Yogācāra tradition has accepted consciousness only. They have rejected emptiness of the *Madhyamika* schools and „everything exist“ as the belief of *Sarvāstivāda* tradition.

**Asaṅga** was the founder of the *Yogācāra* school and his teacher was **Maitreya Nātha**. **Maitreya Nātha** was mentioned as a *Bodhisatta*.

According tot he scholars *Yogācāra* school originated the concept of consciousness depending on *Lankāvatāra Sūtra*. They have given new philosophical interpretation and developed their teaching according to the *Lankāvatāra Sūtra*.

The thinkers who accepted this tradition believed in the existence of the consciousness as an ultimate

sense. They divided consciousness into three:

1. *Pravurti viññāṇa*
2. *Mānana viññāṇa*
3. *Ālaya viññāṇa*

(1) *Pravurti viññāṇa* means mental activities in the day-to-day life of a person. They are:

- a) eye consciousness
- b) ear consciousness
- c) nose consciousness
- d) tongue consciousness
- e) body consciousness
- f) mind consciousness

(2) *Manana* consciousness means that it is hidden (latent, potential) mental activities and it is mentioned as a 'seventh consciousness'. In addition it exists between the *pravurti viññāṇa* and *ālaya viññāṇa*.

(3) *Ālaya viññāṇa* means that it is reaction consciousness. This consciousness continues until *Nibbāna* and it continues during death and birth of a person. But that is not soul ???

### 666 EXAMINE IS THERE ANY IDEALISTIC TREND IN YOGACAVJĀNAVĀDA. 529

What is meant by 'citta-matra' (mind only)? The answer is found in the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra*, for instance:

1. Mind is the measure of all things, it is the abode of their self-nature, and has nothing to do with causation and the world; it is perfect in nature, absolutely pure.
2. Mind is beyond all philosophical views, is apart from discrimination, it is not attainable, nor is it ever born. There is nothing but mind.
3. Of Buddhas, *Wravaka*-forms, *Pratyekabuddha*-forms, and other various form, that they are nothing but mind.

The general idea to what the doctrine of 'Mind only', the sutras sometimes makes summary statements like this:

1. Cittamatraj lokaj – the world is nothing but mind.
2. Cittabahyadarwanaj – nothing is to be seen outside the mind.
3. Svacittamatraj traidhatukaj – the triple world is mind itself.
4. Cittajhi traidhatuka-yonih – mind produces the triple world.
5. Tribhavadacittamatraj – the triple existence is nothing but mind.

From the above statements, it is clear that the theory of ‘mind only’ is a form of pure idealism.

The origin of idealism can be traced back to the Sautrantika School. According to Sautrantikas, object does not come into contact with the sense organ directly because the object is without any duration. This is a good supporting evidence for an idealistic theory which holds that external object is a mere mental fabrication (manomaya).

Madhyamika too, contributed to the development of Yogacara idealism. Their analysis of concept leading to the view that they do not designate any reality, or that they are empty of content, or they do not reveal the nature of phenomena, was welcomed by Yogacara. They differ from Madyamikas in maintaining that the mind is real.

Vasubandhu’s vijbamatratisiddhi is devoted to a refutation of the realistic position, and it is a philosophical justification of the idealistic standpoint. He begins his work by stating that everything is ideation only (vijbaptimatram). He maintains that the whole concept of the three worlds is nothing but a mere ideation. He quotes a statement of the Buddha himself and gives ideation the synonyms of mind, thought and consciousness. The external object is merely an appearance like the double visions on the part of whose eye-sight is with ailment.

Vasubandhu seems to have been interested in refuting the realistic argument on space, time, individuality and empiric standpoints by using metaphysical dialectic argument (e.g. dream, hell etc.) to justify the existence of Absolute idealism.

The recognition of the superiority and transcendence yogi intuition contributed greatly to the theory of Yogacara. Vasubandhu maintains that while dreaming, we cannot know that dream objects are as real to the dreamer as any object is to a person who is awake. The difference between the dreaming consciousness and the awakening consciousness is that in the former, a person’s mind is overwhelmed by torpor (thinamidha). Similarly compared with a person in the states of yogi concentration, worldly people are slumbering in ignorance, they do not realise that the world of sense-experience does not exist in reality.

The highest knowledge yields the realization that reality is pure and undiscriminated consciousness. This leads Vasubandhu to deny not only the validity and possibility of sense perception but also of extraordinary perception.

**666 THE ULTIMATE TRUTH OF THE BUDDHA’S TEACHING IS THE CONSCIOUSNESS ONLY, DESCRIBE ABOVE TOPIC ACCORDING TO THE YOGACARA IDEALISM (VINNAVADA).**

The Ultimate truth of the Buddha’s teaching is the consciousness only. As said above the topic, according to

Yogacara , the idealism is Vinnanavada.

**“Sarva idam cittamatram.”**

This whole existence is mind only.

According to Yogacara school the ultimate Truth of the Buddha’s teaching is mind only or consciousness only. The first teacher of idealism is Vasubandhu. He analyzes the process in three stages:

1. Six sense consciousness ( Sadindriya vinnana) caksu vijnana, sota, ghana, jhiva, kaya and mano.
2. Manana consciousness( sub-consciousness) thinking
3. Alaya consciousness (stored house- consciousness) Smrti bija- seeds of memory, Karmabija- seeds of karma and **Kilesa bija**- seeds of defilement.

Karma bija is responsible to one’s Samsaric existence, kilesa bija is responsible to one’s happiness and suffering and Smrti bija is responsible to next existence (future). The whole existence is mind only. Alaya vijnana comes to being because the three seeds mentioned above stored inside. Sunyata is similar to Asvabhava, and Asvabhava is similar to Abbhava. Likewise, the Alaya vijnana is too, similar to Tathagata ghabha.

Tathagatagharbha means coming in the same way from immeasurable past existence. Vasubandhu says the reason for the existence is because of Alayavijnana that is Tathagatagharbha. But Nagarjuna says the reason for the existence is due to hetu and phala, the cause and effect. In the Pail Buddhism, we can see Bhavanga Citta, but in the Mahatanhasamkhaya Sutta(M.N), the analysis of consciousness is up to six senses only. Once time, Ananda asked the Buddha why there were only six senses explained and why not go beyond that. The Buddha replied, “O! Ananda , it is very deep and too much for you”. The main purpose is to get rid of the impurities in the mind and not to go deep into it. According to Pali Buddhism, Alaya is not bhavanga. Bhavanga is some kind of mind, which is sometimes appearing and disappearing. For the technical term regarding the Alaya vijnana, there are three terms such as reason of existence, mind of impurities (Kilesa manas) and mind of maturity (Vipakavijnana). In the maturity, there are two positions which mind depends on. They are:

1. Chuti Cita- going
2. Pratisandhi Citta- coming to existence; coming more and more with one’s age. One day you will die. Then the mind will go with him. According to Vasubandhu when a person die the next mind is going into a mother’s womb ( matukacci).

Vasubandhu shows there is no Atman. The whole existence is mind only. Then he also shows the 3 ways of activity of the mind.

*666 THE VIJNAVADA CONCEPTION OF "CONSCIOUSNESS-ONLY"*

Vijnanavada gets its name ("consciousness teaching", or "Consciousness-ism") from its theory of a psychological emanation from an original universal consciousness (usually called the Alaya-vijnana). It is in fact the only Buddhist school that incorporated emanationist ideas; especially in later, Sinicized form.

According to the Lankavatara Sutra, all the three worlds (of Desire, Pure Form, and Formlessness) are the result of subjective imagination (vikalpa). No external objects exist in reality; only consciousness [Chandradhar Sharma, A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy, p.109], reality being "mind-only" (Cittamatra).

A similarity can be pointed out here with the eighteenth century Scottish empirical philosopher Bishop George Berkeley, who argued that no objective physical reality exists at all; the world being a sort of collective dream, and God as the over-consciousness holding the whole thing together. Not surprisingly, in the materialistically orientated West, Berkeley's philosophy (which came to be called "Idealism", although it has little in common with the Idealism (Idea-ism) of Plato) did not really catch on.

In the Lankavatara, as with Berkeley, the consciousness in which all things exist is not individual consciousness but Absolute Consciousness. This Absolute Consciousness (Berkeley's "God") is the immortal and unchanging consciousness that transcends duality, and is realised through transcendent Knowledge (jnana) [Dr Chandradhar Sharma, A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy, pp.110-111]. It is variously termed the Alaya-vijnana (storehouse consciousness), Chitta (Mind), or Tathagata-garbha (Womb or Seed of the Buddhas - which is not an ontological reality but rather the potential or seed or cause leading towards enlightenment [Whalen Lai, "The Meaning of "mind-only" (wei-hsin): An analysis of a sinitic Mahayana phenomenon", Philosophy East and West 27, no 1; p.74]).

The Alaya-vijnana is the universal storehouse consciousness, so-called because it is the repository of the vasanas, the impressions or tendencies carried over from past lives. As D. T. Suzuki explains, "every act, mental or physical, leaves its seeds (bijas) behind, which is planted in the Alaya for future germination under favourable conditions" [D. T. Suzuki Studies in the Lankavatara Sutra, p.483].

Through the activity of vasanas, the seven individual consciousnesses - the five sense-consciousnesses, the manovijnana or mind-consciousness, and the klishto-manovijnana or "defiled mind-consciousness" - arise from the Alaya-vijnana like waves from the ocean [Chandradhar Sharma, A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy, pp.111].

In the systematised Yogachara school of Maitreyanatha, Asanga and Vasubandu, the pristine Absolute Consciousness or Vijnaptimatratā is the Absolute Reality. Through individual Ignorance (Avidya), Vijnaptimatratā appears as the three vijñanas; viz: Alayavijnana, Manas or Klishto-manovijnana, and Pravritti-vijnana, by which is meant the six consciousnesses - the five sense-consciousnesses (seeing, hearing, etc) and the manovijnana or mind-consciousness - that make up mental and sensory reality [Ashok Kumar Chatterjee, The Yogachara Idealism, p.87]. Here the Alayavij-nana is no longer the Absolute but one of the facets of relative Consciousness; the repository of the vasanas or bijas. As Chatterjee explains, "none of these eight vijñanas is ultimate. Consciousness is disturbed owing to the impact of a wrong idea", and once this is eliminated and the agitation calmed down, consciousness "regains its eternal quiescence" [Ibid p.107]. There is the parallel here with (and obviously a derivation from an early form of) Samkhya, in which the purusha or consciousness-principle is distinct from the principles of nature and psycho-physical existence (or prakriti). The difference is that whereas Samkhya implies of multiplicity of consciousnesses, Yogachara, like Advaita Vedanta, refers to only one, which is also the underlying substratum of existence. It is not the case that Advaita influenced Yogachara however; more the reverse

In the Yogachara psycho-metaphysics, it is the Klishto-manovijnana, or Manas, that is the cause of the false idea of a separate "I" or self or ego. Through the intellectual activity (manana) of this "defiled mind-consciousness" the vasanas that are latent and indeterminate in the Alayavijnana are actualised, or come into consciousness, and take the form of objects of the senses [Ashok Kumar Chatterjee, The Yogachara Idealism, pp.102-3]. Creation is therefore cyclic. The Alayavijnana is the receptacle of vasanas or impressions from past vijñanas, and in turn generates further vijñanas through the ripening of vasanas [Ibid p.88]. The cycle of karmic forces and their actualisation is an infinite one, like the cycle of the tree and its seed [Ibid p.107].

In its sequence of vijñanas there is an obvious parallel between Buddhist emanationism (Vijñanavada) and Hindu emanationism (Samkhya) with its unfolding tattvas. But Vijñanavada or Yogachara replaces the Samkhyan dualism with monism by reuniting the disparate purusha and prakriti in the single Alaya-vijnana, but otherwise follows the Samkhyan ontology. As in Samkhya there is the emanation from an original but undifferentiated universal state (Alayavijnana = Prakriti = Buddhi) through the mediating state of separative egotism (Klishto-manovijnana = Ahamkara) to manifold phenomenal reality (manas and the senses).

### **The origin and development of Vijnanvada**

The development of the Vijnanavada began around 150 C.E. with the Sandhinirmochana Sutra. In the next few centuries this was followed by the very important Lankavatara sutra in the early 4th century, and the Abhisamayalankara (a Prajnaparamita commentary) and Avatamsaka sutras later in the century [Edward Conze, Buddhism, its Essence and Development, p.164].

The Sandhinirmochana and Lankavatara sutras were especially influential in the formulation of the doctrines of the Yogachara school, founded by two brothers, Asanga and Vasubandu (the latter, because of his great learning, was given the singular honour of being called "the second Buddha"), natives of North-West India, in the 4th or 5th century. Another source of Yogachara teachings was Asanga's little-known teacher Maitreyanatha, who has been called the true founder of the school [Chandradhar Sharma, A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy, p.108]. Asanga and Vasubandu were encyclopaedic systematisers, who developed ideas already established in older writings, such as the Abhidharma, the Prajnaparamita, and the Lankavatara, and gave definitive form to earlier Mahayanist concepts like the ten stages (bhumis) of development of the Bodhisattva, the three "bodies" of the Buddha (trikaya), the three states or levels of self-being (swabhava), and the theory that reality is consciousness-only [Edward Conze, Buddhist Thought in India, p.250; and Buddhism, its Essence and Development, p.164]. This last is the most important aspect of Vijnanavada/Yogachara, for this school differs from the Prajnaparamita and the anti-metaphysical Madhyamika approach in that it gives a positive, qualitative description of the Absolute Reality, which is described as being of the nature of pure Consciousness (vijnana); "consciousness-only" (vijnanamatrata, vijnaptimatrata); or "Mind-only" (Chittamatra).

Vijnanavada Buddhism contributed two important emanationist ideas: the metaphysical idea of emanation from an original universal consciousness (the Alaya-vijnana), and the theological idea of the Trikaya, the Three Bodies of the Buddha. As a philosophical school, Yogacara argues that all that exists are minds and their experiences. If there are no mind-independent things, why do people seem to have similar experiences (e.g., why do you and I both see the candle flame, and we both feel pain when we touch it)? The explanation offered is that previous experiences create a storehouse consciousness (alaya-vijnana, sometimes identified with the tathagatagarbha) which encourages people to have similar experiences in the future.

Late Yogacarins (Dignaga and especially, Dharmakirti, Shantarakshita, Kamalashila and Ratnakirti) were not only logicians but experts in epistemology, theory of consciousness and the Tantric yogins as well. The Mahasiddhas (Great Perfect Ones) in some aspects were also adherents of the Yogacara school.

### **A.Chinese Vijnanvada**

The Yogachara metaphysic, thus formulated in India, was further developed in China, where, due to an artifact of translation and interpretation, the Tathagata-garbha (in Chinese fo-hsing - "Buddha-womb" - the womb of the Buddha or storehouse of the Buddha, the potential for Buddhahood which all beings possess.), was distinguished from the Alaya-vijnana. In Indian texts such as the Lankavatara and the Mahaparinirvana sutras the Tathagata-garbha was specifically identified with the Alayavijnana, and referred to the potential or cause leading or pointing towards enlightenment, rather than an actual state or reality. In Chinese, due to Mencian Confucian and Chuang-tze Taoist preconceptions, it came to mean "Buddha-nature", an ontological reality or essence, like the Vedantic Atman [Whalen Lai, "The Meaning of "mind-only" (wei-hsin): An analysis of a sinitic Mahayana phenomenon", Philosophy East and West 27, no 1; p.73-74]. The Alayavijnana then came to be seen as a lower or impure level of Consciousness, the "tainted consciousness" (shih) relative to the Tathagatagarbha or innately pure Absolute Buddha Mind (hsin) or Buddha-nature.

Tathagatagarbha or Mind or hsin thus became a "ninth consciousness" or original principle over and above the other eight. This idea of the superiority of Mind (hsin) over consciousness (shih) was used by the

Mind-Only schools of Hua-yen and Ch'an to claim superiority over the consciousness-only school of Wei-shih (Chinese Yogachara) [Ibid, pp.65, 79]. In all this we see the development of an emanationist cosmology more like Neoplatonism or Kashmir Shaivism than original Yogachara Mahayana. But the anti-metaphysical emphasis of even the most elaborate Buddhist schools prevented this modified Yogachara from ever becoming as sophisticated as those other two systems.

### **B. Vijnanvada and the West**

In the Nineteenth century, elements of Vijnanavada, such as the Alayavijnana and the Manas, were adopted in modified form by H. P. Blavatsky, the founder of Theosophy. As was mentioned earlier, Blavatsky was also influenced by the Vedantic idea of koshas, so Yogachara can be seen to be a second source of inspiration. More recently, young Buddhist-orientated Westerners have made much of the parallel between the Alaya-vijnana and the Collective Unconscious of the psychologist-mystic Carl Jung. Certainly there are many parallels (e.g. in both there is a universal substratum, a sort of Un- or Super-consciousness, behind the surface consciousness; and the repository of subconscious impulses to manifestation). But there are also important differences too. Jung's archetypes are universal transpersonal religious or mythological motifs, more equivalent to the "gods" of polytheism than to the karmic seeds or vasanas; and Jung's positive assessment of the ego - the ego being a necessary state in the development of self - and higher consciousness, is diametrically opposed to the ego-transcending perception of the various Indian philosophies.

#### **@ Yogachara Glossary**

**Alaya-vijnana, or "store consciousness"** -- one of the central technical terms of Yogacara (Vijnanavada, Vijnaptimatra) philosophy of Mahayana Buddhism. Early Buddhists taught about existence of six-fold consciousness, that is the consciousness of five types of perception (visual, aural, etc.) and of "mind" (manovijnana). The Yogacarins analysing the source of consciousness added two more kinds of consciousness. They are: klistamanovijnana, or manas, that is the ego-centre of an empirical personality, and alaya-vijnana which is the source of other kinds of consciousness. Alaya-vijnana is above subject-object opposition but it is not a kind of absolute mind: alaya-vijnana is momentary and non-substantial. Every sentient being with the corresponding to this being "objective" world can be reduced to its "own" alaya-vijnana. Therefore, classical Yogacara states the existence of many alayas.

The Alaya-vijnana is a receptacle and container of the so-called "seeds" (bija), or elementary units of past experiences. These bijas project themselves as an illusionary world of empirical subjects and corresponding objects. All other seven types of consciousness are but transformations (parinama) of alaya-vijnana. In the course of its yogic practice a Yogacarin must empty alaya-vijnana of its contents. Thus the Yogacarin puts an end to the tendency of external projections of alaya-vijnana changing it into non-dual (advaya) wisdom (jnana) of Enlightened mind.

**Svalaksana** (self quality, self-sign, self-characteristic, etc.)

in early Buddhist philosophy -- an elementary single quality identical to dharma, or a quantum of psycho-physical experience. In the philosophy of late Yogacara (logico-epistemological school of Dignaga and Dharmakirti) it is a designation of reality as such (tathata) given in the momentary act of perception (prior to the beginning of the process of mental constructing -- kalpana, and even to the subject-object duality; therefore svalaksana is advaya, non-duality).

**Tathagatagarbha** (Tathagata -- Thus Coming One -- one of the titles of the Buddha; garbha -- 1) embryo, fetus; 2) womb, matrix) -- one of the most important terms of Mahayana Buddhism. It is embryo, or sprout of

the Buddha-nature in every living being, its "precious nature" (ratna gotra); the name for the absolute reality of the One Mind (ekacitta) of Buddha identical to Buddha's Dharma-body (dharmakaya) and tathata, Suchness (reality as it is).

As the One Mind Tathagatagarbha is a substratum of every being (every dharma), that is, dharmata, dharma-nature. It is endowed with innumerable good qualities such as eternity (nitya), bliss (sukha), essence, or Self (atman) and purity (subha). in the doctrine of Tathagatagarbha alaya-vijnana can be understood as defiled garbha. This theory was extremely popular in the Chinese schools of Buddhism (T'ian-t'ai, Hua-yen, Ch'an / Zen) but the Tibetan tradition knows only a hybrid of Yogacara--moderate Madhyamika--Tathagatagarbha thought. The Tibetan Jonang-pa school (which based its teaching exclusively on the garbha theory) was forbidden in XVII century by dGelugs-pa school as "Hinduized" and "heretical".

**Vasana** (energy of habit) -- beginningless tendency immanent to the "seeds" / bijas (see "Alaya-vijnana") contained in alaya-vijnana to external projection of their contents. This tendency is a cause of the illusory (parikalpita; "mentally constructed") existence of the subject-object duality and samsaric world of births-and-deaths.

#### VIJÑĀPTIMĀTRATA (ORIGINAL BY VEN. SANTA)

**Vasubandhu** was one of the greatest thinkers in the Buddhist tradition. His philosophically most sophisticate were *Vijñāptimātrata Siddhi* that is 'establishment of mere concept'. According to the interest of scholars, philosophic and psychological content of **Vasubandhu's** *Vijñāptimātrata Siddhi* remains unparallel in several respects. Its profound clarity and above all, utilizing only twenty two verses **Vasubandhu** was able to analyze the various implications of two metaphysical views that were eternalism and nihilims, which confused philosophical thinkers of 4<sup>th</sup> century and in another 30 verses he expounded the teaching of **the Buddha** as embodied in thousand of discourses.

Here, **Vasubandhu** is achieving several things:

1. He is disallowing the absolute correspondence between a conception and object of experience.
2. He is melting down the absolute line of conception
3. With the example of dream experience he illustrates the possibility of existence of an empty concept; alongside concept that(?) have empirical content(?) so that the short connection between the particular(?) and universes can be broken down.(?)

The existence of a real object is presupposition of common sense as well as metaphysical realism. The real object is not simple object of perception but that corresponds exactly exists.(?) Whether or not it is perceived by **Vasubandhu** who begins by refusing common sense realism which claims the determination of time and space.(?)

**Vasubandhu** maintains that „all this is mere conception“ (*vijñāpti mātram evaitid*). Here the term *mātra* ('mere' or 'only') has a philosophical significance in usage. **Buddha's** explanation of objective experience and His definition of conception had an influence to **Vasubandhu**. **Vasubandhu** realized the significance of **the Buddha**. Inside(?) he utilized the same term in order to surmount the problem created by realism and idealism, thus it is not intended to deny the object but rather to accommodate the concept. This philosophical argument that is the establishment of mere conception is gained not by simple speculation, but by following the discipline of **the Buddha**, namely analysis of the psychology of human experience.

If **Vasubandhu** maintained that all ideas arise depending on consciousness, then he would immediately be characterized as an idealist. He carefully avoided this by claiming wrong evolution of consciousness (*Vijñāṇa parināma*). The statement that all ideas occurred in that transformation of consciousness does not

entail the denier of human body in which consciousness occurred, nor it does imply that there is no eternal object.(?) *Vijñāna parināma* is philosophical significance for other reason as faith.(?)

This will become evident when the description of that process of evolution is analyzed. The process is explained in terms of three functions:

1. Resultant (*vipāka*)
2. Mentality (*mana*)
3. Conception of the object (*visayasya vijñapti*)

The resultant is then identified as the *alayavijñāna* and further defined as conveyer of all its seeds (*sarva bhījaka*).(?) The description of the evolving consciousness has a result intended to avoid extremists. This evolution of *alaya* consciousness is determined by *vasna* and *karma*.(?)

### **666HOW DID WASUBANDHU ESTABLISH THE CONCEPT OF VIJANPTIMATRA OR MERE CONCEPTION?**

Washubandhu is one of the greatest thinkers in the Buddhist tradition his philosophically most sophisticated were Vijnapatimatratra sitti that is establishment of mere concept has wrong the interest of scholars philosophic and psychological contempt Washubandhu's Vijnapatimatratra Sitti remain unparallel in several respect its profound, clarity, and about all, utilizing only twenty two verses Washubandhu was able to analyze the various implication of two metaphysical view that is externalism and nihilism that have confused philosophical thinking 4<sup>th</sup> century which another 30 verses he expounded the teaching of the Buddha as embody in thousand of discourses.

Here, Washubandhu is achieving several things: 1. He is disallowing, the absolute correspondence between a conception and object of experience. 2. He is malting down the absolute line of conception. 3. With the example of dream experience he illustrating the possibility of being empty concept along side concept that has empirical content so that the shat connection between the particular and universes can be broken down. The existence of a real object is presupposition of common sense as well as metaphysical realism the real object is not simple object of perception but that correspond exactly exist whether or not is it perceive Washubandhu begging by refusing common sense realism which claiming that the determination of time and space.

Washubandhu maintains that "all this is mere conception" (Vijnapti Matram Evaitid). Here the term Matra (mere or only) has a philosophical significance in usage Buddha's explanation of this object experience and his definition of conception have in influence to Washubandhu. Washubandhu realizing the significance of the Buddha inside utilizes the same term in order to surmount the problem created by realism and idealism thus it is not intended to denies the object but rather to accommodate the concept this philosophical argument that is the establishment of mere conception is gained not by simple speculation but by following the discipline of the Buddha namely analysis of the psychology of human experience.

Washubandhu maintains that all ideas arise depending on consciousness then he would immediately be characterized as idealism he carefully avoids this by speaking wrong evolution of consciousness (Vijnana Parinama). The statement that all ideas occurred in that transformation of consciousness does not entail the denier of human body in which consciousness occurred no it does it's imply that there is no eternal object. Vijnana Parinama is philosophical significance for other reason as faith.

This will become evidence when the description of that process of evolution is analyzed the process is explained in terms of three functions: 1. resultant (Vipaka) 2. mentation (Mana) 3. conceptionof the object (Visayasya Vijnpti). The resultant is then identified as the Alavijnana further define as conveyer of all its seeds (Sorvabeijaka). The description of the evolving consciousness as a resultant intended to avoid extremists. This evolution Alaya consciousness determine by Vasna and Karma.

The *Yogācāra* idealism was founded by Asanga. In *Yogācāra* it is maintained, that there is no unsurmountable difficulty in accepting idealism. According to *Yogācāra* idealism *viññāṇa* is the sole reality. Therefore it is accepted, that *viññāṇa* only is existing. Still it is perceived, that it cannot be measured and *viññāṇa* is not the plurality.

*Yogācāra* accepts three lands(?) of *viññāṇa*:

1. *Ālaya viññāṇa*
2. *Mano viññāṇa*
3. *Pravṛti viññāṇa*

Just as none of these *viññāṇa* which as the gradual development has and absolute existence. Therefore these 3 *viññāṇa* are not ultimate. The gradual development of the *viññāṇa* itself is not ultimate, because they wanted to prove the Buddha's teaching on *anātmavāda*.

### *Ālaya viññāṇa*

*Ālaya viññāṇa* is the most fundamental of these three *viññāṇa*. It is called „*ālaya*, because it is the place, in which are contained the impressions (*vasana*). *Vasana* means any *kamma*, whatsoever we did. Whether it is good or bad and also indifferent (*sukha, dukava(?) ātava(?) manuka(?)...*) therefore it's called *sarva bījaka*, it gives the results. On the other hand it can be taken as *vipāka*, the deeds done by the individual in any sphere of existence leaves with the *ālaya*. Therefore *ālaya viññāṇa* is escorting whatever we did.

### *Nibbāna*

Four realities:

<i>citta</i>	- mind	- 89 ( <i>Kāma vacara</i> (54), <i>Rūpa vacara</i> (15), <i>Arūpa vacara</i> (12), <i>Lokuttara</i> (8))
<i>cetasika</i>	- mental factors	- 57
<i>rūpa</i>	- form	- 24
<i>Nibbāna</i>	-	- 1

In the cosmic proces *Ālaya* has two functions:

1. It is the receptor of the impressions of past *viññāṇa*.
2. In turn it gives rise to further *viññāṇas* by nurturing these impressions.

The accumulation of seeds of *viññāṇa* in *ālaya* is called the *hetu parināma* and *phala parināma*. *Hetu parināma* is the development and maturity of *vāsanas* in the *ālaya*. *Phala parināma* is the emerging in to existence of their respective effects.

*Vāsana* is the motive force governing evolutionary classes. It is of two kinds:

1. *Vipāka vāsana*

2. *Nihsyanda vāsana*

*Vipāka vāsana* is more ultimate, it keeps going the stream of mental process. Therefore the continuity(?) of the individual happens through the cycle of birth. The activity of the *vipāka vāsana* process the *ālaya viññāṇa* new stream. It begins from the next birth of the individual. *Nihsyanda vāsana* is the function of the present experiences. Therefore *nihsyanda vāsana* supplies the content of each birth.

*Pravrti viññāṇa* is been conscious experience. It can lay both shorts of *vāsanas* in the *ālaya viññāṇa* only a conscious experience can be good or bad and can supply the seeds of future experiences. Therefore *pravrti viññāṇa* determinates awareness of the object.

*Mana viññāṇa* is more or less a function. It supplies only the *Nihsyanda vāsana*, therefore it implies the present experience. Anyway, there is a difference between *pravrti viññāṇa* and *mano viññāṇa*. With the *pravrti viññāṇa* it takes the world as an imaginary while the *mano viññāṇa* takes face(?) what comes to the mind.

## YOGĀCĀRA IDEALISM

The *Yogācāra* idealism was founded by **Asaṅga** and to rejecting the view of the *Abhidhammika* teaching, he made developing of the *Yogācāra* idealism. **Nāgarjuna** was the founder of *Madhyamika* philosophy and he has proved that we are living in an imaginary world so nothing exists. In this case, **Asaṅga** asked the question whether there is nothing which is responsible for the deed of the being. He added that all the beings are collecting merits and demerits. Because of it, the beings should be responsible for their doing. According to *Yogācāra* idealism, it is accepted as eight kinds of *viññāṇa* and it can be classified into three groups, namely:

1. *Alayaviññāṇa*
2. *Manoviññāṇa*
3. *Pravrttiviññāṇa*.

According to the *Abhidhammic* explanation, there are *cetasika* called *sabbascittasadharana*:

1. *Phassa*
2. *Vedanā*
3. *Saññā*
4. *Cetanā*
5. *Ekaggatā*
6. *Jīvitindriya*
7. *Manasikāra*.

Out of these seven, according to *cetanā* we can see and decide whether what we did was *kusala* (wholesome) or *akusala* (unwholesome). Among the three groups of *viññāṇa*, *kusala* and *akusala* are done by the *manoviññāṇa*, which is associating with *alayaviññāṇa*. If one is doing a good deed, one attains *Nibbāna* supported by *alayaviññāṇa*. Therefore *alayaviññāṇa* is the most fundamental to get enlightened through the *manoviññāṇa* and *pravrttiviññāṇa*. There are two functions of *alayaviññāṇa*:

1. *Vāsana*
2. *Viññāṇa*

Of them, *viññāṇa* is called *hetuprinama* and other one is *phalaprīnāma*.

After that, *manoviññāṇa* directly associates with the *alayaviññāṇa* and in the *abhidhammic* explanation, it is also an element. Through the senses, the element is done by the mind and it is mind-setup therefore it is very similar with early Buddhist teaching as »*mano pubbaṅgamā dhammā*«. In the *manoviññāṇa* it can be seen the concept of the soul and in this point, the mean of the soul is 'I-ness', 'mine' etc. With the *cetanā*, it is possible to do decision of the deed as good or bad.

The last one, *pravrttiviññāṇa* is the third stage and it is determined the awareness of the object. So *pravrttiviññāṇa* is classified into six:

1. *Cakkuviññāṇa*
2. *Sotaviññāṇa*
3. *Ghānaviññāṇa*
4. *Jivhāviññāṇa*
5. *Kāyaviññāṇa*
6. *Manoviññāṇa*

Due to these six senses and their objects, *manoviññāṇa* is emerged when we whatever perceive, but through(?) them(?) it cannot be judged as the truth.(?) These six senses can be classified into two as external and internal. Of them, external are the five consciousnesses corresponding to the five sense-organs and through them, we know all the information about the world. The sixth, *manoviññāṇa* is the internal consciousness and through it, we can get the knowledge of ideas.

#### 666YAGACARA PHILOSOPHY :

Acariyas Asanga and Vasubudu are regarded as the founder of Yogacara School. They lived in the 4<sup>th</sup> century A.D. This school refuses the Sarvastivadins, 'realistic teaching' and Madhyamaka 'sunyatavada' and Vijnaptimatratavada of Yogacarin came into existence as a result of practical method used by them to examine human mind. This philosophy can be regarded as a result of earlier Buddhist teaching because. These were further developed by Yogacarins theoretically and practically. This school maintains that only

The Madhyamikas standpoint is that the subjective worlds as well as the objective world are unreal and void. But the above concepts regarding the internal and external world are denied in this school. According to the concept, 'citramatra midam sarvam' clearly they say that only consciousness is real in this world and the other objects are unreal and the creation of our mind. Thus, they say the three worlds (kama, rupa, arupa) exist in our mind. Although consciousness is the unchanging reality in this world, various

aspects of it can be observed on different occasion. Thus they had divided viññana into 8 factors, they are cakkhu, sota, Ghana, Jivha, kaya, mano, klištamano and alayavinnana.

All the above kind of consciousness depends on Alayavinnana, which is a constantly changing stream of consciousness. Thus Yogacarins have explained consciousness in a eightfold way when they dealt with the very subtle nature of human mind. According to this school, concept such as pudgala, satta skandha, ayatana, dhatu are mind made. They are only the result of the constant changing stream of consciousness. In the Lankavatara Sutta, the knowledge that a person gets through his sense faculties is compared to a dream or mirage. And the concept of Samsara in Buddhism can be compared to a long dream.

Although Yogacarins rejected the Puggala-nairatmya “non-existence of self” and Dharma nairatmya “non-existence of thing in the world.” they advocated the concept of Alayavinnana, which has a similarity to Atmavada. The consciousness, which they think existed in reality, is of 3 kinds: **1** Pranttivinnana, **2** Manavinnana, **3** Alayavinnana. Pranttivinnana is the ‘ordinary consciousness’ that arise as a result of the contact of relevant sense organs and sense object. ‘Manavinnana’ is also called as klistamanovinnana. The Manavinnana is the places were the idea of self existed. This school advocates that all phenomena are nothing but the manifestation of seed of karma and that all the karmic seeds constitute the Alayavinnana and it is the re-linking consciousness of our future birth.

#### 666YAGACARA PHILOSOPHY :

Archariya Asanga and Vasubudu were regarded as the founder of Yogacara school who lived in the 4<sup>th</sup> century A.D. Vasunandhu was and adherence of Sarvastivada school in the very beginning, then, he was became a strong support of Yogacara Buddhist school. This school refuses the Sarvastivadins, ‘realistic teaching’ and Madhyamaka ‘sunyatavada’ and advocates that nothing but consciousness it the ultimate reality in this world, ‘sarvam buddhimayam jagat’ the whole world is ideal. In Vijnaptimatratavada of Yogacarin came into existence as a result of practical method used by them to examine human mind. This philosophy can be regarded as a result of earlier Buddhist teaching because further developed by Yogacarins theoretically and practically. This school maintains that only vinnana is existence and object ‘Vijneya’ or external phenomena are non-existence. But according to Sarvastivadins, as consciousness is real, the object also real in such existence.

The Madhyamikas standpoint is that the subjective worlds as well as the objective world are unreal and void. But the above concepts regarding the internal and external world are denied in this school. According to the concept, ‘citramatra nidam sarvam’ clearly they say that only consciousness is real in this world and the other objects are unreal and the creation of our mind. Thus they say the three worlds (kama, rupa, arupa) exist in our mind. Although consciousness is the unchanging reality in this world, various aspects of it can be observed on different occasion. Thus they had divided viññana into 8 factors, they are cakkhu, sota, Ghana, Jivha, kaya, mano, klištamano and alayavinnana.

All the above kind of consciousness depends on Alayavinnana, which is a constantly changing stream of consciousness. Thus Yogacarins have explained consciousness is eightfold way when they dealt with the very subtle nature of human mind. According to this school, concept such as pudgala, satta and concept such as skandha, ayatana, dhatu are mind made. They are only the result of the constant changing stream of consciousness. In the Lankavatara Sutta, the knowledge that a person gets through his sense faculties is compared to a dream or mirage. And the concept of Samsara in Buddhism can be compared to a long dream.

Although Yogacarins rejected the Puggala-nairatmya “non-existence of self” and Dharma nairatmya “non-existence of thing in the world.” They advocated the concept of Alayavinnana, which has a similarity to Atmavada, according to some schools of Buddhist thoughts. The consciousness, which they think existed in reality, is of 3 kinds: **1** Pranttivinnana, **2** Manavinnana, **3** Alayavinnana. Pranttivinnana is the ‘ordinary consciousness’ that arise as a result of the contact of relevant sense organs and sense object. ‘Manavinnana’ is also called as klistamamovinnana. The Manavinnana is the place were the idea of self existed. This school advocates that all phenomena are nothing but the manifestation of seed of karma and that all the karmic seeds constitute the alayavinnana and it is the re-linking consciousness of our future birth.

The school teaches that Alayavinnana is like the stream and it flows changing constantly. Thus until one attain nibbana, Alayavinnana flows constantly as the underline reality in being. This idealistic school analyses the nature of the conceived by the human consciousness into 3 realms. All the objects of world whether they are mental or physical are conceived by the world in 3 ways, they are:

1 Parikalpita svabhava: Illusory nature of thing or false attribution of an imaginary idea to an object produced by its causes and conditions. This exists only in one's imagination.

2 Paratantra svabhava: that which is devoid of a permanent substance, but is the produce of dependent origination.

3 Parinishpanna: the ultimate reality of a being.

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### 666 THE MAIN TEACHING OF YOGACARA (743)

Yogacara is a form of Absolute Idealism. The philosophy of Nagarjuna is said to have contributed to its development. Idealism developed from the 2<sup>nd</sup> century A.D. and reached culmination with Asavgha and Vasubandhu. The main sources of Yogacara idealism are:

1. Vasubandhu's vijbaptimatratasiddhi.
2. Asavga's Abhidhamma samuccaya.
3. Maitreyanatha's Mahayanasutralankara.

Vasubandhu, who was the chief exponent of Yogacara was a Sautrantika but he was converted to the new faith by his elder brother, Asavgha. Sautrantika's theory of representative perception leads to idealism. According to Sautrantika, object does not come into contact with the sense organ directly because the object is without any duration. This is a good supporting evidence for an idealistic theory which holds that external object is a mere mental fabrication (manomaya).

Madhyamika too, contributed to the development of Yogacara idealism. Their analysis of concept leading to the view that they do not designate any reality, or that they are empty of content, or they do not reveal the nature of phenomena, was welcomed by Yogacara. They differ from Madyamikas in maintaining that the mind or consciousness is real.

Since the Absolute (paramatta) is looked upon as non-dual (advaya) and non-conceptual (nirvikalpa) and as transcending worldly experience, Yogacarins say that it can only be realized in the highest state of yogi rapture where there is undiscriminated consciousness without subject-object dichotomy. The name Yogacara means 'Practice of Yoga', they emphasized the traditional methods of yoga to realize the Absolute.

Vasubandhu's vijbamatratasiddhi is devoted to a refutation of the realistic position, and it is a philosophical justification of the idealistic standpoint. He begins his work by stating that everything is ideation only (vijbaptimatram). He maintains that the whole concept of the three worlds is nothing but a mere ideation. He quotes a statement of the Buddha himself and gives ideation the synonyms of mind, thought and consciousness. The external object is merely an appearance like the double visions on the part of whose eye-sight is with ailment.

Vasubandhu seems to have been interested in refuting the realistic argument on space, time, individuality and empiric standpoints by using metaphysical dialectic argument (e.g. dream, hell etc.) to justify the existence of Absolute idealism.

The recognition of the superiority and transcendence yogi intuition contributed greatly to the theory of Yogacara. Vasubandhu maintains that while dreaming, we cannot know that dream objects are as real to the dreamer as any object is to a person who is awake. The difference between the dreaming consciousness and the awakening consciousness is that in the former, a person's mind is overwhelmed by torpor (thinamiddha). Similarly compared with a person in the states of yogi concentration, worldly people are slumbering in ignorance, they do not realise that the world of sense-experience does not exist in reality.

The highest knowledge yields the realization that reality is pure and undiscriminated consciousness. This leads Vasubandhu to deny not only the validity and possibility of sense perception but also of extraordinary perception.

Yogacara avocated 3 main kinds of vibbana.

#### Pravrtti-vijbana

This includes the 5 vibbana of the 5 senses which are evolved by the Alayavibana.

## Manas

Also known as 'clishta manana vibbana'. It is associated with 4 types of defilements, namely perception of self (atmadrsti), confusion regarding to self (atmamoha), self-pride (atmamana) and self-love (atmasneha). The sabba-citta-sadharana (phassa, vedana, sabba, cetana, etaggata, jivitindriya and manasikara) are operating in this vibbana.

### 1. Alayavibbana

This is the store-consciousness, the basis of all the conscious and unconscious processes. It is called vipaka (resultant) because it represents the germination of seed (bija) which are the dispositions (vasana) of good and bad actions that attained maturity (paripaka). Thus Alaya is that receptacle of all dispositions, which, as seeds, ripen and produced their fruits. When it evolves, it develops touch, then mental activities (monaskara), feeling (vedana), sensation (sabba), and volitional activity (cetana).

The existence of sajsara is therefore explained in term of store-consciousness. The evolution and transformation of this store-consciousness is without a beginning (anadigarika). The cyclic evolution takes place in the following manner: as the seeds mature in the store-consciousness, the evolution of manana takes place, then comes the third stage, the evolution of perceptive consciousness which is called pravrtti-vibbana consists of subject-object discrimination.

Yogacara also introduced 3 degrees of knowledge i.e.,

1. Parikalita—false projection of imaginary object which is regarded as illusion
2. Paratantra—knowledge one get produced by cause and effect which is empirical
3. Parinispanna—the highest Truth which is also known as tathata

## 666 DEFINE WHAT YOGĀCARA IS AND MADE A SURVEY OF THE CENTRAL CONCEPTS OF YOGĀCARA PHILOSOPHY.

Archariya Asanga and Vashubandhu were regarded as the founder of Yogācara school who lived in the 4<sup>th</sup> century A.D. Vashubandhu was and adherence of Sarvastivada school in the very beginning, then he was became a strong support of Yogācara Buddhist school. This school refuses the Sarvastivadins, 'realistic teaching' and Madhyamaka 'Sunyatavada' and advocates that nothing but consciousness it the ultimate reality in this world, 'Sarvam Buddhimayam Jagat' the whole world is ideal. In Vijñaptimaratavada of Yogācarin came into existence as a result of practical method used by them to examine human mind. This philosophy can be regarded as a result of earlier Buddhist reaching because further developed by Yogācarins theoretically and practically. This school maintains that only Viññāna is existence and object 'Vijñeya' or external phenomena are non-existence. But according to Sarvastivadins, as consciousness is real, the object also real in such existence.

The Madhyamikas standpoint is that the subjective worlds as well as the objective world are unreal and void. But the above concepts regarding the internal and external world are denied in this school. According to the concept, 'Citramatra Indam Sarvam' clearly they say that only consciousness is real in this world and the other objects are unreal and the creation of our mind.

All the above kind of consciousness depends on Alayaviññāna, which is a constantly changing stream of consciousness. Thus Yogācarins have explained consciousness is eightfold way when they dealt with the dealt with the very subtle nature of human mind. According to this school, concept such as Puggala, Satta and concept such as Skandha, Ayatana, Dhatu are mind made. They are only the result of the constant changing stream of consciousness. In the Lankavatara Sutta, the knowledge that a person gets through his sense faculties is compared to a dream or mirage. And the concept of Samsara in Buddhism can be compared to a long dream.

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*Vijñānavāda*, also known as *Yogācāra* is the school of Buddhist thought founded by **Ācariya Asaṅga**<sup>21</sup> in the 4<sup>th</sup> century. This school's thinker was also **Vasubandhu**. The fundamental teaching of this school is called *Vijñāptimātra* or *Cittamātra*, generally translated to English as 'mind only'.

This school gives predominance of mind, its creative ability. Therefore, it holds that everything is created by the mind. The whole objective world is a mind-creation. This does not mean that *Vijñānavāda* would deny this existence of objects and an objective world. According to their teaching it is a kind of idealism. The objective world is there, but we see as particular objects are all mind-made.

As evidence for their view quoted the early teaching of **the Buddha** in early Buddhism, the mind also plays a very dynamic role.(?) The *Dhammapada* clearly teaches that the mind is the forerunner of all mental thoughts - »*mano pubbaṅgamā dhammā*«, the mind is supreme - '*mano seṭṭhā*' and everything is mind made - '*mano mayā*'.

*Abhidhamma* also explains the creative ability of the mind. The world according to early Buddhism is a vivid creation of the mind. *Suttas* say that all are under the control of the mind. Each one is maker of one's own world and this is done by one through one's mind. These ideas have been further developed in *Vijñānavāda*. What is implicitly stated in early Buddhism, *Vijñānavāda* made explicit by citing *jhānic* experiences, dream experiences as evidence.

In different *jhānas* the practitioner is in a different mental plain. In dreams we create our own world. Besides, they also used the perceptions that are found in different spheres as evidence to prove their point. They showed how the same objects appeared differently when viewed from different levels of perception. Thus glass of milk to a human being might appear as nectar (*amṛta*) for gods. Through such examples they argued that it is consciousness that produces objects.<sup>22</sup>

## 666VIJNAPTIMATRATA

Vasubandhu is one of the greatest thinkers in the Buddhist tradition. His main philosophical teaching is that only mind is real. The main text is *Vijnapatimatrata siddhi*. In this utilizing only twenty two verses Vasubandhu was able to analyze the various implication of two metaphysical view that is eternalism and nihilism that have confused philosophical thinking 4<sup>th</sup> century which another 30 verses he expounded the teaching of the Buddha as embodied in thousand of discourses .

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21 In the original there was 'Argue'...

22 I dare to comment here the *Vijñāptimātra* philosophy. I would like to express the idea, that if the world is created by our consciousness, it might easily happen that our world experience might be completely different from experience of person eventually being next to us – that means that the objective experience and subjective experience might collide with each other or that the subjective experience of two people in the same occasion under same conditions might be different. But, on the other hand, in the first verse of *Dhammapada* it is said, that world is mind made (*mano mayā*). This I understand as that this world, as our *kamma-vipāka*, was made by our previous *kamma*, which (in its root) was originated by our mind.

Here, Vasubandhu is achieving several things: 1- He is disallowing, the absolute correspondence between a conception and object of experience. 2- He is malting down the absolute line of conception. 3- with the example of dream experience he illustrating the possibility of being empty concept along side concept that have empirical content. The existence of a real object is presupposition of common sense as well as metaphysical realism. The real object is not simple object of perception but that correspond exactly exist whether or not is it perceive.

Vasubandhu maintains that “all this is mere conception” (vijñapti matram idam). Here the term matra (mere or only) has a philosophical significance in usage Buddha’s explanation of this object experience and his definition of conception have influenced to Vasubandhu. Vasubandhu realizing the significance of the Buddha inside utilizes the same term in order to surmount the problem created by realism and idealism thus it is not intended to deny the object but rather to accommodate the concept. This philosophical argument that is the establishment of mere conception, is gained not by simple speculation but by following the discipline of the Buddha namely analysis of the psychology of human experience.

Vasubandhu maintains that all ideas arise depending on consciousness. Yet his teaching is not idealism. Hi avoids this by speaking of wrong evolution of consciousness (Vijñana parinama). The statement that all ideas occurred in that transformation of consciousness does not entail the denier of human body in which consciousness occurred no it doe it imply that there is no eternal object. Vijñana parinama is philosophically significance for other reason as faith.

This will become evident when the description of that process of evolution is analyzed. The process is explained in terms of three functions: 1- Resultant (Vipaka) 2- mentation (Mana) 3-conception of the object ( Visayasya vijñapti). The resultant is then identified as the Alavijñana. Further define as conveyer of all its seeds (sarva bejjaka). The description of the evolving consciousness as a resultant is intended to avoid extremists. This evolution Alaya consciousness is determined by Vasna and karma.

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## **666VIJNAPTIMATRATA CONCEPT17.08.07**

Vasubandhu is one of the prominent Buddhist idealist, lived in about 4th century who is the founder of this theory of Vijñaptimatratā, his most sophisticated work Vijñaptimatratāsiddhi means establishment of mere conception present the true nature of yogacara idealism. His argument in the text indicated that he was not a metaphysical idealist because he reviews only the physical thing that is in the external world. Man normal tendency is to divide the world into two paths, as I and external world. This has done due to delusion. Accordance to idealism, there is no such and so called external world beyond me. This world is only a projection of mind.

vasubandhu could avoids the metaphysical idealism because he is seen to have been able to read the discourse for the Buddha more accurately, for Ex. the Buddha never considers the terms Citta, mana and vijñana as synonym.

Vasubandhu realizes the significant of the term of Vijñapti as a means of expressing the proper function of a concept namely intimately what is available through a cognition(vijñana) all these four terms are sometime taken together and defined as synonym but Vasubandhu clearly distinguish the function of these psychological activity, the term thought is found in Lankavatava sutra is also a unique term found in Yogacara idealism, there is no better way to make an idealist out of Vasubandhu, the philosophical psychological content of Vasubandhu, Vijñaptimatrika siddhi a work that remains unparallel in several respects its profoundly clarity and about all precision only 30 verses. Vasubandhu was able to analyze the various implications of two metaphysical view, nihilism and eternalism.

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(Printed)

The scheme of Vedanta philosophy is surprisingly similar to the idealism of Vasubandhu (280-360 A.D.) as taught in his Vimsatika with a short commentary of his own and Trimsika with a commentary of Sthiramati on it<sup>23</sup>. According to this Vijnanavada (idealism) of Vasubandhu all appearances are but transformations of the principle of consciousness by its inherent movement and none of our cognitions are produced by any external objects which to us seem to be existing outside of us and generating our ideas. Just as in dreams one experiences different objects in different places and countries without there being any objective existence of them or as in dreams many people may come together and perform various actions, so what seems to be a real world of facts and external objects may well be explained as mere creations of the principle of intelligence without any objective basis at all. All that we know as subjective or objective are mere ideation (vijnapti) and there is no substantive reality or entities corresponding to them, but that does not mean that pure non-conceptual (anabhilapyenatmana) thought which the saints realise is also false<sup>24</sup>.

It is possible that the awareness of anything may become the object of a further awareness, and that of another, but in all such cases where the awareness is significant (arthavati) there are no entities or reality as represented by them; but this should not be interpreted as a denial of the principle of intelligence or pure knowledge as such. Vasubandhu then undertakes to show that the perceptual evidence of the existence of the objective world cannot be trusted. He says that taking visual perception as an example we may ask ourselves if the objects of the visual perception are one as a whole or many as atoms. They cannot be mere wholes, for wholes would imply parts; they cannot be of the nature of atoms for such atoms are not; separately perceived; they cannot be of the nature of the combination of atoms, for the existence of atoms cannot not be proved<sup>25</sup>. For if six atoms combine from six sides, that implies that the atoms have parts, for if six atoms combine with one another at one identical point, it would mean that the combined group would not have its size bigger than that of an atom and would therefore be invisible. Again if the objects of awareness and perception were only wholes, then succession and sequence would be unexplainable and our perception of separate and distinct things would remain unaccountable. So, though they have no real objective existence, yet perception leads us to believe that they have. People are dreaming the world of objects in the sleep of the instinctive roots of the habit of false imaginative construction (vitathavik- alpabhyasavasanandraya) and in their dreams they construct the objective world and it is only when they would become awake with the transcendent indeterminate knowledge (lokottaranirvikalpajnalanabhat prabuddho bhavati) that they would find the world-construction to be as false as the dream-construction of diverse appearances. In such a view there is no objective material world and our cognitions are not influenced by outside objects; how then are our minds influenced by good instructions and associations, and since none of us have any real physical bodies, how can one kill another? Vasubandhu explains this by the theory that the thought-currents of new person can sometimes determine the thought-yam na sidhyati Ibid., p. 7. currents of another. Thus the idea of killing of a certain type may produce such a disturbance of the vital powers of another as to produce a cessation of the continuity of one's thought-processes which is called death<sup>26</sup>. So also the good ideas of one may influence the ideas of another for good.

In the Trimsika of Vasubandhu and its commentary by Sthiramati, this idealism is more clearly explained.

23 Vijnaptimatratasiddhi containing two treatises of Vi and Trimsika. Paris 1925.

24 Yo balair dharmanam svabhavo grahyagrahakadidh parialpitas tena kalpitenatmana tesam nairatmyam na tvanabhilapyenatmana yo buddhanam visaya iti. Commentary on Vimsika, p. 6.

25 Napi te samhata visayibhavanti, yasmad paramanurekam dravyam na sidhyati. Ibid., p.7.

26 Paravijnaptivisesadhipatyat paresam jivitendriyavirodhim kacit vikriya utpadyate yaya sabhagasantati- vicchedakhyam maranam bhavati. Vimsatika, p.10.

It is said that both the soul (or the knower) and all that it knows as subjective ideas or as external objects existing outside of us are but transformations of pure intelligence (vijnanaparinama). The transformation (parinama of pure intelligence means the production of an effect different from that of the causal moment simultaneously at the time of the cessation of the causal moment<sup>27</sup>. There is neither externality nor subjectivity in pure intelligence, but still these are imposed on it (vijnana-svarupe parikalpita eva atama dharmasca). All erroneous impositions imply that there must be some entity which is mistaken as something else. There cannot be erroneous impositions on mere vacuity; so these erroneous impositions of various kinds of external characteristics, self etc. have to be admitted to have been made on the transformations of pure intelligence<sup>28</sup>. Both Vasubandhu and Sthiramati repudiate the suggestion of those extreme idealists who deny also the reality<sup>29</sup> of pure intelligence on grounds of interdependence or-relativity (samvrti). Vasubandhu holds that pure consciousness (vijñaptimatratā) is the ultimate reality. This ultimate consciousness is a permanent entity which by its inherent power (sakti) undergoes threefold transformation as the inherent indeterminate inner changes (vipaka) which again produce the two other kinds of transformation as the inner psychoses of mental operations (manana) and as the perception of the so-called external sensibles (visayavijñapti).

The apprehension of all appearances or characterised entities (dharma) as the cognised objects and that of selves and cognisers, the duality of perceivers and the perceived is due to the threefold transformation of vipaka, manana and visayavijñapti. The ultimate consciousness (vijñaptimatratā) which suffers all these modifications is called alayavijñana in its modified transformations, because it is the repository of all experiences. The ultimate principle of consciousness is regarded as absolutely permanent in itself and is consequently also of the nature of pure happiness (sukha), for what is not eternal is painful and this being eternal is happy<sup>30</sup>. When a saint's mind become fixed (pratisthita) in this pure consciousness (vijñaptimatratā), the tendency of dual thought of the subjective and the objective (grahyagrahakanusaya) ceases and there dawns the pure indeterminate (nirvikalpa) and transcendent (lokottara) consciousness. It is a state in which the ultimate pure consciousness runs back from its transformations and rests in itself. It is divested of all afflictions (klesa) or touch of vicious tendencies and is therefore called anasrava. It is unthinkable and undemonstrable because it is on one hand pure self-consciousness (pratyatmavedya) and omniscience (sarvajñata) as it is divested of all limitations (avarana) and on the other hand it is unique in itself<sup>31</sup>. This pure consciousness is called the container of the seed of all (sarvabija) and when its first indeterminate and undefinable transformations rouse the psychosis-transformations and also the transformations as sense-perceptions, these mutually act and react against one another and thus the different series rise again and again and mutually determine one another. These transformations are like waves and ripples on the ocean where each is as much as the product of others as well as the generator of others<sup>32</sup>.

In this view thought (vijñana) is regarded as a real substance and its transformations are also regarded as real and it is these transformations that are manifested as the selves and the characterised appearances<sup>33</sup>. The first type of transformations called vipaka is in a way the ground of the other two transformations which

27 Karanaksannirodhasamakalah karanaksanavilaksanakaryasya atmalabhah parinamah. Sthiramati's Commentary on Trimsika, p.16.

28 Upacarasya ca niradharasyasambhavad avasyam vijñana parinamo vastuto'sty upagantavyo yatra atmadharmo-pacarah pravarttate. Na hi niraspada mrgatrsnikadayah. Ibid. Compare Sankara's Commentary on Gaudapada's Karika.

29 Thus Lankavatara, one of the most important works on Buddhist idealism, denies the real transformation of the pure intelligence or alayavijñana. See Lankavatara, p. 46.

30 Druvo nityatvat aksayataya; sukho nityatvad eva ya-danityam tad dukham ayam ca nitya iti asmat sukhah. Sthiramati's commentary on Trimsika, p. 44.

31 Alayavijñana in this ultimate state of pure consciousness (vijñā-primatratā) is called the cause (dhatu) of all virtues, and being the ultimate state in which all the dharmas, or characterised appearances, had lost all their limitations it is called the dharmakaya of the Buddha (mahamueh bhūmiparamitadibhavanaya klesajneyavarana-prahanat...sarvadharmavibhūtuālabhata's ca dharmakaya ity ucyate).

32 Tac ca varttate srotasanghavat. Ibid., p. 21.

33 Avasyam vijñanaparinamo vastuto'sty upagantavyo yatrātmadharinopacarah pravarttate. Ibid., p.16.

contain the indeterminate materials out of which the manifestations of the other two transformations appear. But as has already been pointed out, these three different types of transformations again mutually determine one another. The vipaka transformations contain within them the seeds of the constructive instincts (vikalpavasana) of the selves as cognisers, the constructive instincts of colours, sounds etc., the substantive basis (asraya) of the attribution of this twofold constructive instinct as well as the sense-faculties and the localisation of space-determinations (sthanavijnapti or bhajanalokasannivesa-vijnapti). They are also associated in another mode with sense-modifications involving the triune of the sense (indriya), sense-object (visaya) and cognition (and each of these triune is again associated with a characteristic affective tone corresponding with the affective tones of the other two members of the triune in a one to one (relation), attention (manaskara), discrimination (samjna), volition (cetana) and feeling (vedana)<sup>34</sup>. The vipaka transformations have no determinate or limited forms (aparicchinnalambanakara) and there are here no actualised emotional states of attachment, antipathy or the like which are associated with the actual pleasurable or painful feelings. The vipaka transformations thus give us the basic concept of mind and its principal functions with all the potentialities of determinate subject-object consciousness and its processes. There are here the constructive tendencies of selves as perceivers, the objective constructive tendencies of colours, sounds etc., the sense-faculties etc. attention, feeling, discrimination, volition and sense-functioning. But none of these have any determinate and actualised forms. The second grade of transformations called manana represents the actual evolution of moral and immoral emotions and it is here that the mind is set in motion by the ignorant references to the mental elements as the self, and from this ignorance about the self is engendered self-love (atma-sneha) and egoism (atma-mana). These references are again associated with the fivefold universal categories of sense functioning, feeling, attention, volition and discrimination. Then comes the third grade of transformations which are associated with the fivefold universal categories together with the special manifestations of concrete sense-perceptions and the various kinds of intellectual states and moral and immoral mental states such as desire (chanda) for different kinds of sense-experiences, decisions (adhimoksa) in conclusions firmly established by perceptions, reasoning etc., memory, attentive reflection (samadhi), wisdom (prajna), faith and firm will for the good (sraddha), shameful (hri) for the bad etc. The term alayavijnana is given to all these three types of transformations, but there is underneath it as the permanent passive ground the eternal and unchangeable pure thought (vijnaptimatrata).

It may be pointed out here that in this system of philosophy the eternal and unchangeable thought substance undergoes by virtue of its inner dynamics three different orders of superficial changes which are compared with constantly changing streams and waves. The first of these represents the basic changes which later determine all subjective and objective possibilities; the second starts the process of the psychosis by the original ignorance and false attribution of self-hood to non-self elements, self-love and egoism, and in the third grade we have all the concrete mental and extra-mental facts. The fundamental categories make the possibility of mind, mental processes and the extra-mental relations evolve in the first stage of the transformation and these abide through the other two stages of the transformation and become more and more complex and concrete in course of their association with the categories of the other transformations. In analysing the knowledge situation, Vasubandhu does not hold that our awareness of blue is only a

34 Feeling (vedana) is distinguished here as painful, pleasurable, and as the basic entity which is neither painful nor pleasurable, which is feeling per se (vedana anubhavasvabhava, sa punar visayasya ahlada- kaparitapakatadubhayakaraviviktasvarupasaks kaparita This feeling per se must be distinguished again from the non-pleasurable- painful feeling existing along with the two other varieties, the painful and the pleasurable. Here the vipaka transformations are regarded as evolving the basic entity of feeling and it is therefore undifferentiated in it as pleasure or pain and is hence called "feeling as indifference (upeksa)" and undifferentiated (avyakrta). The differentiation of feeling as pleasurable or as painful takes place only as a further determination of the basic entity of feeling evolved in the vipaka transformations of good and bad deeds (subhasubhakarmavipaka). Good and bad (subhasubha) are to be distinguished from moral and immoral as potential and actual determinations of virtuous and vicious actions.

modification of the "awareness" but he thinks that an awareness has always two relations, a relation with the subject or the knower (grahakagraha) and a relation with the object which is known (grahyagraha). Blue as an object is essential for making an awareness of blue possible, for the awareness is not blue, but we have an awareness of the blue. But Vasubandhu argues that this psychological necessity is due to a projection of objectivity as a necessary function of determinate thought and it does not at all follow that this implies that there are real external objects existing outside of it and generating the awareness as external agent. Psychological objectivity does not imply ontological objectivity. It is argued that if the agency of objective entities in the production of sense-knowledge be admitted, there could not be any case where sense-knowledge can be admitted to be produced without the operation of the objective entities, but since in dreams and illusions such sense-knowledge is universally regarded as being produced without the causal operation of such objective entities, no causal operation can be admitted to the objective entities for the production of sense-knowledge.

### **666SAMMITIYAS**

The Sammitiyas differed on many doctrinal points from the Theravadin's and other sects. The Sammitiyas preferred to name their changing soul as Puggala, distinguishing it from the Anatya doctrine of the Buddha. In the Kathavattu. The view of the Sammitiyas is given thus. The Pudgalavadin's rely on the following words of the Buddha "**Attipuggla attahitaya patipanno**" there is a person to exerts his own good.

Their appear a person who is reborn for the good and happiness of many, for showing compassion to the world of beings. Being on such words of the Buddha, Sammitiyas state "**Pudgala**" of the above mentioned passages is something positive.

In the Abhidharmakosa and its commentary, the relation between Puggala and Skandhas its explains by the simile of fire and fuel. Fire exists as long as its fuel lasts. So the Puggala exists as long as there are the constituents. But fire is different from fuel in as much as it has the power of burning and objects or producing light, which the fuel by itself does not possess. Fire and furl are co-existent, and the later is a support for the former, and just as one is not wholly from the other because fuel is not wholly of devoid of fierily element (Tejas), in the constituents of a being.

In the Kathavattu, it is stated that the Sammitiyas point out their puggala has a material from in the world men and god. Therefore, the Sammitiyas states that "Puggala" corresponds to the entity called a being (Satva) and also to the vital-force (jiva) of a living being.

Now the Sammitiyas take as the problems of transmigration. They hold that (Puggala) passes from one existence to another but the Puggala of two existences is neither the same nor difference

In support of this contention the Sammitiyas rely on the following utterances of the Buddha:

- "Santi sattaro purisayaga attapurisa puggala" meanings there are four pairs of person or eight persns.
- "So sattakattuparamo Sandhavitva puggalo dukkhassantakaro hoti" meanings a Sotapanna has be reborn seven times at the most attain full emancipation so it is here the transmigrations of the soul (puggal).
- "Anamataggo ayam samsaro pubbakoti na pannayati sattanam tanha sanyojanam" meanings the cycle of existence of a being is without a beginning which is not apparent to beings immersed in desired. The Sammitiyas pick up the birth (samsaro satta to admit the transmigration of soul of being.
- "pubbenivasa nana" Buddha is able to remember his first birth and others.

The Sammitiyas state that the Puggala is the percipient but it is different from mind (Citta vinnana). It is one of the constituents of a being. It is also not momentary (Kshanika) like mind. But it is perceivable in every momentary thought. It is the "Seer" whether the eyes are functioning or not. Because Buddha said "I see by my divine beings appearing and disappearing". Here "I" is (Puggala) of Sammitiyas.

The transmigration of self is express in many statements of the Buddha. The Buddha said "In this world one performs good deeds and as a result enjoys happiness in the next world", "One who controls his sense organs gains a happy stage in his next life", "dying person arises again" etc. It is clear from such statements of Buddha that he had in mind A" Puggala" which transmigrated from one existence to another,

Though there were controversies, it is apparent that the Sammitiyas are seeking to establish that five Kandhas which are distinct from one another can not give to the consciousness of I-ness the unity of the acts a person acts or thinks as one and not as separate objects. Buddha does actually use the words "So" Atta, and puggala.

However, the mental poverty is changing Kandhas but in view of the fact one can think of his past, even of the events of his past existences. The changing Kandhas alone can not be made responsible for memory. Therefore, Sammitiyas affirm the existence of a sixth (mental Poverty) and called it Puggala, which can remain only alone with Kandhas and so must disappear when the Kandhas disappear in Nibbana. Accordingly the individual or "Puggala" is something perusable, being neither identical with five groups of elements nor different from them.

**Date Mon 12-05-2008. The End 1<sup>st</sup> term**

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### **666 GIVE A DETAIL ACCOUNT OF SAMMITIYA BUDDHIST SCHOOL.**

The first division in the Buddhist community occurred as a result of the second council, held 100 years after the Buddha's death, at Vesali, when the followers of the traditional teaching split away from the Sthaviravadins and formed their own school, known as the Mahasavghikas.

A sub-division within the Sthaviravadins emerged in the 3<sup>rd</sup> century B.C, when the Sarvastivadins broke away from the Vibhajyavadins. The prominent offshoots of the Sthaviravadins were the Vatsiputriyas and the Sammatiyas, both known for their theory of puggala.

The Vatsiputriyas or Puggalavadins probably split off sometime during the 3<sup>rd</sup> century BC. They affirmed the existence of an enduring person (puggala) distinct from both the conditioned (sajskrta) and the unconditioned (asajskrta); the sole asamskrta for them is nirvana. The puggala really exists and can transmigrate from life to life, unlike all other things, none of which possess this property.

The Sammatiya school, a derivation of the Vatsiputriya school, had a wide diffusion. According to the reports of Chinese Buddhist pilgrims Hiuen-tsiang in the 7th century, its followers were numerous along the Ganges valley. The school flourished in Gujarat and in eastern India, as well as in Champa, located in what is now central Vietnam. And a 16<sup>th</sup> century Tibetan account states that it still flourished during the Pala dynasty that ruled Bengal up to the end of the 11th century. The Sammatiyas maintained that an act vanishes but that it leaves a thrusting, a commitment to fructify, to have consequences. A person (puggala) is an essence not wholly identical with its components. Thus, the Sammatiyas have tendencies toward an ontological concept of the puggala – that it is real though undefinable. They also posit an intermediate existence between death and rebirth.

Sammatiya believed that though an individual does not exist independently from the five skandhas, or components that make up his personality, he is at the same time something greater than the mere sum of his parts. The Sammatiya were severely criticized by other Buddhists who considered the theory close to the rejected theory of atman, and was taken up by the *Kathavathu* as the first question to be refuted by arguments favouring the Theravada standpoint.

The school apparently had popular support, for the Chinese pilgrim Hiuen-tsiang described it in the 7<sup>th</sup> century as one of the four main Buddhist sects of that time. Its members were also known as Puggalavadins. It had 4 sub-schools; the Vatsiputriyas (presumably named after their teacher, Vatsiputra) are in some accounts referred to as the parent branch of which the Sammatiyas are an offshoot. The 4 sub-schools are:

8. Dhammottariya
9. Bhadrayanika
10. Channagarika
11. Sammitiya

Of these, Sammitiya became the most important and influential school. The cardinal doctrine of this school is that besides the elements composing a being, there is a ‘puggala’ (individuality or a self) which is undefinable and which persists through all the existences.

This ‘puggala’ is not real in the highest sense (paramartha), it is neither identical with nor different from, the khandhas. Though it possesses all the characteristics of the khandhas, it is neither like them caused and conditioned (sahetu sappaccaya) nor is it like Nibbana uncaused

and unconditioned (ahetu appaccaya). Again it is neither constituted (sajskrta) nor unconstituted (asajskrta). Though it is different (abbo) from the khandhas (constituents), it possesses certain characteristics of a constituted being such as happiness and unhappiness. It has certain aspects of the unconstituted inasmuch as it is not subject to birth, old age and death. It ceases only when the individual attains final emancipation (Nibbana).

Sammitiyas quote the Bharaharasutta of the Sajyutta Nikaya (III. p.28) and explain that burden (bhara) refers to the khandhas (constituents) while their carrier (hara) is the puggala. It is this puggala that remembers, feels, does and enjoys the fruits of all actions.

Sammitiyas also adduce other evidences from Pali texts to prove the existence of puggala, e.g.

1. The Buddha spoke of Sumedha as a puggala who got the prediction at the feet of Dipamkara in the virtue of the Savgha.
6. The statement of “attha-purisa puggala”.
7. Sopatanna has been explained by “paramo ayaj puggala”
8. “So kaya kayena passi viharati” here ‘so’ refers to ‘puggala’.
9. The statement of “sandhavitvana puggala”.
10. “Anamataggo ayaj sajsaro pubhagoti na pabbayati sattana”, here the ‘satta’ which goes in sajsara refers to puggala.
11. The Buddha’s knowledge of “pubbenisesena bana”, i.e., the memory of past births is not possible if there is no puggala.
12. Assako loko sabbaj pahaya gamaniya – if people depart everything and go alone in the sajsara, it is clear that there is a ‘puggala’.

The Sammitiyas take the problem of transmigration. They hold that puggala passes from existence to another, but the puggala of the two existences are neither the same nor different. The reason given by them is that a person who has attained the sotapatti stage, continues to be a sotapanna in heaven. A sotapanna man may be reborn as a sotapanna god, thus the sotapannahood remains unchanged though the constituents of his body have changed from those of a man to those of a god. The transition of sotapannahood from one existence to another cannot take place unless the existence and continuity of puggala are admitted.

The Sammitiyas say that the ‘self’ (puggala) is designated by its support (khandhas), just

as fire by its fuel. We get various types of fire, .e.g, forest fire, coal fire, wood fire in the same way a being is called either a man, a god or a naga according to the body. The self and the rupa are inter-dependend and inseparable, they exist at the same time.

Buddha speaks of self in extinction in Nirodha, there is no rebirth when there is complete nirodha. It has been argued by the Sammitiyas that reality or unreality of an object should not be questioned because it is unknowable by average intelligence. It is true that arupa loka is not known by means of rupa-loka, therefore it is not correct to say that arupa loka does not exist. Similarly, the 'puggala' is unknowable by the unwise, but that does not mean that it is not exist. The Buddha did not explain deeply the existence of puggala because the common people cannot understand, but this does not mean that Buddha denies the existence of puggala. These are all the arguments put forward by the Sammitiyas.

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The cardinal doctrine of this school is that besides the elements composing a being, there is a ‘puggala’ which is indefinable and which persists through all the existences.

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## PUGGALAVĀDA

According to *Puggalavādins*, *Sammītiyas* were the most prominent school of the *Puggalavāda*. These schools became popular and wide spread during the reign of *Harśavāda/Harśavāda*(?). They lived in Matura and Sārana, where was the first center of the *Theravāda* as mentioned by some inscriptions. The *Sammītiyas* ascribed the origin of their school to **ven. Mahā Kaccāyana**, the famous monk **Saraṇa**, *Yuan Chwang* tribes.

Most of the passages sighted in the *Kathāvatthu* and their views were also traced to the Pāli *Tipiṭaka*. Their *Sutta Piṭaka* is similar to Pāli of *Thāravāda* tradition. According to *Kathāvatthu*, their main teaching is that there is a persisting soul (*puggala*), passing from one existence to another. They said, that it is not possible for the *khandhas* transmigrate without the *puggala*. They however adhere to the doctrine of an *antarā-bhava*, which was not agreed by the *Theravādins* and *Mahāsaṅghikas*.

The *Sammītiyas* also referred to nametheir changing soul as *puggala*. To prove this, they have given **the Buddha's** words:

»There is a person, who observes for his own benefit.«

And:

»There appears a person who was reborn for the good and happiness of many, who, showing compassion to the world of being.«

Based on these, they said **the Buddha** accepted the existence of *puggala*. Further *Sammītiyas* quote the *Bhārahāra sutta* of *Samyutta Nikāya* and explain that burden refers to the constituent *khandha*, while their carry (*hāra*) is the *puggala* unloaded of the burden who is affected by the cessation of desire, attachment and hatred. This *puggala* bears a name, belongs to a family and is the enjoyer of the happiness and unhappiness.

Duscussing this *sutta*, *Theravādins* say that **the Buddha** used the word *puggala* as a mere concept. **Buddha** had in mind the aggregation five constituents and to them he collectively refers as *puggala*. It appears only when all the constituents are present. The *Sammītiya nikāya* also discussed other possibilities of existence of *puggala*. They viewed that there is no real self, the self is indeterminable five constituents and the self are identical. The five constituents and the self are different etc. *Theravādins* rejected at once all their dogmas. **Buddha** admonished his followers to remove the notion of 'I-ness' and 'my-ness' which was based on the notion of self. He did not refer *puggala* to that self. He was teaching the term of 'non-existence', which was used in different contact. So he denied that a soul would be necessary to refer to absolute non-existence of *puggala*.

*Rūpa, vedanā, saññā, saṅkhārā* and *viññāṇa* are always changing.

1. *Kathāvatthu* (*Sammītiyas*)
2. *Bhavya* (**Vasumitra** and **Vinītadeva**) – *Pudgalavāda*

*Ātma* – negation of *Anātmavāda*

1. **Vasubandhu** – *Abhidharma kośa*
2. **Sāntarakṣita** – *Tatrasaṅgaha*
3. **Moggaliputtatissa** – *Kathāvatthupparakaraṇa*

*Paramātmān* or *Brāhman*

*Sammītiyas'* interpretation of *puggala* is 'changing soul'.

In *Kathāvatthu*:

1. »*Atti puggalo attāhitāya paṭipanno.*« - „There is a person who exerts for his own good.“
2. »*Eka puggalo loke uppajjamāno uppajjati, bahujana hitāya bahujanasukāya lokānukampāya.*«  
- „There appeared a person who reborn for the good and happiness of many for showing compassion to the world of beings.“

### Shortnote

The nature of the *puggala*:

1. It is neither a mirage nor a hearsay
2. It is neither an unconstituted reality like *Nibbāna* nor a constituted material like *rūpa*.
3. It is not real in the highest sense (*paramattha*)
4. It is not something apart from five aggregates
5. It is not possible to establish a relation between *puggala* and *khandha*.
6. Though it possesses a characteristic of *khandha*, it is neither like that caused and conditioned (*sahetu, sappaccaya*) nor it is like *Nibbāna*, uncaused and unconditioned (*ahetu, appaccayā*).
7. It is neither constituted (*saṅkhāta*) nor unconstituted (*asaṅkhāta*)
8. Though it is different from the constituents it possesses certain characteristics of a constituted being (happiness and unhappiness)
9. It is not subject to birth, old age and death
10. It ceases only when the individual attains *Nibbāna*.

*Puggala* and *khandha* – *Abhidhamma* and its commentary, in *Bhāra Sutta, Saṃyutta Nikāya* :

1. *Bhāra* (contained – *khandha* – as burden)
2. *Hāra* – contained – *puggala* – as carrier)

Fire and fuel – *puggala*, five aggregates – they have own characteristic

1. Fire exists as long as its fuel lasts → *puggala* exists as long as there are five aggregates
2. Fire is different from fuel
3. Fire has the power of burning something (an object)
4. Fire and fuel are co-existent
5. Fuel is a support for the fire
6. Fuel is not wholly devoid of fiery element → *puggala* stands in relation to the constituent of a being.  
*Puggala* is affected by desires, attachment, hatred etc.  
*Puggala* bears a name, belongs to a family, enjoys happiness and unhappiness.

*Sammūtiyas*: „*Puggala* has a material form.“

1. *Rūpāvacara* – material sphere – material form
  2. *Arūpāvacara* – immaterial sphere – immaterial form
- »*Taṃ jīvaṃ taṃ sarīraṃ; aññāṃ jīvaṃ, sarīraṃ.*« - „*Puggala* is neither identical nor different from the body.“  
 »*So kāye kāyānupassī viharati.*«

The problem of transmigration:

1. *Puggala* passes from one existence to another
2. *Puggala* of two existences is neither the same nor different.

A *Sotāpanna* man will be reborn as a *Sotāpanna*. This takes place because of the existence and the continuity of *puggala*.

### **Buddha's utterances regarding *puggalavāda***

1. »*Yadidaṃ cattāri purisa yugāni attha purisa puggalā.*« - „There are four pairs of people or 8 persons.“
2. »*So sattakkhattu paramo sandāvitṛāna puggalo dukkhassantakaro hoti*«

The transmigration of soul:

3. »*Anamataggoyam saṅsāro pubbakoṭi na paññāyati.*«

The special features of 'puggala':

1. It is different from mind, but it is the percipient (it has the ability to understand things)
2. It is not momentary. It can perceive every momentary thought.
3. It is the 'seer'<sup>35</sup>.
4. It is the 'doer'. (It does not have an independent nature.)
5. It is only the impermanent, momentary 'soul', that can be any activity.(?)

### **PUGGALAVĀDA (ORIGINAL BY VEN. SUVANNY)**

Pioneer of the *Puggalavāda* was **Vātsīputra**, the elder. The *Vātsīputrīyas* school is one of the 18 schools that arose in India before the 3<sup>rd</sup> century BC. According to *Puggalavāda* the *puggala* exists neither within nor without the five aggregates. The *Puggalavādins* were careful in how to avoid the allegation that their theory might be another form of *Ātmavāda*. The orthodox monks vehemently opposed the *Puggalavāda*, to them it was nothing but a visiting/vision(?) of *Ātmavāda*. In the *Kathāvatthu* the view of *Vātsīputrīyas* is given thus - The *Puggalavādins* rely on the following words of **Buddha**: »*Atthi puggalo atthitāya paṭipanno.*« - „There is a person who exerts for his own good.“ Basing on such word of **Buddha** they stated that 'puggala' of the above mentioned passage is something positive, it is neither a mirage or a hearsay, it is neither the unconstituted reality like *Nibbāna* or *Ākāsa* nor a constituted material element (*rūpa*), feeling (*vedanā*) etc.

The *puggala* is not real in the highest sense (*paramattha*). It has certain aspects of the unconstituted in as much as it is not subject to birth, old age and death. It ceases only when the individual attains final emancipation (*Nibbāna*). The *Puggalavādins* held that the self in transmigration is that the self passes from one existence to another. The 'puggala' whose mind carries with it the effects of his moral observances (*sīla*) and meditational practice (*samādhi*) is reborn in a higher sphere.(?) On one's death one's five constituents after disintegration accompany the self to a sphere of excellence. His meritorious deeds and spiritual acquisition is his treasure, which follows him in his next existence. Thus his self does not go alone. The self in extinction ceases and has no more rebirths.

From all these arguments the author of *Sammītiya Nikāya Śāstra* established that **Buddha** did not fully explain many of his deeper ideas and the existence of self – 'puggala' is one of them. *Puggalavādins* argue toward *Theravādins* that the first question put by the *Theravādins* to the *Vātsīputrīyas* that they admit the existence of *puggala* either as the unchangeable, ever-existing reality like *Nibbāna*, or as a constituted object like *rūpa* or regard it as false like a mirage, or look upon it simply as a hearsay. The *Sammītiyas* denied practically all the four possibilities, though they asserted that the *puggala* was known as the real, ultimate fact (*saccikamaparamatṭāna*).

The next attempt of the *Theravādins* is to find out whether the *Puggalavādins* regarded it as something existing like any of the 57 elements, *rūpa*, *vedanā*, *saññā* etc. The *Sammītiyas* denied it saying they did not admit *puggala* as an element apart from the 57 elements and in support of their contention they quoted from the *nikāyas* the passage »*Atthi puggala atthitāya paṭipanno.*« which indicates that *puggala* exists but not apart from the elements. The next attempt of the *Theravādins* was to show that the *Sammītiyas* might have been advocating either *Ucchedavāda* or *Sassatavāda*. The *Sammītiyas* rejected both of those. It was apparent that the *Sammītiyas* were seeking to establish that the five *khandhas* which were distinct from one another could not give rise to the consciousness of I-ness, a unity.

The facts that a person acts or thinks as one and not as five separated objects, that a person's attainments like *Sotāpannahood* continue to be the same in different existences and that one speaks of one's past existences and so forth do lead to the conclusion that, besides the five *khandhas* there exists some mental property which forms the basis of I-ness and maintains the continuity of *kamma* from one existence to another. The *Sammītiyas* therefore affirmed the existence of a sixth mental property and called it *puggala*, which could remain only along with *khandhas* and thus must disappear when the *khandhas* stop due to *Nibbāna*. As this mental property or *puggala* is not *ḷsanika* (constituted momentary object) and again, as it is not also unchanging and ever existing like *Nibbāna*, so it is not *asāṅkhāta*. Therefore, the *puggala* must be admitted to be neither *saṅkhāta* nor *asāṅkhāta*.

### **666PUDGALAVADA**

Pioneer of the pudgalavada was Vatsiputras, the elder. The Vatsiputriyas School is one of the 18 schools that arose in India before the 3<sup>rd</sup> century B.C. according to the pudgalavada, the pudgala exist neither within nor without the five aggregates. The pudgalavadins were carefully how to avoid the allegation that their theory may be another form of atmavada. The orthodox monks vehemently opposed the pudgavada, to them it was nothing but a visiting of atmavad. In the Kathavatthu, the view of the Vatsiputriyas is given thus: the pudgalavadins rely on the following words of Buddha “Atthi puggalo atthitaya patipanno” (there is a person who exerts for his own good). Basing on such words of Buddha, they state ‘Pudgala’ of the above mentioned passages is something positive, it is neither a mirage nor a hearsay, it is neither the unconstituted reality likes Nibbana or Akasa nor a constituent material element (Rūpa), feeling (vedanā) etc.

35 In English 'seer' means 'forecaster'. Anyway, here 'seer' means 'the one who see'.

The puggala is not real in the highest sense (paramartha). It has certain aspects of the unconstituted in as much as it is not subject to birth, old age and death. It ceases only when the individual attains final emancipation (Nirvana). The pudgalavadins hold that the self in transmigration is that the self passes from one existence to another. The 'pudgala' whose mind carries with it the effects of his moral observances (sila) and meditation practice Samadhi, is reborn in a higher sphere.

From all these arguments, the author of the Sammitiya nikaya sastra established that Buddha did not fully explain many of his deeper ideas and the existence of self 'pudgal' is one of them. Pudgalavadins argument, toward Theravadin: the first question put by the Theravadins to the Vatsiputriyas that they admit the existence of puggala either as the unchangeable, ever-existing reality like Nibbana, or as a constituted object like Rūpa or regard it as false like a mirage, or look upon it simply as a hearsay. The Sammitiyas deny practically all the four possibilities, though they assert that the puggala is known as a real ultimate fact (saccikathaparamatthana).

The next attempt of the theravadins is to find out whether the pudgalavadins regard as something existing like any of the 57 elements, Rūpa, vedanā, saññā etc. The sammitiyas deny it saying they do not admit puggala as an element apart from the 57 element and in support of their contention they quote from the Nikayas the passage "Atthi puggala atthitaya patipañño" which indicates that puggala exists but not apart from the elements. The next attempt of the theravadins is to show that the Sammitiyas should advocate either Uchedavāda or Sassatavāda. The sammitiyas reject both of these. It is apparent that the Sammitiyas are seeking to establish that the five Khandhas which are distinct from one another cannot give rise to the consciousness of I-ness, a unity.

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can remain only along with khandhas and so must disappear when the khandhas in Nibbana. As this mental property or puggala is not Ksanika (constituted, momentary object) and again, as it is not also unchanging and ever existing like Nibbana, so it is not asamkhata. Therefore the puggala must be admitted to be neither samkhata nor asamkhata.

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#### 666PUGGALA VADA-KATHAVATHUPAKARANA-MOGGALITESAPUTTA.

Moggaliputtatesa is one of the earlier among the celebrated personality to appear in Buddhist tradition after death of Buddha, as the result of the deep veneration and respect his life come to be associated with miraculous event and happening. Mahavamsa, the chronicle of the Theravadin speak of the miraculous birth of the Moggaliputtatesathera, because he converted some wrong view of Puggala vadin into realistic understanding through his book kathavathu, the last abhidhamma text book

The three major doctrinal heresy were rejected in Kathavathu they are,

(1)personalist view(puggalavada)

(2) The realist view (sabbadivada)

(3) Transcendentalist view (lokutaravada) as the result of rejection of these three wrong views, Moggaliputtatesa thera became one of the greatest exponent of Buddhist philosophy.

\*refutation of the personalist view,

The conception a person whether ordinary or enlightenment was most training to generating and absolutistic form of thinking the Kathavathu is one of the earliest text to dealt with such emergent absolutistic tendency in Buddhist tradition. in fact the conception of person (puggala) is the first issue it takes up for lengthy debate unfortunately sutta philosophical distinction ideological argument are couched in such try all defining and they were neglected for the considerable period anyway,Moggaliputtatesa thera could control this personalize idea took us certain extended overlook discussion of philosophical method to kathavathu are completely influenced by idea introduced by commentator Buddhaghosa, in later period some Buddhist monks who were interested In Abhidhamma reject the idea of person and formulated confirm non personalize idea (ven.Najnateloka Mahatheraguide through the Abhidhamma pitaka) Buddhaghosa expose the view that the Buddha rejected the whole as being a mere samuti and the path as being real ,event though Buddha never use the term (ultimate) to refer to the path, applying this to the problem of the personal humanity some Buddhist metaphysician and modern scholar reach the conclusion that the personalities unreal, a mere convention and that the aggregate are ultimate is real

In fact, in commenting on the term Sacikata(absolutely truth and paramatha(ultimately real), buddhaghosa introduced an essentialist explanation in term of intrinsic nature(sabhava), here no doubt is the destination between nominal and the real and and whether there is a person or not,

Before analyze the argument in Kathavathu against the conception of an ultimately real person it is necessary to examine some of the terminology utilize in the text as mention above the term Sacca(truth) and thet( reality)were used in sariputta's rejection of the conception of the person upheld by Yamaka. In the

atthavagga of suttanipata where the Buddha refuse to recognize view, conception or idea as ultimate (paramam) we find cerebral form attha the after being often used specially to refer to the fruit or consequent. Even when that term paramatha occurred in early discussion to refer Nibbana it is used in the the sense ultimate truth thus, there is clear evident that the term attha signify the distinction reality the truth, the former presenting and absolute perspective of truth, the later a primitive one. if this is any clue, then Moggaliputtateas's selection of the form of two term sacikatha and paramattha is significant for what is being debated is the question of an ultimately real person and not any every conception of person

Keeping in mind this important philosophical using in term we can examine controversy between theravadin personalist, presenting the debate between two group as they.. Moggaliputatesa does not use any special logical formula the personalize view but simply allowed each party to speak each own language and then proceed to indicate which language is consistent with that of the Buddha the theravadin argue the base agaist personalist thus.

#### 666DIALOGUE BETWEEN THERAVADIN AND PERSONALIST IN KATHAVATHU PAKARANA.13.08.07

- (1) theravadin is a person obtained as an absolute truth, as an ultimate reality.
- (2) personalist against theravadin is the person as absolute truth as an ultimate reality obtain in the way that an absolute truth, an ultimate reality is obtained.
- (3) against personalist one should not say so against theravadin admit your reputation if you say that a person is obtained as an absolute truth as an ultimate reality, then you should also say that a person who obtained as an absolute truth or reality in the way that and absolute truth and ultimate reality is obtained in his dialogue the personalist wanted to prove that although the person who divided into five aggregates and six sensory organs and 18 elements, there must be accepted of person because without a person one is not possible to accept that who transmigrate from birth to birth.

According to their view all the miserable condition as well as pleasant condition pertaining to persons are happening if there is a person, they wanted to denote identification of same personality having frequent changed in the life of particular person, they denoted interrelationship between two persons. the person who was in the previous birth is the same person presented and future having frequent change is his life but this idea is not accepted by theravadin because their whole teaching are depend on analysis of khandha,dhatu and ayatana.

according to personalist (puggalavada) the appearance of any living being may be formulated in various appearances, according to their karmic force but identification of their personalist is the same untill he reaches the complete cessation of collecting karma in addition this identification of person the stream of consciousness may be fluxgates, according to nature of their birth \_ in karmic force the consciousness of the human being is regarded as potential but according to personalist theory as the result doing unwholesome action they may be coming down into lower level, animal life and so on. But their identification of the person is the same according puggalavada most modern interpreters.

and more recently an mislead by buddhagosa into belief that why the six statements describe two persons (puggalavada) the second referred to the aggregate (khandha) real path to which the person can be ultimately reduced. however what Moggaliputa there appear to have had in mind is something very different because he wanted to emphasize person as essential but to denote when disappear into khandha and thought clinging to a person may lead to misunderstand that there is a thought because of Moggaliputa's intention to draw out the implication of the term. saccikatha and paramatha he wanted to reject that there is a person or puggala but all these views between theravadin and puggalavadin pave

the way to atamavada or soul theory which is a common characteristic all Buddhist schools.

(Continue)

it is significant that both the Theravadin and personalist rejected soul theory or acceptance of an essential thing or substantiality both seem to assert that one should not speak of an absolute truth or ultimate reality. Yet the personalist proceed assert a person as on absolute truth as an ultimate reality while Theravadin does not. The two standpoints may be represent person into method. this means that the personalist believed that what can not be spoken of can still be obtained or experienced, where as Theravadin insist that what is unspeakable is also not obtained or not experienced in other words, the personalist is attempting to provide empirical content for a statement left unexplain,(avya kata)navatappe) by the Buddha.

it is only clarity the meaning and use of the primary term absolute truth and ultimate truth, that Moggaliputatesa continue to debate with the personalist in the format of the absolute refutation. What follow is an endless series of proposition relating to the concept of a person and so on, all couch in the language of absolute truth and ultimate reality. the actual refutation come only after the personalist caught few passage form the Buddha in support of his concept of a person. this include statement life. (there is a person who follows his own welfare) atthihitaya patipanno) or there is one person who arise in the world and who is intent on the welfare of the many the happiness of the many with composition for the world for the welfare, for the benifit and the happiness of the manny. Angutaranikaya ekanipata)

Moggaliputatesa regard all of them but counter with a series of causation from the early discourse that emphasize the non-substantiality (anatta) and emptiness (sunnata) of all phenomena interesting, this series begins with the famous statement of the Buddha all experiences phenomena are non-substantial(sabbe dhamma anatta) Muggaliputtatesa administer some anatta theory which is contradictory to puggalavada when the personalist admit that admit aperson Moggaliputatesa emphatically denied it. Because acceptant of the puggala pave the way to Atmavada.

when the meaning of the term dhamma in dhammapada verse(subbe dhamma anatta)dhamma means phenomena world(papanca loka or sankharaloka(condition) but in angutaranikaya causation puglavadin include Buddha also under the term dhamma in dhammapada commentary here dhamma also is common as pancakhan(dhamma kita pane khata eva athipeta), the question pertain to the author of kathavathupakarana was whether there was a person absolutely but personalist wanted to point out that where their was the term use as puggala in the language there was personalist theory. that why the buddha who was having detach mentality was also introduce as the person.

#### 666THE CHARACTERISTIC OF PUGGALAVADA

With the scholastic study of Abhidhamma, there emerged a new sect from the Theravadins during Bimbisara's reign, i.e., at about 286 B.C. This new sect was called Vatsiputriya which was later divided into 4 schools, i.e.:

1. Dhammottariya
2. Bhadrayanika
3. Channagarika

#### 4. Sammitiya

Of these, Sammitiya became the most important and influential school. The cardinal doctrine of this school is that besides the elements composing a being, there is a 'puggala' (i.e. individuality or a self) which is indefinable and which persists through all the existences.

This 'puggala' is not real in the highest sense (paramartha), it is neither identical with nor different from, the khandhas. Though it possesses all the characteristics of the khandhas, it is neither like them caused and conditioned (sahetu sappaccaya) nor is it like Nibbana uncaused and unconditioned (ahetu appaccaya). Again it is neither constituted (sajskrta) nor unconstituted (asajskrta). Though it is different (abbo) from the khandhas (constituents), it possesses certain characteristics of a constituted being such as happiness and unhappiness. It has certain aspects of the unconstituted inasmuch as it is not subject to birth, old age and death. It ceases only when the

individual attains final emancipation (Nibbana).

Sammitiyas quote the Bharaharasutta of the Sajyutta Nikaya (III. p.28) and explain that burden (bhara) refers to the khandhas (constituents) while their carrier (hara) is the puggala. It is this puggala that remembers, feels, does and enjoys the fruits of all actions.

Sammitiyas also adduce other evidences from Pali texts to prove the existence of puggala, e.g.

1. The Buddha spoke of Sumedha as a puggala who got the prediction at the feet of Dipamkara in the virtue of the Savgha.
2. The statement of "attha-purisa puggala".
3. Sopatanna has been explained by "paramo ayaj puggala"
4. "So kaya kayena passi viharati" here 'so' refers to 'puggala'.
5. The statement of "sandhavitvana puggala".
6. "Anamataggo ayaj sajsaro pubhagoti na pabbayati sattana", here the 'satta' which goes in sajsara refers to puggala.
7. The Buddha's knowledge of "pubbenisesena bana", i.e., the memory of past births is not possible if there is no puggala.
8. Assako loko sabbaj pahaya gamaniya – if people depart everything and go alone in the sajsara, it is clear that

there is a 'puggala'.

The Sammitiyas take the problem of transmigration. They hold that puggala passes from existence to another, but the puggala of the two existences are neither the same nor different. The reason given

by them is that a person who has attained the sotapatti stage, continuous to be a sotapanna in heaven. A sotapanna man may be reborn as a sotapanna god, thus the sotapannahood remain unchanged though the constituents of his body have changed from those of a man to those of a god. The transition of sotapannahood from one existence to another cannot take place unless the existence and continuity of puggala are admitted.

The Sammitiyas say that the 'self' (puggala) is designated by its support (khandhas), just as fire by its fuel. We get various types of fire, .e.g, forest fire, coal fire, wood fire in the same way a being is called either a man, a god or a naga according to the body. The self and the rupa are inter-dependent and inseparable, they exist at the same time.

Buddha speaks of self in extinction in Nirodha, there is no rebirth when there is complete nirodha. It has been argued by the Sammitiyas that reality or unreality of an object should not be questioned because it is unknowable by average intelligence. It is true that arupa loka is not known by means of rupa-loko, therefore it is not correct to say that arupa loka does not exist. Similarly, the 'puggala' is unknowable by the unwise, but that does not mean that it is not exist. The Buddha did not explain deeply the existence of puggala because the common people cannot understand, but this does not mean that Buddha denies the existence of puggala. These are all the arguments put forward by the Sammitiyas.

#### *666 EXAMINE HOW FAR IS IT JUSTIFIABLE THE EXPLANATIONS GIVEN BY PUGGALAVADIN TO ESTABLISH THE EXISTENCE OF PUGGALA?*

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#### NOTES ON PUGGALAVĀDA

1. *Kathāvattu* – *Sammītiyas*
2. **Bhavya, Vasumitra, Vinītadeva** – *ātma*, negation of *anātmavāda*

1. **Vasubandhu** – *Abhidharmakośa*
2. **Śāntarakṣita** – *Tatvasaṅgraha*
3. **Moggaliputtatissa** – *Kathāvattuḥpakarana*

*Paramātman* or *Brahman* – *Sammītiyas'* interpretation of *puggala* is a changing soul:

1. In *Kathāvattu*: »*Atti puggalo attahitaya paṭipano*.« - there is a person who exerts for his own good.
2. »*Eko puggalo loke uppajjamāno uppajjati bahiyana hitaya bahujana sukhāya lokānukampāya*.« - There appears a person who has been there for the happiness of good and happiness of many for showing compassion to the world of beings.

1. The nature of the *puggala* – it is neither material nor sensual.
2. It is neither an unconstituted reality like *Nibbāna* nor a constituted matter like *rūpa*.
3. It is not real in the highest sense (*paramātha*).
4. It is not something apart from five aggregates.
5. It is not possible to establish relation between the *puggala* and *khandhas*.
6. Though it possesses all the characteristics of the *khandhas*, it is not like them caused and conditioned (*sahetu, sappaccaya*) nor is it like *Nibbāna*, uncaused and unconditioned (*ahetu, appaccaya*).
7. It is neither constituted (*saṅkhāta*) nor unconstituted (*asaṅkhāta*).
8. Though it is different from the constituents it possesses certain characteristics of a constituted being (happiness and unhappiness).
9. It is not subject to birth, old age and death
10. It ceases only when the individual attains *Nibbāna*

#### *Puggala skandha*

*Abhidharmakośa* and its commentary:

1. *Bhāra* – contained *skandha*
2. *Hara* – container, the *puggala*

1. Fire exists as long as its fuel lasts
2. *Puggala* exists as long as there are the constituents (five aggregates)  
- fire ~ *puggala*; fuel ~ five aggregates

1. Fire is different from fuel
2. Fire has the power of burning something (an object)
3. Fire and fuel are co-existent, the fuel is a support for the former
4. Fuel is not wholly devoid of fiery element

*Puggala* stands in relation to the constituents of a being; *puggala* is affected by cessation of desire, attachment, etc. *Puggala* bears its name, belonging to a family, enjoyer of happiness and unhappiness.

## MADHYAMIKA

In *Mahāyāna* Buddhist philosophy, *śūnyatā* constitutes ultimate reality. Although the concept is encountered occasionally in early Pāli texts, its full implications were developed by the 2<sup>nd</sup> century by Indian philosopher **Nāgarjuna**. The school of philosophy founded by him, the *Madhyamika*, is sometimes called the *Sūnyavāda*.

According to **Kumārajīva**'s account, **Nāgarjuna** was born in South India in to a *Brahmin* family. After **Nāgarjuna** learned some basic Buddhist views, but without complete satisfaction, a **Mahānāga Bodhisattva** – a chief *nāga* took pity on him and presented him with the most profound *Mahāyāna* verses. **Nāgarjuna** mastered these in a short time and propagated the true *Dharma* in India, successfully defeating many opponents in scholastic, philosophical debates. A common consensus gives dates for his life as AD 150-250.

**Nāgarjuna** has written several works. The *Mūlamadhyamika Kārika* is considered the most important one. It consists of 27 chapters and 488 *kārika*.

According to *Madhyamikas*, the theory of *Śūnyatā* based on causality was directed at refuting the four theories of causation, namely *Sayaṃkatavāda*, *paraṃkatavāda*, *Ubhayatavāda* and *Ahetuvāda*.

'*Śūnyatā*' means 'nothiāness' or 'voidness', but in the teaching of **Nāgarjuna** the complete philosophy meaning of *Śūnyatā* is similar to 'no-self nature' (*asvabhāva*), and it is also similar to *Nirvāṇa*.

According to **Nāgarjuna**, *Nirvāṇa* is abiding in a state of non-abiding. The only way of reaching the goal is to realize that in the ultimate sense there is no goal to be reached, *Nirvāṇa* is reality which is *sūnya*.

To explain the concept of *Śūnyatā* and no-self nature, the great philosopher **Nāgarjuna** put forward his ideas on **the Buddha's** doctrine of *Pratityasamutpāda*. The causal formula was: „This being, that arises.“ Every object of thought is necessarily relative. And because it is relative, it is neither absolutely real nor absolutely unreal and nothingness, avoiding both the extremes. Thus according to **Nāgarjuna**, phenomena are dependent on all categories of thought as *śūnyatā* itself. It is the most important concept of *Madhyamika* philosophy.

In *Mūlamadhyamika Kārika* **Nāgarjuna** sums up his teaching about *Pratityasamutpāda* in the following words:

»*Apratitya samutpanno dharmah kascinna vidyate.*« (MK 24,19)

- „Any existence cannot be seen without dependent origination.“

There is not a single thing in the world which is unconditional, absolute, real. Everything is related to, contingent upon, conditioned by something else. Therefore, *Pratityasamutpāda* is equated with *Śūnyatā*, it is 'no-self nature'. Thus **Nāgarjuna** says:

»*Yah pratityasamutpādah śūnyataṃ taṃ pracakṣmahe.*« (MK. 24. 18a)

- „We state that whatever is dependent arising, that is nothingness.“

According to *Hīnayānists*, they think that *Nibbāna* is a positive entity (*bhava*) and thus *Nirvāṇa* is the opposite of *saṃsāra*. While **Nāgarjuna** says that no positive entity which is not dependent on conditions cannot be discovered. If it is not *bhava*, it cannot be *abhava* either, for *abhava* is a relative word.

*Bhava* means 'existence', and existence is '*saṃsāra*'; no existence (*abhava*) is '*Nirvāṇa*'. *Pratityasamutpāda*, viewed from the point of view of relativity is *saṃsāra*, while viewed from the point of view of reality it is *Nirvāṇa*. Therefore, according to **Nāgarjuna** philosophy, *Nirvāṇa* is not opposite of *saṃsāra*, there is no difference between them:

»*Na saṃsārasya nirvāṇat kibcid asti viśeṣanaṃ,*

*Na nirvāṇasya saṃsarat kibcid asti viśeṣanaṃ.*« (MK 25. 19)

- „Nothing of *saṃsāra* is different from *Nirvāṇa*, nothing of *Nirvāṇa* is different from *saṃsāra*.)

Everything is 'Dependent Origination', thus, it is '*śūnyatā*', '*asvabhāva*'. It is the middle path of **the Buddha's** teaching:

»*Yah pratityasamutpādah śūnyataṃ taṃ pracakṣmane,*

*sa prambaptir upādāya partipat saiva madhyama.*« (MK 24. 18)

- „We state that whatever is Dependent Arising, that is *Śūnyatā*. It is in that sense that the path is middle.“

**Nāgarjuna** is considered to be one of the great Buddhist thinkers all over the Buddhist world. By *Mahāyānists* he was called second *Buddha* or 'the Sun among the Buddhist philosophers'.

6<sup>th</sup> February 2002

**The introduction to Mādhyamika school**

Madhyamaka refers to doctrine, whereas Mādhyamika refers to school or people who are the followers of this school.

Mādhyamika and Yogācāra constitute the two major streams of Mahāyāna. Mādhyamika is a school that teaches the doctrine of śūnyatā (emptiness). It came into existence around by the middle of the 1<sup>st</sup> century AD. But the doctrine of emptiness was already existed prior to this period. Mahāyāna arose in the period of 1<sup>st</sup> century BC to 1<sup>st</sup> century AD.

Yogācāra is another stream that develops a little bit later. From Yogācāra, a branch was developed called Tathāgatagarbha.

There is a misunderstanding saying that the doctrine of śūnyatā is nihilistic, because it speaks of everything is empty - it did not mean that in each and every sense, nothing exist. In brief, what they say 'all dharma is empty' – mean they are without svabhāva / no intrinsic nature. This school proposes that everything is empty in its intrinsic nature, or to say, 'the doctrine of nairatmya.'

When Mahāyāna arose, suddenly as it were, there was a large corpus of literature called prajñā-pāramitā (Perfection of prajñā).

Scholars generally agree that the common feature of Mahāyāna is the attainment of Buddhahood, that is by gaining prajñā-pāramitā. Mahāyānist who followed the way of faith (bakti), thinking that if you faith in Amitabha, will be born in pure land. Also you have Mahāyānist who are meditators, they emphasized only dhyāna. Also you have Mahāyānist who are more philosophical, they were called Yogācāra or Mādhyamika.

Thus Mahāyāna is a very complicated movement. But there is only one common feature – it is the ideal of Buddhahood. That is the concept of Prajñā-pāramitā. Prajñā-pāramitā is not attained by Arhat. To attain that, you have to gain śūnyatā. So that idea was already existed even before 1<sup>st</sup> century BC also. Certainly it was not a new idea that was innovated by the Mādhyamika.

But it was in the period of 3<sup>rd</sup> century AD, Nāgārjuna came to expound the teaching of śūnyatā, thus it came to be regarded as specific school called Mādhyamika after the exposition of Nāgārjuna. So in that sense, many people regarded Nāgārjuna as the founder of Mādhyamika school. We shall see Nāgārjuna himself however said that, he has nothing new to say, he taught what the Buddha has taught. Around the 1<sup>st</sup> century BC to 1<sup>st</sup> century AD, there is a literature called Prajñā-pāramitā in which the doctrine of śūnyatā is emphasized.

And around in later 1<sup>st</sup> century AD or early 4<sup>th</sup> century AD, you have another new group of literatures and these literatures were composed, later came to be known as Yogācāra. At that time, they reacted to the early doctrine of śūnyatā. They argued of nītirtha (ppp. A teaching whose meaning has been fully drawn out/ explicit) and neyīrtha (fpp. A teaching whose meaning is still to be drawn out/ implicit). Not only that, they debated in the period of Abhidharma subsequently. All Buddhists are arguing as to what nītirtha and neyīrth really mean. Due to different understandings, they split into different schools.

The earliest Mahāyānist say nītirtha teaching is śūnyatā. But for Yogācāra, that teaching became neyīrth. What is the nītirtha teaching for Yogācāra in the 4<sup>th</sup> century AD - doctrine of nothing exist apart from the mind. We called them as 'Idealism' – what appeared in the external world actually is the projection of the mind. That is in the case of dream. There is only one ultimate reality - mind. So they objected to the teaching of śūnyatā. They say there is one thing not empty, that is the mind.

In another word, when come to Yogācāra period, they have re-interpreted what is meant by emptiness, and what is meant by Middle way. The important aspect of development in Buddhist philosophy precisely consists of the re-interpretation of what is meant by middle way and emptiness. Since Middle way, pratītya-samutpāda, etc are taught by the Buddha, no body would deny to that. But they re-interpreted it in a way like a new innovation. Finally you find Tathāgatagarbha which teaches that the Buddha-nature is actually within everybody. They are really talked about there is a metaphysical entity called Tathāgatagarbha (womb of Tathāgata) – that the Buddha arises from the embryo. That innate nature as the metaphysical reality exists in everybody. Some schools even say it exists in every sentient beings also. Therefore there was this development subsequently.

In Mādhyamika, they proposed two level of truth - saṃvṛti satya and paramārtha satya. Further in Yogācāra, they proposed three levels of truth. All these show that Buddhists are trying to interpret the Buddha's teaching, and arguing what is nītirtha and neyīrtha.

Historically, Mādhyamika is divided into two major sub schools: 1. Prasaṅgika; 2. Svatantrika.

1. Prasaṅgika : from the word 'prasaṅga', from the śaṅj – to attach. Prasaṅga means the logical consequence that is being led to. When you say something, others would ask you, what is the logical consequence or logical fallacy? The consequence is

resulted from a particular proposition, supposing you say, ‘cause produces effect’, or ‘karma produces vipāka’. But if you also say ‘cause and effect are entities in themselves, each having a svabhāva,’ in another words, cause is intrinsically cause, effect is intrinsically effect, that is to say, cause has a svabhāva, forever a cause; likewise phala has a svabhāva, forever a phala. If you propose like this, Nāgārjuna would show you what is the logical consequence of this? You started by saying the Buddha teaches cause and effect, but because of your proposition (premises), that cause and effect each has svabhāva, then the prasaṅga would be that, you can’t even establish causality at all, why? If cause has intrinsically nature, that intrinsic nature does not change, forever would be the cause, then how can cause produce an effect? That consequence came from you proposition that everything has svabhāva. If you don’t have the proposition that everything has svabhāva, you wouldn’t have this problem. Another example, spiritual life. We are pūthagjana, if you have proposition that pūthagjana has svabhāva, and that Buddhahood is something intrinsically an entity, what would happen? It would mean that there is no possibility of spiritual progress. Ultimately the prasaṅga is that the spiritual life is impossible. In this way, this school called prasaṅgika that doesn’t have his own proposition. It simply takes the proposition of opponents and shows the consequence of that. Their argument depends on the view of proposition of opponents.

2. Svatantrika : Later on, some members of Mādhyamika tradition thought that how can there is no own view, while rejecting it and showing the fault of the other views. So slowly they said they should have their own view – that is everything is empty. In this way, they came to be called as svatantrika [tantra – dependent ; sva – own; Lit. depending on own view]. In this way, we can see a change within Mādhyamika.

When we come to the later period, Svatantrika also brought the idea from Yogācāra.

What is svabhāva? Read the [entrance].

Nāgārjuna refuted the idea of asti-svabhāvatā. In Buddhism the Buddha has taught that nothing has any ātman, and also everything is anitya. At the same time, the Buddha has insisted that, for every karma, there is vipāka, there is saṁsāra, etc. Then some Buddhists later on faced the pressure from Indian tradition like Hindu, etc. For them, they have a very definite theory which can account for the rebirth, saṁsāra, etc. But for Buddhists, when come to the Abhidharma period, everything is kṣaṇika (momentariness). If so, everything last for one moment, then many questions would arise? How can Buddhists account for the continuity?

One important doctrinal concept was svabhāva. If you explain in term of svabhāva, many problems would solve. For instance, in the phenomenal existence, everything is momentary, but in essence, it is still there. Because there is essence, then you can account for the continuity, etc. They argue that their concept of svabhāva is not the same as ātman. Thus in this period, they found a conceptual device that is called the doctrine of svabhāva.

Mādhyamika in a way is a critique of the concept of svabhāva. Nāgārjuna uses the term ‘śūnyatā’ as the very powerful antidotes to the notion of svabhāva. In his MMK, he attacked mainly the idea of svabhāva. In this way, the prasaṅga of opponents is exposed.

13<sup>th</sup> February 2002 Lecture 2: Mādhyamika by Professor Ven. Dhammajoti

### **The standpoint of Nāgārjuna**

Generally, Nāgārjuna was considered as one of the greatest Mahāyānist. Certainly from Chinese Mahāyāna school, they claimed him as the first patriarch. But in recent years, Western scholars begin to question, for example, Ak Warder wrote a paper questioning whether Nāgārjuna was a Mahāyānist? From the point of view of Professor, it is questionable whether Nāgārjuna is a Mahāyānist or not.

Unfortunately as in the case of many great śākyas, many many works are said to be written by them. That is something to be watched out in the study of history of Buddhism. Sometimes a book that is totally not even authentic also was claimed to be written by Indian śākyas. One famous example is “the awakening of faith 大乘起信論” in Mahāyāna, expounding the doctrine of Yogācāra’s idealism. According to Chinese tradition, it is said to have been written by Aśvaghoṣa. Until in modern times, some Chinese made a research into this, and they finally conclude that it was not a real work of Aśvaghoṣa. It was not even composed in India. It was a Chinese work. Nonetheless, it was still a work of great philosophical value.

According to modern researchers, this work was composed by somebody else, but ascribed to Aśvaghoṣa. Historically, Aśvaghoṣa was in the period of 2<sup>nd</sup> to 3<sup>rd</sup> century AD. If this is true, it means already in India at that time, this type of philosophy was existed in a highly sophisticated form. This is one reason. The second reason is, it led many scholars to claim that Aśvaghoṣa was the founder of Mahāyānist. From all the other sources, the Yogācāra Buddhism developed in the middle or late 3<sup>rd</sup> century AD. It can’t be in the 2<sup>nd</sup>

century AD. In the early part of 2<sup>nd</sup> century AD, the teaching that was prevailed was the teaching of *nyat*.

In the case of Nāgārjuna, a large numbers of works were ascribed to him. Some were definitely not by him. However, modern scholars agreed only a certain number of works are actually written by Nāgārjuna. In those works, we can be sure as being authored by Nāgārjuna, we can see a very consistent standpoint that he teaches the doctrine of *nyat*. As to MMK, it is very special and we are on very safe ground, because everybody agreed, whether ancient or modern that MMK is authored by Nāgārjuna. MMK is the masterpiece of Nāgārjuna, and this is the standard work of the study of the doctrine of Mādhyamika.

666MADHYAMIKA BY PROFESSOR VEN. DHAMMAJOTI 6<sup>TH</sup> MARCH 2002

Arranged by *~* Dhammapāla bhikkhu

The Buddha is the best preacher of the doctrine of Pratītya-samutpāda. And it is this pratītya-samutpāda teaching that can bring an end to prapañca (intellectual proliferation: to form more and more dōi, or more and more speculation), and it is this tendency that binds us in saṁsāra. So Nāgārjuna's whole purpose of this treatise is to help us to get out of prapañca.

The Buddha is said to be one who has cut off prapañca, because what he says is not prapañca, but a statement that comes directly from His enlightenment. He sees things truly as they are (yathābhūta), and tells us what he see directly.

Prapañca is a mental tendency to proliferate, to produce more and more views, ideas. So Nāgārjuna says the only way to stop this is the teaching of Pratītya-samutpāda (Dependent-origination; Dependent-arising; condition co-production; conditioned arising).

Pratītya-samutpāda is not a theory, nor a prapañca. It is a statement or fact. That fact, according to Buddhism, is discovered by the Buddha in his Enlightenment. Pratītya-samutpāda is not a thesis. But from the philosophical point of views, you can say that, of course, when you have a consistent view which explains things, then you can say that is a theory. From the religious practitioners point of views, it is not a theory. Theory and dōi refers to prapañca, refers to speculation about things that we are not sure of, that we have not directly experienced.

So all these signify by the term 'prapañca'. So Nāgārjuna says he salutes the Buddha, because he is the best preacher of Pratītya-samutpāda, and it is Pratītya-samutpāda that appeared or destroyed the prapañca. Later on, we shall see that:

*Pratītya-samutpāda = middle way = nyat.*

His whole treatise talks about *nyat* (emptiness). In fact this emptiness, from his point of view is none other than the teaching of Pratītya-samutpāda. Nāgārjuna takes the Buddha as a Guru. Even from his opening stanza, we can see his standpoint, he is not a Mahāyānist, at least judged by this stanza. We cannot say this stanza alone that he is not Mahāyānist.

No body can prove that he is a Mahāyānist at all by looking at this stanza. Another point is, there is a pair of four:-

Non-origination; non-extinction  
Non-destruction ; non-permanence  
Non-identity ; non-differentiation  
Non-coming (into being) ; non-going (out of being).  
不生亦不滅      不常亦不斷  
不一亦不異      不來亦不出

To sum up, all that can be accounted in the phenomena existence:- the experience of motion; the experience of time, diversity, identity among things exist at the same time in different space, and so on. When Nāgārjuna says there is no cessation, there is no arising, and so on. He has in brief negated all activities whatsoever, but be very careful, the negation is reference to what has svabhāva. It is not Nāgārjuna says there is nothing in the world that there are no activities. But what he says is that there are no activities which can be explained in term of svabhāva. We cannot say, 'cause is cause in its intrinsic nature; effect is effect in its intrinsic nature, and so on.' If you think like that, it is prapañca, then you will get into trouble. He is going to prove to you that nothing can arise.


Though 4 pairs are mentioned, we need not think that there are only these four, and no more. You can have more or less, sometimes depends also the structure of stanza.

We shall proceed to look at another stanza, the first and 24<sup>th</sup> chapter are very important. Other chapters are the further elaboration.


Once you have understood the first chapter, you really have understood the concerns of Nāgārjuna, the aims of Nāgārjuna and his methodology.

So what is empty, according to Nāgārjuna, means 'it is without *svabhāva*'. Why everything has no *svabhāva*? Because everything is *Pratītya-samutpāda*. Whatever he criticizes some things, you must remember that he criticizes, or he objects only in the sense of any theory supporting the *svabhāva*. He is not saying there is no *karma-vipāka*, etc. If you explain all these things in term of *svabhāva*, then Nāgārjuna will oppose it. He will show you thing becomes impossible.

For the *Mādhyamika*, the position is that: [ Existence = arising ]. That means, when you say something exists, that something arises. You can't speak of something that is hidden, something that is abide in the dormant state in essence which may arise later. But though it doesn't arise the exist in itself, we can't speak in those terms. We have seen in *Abhidharma* class, how *Sarvāstivādin* understand things. For them, everything exists as an essence:- it may arise or may not arise. Once it has arisen, it has become past. When it has just arisen, rather it is present. Once it has arisen and ceases, it has become past. Before it arises, it says that it is in the future. In brief, this is the *Sarvāstivāda*'s thinking. They have the metaphysical essence that is existent. Existence is one thing, arising is another thing. If you have the sphere of existence, the sphere of arising, you can demonstrate like this:-



Nāgārjuna says different: Existence and arising are exactly the same.



What does not arise is what does not exist. What arises is what exists. This is extremely important principle. This is where it differs from *Abhidharmika* view point.

We shall see that in term of *Abhidharma* philosophy, this view is corresponded to *Vibhajyavāda* (distinctionist).

*Vibhajyavāda* is not just a term to denote *Theravāda* school. And it does not simply mean *Analyst*. Don't think like that – the Buddha is also called *Vibhajyavādin*. The *Vibhajya* method refers to the method of answering question in 4 different ways.

1. Categorical One.
2. *Vibhajya* One.
3. Asking back a question, ex:-“Are all *rūpa* resistant?” Then you want to ask, “What type of *rūpa* do you want to know? ” It is present, past and future. According to *Sarvāstivādin*, present *rūpa*, what is experience is resistant. What is past and what is future, they are *rūpa*, but not resistant. In this way, you can ask back a question.
4. Question to be put aside. The very question is asked in a wrong way, a wrong assumption in the mind of the questioner.

In that context, you have the idea of *Vibhajya*. In *Theravāda* tradition, it means the method of analysis. But that kind of understanding of *Vibhajyavāda* is not in accordance with the original meaning of the term. *Vibhajyavāda* originated in the context of the debate about *dharma* – *whether dharma exist in the past, present, and the future*. One camp of Buddhist says that you must make distinction (*Vibhajya vadanti*) that is the distinction among past, present, and future *dharma*s. You can't say they are all “*sarvam asti*”. You can only say ‘*pratyutpanna dharma asti*’ (the present *dharma* exist). By saying that, you are making distinction, you are called a *Vibhajyavādin*.

Another camp says, as far as the existence is concerned, the past, present and future are all the same. They are existed in essence. They may differ in term of activities. The present one has activity, the past and future do not have activity. The *Sarvāstivādin*s don't make distinction. They say, ‘*sarvam asti*’ - all exist in essence (*svabhavat*).

*Vibhajyavādin*s are those who speak, having made distinction. That is the original significant of the term. For the *Vibhajyavādin*, in that case, *Theravādin*, *Sautrāntika*, *Mahāsaṅghika*, etc are all *Vibhajyavādin*s, because they don't believe in the theory of *Sarvāstivāda*.

There are these 2 camps, either Sarvāstivādin or Vibhajyavādin. Vibhajyavādin connotes a very broad community of Buddhists. All those who hold that only the present dharma is real - the only thing is what has just arisen (pratyutpanna). For them, what exists is what arises. So Nāgārjuna share the same point, as far as this point is concerned. Nāgārjuna is on a par with them. For Sarvāstivāda, they really talked about the underlying essence that continuing to persist.

Let's look at stanza 1,

*Na svato nāpi parato na dvābhyā nāpyahetuka/  
utpannā jñtu vidyante bhāvā kvacana ke cana//*

(Tr. No any existent anywhere have ever found to have been produced from themselves, from others, from both, and from without a reason.)

諸法不自生      亦不從他生  
不共不無因      是故知無生

Four existent things:-

1. Thing arisen from itself.
2. Thing arisen from other.
3. Thing arisen from both itself and other.
4. Thing arisen from neither itself nor other.

First, Nāgārjuna enumerates these 4 positions. In ancient India, there were different dōśis (prapañca) like that.

1. Somebody think that the thing arises by itself – we see a different thing as a Phala, from a hetu, but actually, the phala is from the hetu itself. There is no different between phala and hetu. This is the view of Sāṅkhyā philosophy.
2. Another Indian school holds that the phala and hetu are totally 2 different things. Vaiśeṣika hold this view.
3. Some held the view that thing arisen from both (itself and pratyaya). This school is Sarvāstivāda. For them, the thing already exists in essence. But it cannot arise by itself. It needs pratyaya. On the one hand, they want to be a good Buddhist – that the Buddha says everything arises from pratyaya. On the other hand, they add some thing more, saying that the thing already exist in itself, though it hasn't arisen.
4. There are others, thing from no reason, simply arise with no cause for arising. They are Materialist.

Nāgārjuna in the very first stanza, negates all the 4 positions. [P: proposition ; ~ = negation ]

P = A thing arisen from itself.  
~ P = A thing arisen from others.  
P. ~P = A thing arisen from both.  
~ (P.~P)= ~P. ~~P (neither P nor not P)

This is derived from his standpoint of śūnyatā - that nothing has svabhāva. If nothing has svabhāva, how can something arises from itself. He appeals that “not any (na kecana) not in anyway (no kvacana). Nothing is found/experienced.”

It is a kind of Inductive logic, not the deductive logic. Nāgārjuna does not have faith in deductive logic – that means you have some abstract principles, from this, abstract premise, you deduce something/ consequence. This is not the Buddhist way of understanding thing.

The Buddhist's way of understanding is to understand from experience – from whatever that have occurred in the universe first. This way of Inductive thinking is completely in accordance with the Buddha's understanding. In another words, it is really based on empiricism (/experience). That means, Nāgārjuna is not also a pure logician. He is not interested in being a logician.

Clearly that the first stanza is logical, on the other hand, a Western logician might question, “ it has never been found”. But for Nāgārjuna, it is good enough, if nobody has ever experienced, then in term of probability, probably is that this is the fact. It is good enough for us to accept – what else is going to accept other than our own experience. What else that we can be so sure of. We can't be any more sure about thing than we had experienced ourselves. So although you can question this logic, but Nāgārjuna is not afraid of that, he would say, “Well, look into your experience, and tell me what I say is whether contrast to your experience or not?” So he says, “no such case has ever been found that anything arises just by itself, by others, by both and by neither.”

(1). Why nothing arises by itself? [Itself means something have svabhāva – a thing in itself.

Reason I:- A thing in itself, i.e. svabhāva, is something that has always been existing. Therefore there is no arising.

Reason II:- If a thing, having a svabhāva (fixed nature) can arise simply by itself (as it wishes), then everything in the same way, can arise anytime, that lead to simultaneous arising of all things at all time, which is absurd and ridiculous.

(2). Why no thing arisen from other?

Reason I:- If there is no arising of a thing in itself, there is also no arising from another thing – having a svabhāva.

Reason II:- If two things totally different in their svabhāva exist, there cannot be any causal relationship. The two cannot be related as cause and effect. For if this can be possible, then it should be possible to produce fire from water, etc. This second proposition is also rejected.

(3). For the third proposition, Nāgārjuna would not bother very much to argue, if the first proposition is not acceptable, the second proposition is not acceptable, put them together also is useless. Thus he rejected.

(4). The fourth proposition is rejected on the empirical ground. You can't find anything that is produced without any cause. There are always certain precedent cause for a following effect to arise. In this way, all these 4 catuḥkoṭi (4 corner, 4 alternatives) are:

- P = A thing arisen from itself.
- ~ P = A thing arisen from others.
- P. ~P = A thing arisen from both.
- ~ (P.~P)= ~P. ~~P (neither P nor not P)

Catuḥkoṭi is meant to convey the idea of exhaustive possibilities. Nothing can arise by itself, from others, from both, from neither. So the conclusion is that, there cannot be any arising at all, ie., *there cannot be any arising of anything having svabhāva*.

Conclusion: There cannot be arising of anything having a svabhāva.

*Continue...*

*Arranged by Dhammapala*

#### MADHYAMIKA PHILOSOPHY

*Madhyamika* philosophy originated about 65 BC, founded by **Nāgārjuna**. The great teaching of this philosophy was a nihilism and stated that everything is really emptiness. This teaching is not a theory but just a ladder which can reach out into the infinite. The aim of this philosophy is completed emancipation from the world around us in all aspects. This nihilism applied to the phenomenal world and generated through a result of both agnosticism and mysticism. In mysticism, they help an opinion that the highest *jhāna* of **the Buddha** was a negativistic implication.

In *Madhyamika*, **Nāgārjuna** has analyzed and the conception of causality as *paṭiccasamuppāda* and views of the *Sarvāstivādins*. **Nāgārjuna** also made a refutation of the theory of causality held in the early Buddhism. To explain it, **Prof. Murti** described that the work of **Nāgārjuna** was as an Indian philosophy and concerned not only the *Theravāda*, but also the *Sarvāstivāda*. Therefore, for him *Sarvāstivāda* was regarded as path of early Buddhism and according to the *Madhyamika*, refutation of causality is directed against the *Theravāda*. Regarding this opinion, **Prof. W. S. Karunārathna** mentioned that there is no evidence whatever **Nāgārjuna** knew or refuted the doctrine of *Theravāda*.

In *Madhyamika*, **Nāgārjuna** criticized the conception of causality that nowhere and never does a really existing thing originate out of itself, or out of another, or out of both, or without a cause. Certainly, relating to conception of causality, in doctrine of *Theravāda*, there is not anything to refuse. In the Pāli canon as **Nāgārjuna** said, such as nowhere and never does a really existing thing originate, we can see too. But **the Buddha** mentioned that a thing happens neither by itself nor by another nor by both nor by no causes:

»Na sayam kataṃ, na param kataṃ, na sayam kataṃ ca param kataṃ ca, na hetu appaccaya.«

**The Buddha** pointed out that all things are dependently originated.

In making confusion, **Nāgarjuna** said, that things that have been caused must be real or unreal. If a thing is real, it means that it exists. If a thing exists, it needs a cause to come into existence. But if a thing is unreal, it means that it did not exist. If there is no existing there is no cause to come into existence. The *Hīnayāna* taught only *puggala nairatma*(?) (non-substantiality) applied to all *dhammas*.

### THE MAHĀYĀNA MADHYAMIKA SCHOOL

According to the historical evidence eighteen Buddhist schools originated as a result of the fourth Buddhist Council and previous situations, but basically there were four Buddhist schools and one of them was *Madhyamika* school.

*Madhyamika* school originated based on different reasons, such as religious, historical, sociological and philosophical, that developed within a long period. They are roots of the *Mahāyāna* schools, teaching among the schools, contemporary religions and philosophical background, *Mahāyāna* literature of *sūtras*, separation of the *Mahāyāna* school from *Theravāda* school etc.

Basically, based on these reasons and evidences, there originated three teachings:

1. Concept of Buddha
2. *Bodhisatta* concept
3. Teaching of *Trikāya*
4. *saṃsāra* and *Nirvāṇa* concept
5. Concept of 'Emptiness'

There are three *Mahāyāna* traditions – *Madhyamika* tradition, *Yogācāra Viññānavāda* and *Tantrayāna*. According to the historical evidences most of the scholars accept that first *Mahāyāna* Buddhist school originated during the time between 100-150AD. That means 600 years later after passing away of **Buddha**. During that period there had been different translations, revisions and accordingly first, second and third Buddhist Councils and *Mahāyāna* literature of *suttas*.

Thus, *Mahāyāna* tradition has expanded regularly and originated *Madhyamika* school as a result of introducing the *Sāpekṣaka* concept. Consequently *Śūnyatā* concept was too developed in this school and it depended on *Upaniṣad* philosophy. *Madhyamika* philosophy developed very quickly during the time of 150-250 AD, endowed with **Nāgarjuna**.

This school was named *Madhyamika* because *Madhyamika* philosophy originated dependent on the Middle Way. It has introduced and followed Middle Path, it rejected annihilation and eternity views as well as without the existence and non-existence.(?) They had introduced this name for their tradition by themselves. *Madhyamika* school was the most famous school in the *Mahāyāna* tradition and it has a very deep logic system.

**Nāgarjuna** is the founder (*ādikatrūvarayā*) of the *Madhyamika* tradition and he was the greatest philosopher born in this school. He was born in the *Brāhmaṇa* caste and attained different knowledges. Later he became a Buddhist

monk and was a very famous scholar among the western and eastern countries. Most of the scholars accepted that **Nāgarjuna** had written more than 40 books, but most of the books are not to be found. *Mūlamadhyamika Kārika* is the main book in the *Madhyamika* philosophy and it mentions basic concepts of the school.

When we investigate concerning the early Buddhism, some matters had been influenced the origin of the *Madhyamika* tradition, basically they are:

1. Attempt to introduce the new interpretation to the early Buddhist concept which depends on early Buddhist teaching.
2. Attempt to give a philosophical meaning to the emptiness ??? *Praññā Pāramitā Sūtra* literature of ???  
???
8. Attempt to give an answer to the *Sarvastivāda* and *Sautrāntika* traditions.

According to the *Mahāyāna* philosophy, *Madhyamika* tradition had been constructed on the *Mahāyāna prajñā pāramitā* concept, but there is no consent among the scholars in regarding this view, because most of the scholars accepted that between the Dependent Origination in the early Buddhist philosophy and 'Emptiness' in the *Madhyamika* school there is no difference. In addition *Mūlamadhyamika Kārika* has indicated that 'Emptiness' in the *Madhyamika* tradition originated influenced by the Dependent Origination in the early Buddhism.

Apart from that *Mūlamadhyamika Kārika* is the main book in the *Madhyamika* school, which has mentioned the concept of 'Emptiness'. But there is no information in regard to the *prajñā pāramitā sūtras*. But according to the *Mahāyāna* scholars this concept was taken from the *Mahāyāna* philosophy. There is no more evidence to prove it.

*Mahāyāna Madhyamika* tradition has accepted the concept of 'Emptiness' only. Therefore, we can refer to it as a basic concept in the *Madhyamika* school. They have rejected the concept of existence of everything - „*sarvaṃ asthi*“ in the *Sarvāsti* school and the teaching of consciousness in the *Yogācāra* school. Because *Madhyamika* teaching have originated according to the Dependent Origination in the early Buddhism.

Dependent Origination is the foundation in the *Madhyamika* school. They have taken the theory as »*asmiṃ sati idaṃ hoti*« - „if there is a cause, there is a result.“ If there is no cause, there is no result. Hence, cause depends on result, result depends on cause. There is nothing without cause on the ??? cause cannot exist alone. Result cannot exist alone. *Madhyamika* teachers named that as 'relative concept' (*sāpekṣaka*). According to the 'relative teaching' there is nothing in the world alone and irrelative.

According to the *Madhyamika* philosophy 'emptiness' means that it is not existence or non-existence. They have indicated that there is nothing independent in the world and true in the highest or ultimate sense (*paramattha*) according to **the Buddha** was mentioned as follows:

»*Na kvachit kadāchit kaṣcit,*

*Dharmo buddhena desita:.*«

In the *Mūlamadhyamika Kārika* they have explained that there is no difference between the Dependent Origination. Emptiness and the Middle Way:

»*Ya: pratītya samutpāda:*

*Śūnyataṃ taṃ prachakṣmahe,*

*Ya: praknapti rupādāya,*

*Pratipatti siva madhyama.*«

**Nāgarjuna** further mentioned that there is nothing without cause and effect in the world. In the same way there is nothing in the world without emptiness. Hence *Kārika* has indicated:

»*Sarve dharmā: shūnyatā lakṣanāt.*«

The *Mahāyāna Madhyamika* tradition has discussed the concepts as emptiness and relativity according to the theory of Dependent Origination in the early Buddhism, but in a different way. Consequently they gave a new interpretations to the early Buddhist teachings. *Thesamsāra* and *Nirvāna* concept can be refer to as another basic teaching of the *Mahāyāna Madhyamika* school.

When we investigate concerning early Buddhism we see certain factors that contributed to this origin of the Madyamika tradition basic. They are:

- 1 Attempt to introduce the new interpretation to the early Buddhist concept.
- 2 Attempt to give a philosophical meaning to the emptiness which mentioned of the Praanna Paramitra sutta literature.
- 3 Attempt to give an answer to the Sarvastivadin sutra, Sauthtrantika traditions.

According to the Mahayana philosophy Madyamaka tradition was constructed on the Mahayana Prajna Paramita concept. But there is no concentration among the scholars with regarding this view because most of the scholars accepted that between the dependent origination in the early Buddhist philosophy and Emptiness in the Madyamika School.

Madyamika tradition accepts the concept of emptiness. It rejected the concept of everything exists “Saravan Asti” of the Sarvasti School and the teaching of consciousness of the Yogarcara School. Madyamaka teachings have originated according to the depended origination in the early Buddhism exactly. Dependent origination is the foundation in the Madyamaka School. They have taken the theory of “ Asmin Sati idan hoti” etc. that means if there is a cause, there is a result. If there is no cause there is no result. Hence cause depends on result depend on cause. There is no anything without cause. On the other hand cause can not exist alone. Result, too. Madyamika thinkers called their teaching the relative teaching. According to this teaching all phenomena are relative nothing has independent existence.

According to the Madyamaka philosophy ‘Emptiness’ mean neither existence nor non-existence. They have indicated that is no anything independent in the world. In the Mulamadyamika karika they have explained that there is no any different among the dependent origination, Emptiness and the Middle Way. As follows,

“Ya Prateetya Samutpada: Shunyatam tam Prachkshmahe

Ya Praknapti rupadaya Pratipte siva madyama.

Nagarjuna has mentioned further that there is no anything without cause and effect in the world. In the same way there is no anything in the world without Emptiness. Hense Kakika has indicated “Sarva dharmas: Shunya ta lakchanat”

The Mahayana Madyamika tradition has discussed the concepts of emptiness and relative according to the theory of dependent origination in the early Buddhism. But in different way. Consequently it has given new interpretation to the early Buddhist teachings. The Samsara and Nirvana concept can refer as on another basic teaching of the Mahayana Madyamaka School.

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#### THE *MADHYAMIKAS'* DEPENDENT ORIGINATION

**Candrakīrti**, the commentator of **Nāgarjuna's** verses known as '*Madhyamika Kārika*' in explaining the doctrine of Dependent Origination '*pratītyasamutpāda*' as described by **Nāgarjuna** starts with two interpretations of the word. According to one of the word *pratītyasamutpāda* means the origination (*utpāda*) of the non-existence (*abhāva*) depending on '*pratītya*' (causes and reasons). According to the other interpretation *pratītya* means each and every destructible individual and *pratītyasamutpāda* means the origination of each and every destructible individual. But he disapproves of both these meanings. The second meaning does not suit the context in which the Pāli scriptures generally speak of *Pratītyasamutpāda* for it does not mean the origination of each and every destructible individual, but the originating of specific individual phenomenon depending upon certain specific conditions.

The true meaning of *pratītyasamutpāda* or *śūnyavāda* is this, that there is no truth, no essence in all phenomena that appear. As the phenomena have no essence they are neither produced nor destroyed. They really neither come nor go. They are merely the appearance of *mayā* or illusion. The void (*śūnya*) does not mean pure negation, for that is relative to some kind of position. It simply means that none of the appearances have any intrinsic nature of their own. The *Madhyamika* system does not hold that anything has any essence or nature (*svabhāva*) of its own, even heat cannot be said to be the essence of fire, for both the heat and the fire

are the results of the combination of many conditions and what depends on many conditions cannot be said to be the essence of the thing.

*Nirvāṇa* on the *Madhyamika* theory is the absence of the existence of all phenomena, that which cannot be conceived either as anything, which has ceased, or as anything which is produced (*aniruddham anutpannam*). In *Nirvāṇa* all phenomena are lost, we say that the phenomena cease to exist in *Nirvāṇa*, but like the illusory snake in the rope they never exist. *Nirvāṇa* cannot be any positive thing or any sort of state of being (*bhava*), for all positive states or things are joint products of combined causes and are liable to decay and destruction. Neither can it be a negative existence.

It cannot therefore be designated either as positive or as negative for these conceptions belong to phenomena. In this state there is nothing, which is known, and even the knowledge that the phenomena have ceased to appear is not found. Even **the Buddha** himself is a phenomenon, a mirage or a dream, and so are all His teachings.<sup>36</sup> The phenomena therefore cannot be said to be either eternalism (*sasvatavāda*) or nihilism (*ucchedavāda*) and it is for this reason that this doctrine is called the 'Middle Doctrine' (*madhyamika*).

#### 666 THE MADHYAMAKA'S DEPENDENT ORINATION:

Candrakīrti, the commentator of Nagarjuna presented in explaining “pratītyasamutpada” as by Nagarjuna starts with two interpretations of the word. According to one the word pratītyasamutpada means the origination ‘utpada’ of the non-existent (*abhava*) depending on “pratītya” reasons and causes. According to the other interpretation pratītya means the origination of each and every destructible individual. But he disapproves of both these meanings.

The true meaning of pratītyasamutpada or sunyavada is this, that there is no truth, no essence in all phenomena that appear. As the phenomena have no essence they are neither produced nor destroyed. They really neither come nor go. They are merely the appearance of *Mayā* or illusion. The void (*suñña*) does not mean pure negation, for that is relative to some kind of position. It simply means that none of the appearances have any intrinsic nature of their own. The *Madhyamaka* system does not hold that anything has any essence or nature (*svabhava*) of its own, even heat cannot be said to be the essence of fire, for both the heat and the fire are the result of the combination of many conditions and what depends on many conditions cannot be said to be the essence of the thing.

Being neither come from any where nor go anywhere, and go, they are in a process (*samsara*). The supposition that there is a self who suffers changes is not valid, for however we may search we find the five skandhas but no self. *Nirvana* on the *Madhyamaka* theory is the absence of the existence of all phenomena, that which cannot be conceived either as anything, which has ceased, or as anything which is produced (*aniruddham anutpannam*). *Nirvana* cannot be any positive thing or any sort of state of being (*bhava*), for all positive states or things are joint products of combined causes and are liable to decay and destruction. Neither can it be a negative existence.

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36 :-) I call this 'extremism'. :-)

**18.05.07 by Hunny**

Nagarjuna takes four alternatives into his consideration in order to show the contradictory nature of cause and effect theory for e.g. in his chapter on causality in *Mulamadhyamikakarika*, he considers the four alternatives:

- (1) cause and effect are same (satkaryavada)
- (2) cause and effect are different (asatkaryavada)
- (3) cause and effect are same and different (ubayahetuvada)
- (4) things are produced by chance (ahetuvada)

Nagarjuna argues that if cause and effect are the same, there is no point in production the effect from the cause duplicating itself.

He next takes the second alternative that is cause and effect, thing they taught in different. One can not produce the other; therefore the second alternative is unattainable.

The third alternative has the short continue of both, the first two and more.

Thing can not arise by chance as the fourth alternative such as. So all the alternatives on causality are contradictory in their nature, so Nagarjuna conclude that there is no a theory of causality (na svata napiparato nadyabham nappayahetum), things are not originated by themselves nor are they originated by other neither by both nor without cause. Therefore there is no origination.

With such argument, Nagarjuna disposes all the four alternative view on cause and effect in the same way, he rejected view on motion and face, Nirvana and other conception by these means, he shows the contradictory nature of conceptual thinking and the emptiness or Sunyata is the only reality.

## The structure of the conception of Sunyata

Nagarjuna was the first thinker to formulat conceptual structure of Sunyata. he was thinking of conceptual Sunyata he solves that concept are either contradictory or relative to show contradictory nature of concept he took up concept of cause and effect and subject them to a grueling critique we normally think that cause proceed effect but Nagarjuna said what actually happen is that effect proceed cause because he asks how can something we are called until there is an effect this contradiction is based on effect that concept are relative as explicitly are obvious in case like good and bad, day and night etc. if they are relative they have no independence existence, hence they are empty or Sunyata.

## Hua-yen Buddhism

Chinese school try to establish a relational Sunyata, everything in world is interested to everything else they clarify profound nature of reality when they maintain that everything inter-penetrate into everything else, this relationship is said to be one of simultaneous natural identity and natural inter causality therefore nature of everything is Sunyata

Sunyata can be realized in term space parameter if we imagine go to end outer

space glazy and look on us we can then see experience our real nature in Sunyata similarly in term of time parameter we can go to a far distance past or future and look at our present time contact and realize these real nature as Sunyata that is an existential entry point into Sunyata because that nullify all our accumulate or action in this realm of existence through that perspective also we can realize the nature of the Sunyata.

## Philosophy of Sunyata

This established relativity as nature of ultimate reality thus the relative became the absolute. It is because of this ultimate relativity or Sunyata that it became possible or Nirvana and Samsara to be identical.

Sunyata is regarded as matter of everything particularly of value, the value of something depends in proportion to its degree of non availability or non existence creation of Banyan tree from emptiness of seed is an another illustration to prove motherhood of Sunyata in Mahayana tradition Sunyata is regarded feminine she is goddess called Prajnaparamita the mother of all Buddha.

## Ethic of Sunyata

Sunyata forms the basis of compassing as we are all really non existence or share quality non existence we all share an equal ontological validity no one is more important than another we all have exactly the same justification for existence. Therefore as one is holy or other are equally quality moral value originate from this holiness to be moral is to enable oneself.

Hua Yen's doctrine illustrates the necessary dependent of everything on everything else therefore my existence depend on the rest of universe the rest of universe becomes my mother and mother of everything else as well so I owe a moral application to the rest of universe this imply a pervasive basis of morality as basis of existence of universe it is this basis that keep universe going thus

morality became the nature of nature

??? (*MADHYAMIKAS'* VIEW ON *PAṬICCASAMUPPĀDA*)

(page no. 1 and 2 are missing)

Conditioned the succeeding one. This covers three lives. They are as follows:

	Past	Present	Future
1	Ignorance	Consciousness	Becoming ( <i>bhava</i> )
2	Activities which produce <i>karma</i>	names and forms (personality)	Birth
3		Twelve domains	Aging and death
4		Contact (object and senses)	
5		Sensation	
6		Desire	
7		Attachment	

*Paṭiccasamuppāda* formula can be taken as representing three periods of time, namely the past, the present and the future. *Avijjā* and *saṅkhārā* belong to the past. The next seven belong to the present and the last three belong to the future. To understand these it is necessary to study different sort of conditions, because only one of them is called casual condition, for example, ignorance can determine activities as an object of condition. If one decides to reduce ignorance and then because in this life one has been ignored, and acted in such a way as to produce *karma*.(?) The cycle continues round again. *Nibbāna* is often conceived of as stopping this cycle by removing the cause for craving, craving ceases.

In the very first stanza of the *Madhyamika Kārika* **Nāgarjuna** refers to four types of causal theories:

1. Self-causation (*svata utpatti*)
2. External-causation (*parata utpatti*)
3. Both self-causation and internal-causation (*ubhaya*)
4. Non-causation (*ahetu*)

After stating the four types of causal theories to criticize, the first type, self-causation is shown by **Nāgarjuna** as that where are self contradictions in the theory. **Nāgarjuna** analyzed the nature of the causal relation and says, „The own nature of the existence (*bhava*) is not found in the causes (*pratya*). Through causality depends on the intrinsic existence of the elements of the causal process.“ It seems that this would violate the principles of *anattā*, but *paṭiccasamuppāda* does imply any essential realities because of the interdependence of cause and effect. It is quite meaningless to talk about them as existing separately, that is causes depend on their effect in order to be cause and effect; likewise depend on their causes in order to be effect.

However, the strict identity of cause and effect is also refuted. Since if it were the cause the process of origination could not have occurred. Therefore, **Nāgarjuna** explained that the emptiness (*śūnyatā*) of causality is demonstrated by the interdependence of cause and effect.

Candrakīrti, the commentator of Nāgārjuna's verses known as "Madhyamida karika" in explaining the doctrine of dependent origination "pratityasamutpada" as described by Nāgārjuna starts with two interpretations of the word. According to one the word Pratityasamutpada means the origination 'Utpada' of the non-existent (Abhava) depending on "Pratitya" reasons and causes. According to the other interpretation Pratitya means each and every destructible individual and Pratityasamutpada means the origination of each and every destructible individual. But he disapproves of both these meanings. The second meaning does not suit the context in which the Pali scriptures generally speak of Pratityasamutpada for it does not mean the origination of each and every destructible individual, but the originating of specific individual phenomena depending upon certain specific conditions.

The true meaning of Pratityasamutpada or Sunyavada is this, that there is no truth, no essence in all phenomena that appear. As the phenomena have no essence they are neither produced nor destroyed. They really neither come nor go. They are merely the appearance of Mayā or illusion. The void (Suñya) does not mean pure negation, for that is relative to some kind of position. It simply means that none of the appearances have any intrinsic nature of their own. The Madhyamaka system does not hold that anything has any essence or nature (Svabhava) of its own, even heat cannot be said to be the essence of fire, for both the heat and the fire are the result of the combination of many conditions and what depends on many conditions cannot be said to be the essence of the thing.

Nirvana on the Madhyamaka theory is the absence of the existence of all phenomena, that which cannot be conceived either as anything, which has ceased, or as anything which is produced (aniruddham Anutpannam). In Nirvana all phenomena are lost; we say that the phenomena cease to exist. Nirvana cannot be any positive thing or any sort of state of being (Bhava), for all positive states or things are joint products of combined causes and are liable to decay and destruction: Neither can it be a negative existence.

It cannot therefore be designated either as positive or as negative or as negative for these conceptions belong to phenomena. In this state there is nothing, which is known and even the knowledge that the phenomena have ceased to appear is not found. Even the Buddha himself is a phenomenon, a mirage or a dream, and so are all his teachings. The phenomena therefore cannot be said to be either externalism (Sasvatavada) or nihilism (Ucchedavada) and it is for this reason that this doctrine is called the Middle Doctrine (Madhyamaka).

#### 666 *MADHYAMAKA PHILOSOPHY*

The founder of Madhyamaka tradition is Ven. Nāgārjuna, as a philosopher, he has respected by all the scholars of East and West. He has compiled more than forty books concerning Madhyamaka philosophy. Mūlamadhyamikakarika Viṅgrahavyaratini, Saharalekā Upāya extra is some of his compiled philosophical books. Among those books Mūlamadhyā Mikarika is the most important text of Madhyamaka philosophy. By compiled Mūlamadhyā Mikakārika, he expected to fulfill the virtue, which could be seen in interpretation on Buddha's preaching.

Specially, he wanted to reply Sarvāstivādins and Sautrantika interpretations. Madhyamaka main theory is Suññatā. The theory of Sarvam asti of Sarvāstivādins and Viṅgānvāda, theory of Yogācāra are rejected by Madhyamaka.

Madhyamaka philosophy has formed on paiccasamuppāda or dependent origination of origin itself. The teaching of paiccasamuppāda is most important teaching in early Buddhism. All the theories in Buddhism has based on Paiccasamuppāda. In contemporary religious society there were four kinds of theory of cause and effect.

- (1) Sayamkata vāda. There is not different cause and effect because the effect include in cause itself. Cause and effect is

identical. This view is similar the view of Sankya and Vedanta philosophy. This view is identified as Sakkārya vāda or identical of causality.

- (2) Paramkata Vāda. There is clear difference in between cause and effect. Cause and effect can identify separately. It is two things annihilationist accepted this theory in Buddha's time. This theory has identified as Asalkavaya Vāda.
- (3) Ubhayatā Vāda. This theory formed by margin about self two theories. Once they believed cause and effect as identical and on the other hand they believed cause and effect as the different two thinks.
- (4) Ahetu Vāda. They do not believe any relation in between cause and effect. They believed without having any reason something can happen in determinative. Therefore, it has been identified as in determination or (Paticcasmuppāda Vāda).

Acelakassapa Sutta in S.N Buddha has rejected all four kinds of theories Buddha preaches the Dhamma following Paticcasmuppada theory, therefore Buddha said that Yo Paticcasmuppādam Passati, so dhammam passati. Yo Dhammam Passati, So Paticcasamuppādam Passati. Here the importance of Paticcasamuppāda is explained to realize the Dhamma, without understanding Paticcasmuppāda no one can understand the Dhamma.

Therefore, Buddha rejecting all the views preached the Dhamma in middle way. Further, he has explained how the suffering arising and how it can be ceased its theory depend on cause and effect theory. Imasmam Sati, Idam Hoti. When this is presented that come to be. Imssa Upāda, Idam Ujjati. From the arising of this, that arises, Imasmam asti, Idam nahoti. When this is absent that does not come to be. Imassanirodhā, Idam nirujjhati. On the cessation of this, that ceases. In this way arising of suffering and ceasing of suffering has been explained. This is the theory of dependent origination. When there is ignorance Avijā then Sankhāra or formation comes to be in that way how the Sansāric suffering is happening.

To explained individual and the social suffering analyze following this method. Madhyamika philosopher have observe this theory and introduced the theory of relativity they have applied relativism to all canalizations. According to that theory nothing can be seen independently exist in the world always all things depends on other thing maturely related each other. Whole world full of such concept it is mind made.

Examine briefly the evolution of Mahayana Buddhist philosophy up to the theory of emptiness

After the one century of the demise of the Buddha, there arose many Buddhist schools and they have their own teachings. Many great teacher and great books came into existence as the result of religious, social, philosophical etc. therefore, now it is accepted that Mahayana Buddhism came into existence either in the 1<sup>st</sup> century B.C, or A D, and some scholars who studied origin of Mahayana cite many reason that Mahayana is a development from the Mahasanghika schools which found by Nagarjuna.

However, there are some teachings in the Mahasanghika schools, especially in the Lokuttaravada branch of Mahasanghika which are later developed in Mahayana. It is seen that two distinct features in Mahayana are Development of Buddhalogy, raising the Buddha to a superhuman level and finally making him the savior of mankind and the other is Boddhisattava idea. Similarly, the Stupa worship, which became popular after the Buddha's passing away also, is considered as a concept of Mahayana.

Further, Madhyamika which found by Nagarjuna is the one of the most important philosophical school of Mahayana. The main teaching in Madhyamika is Sunyata. Therefore, here we pay attention about the doctrine of Sunyata that should be understood. Sunyata is interpreted differently. Generally, it is rendered into English as emptiness, void ness and nothingness. Such this rendering made Sunyata to be nihilistic or annihilationist doctrine and such this interpretation have been made during the time of Nagarjuna. In fact, this point is seen from Mulamadhyamika karika itself so Nagarjuna had to clearly say that his doctrine of Sunyata is not Ucheda or Sassatavada teaching.

The doctrine of Sunyata has been so much misunderstood that Nagarjuna warns those who mistake his teaching that would fall into great harm just as one who holds a serpent gets destroyed by the serpent itself and Sunyata is not another view but reality and true nature of all things, according to this, he rejected the Svabhava-own nature-teaching put forward by the Sarvastivada. So, Nagarjuna point-out that the view of Svabhava is totally against the Buddha's basic teaching of Paticcasamupāda.

According to the Sarvastivadins everything is a Dharma has two aspects. One is Svabhava, a metaphysical aspect which persists during all three periods of time. The other is the Karitra, the activity aspect of Dharma that is the appearance of the Dharma in the present time. This Svabhava is always present (Sarvam Asti), so Nagarjuna pointed out this Svabhava is going against the Aniccata teaching of the Buddha.

Besides that, Nagarjuna denied the teaching of the Abhidhamma schools that accepted the existence of Dhamma and attempted to show that their teachings are not in accordance with the Dependent Origination. For expel; Sarve Dharmah: Sunnyata Lakshana: (All the Dhamma have the characteristic of emptiness). Thus, he teach the emptiness of Dhamma as well as of Puggala (individual) and Madhyamika advocated all Dhamma are dependent on each other and devoid their own nature therefore, they are emptiness. In this sense Nagarjuna identified Sunnyat with the doctrine of Paticcasamupāda. In fact; this is the real significance of the teaching of Sunnyata.

### 666 THE MAHAYANA MADYAMAKA SCHOOL

According to the historical evidences eighteen Buddhist schools had originated as a result of the forth Buddhist council and previous situation but basically there are four Buddhist schools one of them was the Madyamaka school. Madyamaka School has originated based on different reasons such as religious, historical, sociological, and philosophical, that was developed within long period. They are, routes of the Mahayana schools, teachings among the schools, contemporary religious and philosophical background, Mahayana literature of Sutra, separation of the Mahayana and Theravada schools etc.

Basically based on these reasons and evidences had originated there teachings are: 1 Buddha concept, 2 Bodhisatva concept, 3 Teaching of Threekaya, 4 Sansara and Nirvana concept, 5 Concept of Emptiness etc.

There are three Mahayana traditions; they are Madyamaka tradition, Yogarcara Vinnanavadaya, Tantrayanaya. According to the historical evidences most of the scholars that first Mahayana Buddhist School was originated during the time of the 100-150 century A.D. that means 600 yare later passing away of the Buddha. During that period there had been different translation, revisions accordingly first, second and third Buddhist council and Mahayana literature of Sutta.

Thus, Mahayana tradition has expended and originated Madyamaka School as a result introduction of the Sapekshaka concept. Consequently Shunyata was too developed in this school and it has depends on Upanishad philosophy. Madyamika philosophy was developed very quickly during the time of 150-250 A.D be endowed with Nagarjuna. This school has named as Madynmika because Madyamika philosophy had originated dependant on the Middle way, it had introduced and followed as the middle path except the annihilation and eternity views as well as without the existence and non-existence. They had been introduced this name for their tradition by them selves. Madyamaka School was the nost famous school in the Mahayana tradition and it has very deep logic system.

Nagarjuna is the founder (adi katru varaya) of the Madyamika tradition and he was the greatest philosopher borned in this school. He has borned in the Brahmana caste and attained different knowledge. Later he had became a Buddhist monk and was a very famous scholar in the estern and western countries. Most of the scholars accept that Nagarjuna had wrote more that 40 books but more books of them is non-existent. Mulamaduamika karika is the main book in the Madyamaka philosophy and it has mentioned basic concepts in this school.

When we investigate concerning the early Buddhism some matters had been influenced to origin of the Madyamika tradition basically. They are:

- 1 Attempt to introduce the new interpretation to the early Buddhist concept which depends early Buddhist teaching.
- 2 Attempt to give a philosophical weaning to the emptiness which mentioned of the Praanna Paramitra sutta literature.
- 3 Attempt to give an answer to the Saravastivadin Sauthrantika traditions.

According to the Mahayana philosophy Madyamaka tradition had constricted on the Mahayana Pranna Paramita concept. But there is no concentration among the scholars with regarding this view because most of the scholars accepted that between the dependent origination in merely Buddhist philosophy and Emptiness in the Madyamika School. A punt from that Mulamadyamaka karika is the main book in the Madyamaka School, which has mentioned the concept of emptiness. But there is no any information in this book with regarding the Pranna Paramita sutras. But according to the Mahayana scholars this concept had taken from the Mahayana philosophy. There is no more evidence to prove it.

Mahayana Madyamika tradition has accepted the concept of emptiness only. Therefore it can refer as a basic concept in the Madyamaka School. They have rejected the concept of everything exists "Saravan Asti" as the Sarvasti School and the teaching of consciousness of the Yogarcara School. Because Madyamaka teachings have originated according to the depended origination in the

early Buddhism exactly. Dependent origination is the foundation in the Madyamaka School. They have taken the theory of “Asmi Sati idan hoti” etc. that means if there is a cause, there is a result. If there is no cause there is no result. Hence cause depends on result depend on cause. There is no anything without cause. On the other hand cause can not exist alone. Result, too. Madyamika thinkers that has named as relative concept, according to the relative teaching there is no anything in the world along and unrelative.

According to the Madyamaka philosophy ‘Emptiness’ mean is not existence or non-existence. They have indicated that is no anything independent in the world and true in the highest or ultimate sense (Paramattha) according to the Buddha . it has mentioned as follows.

“Na kvachit kadachit kashcit Darmo Buddhena desita” in the Mulamadyamika karika they have explained that there is no any different among the dependent origination. Emptiness and the middle way. As follows,

“Ya Prateetya Samutpada: Shunyatam tam Prachkshmahe

Ya Praknapti rupadaya Pratipte siva madyama.

Nagarjuna has mentioned further that there is no anything without cause and effect in the world. In the same way there is no anything in the world without Emptiness. Hense darika has indicated “Sarva dharma: Shunya ta lakchanat”

The Mahayana Madyamika tradition has discussed the concepts of emptiness and relative according to the theory of dependent origination in the early Buddhism. But in different way. Consequently the have given new interpretation to the early Buddhist teachings. The Samsara and Nirvana concept can refer as on another basic teaching of the Mahayana Madyamaka School.

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### 666PHILOSOPHY OF MIDDLE-WAY.26/7/99

- Madya = middle. Madya + ika (belong) = Madyamika
- Sautrantika – thoery of moment, extreme thus becom nothingless
- Sarvastivada – existence
- Therefore, these two look like the theory of ucchedavada and sassatavada.
- Yogacara – vijbavada: primary. Therefore according to Nagarjuna their theories seems extreme, and he establishes middle way according to the Buddha’s teachings.
- Nagarjuna – anubuddha, i.e., the sun among the Buddhist philosophers.

Notes:

The Buddhist tradition which florished in Northern India called Madhyamika named themselves so as they prevented all the fanatic philosophical explains. According to them, it was the Buddha’s standpoint that middle path does not flow into any extreme. The master himself introduced his teachings as Middle Path (majjhimapatipada). The intellectual milieu (surrounding) of Madhyamikas was full of different views regarding the Buddhist teachings. They attempted to hold their philosopphy in the Middle position. They neither accepted nor rejected theory and practice, but maintained the middle path. They developed into maximum, subtle, deep logic to explain the theory of voidness ‘wunyatavada’.

The founder of this tradition was Nagarjuna who is said to have lived around 150-200 A.D. He was born a brahmin having a thorough knowledge of traditional brahmin education he entered to the Order and studied the Buddhist philosophies of interest at that time. After the Buddhat education, having come to the conclusion that no school present the true words of the Buddha, he composed several discourses called Madhyamikasutra. According to the scholars like T.R.V. Murti, he has composed over 40 texts, only a very few of them remain today. Among his works, the following are well-known:

- (1) Mulamadhyamikakarika
- (2) Vighrahavivartani
- (3) Yukti shasathika
- (4) Upyakauwalya
- (5) Suhrlleka

There were written in Sanskrit. Today Chinese translation of them are available. Nagarjuna is considered to be one of the great Buddhist thinkers all over the Buddhist world. By Mahayanists he was called second Buddha or the sun among the Buddhist philosophers. He was followed by the large number of students who are well-known in the history of Buddhist thought. Aryadeva the author of cataswataka was well-known among the pupils of Nagarjuna. The scholars have found evidences to prove that Aryadeva was a Sri Lankan. There are 6 more well-known disciples of Nagarjuna.

- (1) Buddhapalita
- (2) Candrakriti

- (3) Devawarma
- (4) Gunasri
- (5) Gunamati
- (6) Sthiramati

As many Mahayana Buddhist schools were influenced by Madhyamika teachings, it is considered as the foundation of Mahayanism. The philosophical teachings of this tradition consists of two main aspects:

- (1) They developed a philosophical approach to the theory of voidness which came in prajnaparamita literature.
- (2) They pointed out and criticized the weaknesses of fundamental Buddhist teachings of different schools.

Madhyamikas developed the theory of voidness, there by they criticized the philosophical teachings of Sautrantikas, Sarvastivadins and Vijbanavadins. They based their philosophy on the theory of causality. They accept it as the fundamental of all the original teachings of the Buddha.

There are 4 theories which against the causality:

- (1) Sayamkatavada – cause and effect one of the same. → Theory of self-causation.
- (2) Paramkatavada – cause is one, and result is one; e.g. milk is one, ghee is one. → Theory of external-causation.
- (3) Ubhayatavada – cause and effect is one, cause and effect is two (the above two) → Theory of causation both (i.e., the above two).
- (4) Ahetuvada – no cause and effect. → Theory of non-causation.

According to Madhyamika the theory of wunyata based on causality was directed at refuting the four theory of causation, namely sayamkatavada, paramkatavada, ubhayatavada and ahetuvada. These 4 theories are refused by the Buddha in the Acetakassapasutta of Sajyutta Nikaya. In Majjhima Nikaya I, Buddha says this: “whoever that sees paticcasamuppada sees the doctrine, who sees the doctrine sees the paticcasamuppada”. Based on this, the Buddha explained the human existence and the cause for it. In the Mahavaggapali of Vinaya Pitaka, Ven. Asajji addressing young man Kolita said the following:

“Ye dhamma hetuppabhava, tesam hetu kathagato aha. Yesabca nirodho evaj vadi mahasamano”

Those things arose due to causes, the well gone one said the reason for it (he also said) they are ceasing thus is said by the great recluse.

Madhyamika developed the philosophical theory of voidness based on the words of the Buddha such as above. There by no view was accepted by them to be correct except the voidness. By the logic they employed to construct the theory of voidness, the views of other Buddhist philosophical traditions were given out. They said the Buddha has taught one and same doctrine by using two levels of language called samvrti (conventional) and paramartha / paramatta (ultimate or absolute). “vyavahana manasratya na desyate, paramarta managamya nirvanaj nadhigamyate” (Mulamadhyamika-karika) – without using common language no ultimate truth is preached. Without understanding ultimate truth no emancipation can be realized. Madhyamikas avoided and criticized all the extremists philosophical ideas. According to them none of them was related to the real teachings. Buddha preached the doctrine not to hold the views but dispel all the views. Views do not direct the person to the ultimate truth. Taking this early Buddhist standpoint, Madhyamika neither accept nor develop any view apart from wunyata.

After the 4<sup>th</sup> Buddhist Council held during the time of Kaniska, Madhyamika philosophy came into being. Generally, Nagarjuna (150-250 AD) is considered the founder of this school. His *Mulamadhyamakakarika* has devoted most in the repudiation of the doctrines of other schools on one hand, and the establishment of the doctrine of ‘Middle Way’ which is a synonym of Wunyata, on the other. However, evidences within the *Mulamadhyamikakarika* showing that, Madhyamika school was developed out from several sources.

In the *Dhammacakkappavattanasuta*, the Buddha mentions that Truth does not lie in the extreme alternatives but in the Middle Path (*Majjhimapatipada*). Early Buddhists generally referred the concept of Middle Path in ethical sense, in the sense of avoiding two extremes of sensual indulgence and self-mortification. However, Nagarjuna based on the *Kaccayanagottasutta*, emphasized the *Majjhimapatipada* as the Middle Path of avoiding two views i.e., *bhava* (existence) and *abhava* (non-existence). It is on this basis that Nagarjuna called his philosophy ‘*Madhyamika*’.

The concept of Wunyata is also not new, it is found in early Buddhism too. However, it is refer to the nature of *anicca* or *dukkha* in early suttas e.g, *wubbato lokaj* (*Suttanipata*). For Nagarjuna, what is meant by Wunyata, is actually *Paticcasamuppada* on its account of *anatta* on one hand, and the Ultimate Reality, *Nirvana* on the other. He employed the relativity concept of *paticcasamuppada* to reject both *Sassatavada* and *Ucchedavada*. By the negation of these two extremes, the theory of *Majjhimapatipada* thus develops into Wunyata. In this way, *Paticcasamuppada*, Wunyata and *Majjhimapatipada* are synonyms. Nagarjuna says:

Yah pratithyasamuppadah wunyataj taj pracaksmahe  
sa prabaptir upadaya pratipat saiva madhyama—karika, chapter 24. verse 18.

We states that whatever is dependent arising, that is emptiness. That is dependent upon convention. That itself is the middle path.

Thus, we observe that Nagarjuna modified the Dhamma in early suttas viz. *paticcasamuppada*, *subbata* and *majjhimapatipada* and equalized them into synonyms as the philosophy of *Madhyamika* school.

Historically, it was due to the repudiation of various views of both Buddhist and non-Buddhist schools that the philosophy of *Madhyamika* was developed, especially the views of *Sarvastivada* and *Sautrantika*.

*Sarvastivada* advocated an identity theory of causality (*satkaryavada*) which is the first of the 4 theories (*svata utpatti*) rejected by Nagarjuna in his *karika*. The *Svabhava* (self-nature) of *Sarvastivada* is the essence of each and everything which ever exists in all periods of time. Everything changes in course of time, but its self-nature will not change i.e., the cause and the effect are having the sameness.

In *Mulamadhyamikakarika*, Nagarjuna employed the relativity concept of *paticcasamuppada* to reject the *Svabhava* theory. He argued that if self-nature of the effect were to be found in the cause, the production would be meaningless (*vaiyartha*) for there would be a duplication, but not the coming of something new. A seed would produce only another seed, not a tree which is of different nature.

Against the *Svabhava* theory of *Sarvastivada*, *Sautrantika* maintains that everything is ever changing, nothing has its duration of unchanging identity. *Sautratika* only accepts the present as real, the past and future are not real. However, the present is also without any duration. Therefore, *Sautrantika* maintains the nonidentity theory of substance (*asatkaryavada*) i.e., the cause and effect are different.

For Nagarjuna, nonidentity is ‘*parata utpatti*’ and it should be rejected also. Here, Nagarjuna employed the dialectic approach in rejecting *parata utpatti*. He says that in the absent of self-nature, there cannot be other-nature. Self-nature and other-nature are relative, without any one of them, the other cannot exist e.g., one can speak of the day only if there is the night, if there is not day, how can there be something called night?

Thus with the basis concept of Dhamma in early Buddhism, especially *paticcasamuppada*, *subbata* and *majjhimapatipada*, and by the repudiation of latter concept of Dhamma in various schools, with dialectical approach, Nagarjuna successfully established his philosophy of *Transcendentalism*.

#### 666 *WHETHER NAGARJUNA IS A MAHAYANIST OR NOT BY PROFESSOR VEN DHAMMAJOTI 2002*

In the whole of *MMK*, there is no mention of any *Mahayana* sūtras by name nor any quotation can be identified. The second point is that, you don’t find passages or any notion that can be traced in *Mahayana* texts. Of course, there is a simile in chapter 24 to describe those who were terribly misunderstood the teaching of *nyat* is like catching the snake from the wrong hand, or like someone harm

others by mantra. This simile is found in the Ratnakūṭa also. Is it that Nāgārjuna quoted from this sūtra? Such simile is a common simile used by various Buddhists. Thus we cannot prove that he has quoted in directly from any Mahāyāna works. This also cannot be accepted. Thirdly, there is no basically Mahāyāna terminology. What are the Mahāyānic term? Example, Bodhicitta [to give rise to Bodhicitta, means to be a real Bodhisattva in Mahāyāna sense, that is the cosmic experience in which one has the will of universal salvation arisen in him. When that arises in him, he doesn't concern with himself, he concerns with the salvation of all beings.] Another one is Upāya-kausalya (the skillfulness in the means). These are important Mahāyāna concepts, which convey the idea that a Bodhisattva must know what is the best way to save different types of beings. Bodhisattva is the one who is concerned with the salvation of everybody. Thus he must know beings are different, and develop different upāya-kausalya. But in MMK, there are no such terms.

Nāgārjuna was in the period of late 2<sup>nd</sup> century AD to the early part of 3<sup>rd</sup> century AD. Anyway by this period, certainly there have been developed a large number of prajñā-pāramitā. We have seen Prajñā-pāramitā was in the period of 1<sup>st</sup> century BC to 1<sup>st</sup> century AD, with the theme of śūnyatā. Nāgārjuna also talked about śūnyatā. If he were a Mahāyānist, he could have been natural for him at least to quote from Prajñā-pāramitā. But no any reference to it. Also, whatever mentioned of the Buddha's teaching can be found in the earlier texts such as 5 nikāya or āgama, for example, pratītya-samutpāda, four Noble truths, etc. Thus considering these facts, we can't say Nāgārjuna was a Mahāyānist. There is no evidence to show he is a Mahāyānist. Thus this is strong enough to question them whether Nāgārjuna was teaching Mahāyāna or not.

However, there is one work which is controversial, that is the Mahāprajñā-pāramitā upadeśa (śāstra 大智度論). This is said to be Mahāyāna work that is quoted more often than any other Mahāyāna works. This work is the commentary of the Mahāprajñā-pāramitā sūtra. According to Chinese tradition, this work was ascribed to Nāgārjuna also. If indeed this work is by Nāgārjuna, then we can be sure that Nāgārjuna was a Mahāyānist. Again the authorship has been questioned by modern scholars, especially Lamotte. Lamotte questions whether that work is by Nāgārjuna or not. Because the description was only from the Chinese sources. No any Indian sources tell us that this work was by Nāgārjuna, nor even in Tibetan sources. Still it is debated.

Apart from this questionable description, all the other works agree to be authored by Nāgārjuna, we can say, there is no evidence to show Nāgārjuna was a Mahāyānist. If he is not Mahāyānist, who is he? He seems to us to be Buddhist who is interested in the real teaching of the Buddha. He saw at that time, Buddhism was developing in the wrong direction, especially Sarvāstivāda developed the idea of svabhāva. In his work, he criticizes mainly the Sarvāstivāda, others also he criticizes like Sāṅkhyā philosophy, Vaiśeṣika philosophy.

On the safe side, Nāgārjuna was a Buddhist, he concerned with the wrong direction in which Buddhists were heading, and he wanted to rectify them. So his whole criticism is centered around the svabhāva, and that concept was evolved in the Abhidharma period. The first thing to stick in the mind is that, you have two opposite ways of looking at things: 1. Svabhāva way of looking at thing; 2. śūnyatā way of looking at thing. Nāgārjuna wants to show, if your view point is that of svabhāva, you are going to end up with troubles, because you will not be able to establish any Buddhist doctrine at all. Of course, Sarvāstivādin was very careful to defend themselves, arguing that svabhāva is not like ātman. Svabhāva is something that involved in the time process. In brief, this is the standpoint of Sarvāstivāda. Every dharma has the aspect of svabhāva (dravya, svalakṣaṇa), the intrinsic nature does not change in time, but kṛitra changes and momentary.

Nāgārjuna says, if you start from svabhāva standpoint, then, there will be no possible of change, thus cannot establish cause and effect relationship, 3-ratna, dukkha satya, samudaya satya, nirodha satya, etc. In this way, you will be negating each and every important teaching of the Buddha.

Sometimes, Nāgārjuna would not be very fair either. Sarvāstivādin also tries to be good Buddhists, they have a way to explain change. But that way is not accepted by Nāgārjuna. Sometimes, it would be unfair not to understand the opponent real standpoint. For instance, svabhāva, they say svabhāva is 'sarvadā asti', but not nitya. It means svabhāva is also anitya. From their own standpoint, they make it very clear that they are not talking about something that never change.

What Nāgārjuna meant when he say everything is empty? "All dharmas are śūnyā (empty)" – what does it mean? All dharmas are śūnyā, because they have no svabhāva. śūnyā doesn't mean nihilism. Svabhāva is understood by Nāgārjuna as something that forever doesn't change.

According to the Buddha, everything is pratītya-samutpāda. The so-called thing is just a process, just an event that takes place where the assemblage or conditions are gathered together. So the co-called thing or event is totally dependent on various factors. How can you say that thing has sovereignty, mastery or self-independent. So in that sense, 'things are empty'.

So 'all things are empty' means:-

1. Because there is no svabhāva;
  2. There is no svabhāva, because they are pratītya-samutpanna. Everything is dependently arisen.
- This is the gist of philosophy of śūnyatā. Once you have understood this, Nāgārjuna says he has nothing new to offer.

*666 THE IMPORTANT OF ARGUMENT FOR 'NON-ARISING' DHAMMAPĀLA BHIKKHU 13<sup>TH</sup> MARCH 2002*

The first proposition held by Sākhya philosophy:- the thing of one unitary substance. That unitary substance is manifesting itself in universe in different forms. So when you say, a fruit (phala) or effect arises, there is nothing new, actually is that thing itself that manifested as an effect. Again it will change back to the self and manifest into another form. The manifestation of whole universe is from one unitary substance.

The second proposition is held by Vaiśeṣika:- they say the cause and effect are totally different entities. Some have the function of cause; some have the function of effect, etc.

The third proposition is held by Jaini. In the case of Buddhism, we have Sarvstivāda. At least, one way of understanding of Sarvstivāda is to speak in term of arising from both svabhāva itself as well as pratīyaya. They say thing in itself existing in svabhāva, but it cannot arise, unless there are pratīyaya. It is the combination of these.

The fourth proposition is held by Materialist.

When Nāgārjuna negates all these, what he has negated is the total possibility of arising on the assumption of existent having svabhāva, i.e., arising is not possible if think in term of svabhāva, What he means '*existent thing do not have svabhāva, i.e. empty.*'

The first stanza spells out the fundamental thought of Nāgārjuna's teaching of emptiness, that is, according to him, the Buddha's teaching also.

We have seen in some details why the first case is not possible.

### **Further elaboration**

Why an entity cannot arise by itself? [- by itself as an absolute permanent entity.]

Arising by itself as svabhāva, these two things are contradiction in terms. When you have a svabhāva, that thing is already there. So it makes no sense to talk about the arising of it. Arising and Existent in svabhāva are contradiction in terms.

If I have a thing called fruit or effect, so it must arises from a cause. So the effect is produced from a cause. That means, there must be subject (cause) and object (effect). So from this point of view, is also contradiction in terms to say there is an effect. So what does it mean by itself? Whatever that arises - never arises by itself. Whatever that by itself never arises. Because it must arises due to some causes.

When you say subject and object, how can you talk about that itself, the thing by itself has no *Subject-Object*. Therefore arising implies arising by a cause (subject) and effect (object). That is the '*Subject-Object*' involved. From this point of view, it is a contradiction in terms to speak of a thing arising by itself. So this is a point that we can elaborate, pointing out the contradiction. Therefore it is the contradiction to speak of self-arising.

Secondly, when you say something arises, that something must be different from the state when it is not arisen yet. Otherwise there is no arising. It is the same state, then what is the arising? Arising means that new thing arises. From this point of view also, we can see a contradiction. But then, you are talking a svabhāva which doesn't change in its nature. So it cannot have a different state. Thus, the arising is contradiction in term.

If I were a Sarvstivādin, I would say Nāgārjuna is not always fair. Sometimes it is a matter of standpoint. If you study Abhidharma,

you would see they were arguing this one, they say, “Why not, a thing can be called svabhāva, at the same time, it can have different stats.” For instance, they say ‘fire’. The nature of fire is the same. But then you have straw-fire, wood-fire, etc. Likewise feeling, you have pleasurable feeling, etc. - feeling in different state. Though they assume different state, their integrity of intrinsic nature remains the same. That is the way the opponent understands. Therefore they would not accept this. But for Nāgārjuna, the different states mean different things. Because whatever that is arisen is whatever that exists. From this point of view, Nāgārjuna would say like this, “if you say there is a new thing that arises, you are saying that it is not arisen by itself, because it must have different things. Because what is svabhāva in itself never change.”

Secondly, whatever exists is whatever arises. But the different standpoint of bhīḥarmika is this, they say, ‘No, we should think in terms of thing existing in itself as a svabhāva, and it arises in the phenomenal world. These two are different things. When it arises in the phenomenal world, it assumes different form, different bhava (state). Thus bhīḥarmikas argue that you actually can speak of svabhāva having different forms. For Nāgārjuna, he would not allow that, because anything arising in any form is a new thing. So it involves two very different standpoints.

Ultimately Nāgārjuna would have to appeal to experience. He says, ‘logic itself can go a long way, but sometimes it can’t solve the problem in the final analysis.’ So Nāgārjuna would still have to appeal to the experience of the Buddha. The whole purpose of Nāgārjuna’s logical argument is not to win as a logician, but to press you to think for yourself that all kinds of contradiction that evolved by assuming a svabhāva. Why? Because the Buddha has taught there is no svabhāva. That is his starting point. The Buddha has taught everything is pratīya-samutpāda. So that is the purpose of his logical argument.

Thirdly, if anything can simply arise by itself, it would lead to infinite arising.

So we can see that though he mentions all the 4 possibilities, his focus is on this arising. The whole thing is the ‘P - is it arising as a svabhāva?’ He wants to disprove that. Then he can conclude that everything is empty. Having done that, Nāgārjuna continue to examine his idea of svabhāva. He tries to disprove svabhāva by arguing that there cannot be anything if there is svabhāva. Secondly for bhīḥarmikas, they talked about pratīya.

The third position, there are svabhāva, but then we would say svabhāva by itself cannot arise. Nāgārjuna must show that there can’t be arising from svabhāva. First he has shown there can’t be arising from svabhāva itself. The second step is that he is going to show that what you talk about as pratīya, I am going to refute it, so that it is nonsensical, illogical to talk about the arising from svabhāva. When that also is done, then you have to admit there is no arising, no svabhāva.

### No arising from Pratīya

Verse II :      *catvāraḥ pratīyāḥ hetuḥcāmbanamanantaraḥ /*  
*tathāivādhipateyaḥ ca pratīyā nāsti paścamaḥ //*  
 因緣次第緣      緣緣增上緣  
 四緣生諸法      更無第五緣

The second point is, ‘no arising from pratīya of an entity having a svabhāva.’ According to Sarvāstivāda, they teach that thing arises from 4 types of pratīya.

1. Hetu pratīya
2. āmbana pratīya
3. Samanantara pratīya
4. Adhipati pratīya

Nāgārjuna says ‘you people teach there are only 4 types of pratīya. There is not a fifth one. If everything arises, it must arise by the help of one of these 4 pratīyas. There isn’t a fifth one. For the time being, let me agree with you for the sake of argument. I am going to prove that each of this cannot be established. When I can prove that each of this cannot be established, and seems you say there is not a fifth one, then also it seems that you are saying that whatever that arises, arises with the help of these 4, then you have to admit that there cannot be any arising’

Nāgārjuna is going to refute / disprove the validity of each of these 4. Pratīya is also talked of in term of svabhāva. In another words, pratīya are things that are in their intrinsic nature - pratīya. Conditions are things which are intrinsically condition. That is the way of thinking of people having the idea of svabhāva. That type of pratīya, Nāgārjuna refutes. He is saying that there are no pratīya which are intrinsically pratīya by itself.

If you look at that, pratyaya is simply a term given to anything that helps the arising of another. If you look at that way, it is perfectly accepted by Nāgārjuna.

Sarvāstivāda teaches 6 hetu and 4 pratyaya.

1. Hetu pratyaya : It is a kind of pratyaya [pratyaya is that something that helps as a subsidiary condition] – it is a condition functioning as a main cause in the production; condition quo cause- in its capacity as a cause. For example, if you grow a tree, what is the main cause? The seed is called the hetu-pratyaya. In Sarvāstivādin system, eventually they articulate the meaning of these two, hetu and pratyaya. Hetu is the fundamental basis, that is singular; pratyaya is secondary, or just supportive. And it can be common. For example: the seed is singular (one type of seed), so the pratyaya is that: water, sun-light, human effort. Pratyaya is that something that can be shared. (we shall see them in details in Abhidharma class.)
2. Ālambana pratyaya : condition quo object - in its capacity as an object. For Sarvāstivādin, they say all 4 pratyayas are taught by the Buddha. This set of 4 are mentioned in the sūtra. When we perceive something, let's say, the eye perceives rūpa (external form) then there produces cakṣu-vijñāna. Here there are two pratyayas involved. The cakṣu-indriya and ālambana. That object as much as eye, both are pratyayas. Therefore object as contributing factor is called ālambana pratyaya. The object itself is contributing to the arising of effect, that itself is called pratyaya.
3. Samanantara pratyaya (immediate condition; equal and immediate condition) – here it applies to the case of citta-caitta. In citta-caitta series, supposing you have one kuḷāla thought, the next moment, that series goes on as a kuḷāla thought ... what happening is that, they say, at a particular time, 'T' is conditioned by this citta that precedes it immediately. The preceding one functions as samanantara-pratyaya. This is a homogeneous series of thought, where you have kuḷāla thought, that kuḷāla thought continues in a series, what happening is that, the citta in the previous kuḷāla function as a condition for the arising of immediately succeeding moment of thought. The next moment of thought again function as condition for the arising of next moment of thought, which again function as a condition for the arising of next moment of thought. At any time, the thought which is immediately preceding is called samanantara pratyaya.
4. Adhipati pratyaya (ādhipateya) [condition of predominant] – it sounds like the first one. It means the generic condition. If 'A' and 'B', if 'B' arises, through some kinds of helps of 'A', A can be considered as adhipati condition. In another word, it will include whatever cases which are not included above. What is more, even in the negative sense, for instance, if dharma arises by another dharma, let's say, I have 'X', that 'X' arises mainly because of dharma 'A'. Any other dharmas 'B', 'C', 'D' etc., that helps to arise can be called adhipati-pratyaya. Not only that, there may be various other dharmas, which don't take part at all or which don't help at all the arising of 'X', but they don't obstruct the arising of 'X'. Even by the fact that do not obstruct, that is also a contribution. Because if it obstructs, 'X' cannot come out. The fact that 'X' can be produced is because these dharmas do not obstruct it.

Sarvāstivāda has a theory that anything arises, must arise from either one of these, or the combination of that four pratyaya.

Nāgārjuna refutes their pratyaya having intrinsic nature. Nāgārjuna says, pratyaya is just a name, in the causal-relationship, when 'A' produces 'B', we say 'A' is pratyaya for 'B'. A cannot be in intrinsic nature be a pratyaya, it can only be considered as pratyaya in dynamic process of production.

*Continue...*

*Prepared by Dhammapala*

We saw that Nāgārjuna takes up the Sarvāstivāda theory of the 4 pratyaya 四緣. According to Sarvāstivāda, a dharma arises from one or more of 4 pratyayas. There isn't a 5<sup>th</sup> one. [ 因緣次第緣, 緣緣增上緣, 四緣生諸法, 更無第五緣 ] Nāgārjuna wanted to show each of the 4 pratyaya is not logically valid. In other word, all of them cannot be established. When Nāgārjuna succeeded in disproving the validity of these 4 pratyayas, then he would have succeeded in proving that there is no arising (anutpāda 不生), because arising must be arising from one or more of these 4.

What are the 4 pratyayas according to Sarvāstivāda?

1. Hetu pratyaya
2. Ālambana pratyaya
3. Samanantara pratyaya
4. Adhipati pratyaya

Nāgārjuna wanted to show there is nothing that arises. Then he would have to show that everything is empty. At the beginning, he makes some general statements about the nature of pratyayas. From verse 3 and 4, we can see he makes this general statement, and

the purpose of this statement is to point out the alternatives in this kind of consideration, and thereby forcing the opponents into a dilemma.

Verse 3:

如諸法自性，不在於緣中，以無自性故，他性亦復無

*Na hi svabhāvo bhāvān pratyayādiṅ vidyate/  
avidyamne svabhāve parabhāvo na vidyate//*

*Lit* : Indeed, the ‘svabhāva’ of existent things is not found in the conditions. When the svabhāva is not existing, the parabhāva is not found.

You can take this as the general statement of the Nāgārjuna position. There is no such thing called svabhāva. Or you can take it also an argument in itself – that means svabhāva is not found among pratyayas. According to Mādhyamika, *what exist is what arises*. You can’t have a thing that doesn’t arise, and yet you can say exist. The so-called thing arises, actually an event occur when pratyayas A,B,C,D come together. You can’t find a thing inside. That is just a coming together of pratyayas of A,B,C,D. Thus, you can’t say there is a svabhāva (/ entity). For example, onion. Onion has different leaves that make up the onion. You can’t find the onion inside.

The so-called ‘bhāva’ (existent) is just an event occurs when conditions come together. Just as different leaves of onion (like pratyayas). You can’t find a thing inside there (onion). Thus svabhāva cannot be found in existent thing. An existent is something that arises, so that thing arises is due to the coming together of pratyayas, then you can’t find a thing called svabhāva among those pratyayas.

If ‘A’ is svabhāva, then, ‘B’ with regard to ‘A’, ‘B’ is parabhāva. From the point of view of ‘A’, the svabhāva of ‘B’ is parabhāva. From the point of view of ‘B’, the svabhāva of ‘A’ is parabhāva. It is just looking svabhāva from the different point of views. They are relative. If you understand that there is no svabhāva of anything, then you can’t say there is parabhāva. In this verse, Nāgārjuna immediately negates the idea of svabhāva and parabhāva. Parabhāva is simply the concept relative to svabhāva.

This verse is an important statement because he started by saying there is no svabhāva in any existent thing.

Nāgārjuna put the opponents into a dilemma. He must give an alternatives.

Verse 4:

果為從緣生，為從非緣生，是緣為有果，是緣為無果

*kriyā na pratyayavati nṅpratyayavat kriyā /  
pratyayā nṅkriyāvanta kriyāvanta ca santyuta//*

*Lit* : Either the causal activity possess pratyaya, or not possess the pratyaya. Pratyaya do not possess causal activity, nor they possess causal activity.

The Sanskrit translation is a bit ambiguous. Then look at the Chinese translation:-

Chinese translation:-

*Is the fruit (phala) produced from pratyaya, or is it produced from apratyaya? Does the pratyaya contain the fruit, or does the pratyaya does not contain the fruit?*

The first alternative dilemma:- You have a thing called ‘X’ from which a fruit is produced. Look at the nature of this, is it a ‘pratyaya’ or ‘apratyaya’? In fact, Nāgārjuna wanted to show both are impossible. The other alternative dilemma :- ‘Y’ as a fruit comes from ‘X’. Is ‘Y’ already inside, or is not inside? Without going through the answer that follows, we can see Nāgārjuna tried to put the opponent to the corner.

If ‘Y’ fruit is already in pratyaya, then why is the meaning of talking about fruit arising? - It is already there, if the fruit is not in the pratyaya, from where it comes? In another word, ‘X’ and ‘Y’ are completely different, then you can’t link the two together. Thus we can anticipate in both cases, there are problems.

These two verses are in the form of general statement to put the opponent into difficult situation. Having stated this, he proceeded to prove one by one. First, he is going to refute the hetu-pratyaya (from verse 5-7). Hetu-pratyaya is a primary cause.

Verse 5:

因是法生果，是法名為緣，若是果未生，何不名非緣

Utpadyate pratītyemnitīme pratyayāh kila /

(utpadyate pratītya-imn-iti-ime pratyayā kila)

yāvannotpadyata ime tīvannpratyayā katha //

Lit. A fruit (phalam) is produced, depending on these [A,B,C,D], thus, these are called pratyayas. So long as the phala is not produced, there, to that extent, why they are not apratyaya?

In other word, pratyaya is not something that has that power to act as the primary cause in itself. A pratyaya is called pratyaya only in dynamic process. Depending on A,B,C,D, then 'Y' arises. When you have process where a fruit 'Y' arises from various pratyayas, in that condition, A,B,C,D is the pratyaya of 'Y'. Only when they are doing the function of producing a fruit, then we can call them a pratyaya. We call something a pratyaya only when it is doing that work of producing a fruit. In that dynamic causal relationship of process, that activity is not inherent in the pratyayas. Likewise, the *pratyaya-ness* (the nature of pratyaya) is not something that is static, that inherent, in that activity. In other word, a thing called pratyaya has meaning only in that very actual process where you have a fruit arising from various conditions.

So we don't have pratyayas in the sense of svabhāva by nature they are pratyaya. Example: when cakṣu sees the rūpa, and produce cakṣu-vijñāna, then both the cakṣu and rūpa become pratyaya. So neither cakṣu nor rūpa by nature is pratyaya. But when they worked together and produced a phala, and at that time only you can call them pratyaya. Outside the situation, you can't call the pratyaya. So nothing is inherent here.

You have various dharmas called A,B,C,D, then they give rise to a fruit 'X'. Nāgārjuna says actually A,B,C,D, you can't say they are pratyaya in inherent nature. But when it is happening like this in the causal process when A,B,C,D come together and give rise to 'X', at that time only you can say A,B,C,D are pratyayas.

At the time when fruit is not arisen, why not call them apratyaya – so long as the fruit is not produced, why not called them apratyaya?

Therefore we can see 'pratyaya' and 'apratyaya' are just concept. They have meaning only when they perform the function.

Pratyaya can only has meaning in the actual dynamic process where they are doing the function of producing the fruit. Outside the situation, why not call them apratyaya?

Thus there is no a thing called pratyaya as inherent nature.

Verse 6:

果先於緣中，有無俱不可，先無為誰緣，先有何用緣

naivāsato naiva sataḥ pratyayo rthasya yujyate/

(na-eva-asataḥ na-eva sataḥ pratyayaḥ arthasya yujyate)

asataḥ pratyayaḥ kasya sataḥca pratyayena kiḥ //

Lit. Neither the pratyaya of a thing which is non-existing, nor of a thing which is existing, is logical / possible. Of what is a pratyaya of something which is non-existing, and what is the use of pratyaya of something which is already existing.

- Means we can't have 'X' pratyaya of 'Y' if 'Y' is sat (existing) or asat (non-existing), both cases is not possible also. The 2 cases are, either you say 'Y' already in 'X' or 'Y' is not in 'X'. When you have pratyaya produces a fruit, you inquire there are these two possibilities:-

1. Fruit is already existing in pratyaya;
2. Fruit is not existing in pratyaya.

Nāgārjuna says both - 'na yujyate'. Why? The second line of verse 6 is explained.

Considering the fruit is non-existing in pratyaya, means there is nothing. How can you talk about pratyaya of something which is nothing. If 'P' produces 'F', then we say 'P' is pratyaya of 'F'. If 'F' is not existing, what is that P of what? (kasya)

The another alternative, on the other hand, if you say the fruit is already in pratyaya, it is already there. It doesn't mean a pratyaya is already existing. So 'pratyayena kiḥ' – what is the use of pratyaya?

That means, whether you take the first or the second alternatives, both cases are meaningless. Nāgārjuna says, if you consider pratyaya as something really having pratyaya that has the ability or function of producing a fruit, and that is the primary one, if you think like that in term of intrinsic nature, then you have logical problem.

Verse 7:

若果非有生，亦復非無生，亦非有無生，何得言有緣

Na sannāsaṇṇa sadasandharmo nirvartate yadā /

(na sat-na-asat-na sat-asat-dharmaṇṇa nirvartate yadā)

kathaṇṇa nirvartako heturevaṇṇa sati hi yujyate //

Lit. When a dharma (fruit) arises, neither as something already existing, nor as something non-existing, nor as something both sat and asat. How is the hetu produces? How it is possible (evaṇṇa sati)?

Nāgārjuna has proved that, the combination *sat* and *asat* is also no possible. So when dharma (fruit) arises, you cannot say fruit arises as something that is existing (sat) or as something that is non-existing (asat), or as something as both 'sat and asat'. Then how can there be a hetu that produces (nirvartakaṇṇa)?

If you take a fruit as something having a svabhāva, what does it mean? Thus you will be caught as phala having a svabhāva.

Nāgārjuna only can refute this because he takes the position of opponent that bhava (existent thing) has a svabhāva. If you think, you have all these logical troubles, you can say pratyaya produces a thing that is first already existing, you can't say phala of pratyaya producing a thing that is non-existing. Thus you can't establish a thing called hetu-pratyaya that serve as a primary cause or condition for the arising.

*To be continue ...*

*By Dhammapala*

## The refutation of 4 pratyayas by Nāgārjuna

### Summary of lecture 6

#### ***I. Hetu-pratyaya***

Verse 5 to 7 tend to refute the hetu-pratyaya. The main idea is that hetu-pratyaya has meaning only in the dynamic process when 'A' is producing 'B', or 'A' is acting as the condition of the 'B'. Outside that process, it has nothing. We can't say, 'A' without doing anything, is in its intrinsic nature a hetu-pratyaya.

It is explained that from the arguments, it follows that whether you consider phala as already existing in pratyaya and they are arising; or not having first existed and then arises. In both cases, it is not possible. In this way, the hetu-pratyaya is refuted.

#### ***II. Ālambana-pratyaya***

Nāgārjuna goes on to refute this. What is the meaning of ālambana-pratyaya? ālambana means object that serve as condition for the arising of our consciousness. When eyes see a rūpa, there is a cakṣu-vijñāna. So in that process, there are 2 pratyayas - cakṣu and rūpa. So the outside object-rūpa is also a pratyaya. That kind of pratyaya is ālambana-pratyaya. This doctrine implies that for us to have any knowledge, or for us to have any vijñāna, there must be an outside object. That outside object serve as the condition.

Verse 8:

anālambana evāyaṇṇa san dharma upadiṇṇyate/

athānālambane dharma kuta ālambanaṇṇa punaṇṇa //

如諸佛所說  
於此無緣法

真實微妙法  
云何有緣緣

Lit: It is pointed that this true (/existing) dharma (sat-dharma) is definitely without an ālambana. Then, when the dharma does not take an ālambana, where is the ālambana (-pratyaya)?

Nāgārjuna's argument here is really not logical in the Western logic. Why? Because he appeals to the Buddha's experience. He is trying to show that there must be an outside ālambana (real object) which serve a condition for the arising of consciousness. He wants to show that idea is wrong. In showing that, what does he do? He appeals to the experience of the Buddha. What does the Buddha say? The Buddha has taught in the highest spiritual realization, there is no subject and object. In the sat-dharma (true dharma), dharma as the ultimate reality that we experience, that so-called reality is not anything at all, it is śūnya (empty). In the highest experience, there is no subject-object. Seeing is just pure seeing – not because eye sees something outside. No distinction between subject and object. This is what he meant by true-dharma. So this true dharma is without any object (na ālambana). If that is true, since it is the highest experience of the Buddha. Being a Buddhist, you have to accept it. Because the Buddha has pointed out in the highest experience, everything is empty. Thus he refuted ālambana-pratyaya.

In Buddhist logic, there are 3 pramāṇa (量 – valid mean of knowledge). In another word, how do I know the knowledge that I get is correct? What are the criteria?

1. Pratyakṣa (Direct-perception)
2. Anumāna (Inference – on the basis of what we have known directly). Ex. Fire and smoke. If far away, there is a smoke, I can infer there is a fire.
3. Śābda (Scriptural authority) It is also a kind of inference. But we rely on the words of śrīya, particularly the Buddha's words.

Nāgārjuna is using 'śābda' – to say the Buddha has pointed out: when the Buddha is enlightened, there is no distinction between subject and object. Everything is śūnya. For us, we think there must be object for us to have vijñāna. But if we take the words of the Buddha, when he sees the true-dharma, the Buddha says it is without ālambana. Therefore the words of the Buddha can be accepted, then there is no such thing at the highest standpoint. Thus Nāgārjuna refutes the ālambana-pratyaya.

### ***III. Samanantara-pratyaya [Lit. completely without gap-immediately]***

There is another type of causal situation. That is the type obtained in the mental states. For instance:- 'C1' - kuṭāla citta. This 'C1' goes on in the series. So next moment 'C2'.. 'C3'..It goes on in the series. Supposing you take 'C3', one says 'C2' is the pratyaya for 'C3', because without 'C2', you can't have 'C3'. 'C2' is immediately before 'C3'. That kind of situation is found in the series of mind (mental series). Sarvāstivādin call it as 'Samanantara-pratyaya'. Nāgārjuna wants to show logically, it is valid to think of the kind of pratyaya-

Verse 9

anutpanneṣu dharmeṣu nirodho nopapadyate/  
nānantaramato yuktaṁ niruddhe pratyayaṁ ca kaṁ //  
果若未生時 則不應有滅  
滅法何能緣 故無次第緣

Lit : When the dharma has not arisen, the nirodha is not possible. It is not logical to talk about nirodha when dharma has not arisen. When it is ceasing, what kind of pratyaya it is?

In this situation, you say 'C2' is pratyaya for 'C3'. ['C3' =present, 'C2'=ceased / past] The problem is, at the time when 'C3' has not arisen, that mean 'C2' is still existing, thus 'C2' is not nirodha (/ has not ceased). According to this definition, 'C2' must cease in order to give way to 'C3'. Thus it is not logically to say that.

The important point here is 'C2' and 'C3' is totally disconnected. For pratyaya, the condition must be adding on something that is real, therefore, in this situation, it is not possible. When a dharma has not arisen, there is no cessation. There is no condition be called by Samanantara-pratyaya.

The opponent would say, 'Can't I say when 'C2' is just ceasing, not having completely ceased yet, so is not totally a nirodha; as is ceasing, it functions as pratyaya. When 'C3' has not arisen, 'C2' is not a nirodha. When 'C2' is not extinction, according to your definition, you don't have samanantara-pratyaya, that is because the two things (C2 and C3) are disconnected. One must arise and the

other must cease. In that case, how can you talk about ‘C2’ serving as condition for ‘C3’.

The second line of verse 9: some one would say, ‘Can’t I say like that – I am not saying ‘C2’ must be a completely nirodha to act as a cause. I agree if it is completely extinction, something is completely extinct, is something that is non-existence. It cannot act as a cause. I agree, but I am saying when it is just ceasing, how about that.’ (niruddhe pratyaya ca ka)

When something is ceasing, how can at the same time it take an object? That also is not logical, because it is in the process of ceasing. It is something that is disappearing, how can it be a condition? In another words, in both cases, it is not possible. ‘C2’ must cease first to give rise to ‘C3’. But then the problem is, if ‘C2’ is ceased, it cannot act as pratyaya. But the thing is, you can’t have ‘C3’ without first having ‘C2’ cease.

In the first consideration, it is illogical. There is a discontinuity. In the second consideration, the opponent might say, ‘I am not saying that ‘C2’ has complete ceased, I am saying when it is ceasing, it serve as a pratyaya for ‘C3’.’ Now Nāgārjuna questions, ‘when it is ceasing, it is disappearing already, how can it act as a condition?’ Given that, therefore is not logical. So this kind of idea – ‘C2’ immediately before ‘C2’ and ‘C2’ serving as condition for ‘C3’, that is not logical.

The main thing is, from the Nāgārjuna point of view, there is no connection between ‘C2’ and ‘C3’ (the one before and the one immediately after). That is only because if you think of ‘C2’, ‘C3’ as entities (svabhāva). Two things are totally distinct from each other. When one ceases, another arises, etc. There is no continuity. You can’t connect the two. Thus, you can’t talk about conditionality.

#### IV. Adhipateya-pratyaya (adhipati-pratyaya)

“Dominant” in the sense - because of ‘A’, ‘B’ arises (in the general sense). Note the different:-

The hetu-pratyaya emphasize the idea that it is the direct, primary and the main cause. In the fourth pratyaya, whatever arises ‘B’ when ‘A’ is present. Even if ‘A’ does nothing, as long as it does not obstruct the arising of ‘B’, it still giving some kind of contribution to the arising (it is an Indirect-contribution).

This pratyaya involves two situation:-

1. Positive (direct) – in any general sense if it makes a contribution.
2. negative (Indirect) – though it does not make a direct contribution, as long as it does not obstruct.

Sarvāstivādin takes the Buddha’s teaching of Pratītya-samutpāda,

“asmiṃ sati, idaṃ bhavati”

Lit. when this is existing, it arises / this being, it comes to be

Whenever you have ‘A’, then you have ‘B’. In that case, ‘A’ is the adhipati-pratyaya of ‘B’. This is the idea of Adhipateya-pratyaya. Let’s us see whether you can establish this or not. That is to say, if you think in term of svabhāva.

Verse 10

bhāvānāṃ niḥsvabhāvānāṃ na sattvī vidyate yataḥ /  
satṭdamasmiṃ bhavattītyetannaivopapadyate //

諸法無自性 故無有有相  
說「有是事故 是事有」不然

Lit : When the existential status (/ real-ness) of existent things (dharmas) which are without svabhāva, cannot be found. “sati idaṃ asmiṃ bhavati” – this one definitely would not be possible.

It is not logically in fact only because if you think in term of svabhāva. If you don’t think of ‘this’ or ‘it’ as fixed entity called svabhāva, then it is alright. You are just describing the general process. Nāgārjuna had refuted all these four so-called pratyayas. Nāgārjuna has proved that, this idea of pratyaya, according to Sarvāstivādin, as something that produces phala is not acceptable.

Verse 11, 12 and 13 are not possible to think of pratyaya as producing phala.

Verse 11

Na ca vyastasamasteṣu pratyayeṣu vasti tatphalaḥ /  
pratyayebhyaḥ kathaṃ tacca bhavenna pratyayeṣu yat//  
略廣因緣中 求果不可得

Lit. That phala does not exist among the conditions either separately or collectively. How can that arises from condition, that which is not in the pratyaya.

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[PratĠtya-samutpĠda = ĠĠnyatĠ = pratĠpat-madhyamĠ]8<sup>th</sup> May 2002 by Professor Ven. Dhammajoti Arranged by

ĠĠĠĠĠĠ DhammapĠla bhikkhu

In the whole book, only in the chapter 24, we see NĠgĠrjuna saying something very directly and positively about his doctrine of ĠĠnyatĠ. Elsewhere, basically he just takes up the position of the opponents and attacked and refuted their position. In the chapter 24, what he means when he says everything is ĠĠnya? And he gives very clear answer. Most scholars quote this chapter to explain about the MahĠyĠna's doctrine of ĠĠnyatĠ. Thirdly, NĠgĠrjuna explicitly equates his explanation of ĠĠnyatĠ with the teaching of the Buddha.

Opponents says if you say everything is empty, then the consequence is disastrous, ultimately it amounts to the destruction of 3 jewels, the whole notion of spiritual practices and progress, the whole notion of merit, demerit, virtue and nothing remained in the world. NĠgĠrjuna says, 'you have all these troubles in your mind because you have not understood the meaning of ĠĠnyatĠ.'

NĠgĠrjuna now is explaining his position. Firstly, in Verse 8, the teaching of the Buddhas are based on two truths:- lokasaĠvĠti-satya (conventional truth) and paramĠrtha satya (absolute truth). Ex: When the Buddha says, 'no self', the Buddha speaks about absolute truth, but there is an empirical self. In a way, the conventional truth is also aspect of absolute truth. What is true is what accord with facts. At the saĠvĠti-satya level, it is said to be conventional, because the idea of something being true or false is based on convention.

Historically speaking, 'saĠvĠti', originally from Ġman –'think'; saĠ - together. People think collectively together, so is the collective idea. Later on, somehow became saĠvĠti, due to the way it was used perhaps among those who speak different dialects. Today, you have saĠvĠti (ĠvĠ - to cover; to obstruct). The idea is, at this level, we are completely covered as it were in our seeing, covered by ignorance, blinded by ignorance. So it is conventionally. But it is an aspect of truth – there is a common understanding.

Parama-artha (第一義) [highest sense; absolute sense]. 'Self' in the highest sense does not exist, but 'self' in empirical sense does exist. It is dependently originated. In this way, NĠgĠrjuna points out, to understand the Buddha's teaching properly, first of all stick in the mind that there are these two truths. If you don't make distinction, you will never understand the Buddha's teaching.

Verse 9 says those who don't understand these distinction, they don't understand the profound nature of Buddha's teaching. The whole idea of understanding is in term of two truths. It is very important.

Another important thing in Verse 14, he says, *to whom ĠĠnyatĠ is logically acceptable, to him everything is logically acceptable (yujyate)<sup>37</sup>; to whom ĠĠnyatĠ is illogical, to him everything is illogical/ impossible/ unacceptable.*

If a person can accept ĠĠnyatĠ, then he can establish everything. For instance, cause and effect. If I say, 'karma is a cause gives vipĠka (fruit)'. If I don't accept ĠĠnyatĠ, how can I explain these process of causation that a cause produces an effect. Because for one thing, if it is not ĠĠnya, it means it is forever the same. It is existing eternally, always non-changing like Ġtman, how can you talk about the arising of that thing? You can't explain the phenomena of the process of change. Also you can't relate two things (cause and effect) absolutely distinct. Then there must be a necessarily relationship there. So the process of change is at all possible when you don't think in term of fixed nature, i.e. when you think in term of emptiness. Emptiness means there is nothing fixed. It is not nihilism. When NĠgĠrjuna says everything is empty, it doesn't mean he denies everything, what he means is everything is PratĠtya-samutpanna (originated by condition), the notion that everything is relatively. Thus you don't get into any extremes. This is the gist of verse 14.

Verse 18 is the most important of the whole book.

yaĠ pratĠtyasamutpĠdaĠ ĠĠnyatĠĠ tĠĠ pracakĠmahe/  
sĠ prajĠaptirupĠdĠya pratĠpatsaiva madhyamĠ//

Lit. that which is PratĠtya-samutpĠda, we declare that as ĠĠnyatĠ. It (ie. ĠĠnyatĠ) is only a derived concept (prajĠapti), and it is also pratĠpat-madhyamĠ.

37 √yuj – to join. What conjoined with truth.

[Pratītya-samutpāda = śūnyatā = pratipat-madhyamā] – This is the precisely what the Buddha teaches.

śūnyatā here is not a doctrine of nihilism. It is the doctrine of Dependent-origination. There is no fixed nature, also the śūnyatā is just a prajñapti. He never get attached to it. Thus he has no any position. What he says about śūnyatā, don't think of 'the view'. It is only the concept. Even emptiness is a concept.

To conclude:-

1. Everything is empty (śūnyatā) because everything has no fixed/ intrinsic nature (svabhāva);
2. everything has no fixed nature because everything is dependently originated (pratītya-samutpanna).

The second line of verse 18 says, 'emptiness is also empty', it is still a concept. Don't think that emptiness itself is not empty, but everything else is empty. In fact, even that emptiness itself is also empty, because it is only a relative concept.

To conclude:-

i.e. It is not that everything else is empty, except 'emptiness' itself.

i.e. 'Emptiness' doesn't have any ontological status. It is only a relative concept.

Thus he makes his declaration, his teaching of emptiness is the same as the Buddha's teaching of pratītya-samutpāda. And that emptiness is just a concept, to try to express the Buddha's teaching of pratītya-samutpāda and also, the import of emptiness is that of Middle way, not to attach to extremes, that in fact is the same import of the doctrine of pratītya-samutpāda.

15<sup>th</sup> May 2002

Lecture 10: Mādhyamika by Professor Ven. Dhammajoti

Arranged by ธรรมภาณี Dhammapāla bhikkhu

## **The implication of Nāgārjuna's declaration of śūnyatā**

[Pratītya-samutpāda = śūnyatā = pratipat-madhyamā]

śūnyatā is a prajñapti (concept, name). This is the real standpoint of Nāgārjuna. According to his standpoint, he is not teaching anything new. He just follows the Buddha's teaching of pratītya-samutpāda. That is why, in the beginning, he salutes the Buddha who is the best speaker. It is because through the pratītya-samutpāda, that prapañca can be appeased.

In Chinese, there are 2 commentaries. One is by Piñgala, he comments on the verse 18 of MMK,

yaṁ pratītyasamutpādaṁ śūnyatāṁ tṛṇaṁ pracakāmahe/

sṁ prajñaptirupādāya pratipatsaiva madhyamāṁ//

Lit. that which is Pratītya-samutpāda, we declare that as śūnyatā. It (ie. śūnyatā) is only a derived concept (prajñapti), and it is also pratipat-madhyamā.

He says, "what is pratītya-samutpāda, that we say non other than emptiness. Emptiness also is empty; it is only in order to guide the sentient beings that a concept (prajñapti) is utilized for the teaching (on emptiness). As it (emptiness) is separated from two extremes [asti; nāsti], it (śūnyatā) is said to be the middle way."

The first line is simply taken from the stanza. What is meant when it is emphasized emptiness is also empty? The concept is not a real thing. The commentator says "concept vs reality". Concept is what is meant by a mind; reality is whatever is real, when we experience something real, we try to express it, even the Buddha had to do that, otherwise he could not communicate with the world. He only uses the concept / names. But the problem is 'we confuse concept with reality' – whatever we think in our mind, we think that is real. Reality is not really exists, concept is simply made by the mind, it can be changed, it is relative.

Therefore Nāgārjuna says śūnyatā = prajñapti, this is really what he meant. We must not think, simply because he says nothing exist except śūnyatā. When he says like that, some people might think śūnyatā is absolute thing, if you attached like that, you misunderstood him. It is very dangerous. It is like grasping the snake from the wrong end. Therefore this must be spells out clearly that emptiness is also empty.

śūnyatā is not a word started by Nāgārjuna. The word 'śūnya', 'śūnyatā' were already in the sūtra. Especially in Mahāyāna, there were a

large group of literature called *prajñā-pāramitā* (the Perfection of wisdom). The main theme is *śūnyatā*. For Mahāyāna, they talked about *prajñā* in a perfect form. Thus they say *prajñā* attained by Arhat is inferior, and it is different from the real *prajñā* of the Buddha. The real *prajñā* of the Buddha had to be understood as *prajñā-pāramitā*. What is the difference? In the highest perfect *prajñā*, *śūnyatā* is understood properly. In their theory, they say, there are two-fold *śūnyatā*:-

1. Pudgala-*śūnyatā*-*nairātmya*;
2. Dharma-*nairātmya*-*śūnyatā*.

What they are saying is, the *prajñā* of Arhat can understand only the *pudgala-śūnyatā-nairātmya* (there is no *pudgala*, no *ātma*). According to Professor, it is really unfair to say Arhat's ideal is inferior by this scheme, i.e. Arhat can only understand the first, not the second.

The so-called Hīnayānist say, there is no *ātma*, no *pudgala*, why? Because there are only 5 *skandhas*. *Skandhas* are real. But not the *pudgala*, not the *ātma*. What are the *skandhas*? *Skandhas* are the *dharmas*. So they are saying *dharmas* are real, though the *dharmas* are put together on the basis of which we have a *prajñāpti* called *pudgala* is not real. Therefore this is a type of so-called wisdom that is attained by Arhat. But they don't realize that even the *skandhas* are also *śūnya*. Therefore their *prajñā* is inferior. This is from the Mahāyāna's standpoint. But the Mahāyāna's criticism would be justified/ fair if it is directed to certain *ābhīdharmikas*, not to Theravāda.

*Dharmas*, according to early Buddhism, is simply an occurrence according to the process of *paṭicca-samuppāda*. Conditions come together, something arises. We call it a *dharma*.

Mahāyāna developed this scheme, and applied to all those who are not Mahāyānist. This is not appreciated by Professor. On the other hand, it is also their contribution to point out that something went wrong among certain groups of *ābhīdharmikas*.

If a person can realize *pudgala* is *śūnyatā*, it is impossible that he cannot realize *dharma* - *śūnyatā*. Another example, “*ātman*; *ātmya*.”

The so-called Hīnayānist can realize the *ātman* is *śūnya*. They cannot realize the *ātmya*. How can it be? If a person can realize that there is no *ātma*, then there can't be anything that belongs to that person (*ātmya*). Therefore if you admit that a person can realize the emptiness with regard to *ātman*, you got to accept logically that a person must also accept the emptiness of *ātmya*, i.e. *Dharmas*. *ātma* is like the point of reference, once there is no point of reference, you can't have thing referred to, i.e. *Dharmas*.

In the *prajñā-pāramitā-hṛdaya sūtra*, at the very beginning, the Bodhisattva look down, and openly declare that 5 *skandhas* are empty. In the wisdom of the Bodhisattva of Mahāyāna, what He sees is that, not only that *ātma*, *pudgala* are empty, but also the 5 *skandhas* that go to form that *pudgala*, *ātma* are also empty.

Later on, in the school of Yogācāra, they also have a different interpretation. They thought that, when this Mādhyamika led by Nāgārjuna, preaching that everything is empty, they said that is not right. In their understanding, there is absolute reality. We can't say they are wrong. It is only the different opinions, and based on different experience, because that kind of teaching is not a purely theoretical teaching, it is based on meditational experience. They really go to the meditation. The mind is real, external reality is not real, then you can say external reality is empty. But in their meditational experience, the consciousness is real, that is the pure-consciousness. Thus their standpoint is different from Mādhyamika, it is not intellectual, it is based on experience.

Yogācāra says emptiness is not *prajñāpti*. It is a real thing, that is a pure mind (*cittamātra*). Everything comes from the mind.

Emptiness here means moral detachment to views. Everything is dependent on conditions. If emptiness is not empty, then it would have become extreme. Nāgārjuna is not taking emptiness as a view. It is because emptiness is also empty, that you can have a middle way.

There is nothing that can be fixed. When no right views are based on any fixed thing, then views are just relative. Therefore you can avoid extremes, avoiding the extremes is the middle way. So the teaching of *śūnyatā* is the teaching of middle way.

Verse 19:

*aprāptīya-samutpanno dharmaḥ kaścinna vidyate /*  
*yasmāttasmādaśūnyo hi dharmaḥ kaścinna vidyate //*

Lit. As there exists no *dharma* which is arisen without being conditioned. Therefore there indeed exists no *dharma* which is not empty (*śūnya*).

Or

There is not any dharma that is found to have been arisen without having been conditioned (independently of pratītya). Because of this, therefore, there is not any dharma that is found to be non-nyā.

In the earlier verse, nyā is the same as Pratītya-samutpāda. In this verse, he goes on to explain what is meant by nyā? The meaning of nyā is that *everything is dependently arisen/ originated*.

Then he begins to answer those objections. He counter-attacks one by one in the following verses-

Verse 1 is correspond to the verse 20

Verse 1: Yadi nyam idam sarvam udaya na-asti na vyaya /  
catrīryasatyān abhva te prasajyate //

Sarvstivādin says if everything is empty, then it means nothing that arises; nothing to cease. It means there is no 4 Noble Truth.

Verse 20: yadyānyamida sarvamudaya nsti na vyaya /  
catrīryasatyān mabhvaste prasajyate //

Nāgārjuna says in opposite, if everything is ānyā, there is no arising and ceasing. There is no 4 Noble truth.

Verse 21

apratītya samutpanna kuto dukkha bhaviyate /  
anityamukta dukkha hi tatsvabhavye na vidyate //

Lit. Whence (how) will what is arisen without being conditioned become dukkha? For, what is impermanent is said to be dukkha – that does not exist in what exists as a svabhva.

A thing that is arisen without being dependent, from where there is dukkha, because dukkha is said to be anitya, in that real nature (exist forever), you can't find anitya (you can't find dukkha). Hence it is in this way, you (Sarvstivādin) deny dukkha, by denying dukkha, you deny the 4 Noble Truth.

22<sup>nd</sup> May 2002

Lecture 11: Mādhyamika by Professor Ven. Dhammajoti

Arranged by Dhammapāla bhikkhu

Nāgārjuna says, if you say 'everything is not empty' – means everything has svabhva, svabhva means no change. No change means no dukkha. What is dukkha? Dukkha is impermanent, they arise and cease, are changing. Therefore they are dukkha. If you say everything is fixed, how can there be arising and ceasing? There is no change whatsoever. The whole idea of change is not possible. Thus according to Nāgārjuna, Sarvstivādin destroy the whole of Buddha's teachings. 'Change' is the basis fundamental Buddhist standpoint.

Verse 21

apratītya samutpanna kuto dukkha bhaviyati /  
anityamukta dukkha hi tatsvabhavye na vidyate //

苦不從緣生 云何當有苦  
無常是苦義 定性無無常

Lit : Whatever that is arisen, without being dependent on condition, from where will the dukkha arise? For, dukkha is said to be anitya (impermanent); in the case of there being self-nature, that dukkha will not be found.

Verse 20 and verse 21 explain how if you say that everything is not nyā, thus you destroy the first truth.

Verse 22

svabhvato vidyamāna ki puna samudēyate /  
tasmātsamudayo nsti nyā pratibdhata //

若苦有定性 何故從集生  
是故無有集 以破空義故

Lit : If something is existing in its intrinsic nature (/in term of svabhva), why again it will arise. Therefore for one who is destroying nyā does not have samudaya.

Thus you destroy the second truth – the origin of suffering.

Verse 23

Na nirodhaḥ svabhāvena sato dukkhasya vidyate /  
svabhāvaparyavasthānān nirodhaḥ pratibandhase //  
苦若有定性 則不應有滅  
汝著定性故 即破於滅諦

Lit : No nirodha of dukkha which is existing in term of self-nature is found. Because of the attachment to svabhāva, you destroy the nirodha.

In this way, you destroy the nirodha, because a thing that always exist in its own nature, how can you have an extinction of dukkha.

Verse 24

svbhāvye sati mṛgasya bhāvanā nopapadyate /  
athāsau bhāvvyate mṛgaḥ svabhāvyaḥ te na vidyate //  
苦若有定性 則無有修道  
若道可修習 即無有定性

Lit : There being the notion of svabhāva, the cultivation of the path is not possible. ...

For Nāgārjuna, svabhāva is something that is not pratītya-samutpanna. It has sovereignty, it is completely independent by itself, it would never change. If there is something like that, everything would not be possible. Thus you destroy the Buddhism.

Nāgārjuna wants to point the fallacy of opponents. Of course Nāgārjuna is not fair from the point of view of Sarvāstivāda. But Nāgārjuna finds very clearly what he means, the type of notion that he opposed to.

Verse 25

yadā dukkhaḥ samudayo nirodhaḥ ca na vidyate /  
mṛgo dukkhanirodhatvātkatamaḥ prapayīyati //  
若無有苦諦 及無集滅諦  
所可滅苦道 竟為何所至

Lit : When dukkha, samudaya and nirodha do not exist, what path is it that will lead on to, as a result of the fact of cessation of dukkha.

In the earlier verse, Nāgārjuna says there cannot be a path for bhāvanā, because there is no idea of change. Everything is fixed, ex. pṛthagjana will be forever be pṛthagjana.

Verse 26

svabhāvenāparijñānaḥ yadi tasya punaḥ katham /  
parijñānaḥ, nanu kila svabhāvyaḥ samavasthitaḥ //  
若苦定有性 先來所不見  
於今云何見 其性不異故

Lit : If the non complete knowledge is intrinsic, how again there be a complete knowledge of it; is it not the case that svabhāva remains fixed.

To overcome dukkha, first you must know it fully. The non perfect knowledge is by nature so, how can there be later on a full knowledge of it. It means if dukkha is something that in its intrinsic nature, cannot be known fully, that it will forever remains not capable of being fully known. (i.e. you can't talk about overcoming it later.)

According to Nāgārjuna, you can't say first something cannot be known fully, later on (punar) it can be known fully. Thus, you can say that only if you accept that 'nothing is fixed.'

Verse 27

prahāṣasātkāraṇe bhāvanā caivameva te /

parijvanna yujyante catvāryapi phalāni ca //  
 如見苦不然 斷集及證滅  
 修道及四果 是亦皆不然

Book trans: Just as in the case of knowledge (of suffering), therefore, your knowledge of abandoning perceptual confirmation, practice, and the four fruits (i.e. religious attainment) cannot be possible.

Conclusion: if you talk about something having fixed nature, you can't talk about knowing it fully, you can't talk about abandoning it, you can't talk about realizing it, you can't talk about cultivating towards it. Likewise even the four fruits also. If the fruits are there, there is no need to cultivate it. Therefore all these notions will be negated if you attached to the idea of svabhāva.

Verse 28

svabhāvenādhigataṃ yatphalaṃ tatpunaṃ kathaṃ /  
 ākyaṃ samadhigantuṃ syātsvabhāvaṃ parigṛhṇataṃ //  
 是四道果性 先來不可得  
 諸法性若定 今云何可得

Lit: that fruit (spiritual attainment) which has not been attained in term of svabhāva, that one, again, how could it be attained for one who is being attached to svabhāva?

If you try to explain all these things in term of svabhāva, then you have all these problems, ie. spiritual attainment is not possible. The argument is that if that fruit also has a fixed nature. When there is no spiritual attainment, there is no aryapudgala.

Verse 29

phalābhāve phalasthā no na santi pratipannakā /  
 saṅgho nāsti na cetsanti te 'au puruṣapudgalā //  
 若無有四果 則無得向者  
 以無八聖故 則無有僧寶

Lit : In the case of the absence of phala, there would not be those who are abiding in the phala [Stream-entrant, etc], nor destined for that attainment (pratipannakā). If these 8 puruṣapudgalā do not exist, there is no Saṅgha.

Verse 30

abhāvāccāryasatyānāṃ saddharmo 'pi na vidyate /  
 dharma cāsati saṅghe ca kathaṃ buddho bhaviṣyati //  
 無四聖諦故 亦無有法寶  
 無法寶僧寶 云何有佛寶

Lit : Because of the absence of the four Noble truth, the true dharma also does not exist. When there is no dharma and no Sangha, how will the Buddha be?

Nāgārjuna has shown that by insisting that things are fixed, you have denied the four Noble Truths. If you denied it, you destroyed the true dharma. First you denied the Sangha, then I have shown you that, by insisting on the fixed nature, you have destroyed the saddharma. If you destroyed the Sangha and Dharma, how will one become the Buddha? Thus you are destroying the possibility of one becoming the Buddha.

Verse 31

apratītyāpi bodhiṃ ca tava buddhaṃ prasajyate /  
 apratītyāpi buddhaṃ ca tava bodhiṃ prasajyate//  
 汝說則不因 菩提而有佛  
 亦復不因佛 而有於菩提

Lit : For you, it would lead to the consequence that there could be the Buddha even without depending on Bodhi; and for you, Bodhi would be logically possible [i.e. logical fallacy] without even depending on the Buddha.

From the line of argument that Nāgārjuna has shown, you have denied the Buddha. When you have denied the Buddha, but yet there

is a Bodhi, you should be saying logically that you should be implying that there can be Bodhi without the Buddha and there can be Buddha without the Bodhi.

Verse 32

yaꣳcꣳbuddhaꣳ svabhꣳvena sa bodhꣳya ghaꣳannapi /  
na bodhisattvacaryꣳyꣳ bodhiꣳ te 'dhigamiꣳyati //  
雖復勤精進 修行菩提道  
若先非佛性 不應得成佛

Lit : He who is not enlightened in term of self-nature, will not attain the Bodhi by practice of the Bodhisattva way.

### Summarize:

All these result from, if you are thinking that in term of svabhꣳva (by nature so / intrinsically so). There is no possibility of change. When there is no possibility of change, it means no progress is possible. It means there are no four Noble Truths, no triratna, etc. That is the Nāgārjuna's argument in a nutshell.

For Sarvꣳstivꣳdins, though they talked in term of svabhꣳva, it doesn't amount to the denial of all these things, ie. 4 Noble Truths, etc. They still can be changed. [Read Entrance - appendix]

But Nāgārjuna is very strict about the word 'svabhꣳva'. For him, svabhꣳva is something that never changed, eternal, fixed, independent. He argued from that standpoint.

All we can say is that, though it might not be fair by Sarvꣳstivꣳdin, but it would be fair by those who have this kind of notion of svabhꣳva, at least. There were various conception of svabhꣳva, ex. Ātman. Nāgārjuna was from the beginning, not really a Mahꣳyꣳnist, nor Hꣳnayꣳnist. He was concerned with the wrong direction in which these Buddhists were heading for, ie. scholastic argument in Abhidharma, etc., In the process of refining their position and attempting to defeat the opponents, they got arguments from various sources, like Vaiꣳeᣳika, Saꣳkhyꣳ. They were heading towards Ātmavꣳda. That's why, Nāgārjuna wanted to correct that direction. Thus he wrote MMK.

If you want to avoid these problems, what must you do? You must think in term of ꣳnyā. These phenomena are dependently originated (緣生). It denied the metaphysical position. Then everything is possible. That is called the Middle way = the way of ꣳnyatꣳ. Mꣳdhyamika means avoiding extremes. That avoiding extremes consist in understanding things in term of ꣳnyatꣳ.

The end of Mꣳdhyamika

### *MADHYAMIKAS' VIEW TOWARDS AN 'OBJECT'*

*Madhyamika* philosophy was founded by **Nāgarjuna** in 1500 AD. The origin of this school is the result of *Theravāda* teaching. **Buddha** said to **Kaccāyana**, that one extreme is to believe that everything exists and another extreme is that nothing exists. The *Tathāgata* preached the truth from the middle position. Accordingly *Madhyamikas* with the rejection of the theory of moments they introduced the world as illusion – their perception is *sūnyatā*.

**T.R.V. Mūrṭi** states following: „The idealism of *Yogācāra viññānavāda* school had to be understood as a significant modification of the *Madhyamika sūnyatā* on the constructive basis.“

The position of the *Viññānavādins* on an object is that any external object has two different images. The two are:

1. Perceptual image
2. Conceptual image

Perceptual image projects before our eyes. The image is the exact dimensional picture of the object of external world. There is another image which is known as conceptual image. The conceptual image is not as it appears. As far as the theory of knowledge is concerned, the conceptual knowledge cannot be of any service. Therefore, unreal consciousness is the soul-reality. The object is only a mode of consciousness. The external appearance of the object is a transcendental illusion, because of which consciousness is deteriorated into subject-object duality. Consciousness is creative and its creativity is giving illusionary idea of the object. The process of idealism takes place through these three states of consciousness:

- 1) *Alayaviññāna*
- 2) *Kliṣṭamanoviññāna*
- 3) *Pravrtiviññāna*

### 666 MĀDHYAMIKA'S EXAMINATION OF THE FOUR NOBLE TRUTH (ARYASATYA PARĪKĪ)

by Professor Ven. Dhammajoti April 2002 Arranged by <sup>~</sup> Dhammapāla bhikkhu

In many ways, this is one of the most important chapter. First of all, in the earlier chapter, Nāgārjuna did not really explain what he meant by śūnyatā properly. It is in this chapter that he tells us something positive, and shows us how others have misunderstood his notion of śūnyatā, and how śūnyatā is to be properly understood. Hence this chapter is important.

Also in this chapter, we will come across many passages and similes which are aptly quoted by Mahāyānist when they want to explain the Mādhyamika doctrines. Thirdly it is in this very chapter that Nāgārjuna explicitly states his standpoint saying his teaching of śūnyatā is none other than the Buddha's teaching of Pratītya-samutpāda.

This chapter, first begins by stating the opponents' position – those who oppose to his teaching of śūnyatā. What are the reasons? Why are they afraid of teaching of śūnyatā? What do they think is the danger of this teaching of śūnyatā?

Verse 1

Yadi śūnyam idam sarvam udayaṃ na-asti na vyayaṃ /  
 catrīm uryasatyānīm abhivaṃ te prasajyate //  
 若一切皆空 無生亦無滅  
 如是則無有 四聖諦之法

Lit : If this all is empty, there is no arising, no ceasing. For you, there would be the consequence of the non-existence of the Four Noble Truth.

Note : This is a clear objection. The opponents say if you say everything is empty, then all the 4 Noble Truth cannot stand. For the early Buddhists as well as bhidharmikas during that period, all Buddhists are concerned with the 4 Noble Truths – central scheme of doctrine. If someone negates the whole of 4 Noble Truth, then he has negated the whole of Buddhism. The opponents say when you preached the doctrine of  $\text{nyat}$ , you are actually negating the Buddha’s teaching of 4 Noble Truth. The opponents are going to elaborate in the verse 2.

Verse 2

parijñā ca prahñā ca bhñvanā sñkñikarma ca /  
 catñrñm ñryasatyññm abñvñt na-upapadyate //  
 以無四諦故 見苦與斷集  
 證滅及修道 如是事皆無

Lit : The complete knowledge, the abandonment, the cultivation, and the realization is not possible because of the absence of 4 Noble Truth.

dukkha	→ parijñā
samudaya	→ prahñā
nirodha	→ sñkñikarma
mñrga	→ bhñvanā

Parijñā - literally means complete knowledge (/ full understanding 遍知) Another term is called ‘abhisamaya (現觀)’ in connection with the realization of the 4 Noble Truth. It is the direct real spiritual insight.

According to Early Buddhism, liberation comes about when you can realize dukkha directly. There is the understanding face to face (abhi). Most important is the complete understanding in the sense of direct Insight of the 4 Noble Truth. So parijñā is connected with dukkha.

Prahñā – abandoning of the cause. Sñkñikarma – the direct realization of nirodha (the unconditioned). In early Buddhism, it means nibbñna.

In Sarvñstivñda abhidharma, nirodha is not just the absence of dukkha. It means a real dharma that can be realized. Sñkñikarma corresponds to nirodha.

Bhñvanā - cultivation / practice - cultivation of mñrga. So to achieve nirodha, we have to practice mñrga. When you negated the 4 Noble Truth, you also have negated these possibilities that can be perfect insight which enable us to understand dukkha, you have negated the fact that defilements can be abandoned. You have negated the fact that we can reach the goal. There is nothing to realize. And also, since there is no path, there would not be any cultivation of path. Cultivation would make no sense.

By negating these 4, you negate other 4 as well. Go back to verse 1, if all is ññya, there is no arising and no ceasing of dukkha – unsatisfactoriness. When there is no arising, no ceasing, there is no dukkha.

A stanza in Pñli,

Aniccā vata sañkhāra	uppñdavayadhammino
uppajjitvā nirujjhanti	tesaṃ vñpasamo sukho

Lit – All sañkhāra are anicca. They are of the nature of arising and ceasing [*this part is about dukkha*]. Having arisen, they (sañkhāra) ceased, the cessation of that is happy (/ appeasement which is nibbñna).

This gñthñ explains the sañskñra-duñkhatñ. There are 3 duñkhatñ :-

1. dukkha-duñkhatñ
2. vipariññma-duñkhatñ
3. sañskñra-duñkhatñ - all sañskñra in their very nature is dukkha. Sañskñra means anything exist in the universe. Whatever that exist at all, all the 5 skandhas are actually dukkha in their intrinsic nature.

If there is no arising, no ceasing, what are you negated? You have negated dukkha. If there is no dukkha, there is no cause of dukkha, also there is no cessation of dukkha. If there is no nirodha, there is no path to lead to nirodha. In this way, by negating the idea that

there is something arises and ceases, you have negated duḥkha, and as a consequence, you have negated all the other 3 truths also.

In verse 2, says there are 4 also would be negated. These 4 are spiritual life/ practice and realization. You are negating the whole idea that there is invalidity for any one to follow the spiritual life. In this verse 2, the objection is voiced powerfully. Then the opponents continue-

Verse 3

Tat-abhṅvāt na vidyante catvāri śryaphalāni ca /  
Phala-abhṅve phalasthā no na santi pratipannakā //  
以是事無故 則無四道果  
無有四果故 得向者亦無

Lit : Because of the absence of that [parijñā of duḥkha, etc], the 4 Noble fruits also are not found. When these attainments do not exist, there would not be those who are in the attainment.

If there is no spiritual life, if realization is not possible, how can you have steam-entrant, etc? Only when there is a spiritual life, a method is correct, there is a real goal to achieve, then you can talk about this attainment. But you have negated the whole concept of spiritual life and realization. There are altogether 8 śrya-pudgalas - 4 pratipannaka 向 (those who are destined to become) and 4 phala 果.

When the 4 phala are not there, you cannot talk about the 4 pratipannakas. They are the preliminary stage of that attainment. Since the attainment itself is negated, you have negated the other 4 also. So you have negated all the 8 śrya-pudgalas. Then you have negated the whole idea of Saṅgha.

Verse 4

Saṅgha na-asti na cet santi te aṅgau puruṣapudgalā /  
abhṅvāt ca śryasatyānā saddharmaḥ api na vidyate //  
若無八賢聖 則無有僧寶  
以無四諦故 亦無有法寶

Lit : There is no saṅgha. If these 8 puruṣa-pudgala do not exist, because of the non-existence of the noble truth, the true-dharma also does not exist.

Note: when you negate these 4, you have negated the whole of saddharma.

Verse 5

Dharma ca asati saṅghe ca kathaḥ buddhaḥ bhaviṣyate /  
evaḥ trīṇi api ratnāni bruvāṇāḥ pratibḍhase //  
以無法僧寶 亦無有佛寶  
如是說空者 是則破三寶

[ḍvḍh – to harm, to destroy]

[bruvāṇāḥ : pr.p. – who are speaking]

Lit : When the dharma is not existing, and the Sangha [also does not exist,] how will there be Buddha? In this way, you destroyed 3 ratna.

Verse 6

nyatāḥ [bruvāṇāḥ] phala-sadbhṅvam-adharmaḥ dharmam eva ca /  
sarva-saṅvyavahāraṁ ca laukikān pratibḍhase //  
空法壞因果 亦壞於罪福  
亦復悉毀壞 一切世俗法

Lit. [You who are talking about (bruvāṇāḥ)] nyatā, you destroyed the reality of phala (4 phala), and also evil and virtue, and all the worldly conventionality.

Note : Not only you have destroyed 3 ratna, you have destroyed also the idea of dharma and adharma (virtue and evil). Thus you are

negating the virtue and evil. You also negated the conventional way of speaking in the world.

Now Nāgārjuna says all these problems don't belong to him, it is belonged to them. Because they don't understand the meaning of śūnyatā.

Verse 7

Atra br̥hma śūnyatāy na tva vetsy prajojana /  
śūnyatā śūnyatā-ārtha ca tata eva viḥanyase //  
汝今實不能 知空空因緣  
及知於空義 是故自生惱

Lit : Herein, we [Nāgārjuna] say, you do not understand the purpose / usefulness with regard to śūnyatā, you do not understand the meaning of śūnyatā. Therefore, you are thus troubled [*perturbed in your mind*].

Nāgārjuna says, 'you are so worried telling me so many things that I destroyed 3 ratna, the whole of spiritual life, etc' all these come about because you don't understand śūnyatā, the meaning of śūnyatā and its usefulness.

Next, Nāgārjuna is going to explain what he really meant by śūnyatā.

**QUESTION:** EXAMINE WHETHER IT IS POSSIBLE TO COMPARE *TATHĀGATA-GARBHA* CONCEPT IN *MAHĀYĀNA* WHICH EVOLVES CONSCIOUSNESS *SAṂVATTINIKĀ* IN EARLY BUDDHIST TEXTS. (*TATHĀGATA-GARBHA* OR *ĀLAYA VIÑÑĀNA*) (ORIGINAL BY VEN. ANIK CHAKMA)

The *cittamātrīn*(?) of Buddhist philosophy is unique in its fundamental negation.(?) Existence of external objects, meaning object external to mental projection, and its assertion of the inherent existence of subjective consciousness. This basic tenant constitutes the fundamental criteria for identifying an adherent of the school. Further more, this school postulates self-awareness, and different concept of **Buddha** nature than that present in the *Madhyamika* school. This later concept and several concepts are share with the other school of Buddhist philosophy.

Within the *Cittamātrīn* school a division is drawn between what are referred to as the traditional group and the speculative group. The distinguishing factor between the two is that the former accepted three different ultimate attainments for a fractional(?) of any of the three vehicles within this division prostitute(?) to eight categories of consciousness. The former group asserts the existence of eight consciousnesses, namely *Ālaya Viññāna*, translated as the foundation of consciousness which plays a critical role in the philosophy. It is better to focus attention on the rationality behind such a position as introduction of *Ālaya Viññāna* concept. Anyway, various *Mahāyāna* schools define such a concept as a psychic factor to prove rebirth concept. When compared with early Buddhist texts, **the Buddha** has given some hint(?) connection with such a concept but He did not emphasize it as a metaphysical speculation as explained in the text. *Ālaya Viññāna* is a mind with only the five all accompany mental factor surrounding it.(?) Focusing on the five sensual objects it is stable mind mentioning continuity in a stream all the way through the final attainment of omniscience. It has a store of all energies.(?)

In *Abhidhamma Samuccaya* this conscious or *Tathāgata-garbha* appeared in *Mahāyāna* has been described. According to this text in the absence of a stable mind like the *Ālaya Viññāna* migration from one life-time to another would not be tenable. Likewise in the absence of such consciousness other mental process would also not be possible such as the simultaneous emergence of two different consciousness, the greater clarity of the particular consciousness, the forming of imprints of wholesome and unwholesome mental states and experience during the death process. Of these eight reasons in support of *Ālaya Viññāna* the one concerning the impossibility of mental states leading their imprints has been dealt with in great detail with five additional reasons to support it. These five reasons constitute what is called 'the five lines of reasoning' presented in the *Mahāyāna Saṅgraha*. It appeared that such a philosophical position has been dealt necessary mainly to support the interpretation of the universal concept of *kamma* and rebirth. In first case, the fundamental method basis for storing the imprints of action engages in each

pustules/postulates(?) to satisfactory account for different resultant, different situation.(?) In the second case a stable stream of consciousness maintaining its continuity through the ongoing process of life after it seems as indispensable for upholding the theory of rebirth.(?) It would be of value to exchange views on the position of the other school as they contrast with the tenets of this school what philosophical or doctrinal nuances deter this school from taking any attentive stand.

According to adherents of the *Cittamatin* school it is on the basis of *Alaya Viññāṇa* that every instance of consciousness leaves its imprints in the nature of an abstract energy capable of eventual matured(?) into a manifest tangible phenomenon.(?) To be specific the latencies of a prior moment of consciousness serve as the substantial cause both of a later moment of a subjective consciousness and equal its object. Among the different mode of classification of latencies the most popular is the three-fold division by way of their substantial effect.(?)

### **666THE MAHASANGIKA**

There are two groups of Mahasangika School at the two different periods, therefore there is confusion regarding this school. Pali source reveal that Mahasangika and Vajjiputtika branch off from Theravadin and gave right to the Saravastivadin. Bikkhu Purana doubted about the compilation of Buddhist discourse cause the emergent of Mahasangika School. This school appears also to spread to Srilanka, like the Theravadin the earlier Mahasangika believe in the simultaneous comprehension to the truth. According to their view, past and future do not exist while present and nine fold Asanskruta dhamma do not exist.

- (1) Pretisanganiradha(cessation through knowledge)
- (2) Aprasanganirodha(cessation without knowledge)
- (3) Akasa(space)
- (4) Anancata(immovability)
- (5) Kusladhamma Tathata
- (6) Akusladhamma Tathata
- (7) Abheyakata dhamma Tathata

That is such as of dhamma that are moratorium unmeritorious and neither the one no the other.

(8)Maragama

(9)Pratityasa Mutpatha katthata of the factor of the part of the law of dependent, like Theravadin Mahasamgika also believe that Arahant are not subjected to retrogression.

### **666THE MAHASANGIKA SCHOOL**

We find a remarkable division in Buddhist order a century after the Buddha's demise between conservative and liberal thinkers it is in division that gems are treasure of the Mahayana doctrine which the later history of Buddhism influenced much in the field of Theravada's school. Pali, Sankrit and historical, chronicle and Chinese, Tibetan source reveal the reason for this schism occurred in the Buddhist order or dispensation. The ten folds, who presented ten points pertaining to discipline caused for the establishment of new school under the name of Mahasangika we learn further from Kathavathupakarana or Mogaliputtatesathera and the Samavadhoprajacakra of Vashumitra about the ten point presented by Mahasangika which caused conflict between Theravadin and Mahasangika.

They are accordingly:

- (1) singelokapa, the practice of carrying salt in the horn for use when needed.
- (2) Dvanmulikapa: the practice of taking food after midday.
- (3) Gamantara, the practice going to the neighboring village and taking second milk there the same day.
- (4) Avasagapa: observance of uposatha in different place within the same parish.
- (5) Anumikapa: doing an act on obtaining sanction for eat afternoon.
- (6) Ajinakapa: the use of president as authority
- (7) Amitikapa: drinking of milkweed= after milk.

- (8) Galogipata kopa: drinking of palm juice which as not yet today
- (9) Adasakanitisina; the use of borderless sheet to seat on.
- (10) Jataruparajata; the acceptance of gold and silver.

The Mahasangika presented this idea of Vinaya rule because they happen to face with some social problem and their life became uneasy.

In addition to these ten fold rules connected with Vinaya Chinese and Tibetan source reveal the origin of this school is because of Mahadeva five articles of face.

According to bhava vashumitra and Vinindeva and Theranatha, these five articles connected with Arahant are as follow:

- (1) an Arahant may commit the sin under unconscious temptation
- (2) one may be an Arahant and not know it
- (3) an Arahant may not doubt on doctrinal matter
- (4) one can not attain arahantship without the aid of the teacher
- (5) the noble way may be sin with the shout that is one meditating seriously on religion may make such exclamation as how sad and by showing doing attain process toward perfection.

Mahasangika School divides into two divisions as pubbaseliya and abbaseliya. According to the above mention five fold articles according to Yuan Chang Mahadeva enunciate these five dogmas which subjected a bitter controversy among Bhikkhus in the contemporary society various opinions in connection with the Mahadeva idea erupted and it lets for the formation various dogmas at the same time. Some scholars pointed out that the idea of Mahasangika on discipline was not reasoned for the schism. According to them some doctrinal matter connected with the life of Buddha pave the way to emerge various school anyway orthodox Theravadin completely opposed the Mahasangika idea because they may corrupt the basic Buddha's teaching of Mahasangika about the supernatural quality of the Buddha also lead to later Mahayana development it is known as Buddhology which teaching the super human quality of the Buddha which cause the practice of variety of ritual and religious performance.

#### 04.06.07

the principle objective of the Mahasangika in succeeding from the main body of orthodox Buddhist became appearance to us by a glance at the subject matter of the disciplinary rule presented by orthodox monks who also known as Theravadin but it seems that the separation of the Mahasangika from Theravadin seem to be as the result of the doctrinal matter they believe it appears from what has been stated previous that though germ of Mahayana Buddhism are treasurable in the doctrine of Mahasangika school it was afflicted to Hinayana and possessed a Pitaka similar to these of the prominent Hinayan school the Mahasangika claimed for themselves more orthodoxy than Theravadin and believe to have preserved more accurately Pitaka settled by Mahakassapa in the first Buddhist council.

The little that we know about their doctrine from the Kathavathupakarana, the Mahavastu. Vashumitra pointed to two facts that they subscribe to the cardinal principle of Hinayana school. A comparative study of the Mahavastu of the Mahasangika with the Pali Vinaya of Theravadin show the great doctrinal affinity between two schools one of the object commend to both schools the discourse of the Buddha relating to soul theory, Karmic cause and other basic teaching seem to be equivalent the discourse regarding four fold Aryan truth, eight fold path leading to emancipation Padiccasamupada etc. are similar to their interpretation. However the school known as Theravada and Mahasangika differ in their Buddhological speculation and sculleries issuing their form. Profesor Takakusa has shown in his article encyclopedia religious and ethic (vol 4). The way in which the idealisms was carried by the Buddhist giving right to believe of the Mahasangika that Buddha was lokutara(super human) and know worldly attribute(Sarvas dhamma) and moral being popularly known as Sakya gotama was required only for lokutaravada conforming to worldly way) for the benefit fo the world.

The corollary—similarly based on this belief—are that Buddha is omnipotent, speech truth and nothing but truth his Rupakaya (physical body) life, energy and power are limitless he is always self-possess and in Samadhi he has developed various higher version which are helpful to work for the benefit of well-fare of other the Mahavastu reveal much about the potentiality of the Buddha further (Mahavastu vol 1 p.169) the most important doctrine that resulted in this way lays in the theory of the Bodhisatva. The Mahasangika by idealism Buddha had to make room for a class of being called the Bodhisatva who by passing true various trial and by making eminent self sacrifice rose to higher state of Bodhisatvahood. This act as sacrifice as the four fold Cariya (practices) which are known as (1) Prakutacariya, (2) pranithanacariya, (3) Anuloma cariya (4) Anivanacaruya vol 1 p.46) in addition to this practice the ten Bhumis and six Paramita were presented by Mahasangika which paved the way for Mahayana Buddhism.

#### 11.06.07 continue

It was the Bodhisatva who would attain Buddhahood in course of time the Bodhisatva in the various births were believed to be born without passing through the embryonic stage they would not entertain feeling of enmity and hatred (Vihimsa sanna and vyapada sanna) and were about sensual desire (kamasanna). In conformity with the believe they suppose that prince Rahula was self born (uppatika) spontaneous as Bodhisatva could not be subjected to Karma sensual pleasure and thus no sensual intercourse. The attainment of Sakyagotama were regarded them the ideal to be cap in view. According to them it was for the enlightenment of worldly being that Lokutara Buddha adopted the human form to enable people to imitate his e.g. on ultimately attain buddhahood it was the schism between the Mahasangika and Theravadin.

According to the later the final goal of a Buddhist should be Arahanhood and not Buddhahood as it is exceeding rare that Buddha appears in the world ( buddhuppado sutulabho. It is possible for the Buddhist to become Arahan in large number but it is exceedingly difficult to them to attain Buddhahood the plurality of Buddha as well as evident for the first time of the Mahavastu. According to them the final goal of Buddha should be Buddhahood but not Arahanhood in accordance with this principle as also for other reason stated that previously they did not look upon the position of an Arahan as the higher states of sanctification Mahavastu p (232).

It was the Mahasangika who originated the worship of Ceiteya and favor that great religious merit could be acquired by even single circumambulation of a stupa trace of stupa worship are also found in the pali word but as such worship is not in consonance with principle of Theravadin it seem that in later time the former borrow in front the Mahasangika

### **666 HISTORY AND THE DOCTRINE OF THE MAHASANGHIKA**

The Mahasanghika is one of who early schools of Buddhism. The Dipavamsa says that after the 2<sup>nd</sup> Buddhist Council, held 100 years after the Buddha's Parinibbana the Sangha divided into two, one Group, the orthodox group that rejected the dasvatthu coming to be known as Theravadins and those who broke away from them coming to be called Mahasanghikas. The dipavamsa also says that this new breakaway group held a separate Council and formed their own Tripitaka. However, the northern tradition says that this real schism took place sometime after the 2<sup>nd</sup> Council and that not only vinaya problem but also Dhamma problem may have been the cause. The five to points raised by Mahadeva are considered as an important cause for this schism.

Tradition says that Mahasangika say that Ven .Mahakasyapa is their founder. They had their own Canon and its language is mixed Sanskrit. Subsequently the Mahasanghika broke into 7 other schools such as Lokuttaravada, Kaukutika, Bahusrutiya etc. Among which Lokuttaravadins are the best known. They spread into many parts in

Magadha, and took places in Northern, Southern and Eastern India. The different schools seem to have held slightly different views. The major difference between the Mahasanghika and the Theravadin is in their conception of Arahant, the Buddha and the Bodhisattava.

They seem to have considered there was no distinction between the Arahants and the non- Arahants. They also held that Arahant have raga and moha. That Arahant needed other help to attain emancipation. In brief they were of the view that Arahant State is not real emancipation and that Arahants can fall to lower spiritual states.

According to them the Buddha is supra-mandane; his body is also supr-mandane ( lokuttara), and it is the result of part exist; I his created body ( rupa kaya) the buddy could appear anywhere, at any time. They held that he has unique power, his life is unlimited, that his mind is always in mediation, he has no impurities.

Their conception of the Bodhisattava too was different from that of the Theravadin. In accordance with the develop of their Buddha's concept the Bodhisattava considered as a unique being, who has practiced al perfection from innumerable past and that he is destined to Buddha hood. He is no ordinary human being. His conception is the mother's womb, his birth is all considered as unique and miraculous events. They believed that Bodhisattava takes any form of lower existence to help beings. He entered the mother's womb in the shape of a white body elephant. And this is his created body. Further more it is said that this is his mind is totally pure from al defilement. This idea generally influenced the rich of Mahasnghika.

#### **666THE MAHASAMGHIKAS AND LOKOTTARAVADINS:**

The history of Mahasamghikas School goes back to period of 2<sup>nd</sup> Buddhist council. The origin of this school is said to have been the ten point raised by the Vajjiputras. The orthodox elder rejected the ten points on the authority of the Vinaya rules. Then the vajjiputra held a separate council, with a large participation. Therefore, they were called Mahasamghika on the school thus the Dipavamsa informs us that the Mahasamghikas School proposed drastic changes to the Canon that existed during the time of its origins.

We give below the detail of the changes that they introduced to the Canon:

- (1) The opinion that the Mahasamghikas held was that the Abhidhamma was not preached by the Buddha.
- (2) The Mahasamghikas also rejected the Niddesa and the Patisambhidamagga which are in the K.N. of the Pali tradition.
- (3) The Mhasanghikas rejected the Parivara, the 5<sup>th</sup> text of the Pali Viniya Pitaka.
- (4) The Mahasamghikas rejected some of the Jatakas.

The actual position is that while rejecting the six texts of Abhidhamma Pitaka of Theravadins, they composed their own texts and cooperate them in the Abhidhamma pitaka. According to the information available in the sources of Northern Buddhism, the Mahasamghikas accepted not three but five Pitakas. They are Sutra, Vinaya, Abhidhamma, Misra and Dharani. The sources of the modern Buddhism indicate that the reason for convening the 2<sup>nd</sup> Buddhist Council was the five points raised by one of the learned monk lived at that time, Vinitadeva.

The five points that he raised are as follows:

- (1) An Arahant can be seduced by others.
- (2) An Arahant may be ignorant of various matters.
- (3) An Arahanta has doubt.
- (4) An Arahant can take instruction from others.
- (5) One can enter the Buddhist path as the result of words.

The Mahasamghikas are known as the Lokuttaravada on the basis of their effort to elevate the Buddha to supra mundane level. The Theravada tradition believes that the Buddha's too was an Arahant. As reported in the Gopadakamoggana Sutta of M.N. the difference between the Buddha and Arahant is that the former realizes the path first and the later followed by. Accordingly both followed the same path.

In Mahayana Buddhism, the Buddha was elevated to the position of the Supreme Being, supramandance level. Similarly Mahayana Buddhism introduced a new path, full of rites and rituals. It is quite obvious, according to the conical evidence thus the Arahant is not a perfect knowledge. The Arahant are different from one another as far as their spiritual attainment is concerned. For example the Arahants who have developed super knowledge have not experience the absorption of attainment. Similarly arhant who have achieved absorption attainment could not have experience super natural knowledge.

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### **666 THE MAHASAMGHIKAS AND LOKOTTARAVADINS**

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The Mahasamghikas are known as the Lokuttaravada on the basis of their effort to elevate the Buddha's supra mundane labour. The Theravada tradition believes that the Buddha's too was an Arahant. As reported in the Gopadakamoggan Sutta of M.N. the difference between the Buddha and Arahant is that the former realizes the path first and the later followed by. Accordingly both followed the same path. Vinitadeva's five points pave the way for the emergence of a new trend of Buddhism, which was later known as Mahayana.

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**Although Mahayana refers all Buddhist schools as Hinayana, many of its concepts were influenced or even developed out from their teachings. Of all these schools, the most influential was Mahasanghika. Most of the Mahayana important concepts (about 65%) are derived from this school, e.g.**

1. Supramundane nature of the Buddha.

According to Mahasanghika, the Buddha was not simply a historical person. The real Buddha was transcendental, supramundane, eternal and infinite. The historical Buddha was only a fictitious person sent by Him to appear in the world, to assume a human body, to live like an ordinary human being and to teach the Dhamma to the world.

The real Buddha is the Reality or the Dharmakaya and the fictitious Buddha is his Nirmanakaya. Though as Nirmanakaya, his material body was unlimited, pure and extremely beautiful with 32 great marks. He never sleeps nor dreams but is always in Jhanic state. His power is limitless and can comprehend everything and answer all questions in one moment. He preached only the Ultimate Truth. All these concepts became the main doctrines in the Saddharmapandarikasutra, Svarnaprabhasasutra, Avatamsakasutra and many other sutras of the Mahayana.

2. Defects of Arahants and superiority of Bodhisatta.

Mahasanghikas maintain that Arahants are not perfect; they are troubled by doubts and are ignorant of many things. They can be tempted and may even fall away from their attainment. On the other hand, Bodhisattvas are more perfect than Arahants, they are not selfish but altruistic. They are the real sons of the Buddha, so only Bodhisattva is the true ideal to Nibbana. According to Mahavastu, one should perfect oneself with 10 paramitas in a gradual course of Dasabhumi to attain Buddhahood. This was fully accepted in the Dasabhunikasutra and the Bodhisattvabhumi of the Mahayana

According to Mahasanghika, Bodhisattva on the Acala-bhumi are transcendental, as in the case of Siddhartha, he was self-born. He sat cross-legged in the womb and preached to the devas. He was untouched by the phlegm and such other impurities. He came out from the right side of his mother's body without piercing it. This is the theme in Buddhacarita Mahakavya of Asvaghosa.

3. The dignity of Prajba.

Mahasanghika held that empirical knowledge obtains through sense perception cannot give us an insight into Reality. Only Wunyata which transcends all worldly knowledge can give us a vision of the Real. All verbal statements give only false views, they are mere thought-constructs. This becomes the main concept in the Prajbaparamitasutra and the Madhyamika texts.

4. Unsubstantial nature of the Dhamma

Theravada maintained that puggala was unsubstantial, but the 3 dhammas of rupa, citta and cetasika were regarded as real (paramatha). The Mahasanghika maintained that not only puggala but also the dhamma are also unsubstantial, Pudgala-nairatmya and Dharma-nairatmya. This is the central doctrine in Mahayana.

5. The theory of pure mind.

Mahasanghika maintain that the original nature of the mind is pure, it becomes contaminated when it is stained by upaklewa (passions) and agantukarajas (adventitious defilements). This is the prototype of Yogacara.

Historically, the defeats of Arahant advocated by Mahadeva of the Mahasanghika were further developed by the Mahayana. These 5 dogmas which are rejected by the Theravadins in the Kathavatthu became the fundamental doctrines of the Mahayana.

Despite the great influence of Mahasanghika, other schools also contributed for the origin of Mahayana. The Lalitavistara of the Sarvastivada largely influenced the Bodhisattva concept of Mahayana. The 'svabhava' of Sarvastivada and the 'asatkaryavada' of Sautrantika also contributed much for the emergence of

Madhyamika. Furthermore, Sautrantika's conception of 'Bahyarthanumeyavada' also led to the development of Yogacara.

The liberal attitude towards Vinaya, the free interpretation of the Dhamma, speculation of the nature of the Buddha, degrading the status of Arahants, Bodhisatva ideal, practicing of paramita along the Dasabhumi and the using of Sanskrit, which were the characteristics of the Mahasanghikas, were totally followed by the Mahayanists. And since about 65% of the Mahayana doctrines are derived from Mahasanghika, we can say that Mahasanghika had contributed most for the origination of Mahayana.

## **666 EXAMINE THE PHILOSOPHICAL TRENDS IN THE MAHAYANA SUTRA LITERATURE. (1358)**

Traditionally there are 9 main texts from which the philosophical teachings of the Mahayana derived. They are called nava-dharma or Vaipulya sutras, which, are venerated in Nepal. All these texts are not of the same period and they do not belong to one tradition.

### **1. Ashtasahasrika prajba paramita**

Prajba means transcendental knowledge, paramita means perfection and wunyata, voidness. In this text, there are 8,000 verses and it is the most ancient prajba paramita text. This is the only text which, gives the philosophical conception while other Vaipulya texts devote a lot to describe Buddhas and Bodhisattas. Here, prajba is not only a means of knowledge about absolute truth, it describes prajba with regard to Bodhi and Dharmakaya. Prajba is often personified as a goddess. It stresses the doctrine of wunyata and the non-existence of the world of experience. It also describes prajba which, is one of the 6 Perfections in Mahayana.

### **2. Saddharmapundarika**

This is one of the best known Mahayana sutras highly esteem in China and Japan. It is delivered by the Buddha on the Vulture's peak to the Bodhisattas. Here, prominent place is given to describe the beauty (physical), purity, and supra human status of the Buddha. The lotus stands without any contact with the mud which, is compared to the Buddha who does not touch by any defilement in the world. This text consists of 2 sections. The first section while describing the status of the Buddha explains various ways of teaching the law and the eternity of the Buddha. The second part containing spells and many mythological narratives, including a story of a Bodhisatta who burnt himself alive in honour of a former Buddha. There are also mantras which lead to the driving away of spirits. This text contains details of how bhakti-magga was developed. In this text, a Buddha is respected in the same way as Hindu respecting their god Krishna.

### **3. Lativistara**

This describes the life of the Buddha (Sakyamuni) up to the commencement of his mission. There are numerous Buddhas and Bodhisattas with lot of miracles. This book is supposed to have influenced Christian in writing the life about their Christ. According to Rev. Sasanaratna of Moratuwa, the word Lalita is defined as a "game". Prince Siddhartha was born in the miraculous ways e.g. he was coming out from the mother's womb after a white elephant had entered the womb. This book is suppose to have been one of the Sarvastivadins texts and it was later accepted by Mahayanists. Its main characteristic is the expression of Bodhicitta with exaggeration.

### **4. Lavkavatara**

It gives an account of Sakyamuni coming to mountain Malaya in Sri Lanka. King Ravana came to pay his respect and asked for the definition of virtue and vice. This text criticizes Hindu schools as Sankhya pasupata. There are descriptions of Vijbanavada, with special reference to alayavijbana. In the 8<sup>th</sup> chapter, there is a description regarding drawbacks in eating flesh. This book maintains that monks should not eat flesh even under Trikoti parisuddhi. This book also contains description about various mantras to drive away evil spirits. There are also facts about Wunyatavada and we can say that this text belongs to both Wunyatavada and Vijbanavada.

### **5. Svarna-prabhasa**

It means a glitter gold. In many ways, this book resembles the lotus. They are many commentaries written in various traditions both in Chinese and Tibet. From the 1<sup>st</sup> up to the 5<sup>th</sup> chapters, Mahayana principles are included, in the last chapter it describes that by making offering to the Buddha one can obtained good results. The 6<sup>th</sup> chapter is devoted entirely to describe wunyatavada. It is just the same as the Prajba paramita and Saddharmapundarika, so it is clear that it has been influenced by these two texts. Moreover there are Tantric teachings also, some facts are knotty (unclear), they are in the form of hidden meanings. Goddess

Sarasvati is mentioned here as one who gives a mantra to protect people from evil spirits. This text also stresses the supernatural features of the Buddha.

#### **6. Gandavyuha**

The title means 'the structure of the world', which is compared to a bubble. It is also called Avatajsaka sutta in the Chinese. In Tibet Tripitaka, there is a category of books which are also under the name of Avatajsaka. Gandavyuha is only a portion of the larger work of Avatajsaka. In this text we observed that it preaches in a fully developed Mahayana manner. Wunyata and dharmakaya of the Buddha are also mentioned, the Bodhicitta and the doctrine of momentary (kshana sampatti) too are included. Here it explains how prince Sudharna went from village to village to obtain Buddhahood, but was unsuccessful. At the end he met Bodhisatta Mabjusri and got advice from Bodhisatta Samamtabhadra and attained Buddhahood. This text is honoured greatly in Nepal also.

#### **7. Tathagataguhyuka**

Also known as Tathagata-Guna-bana, a Tantra text of the worst category. There is a description about concentration (samadhi) suitable for monks. It also describes with pictures how to worship the Buddha in secret ways and methods and about food that should be taken when doing meditation. There are dharani, mudra and sadhana. It also states that one who wishes to develop concentration (bhavana) should eat flesh of elephant, corpses and dogs. It stresses the importance of the words 'oj huj'. It considered low grade activities as a symbol of worshipping the Buddha e.g., offering make to the Buddha should be done with urine. It also said that those who do bhavana should take food mixed with urine, this text exhibit the influence of Tantrayana.

#### **8. Samadhiraya**

This is a narrative describing different methods of meditation of which Samadhiraja is the greatest and best. At the very beginning it says 'Namo ratnatrayana' (Triple gems). There is a dialogue between Sakyamuni and Candraprabha who is a rich man. This text explains the chief principles of Mahayanism, e.g. khanti prajbaparamita (compassion). It says khanti is the best while dana and sila-prajbaparamitas are not so great as khanti. To cross sajsara one should practice khanti. It gives a prominent place to wunyata. Just like the Lavkavatara, it shows the draw back of eating flesh but saying that there is no harm eating flesh for the protection of life as in case of disease.

#### **9. Dawabhumiwvara**

This text is also included in the Avatajsaka group. It describes the ten stages in the career of the Bodhisatta before he can obtain Buddhahood. In this text, Sakyamuni is temporarily wandering and meet Bodhisatta Vajragrabha. The ten stages are described by the Vajragrabha at a great assembly of gods after the Buddha attained enlightenment in the second week. They are as follows: Pramudita, Vimala, Prabhakari, Arcismati, Sudurjaya, Abhimukhi, Durajgama, Acala, Sadhumati and Dharmamegha.

Various scholars wrote books based on Dawabhumi, Chandrakrithi wrote Madhyamikavatara, Shantideva wrote Shikshasamucchaya, Nagarjuna wrote Dawabhumika vibhasha wastra. Thus this texts became the foundation of various Mahayana writing. There are some ideas bent toward Tantrayana. It was translated into Chinese during the year 300 A.D.

There was an intermediate school between Wunyata and Vijbanavada known as 'Tathagata-garbha'. The earliest Tathagata-garbha text was the Tathagata-garbhasutra. It was composed between 200 and 250 AD. The most important one, however, is the Wrimala-devi Simhanadasutra, composed some time between 250 and 350 AD. These texts advocate that one is 'the embryonic Perfected One' in which the term Tathagata-garbha implies. This 'embryo' is seen as existing within all living beings, indicating that, however deluded or defiled they are, they can mature into Buddhas. This is the most important concept in Mahayana Buddhism.

Mahayana Buddhism can be called the religion of Pure Land as most of its followers aspire to be reborn in the Western Paradise. The teaching of Pure Land as the Buddha-land of Amitabha Buddha are chiefly based on the Smaller Sukhavativyuhasa, the Greater Sukhavativyuhasa and the Amitayurdhyanasutra. The Smaller Sukhavativyuhasa is the oldest one, composed around the 1<sup>st</sup> century BC. These texts teach that by merely chanting the 'Holy Name' of Amitabha Buddha, one will be able to reborn into the Sukhavati, the Pure Land of Amitabha Buddha. There, in the Pure Land, one practices Noble Eightfold Path and all the 37 Bhojjhngas till attain Buddhahood.

### **666 EXAMINE THE PHILOSOPHICAL TREND IN MAHAYANA SUTRA LITERATURE.**

There are 9 main texts from which the teachings of Mahayana derived. They are called Nava-dharma or Vaipulya sutras which are highly venerated in Nepal.

### **(1). Ashtasahasrika prajba paramita**

It comprises 32 chapters with 8,000 syllabic units in prose. It is the oldest of all prajba paramita texts. Subhuti enumerates 18 aspects of wunyata which forms the main theme of the text. Here, prajba is not only a means to Absolute Truth, it is related to Bodhi and Dharmakaya.

### **(2). Saddharmapundarika**

This text describes the physical beauty, purity, and supra human qualities of the Buddha who is compared to a lotus. There are 27 chapters. The first few chapters describe the Trikaya of the Buddha. The last few chapters containing spells and many mythological narratives, including a story of a Bodhisatta who burnt himself alive in honour of a former Buddha. Bhakti cult is the main feature of the text.

### **(3). Lalitavistara—concept of Bodhicitta**

Buddhacarita is the main theme. Numerous Buddhas and Bodhisattas with lot of miracles are mentioned. Prince Siddhartha was born in miraculous ways e.g. he came out from the right side of his mother's body. It belonged to Sarvastivada and was later accepted by Mahayanists. Its main characteristic is the expression of Bodhicitta with exaggeration.

### **(4). Lavkavatara**

It gives an account of Sakyamuni coming to mountain Malaya in Sri Lanka. King Ravana came to pay his respect and asked for the definition of virtue and vice. It maintains that monks should not eat flesh even under Trikotī parisuddhi. Various mantras and concept of wunyata are found. Descriptions of Vijbanavada with special reference to alayavijbana is the main topic.

### **(5). Svarna-prabhasa**

From the 1<sup>st</sup> up to the 5<sup>th</sup> chapters, Mahayana principles are included. In the last chapter it describes that by making offering to the Buddha one can obtain good results. The 6<sup>th</sup> chapter is devoted entirely to describe wunyata. It is just the same as the Prajba paramita and Saddharmapundarika. Tantric teachings are found and Goddess Sarasvati is also mentioned. This text makes a transitory stage to Tantrism.

### **(6). Gandavyuha**

It is a portion of the larger work of Avatajsaka. The most developed Mahayana concepts are found. Wunyata and dharmakaya are mentioned, Bodhicitta and the doctrine of momentary (kshana sampatti) too are included. It describes how Prince Sudharna went from village to village to obtain Buddhahood, but was unsuccessful. At the end he met Mabusri and got advice from Samantabhadra and attained Buddhahood.

### **(7). Tathagataguhyuka**

Also known as Tathagata-Guna-bana. It describes with pictures how to worship the Buddha in secret ways. Methods of meditation are introduced. Dharani, mudra and sadhana are included. It stated that one who wishes to develop concentration should eat flesh of elephant, corpses, dogs and food mixed with urine. It stresses the importance of the words 'oj huj'. Low grade activities are used to worship the Buddha.

### **(8). Samadhiraya**

It explains the chief principles of Paramita. Khanti is the best while dana and sila are not so great as khanti. To cross sajsara one should practice khanti. Different methods of meditation are mentioned, of which Samadhiraja is the best. It gives a prominent place to wunyata. Just like the Lavkavatara, it shows the drawback of eating flesh.

### **(9). Dawabhumiwvara**

This text also belonged to the Avatajsaka group. It describes the ten Bhumis. Sakyamuni while wandering met Bodhisatta Vajragrabha. The ten stages are described by Vajragrabha at a great assembly of gods. Various scholars wrote books based on this text e.g., Chandrakrithi wrote Madhyamikavatara, Santideva wrote Siksasamuccaya and Nagarjuna wrote Dawabhumika vibhasa wastra.

The theory of Sunyata is especially associated with name of Nagarjuna and Madhyamaka school of Buddhism, it is intimately connected with the teaching on paticcasamuppada, is really development of logical implications of the latter. The Theravada also deals with Sunyata but this subject has hardly been taken into serious consideration by scholars of the present day.

The following are some interesting views that have been expressed by noted scholars: Dr.N. Aiyaswamy writes, “suyata is not quite unfamiliar with early Buddhists. Sunyata as an equivalent for dependent origination is quite an innovation of Nagarjuna Dr. Stcherbatsky writes: “term sunyata is an innovation of Mahāyāna, an innovation made necessary by the course of philosophic development.

Its germs are found in Hinayana, but Mahāyāna has given it quite a new interpretation, an interpretation in which the two main schools of Mhayāna radically diverged”.

Three point should be noted: (1) that Sunnata is used in Theravada as an equivalent for (Paticca Samuppada), (2) that sunnata is used in Theravada not only as an equivalent for nature of phenomenal world but also as an equivalent for Nibbana and the absolute, and (3) that conception of sunyata far from being quite a new interpretation, on part of Nagarjuna or of Mahāyāna, represents more accurately only a more detailed statement of logical consequences of Theravada theory of causality and Sunnata.

Mogharajamonavapucchassutta of S.N shows this Theravada usage “It is the contention of the Madhyamikas that the final release is possible only through Sunyata-by giving up of all views, standpoints and predicaments. Majjhimanikaya devotes two suttas for specific consideration of Sunnata, the first of these (called Cula-sunnata-sutta) describes Sunnata as highest attainment that brings about reaches. Sunnata is reality as it is (yathabhucta) the purest (Parisuddha), the highest incomparable (Paramanuttara)

It is noted that “look upon the world as being non-substantial, O Mogharaja, being ever so mindful. One surpasses that by uprooting belief in substantiality. Death does not get hold of him who regard world in this way.” Sn. Verse 1119.

In this regards we can see Madhyamika School emphasizes Sunyata as an equivalent for ultimate reality.

\*Eastern thought started from beyond the concept of Sunyata. Nasadiya Hymn Rg veda. Started by saying that ultimate reality god beyond being and nonbeing (sat and asat). Udalaka was the first thinker to put forward an empirical argument to prove and explain nature of Sunya he takes a bunion seed and break it and shows that there is nothing inside

It is interesting to see that early Buddhism did not have an explicit idea about notion of Sunyata though it has a concept of Sunyata. Once the Buddha advises Mogaraja Sunyato lokam avekassu sunna, it always equal to the absent a soul or anything belong to a soul sunnam atenava attaniyenava. 442

**QUESTION: EXAMINE BRIEFLY THE EVOLUTION OF MAHĀYĀNA BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY UP TO THE THEORY OF EMPTINESS (ŚŪNYATĀ).**

One century after the demise of **the Buddha** there arose many Buddhist schools and they had their own teaching. Many great teachers and great books came into existence as the result of religious, social, philosophical etc. ????. Therefore, now it is accepted that *Mahāyāna* Buddhism came into existence either in the 1<sup>st</sup> century BC or AD and some scholars who studied origin of *Mahāyāna* cite many reasons why *Mahāyāna* developed from *Mahāsaṅghika* schools which were founded by **Nāgarjuna**.

However, there are some teachings in the *Mahāsaṅghika* schools, especially in the *Lokuttaravāda* branch of *Mahāsaṅghika* which later developed in *Mahāyāna*. It seems that there are two distinct features in *Mahāyāna*:

1. Development of *Buddhology* raising the *Buddha* to a superhuman level and making Him the savior of mankind
2. *Bodhisattva* idea

Similarly, the *stūpa* worship which became popular after **the Buddha's** passing away also is considered as a concept of *Mahāyāna*.

Further, *Madhyamika* which was found by **Nāgarjuna** is the one of the most important philosophical school of *Mahāyāna*. The main teaching in *Madhyamika* is *Śūnyatā*. Therefore, here we pay attention about the doctrine of *Śūnyatā* that should be understood. *Śūnyatā* is interpreted in various ways. Generally it is rendered into English as 'emptiness', 'voidness' and 'nothingness'. Such a rendering made *Śūnyatā* to be nihilistic or annihilationist doctrine and such this interpretation have been made during the time of **Nāgarjuna**.<sup>38</sup> In fact, this point is seen from *Mūlamadhyamika Kārika*

38 It is quite evident that teacher is not aware of his words. From these sentences it seems, that during the time of **Nāgarjuna** *Śūnyatā* was rendered to English as 'nothingness' etc. and thus during the time of **Nāgarjuna**, because of this English translation, *Madhyamika* school was considered to be nihilistic. I am sure that even the teacher himself would not approve such a joke.

itself so **Nāgarjuna** had to clearly say that his doctrine of *Śūnyatā* is not *Uccheda* or *Sassatavāda* teaching.

The doctrine of *Śūnyatā* has been so much misunderstood that **Nāgarjuna** warns those who mistake his teaching that would fall into great harm just as one holds a serpent gets destroyed by the serpent itself and *Śūnyatā* is not another view but reality and true nature of all things. According to this he rejected the *svabhāva* (own nature) teaching put forward by *Sarvāstivāda*. So, **Nāgarjuna** point out that the view of *svabhāva* is totally against **the Buddha's** basic teaching of *paṭiccasamuppāda*.

According to *Sarvāstivādins* everything is a *dharma*. This *dharma* has two aspects:

1. *Svabhāva*, a metaphysical aspect which persists during all three periods of time
2. *Karitra*, the activity aspect of *dharma* that is the appearance of the *dharma* in the present time

This *svabhāva* is always present (*sarvaṃ asti*), so **Nāgarjuna** pointed out this *svabhāva* is going against the *aniccatā* teaching of **the Buddha**.

Besides that **Nāgarjuna** denied the teaching of the *Abhidhamma* schools that accepted the existence of *dhamma* and attempted to show that their teaching is not in accordance with the Dependent Origination. For explanation, *Sarve dharmāḥ – Śūnyatā lakṣaṇa* (all the *dhammā* have the character of emptiness). Thus he taught the emptiness of *dhammā* as well as of *puggala* (individual) and *Madhyamika* advocated all *dhammā* as dependent on each other and devoid of their own nature, and such to be emptiness. In this sense **Nāgarjuna** identified *Śūnyatā* with the doctrine of *paṭiccasamuppāda*. In fact this is the real significance of the teaching of *Śūnyatā*.

**QUESTION:** DISCUSS HOW THE *DHAMMĀ* THEORY OF *ABHIDHAMMA* INFLUENCED THE ORIGIN OF *ŚŪNYATĀ* PHILOSOPHY?

*Śūnyatā* is the fundamental teaching taught by **Nāgarjuna** through his *Madhyamika* philosophy. The main work dealing with *Madhyamika* teaching is the *Mūlamadhyamika Kārika* of **Nāgarjuna**. As the concept of *Sūnya* or *Śūnyatā* is clearly presented by **Nāgarjuna**, this term is generally interpreted as 'void' or 'empty'.

**Nāgarjuna** presented this theory and it is clearly seen by the way he presented it through his *Mūlamadhyamika Kārika*. He has shown the main teachings of Buddhism at that time as wrong. These main teachings were about the existence of something, an entity or a substance, some kind of metaphysical entity. It was mainly *Sarvāstivādins* who presented such concept.

The *Sarvāstivādins* put forward the view that all factors constitute the individual and universe that is all *dharmās* have an unseen aspect.(?) This they called '*svabhāva*', the 'own nature'. This 'own nature' or '*svabhāva*' of *dharmās*, *Sarvāstivādins* said to be existing in all three periods of time. This in other words means that *svabhāva* of *dharmās* exists in the past, present and future, that it exists always. Hence, their teaching came to be called *Sarvāstivāda* (that 'all exists'). The *Sautrāntikas*, the other famous Buddhist school, also put forward this kind of substantiality view.

**Nāgarjuna** wanted to point out that these views were against the true teachings of **the Buddha**, who explained that everything is *aniccā* (impermanent). This position was that if everything is *aniccā*, how can these be *svabhāva* or any such thing that persists in all three periods of time. He used the *Mūlamadhyamika Kārika* to show that this interpretation of **the Buddha's** teaching is wrong.

In order to do that he used a method called 'dialectics'. This is a kind of logic through which he showed the internal contradictions of the views put forward by *Sarvāstivādins* and other such schools and demonstrated that those views were wrong, that they contradicted themselves and were merely absurd statements. Hence, this method of argument is referred to in western philosophy as reduction of absurdum, reduction of the opponents view to mere absurdity.

His position is that everything should be viewed as being void, devoid or empty (*sūnya*) of an own nature (*svabhāva*). This means that everything is impermanent and interrelated and therefore without

independent existence and hence without any permanency. He used his dialectical method very effectively to present this theory of *Śūnyatā*.

QUESTION: ENUNCIATE THE MODE OF DEFINITION ON THE CONCEPT OF *NIRVĀNA* IN *MAHĀYĀNA* BUDDHISM

In *Mahāvibhāṣa Sūtra* the etymological meaning of *Nirvāṇa* – *Ni + va* - ‘extinction’, ‘blowing’, ‘moving out’ and the literal meaning is ‘free from craving, passions, attachment etc.’. But it is also called ‘*Tanhakkhaya*’ - the extinction of thirst; ‘*Asankhāta*’ - unconditioned; ‘*Virāga*’ - absence of desire; ‘*Nirodha*’ - cessation. It is impossible to describe *Nirvāṇa* by words. *Nirvāṇa* is the admission of all qualities that is no more stirring of passion. When ‘*vanna*’ means ‘forest’, then *Nirvāṇa* is getting out of the forest of the aggregates.

But **Nāgarjuna** stated *Nirvāṇa* to be without any designation. It is only in conventional or relative terms. Thusw, it is not eliminated, attained, annihilate, eternal, disappeared and originated. Further *Nirvāṇa* is stated as follows:

1. It is *Aprapradradyaya* – it cannot be imported by one to another. One has to realize the truth within oneself and not understand it by listening to the instruction of the *Ārya* (or by listening and speaking).
2. It is *Sanda*, because it has nature, cessation.(?) It is undisturbed by origination or destruction (*Madyavatara Sutra*). It is shown while *Śūnyatā* is taken in the sense of *sabhāva rahitaṃ* (without natural characteristic). The point is that anything having real existence cannot be subject to the causal law so whatever is subject to causal law has no real existence like seed and shroud, then both of them can be described as *Sanda* or *Sabhāvavirahita* or quiescent.
3. It is *Prapañcābhiraprapañcitaṃ*. It is inexpressible (*avecha*), the first *prapañca* is taken as a synonym of speaking. The sense of *Śūnyatā* is not utterable by word.
4. It is *Nirvirya* or unrealizable in concept. Verbal is thought construction, so *Śūnyatā* is beyond thought construction.
5. It is *Ananaratha*, devoid of different meaning. Thus he points out that *Śūnyatā* is not to be taken in the sense of *nasvabhāva* (annihilationism) or *abhāva* as wrongly supported by *Hīnayāna*.<sup>39</sup>

Besides that according to *Mahāyāna* **the Buddha** propounded two truths. One was conventional truth which is ultimately unreal and the other is absolute truth which is ultimately real. **Nāgarjuna** said that without relying on the conventional truth, the absolute truth is not taught, without understanding the absolute truth *Nirvāṇa* is not attained.

According to *Madhyamika* philosophy it is impossible to speak about the absolute truth, to say something about the truth means to determine it, to make the absolute relational(?). Further, 'the unconditioned' is not different from 'the conditioned world', both fall under 'the Dependent Origination' understood as emptiness.

The another point, the term emptiness is used from two points:

1. Empirically it means relativity which is phenomena

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<sup>39</sup> The problem is that there is no *Hīnayāna* and those who use this term are outmoded people (according to book *Zen and the Taming of the Bull* p. 77-78).

2. Absolutely it means reality which is release from duality (*Nirvāṇa*)

Further **Nāgarjuna** holds that there is no difference between *Nirvāṇa* and *Samsāra*, from the absolute truth point of view, both are emptiness. The difference lies only in conventional truth. The same thing, when it is viewed through the glasses of causality is *Samsāra* and when causality is stopped it is *Nirvāṇa*.

In this way the concept of *Nirvāṇa* is clearly understood in *Mahāyāna* Buddhism.

QUESTION: DEFINE THE TERM *MADHYAMIKA* AND EXPLAIN THE EMPTINESS ACCORDING TO THE *MŪLA MADHYAMIKA KĀRIKA*

According to the historical evidence there were eighteen Buddhist schools as the result of four Buddhist councils and previous situations. Basically there were four main Buddhist schools – one of them was *Madhyamika* school. *Madhyamika* originated based on different reasons, such as religious, historical, sociological and philosophical. It was developed within a long period. These reasons are roots of *Mahāyāna* school teaching among the contemporary religions and philosophical background.(?) Later the *Madhyamika* school joined *Mahāyāna* school.

This school was named *Madhyamika* because *Madhyamika* philosophy originated as depending on the Middle Way. They have introduced this name for their tradition by themselves. *Madhyamika* school was the most famous school in the *Mahāyāna* tradition and it has very deep logical system. The *Madhyamika* school's founder was **ven. Nāgarjuna** and he was the great philosopher in that school. he was born in a *Brāhmaṇa* family. He had different views and knowledge than others. He was respected by the scholars of East and West countries.

Later he became a Buddhist monk and he was very famous scholar among the Eastern and Western countries. Most of the scholars accepted that **Nāgarjuna** has written more than fourteen books, most concerning *Madhyamika* philosophy. Among these books *Madhyamika Kārika* was the main book in *Madhyamika* school. It has mentioned basic concepts of the school. **Nāgarjuna** expected to fulfill the virtues, which can be seen in the interpretation of **Buddha's** teaching. Especially he wanted to reply to *Sarvastivāda*, *Sautrāntika* and *Yogācāra* – to their interpretations. The theories of *Sarvastivāda*, *Sautrāntika* and *Yogācāra* were rejected by *Madhyamikas*. *Madhyamika* theory is *śūnyatā*.

According to the *Madhyamika* philosophy, *śūnyatā* 'emptiness'. It is non-existence. They indicated that there is nothing dependent on the world and truth in the ultimate sense. In the *Madhyamika* texts it is explained that there is no difference between the dependent origination, emptiness and evidence-way. **Nāgarjuna** has further mentioned that there is nothing without cause and effect in the world, and in the same way there is nothing in the world without emptiness. *Madhyamika* philosophy includes *paṭiccasamuppāda* or Dependent Origination in origin of itself. There were contemporary religious societies, where four kinds of theory were based on cause and effect.

**The Buddha** has rejected these four kinds of theories in the *Acelakassapa Sutta (Saṃyutta Nikāya)*:  
»*Paṭiccasamuppādaṃ passati so dhammaṃ passati. Yo dhammaṃ passati, so paṭiccasamuppādaṃ passati.*«  
Here the *paṭiccasamuppāda* is explained to realize the *Dhamma* without understanding *paṭiccasamuppāda* is not possible by anyone – therefore, **the Buddha** rejected all those views. The *Madhyamika* school had concept of emptiness in relation with theory of dependent origination in early Buddhism, but in a different way. Consequently they have given a new interpretation to the early Buddhist teachings.

QUESTION: HOW DID THE *MADHYAMIKA* SCHOOL EMPHASIZE *ŚŪNYATĀ* AS THE ULTIMATE REALITY? (ORIGINAL BY VEN. IM DINA & VEN. H. SOVANNY)

The theory of *Śūnyatā* is especially associated with name of **Nāgarjuna** and *Madhyamika* school of Buddhism. *Śūnyatā* is intimately connected with the teaching on the *Paṭiccasamuppāda* and is really the development of the logical implications of the latter. The *Theravāda* also deals with *Śūnyatā*, but this subject has hardly been taken into serious consideration by scholars of the present day. The following are some interesting views that have been expressed by three noted scholars:

**Dr. N. Aiyyasvami** writes: „The *Śūnyatā* doctrine is not quite unfamiliar with the early Buddhists.“

„They take it from *Nairatmya*. *Śūnyatā* as an equivalent for Dependent Origination is quite an innovation of **Nāgarjuna**.“ (**Karatalaratna, P.i**)

**Dr. Stcherbatsky** writes: „The term *śūnyatā* is an innovation of the *Mahāyāna*, an innovation made necessary by the course of philosophic development. Its germs are found in the *Hīnayāna*, but the *Mahāyāna* has given it quite a new interpretation, an interpretation in which the two main schools of the *Mahāyāna* radically diverged.“ (*Madhyananta, Vibhaṅga P.V.*)

**Dr. N. Dutt** writes: „The *Sarvāstivādins* are also responsible for the addition of the fourth term, *śūnya* to the usual trio viz. *dukkha*, *anitya* and *anātma*, though the word conveyed no *Mahāyānic* meaning as it connoted no other sense than *anātma*.“ (*Aspects of Mahāyāna Buddhism*, p. 26)

To be more precise to prove

1. That *suññatā* is used in *Theravāda* as an equivalent for Dependent Origination (*Paṭiccasamuppāda*)
2. That *suūūatā* is used in the *Theravāda* not only as an equivalent for the nature of the phenomenal world but also as an equivalent for *Nibbāna* and the absolute
3. That the conception of the *suññatā* is far from being quite a new interpretation

on the part of **Nāgarjuna** or of the *Mahāyāna* represents more accurately only a more detailed statement of the logical consequences of the *Theravāda* theory of causality and *Suññatā*.

„It is the contention of the *Madhyamikas* that the final release is possible only through *Śūnyatā* – by the giving up of all views, standpoints and predicaments.“ (**T.R.V. Mūrti**, p. 269)

The *Majjhima Nikāya* devotes two *suttas* for the specific consideration of *suññatā*. The first of these (called the *Cūlasuūūatā Sutta*) describes *suññatā* as the highest attainment that brings about reaches(?). *Suññatā* is reality as it is (*yathā bhūta*), the purest (*pārisuddha*), the highest incomparable (*paramanuttara*) and above change (*avipallatha*).

It is noted: „Look upon the world as being non-substantial, O **Mogharāja**, being ever so mindful. One surpasses that by uprooting belief in substantiality. Death does not get hold of him who regards the world in this way.“ (*Saṃyutta Nikāya*, verse 1119) In this regards we can see *Madhyamika* school emphasizing the *Śūnyatā* as an equivalent for the ultimate reality.

QUESTION: HOW DID THE *MADHYAMIKA* SCHOOL EMPHASIZE *ŚŪNYATĀ* AS THE ULTIMATE REALITY?

*Śūnyatā* is the fundamental teaching of *Madhyamikas*. There was a school of thought that considered *Śūnyatā* purely as a *Mahāyāna* teaching, not found in early Buddhism. They even went to the extent of saying that „*Śūnyatā* emphasises revaluation of early Buddhist teaching.“ There is another new school of thought, where it is said, that *Śūnyatā* is nothing new, it is found in early Buddhism – this is not a *Mahāyāna* teaching. According to them **Nāgarjuna** presented *Śūnyatā* to take back Buddhism to the original teaching of **the Buddha**. **A.K. Warder, David J. Kalupahana, Asanga Tilekeratna** and many others are of this view.

There are twenty modes of *Śūnyatā*. They are:

1. The unreality of 'internal elements of existence' (*adhyatmaśūnyatā*)
2. The unreality of the 'external objects' (*bāhirdhaśūnyatā*)
3. The unreality of both together as in the sense-organs (*adhyatmabāhirdhaśūnyatā*)
4. The unreality of unreality (*śūnyatāśūnyatā*)
5. The unreality of the 'great' (*mahāśūnyatā*)
6. The unreality of the 'ultimate reality', *Nirvāṇa* (*paramarthaśūnyatā*)
7. The unreality of the 'conditioned' (*saṅskṛtaśūnyatā*)
8. The unreality of the 'unconditioned' (*asaṅskṛtaśūnyatā*)
9. The unreality of the limitless (*atyantaśūnyatā*)
10. The unreality of that which is beginningless and endless (*anāvaragraśūnyatā*)
11. The unreality of the 'undeniable' (*anāvakaraśūnyatā*)
12. The unreality of the 'ultimate essences' (*prākṛtiśūnyatā*)
13. The unreality of 'all elements of existence' (*sarvadharmāśūnyatā*)
14. The unreality of all determination (*lakṣaṇaśūnyatā*)
15. The unreality of past, the present and the future (*anupāmbhaśūnyatā*)
16. The unreality of 'relation or combination conceived as a non-ends' (*abhavasvabhavaśūnyatā*)
17. The unreality of the 'positive constituents of empirical existence' (*bhavaśūnyatā*)
18. The unreality of the 'non-empirical' (*abhavaśūnyatā*)
19. The unreality of 'self-being' (*svabhāvaśūnyatā*)
20. The unreality of 'dependent being' (*parabhavaśūnyatā*)

Some teachings are in the *Mahāsaṅghika* schools especially in the *Lokuttaravāda* branch of *Mahāsaṅghika* which are later developed in *Mahāyāna*. The main teaching in it is *śūnyatā*. Generally it is rendered into English as 'emptiness', 'voidness' and 'nothingness'. Such renderings made this to be a nihilistic doctrine. Such interpretations have been made during the time of **Nāgarjuna**. In fact, this is seen from *Mūlamadhyamika Kārika* itself. **Nāgarjuna** had to clearly say, that his doctrine of *śūnyatā* is not *uccheda* (nihilistic) teaching.

The doctrine of *śūnyatā* has been so much misunderstood, that **Nāgarjuna** against(?) those who have mistaken his teaching that fell into a great harm just as one who holds a serpent gets destroyed by the serpent itself.(?) **Nāgarjuna** says: *Śūnyatā* is not another view and it has the reality and true nature of all things. "According to this, he rejected the *svabhāva* – 'own nature' teaching put forward by the *Sarvāstivāda*. So, **Nāgarjuna** pointed out the view of *svabhāva* as totally against the **Buddha's** basic teaching of impermanence.

Similarly, it contradicts the *paṭiccasamuppāda* doctrine, which is another way of explaining *aniccatā*. *Paṭiccasamuppāda* clearly shows the relativity of everything, that there is nothing independent and hence everything void (*sunya*) of anything permanent.(?) In this sense **Nāgarjuna** identified *śūnyatā* with the doctrine of *paṭiccasamuppāda*. In fact this is the real significance of the teaching of *śūnyatā*. It shows that everything is relative and therefore devoid of any *svabhāva*. Hence, *śūnyatā* means that everything is *svabhāva-sunya*.

## 666 HOW DID THE MADDHYAMAKA SCHOOL EMPHASIZE SUNYATA AS THE ULTIMATE REALITY?

The theory of Sunyata is especially associated with name of Nagarjuna and Madhyamaka school of Buddhism. Sunyata is intimately connected with the teaching on the Paticcasamuppada and is really the development of the logical implications of the latter. The Theravada also deals with Sunyata but this subject has hardly been taken into serious consideration by scholars of the present day. The following are some interesting views that have been expressed by three noted scholars: Dr. N Aiyaswamy writes, "The Sunyata doctrine is not quite unfamiliar with the early Buddhists.

They take it for Nairatnya, Sunyata as an equivalent for dependent origination is quite and innovation of Nagarjuna". (karatalaratna, P.i). Dr. Stcherbatsky writes: "the term Sunyata is and innovation of the Mahāyāna,

an innovation made necessary by the course of philosophic development. Its germs are found in the Hinayāna, but the Mahayana has given it quite a new interpretation, an interpretation in which the two main schools of the Mahayana radically diverged”. (Madhynanta. Vibhanga P. V.). Dr. N. Dutt writes; “the Sarvastivadins are also responsible for the addition of a fourth term, sunya, to the usual trio, Viz, Dukkha, anitya and anatma, though the word conveyed no Mahayanic meaning as it connoted no other sense than anatma” (Aspects of Mahayana Buddhism, P.26).

To be more precise to prove (1) that Sunnata is used in Theravada as an equivalent for dependent origination (Paticca Samuppada), (2) that sunnata is used in the Theravada not only as an equivalent for the nature of the phenomenal world but also as an equivalent for Nibbana and the absolute, and (3) that the conception of the Sunyata far from being quite a new interpretation, on the part of Nagarjuna or of the Mahayana, represents more accurately only a more detailed statement of the logical consequences of the Theravada theory of causality and Sunnata.

“It is the contention of the Madhyamikas that the final release is possible only through Sunyata by the giving up of all views, standpoints and predicaments. (T. R. V.Murti, P.269). The Majjhima Nikaya devotes two suttas for the specific consideration of Sunnata. The first of these (called the Cula Sunnata Sutta) describes Sunnata as the highest attainment that brings about reaches. Sunnata is reality as it is (Yathabhucca) the purest (Parisuddha), the highest incomparable (Paramanuttara) and above change (avipallatha).

It is noted that “look upon the world as being non-substantial, O Magharaja, being ever so mindful. One surpasses that by uprooting belief in substantiality. Death does not get hold of him who regards the world in this way.” Sn. Verse 1119. In this regard we can see Madhyamika. School emphasizes the Sunyata as an equivalent for the ultimate reality.

#### THE CONCEPT OF EMPTINESS (ŚŪNYAM AND ŚŪNYATĀ)

This term '*sūnyam*' can be translated as 'empty', 'devoid', 'nothing' and 'non-existent'.

Emptiness, openness, nothingness, non-substantiality and inexhaustibility have been used to translate *Śūnyatā*. These two terms of nature important in Buddhism have been used to express a philosophical idea of later developed Buddhist scholastic philosophy. As general religious(?) *Sūnyam* and *Śūnyatā* are used as an attempt to indicate and incite an awareness of the way things really are (*yathābhūtam*).

The complexity of the concept expressed as emptiness derives from the recognition in Buddhism, that teachings of the truth about life is an agent for alleviating suffering, but that implicit in thinking and speaking resides a tendency to create an illusion.(?) The teaching of the emptiness of things is a medicine for spiritual illness. It is a response to a universal problematic condition that is found in ordinary life. Different Buddhist schools have recognized the value of different interpretations of *śūnyatā*. There is a clear recognition that the notion of emptiness is closely tied to the practice of non-existence of things.

*Madhyamika* school held that all things are empty because they originated and still exist according to the theory of causality. **Nāgarjuna** is often regarded as the founder of the *Madhyamika* school. His major writing *Mūlamadhyamika Kārika* includes a summary of eight negations that have epitomized the emptiness teaching:

1. No origination
2. No dissipation
3. No permanence
4. No ending
5. No differentiation
6. No identity
7. No coming
8. No going

Throughout this world **Nāgarjuna** analyses basic philosophical notions, for example causal condition, time, self, *Tathāgata* and *Nirvāṇa*.

1. The *Tathāgata* exists after death.
2. The *Tathāgata* does not exist after death.
3. The *Tathāgata* exists and does not exist after death.
4. The *Tathāgata* neither exists nor non-exists after death.

**Nāgarjuna** claimed that none of these statements are successful to explain the nature of fully Enlightened One. So, the language that we use is relative. Therefore, everything is empty. He shows that non-existence is the sense of self-sufficient existence (*svabhāva*) and that it is empty.

At the same time he demonstrates that all things exist, because emptiness is the same as dependent co-origination (*paṭiccasamuppāda*). Conventional experience divides the world into likes and dislikes, desires and fears, and you and me are separate emptinesses. This type of fact that this perception can exist only in interrelationship.(?) To perceive through the deep avoidances of emptiness people must avian(?) of how they construct attachment and fears while perceiving, conceptualizing and judging.

**QUESTION:** EXPLAIN THE ANALYSIS OF ŚŪNYATĀ ACCORDING TO PAṬICCASAMUPPĀDA

*Śūnyatā* is generally translated to English as 'emptiness'. Many scholars consider this emptiness to mean 'nothingness'. This gives the idea that this concept denotes nihilism. The term is used by **the Buddha** himself in *suttas* in the *Suttanipāta*. **The Buddha** used the term to mean the absence of any substance, any entity or soul. So, as **the Buddha** used *suñña*, means without or devoid of any soul or substance.

**Nāgarjuna**, the founder of *Madhyamika* philosophy, which puts forward the *Śūnyatā* idea says his teaching is not a kind of nihilism. Some modern scholars point out that **nāgarjuna** was also using the term in the same sense as **the Buddha** did.

If so, *sūnya* means something like *anattā*. This means in other words it means taht everything is impermanent (*anityā/aniccā*). So, what is impermanent is explained in Buddhism as Dependently Arising. That is arising due to the presence of certain causes and conditions. Similarly, when these causes and conditions are not there, they too disappear. This shows that everything is without an underlying substance that persists and prevails throughout without changing. Therefore, everything is related to other things.

This relativity is called *Paṭiccasamuppāda*. All things according to Buddhism are dependently arising (*Paṭiccasamuppāda*). The core of *Paṭiccasamuppāda* teaching is taht there is no abiding 'thing' that lies underneath or behind phenomena. There is 'no soul' behind the five aggregates. The five aggregates rise and fall depending on each other. The whole universe is 'empty' (*suñña*) of an entity or a substance that exists permanently without being subject to changes.

Then, it is seen taht the theory of *Śūnyatā* and *Paṭiccasamuppāda* are not different from each other. In ignorance(?) they bring the same idea, but is too different perspective.(?) Both these are not nihilistic views. They emrely bring out the relative nature of phenomena.

**QUESTION:** WITH REFERENCE TO THE INTEPRETATION OF THE CONNECTION BETWEEN THE CAUSE AND EFFECT, EXPLAIN HOW THE *MADHYAMIKA* TRADITION AND *YOGĀCĀRA* TRADITION DIFFER FROM EACH OTHER?

*Madhyamika* school, which is *Mahāyāna*, is said to have originated in the second century AD. The founder of this school was **Nāgarjuna**.

**The Buddha** gave all His explanations about the world and man on basis of Dependent Origination. *Madhyamikas* also did the same contribution to Buddhsim, but their teaching in explaining ideological and philosophical problem arose among Buddhists themselves.

Thus, they taught emptiness of *dhammā* as well as of *puggala* (individual). *Madhyamikas* advocated the relative existence of

things. According to them, *dhammā* are dependent on each other. *Dhammā* are devoid of their own nature, therefore, they are empty and dependent on each other. So, *Madhyamika* philosophy is based on concept of *Śūnyatā*, which is the characteristic of phenomena denying the *Vijñānavāda* (idealistic concept) and *Sarvāstivāda* (realistic concept) and teaching the relative existence of things. He (**Nāgarjuna**) says, that emptiness is the characteristic of all the phenomena. There are 3 main sources contributing to the doctrine of *Yogācāra*:

1. Tradition of meditators
2. Even *Madhyamika* up to some extent, the doctrine of unreality of external world
3. *Abhidhamma* doctrines, particularly *Sarvāstivāda*, *Sautrāntika*, *Vātsīputrīya* and *Sammītiya*.

Historically *Yogācāra* came about as party(?) in reaction to version of *Śūnyatā* and Middle Way preached by *Madhyamika* school. Therefore, for *Yogācāra*, *Śūnyatā* is not emptiness. It is an absolute, ontological entity. That *Śūnyatā* is absolute is revealed by removing illusion.

In *Yogācāra*, there had been always a perception error. *AlayaVijñāna* is the constructor. It is responsible for all our phenomenal, empirical experience. It manifests into division of subject and object, that is due to our conditioning forces that bifurcate into subject and object.

For *Yogācāra* school, situation is peculiar. All three *Vijñānas* are momentary. *Alaya* is not one unchanging consciousness persisting throughout duration of evolutionary process. It is a stream of discrete moments' flow on like a current of a river with perpetual succession of *vasanas*(?) of different *karmas* and further effects of them.

In *Yogācāra* nature of consciousness is understood in an entirely new light. The subjective is not a passive spectator of what goes on before it, but it is the dynamic will which creates its contents.

#### *PAṬICCASAMUPPĀDA* (DEPENDENT CO-ORIGINATION) (ORIGINAL BY VEN. SUMITRA) (FEBRUARY 2006)

According to the Pāli-English Dictionary the word *Paṭiccasamuppāda* is:

1. Arising on the ground of a preceding cause happening by way of cause.
2. Working of cause and effects
3. Causal chain of causation
4. Causal genesis, dependent origination
5. Theory of the twelve causes

This term is a unique word in Buddhism which arised from the Buddhist critique of Indian theories of causality. It states that events are not predetermined nor are they random and it rejects notions of direct causation. The common formula of *Paṭiccasamuppāda* is as follows:

„This being, that becomes,

From the arising of this, that arises,

This not being, that does not become,

From the ceasing of this, that ceases.“ (*Samyutta Nikāya*)

In early Buddhism we find another formula which expresses the whole process of human being:

1. With ignorance as condition mental formation arises (*avijjā*)
2. With mental formation as condition consciousness arises (*saṅkhārā*)
3. With consciousness as condition name and form arise (*viññāṇa*)
4. With name and form as condition sense gates arise (*nāma-rūpa*)
5. With sense gate as condition contact arises (*salāyatana*)
6. With contact as condition feeling arises (*phassa*)
7. With feeling as condition arises craving (*vedanā*)

8. With craving as condition arises clinging (*taṇhā*)
9. With clinging as condition becoming arises (*upādāna*)
10. With becoming as condition birth arises (*bhava*)
11. With birth as condition aging and death arises (*jāti, jarā-maraṇa, sokaparideva dukkhadomanassa*) etc.

*PAṬICCASAMUPPĀDA (FEBRUARY 2006)*

*Paṭiccasamuppāda:*

- |  |   |
|--|---|
| 1. Ignorance ( <i>avijjā</i> )           | 7. Feeling ( <i>vedanā</i> )                |
| 2. Mental formations ( <i>saṅkhārā</i> ) | 8. Craving ( <i>taṇhā</i> )                 |
| 3. Consciousness ( <i>viññāṇa</i> )      | 9. Clinging ( <i>upādāna</i> )              |
| 4. Name and form ( <i>nāma-rūpa</i> )    | 10. Becoming ( <i>bhava</i> )               |
| 5. Six sense gates ( <i>salāyatana</i> ) | 11. Birth ( <i>jāti</i> )                   |
| 6. Contact ( <i>phassa</i> )             | 12. Aging and death ( <i>jarā maraṇaṃ</i> ) |

The *Paṭiccasamuppāda* with its twelve links starting with ignorance and ending in aging and death shows how man being fettered wanders in *saṃsāra* birth after birth but by getting rid of these twelve factors man can liberate himself from suffering and rebirth. **The Buddha** has taught the way to put an end to this repeated wandering. The arising of the *dukkha* is taught by *anuloma* (regular) way of *Paṭiccasamuppāda*. The other way to the ceasing of suffering is formulated to *paṭiloma* formula - „Through this entire cessation of ignorance ceases, mental formation ceases... through the cessation of birth cease aging and death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief and despair. Thus this whole mass of suffering ceases.“

The general formulation has two very well known applications. The first application to suffering is known as the Four Noble Truths:

1. *Dukkha* – There is suffering. Suffering is an intrinsic part of life and also experience as dissatisfaction thus contains unhappiness, impermanence etc.
2. *Samudaya* – There is a main cause of suffering which is attachment or desire
3. *Nirodha* – There is a way out of suffering which is to eliminate attachment and desire.
4. *Magga* – The path that leads out of suffering is called the Noble Eightfold Path.

The other application is to the(?) river(?) process and it is known as the twelve *nidānas* or the twelve links of conditioned existence. In this application of *Paṭiccasamuppāda* is linked as condition preceding one, and itself ???

## **666**FOUR REALITIES

According to the Abhidhamma existence is a process of mental and physical states which arise and perish momentarily as causes conditions and effect. The world which appears as a unity is a plurality of constituents in reality. These are real elements of existence because they are results of analyzing the things in the world. They are real as they can not be further analyzes into any other reality. In the Theravada Abhidhamma this real elements as existence are classified into three and with the final goal of Buddhism it becomes four those are four realities.

### **1-Citta**

2-Cetasika

3-Rupa

4-Nibbana

Citta, Cetasika and Rupa never exist independently. They are depending on each other. Mind and mental concomitance (Citta and Cetasika) have four kinds of relationships. They are:

1-Arise together

2-They perish together

3-They take same objects

4-They arises the same sense-organ.

Mind and mental concomitance always arise in connecting with physical senses of the body. Therefore mind and form never exist separately.

\* Citta:

The term Citta explains with different words as Vinnana, Citta, Mana. According to the Atthasalini it has explained the Citta as “consciousness (Citta) is so called because of its variegated nature. Mind (Mano) is so called because it knows the measure of the objects. Mental action (Manasika) is just mind”.

Consciousness, explains in various based above, has been classified into 69/121 types in almost all the Theravada Abhidhammic texts. One moment of consciousness comprises three moments’ four stages namely nascent (Uppada) static (Thiti) cession (Bhanga) The time living has been given according to a statement in the discourses, the non-material disappears quicker than the material.

Cetasika

The form Cetasika is used fin the sense of a originating in consciousness accompanied with consciousness. Cetasika is not something different from consciousness that comprises characteristic of it. Cetasika arise and perishes with consciousness, they have the same object and basis as consciousness. In the analyses of the aggregates, Vinnana (Consciousness) represents “Citta’ in Abhidhammic specification. Vedana, Sanna and Samkhara represent the Cetasikas.

Rupa- (Matter)

The Abhidhamma concept of Rupa represents the physical aspect of the person or individuals and the world of experience. The common definition of Rupa, as stated in the canon as well as in the commentary is “Matter” (Rupa) means that which is subjected to molestation. Here molesting means becoming transformed with the effect of cold, heat, etc that means arising in another form when

opposite condition such as cold and heat are present. Rupa, comprising two groups, primary (Bhuta) and secondary (Upadana). Rupas are twenty eight (28) in numbers. Among the 28 Rupas only the first 18 can be considered as real Rupa\_Dhammas.

- 1-Essential material qualities – Patavi, Apo, Tejo, Vayo.
- 2-Sensitive material qualities -Ckkhu, Sota, Shana, Jivha, Kaya
- 3- Material qualities of sense -Field \_Rupa, Sadda, Ganda, Rasa.
- 4- Material qualities of sex -Purisatta, Ittatta.
- 5- Material qualities of bases -Itadaya vatttu.
- 6- Material qualities of life -Rupa – Jivitindriya.
- 7- Material qualities of nutrition \_Kabalinkahara.
- 8- Material qualities of Limitation -Akasa.
- 9- Material qualities of communication -Kayavinnafti.
- 10- Material qualities of plasticity -Lahuta, Muduta, Kammannuta.
- 11- Material qualities of salient feature - Upacaya, Santati, Karata, Aniccata.

Nibbana\_(Arupa)

The Abhidhammic interpretation of Nibbana the final goal of Buddhism, somewhat differs from the descriptions of the early discourses. In the early discourses, Nibbana is described as complete detachments from defilements words of negation are mostly used. In Abhidhammic interpretation, the commentators have made an attempt to describe it in a positive way thereby cauterizing it as a real Dhamma.

According to the passage the first characteristics of Nibbana is to be realized by wisdom of four paths. The second is, it becomes an object to the path and fruits. The two divisions of Nibbana are **Sopadisesa and Nirupadisesa**

**Question: As a result of interpreting the five aggregates, Abhidhamma were compiled, discuss.**

material disappears quicker than the material.

#### ***ABHIDHAMMIC DHAMMAVĀDA AND ITS CONTROVERSIES (ORIGINAL BY VEN. SĪLADĪPA)***

**Buddha** delivered his teaching on different occasions, on different purposes and to different individuals. Therefore the deliverances of **the Buddha** were not systematized. The *Abhidhammikas* wanted to systematize the teaching of **the Buddha**. *Abhidhammikas* paid their attention on early Buddhist teaching, there **the Buddha** classified the individual.(?) Those classifications are:

1. Five aggregates
2. Twelve bases
3. Eighteen elements
4. Five senses
5. Six senses

Depending on these classifications, *Abhidhammika* introduced new teaching called 'four ultimate realities'. Those also came into being as a result of giving definition to the early Buddhist teaching, the five aggregates (*dharma*). With these classifications there arose controversy among the Buddhist schools.

In early Buddhism, it analyzed the individual. This analysis was followed by the *Abhidhammikas* in *Hīnayāna*. The texts – *Dhmmasaṅganī*, *Vibhaṅga*, *Dhātukathā*, *Puggalapaññati* and *Yamaka*. Through these

texts they have proved that there is nothing which can be available as permanent (*ātma*). And also they wanted to prove that nothing can exist alone. All those are existing dependent on each other. In another words, the existence of the individual is a psycho-physical combination. To prove these tasks they made the *Pakarana* four(?) *Paṭṭhāna*. In *Paṭṭhāna*, following the cause and effect theory they synthesized the individual. Because of that theory it is highly accepted that nothing can exist alone. All the things are dependent on each other.

Even though through analyses and syntheses, the *Ahidhammikas* showed the real nature of the individual. Some of the schools were not satisfied with that theory given by *Abhidhammikas*. Those schools were :

1. *Sammūtiyas (Puggalavādins)*
2. *Sarvastivāda*
3. *Sautrāntika*
4. *Vibhajjavāda*

*Sammūtiya* school mentioned the existence of the *puggala*. This *puggala* would transmigrate from life and life until the individual attains the *Nibbāna*. *Sarvastivādins* mention that the five aggregates as a whole are transmigrating from life to life. And it ceases with the attainment of *Nibbāna*. *Sautrāntika* (those who were dependent on *suttas*, the discourses delivered by **the Buddha** himself) mentioned that what **the Buddha** taught was correct while the other things were wrong.

*Vibhajjavādins* also followed the same method used by **the Buddha** for the classification of individual. Therefore these schools have gone against the interpretation given on individual.

These controversies pointed were discussed in *Kathāvathu Pakarana* which was composed by **ven. Moggaliputtatissa Thera**. In the text the controversy points made by the other schools were defeated.

#### 666 *BUDDHIST MYSTICISM IN MEDITATION*

Meditation is one of the dominant mysticism in Buddhism, leading to a complete concentration of mind, ‘one-pointedness’ or absorption (Samadhi). Attention is progressively withdrawn from outer things, so that a man may become entirely unconscious of them, and may thus enter into a state of trance. It is said that the Buddha was once so absorbed while walking in the open air that he was altogether unconscious of a thunderstorm, in which two farmers were struck by lightning. In Samadhi at its highest point the consciousness of self disappears along with that of the outer world. It is the culmination of the eightfold path which leads to Nirvana.

The scriptures speak of different spheres of being. There are three great spheres of cosmic existence. The first and lowest is Kama-loka, the world of desire or sense. Above this is Rupa-loka, the world of form, in which there is a subtle residue of matter, so that its occupants possess the powers of sight and hearing but not the senses of touch, taste and smell. Beyond this is Arupa-loka, the formless world, in which there is no residue of matter, although its inhabitants are still subject to the limitations of cosmic existence and yet free from the Samsara.

To rise above the level of the sense-world and to enter the world of form, it is necessary to pass through four stages of meditation and trance and to overcome what are known as the five ‘hindrances’. The Rupa jhanas have been described as ‘mystic raptures’. The distinctive feature of mystical experience is the consciousness of the transcendent – the immediate awareness of supreme Reality. The four trances may, indeed, lead to a higher plane of being, but their characteristic quality is subjective.

The four Rupa jhanas are succeeded by certain exceedingly subtle states of consciousness corresponding to the planes of the formless world. In formless world, through the practice of trance they are said to attain certain supernormal faculties – for instance, of creating a mind formed body, the power of hearing distant sounds and of reading the minds of others, the memory of one’s own past lives, the power to read the history of other beings – to see their passing away and rebirth. They are regarded as a by-product of meditation.

The formless world is not ultimate. Craving for life in that world is a fetter from which man must seek release. In the Udana, Nirvana is described as a plane not only beyond the level of physical experience, but beyond the place of infinite space, of infinite consciousness, of nothingness and of neither consciousness nor non-consciousness. It is said that on the last night of his life the Buddha himself, having passed through the four Rupa jhanas and the four Arupa jhanas, entered this plane of being. He says himself, referring, no doubt, to his own experience of enlightenment, under the Bo- tree: "I reached in experience the Nirvana which is unborn, unrivalled, secure from attachment, undecaying and unstained. This condition is indeed reached by me whom am deep, difficult to see, difficult to understand, tranquil, excellent, beyond the reach of mere logic, subtle and to be realized only by the wise."

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### TANTRAYĀNA (TANTRISM, MEDITATIONS) (2009)

- 1) Yoga
- 2) Sense pleasure

*Ūśmata yoga*

Introduction to *Tantrayāna*

*Tantrayāna* developed by following *Mahāyāna* and *Hīnayāna* traditions. The tradition emerged in India. Because of that, Hinduism was followed by the Tantric monks. As a result of that, they have added some deities and mysterious deeds to the *Tantrayāna*. According to the *Theravāda* tradition there are three bodies, such as:

- a) *Sammā Sambuddha*
- b) *Pacceka Buddha*
- c) *Arahats*

The fully enlightened *Buddha* can attain it only individually. But he can explain the *Dhamma* to the others. *Pacceka Buddha* also attained the enlightenment individually, but he cannot preach the *Dhamma* to the others.<sup>40</sup> Therefore, both *Sammā Sambuddha* and *Pacceka Buddha* were kept aside. Those, who wanted to attain *Nibbāna*, can easily follow the practical part of an *Arahat*. Thus one is able to attain *Nibbāna* by eradication of fetters (*dasa sañyojana*).

In *Mahāyāna* tradition, *Mahāyānist*s believed that becoming an *Arahant* is an easier task. But to become a *Sammā Sambuddha* is a very difficult task, but it is very beneficial for most of the people. They thus introduced a part for the attainment of enlightenment, that is the part of the *Bodhisatta*. Here the matter is, that the enlightenment cannot be attained in the present life itself. As a *Bodhisatta* they have to take several lifetimes<sup>41</sup> until they attain enlightenment.

Having considered all those matters *Tantrayāna* introduced a new practices, part by following this part, the *Bodhisatta* can attain the enlightenment in this life itself. Therefore, he must perform all the perfections (*pāramitā*) in this life itself. On the other hand, he must perform whatever was performed by the *Buddha*. With the attainment of enlightenment, he should behave as a *Buddha*, he should rescue other fellow beings from this world of suffering.

According to Tantrism the practice of the *Bodhisatta* is a very difficult process, because he should be skillful both in *Theravāda* and *Mahāyāna*.

*Tantrayāna* emerged in India and spread to Tibet, China and Japan. In Tibet it developed and it is still alive. They have

40 Here would be good to mention, that *Pacceka Buddha* as well as *Arahat* can preach *Dhamma* and explain it to others. The only disadvantage is, that they cannot explain it so perfectly, thoroughly and faultlessly, which is the great skill of the *Sammā Sambuddha*.

41 Several? Several?!! No! Thousands! Millions! Billions! Trillions! Quadrillions of lives, hundreds of thousands aeons! Long, very long time!!!

different branches and among those branches *Kargupta* is a prominent branch. According to the branch, the teacher and the student should have a great relationship. Here the teacher does not say anything to his student. The student should be very close to the teacher. When the student associates the teacher, he learns much more. In this process, sometimes the student has to stay for a long time till his mind becomes pure. Then the teacher, having realized that the student's mind is pure and calm, will transform(?) his view.

*Kargupta Nikāya* emerged from a divine teacher. He was **Vajrāsatva**. Then it was handed over to the human teacher named **Tilopa**. From **Tilopa** it was handed over to his student **Nāropa**. From **Nāropa** to **Maropā**. From **Maropā** to **Milarepā**. **Milarepā** is an erudite teacher in Tibet.

The teacher **Nāropa** has introduced six kinds of *yoga* practices. They are:

- 1) *Ūśmagata Yoga*
- 2) *Māya Sarīra Yoga*
- 3) *Svapna Yoga*
- 4) *Shuddhāloka Yoga*
- 5) *Bardo Yoga*
- 6) *Viññāṇa Saṃkramanā Yoga*

Any *Bodhisatta* cannot follow these *yoga* practices without practicing *Mahāmudra* meditation. Therefore, the *Mahāmudra* meditation should be practiced first. According to the nature of this meditation, it takes no *Mahāyāna* or *Tantrayāna* tradition. It is between them. Through their meditation, the *Bodhisatta* would realize the real nature of the human mind. After that he can easily control his own mind. Now he has built up a mentality through which he may see the *Nibbāna* anywhere. And also he sees all the *Bodhisattas* as *Buddhas*. As a result of that he is able to realize the mundane life as the supra-mundane life. Therefore, this meditation gives new vision, because of that he feels the *samsāra* as itself as *Nibbāna*.

#### 1) *Ūśmata Yoga*

This is a meditation on breathing. The meditator practises different methods of breathing. Those methods are not easy to follow. All the individuals usually have the spiritual power of the mind. According to the *Tantrayāna*, the spiritual power is hidden as the base of the backbone and under the navel. The aspirant should have taken out the spiritual power from the top of the head. Usually the spiritual power of the man is not alive. It should be awakened with this meditation. When this meditation is well trained, one can do anything with the complete strength of the mind. It is called „psychic-power.“ As *Tantric* people believed, we use only one tenth (1/10) of the power of mind. The remaining nine tenths (9/10) of the mind call(?) also take as a result of this meditation. The following psychic-power could be obtained as a result of this meditation:

- 1) Reading other's mind (see what others see)
- 2) The power of going through the air
- 3) Making one's own body bigger or smaller.

All those powers are accepted as mundane powers – a special feature of another meditation accepted in *Ūśmata Yoga* is by following one of the meditations belonging to the *Ūśmata Yoga* one can imagine different kinds of matter (*rūpa*). Then he is able to imagine even the image of the God. Finally, he is able to give life to all those forms. The final essence of this meditation is making small the matter until it becomes empty. That is called the state of *Sūññatā*. This is a very difficult task to be performed. Therefore mind should be very calm and it should be a well trained mind. Having realized the difficulty of this meditation they are to practice *Mahāmudra* meditation.

#### 2) *Māya Sarīra Yoga*

In this meditation one would train to see his material body as it is in the mirror. At the same time he should have to think about a form of a god also. The figure which was in the mirror and the imagination of the form of the god are not real. They are mysterious.

#### 3) *Svapna Yoga*

With this meditation one is able to understand true nature of the dreams. This time the person is dreaming, knowing that „I am dreaming.“ Just like one watches a film, he sees the dream consciously. Through this practice of meditation he is able to change his dreams. Usually this is a dream with defilements (pleasure). With this meditation one is able to watch the dreams which are free from defilements (no pleasure).

#### 4) *Shuddhā Loka Yoga*

By following this meditation one can see the purity of mind while he is living. Usually one cannot see the purity of mind when he lives, but also because of this meditation, one would be able to see the purity of mind that should be experienced at the death. As a result of this meditation one can face the death without any difficulties. Not only that, but also he can easily combine with *Shuddhā Loka* and can attain *Nibbāna* as well.

#### 5) *Bārdo Yoga*

The purpose of this meditation is to examine the following:

- a) The way one reaches to the death
- b) The way of one's life that is moving in the intermediate life after the death
- c) The way of attaining *Shuddhā Loka* and *Nibbāna*
- d) The way of conception in the next life or existence
- e) The way of having next birth if it is possible

#### 6) *Viññāṇa Saṅkramana Yoga*

The purpose of this meditation is to take out the life (*viññāṇa*) from the top of the head of the person at the time of death. When one's *viññāṇa* gets out from the top of the head, he would reborn in the heavenly world.

In Tibet this meditation is called '*Pova*'. Those who practice this meditation have a hole on the top of the head. To show the hole they used to put a grass leaves. As a result of this hole, for the *viññāṇa* it is easy to get out during the dat. When one practises all these six kinds of meditation he is able to win the life by defeating the death.

The aspirant in *Theravāda* should eradicate the defilements (*kilesa*) for the attainment of final bliss. In Tantrism the aspirant does not try to eradicate the defilements, but he tries to understand the real nature of the defilements by living with them. As they believe if someone is able to practise in such a manner he can completely eradicate all the defilements. This is not a suppression of defilements. Then defilements would never arise. It is similar to a man who gave up all the toys with which he played in his childhood. Thus the Tantric yogin would have a sexual life with a woman, and he would please the whole body. This time he had only the feelings of lust. When he had the sexual life in such a manner, he pleased all his senses as possible as he could. After that he could easily eradicate his lust.

According to Tantrism one should do whatever consciously, because of that he realizes the real nature of what he experienced. Usually people engage in different activities unconsciously. Because of that they cannot experience them well. When one does something applying the consciousness from the beginning until the end, he can realize the real nature of that what he did. By following this method one can get rid of anything what he used to do, such as consumption of liquor, 5 kinds of pleasure etc.

In Tantrism the yogins accepted the defilements as *Bodhisatta*.(?) Therefore, they respect the defilements concerning that they are the *Buddhas*. Accordingly five *Buddhas* are mentioned:

- 1) The lust (*rāga*) – *Akśabha*
- 2) Hatred (*dosa*) – *Vyrocana*
- 3) Ignorance (*moha*) – *Ratana sambhava*
- 4) Maliciousness (*pisuna*) – *Amitabha*
- 5) Jealousy (*issā*) – *Amogha siddhi*

## 666 THE PRINCIPLE SECTS AND TEACHING OF TANTRAYANA

### 1. Introduction

The beginning of Tantrayana seem to be inseparable from the beginning of the Mahayana; indeed the Tibetans never made any different between Mahayana and Vajrayana, another name of Tantrayana. What are known as sutras (mdo) in Sanskrit are classed by

them as tantras (rgyud). And mantras became so fundamental to Tantrayana that it is also known as Mantrayana. It is accepted that Tantrayana appeared in the 7<sup>th</sup> century AD

## 1. Vajrayana Buddhism in India.

### Origins.

Vajrayana or Mantrayana, also known as Tantric Buddhism, first gained prominence in various parts of India and Sri Lanka. Scholars infer that, because of the esoteric nature of Tantric practice and doctrine, this school might have been developing quietly from the 2nd or 4th century AD, when Buddhist tradition associates Nagarjuna or Asanga with its origins. Most scholars associate the Vajrayana tradition primarily with India and Tibet.

Vajrayana maintains that nirvana as sunyata is one side of a polarity that must be complemented by karuna. Sunyata is seen as passive wisdom (prajna) that possesses an absolutely indestructible or diamondlike (vajra) nature beyond all duality, whereas karuna is the means (upaya) or dynamic aspect of the world. Enlightenment arises when these seeming opposites are realized to be in truth one. This realization, which is known experientially and not through a purely cognitive process, is portrayed in some types of Vajrayana imagery and practice as the union of the passive female deity, which signifies wisdom or voidness, with the dynamic male, signifying compassion without attachment. Such a union, called yab-yum ("father-mother") in Tibetan, is not a satisfaction of physical impulses but a symbol of the unity of opposites that brings the "great bliss," or enlightenment.

Adherents of the Vajrayana tradition believe that as all things are in truth of one nature, the void, and the physical-mental processes can be used as a vehicle for enlightenment. In the Kalacakra Tantra it is written that the Buddha taught that in this age of degeneration enlightenment must be achieved through one's own body, which contains the whole cosmos. This doctrine is taught in all the tantras. Vajrayana specialists warn, however, that in order to use correctly the body's processes to achieve an identification of the void with compassion, the aspirant must follow absolutely the instructions of a master or teacher who has been initiated into the mysteries. Such a master alone can direct every step so that the pupil learns to control mental and physical processes instead of being dominated by them. Therefore, the first step toward enlightenment in Vajrayana practice is the undergoing of initiation by a master.

The master first endeavours to direct the student to compassion through meditation on the transitoriness of life, the relation of cause and effect of one's actions, and the general suffering of humanity. After this sympathy for the suffering of humanity is aroused, the master guides his pupil in yogic, or contemplative, exercises that help to produce inner experiences corresponding to the various stages of spiritual growth. This process of advancement toward enlightenment involves the identification of the initiate with gods or goddesses that represent various cosmic forces. These gods are first visualized with the help of mudras (meditative gestures and postures), mantras (sacred syllables and phrases), and icons, all of which are believed to possess the essence of the divinities to be invoked. The icons are portrayed in a mandala, a sacred design that represents the universe as an aid to meditation. After this visualization, the initiate identifies with the divinities and finds that each in turn is sunyata, or voidness.

The culmination of this process, called vajrasattva yoga, gives the initiate a diamondlike body beyond all duality. Four stages in the process are described in four different groups of tantras, the Kriya-tantra, Caryā-tantra, Yoga-tantra, and Anuttarayoga-tantra. These four stages are likened to the fourfold phases of courtship: the exchange of glances, a pleasing or encouraging smile, the holding of hands, and consummation in the sexual act. The first stage involves external ritual acts, whereas the second combines these outward acts with contemplation. The third stage involves only contemplation, and the fourth is the unification of all dualities in the sexual act, symbolically or effectively. This last stage, however, is divided into two phases. The first involves the use by the initiate of controlled imagination, which allows him to experience the union on an ideational level. The second phase is the maithuna, or sexual coupling. This act, however, cannot be construed as an ordinary physical mating, because the initiate has already realized the voidness of all things, allowing him to act with perfect control over his emotions and without attachment. Whereas the ordinary sexual act gives rise to only momentary pleasure, this maithuna is considered to be an appropriate technique for attaining enlightenment and eternal bliss.

These Vajrayana practices have been unjustly condemned as a degeneration of Buddhism by those who do not look beyond the surface. It is quite easy to misinterpret the Guhyasamaja-tantra when it states that adultery and eating of human flesh are actions of the bodhisattva if one does not realize that this imagery points to the belief that voidness alone exists, beyond good or evil, or that the initiate must act only with compassion for the benefit of the salvation of the world. Once the true depths of Vajrayana doctrines and practices are perceived, this school can be designated as a development of Buddhist thought that emphasizes the attainment of enlightenment through a graduated process of meditation under the direction of an initiated teacher.

### Vajrayana literature.

While the sutras can be said to represent the theoretical and speculative aspect of Buddhism, the tantras, written in a highly figurative language, express Buddhism as individually lived. The tantras are essentially individually oriented works that apply to larger groups of persons because of the similarity of the experiences described in them. The individual spiritual development occurs through symbols that must not be reduced to signs; a symbol always points beyond itself. Because of this symbolic character, the tantras have usually been kept secret, and a literalist interpretation of such texts has usually failed to make any sense out of them.

The Guhyasamaja-tantra ("Treatise on the Sum Total of Mysteries"), also known as the Tathagataguhyaka ("The Mystery of Tathagatahood [Buddhahood]"), is the earliest known written tantra. It is by tradition ascribed to the renowned Indian scholar Asanga (c. 4th century AD), the propounder of the Yogacara philosophy. Usually the tantras do not give an explanation of the technical or symbolic terms, as this explanation is left to the teacher, but the Guhyasamaja-tantra devotes a very long chapter to the elucidation of these terms.

An important feature of all tantras is a polarity symbolism, which on the physical level appears as the union of male and female; on the ethical level it appears as the union of beneficial activity and an appreciation of what there is as it is; and on the philosophical level it appears as the synthesis of absolute reality and absolute compassion. The richness of this symbolism is already indicated in

the opening of the Guhyasamaja, where the absolute, which is depicted as a polarity, manifests itself in various mandalas (circular diagrams that have both a psychological and cosmic reference), each related to one of the celestial, meditational buddhas--Aksobhya, Vairocana, Ratnasambhava and Amitabha, and Amoghasiddhi--each of whom again represents a polarity, portrayed in iconographic works through their union with their female consorts.

The ideas and symbols presented in the Guhyasamaja-tantra became in the course of time more and more clearly elaborated. Because the tantras reflect an individual process of growth, the centre toward which this process gravitates, and from which it is also fed, appears in various symbols given various designations. Thus, there is the Hevajra-tantra, in which the sustaining life force is called Hevajra, and the Mahavairocana-tantra, in which it is called Mahavairocana ("The Great Resplendent One").

In view of the fact that the tantras may emphasize either "beneficial activity" or "appreciative awareness" or their "unity," the Tantric literature has been divided into the so-called Father Tantra (emphasizing activity), the Mother Tantra (emphasizing appreciation), and the Nondual Tantra (dealing with both aspects unitively). Almost all these works have been lost in their original Sanskrit versions, but their influence is noticeable in such works as Jñanasiddhi ("Attainment of Knowledge") by the great Vajrayana teacher Indrabhuti (c. 687-717), Prajñopayavinishcayasiddhi ("The Realization of the Certitude of Appreciative Awareness and Ethical Action") by the 8th-century writer Anangavajra, and the songs of the 84 mahasiddhas ("masters of miraculous powers," who were considered to have attained the Vajrayana goal). One of the last Sanskrit works to have been written in Central Asia was the Kalacakra-tantra. Its penetration into India may be dated AD 966. The central theme is the Adi-Buddha--primeval buddhahood--manifesting itself as a continuum of time (kala) and space (cakra).

## 666 THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE PLURALITY OF THE PATH TO LIBERATION

In the first sermon (Dhammacakkapavattana sutta) of the Buddha he advised the monks to avoid two extremes and to follow the middle path. What is this Majjhima Patipada? This is the Noble Eightfold Path. (Ayameva ariyo atthangiko maggo De me bhikkhave anta pabbajitena na sevitabba; yocayam kamesu kamasukhallikanuyogo hino, gammo, potthujaniko, anariyo, anatthasanhito, yo cayam attackilamathanuyogo dukkho anariyo anatta samhito-monks, there are two extremes that monks should not have to follow: what are those " Attachment to worldly pleasures. These are low (hino), common to the villages (gammo), common to the ordinary people (potthujaniko), innoble (anariyo), useless (anatthasanhito), disadvantageous" and following the path of self-mortification or severe penance, unpleasant (dukkho), innoble (anariyo) disadvantageous (anatthasanhito).

Ete te bhikkhave ubho ante anupagama majjhima patipada tathagatena abhisambuddha cakkhukarani, nanakarani, upasamaya abhinnaya sambodhaya nibbanaya samvattati- no having following these two extremes the Buddha through the middle path which is produced knowledge (nanakarani), tranquillising (upasamaya) for the realization (sambodhaya) for Nibbana (Nibbanaya).

In the Satipatthana sutta it is mentioned that four kinds of Mindfulness is the only path for the realization of Nibbana.

Many other ways also mentioned in another places in various suttas in the Nikayas.

Yamhijjananca pannaca sa ve nibbane santike- if anyone attains to trances and wisdom, he is near to Nibbana.

### **In the Dhammapada:**

Sabbe sankhara anicca yadapannaya passati, attha nibbindati dukkhe esamaggo visuddhiya- all conditional things are impermanent. If anyone sees this by wisdom, then he will be disgusted with the dukkha. **That will be the path to liberation.**

**The same thing will apply to Sabbe sankhara dukkha and Sabbe dhamma anatta.**

### **In the Samyutta Nikaya:**

Sile patitthaya naro sapanno, cittam panna bhavayam, atapinipako bhikkhu so imam vijataye jatam- a wise man who is established in Sila if develop the mind and the wisdom. This clever monk who is exert himself will remove all his confusion.

Later on in almost every suttas we can read Sila, Samadhi and Panna three kinds of discipline (Tividha sikkha) have been mentioned.

In the first sermon, there is no mention about Tividha sikkha separately. But we can say that these three kinds of discipline is included in the Eightfold Path. This has been mentioned in the Cullvedall sutta

1. Sammaditthi
2. Sammasankappa (**Panna**)
3. Sammavaca
4. Sammakammanda
5. Sammaajiva (**Sila**)
6. Sammavayama
7. Sammasati
8. Sammasamadhi (**Samadhi**)

“Tihi ca kho visakha khandhehi attingiko maggo sangahito”-The eightfold path can be comprised in the three aggregates. As the sutta mentions three aggregates are Sila, Samadhi and Panna.

**We can see clearly the division of these three kinds of discipline in the D.N specially in the Silakkhandha vagga. In the suttas of Brahmajala, Samannaphala, Ambattha, Sonadanda, we can see that how Sila, Samadhi and Panna explained in the gradual level and the way Sila itself have been explained in great length dividing into Culasila, Majjhimasila, and Mahasila. That shows how the path of liberation has been developed from the very beginning.**

We know that the emphasis on Sila came on after the pathama bodhi period (Early period of the life of the Buddha). Because of the formation of precepts or enactment of precepts, for monks came on (20) years after the enlightenment.

Sequence or methodology of liberation (vimutti) has been mentioned in the Mahaparinibbana sutta in the manner of gradual development (Iti silam iti samadhi ito panna silaparabhavito samadhi mahapphalo hoti mahanisanso. Samadhi paribhavoti panna mahapphala hoti mahanisansa panna paribhavitam cittam sammadeva asavehi vimuccati seyya thidam kamasava bhavasava ditthasava avijjasaya- such and such is morality, such and such is contemplation, such and such is wisdom. Great because of the fruit, great the advantage of contemplation when it is set round with morality. Great because the fruit, great the advantage of wisdom when it is set round with contemplation. The mind set round with wisdom is set quite free from the intoxications (asavas) what is to say intoxication of sensuality of becoming, of wrong views; from delusion).

*[Without Sila, Samadhi and Panna no one can see Anicca, Duddha and Anatta clearly].*

The methodology of liberation is Sila, Samadhi, Panna and Vimutti.

One has to start with Sila then come to Samadhi and Panna. Then only he will be liberated.

Therefore, it is a gradual development, gradual practice and as mentioned in the Paharada sutta (A.IV-200-201).

This gradual development is similar to the gradual slope of the ocean.

Seyyathapi paharadha mahasamuaddo-----anna pativedho (A.N)

“Paharadha just as the mighty ocean slopes away gradually, falls away gradual, she lies away gradually with son abruptness like a precipice. Even so in this discipline of dhamma there is a graduated training a graduated practice, a graduated mode of progress with no abruptness such as a penetration of Niravana.

We can see that even (10) perfections (dasaparamita), which is the path of the Bodhisattva, has been developed through this Sila, Samadhi and Panna.

(10) Perfections

1. Dana-sila
2. Sila- sila
3. Nekkhamma-sila
4. Panna-panna
5. Viriya- samadhi
6. Khanti- sila
7. Sacca- sila
8. Aditthana- samadhi
9. Metta- samadhi
10. Upekkha- samadhi

Bodhi:

The term Bodhi applies to the knowledge of Arahattamagga and to the all knowledge. (Bodhiti sammambodhi arahattamagganananassa ca etam adhivacanam).

In the Alagaddupama sutta mentioned that “ if the three fetters are destroyed in any monk they all are ending in enlightenment (Yosam bhikkhave tini samyojanani pahinani sabbe te sotapanna sambodhi parayana).

The Bodhi has been divided into three:

1. Sammasambodhi
2. Pacceka bodhi
3. Savaka bodhi

In the **Anguttara Nikaya** there are two Buddhas (A.I. 77) (Dve me bhikkhave Buddha katame dve? Tathagata ca araham sammambuddho pacceka buddho ca. Ime kho bhikkhave dve Buddha ).

**Theragatha Atthakatha: the term “Savaka paramippatto” has been mentioned for the fulfilment of paramitas of Savakas.**

“Mahamoggallana theragatha Atthakatha: “Sambodhi pana tividha sammambodhi, pacceka bodhi, savaka bodhi”

**That shows there are three bodhis as paths or realizations through which become three Buddhas.**

- ❖ Sammasam bodhi- sammasam Buddha
- ❖ Pacceka bodhi- pacceka Buddha
- ❖ Savaka bodhi- savaka Buddha

But we have to make a note here that we cannot find the word “Savaka Buddha ” at the beginning in the Atthakathas. First of all we come across the term “Catusacca Buddha ” in Samyutta Atthakatha (S.A.I. P-20)-Hevavitharana) cattaro Buddha , sabbannu Buddha , pacceka Buddha , catusacca Buddha , suta Buddha ti. Tatha samatimsa paramiyo puretva sammasambodhim patto sabbannu buddho nama. Kappasatasahassadhikani dve asamkheyyani paramiyo pure tva sayambhutam patto paccekabudha nama. Avasesa khinasava catusacca, Buddha nama, bahussuta suta Buddha )

Then in the Theragatha Atthakatha we came across the term “Savaka Buddha ” as well as the Bodhisatta term has been used for three kinds of bodhisattas Mahabodhisatta, Pacceka bodhisatta and Savaka bodhisatta.

That shows the Authors of Atthakathas logically realized if the word bodhi refers to the realization of Four Noble Truths they all could be named buddhisattas and Buddhas.

The word “Savaka bodhi” has been mentioned not only in Theragatha Atthakatha but also in the Sumangalavilasini (D.N) Saratthappakasini (S.A) and in the Samantapasadika (V.A). That means Buddhaghosa referred to this term “ Savakabodhi” in the sense of Arahatta magga nana but Dhammapala in his commentary on Theragatha Atthakatha even went further and mentioned the word “Savaka Buddha ”.

Here he has been mentioned about if a Savaka who has the intention to attain into Aggasavaka or Mahasavaka or even the Arhantship will be named as Savaka-Buddha

Savaka pana satthu sabrahmacarino va catu-sacca-kammattana-kathan sutva, tasmim yeva khane ete-

This is a very bold step that has been taken up by Dhammapala Thera to mention as Savaka-Buddha which has been reluctant to mention all these times but all possible avenues have been set for such development during the Buddhaghosa’s time. As mentioned by Dr.T.Endo in his book “Buddha in Theravada Buddhism” (P-236-37).

If there are three Buddhas that means there should be three bodhisattas also. The same thing has been mentioned in the Theragatha Atthakatha. The word **Tinnam bodhisattanam** has been mentioned to indicate three kinds of bodhisattas.

These are:

1. Maha bodhisatta
2. Pacceka bodhisatta
3. Savaka bodhisatta

Savaka Bodhisattas also have to fulfil paramitas but the time factor will be different for their resolutions (Abhinihara).

If anyone wants to become Aggasavakas they have to fulfil Paramitas one incalculable and one hundred thousand Kappas. If anyone puts the resolution to become Mahasavaka, The Mother of the Buddha, The Father of the Buddha, The Attendant of the Buddha, The Son of the Buddha, they have to fulfil only one hundred thousand Kappas.

Regarding the Savaka Buddha, the two passages in the Theragatha Atthakatha and the Upasaka Janalankara are almost identical. That means Upasaka Janalankara following the Theragatha Atthakatha that passage has been copied. However, Ven Walpola Rahula was quite unaware of the Theragatha Atthakatha said

in his article “ The Bodhisatta ideal in Theravada and Mahayana” (Zen and the Taming of the Bull 6<sup>th</sup> article) Ananda Thera of Mahavihara tradition lived in 12<sup>th</sup> in his Upasaka Janalankara mentioned there are three Boddhis and when the Savakas realized the Savaka bodhi becomes a Savaka Buddha. Ven. W. Rahula thought the title of Savaka Buddha has given to the Savaka by Ven. Ananda in the 12<sup>th</sup> century.

It seems that in some Atthakathas the position of Arahant and the Savaka Bodhi has been divided into two. Mainly Savaka Bodhi means the position of two main disciples. In order to achieve that position of Aggassavaka one has to follow paramitas the period of one incalculable and one hundred thousand kappas. To become Mahasavaka and Aggapatthayaka, Buddha Mata should be fulfilled paramitas only one hundred thousand kappas. (Two main disciples are Sariputta and Magallana).

Taking this methods into consideration by Mahayanists also followed this as two separate positions and mentioned:

Arahanta  
 Wravaka Bodhi  
 Pratyeka Bodhi  
 Samyaksambodhi                      as separate position

Astasahasrika prajbaparamita mentions the ‘Bhumis’ instead of ‘Bodhi’. Therefore, it has been mentioned:

1.                      Wravaka Bhumi
2.                      Pratyeka Buddha Bhumi
3.                      Bodhisattva Bhumi

Saddharmapundarika sutra mentions ‘Yana’ instead of ‘Bhumi’:

Wravaka Yana  
 Pratyeka Buddha Yana  
 Buddha Yana or Bodhisattva Yana

Aupamaya parivarta (3<sup>rd</sup> chapter) of the Saddharmapundarika sutra mentions that:

‘traidhatukat satvanam niskasanahetostrini yananyupadarwayanti yaduta wravata yanam pratyekabuddhayanam Bodhisattvayanamiti’ (In order to drive away from the three kinds of worlds (the Buddha) admonished three yana such as wravaka yana, pratyekabuddha yana and the Bodhisattva yana)

#### EXPLAIN THE CONCEPT OF *NIBBĀNA* IN EARLY BUDDHISM

The etymological meaning of *Nibbāna* – ‘ni + vaṇa’ is ‘freedom from craving’ or ‘ni + va’ as ‘extinction’. *Nibbāna* is also called *taṇhakkhaya* which means ‘the extinction of thirst’; ‘*asankhāta*’ – ‘unconditioned’; ‘*virāga*’ – ‘absence of desire’; ‘*nirodha*’ – cessation.

According to Pāli texts, there are many more terms expressing *Nibbāna*, e.g., *rājakkhaya* (extinction of desire), *dosakkhaya* (extinction of hatred), *mohakkhaya* (extinction of illusion), *bhavonirodho* (cessation of becoming).

Since *Nibbāna* is expressed in negative terms, there are many having a wrong notion that it is negative, and that it expresses self-annihilation. *Nibbāna* is definitely no annihilation of self, because there is no self to annihilate. If at all, it is the annihilation of the false idea of self.

There are also positive terms expressing *Nibbāna*. *Khema* means ‘security’, *suddhi* (purity), *panītaṃ* (sublime), *santi* (peace), *vimutti* (release). Though it is expressed in positive terms, *Nibbāna* is also not something positive. The ideas of ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ are relative and are within the realm of duality. These terms cannot apply to *Nibbāna*, which is beyond duality and relativity. *Nibbāna* is beyond words, logic and reasoning i.e., *attakkavacara*.

*Nibbāna* is not a natural result of the extinction of craving. It is not the result of anything. If it is a result, then it should be produced by a cause. *Nibbāna* is neither a cause nor an effect. It is the Ultimate Truth (*Suttanipāta* 758) beyond cause and effect.

One must see *Nibbāna* to realize it. There is a path leading to a mountain, but the mountain is not the result of the path.

Supposing, even if there is a path leading to a mountain, the mountain is not the result of the path.<sup>42</sup>

People tend to say „**Buddha** entered *Parinibbāna* after death.“ But *Parinibbāna* does not mean a place, it simply means 'fully passed away', 'fully blown out' or 'fully extinct',<sup>43</sup> because **the Buddha** has no re-existence after death. The *Ratana Sutta* says: „Their past is extinct with no new arising, their mind is not drawn to future birth; their old seeds are destroyed, desires no more growing, the wise goes out just like a lamp.“ - verse 14.

In Buddhism it is the wisdom that realizes *Nibbāna* within the 5 aggregates. **The Buddha** says: „Within this fathom long sentient body itself, I proclaim the world, the arising of the world, the cessation of the world and the path leading to the cessation of the world.“ This means that all the Four Noble Truths are found within the 5 aggregates. This also means that there is no external power that grants the realization of *Nibbāna*. So, the wise realise *Nibbāna* within themselves (*paccattaṃ veditaṅgaṃ viññūhīti*).

He who attains *Nibbāna* is the happiest person in the world, he does not repent over the past, nor does he brood(?) over the future. He lives fully in the present, gains nothing, accumulates nothing, not even anything spiritual, because he is free from the thirst for becoming.

The meaning of happiness as referred to *Nibbāna* is not of sensation, it is the happiness obtained without sensation. When there is no experience through senses, there comes happiness which is supreme.

There are two *Nibbāna* elements, one is *sotapadisesa* (physical remaining) and the other is *anupadisesa* (physical without remaining). Though *Nibbāna* is deep, subtle, hard to understand, difficult to realize (*Majjhima Nikāya*), still it is attainable as **the Buddha** said thus:

„There is the unborn, ungrown and unconditioned, were there are not unborn, ungrown and unconditioned, there would be no escape for the born, grown and conditioned. Since there is unborn, ungrown, unconditioned, so there is an escape for the born, grown and the conditioned.“ (*Udānapāli*)

Although *Nibbāna* is compared to a great ocean where the amount of water and the number of fish and sea-animals are immeasurable (*Milindapañhā*), *Nibbāna* in early Buddhism is not a metaphysical proposition. *Nibbāna* can be attained by spiritual purification. The following stanza explains how one attained *Nibbāna* step by step through repeated failure to final success:

„Mindful of the yogis of the past, and recollecting their way of life,  
even though it is the last hour, one may attain the undying state.“

(*Theragāthā*, verse 947)

## 666 ABHIDHAMMA ANALYSIS OF NIBBANA. 764

Nibbana is the fourth ultimate realities in the Abhidhamma, the other three being the citta, cetasika and rupa. The term nibbana is defined in the Abhidhammatthasavghadipaniṣā as follows:

- (e) Ni + vi (to weave) - absence of weaving
- (f) Ni + va (relieve) - fire of craving is extinguished.

In the Abhidhammavātaṅga nibbana is defined as Ni + vana (craving) - absence of craving.

The Abhidhamma interpretation of nibbana is somewhat differs from the descriptions of the early discourses. Generally, nibbana is defined in negative terms in the Nikayas, while the commentators of Abhidhamma try to describe it in a positive way thereby categorizing it as a real dhamma.

There are several attempts have been made by the commentators in the explanation of nibbana in the Abhidhamma. For instances:

### **(6) The characteristic of nibbana**

While mentioning that nibbana means to be free from craving, the Abhidhammatthasavgha presents 2 characteristics of it as follows:

42 This is the common interpretation of the unconditionality (*asankhāta*) of *Nibbāna* – one goes by path (Eightfold Path) to a mountain (as *Nibbāna*), but that does not mean that the mountain would be conditioned by the path.

43 The word 'extinct' might be misleading, as extinction is another word for annihilation. I don't believe that the teacher thinks that *Parinibbāna* would be annihilation.

10. Nibbana however is termed supramundane, and is to be realized by the wisdom of the four paths. It becomes an object to the paths and fruits, and is called Nibbana because it is departure (ni) from craving (vana).

11. Nibbana is onefold according to its intrinsic nature. According to the way it is twofold namely, the element of nibbana with and without the substrate remaining. It is threefold according to its different aspects namely, void, signless and longing-free.

**(7) The division of nibbana**

The Vibhavitika gives two divisions of nibbana:

- (a) Saupadhisesanibbanadhatu – the realization of nibbana with the five aggregates left.
- (b) Nirupadhisesanibbanadhatu – the five aggregates disappear at the death of an arahant.

3 divisions of nibbana is given in Abhidhammasavgaha:

- 25. Subba – devoid of attachment, hatred and delusion either by way of object or of accompaniment.
- 26. Animitta – free of the signs such as attachment and hatred.
- 27. Appanihita – free from longings such as attachment and hatred.

**(8) Nibbana is obtainable**

According to Abhidhammavavata, to say that ‘there is no one nature called nibbana in reality as it cannot be obtained as soul or soul the hare’s horn’ is not reasonable, because nibbana can be obtained by the persons who follow the relevant practices and investigate it through the eye of wisdom. Something should not be denied merely because untrained person (puthujjana) do not obtain it.

**(9) Nibbana can be produced by two ways**

In the Abhidhamma works, we find nibbana is explained as a state or a dhamma. Vibhavitika gives two methods by which nibbana can be proved, i.e., by direct perception and inference:

- (a) nibbana is so called as it is to be realized by the wisdom of the four paths. This statement shows the verifiability by the noble ones. Therefore it is a form of direct perception.
- (b) Nibbana becomes an object to the paths and fruits, shows that it can be proved through the inference by the good worldlings. (kalyanaputhujjana).

**(10) Nibbana has its own nature**

The commentators have made an attempt to describe nibbana as having its own nature like the other dhammas as being either mental or material. Thus, by explaining nibbana as a dhamma possessing its own nature they wanted to prove it as a real state and disprove the theory that it is mere voidness. For this reason, nibbana has also been explained according to the 4 ways of definition:

- (1) Characteristic – pacification
- (2) Function – deathlessness or happiness
- (3) Manifestation – signlessness
- (4) Proximate cause – renunciation

On the contrary, that there is no proximate cause for nibbana according to the Abhidhammasavghadipani.

**(11) Nibbana as a reality (dhamma)**

The Abhidhammavata presents a catechism in order to prove nibbana as a reality which can be obtained in reality.

- (1) If nibbana is mere absence of defilements, all untrained people will be realizing nibbana as they could moments free from defilements.
- (2) If it is mere eradication of defilements, nibbana becomes manifold and in many ways it has eradicated what is conditioned, impermanent and unsatisfactory.

Therefore, nibbana is not merely the absence of defilements. By realizing whatever dhamma, if there is eradication of defilements, that state or dhamma is called nibbana because it becomes the foundation for the destruction of defilements, nibbana being itself endless.

Hence according to Abhidhamma, nibbana is not a mere concept but it is a real state which becomes the objects of the paths and their fruits, which is permanent as it has no arising, formless as it has no nature of rupa, and which is devoid of obsession. Thus, a keen interest was taken by the commentators to prove nibbana as a real state having a nature of its own.

**666 EXPLAIN THE MAHAYANA VIEWS ON THE CONCEPT OF SOUL AND SOULLESSNESS. (665)**

There are several views regarding the concept of soul and soullessness in different texts of Mahayana Buddhism. Most of the later schools of Mahayana advocate the metaphysical entity of Dhammadhatu or Tathata as the Principle of universe. This metaphysical entity is considered as the origin and the final Truth of all phenomena. It is sometimes known as Subbata. Though it is considered as the universal Entity, it is never consider as a soul, it is more like an unlimited Space in unlimited Time.

With regard to the concept of soul, Mahayana accept the doctrine of Anatta i.e., non-substantiality. And there are two main Mahayana schools, which are excellent in repudiating the concept of permanent soul. One is Madhyamika and the other is the Yogacara. Following are the basic argument presented by these two Mahayana schools in rejecting the concept of soul.

**28. Madhyamika**

This school advocates the teaching of Subbata (Emptiness). According to the concept of Emptiness, all things are of the nature of impermanent and non-self, their arising and falling are the result of paticcasamuppada. Emptiness in this sense is “not having its own-ness”, every thing is inter-related and inter-dependent. Since nothing can exist independently, the concept of unchanging, permanent and self-existing soul is thus rejected. The following statement of the Madhyamika texts clarify the point;

- (1) .The Mahapabba paramitta sutra says: “sarvadarmanaj subbata”—all elements of existence have the characteristic of emptiness.
- (2) . The Vajjarchedika prabaparamittasutra gives several similes to explain the impermanent nature of all phenomena i.e., the similes of star, darkness, light, white snow, dream, lighting and bubble.
- (3) .the Mula Madhyamika karika says :  
atmetyapi prabapti—self is conventional  
manatmetyapi desita—preached is the non-self  
buddhairnatma na canatma—Buddha doesn’t speak of self or non-self  
kascidithyapi desita—such an idea is not seen, therefore it is not preached

**29. Yogacara**

This school advocates the doctrine of ‘Thought Only’ (citta-matra) i.e., all Phenomena are only the projections of mind. The most characteristic of this doctrine is the so-called ‘Idealism’, which is ‘subjective’ with regard to the empirical and ‘absolute’ with regard to the transcendental subject. As to the first, it denies the independent reality of an external object. Since the object does not exist, so also the consciousness which grasps it i.e., in the absent of a cognizable object there can also be no cognizer. The intention is therefore is to effect a withdrawal from both the empirical object and the empirical subject. As the empirical subject is rejected, the concept of subjective soul is therefore also totally denial.

The following statements of the Yogacara tell how the Yogacarins reject the concept of permanent, unchanging soul:

1. ‘attamatra midam sarvam’ i.e., all are the creation of mind.
2. ‘tribhava cittamatra’ i.e., all existence is nothing but mind.
3. ‘cittamatram lokam’ i.e., the world is nothing but mind.

One of the most important works of Vasubandhu, the ‘Abhidharmakosa’, also gives a very detailed argument to disprove the soul concept of the Pudgalavada i.e., the Vatsiputriyas. The 9<sup>th</sup> Kowasthana of the Abhidharma, which is named as ‘Atmavada-pratisedha’ by Vasubandhu himself, is a special appendix devoted to the much controverted question about the Buddhist denial of the existence of soul. In support of his argument, Vasubandhu quotes scriptural passages. In the Manusyaka-sutta, it is declared that a human being is nothing but a combination of five sets of elements. Different names are being given to these combinations, such as sentient being (sattva), a man (nara), a person (purusa) or a Manu’s progeny (manusya) etc. In all these designation, nothing is permanent, all are subject to change. In the Bimbisara-sutra, therefore the Buddha declared: ‘O monks ! the notion of ‘myself’ and of ‘mine’ is a childish notion of simple uneducated and ignorance people, who are misled by current expressions. There is no Self, nothing mine, nothing except the separate elements of suffering of life in their ever changing apparitions’. The later Mahayanists regard this Abhidharmakosa as the authority in refusing the concept of Soul.

## 666 THE CONCEPT OF SOUL AND SOULLESSNESS IN MAHAYANA BUDDHISM.

Mahayana accepts the doctrine of Anatta or soullessness. There are two main Mahayana schools which are excellent in repudiating the concept of permanent soul. One is Madhyamika and the other is Yogacara or Vibbanavada. However, these two schools neither use the ‘Analytical Method’ (analysis of 5 aggregates, 12 bases and 18 elements) nor the ‘Synthetical Method’ (12 factors of paticcasamuppada) to reject the concept of soul which are commonly used in early Buddhism. They employed their distinctive doctrine of ‘Wunyata’ and ‘Citta-matra’ to repudiate the soul theory. Following are their basic arguments:

### **1. Madhyamika**

This school advocates the teaching of Wunyata (Voidness). According to the concept of Voidness, all things are of the nature of impermanent and non-self, their arising and falling are due to the result of causality (paticcasamuppada). Voidness in this sense is “not having its own-ness” (nis-svabhavatva or svabhava-wunya). As everything is inter-related and inter-dependent, there is nothing having its permanent or unchanging own-ness. Since nothing is having its permanent own-ness, the concept of unchanging, permanent and ever-existing soul is thus rejected. This is further explained by the concept of ‘Pudgala-nairatmya’ (Voidness of Self) and ‘Dharma-nairatmya’ (Voidness of the element of existence). The following statements of the Madhyamika texts clarify the point;

- (1) .The Mahaprajba paramitta sutra says: “sarvadarmanaj subbata”—all elements of existence have the characteristic of emptiness.
- (2). The Vajracchedikaprabaparamittasutra says that all phenomena are like star, darkness, light, white snow, dream, lighting and bubble which are impermanent and without self.
- (3). The Mulamadhyamikakarika says:  
 Atmety api prajbapitam anatmety api dewitaj  
 buddhair natma na canatma kawcid ity api dewitaj—chapter 8 verse 6  
 The Buddhas have make known the conception of self and taught the doctrine of non-self. At the same time, they have not spoken of something as the self or as the non-self (i.e., both self and non-self are wunyata)

### **2. Yogacara**

This school advocates the doctrine of ‘Thought Only’ (citta-matra), all phenomena are only the projections of mind. The most characteristic of this doctrine is the so-called ‘Idealism’, which is ‘subjective’ with regard to the empirical and ‘absolute’ with regard to the transcendental subject. As to the first, it denies the independent reality of an external object. Since the object does not exist, so also the consciousness which grasps it. That is to say, in the absent of a cognizable object there can also be no cognizer. The intention is therefore is to effect a withdrawal from both the empirical object and the empirical subject. As the empirical subject is rejected, the concept of subjective soul is therefore also totally denial.

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Perhaps one may say that the Alayavibbana of the Yogacara is another name of ‘soul’ in its idealistic manner. But since the Alayavibbana itself is nothing than a stream of flux containing seeds which are impermanent, it does not possess the nature and the characteristic of soul which is eternal and unchangeable.

In conclusion, Mahayana is similar to Theravaada in maintaining the theory of ‘Anatta’. They used to refer everything in the world as empty or mind-made. However, Theravada’s theories of ‘Analysis’ and ‘Synthesis’ are empirical, but the theories of ‘Wunyata’ and ‘Citta-matra’ of the Mahayana are dialectical (prasavgika) and metaphysical in nature.

QUESTION: EXAMINE THE MAHĀYĀNA THEORY THAT THERE IS NO DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SAṂSĀRA AND NIRVĀṆA. (ORIGINAL BY VEN. HUNNY)

In Buddhism *Nibbāna* (from *nir* + *vaṇa*) means 'freedom fro desire'. There are two aspects of *Nibbāna*:

1. The full extinction of defilements (*kilesa parinibbāna*) – *Nibbāna* with the groups of existence still remaining.
2. The full extinction of groups (*khandha parinibbāna*) – *Nibbāna* without the groups of this physical-mental process of existence.

In the 25<sup>th</sup> chapter of *Mūlamadhyamika Kārika* it is said that „*Saṁsāra* has no special thing that distinguishes it from *saṁsāra*.“

According to *Madhyamika* philosophy *Nirvāṇa* means 'elimination'. *Nirvāṇa* and *saṁsāra* are not different, therefore they are identical. But this cannot be explained in this simple way. If this is taken in this literal sense, the whole aim of *Madhyamika* philosophy lead followers by true teaching of **the Buddha** facts.(?) On emay ask, if *saṁsāra* and *Nirvāṇa* are identical, why to practice Buddhism, why not be *insaṁsāra*. If these two are the same, then just as *insaṁsāra* there is *dukkha* in *Nirvāṇa*, and if so, there's no need to strive to realize *Nirvāṇa*.

this shows what is meant by this stanza, that it is not simple to identify *saṁsāra* with *Nirvāṇa*. In interpretation, just as when understanding the whole of *Madhyamika* philosophy, it is important to remember that the main purpose of its teaching is *Śūnyatā*, which means emptiness of everything (*dharmā*). This emptiness means they are devoid of anything called *svabhāva*, a sort of a 'thing', some entity that is specific to a *dharma* that is its own-nature.

For *Sarvāstivādins* everything is *dharma* and every *dharma* has a *svabhāva*. This *svabhāva* has the specific characteristic of its own nature and it prevails into three periods of time – in past, present and future; and gives this particular *dharma* a speciality. **Nāgarjuna** rejected the existence of *svabhāva* in *dharmās*. This

he did by showing that everything is relative to each other, therefore, nothing has independent existence. If nothing exists independently, there is nothing that could be called permanent, and having characteristics specific to it.

So, *samsāra* and *Nirvāṇa* both are devoid of *svabhāva*, anything special that makes them distinct from each other. As they are devoid of such *svabhāva*, they are not distinct. It does not mean that *samsāra* and *Nirvāṇa* would be the same. This is made clear as to what is the extremity of *Nirvāṇa* and what is the extremity of *samsāra*, between them not even a subtle something(?) is to be seen.

According to *Theravāda* Buddhist school of thought, *Nirvāṇa* and *samsāra* are regarded as two different factors. One attains *Nirvāṇa* by crossing over the ocean of *samsāra*. So, on this statement written above, which we can find in early Buddhism, *Madhyamikas* have built up their philosophy.

QUESTION: EXPLAIN THE *TRIKĀYA* CONCEPT AND EXAMINE *NIKĀYA* TEACHING CONNECTED WITH THAT CONCEPT.

During the time of various Buddhist schools, especially *Lokuttaravādins*, raised the *Buddha* to status of a god or even to a metaphysical entity. However, even more obvious(?) glorification is seen in *Mahāyāna*.

In Pāli texts there was an opportunity for *Mahāyānists* to put forth doctrine of *Trikāya*, specific concept of *Buddha* in *Mahāyāna*. In *Aṅguttara Nikāya* **the Buddha** says, that he is neither a god nor a *gandhabba* nor a man. In *Itivuttaka* he says to **Vakkali** that he who sees *Dhamma*, sees **the Buddha**. All these statements led to development of *Trikāya* concept in *Mahāyāna*.

*Nirmānakāya* (body of transformation). There are numerous *Nirmānakāyas* created by *Dharmakāya* in countless worlds to preach to the beings of lower range. As **Sākyamuni**, He adopts Himself to earthly conditions, possessing an earthly body, but yet maintaining purity. He does not sleep nor dream and preaches only the ultimate Truth.

**Sambhogakāya** (body of enjoyment), the body that partakes enjoyment and as the *Buddha* ideal, it is that which preaches to *Bodhisatvas* of higher range. It is accomplished with all the *Mahāpurisa Lakṣaṇa*, which is said by most of *Mahāyāna Sūtras*.

The *Dharmakāya* (body of law) is His highest body, comprising all essence of knowledge and compassion in absolute state. It is sometimes called '*Svabhāvakāya*', which is immeasurable and unlimited. It fills all space and is the basic of both *Nirmānakāya* and *Sambhogakāya*. It is also called *Tathata*, *Dharmadhātu* or *Tathāgatagarbha*.

In the beginning, *Trikāya* doctrine was very vague, the number of *kāyas* was uncertain. In Chinese sources, **Nāgarjuna** in his commentary on *Prajñāpāramitā* spoke only about 2 *kāyas*: *Rūpakāya* and *Dharmakāya*. According to **N. Dutt**, up to the time of **Nāgarjuna** the concept of *Sambhogakāya* was not distinguished from *Rūpakāya* or *Nirmānakāya*.

According to *Abhisamayalāṅkāra Kārika* there are 4 *kāyas* of which *Svabhāvikakāya* is real and *Dharmakāya*, *Sambhogakāya* and *Nirmānakāya* are unreal. In *Sūtralaṅkāra*, *Svabhāvikakāya* is identified with *Dharmakāya*.

The most developed form of *Trikāya* concept is found in *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka Sūtra* and *Suvarṇaprabhasa Sūtra*. It is stated that *Tathāgata* has no origin, there is only *Dharmakāya*. **Gotama Buddha** attained *Buddhahood* long time ago. It is only His *Nirmānakāya* which is visible to people. There are numeral such *Nirmānakāya Buddhas* in this world. Therefore, **Gotama Buddha** was only a shadow and image of *Dharmakāya* which follows the ways of the world.

In Pāli commentary it is said that **the Buddha** duplicated him and sent one copy to *Tāvatiṅsa* heaven to

preach *Abhidhamma* to the gods, while he remained on earth to preach to **Sāriputta**. Perhaps this is the influence of *Mahāyāna*'s concept of *Nirmānakāya*.

#### IMPORTANCE OF PĀRAMITĀ

1. Because *paññā* (Skt. *prajñā*) *pāramī* is the realization of *suññatā* (Skt. *śūnyatā*) (emptiness) in all *paññā pāramitā* literature *paññā pāramitā* means the understanding of *suññatā*. It says that staying in the *suññatā* a *Bodhisatta* should establish himself in *paññā pāramī*.
2. How *Bodhisatta* fulfils or realizes this *suññatā*? The *Bodhisatta* should not fix himself on *rūpa* and *viññāṇa*. He should not fix himself in *cakkhu... paṭhavī ... dhātu... Arahantship, Paccekabuddha* (Skt. *Pratyakabuddha*) and even *Buddha*. In short he should not grasp anything.
3. *Suññatā* means *anattā* (not-self) of everything.
4. According to *paññā pāramitā* literature the term *Mahāyāna* also means the knowledge of *suññatā*. Why *suññatā* is explained as the way to enlightenment? Because a *Bodhisatta* in order to gain enlightenment should realize *suññatā*. The possible answers quoted from *Samyutta Nikāya* (IV. 360) - „What is the path for *Nibbāna* ... *suññatā* ... *asankhatagāmī magga Nibbāna*.“ There are three goals to liberation, namely:

1. *Suññatā*
2. *Animitta*
3. *Appanimitta* (*tevidha vimukkhā mukha*)

According to *Theravāda* if someone follows these three he will attain the *Arahantship* (enlightenment). According to *Mahāyānists* a *Bodhisatta* should concentrate on these but he is not supposed to realize until his wholesome roots mature. (Here we can see the different views between *Mahāyāna* and *Theravāda*.) Because if one realized any of them one will either become an *Arahant* or a *Paccekabuddha*. *Bodhisatta* has to stay in *saṃsāra* to fulfill the *pāramitā* and to mature his wholesome roots. According to *astasaḥśrīkaprajñā pāramitā* a *Bodhisatta* can concentrate on these things but without entering the *Nibbāna* (Skt. *Nirvāṇa*). He does that with *Upayakauvalya* (skilful means). Two similes are given:

1. It is just like a bird flying in the air with its 2 wings, it neither falls to the ground nor it stands anywhere on any support. Therefore, *Bodhisatta* dwells in way of emancipation, thus in the relics of emptiness achieves complete release(?) over emptiness. Just so he dwells in the relics of the sign-ness and wisdom, but he does not fall into emptiness or sign-ness of wisdom. In the same manner the *Bodhisatta* concentrates these things without falling into a particular one. At that time he uses his skill in means in order not to fall into *Nirvāṇa*.
2. It is just like a skilful archer, shooting the arrows up to the sky succeeding without letting the arrows drop to the ground. In the same way the *Bodhisatta* can as long as He wishes stay there concentrating on these things without realizing them.

*Bodhisatta* has special duty – He is responsible for a large number of beings to elevate them from *Nibbāna*.

It is said that the *Bodhisatta* is not realizing the *Bhūtakoti* i.e., the ultimate truth when concentrating on the *tevidha, vimukkhā, mukha*. This *Bhūtakoti* is similar to *tathata, dharmatā, dharmadhātu* and *śūnyatā*. *Mahāyāna* also explains *śūnyatā* on the basis of *anattā* (non-self). In the *Suttanipāta* it is said: »*Sabbato lokaṃ avekkhassu*.« - „One should look at the world's emptiness.“ (*Moghariyamanavapucchā Sutta, Samyutta Nikāya*)

**The Buddha** asked **Mogharaja**(?) to look at the world as non-self and asked him to be mindful all the time to see the things as empty. However, according to *Theravāda*, the *khandha-vibhaṅga, āyatana vibhaṅga* and *dhātu*

*vibhaṅga* are the methods to get rid of the view of self. Hence, with the methods of visualizing the emptiness of all things, the *Mahāyānists* are said to have got rid of not only the view of self but also the view of *dharmās*.

**QUESTION: DESCRIBE THE CHARACTERISTIC OF PERFECTIONS APPEARING IN MAHĀYĀNA SCRIPTURE WHICH LEAD TO FULL ENLIGHTENMENT.**

The first conception of *Mahāyāna* is the *Bodhisattva* idea and the ybelieved that we all are *Bodhisattvas* and finally become *Buddhas*. This thought gives a great impetus to lead the Enlightenment.(?) There are two views of *Bodhisattva*:

1. Those who take the vows to realize their idea on the way to *Buddhahood*
2. Those who are striving for enlightenment through the practice of four greate vows and perfections. They are:
  - a) To save all beings
  - b) To destroy all evil passions
  - c) To learn the truth and teach it
  - d) To lead all beings towards *Buddhahood*

**Sākyamuni** was a *Bodhisattva* who fulfilled perfection and in the *Jātaka* stories tells us about His previous lives such as reborn as an animal, man, working with His compassion for welfare of others. Therefore, the difference between *Bodhisattva* and *Arahant* is that the *Arahant* intends upon his own enlightenment and liberation, while the *Bodhisattva* wishes to help all beings and bring them to full enlightenment. In order to do this although qualified for *Nibbāna* he renounced it and remained in the world to help all beings. He is making effort to become a *Buddha* so many years. In *Theravāda* is mentioned in certain period but in *Mahāyāna* it is unlimited period.

In *Mahāyāna* there is also the important characteristic of perfection which some(?) different from ten *pāramitā* in *Theravāda*, but it seems to be an elaboration of the four stages of spiritual progress of *Sotāpatti* in early Buddhism. Gradually the idea of the *pāramitā* related with *bhūmi* by making the *Bodhisattva* cultivate one of the *pāramitā* in each *bhūmi*. As the *Bhodhisattva* passes from one stage to another, his power also increases until the tenth stage and He becomes almost equal to the *Buddha* and possesses various supernatural powers. Thus the ten *bhūmis* are:

1. *Parmuditā* – joyfulness because of the fruit of His action. He is born in the *Buddhist* family, wishes good will for all beings with his vow that he made, devoted himself to equal the *Budha* to help and preach the *Dhamma* for all beings and His chief thought is not only „May I become a *Buddha* to attain *Nibbāna*“ but „May I become a *Buddha* to help all beings and so on.
2. *Vimala* – Immaculate – he aattained this quality by the moral practice. Here ordinary beings may strive to imitate the *Bodhisattva* by moral practice and as best as we could, we have to free ourselves from the conception of ego.
3. *Prabhākārī* – Luminous
4. *Acismati* – Radiant
5. *Sudurijaya* – Invincible
6. *Abhimukti* – Being in front
7. *Duraṅgama* – Forgoing
8. *Acala* – Immovable

9. *Sadhumati* – With holy wisdom

10. *Dharmamegha* – Cloud of *Dharma*

These ten *bhūmis* are similar with ten *pāramitās* in *Theravāda*.<sup>44</sup>

In *Saddhammapundarīka Sūtra* there are three terms - *Sāvakayāna*, *Pratyekabuddhayāna* and *Bodhisattayāna* or *Buddhayāna*. Of them, first two are named as '*Hīnayāna*' – lower path for one who follows these two paths can be only an *Arahant* or *Pratyeka Buddha*, who are lower than the *Buddha*. *Sāvaka* is just a *Buddha's* disciple who knows the true *Dhamma* because of the *Buddha's* teaching. *Pratyekabuddha* is the one who knows the true *Dhamma* by himself but he does not preach it to any other and only the *Buddha* who knows the true *Dhamma* by Himself preaches it to all beings. So, *Buddhayāna* is the highest path and it is named as *Mahāyāna*. These three *yānas* are also mentioned in *Theravāda* by the '*Bodhi*', namely *Sāvakabodhi*, *Paccekabodhi* and *Sammasambodhi*.

Further, *Mahāyāna* said that these three, *Śrāvaka*, *Pratyeka* and *Buddha* are equal such as regarding to their purification from defilement. That means that *Nirvāṇa* is not different from them. But according to *Theravāda* practicing *Pāramitā* is quite different from them.

QUESTION: DESCRIBE THE CHARACTERISTIC OF PERFECTIONS (*PĀRAMITĀ*) AS APPEARING IN *MAHĀYĀNA*

According to scripture which is leading to full enlightenment a *Bodhisatta* must practise the six or ten

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<sup>44</sup> I do not see any considerable similarity between *Theravāda pāramitās* and these ten *bhūmis*. The only similarity is that they are ten achievements, but it is quite evident that they are completely different.

*pāramī* (perfections). This important word '*pāramī*' has been also translated as 'transcendental virtue', 'perfect virtue', 'highest perfection', 'complete attainment'. The term *pāramī* is also found in *Divy 637,5, Mantrānāṃ pāramiṃ galāh*. In Pāli the term *pāramī* and *pāramitā* occur in the *Suttanipāta*, *Jātaka*, *Nettipakarana* and other treatises; and **T. W. Rhys Davids** and **W. Stede** translated it as 'completeness', 'perfection', 'highest state' (Pāli Dictionary). The six *pāramitās* are really the chief factors in *Bodhisatta's* discipline and the four additional *pāramitās* are merely supplement in character. The six *pāramitās* are mentioned and discussed in many passages of Buddhist Sanskrit literature, while the seventh, eighth, ninth and tenth are mentioned only in a few paragraphs and are not explained at a great length. Thus *Bo.(?) bhū.(?)* classifies each of the six chief *pāramitās* under nine separate headings, but it dismisses the other four *pāramitās* in a few sentences in another chapter. The *Da.(?) Bhū.(?)* definitely increases the number of the *pāramitās* to ten, as it teaches that a *Bodhisatta* practices one of the *pāramitās* in each of the ten *bhūmis* (stages) of his career. The six chief *pāramitās* are given as follows:<sup>45</sup>

1. *Dāna* (giving, generosity, liberty)
2. *Sīla* (virtuous conduct, morality, righteousness)
3. *Śanti* (forbearance, patience)
4. *Vīriya* (energy)
5. *Dhyāna* (rapture, musing)
6. *Prajñā* (wisdom)

The four supplementary *pāramitās* are the following:

7. *Upāya* or *Upāya-kauśalya* - skillfulness in the choice or adaptation of means for conversion of succour.(?)
8. *Pravidhana* – this stage is called 'the steadfastness' or 'immovability'. Its characteristic is the possession of supreme knowledge. It is well in action, the state of a divine mind, the state of consciousness of which we can have no conception. By now the *Bodhisatta* has lost the idea of duality. His sub-conscious intelligence is constantly acting in all kinds of merciful ways, but his conscious mind is quiet and serene.
9. *Bala* (power, strength)
10. *Jñāna* (wisdom)

The last four were lately added. Each of the *pāramitās* corresponds with ten *bhūmis* (ten stages) of spiritual progress. *Bodhisatta* is expected to teach his pupils each stage up to the time when all beings in this Universe have attained enlightenment at the last moment.

In the *Kathāvatthu Theravāda* maintains that the *Bodhisatta* cannot be born into various states at his own, free will.

**QUESTION: DESCRIBE THE EFFORT OF MAHĀYĀNISTS TO VALIDATE REBIRTH THROUGH 'THE TATHĀGATA-GARBHA' CONCEPT.**

The first word of the term *Tathāgata-garbha* means 'Perfect One' or '*Buddha*', while the second basically means either an embryo or a womb or other container. *Tathāgata-garbha* thus means something like 'embryonic Perfect One'. The *Tathāgata-garbha* then represents the '*Buddha*-potential' within all beings. In the *Tathāgata-garbha Sūtra* it is to be equivalent to the '*Buddha*-nature' and is affirmed by **the Buddha** to be 'complete with virtues and not different from oneself'. It is an emptiness which is itself full of possibilities, it is resplendent with the qualities of *Buddhahood*, beginningless, unchanging and permanent. It is beyond duality, having the nature of thought. Beings are seen as ignorant of this great inner treasure, but **the Buddha** reveals it to them so as to encourage them in spiritual development. Moreover,

<sup>45</sup> Terms are given in Sanskrit.

it is the *Tathāgata-garbha* which responds to spiritual teachings and aspires for *Nirvāṇa*.

In the *Tathāgata-garbha Sūtra* and *Ratnagotra-vibhaṅga* a number of metaphors are used to illustrate the relationship between the intrinsically pure *Tathāgata-garbha* and the 'stains of adventitious defilements' – greed, hatred, delusion etc. - which are said to obscure it. It is both like a *Buddha*-image wrapped in tattered rags, which suggests an unchanging perfection which has simply to be uncovered and also like the schools of a great tree piercing through the fruit from which it grows, suggesting that it is a potential in need of cultivation. Yet it has to be separated from accompanying impurities, just as gold-ore has to be refined so as to bring out and manifest the intrinsic purity of gold. In *Bodhisattvas* it is partly purified and in *Buddhas* it is wholly purified.

If the *Tathāgata-garbha* is the pure basis of successful spiritual striving, it is necessary to account for the existence of the alien defilements which hold living beings back from enlightenment. How do they co-exist in a being? The *Ratnagotra-vibhaṅga* sees the defilements as a 'shell' as beginningless as the 'stainless nature of mind' that it covers. The *Śrīmala-devī Sīhanāda Sūtra* says that defilements are ultimately rooted in beginningless ignorance but that only a *Buddha* can comprehend how the mind, whose inner nature is the intrinsically pure *Tathāgata-garbha* can be in any way associated with defilements. This is because the *Tathāgata-garbha* is seen as the eternal foundation and support of both the unconditioned, including 'inconceivable' *Buddha* qualities and the conditioned world of *Samsāra*. Quoting from the *Mahāyāna-Abhidharma Sūtra* the *Ratnagotra-vibhaṅga* equates the *Tathāgata-garbha* with the 'realm' (*dhātu*), or *Dhamma*-realm which is described thus:

„This realm is without beginning in time,

It is the common basis of all *dharmās*,

Because it exists, there also exist

All places of rebirth and full attainment of *Nirvāṇa*.“

Making the *Tathāgata-garbha* the basis of all, clearly implies that it is also the basis of the defilements and ignorance. The *Ratnagotra-vibhaṅga* supports this implication by saying that *karma* and the defilements are based on unsystematic attention, that this is based on 'the mind's purity', but that this 'true nature of mind' is itself without any further basis. The *Laṅkāvatara Sūtra* actually says that the *Tathāgata-garbha* „holds within the cause for both good and evil and by it all forms of existence are produced. Like an actor it takes on a variety of forms...“ In the final analysis, though(?) the *Tathāgata-garbha* texts seek to avoid any notion that genuine evil comes from the pure *Tathāgata-garbha*. (?) Thus is seen by the fact that the true *Nirvāṇa*, *Buddhahood*, is not regarded as the extinction of anything but as the 'Dhamma-body' or *Tathāgata*. This already exists, for(?) 'covered' by destroying real defilements but simply by not originating illusory ones and the illusory suffering to which they lead. Why these illusions should be imagined is still not explained, however, only a *Buddha* can know.

### ??? (BODHISATTA AND PĀRAMĪ IN THERAVĀDA AND MAHĀYĀNA)

???

In *Theravāda* Buddhism there is no *Bodhisatta* but '*Avihinihara*'. In order to become *Bodhisatta* one has to make up his mind and has to make determination. (This is something similar to **Nāgarjuna** Buddhism.)

In *Sattabhūmi* concepts (some Sanskrit texts) we find ten stages of development. each of these stages corresponds to one *pāramitā*. In *Mahāyāna* Buddhism basically there are six *pāramitās*. Later on these six *pāramitā* are very different from what we have in *Theravāda* Buddhism. They are:

1. *Dāna* (charity)
2. *Sīla* (morality)
3. *Kṣanti* (patience)
4. *Vīriya* (industriousness, effort)

5. *Dhyāna* (rapture, musing)

6. *Pragñā* (wisdom)

Later texts like *Lankāvatāra* and so on added four more:

7. *Upāya*

8. *Prarvidhāna*

9. *Bala* (power, strength)

10. *Gñāna* (knowledge)

Each of *pāramitā* corresponds to ten *bhūmi* (ten stages) of spiritual progress. *Bodhisatta* is expected to keep his vow<sup>46</sup> each stages up to the time when all beings in this Universe have attained enlightenment at the last moment.

The important doctrine which made *Mahāyāna* Buddhism spread are:

1. *Nirmāna kāya* (human body)

2. *Sambhoga kāya* (body of enjoyment)

3. *Dharma kāya* (universal principle, universal truth)

In these, according to *Mahyāna*, *Dharma kāya* is very important. *Dharma kāya* is which can be seen, can be experienced. In fact, the essence of universe of everything is *Dharma kāya*. *Buddha* is rather the appearance of *Dharma kāya*. According to *Theravāda*, there are only two *kāyas*. They are *Rūpa kāya* (refers to the body of the *Buddha*) and *Dhamma kāya* (refers to the teaching of the *Buddha*).

#### 666 COMPARE THE CONCEPT OF PARAMITA OF MAHAYANA AND THAT OF THE THERAVADA.

The concept of Paramita (Perfection) appears both in Mahayana and Theravada texts. Buddhavajsa, Cariyapitaka and Apadana-pali of Theravada; Mahayanasutralavkara, Bodhisattvabhumi, Dawabhumikasutra and other texts of Mahayana, give accounts on paramita concept.

In Pali Nikayas, paramita is not important, the 10 paramitas first appear in Buddhavajsa, and 7 are elucidated in Cariyapitaka. They are also known as 'Buddhakara Dhamma' in Buddhavamsa. It was only during the sub-commentary period that Dhammapala paid much attention on this doctrine.

The 10 paramitas of the Theravada, according to Buddhavamsa are: 1. Dana—Generosity, 2. Sila—Morality, 3. Nekkhamma—Renunciation, 4. Pabba—Wisdom, 5. Viriya—Energy, 6. Khanti—Patience, 7. Sacca—Truthfulness, 8. Adhitthana—Determination, 9. Metta—Loving-kindness and 10. Upekkha—Equanimity.

According to Dhammapala, these 10 qualities are called parami only when they are:

1. not spoiled by craving e.g., this is my dana
2. not spoiled by pride e.g., this dana is mine
3. not spoiled by wrong view e.g., this dana is myself
4. grounded on mahakaruna or great compassion and,
5. grounded on upaya-kosalla-bana or wisdom of skill in seeking merits

The number of paramita in Mahayana is generally accepted as 6 i.e., dana, sila, ksanti, virya, dhyana and prajba. List of 10 paramitas (in addition to 6 plus upaya-kausala, pranidhana, bala and jvana) are also found in Buddhist Sanskrit literature. The Abhidharma-mahavibhasawastra records the 6 paramitas, which, according to the Sarvastivadins, is erroneous, and the number must be 4 since ksanti is included in sila, and dhyana in prajba. This position was also taken by the Kashmirian Vaibhasikas. Further, the Tibetan literature has a

46 In the original there was 'text his pupils'. I substituted it according to my knowledge. What was the original idea, that is a mystery.

treatise on 5 paramitas. Various authorities speak of different numbers may suggest that the doctrine of paramitas was the result of a gradual growth.

E.J.Thomas believes that the first 6 paramitas are original, as it ends with the attainment of wisdom (prajba). Har Dayal also says that the first 6 are the chief factors in a bodhisattva's discipline, and the additional 4 are merely supplementary in character. He surmises that the number was raised to 10 as a result of the decimal system of computation in the science of arithmetic in the 3<sup>rd</sup> or 4<sup>th</sup> century AD.

Since the concept of paramita is difficult to trace in the Pali Nikayas, some scholars infer that it was most probably introduced from other schools. They believe that there existed a Sanskrit form of the Buddhavamsa. Ven. H. Banavasa has in fact attempted to show some parallel passages between the Pali Buddhavamsa and the Sanskrit Mahavastu.

Paramitas like nekkhamma, sacca, adhitthana, metta and upekkha are mentioned only in the Pali list. Har Dayal believes that paramita doctrine was developed out of the three fundamental training in early Buddhism; viz, sila, samadhi and pabba. Vasubandhu in his Mahayanasutralavkara commentary also explains that the 6 paramitas are fundamental related to adhisila, adhicitta and adhiprajba. Though, the Pali list lacks samadhi, Dharmapala took metta and upekkha as forms of samadhi.

3 degrees of paramitas are mentioned in both traditions: paramita, upaparamita and paramattha-paramita, hence the number of 10 was raised to 30. In Cariyapitakaatthakatha, Dharmapala, on the other hand, reduced the 10 paramita to 6: nekkhamma and sacca are included in silaparamita, metta and upekkha in jhanaparamita, and adhitthanaparamita is included in all the 6.

With regard to the order of paramita, Mahayana list based on the 10 stages of Bhumi concept. Theravada, according to Dharmapala, explained the order with 'desanakkama' (order of preaching). Sumedha discovered them in this particular sequence

giving is the great support of virtue and easy to practice, therefore giving comes first. Giving possessed of morality is of greater fruit and advantage, therefore after giving should come morality....'.

Each perfection must be fortified by the following one. From here, it is clear that, why pabbaparamita is not placed at the final list of the Theravada though it is considered the ultimate attainment of a Bodhisattva.

Both Theravada and Mahayana agree that the practice of paramita require an immeasurable period of time. And both of them also maintain that, only by fulfilling all these paramitas, a bodhisatta can only become a Sammasambodhi Buddha.

#### **BODHISATTA IDEAL AND WAY OF LIVING (LECTURED BY VEN. SĪLAVAMSA)**

The first conception of *Mahāyāna* is that of *Bodhisatta*. The *Bodhisatta* is the 'future *Buddha*' and we all have already taken *Bodhisatta* vows and are already on the first rung of the ladder of *Bodhisattaship*. This thought gives a great impetus to lead the Buddhist life.

There are two views of the *Bodhisatta*. First in its broader and more popular sense and as the name for those who take the vows to realize their ideals on the way to *Buddhahood* and secondly as the name for those who are very striving for enlightenment of the sentient beings (human beings) through the practice of the four great vows and the *pāramitā*. These four vows are:

1. To save all beings
2. To destroy all evil passions
3. To learn the truth and teach it
4. To lead all beings towards *Buddhahood*

*Sakyamuni* was himself a *Bodhisatta* and in the *Jātaka* tales<sup>47</sup> we are given the stories which tell us of His previous lives as animals and as man in each of which he practiced compassion and worked for the welfare of others.

In *Hīnayāna* Buddhism<sup>48</sup> the followers of **the Buddha** were taught to become not *Bodhisattas* but *Arahants*. But *Mahāyānists* wanted to make every being like *Sākyamuni*, they wanted lavishly distribute the bliss of enlightenment and they wanted to remove all the barriers that were supposed to lie between the *Buddhahood* and common humanity.

The great difference between the *Bodhisatta* and *Arahant* is that the *Arahant* intends upon his own enlightenment and liberation while the *Bodhisatta* wishes to help all creatures and bring them to full enlightenment in order to do this, although qualified for *Nibbāna*. He voluntarily renounces it in order to remain in the world to help all creatures, man and animals.

(1) The first step on the much/march(?) of *Bodhisatta* is the moment when he takes vows which according to **Santideva** in his book *Bodhicaritara* are as follows:

1. The sins accumulated connected in my former existences, accumulated in all features are infinite and omnipotent.(?) By what power can we be conquered? It is not by the desire of *Bodhis*, by the desire to become *Buddha* or salvation of man? This totally disinterested desire is infinitely sacred. It covers a multitude of sins.  
(?)

2. I worship **the Buddha** and *Bodhisatta* with a view to understand the vow of *Bodhi*. Processing nothing by reason of my sins, how can I render unto them the worship? This is their due(?) but I am wrong.(?)

According to *Mahāyāna* Buddhism it may be interesting to consider that ten stages of the *Bodhisatta* are somewhat different from the *pāramitā* taught in *Theravāda* Buddhism. The first is that of 'joy' (*pramudita*), as the cause by the fruit of His actions and meditation. He is born in the family of **Buddha**. he feels joy in his affection for **the Buddha** to enjoy, in the fact, that he is devoting himself to the work of *Bodhisatta*. He also takes joy in his feeling of goodwill to all creatures and to the vows which He has made. Fears disappear and he devotes himself to honor **the Buddha** helping all creatures and preaching the law. His chief thought is not „may I become a *Buddha* and attain *Nibbāna*“ but „may I become a *Buddha* in order to help every creature who may have recourse in me. Here we are reminded of **Amita** and vows or *Bhagavāt*. If those beings who have directed their thoughts towards the higher perfect knowledge, in other words, and who having heard my name when I have obtained 'knowledge', have meditated on me having thought if at the moment of their death, having approached them surrounded by an assembly of *bhikkhus* I should not stand before them, worshiped by them that is to show that their thought should not be troubled, then may I not attain the higher perfect knowledge.“

In our own lives we can cultivate this expect/expectation(?) to joy, we can make an imitation of *Bodhisatta*, even though we cannot practice it as yet perfectly. The religious life should be joyful. The very thought of belonging to the family of **Buddha** ought to bring the greatest happiness and as many *sūtras* say perfume our lives with their thoughts or actions.

(2) The second stage of *Bodhisatta* is that of the immaculate (*vimala*) which is attained by the practice of morality or *sīla*. Here again, we, ordinary beings may strive to imitate the *Bodhisatta* practicing morality as best we can, do this as we free ourselves from the limited conception of ego. The *Bodhisatta* not only lives according to the precepts but urges others to do so, both by teaching and example. Here he is walking in the Noble Eightfold Path.

(3) The third stage is called the illuminating (*prabhakari*). Here he reflects upon the nature of things and

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47 In the original there was 'tails'...

48 There is no *Hīnayāna* Buddhism in this world. This is an outmoded term and no good scholar uses it. Correct term is *Theravāda*.

practices patience, which really means furtherance towards people and things as they are. Patience or forbearance is one of the chief *Mahāyāna* Buddhist virtues. To be tolerant and patient with the sin, frailties, vanities and oddities of others are important virtues. Most of us can imitate the *Buddha* here with great advantage to ourselves and others.

(4) The fourth stage is called radiant (*achismati*). It is the stage in which the greatest energy must be practiced. There *the Bodhisatta* practices most strenuously good word as well as meditation,

(5) but in the fifth stage *sudurjaya* meditation predominates. Without meditation how it is possible to attain knowledge. Further *Bodhisatta* is viewed of example of the emphasis desirability of meditation. Through meditation, we can grow the truth which leads to the reign of *prajñā* (*transcendental knowledge*).

(6) And the sixth stage called 'the turned towards' (*adhimukti*), there is he now an *Arahant* and *Bodhisatta*. His mind is open and clear and he shines as it were by the light of *prajñā*. The *Bodhisatta* is now very high being indeed, so high that our ordinary relative minds cannot follow him. To understand Him now we must ourselves stand where He is. The *Hīnayāna* does not mention any further stages but the *mahāyāna* conceives of three more.

(7) The seventh is the 'far going' (*durāṅgama*). He is now skilled in all means of sending others to *Bodhi*. This stage includes all the fruits of the previous six and gives the full development of intelligence of the *Bodhisatta*. Although He has no longer a worldly thought, He can through His great compassion assist others in their troubles in this world. He turns over His merits to assist them. The conception of magical body (miracle) in *Mahāyāna* is interesting. In order to help beings, the *Bodhisatta* may assume any form He wishes. He may become any kind of man or woman. He may assume the form of deity in which to appear to devotee. He may take any form, high or low if thereby He can carry out His benevolence and mercy not nearly to human beings but to animals and plants and the very dust on which he treats.(?) This is a noble teaching of *Mahāyāna* Buddhism that all life is one and that the *dharmakāya* is manifested in all forms. This is why we should treat animals with kindness and care for plants rather than think that lower forms of life only exists for the benefit of higher forms and have no significance of their own. In *Mahāyāna* Buddhism, all are of value for all are expressions of *dharmakāya*.

(8) The eighth stage is called the 'steadfast' or 'immovable'. Its characteristic is the position of supreme knowledge. It is well in action, the state of a divine mind, the state of consciousness of which we can have no conception. By now, the *Bodhisatta* has lost the idea of duality. His sub-consciousness, intelligence is constantly acting in all kinds of merciful ways but his conscious mind is quiet and serene.

(9) This stage gives way to ninth that is of 'the good' (*sādhumati*) and the preacher of the law.

(10) In the tenth 'cloud of the law' (*dharmamegha*) is the arrival at the end. The *Bodhisatta* realizes the last of the *samādhi* and the *Buddha* consecrates him. He has now all the powers and characteristics of a *Buddha*. He is the personification of love and sympathy. He has reached the higher principle next to **the Buddha**. He is now enshrined in the heart of the *dharmakāya*. The goal is reached, but he is still a *Bodhisatta* in the sense that He is manifested as *Dharmakāya* who helps creatures and prepare them in turn for *Buddhaship* and *Buddhahood*.<sup>49</sup>

*Dāna pāramitā* which means 'generosity', 'charity', 'giving', materially in the forms of calm and mental spiritual, giving to is appeared emphatically. In *Mahāyāna* Buddhist text writing a book, educating a child, delivering a sermon, preparing a meal, washing dishes, living once own life as well as possible are regarded as *dāna* because they are beneficial for all living beings. *Dāna* expresses itself not only in liberality and alms giving but in being amicable and sympathetic for others in their joys and sorrows. It also includes a willingness

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49 What is the difference between *Buddhaship* and *Buddhahood*? That's a question...

to give all one's acquired merits for the salvation of others.

The second *pāramitā* is *kṣanti* (patience) which, as mentioned before, is a kind of forbearance. The aspirant to *Buddhahood* never grows angry, in patience or excitement over that is done by ignorant person for he must ever keep in mind that all trouble is due to causes.

Enerby (*vīriya*) is fourth *pāramitā*. In order to treat the path, it is necessary to be energetic and strenuous not to give way to weakness or discouragement, not to become attached to worldly pleasure and to keep one's resolution straw(?).(?)

The fifth *pāramitā* is *dhyāna*, contemplation or meditation. buddhism has many systems of meditation and *Mahāyāna* is specially rich in this field. Whatever is chosen it is purpose for acquiring pure knowledge that will help us on our path and prepare us for the realization of the truth.

The sixth *pāramitā* is knowledge or wisdom (*prajñā*) which is supreme virtue, although to attend is all the *pāramitā* should be practised equally.(?) Its complete position is same like *Nirvāṇa*. We, ordinary beings, can only try ot have glimpse of the full splendor of *prajñā* which the *Bodhisatta* reflects.

#### **QUESTION: DISCUSS THE *BODHISATTA* CONCEPT IN *THERAVĀDA***

There are broadly two types of *Bodhisatta* in the *nikāyas*. One is the *Bodhisatta* referring to the state before the attainment of enlightenment in the life of **Gotama Buddha** and the other is *Bodhisatta* used as a generic term referring to the previous existences of any *Buddha* in the past.

In *Khuddaka Nikāya* the word '*Bodhisatta*' does not occur as often as in the other four *nikāyas*. However, it is in this *nikāya*, particularly in those texts which are said to be of a late origin in the chronology of the Pāli canonical texts (like the *Cariyāpiṭaka* and *Buddhavaṃsa*). Thus we find a further development in the concept of *Bodhisatta* in *Theravāda* Buddhism.

The *Buddhavaṃsa* is entirely based on the history of **Gotama Buddha's** career as *Bodhisattva* from the time that He made His resolution before **Dīpankara Buddha** to become a *Buddha* in the future. He was then known as **Sumedha** and had to spend an incalculable length of time (*asankheyya*) before finally becoming **the Buddha**. Under each and every past *Buddha* **Gotama Bodhisattva** received a prediction that He would be the *Buddha* named **Gotama** in a distant future. Eight conditions (*atthadhamma*) are mentioned as preconditions for anyone to aspire to be a *Bodhisattva*. Further then perfection (*pāramī*) have to be practiced and fulfilled. The *Jātaka* stories illustrate as far as 547 accounts of the *pāramīs* **the Buddha** practiced in his previous existences.

In the *Kathāvatthu*, *Theravāda* maintains that the *Bodhisattva* cannot be born into various states at his own free will. The argument put forward by them is based on the contention that if the proposition of the *Andhakas* were accepted the very basis of the *kamma* theory would be at stake. While the *Andhakas* emphasize the compassionate nature of the *Bodhisattva*, the *Theravādins* maintain that even the *Bodhisattva* is not exception to the law of *kamma*. Subsequently, in the *Aṭṭhakathā* literature, the *Theravāda* in order to glorify and apotheosize(?) **the Buddha** or the *Buddhas* had to give way to the emphasis on the altruistic nature of the *Bodhisattva* advocated especially by **Dhammapāla** in his exegesis on *karunā* or compassion of the **Buddha**. Hence, expressions like »*karunāya dukkhaṃ sampaticchati*« - „by compassion [the *Bodhisattva*] accepts suffering“ - is a testimony to the direction into which even the *Theravādins* were drawn regarding the doctrine of *Bodhisattva*.

The position taken by the *Theravādins* in the *Kathāvatthu* suggests that the *Bodhisattva* is treated as a being not different from the other mendicants, whose attainments are not yet perfect. The *Theravādins* did not want to make any distinction between the disciples (*sāvaka*) and the *Buddha-to-be* (*Bodhisattva*) as **N. Dutt** puts it. This fact is in direct contrast to what we find in *Aṭṭhakathā* texts. But this interpretation of a quality between the mendicants and *Bodhisatta* is not a special feature of *Theravāda* Buddhism alone. In early *Mahāyāna* texts the same idea is also expressed though the *Bodhisatta* is at the same time depicted as being superior to the *Arahants*.

The position taken by the *Theravādins* in the *Kathāvatthu* testifies that it was sort of reaction and reassertion against various new developments taken place in the Buddhist community at that time. The main feature discernable in the proposition advocated by the different schools is directed towards drawing a line of demarcation between the *Bodhisatta* and the ordinary disciples. The *Kathāvatthu* however does not go beyond the boundary of descriptions and explanations about the *Bodhisatta* found in the Pāli Canon. Therefore, the *Bodhisatta* is described and conceptualized always with **Gotama Buddha** in mind. In short, **Gotama Bodhisattva** is the model for all *Bodhisattvas*, which fact continues also in the later texts and forms the nucleus of the concept of *Bodhisattva* in *Theravāda* tradition.

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While in the commentary **Ācariya Dhammapāla** classified the *Bodhisattas* into three classes as

1. *Mahā-Bodhisattata*
2. *Pacceka-Bodhisatta*
3. *Sāvaka-Bodhisatta*

(*Thag.*A.1.92), this suggests three kinds of enlightenment or *sambodhi*, namely:

1. The full enlightenment (*sammā sambodhi*)
2. The enlightenment of a private (*pacceka*) *Buddha* (*pacceka sambodhi*)
3. The enlightenment of a disciple (*sāvaka-sambodhi*).

The first one is defined to be the realization and causing the realization of all *dhammās* rightly and by oneself while the second is the realization of truth not known before, through self-awakened knowledge. The last is the realization of the truth by the disciples, who became enlightened after hearing **the Buddha's** preaching. This implies an ideal interpretation of the distinction among *Buddhas*, *Paccekabuddhas* and *Sāvakas* regarding the mode of attaining the final goal. This development is no doubt the result of a clear distinction the *Theravādins* tried to make among the enlightened. Emphasis is laid on the supremacy of *Buddhahood*.

Eight conditions (*atthadhammā*) are reckoned as preconditions for anyone to aspire to be a *Bodhisatta*. Further, ten perfections (*pāramī*) have to be practiced and fulfilled. The *Jātaka* stories illustrate as far as 547 accounts of the *pāramīs* that **Gotama Buddha** practiced in his previous existences.

Although the basic perfection s are ten in number, the commentarial texts (the *Petavatthu Aṭṭhakathā* and the *Aṅguttara Nikāya Aṭṭhakathā*) reckon 30. To the ten basic perfections (*pāramī*) are added the degrees of the 'higher' ten perfections (*upa-pāramī*) plus the degrees of the 'ultimate' ten perfections (*paramattha-pāramī*). Thus these are the adaptation of the ten basic perfection into three levels of intensity.

Furthermore, the ten basic perfections are sometimes specified as *sāvaka-pāramī* (VvA.2) when implying to those fulfilled by the *sāvaka-bodhisatta* or the disciples. Though it is generally noticed that the term

'*Bodhisatta*' in early Buddhism is to designate either the previous existence of **Gotama Buddha**, or of those of the past and future, which are of theoretical outcome, the disciples too came to be recognized as *Bodhisattas*. This may have been derived of the influence and interaction among new overall elaboration of the *Buddha* concept and the *Bodhisatta* doctrine, particularly of the commentarial tradition.

#### THE CONCEPT OF *BODHISATTA* IN CANON AND COMMENTARIES

In the Pāli scriptures, the designation *Bodhisatta* is given to **prince Sidhatta** before His enlightenment and during His former lives. Thus the concept of *Bodhisatta* in *Theravāda* normally regards an unenlightened being or **Buddha-to-be**, whereas *Mahāyānists* maintained that there are enlightened as well as unenlightened *Bodhisattas*.

In many places of the *suttas* when narrating his quest for the truth, **the Buddha** always repeats the statement: »*Pubbeva sambodha anabhisambodha bodhisatto'va samano.*« - „Before enlightenment and yet to be enlightened, as a *Bodhisatta*.“ This shows that **the Buddha** named himself as a *Bodhisatta* when he was searching for enlightenment.

In early *suttas*, two types of *Bodhi* are mentioned, i.e., *Sammā-sambodhi* and *Pacceka-buddhabodhi*. However, in the *Madhurattavilāsini*, the commentary of *Buddhavaṃsa*, two different types of *Bodhi* are mentioned, i.e., *Arahantabodhi* and *Sabbabbubodhi*. Another type of *Bodhi* called *Sāvaka-bodhi* is also found in the *Theragāthā Aṭṭhakathā*. Thus there are five types of *Bodhi* in *Theravāda*, viz.

1. *Sammā-sambodhi*
2. *Pacceka-buddhabodhi*
3. *Arahantabodhi*
4. *Sabbabbubodhi*
5. *Sāvaka-bodhi*.

*Sammā-sambodhi* and *Sabbabbubodhi* are similar, both refer to the *Buddha*, whereas *Arahantabodhi* and *Sāvaka-bodhi* are similar referring to *Arahant*.

Some scholars have translated the term '*Bodhisatta*' as 'enlightened being'. Such translation implies that *Bodhisatta* is equal to *Buddha*. Although literary such translation has no fault, but doctrinally, *Bodhisattva* still has not attained enlightenment. There are textual evidences to prove that *Bodhisatta* is not an enlightened being:

##### (1) *Nikāyas*

In *nikāyas* when narrating his quest for the Truth, **the Buddha** always repeated the statement »*Pubbeva sambodha anabhisambodha bodhisatto'va samano.*« - „Before enlightenment and yet to be enlightened as a *Bodhisatta*.“ This statement suggests that *Bodhisatta* is not an enlightened being but still on the way of struggling for enlightenment. Such statement occurs in the *Ariyapariyesana Sutta*.

##### (2) *Buddhavaṃsa* and *Mahāvātthu*

In *Mahāvātthu/Buddhavaṃsa*(?) as well as in *Mahāvātthu* it is said that due to the compassion towards worldly beings, although having the capability and qualities to attain enlightenment, **ascetic Sumedha** postponed such attainment and made a resolution before **Dīpaṅkara Buddha** that he would become a *Buddha*. This shows that **Bodhisatta Sumedha** had not attained enlightenment.

Therefore, the commentary on *Dīgha Nikāya* defines the term '*Bodhisatta*' as ???

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??? *Dhamma*' in *Buddhavaṃsa*. It was only during the sub-commentary period that **Dhammapāla** paid much attention on this doctrine. The 10 *pāramitās* according to *Buddhavaṃsa* are:<sup>50</sup>

1. *Dāna* (generosity)
2. *Sīla* (morality)
3. *Nekkhamma* (renunciation)

50 71. “*Dānaṃ sīlaṅca nekkhammaṃ, paññāvīriyaṅca kīdisaṃ;*

*Khantisaccamadhiṭṭhānaṃ, mettupekkhā ca kīdisā.*

77. “*Dasa pāramī tayā dhīra, kīdisī lokanāyaka;*

*Kathaṃ upapāramī puñṇā, paramatthapāramī kathaṃ’.*

(*Khuddaka Nikāya – Buddhavaṃsapāli – Ratanacāṅkamanakaṇḍaṃ*)

4. *Paññā*<sup>51</sup> (wisdom)
5. *Vīriya* (effort)
6. *Khanti* (patience)
7. *Sacca* (truth)
8. *Adhiṭṭhāna* (determination)
9. *Mettā* (loving kindness)
10. *Upekkhā* (equanimity)

According to **Dhammapāla** in his *Paramatthadīpanī* these 10 qualities are called *pāramī* only when they are:

1. Not spoiled by craving - e.g., „This is my *dāna*.“
2. Not spoiled by pride – e.g. „This *dāna* is mine.“
3. Not spoiled by wrong view – e.g. „This *dāna* is myself.“
4. Grounded on *Mahākaruṇā* or great compassion
5. Grounded on *upāya-kosalla-bana* or wisdom of skill in seeking merits.

In *Paramatthajotikā*, commentary composed on the *Suttanipāta* there are mentioned 3 kinds of *Bodhisattas* and different length of their careers:

1. *Paññādhika* – who is developed better in *paññā* faculty, but less in *saddhā* and even less in *vīriya*. The period is 4 *asaṅkhayyāni* and 100 000 *kappas*.
2. *Vīriyadhika* – who is developed better in *vīriya* faculty but less in *paññā* and even less in *saddhā*. The period is 8 *asaṅkhayyāni* and 100 000 *kappas*.
3. *Saddhādhika* – who is developed better his *saddhā* faculty but less in *vīriya* and even less in *paññā*. The period is 16 *asaṅkhayyāni* and 100 000 *kappas*.

???

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??? which results in the immediately following

- (11) *Kutthī* (leprosy)
- (12) Smaller than a quail or larger than an elephant in size, if born as an animal.
- (13) Among the *khuppipasikanijjhamatanhika petas*
- (14) Among the *kālākabījakas* or in *Āvīci* or *lokantarika nirayas*
- (15) If born in *kāmāvacara*, as a *Māra*
- (16) If born in the *rūpāvacara* among those lacking in consciousness (*asabbibhava*) or in the pure abode (*suddhāvāsā*)
- (17) In the *arūpa* world
- (18) In another world-system (*abba-cakkavāla*)

3. The *Samyutta Nikāya* mentions that a *Bodhisatta* should develop 6 kinds of intentions (*ajjhasaya*):

- a) *Nekkhammajjhasaya* – renunciation or giving up 5 kinds of sensual pleasure
- b) *Pavivekajjhasaya* – solitude or non-delightedness in company. In the *Khaggavisana Sutta* of *Samyutta Nikāya* solitude is very much appreciated by **the Buddha**. According to some scholars, the *Khaggavisana* is referring to *Paccekabuddha*.
- c) *Alobhajjhasaya* – generosity or having the intention to give even if the *Bodhisatta* has nothing to give.
- d) *Adosajjhasaya* – intention of non-hatred. Here *adosa* can mean *mettā*.
- e) *Amohajjhasaya* – intention of improving one's own wisdom. This is the most important part of a *Bodhisatta*. He has to know what is *paññā*<sup>52</sup> and what is *pāpa*.
- f) *Nissaranajjhasaya* – intention to free oneself from *samsāra*. The *Bodhisatta* has realized the fault of all kinds of existences.

With these 6 intentions a *Bodhisatta* is said to be able to perfect the *pāramitās* easily.

51 In the original there instead of *paññā* there is *pabba*. This kind of substitution is throughout whole the original comprising of 5 pages (but page 2 and 4 are missing...). I couldn't find the word *pabba* in my Pāli-English dictionary, therefore I present it as *paññā*, which is, however, correct..

52 In the original there was '*pubba*'.

THE *BODHISATTA* IDEAL IN *THERAVĀDA* AND *MAHĀYĀNA* BUDDHISM (LECTURED BY PROF. TILAK KARIYAWASAM) (FEBRUARY 2001)

*Bodhisatta* is a person who aspires to become a *Buddha*. The word *Bodhisatta* can be found in the *Majjhima Nikāya* as well as in *Dīgha Nikāya*. This word became very important because it contains the relevant sources for the development of *Bodhisatta* doctrine in the later period.

We can see the sources of *Bodhisatta* doctrine which are in *Theravāda piṭakas* and commentaries. As we know, the *Tipiṭaka* contains three major baskets, in which *Sutta Piṭaka* and *Vinaya Piṭaka* contain the earliest records. We can see in detail from the following chart:

<i>Sutta Piṭaka</i>	<i>Vinaya Piṭaka</i>	<i>Abhidhamma Piṭaka</i>
<i>Dīgha Nikāya</i>		
<i>Majjhima Nikāya</i>		
<i>Samyutta Nikāya</i>		
<i>Aṅguttara Nikāya</i>		
<i>Khuddaka Nikāya</i> *		

\* Some portions of it contain early sources, i.e. Chp 1 & 2 of *Suttanipāta*, *Thera-* and *Therīgāthā*<sup>53</sup>

Common consensus that it was later than the above mentioned.(?) We can find out the sources of *Bodhisatta* doctrine in the following *suttas* of *Majjhima Nikāya*:

1. *Mahāsīhanāda Sutta* (S<sup>54</sup> no. 12) – Greater Discourse on the Lion's Roar
2. *Bhayabherava Sutta* (S no. 4) – Discourse on the Fear and Dread
3. *Ariyapariyesana Sutta* (S no. 26) – Discourse on the Noble Search
4. *Dvedhavitakka Sutta* (S no. 19) – Discourse on the Twofold Thought
5. *Acchariya Abbhūta Dhamma* (S no. 123) – Discourse on Strange and Wonderful Things

These discourses contain birth story of **Siddhatta** (Skt. **Siddhārta**) *Bodhisatta* before his enlightenment, hence it starts from his birth till the age of 35 when he attained enlightenment. This period was considered as an important period for the further development of *Bodhisatta's* doctrine in later time.

Brief account on the above mentioned *suttas*:

1. *Mahāsīhanāda Sutta*

In this *sutta* **Siddhatta** *Bodhisatta* mentions how He spent His time to undergo much suffering which He was following asceticism to become a *Buddha*. Here we can gather the general idea during 6<sup>th</sup> century BC that anyone who wanted to get higher achievement had to undergo the austere ascetic practice. **The Buddha** without exception when He had underwent these practices He was the forerunner(?) of these ascetic practices. In His own statement He said: „**Sāriputta**, I recall having lived a holy life possessing four factors. I have practiced asceticism – the extreme of asceticism; I have practiced coarseness – the extreme of coarseness; I have practiced scrupulousness – the extreme of scrupulousness; I have practiced seclusion – the extreme of seclusion.“

During that time the four kinds of asceticism were:

1. *Tāpassi* – (p. 78) „Such was my asceticism, **Sāriputta**, that I went naked, rejecting inventions(?), licking my hands, not coming when asked, not stopping when asked; I did not accept food brought or food specially made or an invitation to a meal. ... Thus in such a variety of ways I dwelt pursuing the practice of tormenting and mortifying the body. Such was my asceticism.

**666 THE DOCTRINE OF YANA 1/8/2002**

The Yana doctrine is another diverging point Mahayana from the Hinayana. The word ‘Yana’ cannot be

53 Many parts of *Tipiṭaka* were 'constructed' after **the Buddha's** death. Today it is hard to say what was said by **the Buddha** and what were the fabrications made by 'theras'. If we like the particular *sutta*, we say: it was said by **Buddha**. If we don't like, we say: „this was of a later production.“ You can see that behavior on yourself when you are confronted with a Muslim explaining you mistakes in *Tipiṭaka*.

54 I did not discover what is 'S'.

traced in the pali canon, but R. Kimura in his book 'A Historical Study of the terms Hinayana and Mahayana and the origin of Mahayana Buddhism' says that the word 'Ekayana' is in the pali canon. Though he says that we can find in the pali canon only the word Ekayana. (M.N. & D.N. Satipatthana sutta can find the word Ekayana)

As he says we can find in the Prajnaparamita sutras, Saddharmapundarika sutras and in the Avatamsaka sutra how the Doctrine of Yana had been developed. In those sutras the words 'Ekayana, Agrayana, Anuttarayana, Paramayana, Uttamayana, Bodhisattvayana and Buddhayana have been used which are similar to the word 'Mahayana'.

In the early Mahayana sutras the words Wravakayana, Pratyekabuddhayana and Bodhisattvayana are appeared. Pratyekabuddhayana and the Wravakayana the two have been denoted by the word 'Hinayana'.

In the Saddharmapundarika sutra more often the word 'Buddhayana' has been mentioned to indicate Bodhisattvayana. The word Buddhayana has been mentioned because of the fact that Bodhisattva's aim is to attain the enlightenment by following this Yana.

It is the intention of Saddharmapundarika to unite three Yanas together. That is why the word Ekayana has been used.

At the very beginning of the sutra, Ven. Sariputra requested to the Buddha to preach the sutra. But the Buddha mentioned that 'It is no use of preaching this sutra because the people including Devas in this world will be frightened to listen to this sutra'. (Alam waruputra anenarthena prakasitena, utrasisyati wariputra ayam sadevako lokasminnarthe vyakriyamane). This is true in the sense that Saddharmapundarika sutra mentions that the two yanans Wravakayana and Pratyekabuddhayana are false yanans. The problem lies here if the above mentioned two yanans are false what will be the position of Wravaka and Pratyekabuddhas. The answer is given in the Saddharmapundarika sutra is that they will attain into enlightenment by the Buddhayana. In this manner the Saddharmapundarika sutra mentions that only one yana exists. That is Ekayana and there is no second yana or the third yana. (Ekamhi yanam dvitiam na vidyate tritiam hi naivasti kadaci loke).

It is further added that even to achieve the position of Wravaka or Pratyekabuddha they have to accept that there is only one yana exists and no second. However may as to Saddharmapundarika sutra if one wants to get the knowledge of Buddha (Buddhajbana) he needs the Bodhisattvayana. In the Mahayana sutra the concept of the Bodhisattva has been specially developed.

According to Keith 'Buddhist Philosophy' p.288, the Mahayanists get the credit of developing the Bodhisattva ideal. But E.J. Thomas does not agree with this idea in his 'The History of Buddhist Thought' p.200. He thinks that Theravada and Mahayana both the traditions were influenced by some early texts which do not exist any more. But it is very difficult to give a primary text which were influenced by the both traditions but rather possible to think that these traditions were influenced by each other for the development of these concepts.

According to the available sources the Mahavastu can be considered as the primary text to develop the concept of the Bodhisattva. But it is not a Mahayana text. This is a text of Mahasanghika but the explanation given in this text is similar to Theravada tradition.

Nalinaksha Dutt in his "Aspects of Mahayana and its relation to Hinayana" mentions that Mahasanghikas are Hinayanists and mentions:

- (1) Theravada Prakarana
- (2) Mahasanghika are Hinayanists.
- (3) Sarvastivada

But in the Mahavastu there is no mention with regard to that everybody will be Bodhisattvas. But explain the Bodhisattva career of Sakyamuni Buddha.

In the Saddharmapundarika sutra mentioned that if anyone worships the relics of the Buddha he will be qualified to be a Bodhisattva. In the Book of Hirakawa Akira (Tr. Paul Groner) "A History of Modern Buddhism – from Sakyamuni to Early Mahayana in a separate chapter called 'Relics worship and Mahayana

Buddhism'. It is mentioned that because of the relics worship (stupa worship) Mahayana was originated.

Importance of Relics worship has been mentioned in the Saddharmapundarika sutra and Culasukhavativyuha sutra.

Lay devotees were more engaged in Stupa worship who could not practise the Vinaya and enter to the Order of Sangha. Those worshippers lived near by Stupas and they meditated on Buddha. And there have been groups (Bodhisattvagana). These people were called Bodhisattvas.

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In the Mahavastu it is mentioned that there are four kinds of Bodhisattva careers:

“catvarimani bodhisattvanam

bodhisattva caryani katamani

catvari? Prakrti carya, Pranidhana carya, anuloma carya, anivartana carya.”

These four stages are the careers of Bodhisattvas. What are the four? They are the natural career, the resolving career, the conforming career and the perserving career.

### 1. Prakrti Carya

When he lives as an ordinary natural life as home. It is the nature of Bodhisattvas in the world to respect mother and father, to be well disposed to recluse and Brahmanas, to honour their elders, to practice ten right ways of behaviour (dawakuwala karmapattham) to exhort others to give alms and acquire merit, and to honour contemporary Buddhas and their disciples. But as yet they do not conceive the thought of winning the unsurpassed perfect enlightenment.

(Iha mahamandgalyayana bodhisattva praktirevam Bhavanti matrbah pitrbah sramaynya brahmanyah kulajyestapacayakah dawakuwalam karmapatham samadaya vartante paresam dewayanti danani detha karotha punyaniti, tistantanca Buddham)

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pujayanti Wravakanca no ca tavadanuttaraya. Samyak sambodhaye cittamutapadenti (Mahavastu, p.46)

The important factor here is the prior to become a Proper Bodhisattva the intended person should be a pious and devoted person who is spending his life according to dharma. Another important factor here is that he should not generate a thought of becoming a Bodhisattva yet. (Bodhicittopada).

### 2. Pranidhana Carya

Means that in which he 'vows' to win enlightenment. When (the Bodhisattva) laid up an abundant store of merit, and have body and mind well developed, they approach the beautiful Buddhas and turn their thoughts to enlightenment and vowed.

‘Te yada vipula punyasamcaya; Bhonti bhavita sariramanasa; Te upetya varjnupadharino; Bodhaye upajanenti manasaj’ and vowed. (Mahavastu)

Three vows:

(1) By the power of merit I laid up in a store, may I have insight into all things. May not my vow come to naught.

(2) May my store of the root of merit be great enough for all living beings. Whatever evil deed has been done for me, may I alone reap its bitter fruit.

(3) May I be like the other Buddhas and may I set rolling the wheel of Dharma that has no equal.

While explaining this resolving career (pranidhana carya) the Buddha revealed that when he met the Buddha Sakyamuni (in his previous life) in the city named Kapilavatthu, he was being a merchant at that time offered milk rice to Buddha and he made first vow.

After that incalculable kalpa afterwards, there was a Buddha called Samitavin. At that time as a universal monarch he made a vow to be a Buddha like that Buddha Samitavin. He (the Buddha) checked it when he becomes a Buddha.

At the time of the Buddha Parvata as King Arka the Bodhisattva offered eighty thousand caves adorned with seven precious substances and vowed.

In that way, Siddhartha Gautama Buddha in his previous lives made vows in front of 300 kotis of Buddhas, in the name of Sakyamuni. Eight hundred thousand of Buddhas is the name of Dipankara. 500 Buddhas in the name of Pradyota, 3 kotis Puspa, 18 thousand in the name of Maradhvaja. All these Buddhas made their proclamations of Siddhartha Buddha.

### 3. Anuloma Carya

This is the career of the Bodhisattva when he fulfils the Ten Bhumis.

### 4. Anivartana Carya

In this career the Bodhisattva permanently set on the attainment of enlightenment without possibility of falling or turning back.

As it is mentioned in the Prakrti Carya the original concept of thought of enlightenment could be traced here. Therefore it is worth mentioning that the Mahayana concept of the production of thought of enlightenment was probably came from Mahasanghikas.

### **Bodhicittopada**

Production of thought of enlightenment. This special concept of Bodhicittopada is very important as it has been mentioned in the Buddhist Sanskrit texts. In a later text called 'Bodhicaryavatara' written by Santideva in the 7<sup>th</sup> century AD, his first chapter mentioned as Bodhicittanusansa (profit of the Bodhicitta). Though it seems that in the Pali tradition there is no mention (about Bodhicitta). But we can trace such indication to this Bodhicitta in Pali tradition though there is no mention about actual word of Bodhicitta. For example we can find the similar determination of Sumedha Tapasa in the Buddhavajsa though there is no mention about the word Bodhicitta.

'Kimme abbata vasena; Dhammam sacchikatenidha; Sabbabbutam papunitva; Buddhohessim sadevake.'

why I realize Dhamma alone as an unknown person, I shall attain into sabbabbuta and become a Buddha in the world including devas'

In these very words we can see the intention of generating Bodhicitta. Bodhicittopada means to generate the Bodhicitta, producing the Bodhicitta, and a thought of becoming a Buddha for the welfare and liberation of all creatures. This is the meaning of Bodhicitta.

According to Buddhist Sanskrit texts (specially Mahayana texts) one has to have a Bodhicitta to become Bodhisattva.

To think to become a Buddha for welfare of others.

After resolution he should fulfil paramitas to achieve the Buddhahood.

He must have a prediction (vyakarana) from a living Buddha.

But according to the later Mahayana texts necessarily one has to have a Bodhicitta to become a Bodhisattva.

Further, Mahayana texts have mentioned same special features of a person who wanted to generate the Bodhicitta and the preliminary preparations of the Bodhisattva who wanted to generate the Bodhicitta.

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In the Mahavastu it has been mentioned a period of Prakrti Carya (natural career). in that he becomes a kind of novice to be a Bodhisattva. But it was mentioned during that period he should not generate the Bodhicitta.

In the Mahayana Sutralavkara and in the Bodhisattva-Bhumi it has been mentioned that not a person who intends to become a Bodhisattva should enter to the 'Gotra' (family or caste). This particular concept of Gotra makes an ordinary person to be a suitable person to achieve the states of a Bodhisattva. In the Dawabhumika-sutra, it has mentioned as 'Buddhagotra' (family of Buddha) and eligible to attain to the position of Noble (ariya) and he is considered as worthy of offer worthy of respect.

## Gotra

This concept of Gotra has been borrowed by Mahayanists from the Theravadins. In the Nikayas it has been mentioned that there is a Gotrabhu person who are eligible to be a Sotapanna. In the A.N. it has been mentioned that (A. IV. 373) there are nine persons who are worthy of worship, worthy of respects, worthy of offer, worthy to salute and will be fields of merits. Who are these 9 persons? Arahant and the person who has entered to the path of arahantship; Never returner and who has entered to the path of never returns; once returner and who has entered the path of once returner; stream winner and who has entered to the stream winning; and Gotrabhu.

Navayime bhikkhave puggata; ahuneyya pahuneyya dakkhineyya abjalikaraniya anuttaram pubbakkettam lokassa, katame nava? Araha, arahattaya, patipanno anagami anagami phala sacchikiriyaya patipanno; sakadagami, sakadagami phala sacchikiriyaya patipanno; sotapanno, sotpattiphala sacchikiriyaya patipanno; Gotrabhu.

The nine persons are, arahanta phala, arahanta magga, anagami phala, anagami magga, sakadagami phala, sakadagami magga, sotapatti phala, sotapatti magga, gotrabhu. Among the nine persons referred here who has gone beyond puthujjana and eligible to attain to the position of Noble (ariya) and he is considered as worthy of offer, worthy of respect.

In the Puggala-pabbatti identifies a Gotrabhu as follows:

'katamo ca puggala gotrabhu? Yesam dhammanaj samanantara ariyadhammassa avakkhanti hoti. Tehi dhammehi samannagato puggalo ayam vaccati gotrabhu' (if the person has particular of dhammas, he can be called gotrabhu).

The Bodhisattva enters to the Buddhagotra to identify himself from other Wravakas and Pratyeka Buddhas. Wravakas and Pratyeka Buddhas have different Gotras (Mahavyutpatti).

The Bodhisattva achieves Buddhagotra on the grounds of the collection of punyas (punyasambhava). The Bodhisattva's gotra is distinguished by certain marks, which indicates his fitness for the practice of the 6 paramitas.

He develops virtues. He is critically evaluates his own actions and he is not engaged in a slightest

wrong because of fear of sins. He helps others. He advises others to abstain from improper actions. He sympathizes others. He is virtuous. He loves the truth. He has lovely words even for animals. He appreciates and accepts the others' merits. He has patience even towards the people injuring him. He is more energetic and courageous. He has pleasure in renunciation. He is silent. He likes to live in forests. Naturally he is less defiled, his hindrances are less effective. His mind is not disturbed by evil thought. (prakrtya mandaklewo manda nivarano manda dausutulyah) (Bo. Bhu.) He is pure. He has all the

## 666 EXPLAIN HOW GENEROSITY AND MANKIND ARE REFLECTED IN BODHISATTA IDEAL MAHĀYĀNA BUDDHISM

### **Compare the Mahayana conception of Bodhisatva with that of the Theravada.**

The Bodhisattva is indeed the characteristic feature of the Mahāyāna, the ideal which distinguishes it from the Hinayāna which its conception of the Ārhanth intent on his own salvation in the attainment of Nirvana. The bodhisattva is the future Buddha who is searching for the enlightenment to save all being without discrimination. The Bodhisattva should be fulfilled the six pāramitas (perfection). In those are: 1 Dāna (giving, charity, generosity), 2 Sīla (virtuous conduct, morality, righteousness), 3 Ksānti (forbearance, patience), 4 Virya (energy), 5 Dhyāna (rapt musing, contemplation), 6 Prājñā (wisdom).

Of these chief six pāramitta charity is one of the most importance that the Bodhisatta should be done. That is Dāna pāramita which means generosity, charity, giving materially in the forms of calms and mental spiritual giving to is appeared emphatically in Māhāyāna Buddhist text writing a book, educating a child, delivering a sermon, preparing a meals, washing dishes, living once own life as well as possible are regarded as Dāna because they are beneficial for all living beings. Dāna expresses itself not only in liberality and alms giving, but also in being amiable and sympathetic for others in their joy and sorrows. It also includes a willingness to give all its acquired merits for the salvation of others.

The practical effect of the doctrine is to encourage the ideal of compassion for all being, the tacking of the vow not to attain Buddhahood until all creatures have been delivered is the logical outcome of the spirit of this reasoning; the true Bodhisattva cannot be delivered until creatures are delivered, and egoism is thus entirely annihilated (forts its terms cf. cit, in C, PP.14, 228, sukhāvativyuha).

Such general compassion demands great energy in giving, for which even study should be sacrificed. (BCA. VI01), but generosity has its own reward; the Crāvaka claims that, his meditation is the more rapid way of gaining release, but in truth the Mahāyānist attains enlightenment (Bodhi) and Buddhahood more rapidly by his practice of generosity; when he takes the resolve to become a Buddha for the good of other, all his thoughts are dominated by the thought of enlightenment (Bodhicitta), all in him become meritorious, and the car of the Mahāyāna bears him inevitably to the enlightenment which he does not desire foe himself but seeks to attain solely for others (BCA. Vii. 29). Form physical suffering he exempt, since he sins not, from moral suffering because he has knowledge; while other strive vainly for unsatisfying ends, he has pure delight in his own action of compassion. (BCAP. IX. 76; BCA. I. 19F; Vii.27F)

I apply to the acquisition of the quality of the 4 perfect Buddha the merit of my confession of my taking refuge in the three, Jewels, Buddha, the law and the order, and of my production of the thought of enlightenment. May in this universe of creatures, at the time when no Buddha appear be the refuge, the shelter, the safely, the island of creatures, may I make them cross the ocean of existences. I adopt as mother, father, brothers, sisters, sons all creatures. Henceforth for the happiness of creatures I will practice with all my power generosity, morality, patience, energy, meditation; knowledge, skill in the means of salvation.

The concept of Bodhisatta is the fundamental doctrine in all Mahayana traditions, whether it is in India, China, Tibet, Korea or Japan. However, this Bodhisatta concept has undergone certain changes as it spread from India to China then to Korea and Japan, and even it is different among the different Mahayana schools.

'Bodhisattva' is a Sanskrit term which derived from 'Bodhi', means 'enlighten', and 'sattva', 'beings' or 'essence'. A Bodhisattva is thus a person who in his essence being is motivated by the desire to win full enlightenment i.e. to become a Buddha. Destine to become a Buddha, he nevertheless, in order to help suffering beings, selflessly postpones his entrance into the bliss of Nirvana.

The common feature of the Bodhisatta concept in all Mahayana traditions which marks it different from the Theravada is that, the Bodhisatta in Mahayana can be an ordinary being, whereas in Theravada, he should be the one who possesses the 8 conditions (i.e, he should be a human being, a male, has the spiritual ability to become an Arahant in that very life, a recluse, possess jhanas, has made a firm determination in front of a living Buddha and prepared to sacrifice even his life). According to the Saddharmapundarika, all the 8 conditions are not necessary and even a female can also resolute to make a vow to be a Bodhisatta. Once the determination is made, even an ordinary Bodhisatta is much more respectable than an Arahant and the offering make to him can obtain much more merit than to any Arahant.

The essential premise of the bodhisattva ideal is to generate in one's own self the thought of enlightenment (Bodhicitta) and to fulfill the vow to become a Buddha, foregoing entrance into Nirvana in order to remain in the world as long as there are creatures to be saved from suffering. With that vow the aspirant begins the career of a Bodhisattva, which traverses 10 stages or spiritual levels (Bhumi) and achieves purification through the practice of the 10 Perfections (Paramitas). These levels, which become progressively higher, elevate the Bodhisattva to the condition of a Buddha. The first six levels are preliminary, representing the true practice of the six Perfections (generosity, morality, patience, vigour, concentration, and wisdom). Irreversibility occurs as soon as the seventh stage is reached. From this moment the Bodhisattva assumes the true Buddha nature, even though further purification and fortification must be achieved in the stages that follow. This is the moment when, having performed his duty, he engages in activity aimed at completely fulfilling the obligations of a Bodhisattva. The difference between this and the preceding six stages is that now the activity is explained as an innate and spontaneous impulse manifested unconstrainedly and therefore not subjected to doubts. Everything is now uncreated, ungenerated; thus, the body of the Bodhisattva becomes identified more and more completely with the Essential body (Dharma-kaya), with Buddhahood, and with omniscience.

According to the Lankavatara, a Bodhisatta is prohibited to eat any kind of meat and if he does so, he breaks the Bodhisatta precepts and the Bodhicitta faded away, and at time of death he will definitely go to hell. However, the Tibetan tradition regarding eating meat as a form of 'skill'(upaya) to save the animal whose meat is being eaten by a Bodhisatta. A Bodhisatta can be a monk or a layman, but in some traditions of Tibetan Mahayana, a Bodhisatta monk can even marry, because he has gone beyond good and bad!

The Great Bodhisattas in Mahayana are the saviours of the countless worlds in the universe, e.g. Avslokitesvara, Mahasthaamaprata and Smamntabhadra ect. This is the result of the evolution of the altruistic concept in later Mahayana Buddhism which, the Mahayanists have greatly emphasized. These great Bodhisattas are not in the operation of kammic force and thus they can practice the Paramitas in anywhere and at any time, even in hells. They are sometimes considered being reborn in the states which they seem fit to benefit other, but later they are being considered to transform (or reincarnate) themselves in guise of saving the suffering beings.

The Bodhisattva ideal, with its more practical attitude to life, emphasises the value of family life. The godly and efficient layman so envisaged in Mahayana Buddhism is exemplified in the figure of Vimalakirti, described in the Vimalakirtinirdesa. Here, the layman Bodhisattva who, is more look like a god than a human being, is much more respectable and venerable than any Arahant.

A Bodhisattva is said to be dominated by two forces—compassion and wisdom. Here, compassion means the selfless desire to make others happy and to get rid the suffering of all beings. Wisdom of the Bodhisattvas refers to the highest knowledge of 'Emptiness'. Apart from these two wheels of a Bodhisattva carrier (Bodhisattacarita), 'skillful means'(upaya) is also very essence for any Bodhisattva to treat the Bodhisattva Path. This skillfu means is borne out from the Wisdom of Empitiness. In this regard of skillful means, a Bodhisattva may employ art or even sex to enlighten other. Asvaghosa was such a great Mahayanist poet as well as a Bodhisattva who composed the Buddhacarita and sang it in the public for propagating the Dharma.

The carrier of a Bodhisattva starts with ten Paramitas through an uncountable lives, and the perfection of each Paramita is designated as a fulfillment of each Bhumi. This gradual process is depicted in the Mahayana texts such as the Bodhisattvabhumi, Dasabhumika sutra and Mahavastu etc. The length of a Bodhisattva's career varies—some practice the Paramitas for at least four asankheyyas and one hundred thousand kappas, others for at least eight asankheyyas and one hundred thousand kappas. The first of these period is the very least that is required and is intended for those who excel in wisdom (pabba), the middle period is for those who excel in faith (saddha), and the last and the longest period for those whose chief feature is perseverance (viriya).

With the development of Bodhisattva concept in much later time, the number of Bodhisattvas becomes endless. Important

Mahayana texts such as the Saddharmapundarika and the Avatamsaka sutra, have a long list of the names of such Bodhisattvas and when names cannot be given the writers merely refer to them in millions. In addition to Avalokitesvara and Māyājūri, Samantabhadra, Mahasthamaprabhata and Kṣitigambhī have become important in the Far East. These six Bodhisattvas, along with Akāśagarbha and Vajrapāṇi, make a group of eight who have become more famous than the others. These and many others e.g. Tārā are worshipped both iconographically and in sadhanas, specially by the Mahayana Buddhists in Tibet.

**QUESTION: EXPLAIN HOW GENEROSITY AND MANKIND ARE REFLECTED IN BODHISATTVA IDEAL IN MAHĀYĀNA BUDDHISM**

The *Bodhisattva* ideal is the central doctrine of the *Mahāyāna* tradition of Buddhism. In the view of *Mahāyānists* a *Bodhisattva* is a sentient being whose essence is perfect wisdom and great compassion. Out of great compassion for the world, a *Bodhisattva* renounces *Nirvāṇa* and goes on suffering in *saṃsāra* for the sake of others, perfecting himself during an incalculable period of time. He discovers the truth and declares it to the world. His capacity for service to others is unlimited. The great mind of loving kindness and compassion is the heart of a *Bodhisattva's* practice.

A *Bodhisattva* is thus defined as a sentient being whose essence is enlightenment. Enlightenment consists of wisdom and compassion. Compassion indicates the *Bodhisattva's* relationship towards beings suffering in *saṃsāra*. This compassion is endless or boundless. Wisdom governs His relationship with reality or the true nature of things as they really are. Thus compassion and wisdom complement each other. The personality consisting perfect wisdom and great compassion of the *Bodhisattva* places the *Bodhisattva* ideal as the highest and the noblest above the *Arahant* and *Pratyekabuddha*.

One who has undertaken this spiritual task on oneself is called a *Bodhisattva*. A *Bodhisattva's* ideal as the highest and the noblest above the *Arahant* and the *Pratyekabuddha*.

One who has undertaken this spiritual task on oneself is called a *Bodhisattva*. A *Bodhisattva's* spiritual venture is not individualistic, rather His concern is the attainment of *Buddhahood* to every being and he assiduously works on it.

The *Bodhisattva* ideals are recognized in all schools of Buddhism. All agree that *Bodhisattva* is a being who vows to become a *Buddha*, whose very essence is that of enlightenment. In early Buddhism a *Bodhisattva* practices certain perfections or *pāramitā*. There are ten perfections:

- |                                    |  |                                   |
|------------------------------------|--|-----------------------------------|
| 1. <i>Dāna</i> (generosity)        | 5. <i>Vīriya</i> (strength)                      | 9. <i>Mettā</i> (loving kindness) |
| 2. <i>Sīla</i> (virtues)           | 6. <i>Khanti</i> (patience and forbearance)      | 10. <i>Upekkhā</i> (equanimity)   |
| 3. <i>Nekkhamma</i> (renunciation) | 7. <i>Sacca</i> (truth)                          |                                   |
| 4. <i>Paññā</i> (wisdom)           | 8. <i>Adhiṭṭhāna</i> (resolution, determination) |                                   |

In the case of the *Mahāyāna Buddhism*, six perfections are mentioned. They are:

1. *Dāna* (generosity)
2. *Sīla* (virtue)
3. *Kṣāntī* (patience)
4. *Vīriya* (strength)
5. *Dhyāna* (meditative contemplation)
6. *Prajñā* (wisdom)<sup>55</sup>

The *pāramitā* contain the essence of practical ethics that a *Bodhisattva* should possess. They represent the highest virtues without which it is impossible to attain *Buddhahood*. Practically, the methods of *Bodhisattva's* practice are purification of one's mind and performance of altruistic acts. Perfect wisdom and great compassion are thus conceived as inseparable properties constituting the personality of a *Bodhisattva*. A *Bodhisattva* views the liberation of others as the primary goal of his spiritual exertion.

All the practices of the *Bodhisattva* begin with the mind of loving kindness and compassion. The mind of loving kindness and compassion is always first and foremost. Thus the great mind of loving kindness and compassion is indeed the heart of the *Bodhisattva's* practice. The *Bodhisattva's* path leading to *Buddhahood* is thus closely related to cultivation merits, helping other sentient beings. It will take a tremendously long time and require the accumulation of boundless merits. However, with his noble objective ahead of Him it helps Him to uplift Himself towards the path of performing wholesome acts progressively.

In the view of *Mahāyānists* all sentient beings are endowed with *Buddha*-nature and all may become *Buddhas*. If we realize it and vow to become *Buddhas* we are all *Bodhisattvas*. But *Buddhahood* is secured only through practice.

<sup>55</sup> **Mr. Bogoda**, teacher of Religious Studies from Buddhist and Pali University of Sri Lanka claims that *Mahāyāna's* sixth *pāramī* is *upāya* (skill of strategy).

The *Bodhisatta* is indeed the characteristic feature of *Mahāyāna*, the ideal which distinguishes it from the *Hīnayāna*<sup>57</sup> where the conception of *Arahant* intends on one's own salvation in the attainment of *Nibbāna*. The *Bodhisattva* is the future *Buddha* who is searching for the enlightenment to save all beings without discrimination. The *Bodhisattva* should fulfill the six *pāramitās* (perfections). In those are:

1. *Dāna* (giving, charity, generosity)
2. *Sīla* (virtuous conduct, morality, righteousness)
3. *Kṣānti* (forbearance, patience)
4. *Vīriya* (energy)
5. *Dhyāna* (rapture musing, contemplation)
6. *Prajñā* (wisdom)

Of these chief six *pāramitā* charity is one of the most important that *Bodhisattva* should accomplish. That is *dāna pāramitā* which means generosity, charity, giving materially in the form of calms/alms(?) and mental spiritual giving appeared emphatically in *Mahāyāna* Buddhist texts – writing books, educating a child, delivering a sermon, preparing a meal, washing dishes, living one's own life as well as possible – all those are regarded as *dāna* because they are beneficial for all living beings. *Dāna* expresses itself not only in liberality and alms giving, but also in being amiable and sympathetic for others in their joy and sorrow. It also includes a willingness to give all its acquired merits for the salvation of others.

The practical effect of the doctrine is to encourage the ideal of compassion of all being, the taking of the vow not to attain *Buddhahood* until all creatures have been liberated – that is the logical outcome of the spirit of this reasoning. The true *Bodhisattva* cannot be liberated until creatures are liberated, an egoism is thus entirely annihilated (forgets(?) its terms cf. Cit. In C(?) pp. 14,228, *Sukhāvativyūha*)

Such general compassion demands great energy in giving, for which even study should be sacrificed (*BCA. VI01*). But generosity has its own reward. The *śrāvaka* claims that his meditation is a more rapid way of gaining release, but in truth the *Mahāyānist* attain enlightenment (*bodhi*) and *Buddhahood* more rapidly by one's practice of generosity. When one takes the resolution to become a *Buddha* for the good of others, all his thoughts are dominated by the thought of enlightenment (*bodhicitta*). All in him become meritorious, and the car(?) of the *Mahāyāna* bears him inevitably to the enlightenment which he does not desire for himself but seeks to attain solely for others (*BCA VII.29*). From physical suffering he is exempt, since he sins(?) not from moral suffering because he has knowledge, while others strive vainly for unsatisfying ends. He has pure delight in his own action of compassion (*BCAP ix 76; BCA.i. 19F; vii. 27F*).

„I apply to the acquisition of the quality of the perfect **Buddha**, the merit of my confession of my taking refuge in the three Jewels, **Buddha**, the Law and the Order and of my production of the thought of enlightenment. May I in this universe of creatures at a time when no *Buddha* appears the refuge, the shelter, the safety, the island for creatures, may I make them cross the ocean of existence. I adopt all creatures as my mothers, fathers, brothers, sisters and sons. Henceforth for the happiness of creatures I will practice with all my power of generosity, morality, patience, energy, meditation, knowledge, skills in the means of salvation.“

## 666 THE CONCEPT OF BUDDHA IN THERAVADA AND MAHAYANA. (678)

<sup>56</sup> The references written in brackets throughout this note do not make any sense to me.

<sup>57</sup> There is nothing like *Hīnayāna* and those who use this term are outmoded. (see book *Zen and the Taming of the Bull* p. 71 and 72).

Early Pali sources depict Gotama Buddha as an ideal human being. He was a lover of silent (muni) who led a simple life. He was respected by all who followed him not only he was the teacher, but because he was a human being par excellence. In Suttas, he is called isisattama, sabbasattanaj uttama, appatipuggala and devamanussa settha etc. He is equal to the arahants in terms of attainment. Their sole difference is that he is the discoverer and the shower of the ancient path (maggakkayi), while the disciples are the followers of him as his students.

Early suttas also depict the Buddha as having ordinary human nature. In Mahaparinibbanasutta, he says that he is old like an old cart is decaying, he becomes sick, tired and needs rest. He is thirsty and has to drink water. He is delighted with beautiful cetiyas and looks at Vesali with the last sight. In Mahavaggapali, he condemned his disciples foolish, noisy, fond of quarrelling and left them staying in the forest.

There are also later development in the Pali texts on the concept of Buddha. In Lakkhanasutta, he is said to have 32 great marks. He is the Omniscient One (sabbabhu) possessing Dasabala and attharasabuddhadhamma. In Acchariya-abbhuta sutta, even as a Bodhisatta, he is characterized with various marvelous features. He descended from the Tusita heaven and entered his mother's womb with immeasurable marvelous lights, the ten-thousand world systems shook and quaked and trembled. And in Mahavamsa, besides Gotama Buddha, other 27 Buddhas are also mentioned. The practise of paramitas too, is emphasized.

During the time of various Buddhist schools, the Buddha was raised to the status of a god or even to a metaphysical entity, especially by the Lokuttaravadins. However, the more obvious glorification is seen in Mahayana. Certain passages in Pali texts gave an opportunity for the Mahayanists to put forth the doctrine of Trikaya, the specific concept of Buddha in Mahayana. In Anguttara Nikaya, the Buddha says that he is neither a god nor a gandhabba nor a man. And in the Itivuttka, he says to Vakkali that: 'he who sees the Dhamma sees me'. All these statements lead to the development of Trikaya concept in Mahayana.

### **The Nirmanakaya—Body of Transformation**

There are numeral Nirmanakayas created by Dharmakaya in countless worlds to preach to the beings of lower range. As Sakyamuni, it adopts himself to earthly conditions, possessing an earthly body but yet maintaining purity. He does not sleep nor dream and preached only ultimate Truth.

### **The Sambhogakaya—Body of Enjoyment**

The body that partakes the enjoyment and as the Buddha ideal who preached to the Bodhisattvas of higher range. It is accomplished with all the Mahapurisa lakkhanas who preaches most of the Mahayana sutras.

### **The Dhammakaya—Body of the Law**

This is the highest body, comprising all the essence of knowledge and compassion in the absolute state. It is sometimes called 'Svabhavakaya' which is immeasurable and unlimited. It fills all space and is the basic of both the Nirmanakaya and the Sambhogakaya. It is also called Tathata, Dharmadhatu or tathagata-garbha.

In the beginning, the Trikaya doctrine was very vague, the number of kayas was uncertain. In Chinese sources, Nagarjuna in his commentary on the Prajnaparamita spoke only of 2 kayas: Rupakaya and Dharmakaya. According to N. Dutt, up to the time of Nagarjuna, the concept of Sambhogakaya was not distinguished from that of Rupakaya or Nirmanakaya.

According to Abhisamayalankara-karika, there are 4 kayas of which Svabhavika-kaya is real and the Dharmakaya, Sambhogakaya and Nirmanakaya are unreal. In Sutralankara, Svabhavika-kaya is identified with Dharmakaya.

The most developed form of Trikaya concept is found in Saddharmapundarikasutra and Suvarnaprabhasasutra. It is stated that the Tathagata has no origin, there is only the Dharmakaya. The

Gotama Buddha attained Buddhahood long long ago. It is only his Nirmanakaya that is visible to the people. There are numeral such Nirmanakayas residing over countless worlds and Gotama is the Nirmanakaya Buddha of this world. Therefore, Gautama Buddha was only a shadow, an image of the Dharmakaya which follows the ways of the world.

In Pali commentary, in order to explain the problem of the duration of time, it is said that the Buddha duplicated himself and sent it to the Tavatimsa heaven to preached the Abhidhamma to the gods while he himself remained on earth to preach to Sariputta. Perhaps, this is the influence of the Mahayana's concept of Nirmanakaya. (57)

## 666WRITE SHORT NOTES ON VARJAYANA AND ASTASAHASSRIKA PRAGBAPARAMITA.

### (1). Vajrayana

Tantric Buddhism assumed several forms and produced several schools. Its earlist stage is called Mantrayana which concerned itself with mantras, yantras and dharanis etc. However, the most developed school is Vajrayana.

According to one of the Tantric texts, the Guhyasamaja, the phenomenal world is said to have emanated from the original Tathagata or the Reality. The 5 skandhas and the impurities like raga, dvesa and moha, are personified as so many buddhas, issuing out of the original Tathagata, called 'bodhicitta-vajrastathagata'. Hence, the source of all Buddhas is the Vajra, which is identical with Wuyata.

In Vajrayana, Wunyata is something positive which, Indrabhuti takes as Mahasukha while Anavgavajra defines it as Prajnopaya. Being characteristicless, Vajra is incapable of leading people to the Truth; therefore from time to time it converts itself into kaya-vak-citta-vajra and teaches the way that is Vajrayana. Thus Vajrayana accepts the Yogacara view about the 3 kayas and like the Madhyamikas, identify Wunyata or Vajra with samsara. The Vajrayana sadhakas taught that excreta, urine, etc. are not different from any good food; nor any woman, whether mother or a sister or other's wife or a girl of low caste, from any other enjoyable woman.

Though hideous in many respects, the Vajrayana made many contributions to Buddhism. Some Hindus were also impressed by its doctrines, deities, mantras, sadhanas and exquisite art etc. Varjayana later gave rise to Sahajayana and Kalacakrayana.

In Tibet, Vajrayana has developed into several schools, among them are: Rnying-ma-pa of Padmasambhava (8<sup>th</sup> century), Sa-skyapa of Virupa (9<sup>th</sup> century), Bka'-brgyud-pa of Tilopa (11<sup>th</sup> century), Bka'-gdams-pa of Atissa (11<sup>th</sup> century) and finally the reformed sect, Gelugpa the "Virtuous" of Tsong-kha-pa in the 14<sup>th</sup> century whose members are commonly known as Yellow Hats from the colour of their head-covers.

### (2).Ashtasahasrika prajba paramita

Prajba paramita means transcendental knowledge, this is a name given to the whole literature consisting of treatises on the doctrine of wunyata. In Astasahasrika-paramita-sutra, there are 8,000 verses, and it is the most ancient prajba paramita text, perhaps was written around 50 century AD . All the other prajba paramita texts were written later.

The antiquity of this text is also attested by internal evidences, e.g., the concept of Sambhogakaya and the ten stages of a Bodhisattva are mentioned. The special feature of this book is, it gives the philosophical conception while other Vaipulya texts devote a lot to describe Buddhas and Bodhisattas.

This text comprises 32 chapters, denoted by the term 'parivarta'. A peculiar feature of its composition is the salutatory verses found at the commencement of the text. Instead of the usual formula of salutation to the Triple Gems, or to the Buddha, the author pays adoration to the subject of the work, viz., Prajaparamita. Thus

Prajaparamita as Wunyata, is personified, and is treated as the ‘mother’ of all Buddhas, since all the Buddhas are enlightened because of Prajaparamita, which is a famine noun.

The scene is set on the Grdhrakuta, ‘Vulture Peak’ in the vicinity of Rajarha. When the Sakyamuni was once sojourning there in the company of a large number of disciples and followers, Wariputra opened the discourse by asking Subhuti for information on the principles of the prajaparamita, and the replies and discussions which followed form the principal subject-matter of the text. Subhuti enumerates 18 aspects of Wunyata which in later texts are explained in detailed by Nagarjuna and Haribhadra.

There are a large number of prajaparamita texts, when philosophically and religiously concerned, of all these texts, the Astasahasrika-prajaparamita is the utmost importance as it contains all the essential ideas of Mahayana.

### 666SHOW WITH REFERENCE TO THE DISCUSSION HOW PAPA BCAS OCCUR VIA SABBA. (440)

The process of sense-perception, according to the Madhupindika sutta (M.N.), has the following stages:

“Visual-consciousness arises, monk, arises because of eye and forms; the meeting of the three is contact, because of contact arises feeling, what one feels one perceives, what one perceives one reasons about, what one reasons about, one turns into papabca, what one turns into papabca, due to that papabca-sabba-savkha assail him in regard to forms belonged to the past, future and present”

The stages can be simplified into a diagram below:

1. eye + form + vision-consciousness
2. phassa (contact)
3. vedana (feeling)
4. sabba (perceiving)
5. vittaka (thinking)
6. papabca (mental proliferation)

Phassa brings about the collision between sense organ, object and its corresponding consciousness. There are two kinds of phassa, i.e. patigha samphassa and adhvacaana samphassa. The former refers to our impression which comes through the five senses whereas the latter comes through mental contact.

Phassa further gives rise to vedana, a reaction to contact. There are five types of feeling i.e. bodily and mentally agreeable and disagreeable feeling and of neutral.

What one feels one perceives. With what one perceives there also arise together vitakka and vicara i.e. thinking and investigation. Vitakka is the reasoning of the original data whereas vicara is its advanced stage of examination.

The final stage is the papabca i.e. mental proliferation, expansion or manifoldness. This refers to the consequent prolificity of ideation which has the tendency of worlding’s imagination to break loose and run riot. In Abhidhamma, it is called ‘kappana’ or ‘parikappana’ which means ‘synthetic function of the mind’. According to the Cullavedalla sutta, papabca presupposes language; the initial and discursive thought is the activity of speech. Hence papavca-sabba-savkha means concepts, designations or linguistic conventions characterized by the prolific conceptualizing of the mind.

In Mahaniddesa, tanha, mana and ditthi are defined in terms of papabca, actually, these 3 evil roots are papabca itself rather than the results of papabca. Since this papabca is built on sabba and vitakka, therefore in the Suttanipata (847) and the Anguttara Nikaya (vol. II.p.162), it is said that proliferation is stopped and calmed by complete losing interest in the 6 modes of contact and putting them out of function. This is by the method of Samadhi, however it is not a permanent result. If one does not entertain tanha, mana and ditthi with regard to the conditioned phenomena involved in the process of cognition, by resorting to the fiction of an ego, one is free from the yoke of proliferating concepts and has thereby eradicated the proclivities to all evil mental states which breed conflict both in the individual and in society.

The function of sabba i.e. perception in Buddhist philosophy is recognition (samyannana) of object both physical and mental. Perception in Buddhism is sixfold : perception of forms, sound, smell, taste, bodily contact and mental objects. According to Buddhism, perceptions often deceive us, they become known as illusion or perversity of perceptions (sabbavipallasa). Because of our preconceived notions, our attachment and carving, likes and dislikes, we fail to see the sense organs and the sense objects in their

respective and objective nature, and thus we go after illusions and deceptions. As sabba delude and mislead us, we fail to see thing in their true perspective, therefore the way we see things becomes perverted (viparitadassana). There are four perversions (vipallasa) that distort perceptions:--

1. What is impermanent (anicca) as permanent (nicca)
2. What is unsatisfactory (dukkha) as pleasant (sukha)
3. What is with self (anatta) as self (ata)
4. What is impure (asubha) as pure (subha)

## 666 EXAMINE THE PLACE OCCUPIED BY JHANIC INSIGHT IN INDIAN ASCETIC LIVES. (629)

Jhanic insight was the most important aspect of ascetic tradition in ancient India. And for the Upanisadic tradition, as the jbanamarga had turned from the knowledge of the external world to an understanding of the individual, Jhanic insight had also become a specific method for the Upanisadic sages to see the atman. As such, there were three religious traditions in ancient India that practiced Jhanis intuition i.e.,

### 1. Late Upanisadic tradition

The Ultimate Goal of the Vedic thinkers of all periods is to realize the atman and to be unified with it (jagadatman). The seeing of this atman changed from the 'ritual-way' (karmamarga) of the Brahmanas to the 'knowledge-way' (jbanamarga) of the Upanisads. This so called 'jbanamarga' of the Early Upanisad is by 'reasoning and speculating' (takka and vimamsa) and that of the Middle and the Late Upanisad is through 'intuition' (dhyana). The atman which is hidden within all things and does not shine forth is seen by the subtle seers with their subtle awakened intuition. One sees (pawyate) while in Jhanic rapture (dhyayamanah). As the Wvetasvatara puts it, one would see (pawyet) God hidden as it were by practicing the drill of dhyana. This was a different way of knowing acquired by means of Jhana, though the vision or revelation itself was said to be due to the grace of God.

### 2. Wramana tradition.

For some early ascetics like Alara Kalama and Uddaka Ramaputta, the aims of practicing Jhana were different from that of the Upanisadic sages. They took the stages of Jhanic trance as the final goal in life e.g., Alara Kalama regarded the base of nonthingness (akibci) as ultimate freedom whereas Uddaka Ramaputta took nevasabbanasabba as highest emancipation.

For other Wramana traditions, the attainment of Abhibba through Jhana was the only aim e.g., Purana Kassapa and Nigantha Nataputra. They were said to have attained omniscience knowledge by means of Jhana. Even, Abba Kondabba was said to have vision of the future through Jhanic intuition. For the empirical materialists who had attained Jhana, observed the deceased of beings but not their survival with their Jhanic insight (Dibbacakkhu), maintained annihilatist theory. And the Ajivikas, on the other hand, due to an externalization of experiences had in trance-states, believed the size and colour of soul.

### 3. Buddhists tradition.

The method to verify the Ultimate Truth in Buddhism is stated in detailed in many passages throughout the Nikaya. Briefly, it consists in the practice of the virtuous life (ariyena silakkhandhena samannagato) followed by the restraint of the senses (indriyasajvara), the development of mindfulness (satisampajabba) and the elimination of the 5 impediments (pabcanivarane pahaya). This results in the attainment of 4 jhanas, in which there is 'a perfection of equanimity and mindfulness' (upekkhasatiparisuddhi). In this state there manifest the 6 abhibba. Of the 6 only 3 are necessary for the attainment of Ultimate Truth i.e., pubbenivasanussatibana (verifies rebirth), cutupapatabana (verifies karma) and asavakkhayabana (verifies the Four Noble Truths).

These stages are often described as the stages of sila, samadhi, pabba, vimutti and vimuttibanadassana. It is clear that the practice of Jhana in Buddhism is only one of the stages to attain the Ultimate Truth. It is with this motivation to attain Emancipation that the Buddha and his disciples practiced Jhana.

According to K.N. Jayatilleke, the different results of Jhanic experience is not due to any defect in Jhanic insight as such; it is due mostly to the manner in which the yogi has been conditioned to interpret what he sees in Jhanic states. In other words, it is the subjective bias and the habit of mind that condition the personal Jhanic perception. Despite of the differences in experience, the place occupied by Jhanic insight in India ascetic lives was very high, it was the method or way to their specific aims.

## 666 EXAMINED THE VALIDITY AND SIGNIFICANCE OF ABHIBBA AS A HIGHER ATTAINMENT IN BUDDHISM. (623)

In Buddhism, apart from normal perception, extrasensory perception is recognized as a valid means to knowledge. In Pali it is called 'abhibba' which means 'higher knowledge'.

It is mentioned in the Samyutta Nikaya (III.p.232) that, one is able to direct one's mind in the exercise of higher knowledge after attaining the fourth jhana. The 6 kinds of abhibba mentioned in early Buddhism are:

1. Iddhividha (psychokinesis), which is not a form of knowledge but a power i.e. the ability of walking on water and levitation etc. According to Visuddhimagga (405), it consists in the various manifestations of the 'power of will' (adhitthana iddhi) in the jhanas.
2. Dibbasota (clairaudience), the faculty of perceiving sounds even at a distance, far beyond the range of ordinary auditory faculties. It is an extension of sensory auditory perception both in extent and in depth.
3. Cetopariyabana (telepathy), which enables one to comprehend the general state as well as the functioning of another's mind. With the help of this vision, one can know another person's mind whether it is lustful or free of lust, hateful or free of hatred.
4. Pubbenivasanussatibana (retrocognition), the ability to perceive one's own past history. This capacity is connected with satanussati vibbana.
5. Dibbacakkhu or cut'upapatabana (clairvoyance), the knowledge of the decease and survival of other beings who wander in the cycle of existences in accordance with their karma. According to Itthivutthaka, the present of the physical eyes is necessary for the operation of dibbacakkhu (Itt. P.52)
6. Asavakkjayabana (knowledge of the destruction of defiling impulses) which provides an insight into the four Noble Truths. It has been described in Pali texts as a self-transforming knowledge associates with the understanding of the three characteristics (tilakkhana) and the law of causation.

These six came to be known as chalabhibba in the Pali Nikaya, but since the first is not a form of knowledge, it came to be dissociated from the rest and these latter were known as pabcabhibba. In the same way, Dibbasotadhatu is not considered a specific form of knowledge (bana) since it does not connected with the investigation of Ultimate Truth in Buddhism. The other 4 are called 'bana' as they have the characteristics of knowledge. Cetopariyabana corresponds to Manahparyayabana in Jainism. With this super-cognitive power in jhanic condition, the Buddha knows the states of mind of another, thus helped him in the preaching of Dhamma. However, this Cetopariyabana too, has little to do with the attainment of Emancipating Knowledge.

The other three kinds of higher knowledge are of special concern in Buddhism, which are known as the 'three-fold knowledge' (tisso vijja). It is said in the Samabbaphalassutta that, the main functions of Pubbenivasanussatibana, Cutupapatabana and Asavakkhayabana are to verify rebirth, karma and the Four Noble Truths as well as the origin and cessation of suffering (paticcasamuppada) respectively. And among the three, Asavakkhayabana is the most important as far as emancipation is concerned. Some ascetics of other traditions were also said to possess Pubbenivasanussatibana and Cutupapatabana, but not Asavakkhayabana. Therefore, Asavakkhayabana is the unique knowledge in Buddhism.

According to the M.N., Buddha also possesses the 7<sup>th</sup> knowledge of anagatansabana i.e. the knowing of the future conditions of people according to their present behaviour. However, this type of abhibba is also not related for the attainment of Emancipation.

In conclusion, we can say that, three out of the six Abhibba, only the 'Tevijja' are helpful in the attainment of emancipating knowledge. However, not all the Arahants were capable to verifying the Dhamma in this manner. Among all of them, only 60 out of 500 were capable of attaining the 'higher knowledge'. The rest are said to be 'emancipated by knowledge alone' (pabbavimutta). This is mainly due to the difference in their faculties (tesam..indriyavemattataj).

According to the analysis of the five aggregates, for a consciousness to arise it must have an object. The object may be a color, sound, smell, taste, touch or a mental object, these are the six external objects. Corresponding to these six external objects are the six internal sense faculties, called 'doors' since they are the portals through which the objects enter the field of cognition, these are the eye, ear, nose, tongue, body and mind. When a door receives its object, there arises a corresponding state of consciousness, such as eye-consciousness, ear-consciousness, etc. the union of the object, the door or sense faculty, and the consciousness is called '*contact*'.

The life-span of a citta is termed, in the Abhidhamma, a mind-moment (cittakkhana). This is a temporal unit of such brief duration that, according to the commentators, in the time that it takes for lightning to flash or the eyes to blink, billions of mind-moments can elapse. Nevertheless, though seemingly infinitesimal, each mind-moment in turn consists of three sub-moments – arising (uppada), presence (thiti), and dissolution (bhanga). Within the breadth of a mind-moment, a citta arises, performs its momentary function, and then dissolves, conditioning the next citta in immediate succession. Thus, through the sequence of mind-moments, the flow of consciousness continues uninterrupted like the waters in a stream.

Material phenomena as well pass through the three stages of arising, presence and dissolution, but for them required for these three stages to elapse is equal to the time it takes for seventeen cittas to arise and perish.

According to the analysis of the mental state, the entire process takes place within the period of 17 moments, i.e., one thought process was accordingly divided into 17 moments. The process of perception in the Abhidhammasangaha begins with the vibration of the unconscious for two moments, in the second moment of which unconscious mind is cut off. The succeeding moments are those of attention (pabcadvaravajjana), sensation (cakkhuvibbana), assimilation (sampaticchana), discrimination (santirana), determination (votthapana), seven moments of cognition (javana) and two registration (tadarammana). The number is made up to 17 by adding one moment of thought at the beginning of the perceptive process. This thought moment occurs before the material object makes an impression on the sense organs, and is technically termed past unconscious (atitabhavavga).

The 17 thought moments are given a simile that a man sleeps with his head covered under a mango tree the fruits of which are ripe (bhavavga); a ripe fruit falls (bhavavgacalana); he awakes (bhavavgupaccheda); he removes the covering of his head (pabcadvaravajjana) and looks at the fruit (cakkhuvibbana); he takes the fruit (sampaticchana), squeezes it (santirana), smells it (votthapana), and eats it (javana); what remains in the mouth he swallows with the saliva (tadarammana).

The three kinds of bhavavga consciousness are vipaka. Pabcadvaravajjana is a kiriya citta. Pabca-vibbana is one of the ten moral or immoral vipaka cittas. Sampaticchana and santirana are also vipaka cittas. The mind-door consciousness, a kiriya citta, function as the votthapana citta, and one can use one's freewill at this stage. The seven javana thought-moments constitute kamma, it is at this stage that an action is judge whether moral or immoral. In the case of an Arahant, this javana is neither moral nor immoral but kiriya. The tadarammana is a vipaka citta.

Thus, in a particular thought-process there arise various thought-moments which may be kamma, vipaka or kiriya.

It should be noted that the entire cognitive process occurs without any self or subject behind it as an enduring experiencer or inner controller, a 'knower' outside the scope of the process itself. The momentary cittas themselves exercise all the functions necessary to cognition, and the unity of the cognitive act derives from their coordination through laws of conditional connectedness.

Within the cognitive process each citta comes into being in accordance with the lawful order of consciousness (cittaniyama). It arises in dependence on a variety of conditions, including the preceding citta, the object, a door, and a physical base. Having arisen, it performs its own unique function within the process, and then it dissolves, becoming a condition for the next citta.

### BONUS: RISE OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL SCHOOLS<sup>58</sup>

The schools in Indian philosophy have sprung from two or rather three original sources or traditions. The *Brāhmanical* systems based on the *Ātman* doctrine of the *Upaniṣads* and the Buddhist schools on the *nairātmya* doctrine of **Buddha** conceive reality on two distinct and exclusive patterns. The *Upaniṣads* and the systems drawing their inspiration from them conceive reality on the pattern of an inner core or soul (*ātman*), immutable and identical amidst an outer region of impermanence and change to which it is unrelated or but loosely related. This may be termed the substance view of reality (*ātmavāda*). In its radical form, as in the *Advaita Vedānta*, it denies the reality of the apparent, the impermanent, and the many, and equates them with the false. The *Sāṅkhya* does not go so far; still it inclines more towards the substantial, the permanent, and the universal. The *Nyāya* with its empirical and pluralistic bias accords equal status to both substance and modes. Not only do these systems accept the *ātman*, but what is more, they conceive all other things too on the substance pattern. The *ātman* is the very pivot of their metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics. In epistemology, substance makes for unity and integration of experience; it explains perception, memory, and personal identity better than other assumptions. Bondage is ignorance of the self or the wrong identification of the self with the non-self (*ātmanyantmādhyāsa*). Freedom is the discrimination between the two.

The other tradition is represented by the Buddhist denial of substance (*ātman*) and all that it implies. There is no inner and immutable core in things; everything is in flux. Existence for the Buddhist is momentary (*kṣaṇika*), unique (*svalakṣaṇa*), and unitary (*dharmamātra*). It is discontinuous, discrete, and devoid of complexity. Substance (the universal and identical) is rejected as illusory; it is but a thought-construction made under the influence of wrong belief (*avidyā*). This may be taken as the modal view of reality. The Buddhists brought their epistemology and ethics into full accord with their *nairātmya* metaphysics. Their peculiar conception of perception and inference and the complementary doctrine of mental construction (*vikalpa*) are necessary consequences of their denial of substance. heroic attempts have been made to fit in this theory with the doctrine of *Karma* and rebirth. *Avidyā*, which is the root-cause of pain, is the wrong belief in the *ātman* (*satkāya-dṛṣṭiprabhavāḥ sarve kleśāḥ*); and *prajñā* (wisdom) is the eradication of this belief and its attendant evils.

The terminology employed above is after the best Jaina epistemological treatises. Philosophical views, they say, are principally two – the *dravyārthika-naya* (substance view) and *pariyāyārthika-naya* (modal view). Each view, carried to the extreme, denies the reality of the other. One emphasizes the universal and the continuous to the exclusion of the changing and the different, and the other holds the opposite view. The *Vedānta* is cited as the exponent of the extreme form of the substance view; and Buddhism (*tathāgatamata*) represents the exclusive modal view.

The Jaina system ostensibly reconciles these two opposed views by according equal reality to substance and its modes. There is no substance without modes, nor are there modes without substance. Reality is manifold (*anekāntātmaka*); it is not of one nature; it is unity and difference, universal and particular, and permanent and changing. The Jaina philosophy shaped its epistemology on this pattern and formulated the logic of the disjunction of the real (*syādvāda*). This view may be said to constitute the third stream of Indian philosophy, lying midway between the two extremes of the *ātmavāda* and the *anātmavāda*. Seemingly partaking of the nature of both, it was essentially un-*Brāhmanical* and un-Buddhistic. It was un-*Brāhmanical* in that it accepted a *changing Ātman* and even ascribed different sizes to it; no *Brāhmanical* system could ever accept that. It was un-Buddhistic in that it accepted a permanent entity, *ātman*, besides change. As a result, the Jaina found favour with neither. The synthesis of two views is a third view, and is no substitute for either. The Jaina system had comparatively little influence on the course of Indian philosophy, and was

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58 I didn't copywrite the footnotes.

little affected by other systems. Jainism has remained practically stationary down the ages.

(Indian philosophy must therefore be interpreted as the flow of two vital streams – one having its source in the *Ātman* doctrine of the *Upaniṣads* and the other in the *anātmavāda* of **Buddha**. Each branched off into several sub-streams.) There were lively sallies and skirmishes, but no commingling of the two streams. Throughout the course of their development they have remained true to their original inspirations. The *Brāhmaṇical* systems are wedded to Being, Buddhism to Becoming; the former espouse the existential and static view of reality, the latter the sequential and dynamic; for the one space, for the other time is the archetype. (The *Brāhmaṇical* systems are relatively more categorical and positive in their attitude (*vidhimukhena*), while the Buddhists are more negative (*niṣedhamukhena*). Again, the former are more dogmatic and speculative, the latter empirical and critical. Subjectively minded, Buddhism is little interested in cosmological speculations and constructive explanations of the universe. The *Brāhmaṇical* systems are bound to an original tradition; they all accept the authoritarian character of the *Vedas*. Buddhism derives its inspiration from a criticism of experience itself. The tempo of development is quicker and intenser in Buddhism than in the *Upaniṣadic* tradition.

An opposite view has been advocated by a not inconsiderable section of the schools of Indian thought. They interpret Indian philosophy as having developed out of one tradition, the *Upaniṣadic*. Buddhism and Jainism are treated as deviations, rather than radical departures, from the *ātmavāda* of the *Upaniṣads*. This, however, ignores the sharp differences and exclusive attitudes inherent in these systems. Similarly it overlooks the internal differences within the fold of Buddhism, and considers it one unitary system instead of a matrix of many systems. *Nairtmyavda* is the genus of which the different Buddhist systems – the *Vaibhāṣika*, the *Sautrāntika*, the *Mādhyamika* and the *Yogācāra* – are the species; they are the various attempts to express the same denial of substance.

The entire course of the development of Indian philosophy is proof of our contention. No Buddhist system did ever accept the reality of the *Ātman*, the permanent and the unchanging. No non-Buddhist system except the *Cārvaka*, on the contrary, could ever reject it as unreal.

It may be said that this state of affairs is true of the later scholastic phase of Buddhism, and not of the original teachings of its Master. Reliance may be placed on certain texts affirming the *Ātman*. But we have to consider, as against this, more numerous passages which deny the self in unmistakable terms. It will not do therefore to select those texts that favour a pre-conceived interpretation and to ignore the others. A systematic exegesis of the texts and a synthesis of the doctrines can alone prove fruitful. Such syntheses have been made by the Buddhist systems from time to time, notably by the *Ābhidharmika*, the *Mādhyamika* and the *Vijñānavāda* systems. The modern exponent has to take these into account, as *prima facie* they claim to embody and express the original teachings. In the case of Buddhism too, we must accept the law of evolution that the later phases are potentially contained in the earlier. The theory of a primitive soul-affirming Buddhism followed by a soul-denying scholasticism does not solve any problem; it adds one more. 'In the attempt of bridging the difference between the *Upaniṣads* and **Buddha** we would have immeasurably increased the distance between **Buddha** and Buddhism. Nor can we find any adequate reason for such a gross misunderstanding of **Buddha** by his followers.'

It may be said that the denial of the self is beset with such insuperable difficulties that it could not have been seriously maintained by any philosopher. The answer is that the doctrine of an entity, immutable and impervious to change (*ātmavāda*) is also beset with equally insuperable difficulties, though of an opposite kind. The Buddhist schools have made very consistent and commendable efforts to explain phenomena on their own hypothesis, as the *Brāhmaṇical* systems have on theirs, though in the opposite direction. The deep opposition between these radical standpoints stimulated the systems on either side; they gained in depth and maturity. It also helped the emergence of the dialectical consciousness, which we find in a systematic form in the *Mādhyamika* philosophy. Dialectic is the consciousness of the total and interminable conflict of the ideas of reason, of philosophical views. It presses towards their resolution in the Absolute, which is the negation of the opposites (*advaita, advaya*). The *Advaitic* turn in the Buddhist and *Brāhmaṇical* systems is a necessary outcome of this.

#### BONUS: CAUSALITY (BOOK: **EARLY BUDDHISM, CHAPTER 3: CAUSALITY**)

**The Buddha** claimed that his search for the nature of things led him to the discovery of the uniformity of the causal process

(*dhammaṭṭhitatā*, *dhammaniyāmatā*, or simply *dhammatā*). It was the knowledge of the causal pattern that enabled him to put an end to all defiling tendencies and thereby attain freedom (*vimutti*).<sup>1</sup> This claim of **the Buddha** has to be evaluated in the light of the background in which various metaphysical theories, such as that of eternal 'soul' or 'self' (*ātman*), 'inherent nature' (*svabhāva*), or creator God (*īśvara*), were posited in order to explain the functioning of phenomena. One of the most important of the discourses **the Buddha** addressed to the monks is the „Discourse on Causal Relations“ (*Paccaya-sutta*),<sup>2</sup> in which he speaks of (1) causality (*paṭiccasamuppāda*) and (2) causally conditioned phenomena (*paṭiccasamuppanna dhamma*).

These concepts, according to **the Buddha**, explain everything in this world, the individual things and the relations existing among them. In this chapter the causal relations will be examined, leaving until later a discussion of causally conditioned phenomena, although the two are inseparably connected.

Before and during the time of **the Buddha** the philosophical atmosphere in India was clouded with many metaphysical theories, and this was so even with regard to the concept of causation. There were three major theories of causality:

- (1) self-causation (*sayam kataṇ*)
- (2) external causation (*param kataṇ*)
- (3) a combination of self and external causation (*sayam kataṇ ca param kataṇ ca*).<sup>3</sup>

This first was propounded by the Substantialist school, which accepted the reality of the 'self' (*ātman*) and considered causation as being due to the activity of this principle immanent in everything (*sarvaṇ*). Because the immanent 'self' is found in man as well as in the things of the outer world, it was looked upon as the agent in terms of which all the activities of man, as well as the functioning of the things of the world, should be explained. This school, by implication, denied the causal efficacy of any factor outside the 'self'.

The second theory was put forward by the Naturalists, who, as a reaction against the idealist metaphysics of the Substantialist school, believed that the functioning of phenomena ways due to their 'inherent nature' (*svabhāva*).

According to the Naturalist theory, 'inherent nature' (*svabhāva*) is a principle governing physical nature and man himself is determined by this physical principle, his psychic personality playing no effective part in his behavior. In contrast, the Substantialist theory held that a 'self' is recognized even in physical phenomena and is ultimately identified with the psychic principle (*cit*) considered to be the reality in man. Thus, the Naturalist conception of causation through 'inherent nature' (*svabhāva*) came to be recognized as a form of 'external causation' (*param kataṇ*) because, as far as anthropocentric philosophies are concerned, it denied man's moral responsibility.

The third theory is an attempt to combine the first two theories and was put forward by the Jains. Although it recognizes both aspects of causation, self-causation as well as external causation, it carries with it all the metaphysical assumptions of the two.

The Buddhist theory of causality seems to have been influenced by the Naturalist theory of 'inherent nature' (*svabhāva*). Yet it differs from the Naturalist theory in two important ways. First, the Buddhist theory is not confined to physical causation alone, as is the Naturalist theory. In Buddhism, the causal pattern is recognized even in the psychic, moral, social, and spiritual realms, whereas in Naturalism everything is subordinate to physical causation. Second, unlike the Naturalists who believed that the principle of 'inherent nature' is strictly determined and that nothing can change the course of nature, Buddhists accepted a causal principle that was more or less a theory of conditionality. An examination of some features of the causal nexus as presented in the early texts will help in understanding the nature of the Buddhist theory of causality.

In the „Discourse on Causal Relations.“ **the Buddha** mentions four characteristics of causation: (1) objectivity (*tathatā*)

- (2) necessity (*avitathatā*)
- (3) invariability (*anaññathatā*)
- (4) conditionality (*idappaccayatā*)

These four characteristics are said to be found in the causal relations obtaining among phenomena.

The first emphasizes the objectivity of the causal relation. It was, in fact, intended to refute the claim of some idealist philosophers who belonged to the *Upaniṣadic* tradition and who maintained that change, and therefore causation, are mere matters of words, nothing but names (*vācārambhanam ... nāmadheyān*);<sup>4</sup> in other words, they are mental fabrications having no objective reality. For **the Buddha**, causation was as real as anything else. In fact, in one of the discourses preserved in the Chinese *Āgamas*,<sup>5</sup> the problem of the status of causation is brought up when the question is raised as to who fabricated (literally, 'made') the theory of causation. **Buddha's** reply is: „It is made neither by me nor by another. Whether the *Tathāgatas* were to arise in this world or not, this constitution of things [= *dhammadhātu*] is eternally existent. Concerning this [the constitution of things] the *Thathāgata* has insight, is fully enlightened.“ The objectivity of causation is further emphasized when its discovery is compared to the discovery of a bygone kingdom (*purāṇam rājadhāniṇ*).<sup>6</sup>

The second and third characteristics, 'necessity' (*avitathatā*) and 'invariability' (*anaññathatā*), stress the lack of exception or the existence of regularity. The fact that a certain set of conditions gives rise to a certain effect and not to something completely different, is one of the basic assumptions of the causal principle. If this feature is not recognized, the

basic pattern of events perceived in this phenomenal world cannot be explained satisfactorily. Events that appear to follow no causal pattern, events that are generally called accidental occurrences, are not really so. It is merely our ignorance of the causal pattern that prompts us to consider them accidental.<sup>7</sup>

The fourth characteristic of causation, 'conditionality' (*idappaccayatā*), is by far the most significant in that it steers clear of the two extremes – the unconditional necessity implied in strict determinism and the unconditional arbitrariness assumed by accidentalism. Hence it was used as a synonym for causation. It was emphasized at the time when the determinism (*niyatīvāda*) of **Makkhali Gosāla** (the leader of the *Ājīvika* sect) and indeterminism (*adhiccasamuppāda* or *adhiccasamuppanna-vāda*) were dominant theories.

On the basis of these characteristics of causation, **the Buddha** formulated the general formula that is set out in the early discourses as follows:

„When this is present, that comes to be;  
from the arising of this, that arises.  
When this is absent, that does not come to be;  
on the cessation of this, that ceases.“

(*Imasmim sati idaṃ hoti;  
imassa uppādā idaṃ uppajjati.  
Imasmim asati idaṃ na hoti;  
imassa nirodhā idaṃ nirujjhati.*)

This statement found in many places in the early texts,<sup>8</sup> explains the conception of causality or causal uniformity which **the Buddha** arrived at after a perusal of the various instances of causal happening, and which came to be known as the golden mean between the two extremes, eternalism and annihilationism. It is, indeed, the truth about the world which **the Buddha** claimed the discovered<sup>9</sup> and which became the „central“ doctrine of Buddhism. It was **the Buddha's** answer to both the eternalist theory of the Substantialists, who posited an unchanging immutable 'self' (*ātman*), and the annihilationist theory of the non-Substantialists, who denied continuity altogether. Thus **the Buddha** is said to have remarked: „To him who perceives through proper insight the arising of the things of the world, the belief in nonexistence [= annihilation] does not occur. to him who perceives through proper insight the ceasing of the things of the world, the belief in existence [= immutability] does not arise.“<sup>10</sup>

One of the significant features to be noted in this conception of causation is the lack of metaphysical assumptions which are generally found in the rationalist theories of causality met with in the later schools of Indian philosophy. The metaphysical theory of the *Sāṅkhya* and the *Sarvāstivāda* schools, which emphasized the identity of cause and effect (*satkārya-vāda*), may be similar to the theory of self-causation upheld by the *Upaniṣadic* thinkers, and the *Vaiśeṣika* and *Sautrāntika* theories, which insisted on the difference between cause and effect (*asatkārya-vāda*), may, in a way, be related to the theory of external causation accepted by the Naturalist tradition. But because of the epistemological standpoint he adopted, **the Buddha** was able to formulate an empiricist theory of causality without getting involved in either of these metaphysical doctrines.

While individual instances of causal happening were verified on the basis of experience, both sensory and extrasensory, the uniformity of the causal law was reached through inductive inference based on these experiences. While causation itself is a phenomenon experienced, causal uniformity is considered an inductive inference. On the basis of the present experiences of causal happening, inductive inferences are made with regard to the past and the future.<sup>11</sup> While some past incidents may be brought back through reminiscences, one cannot rely on memory completely, for it tends to fade. Hence, even knowledge of the past is based on inductive inference. Because it is possible to remember past incidents through extrasensory perception, knowledge of the past may be partly experiential. But knowledge with regard to the future may be had only through inductive generalization. This may be one of the reasons why none of the extrasensory perceptions refer to the future. Thus experiential knowledge (*dharme ñāṇa*) consists of knowledge of causally conditioned phenomena (*paṭiccasamuppanna-dhamma*) as well as the causal relations (*paṭiccasamuppāda*) of the present and partly of the past. Inferential knowledge (*anvaye ñāṇa*) is primarily of the future and partly of the past. The uniformity of the causal principle, which involves prediction into the future, is therefore an inductive generalization.

The universal applicability of the causal law is recognized in early Buddhism when it uses this causal principle to explain every phenomenon. We come across many instances in which the causal principle is applied to explain the functioning of physical, both organic and inorganic, phenomena. Among events that receive causal explanations are the evolution and dissolution of the world-process,<sup>12</sup> natural occurrences like drought<sup>13</sup> and earthquakes,<sup>14</sup> and also plant life.<sup>15</sup> A special application of the causal principle is made with reference to the human personality, a problem of prime importance to **the Buddha** as well as to the pre-Buddhist thinkers. This twelvefold formula of causation, which became very popular in the early

Buddhist texts, will be discussed in detail below. Psychological processes are also explained in terms of the causal principle.<sup>16</sup> Furthermore, moral and social, as well as spiritual, behavior find causal explanations (chapters 5, 6, 7). As later scholiasts grouped them, there are five main spheres or realms in which causality predominates:

- (1) physical (inorganic) order (*utu-niyāma*)
- (2) physical (organic) order (*bīja-niyāma*)
- (3) psychological order (*citta-niyāma*)
- (4) moral order (*kamma-niyāma*)
- (5) ideal spiritual order (*dhamma-niyāma*).<sup>17</sup>

These five groups appear to be so all-inclusive that nothing in experience is excluded. In short, everything in this universe comes within the framework of causality. Hence, to know causation is to know the truth. This explains **the Buddha's** statement, „He who perceives causation (*paṭiccasamuppāda*) perceives the *Dhamma*.“<sup>18</sup>

Of the various applications of the causal principle, the most prominent in the early Buddhist texts is, for obvious reasons, the formula of the twelve factors, which describes the causation of the human personality. The prominence given to the twelvefold formula seems to have led some scholars to think that this is all that Buddhism has to say about causation.<sup>19</sup> Even the few facts regarding the Buddhist theory of causality just presented should be sufficient to show that such a view is untenable.

The need for a rational and factual description of the life-process and how the so-called individual comes to experience happiness as well as suffering was felt by **the Buddha** from the very beginning of his career. In this task he was faced with insuperable difficulties created by some of the pre-Buddhist thinkers. On the one hand, when speaking of the life-process, some scholars were accustomed to thinking in terms of an immutable reality called the 'self' (*ātman*); on the other hand, there were some who denied a self and as a result denied the continuity of the life-process and along with it whatever comes under the category of morality and spirituality. In addition, there were those who believed in an omniscient being who was responsible for the creation and preservation of the world-process and hence of the life-process. The necessity of explaining the life-process without contributing to any one of these theories, with which he did not agree, led **the Buddha** to devise the twelvefold formula.

Since the question of the absolute beginning of the world-process was considered a metaphysical one (see appendix I), the twelvefold formula was presented in the form of a cycle or circle (*vaṭṭa*). The formula is generally stated in the following manner:

When this is present, that comes to be; on the arising of this, that arises. When this is absent, that does not come to be; on the cessation of this, that ceases. That is to say, on ignorance depend dispositions; on dispositions depends consciousness; on consciousness depends the psychophysical personality; on the psychophysical personality depend the six „gateways“ [of sensual perception]; on the six „gateways“ depends contact; on contact depends feeling; on feeling depends craving; on craving depends grasping; on grasping depends becoming; on becoming depends birth; on birth depend aging and death, sorrow and lamentation, suffering, dejection and vexation. In this manner there arises this mass of suffering.

In this special application of the causal principle, ignorance (*avijjā*) heads the list of twelve factors. It is not the beginning of the cycle of existence, but is one of the most important factors that contribute to evil or unwholesome behavior, and that when completely eliminated lead to enlightenment and hence to the cessation of suffering. Ignorance is said to condition the dispositions (*saṅkhāra*) which play a significant role in determining the nature of man's behavior (*kamma*). The nature of one's consciousness (*viññāṇa*) also depends on the nature of the dispositions. Consciousness being the factor that determines the nature of the new psychophysical personality (*nāmarūpa*), the part played by the dispositions in determining life after death is emphasized. Dispositions therefore account for the nature of one's behavior (*kamma*) as well as one's future birth or rebirth (*punabbhava*).

The process of rebirth is explained as the combining of the two factors, consciousness (*viññāṇa*) and the psychophysical personality (*nāmarūpa*). The psychophysical personality referred to here is the foetus formed in the mother's womb (*gabbha*) and which represents the beginning of a new life span. Consciousness surviving from the past is said to become infused in this new personality, and thus a continuity is maintained between the two lives. The latent dispositions in this surviving consciousness therefore determine to a great extent the nature of the new personality.

When the individual is born, his senses, if they are not impaired, will start functioning, and through them he is fed new impressions which also will be instrumental in determining the nature of his personality. Hence the relationship between the psychophysical personality and the six „gateways“ of sense perception (*saḷāyatana*). Depending on the nature of the six gateways of sense perception, there arises contact (*phassa*). Contact leads to feeling (*vedanā*), pleasurable, painful, or neutral. Depending on the nature of the feelings, there arises craving (*taṇhā*) which is generally considered to be threefold: desire for

sense pleasures (*kāma*), for existence (*bhava*) and for nonexistence (*vibhava*). Craving is the cause of grasping (*upādāna*), as a result of which the process of becoming (*bhava*) is set in motion. This stage represents again the end of a life span and the beginning of a fresh one. The factors that earlier were said to be operative at the beginning of a new life process, namely, consciousness (*viññāṇa*) and the psychophysical personality (*nāmarūpa*), are also operative here, in the same way that grasping (*upādāna*) and becoming (*bhava*) are operative there. The difference is that, since the early Buddhists were interested in accounting for at least three life terms when presenting the causal process in this manner, they seem to have taken only those prominent factors which they wanted to emphasize and associated them with the beginnings of the two life processes. Thus birth (*jāti*) in the third case is given as the result of becoming (*bhava*). Birth, then, is considered the cause of the entire mass of suffering that one is faced within this life.

Since rebirth is the cause of suffering and is invariably associated with decay and death (*jarā-marāṇa*), avoiding future birth or becoming (*punabbhava*) is the goal of the religious life. How is one able to put an end to future rebirth? According to the causal process it would seem that development of right understanding (*sammā diṭṭhi*), which would replace ignorance (*avijjā*), and the elimination of craving (*taṇhā*), which results in nongrasping (*anupādāna*), would put a halt to this process of becoming. Deathlessness of immortality (*amata*, Sk. *amṛta*) is therefore nothing more than rebirthlessness or 'becoming-lessness' (*apunabbhava*). But in later *Mahāyāna*, deathlessness seems to have been interpreted as the absence of death even at the end of the present life span, and hence **the Buddha's Parinibbāna** is looked upon as being unreal or as a fiction. (This will be discussed in Chapter 10.)

Deathlessness is the ultimate consequence of the attainment of enlightenment and the elimination of craving. But the immediate result of enlightenment is the attainment of perfect happiness (*parama sukha*) arising from the absence of craving or attachment (*virāga*). Viewed in this light, we can understand the paeans of joy expressed by the monks and nuns, as recorded in the *Thera-gāthās* and *Therī-gāthās*.

Notes:

1. *Ud* I ff.
2. *S* 2.2 ff.; *TD* 2.85 b.
3. *S* 2. 18; *TD* 2.81 a.
4. *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 6.1.4-6
5. *TD* 2.85 b.
6. *S* 2.165-106
7. **H. Van Rensselaar Wilson**, „On Causation.“ in *Determinism and Freedom in the Age of Modern Science*, ed. **Sidney Hook** (New York : New York University Press, 1965), pp. 225 ff.
8. *M* 1.262 ff.; *TD* I.562c; *S* 2.28; *TD* 2.85b.
9. *Ud* I ff.
10. *S* 2.17; *TD* 2.85c.
11. *S* 2.58; *TD* 2.99c.
12. *D* 3.80 ff.; *TD* 1.36b ff.; *A* 4.100-103; *TD* 2.736b-c.
13. *A* 3.243.
14. *A* 4.312; *TD* 2.753c.
15. *A* 1.223-224; *S* 3.45; *TD* 2.8c; *S* 4.315; *TD* 2.231a.
16. *M* 1.111-112, 190; *TD* 1.604b, 467b.
17. *DA* 2.432; *DhsA* 272.
18. *M* 1.190-191; *TD* 1.467a
19. **A. B. Keith**, *Buddhist Philosophy in India and Ceylon* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1925), p. 264.
20. *S* 2.28; *TD* 2.98a.

Selected Readings:

- Primary sources:

1. *Mahā-nidāna-suttanta* (*D* 2.55 ff.); 'The Great Discourse on Causation' (*SBB* 3.50 ff.); *TD* 1.60 ff.
2. *Nidāna-Samyutta* (*S* 2.1-133) including 93 discourses; 'The Kindred Sayings on Cause' (*KS* 2.1-94); roughly corresponding to *TD* 2.79-86
3. *Ārya-śālistamba-sūtra*, restored from quotations and Tibetan and Chinese translations by **L. de la Vallé Poussin**, *Théorie des Douze Causes*, Ghent: University of Ghent, 1913; by **N. A. Sastri**, Adyar Library Series 76, Adyar : Adyar Library, 1950, together with restorations of *Pratītyasamutpādavibhaṅganirdeśa* and *Āryapratītyasamutpāda-sūtra*.

- Secondary sources

1. **Conze, Edvard.** *Buddhist Thought in India*, London : George Allen & Unwin, 1962. Pp. 144-158
2. **De la Vallé Poussin, L.** *Théorie des Douze Causes*, Gent : Univerzity of Ghent, 1913.
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### BONUS: GENESIS

The term genesis means „creation“, „generation“ or „production.“ It has also been used as the title of the first book of the Christian Bible. Seeing the relation between the purpose of the book of Genesis in the Bible and the Buddhist canonical discourse entitled *Aggañña sutta* (q.v.) in the *Dīgha Nikāya* of the *Sutta Piṭaka*, scholars have described the *Aggañña sutta* as the Buddhist book of Genesis. In accordance with this description the discussion of the concept of Genesis in relation to Buddhism will in the sequel pay special attention to the religious, ethical and philosophical significance of the ideas contained in the *Aggañña sutta*. As a general theory of creation, generation or production Buddhism propounded the theory of Conditioned Genesis or Dependent Origination; the theory of *Pañiccasamuppāda* (Skt. *Pratītyasamutpāda*), which though variously interpreted, is a cardinal doctrinal tenet common to all systems of Buddhism. It was presented as **the Buddha's** theoretical Middle Way which avoided a number of extreme views such as eternalism, nihilism, a variety of deterministic theories as well as forms of indeterminism which held that there is no casual order whatsoever in the universe. The *Aggañña sutta* narrative is evidently an early Buddhist attempt to construct a legendary history of the origin of the world, the evolution of man and social institutions which is consistent with the general theory of conditioned genesis.

A student of the development of human ideas in the numerous cultures of the world is bound to be struck by the universality of the presence of cosmogonical myths to account for the beginnings of the universe and all existence. It may be said that the presence of a cosmogony indicates a higher level of development in abstract thinking. In the Indian context the Buddhist account of the origin and development of the world and society was preceded by numerous cosmogonical myths belonging to the *Vedic* tradition. Indian thought had already reached a high level of development in abstract thinking and attained considerable philosophical maturity by the time **the Buddha** began his mission as a strikingly innovative teacher. The story of genesis found in the *Aggañña sutta* is illustrative of some of the uniquely innovative aspects of the Buddhist world view. Compared to the degree of attention that the Biblical story of Genesis has received in the history of religious ideas it should be remarked that considering the richness of imagination and the philosophical vision implicit in the Buddhist story, it has received far less attention than it deserves.

Most cosmogonies attempt to postulate a primal element from which the universe came into being. The cosmogonical myths of ancient cultures are a mixture of primitive animistic beliefs and beliefs about supernatural forces thought to underlie the variegated multiplicity of the phenomenal world. According to **Homer** the prime component of the universe is the ocean and according to **Hesiod** it is earth. In later *Milesian* thought an attempt was made by the more philosophically minded to present theories about the origin and development of the universe on a more naturalistic and speculative basis. According to one of the Egyptian cosmogonic legends primal spirit and primal matter coexist in all eternity in indissoluble union and the diversity in the universe emerges from these first principles. In Chinese cosmogony the origin of everything is traced to the male and Female principles *Yang* and *Yin*. In the Judeo Christian tradition God is the maker of both heaven and earth, the sea and all that is in them. The Biblical myth of Genesis is an attempt to reconstruct in terms of the religious consciousness of the Israelite people the legendary history of the origin of the world, the beginning of human existence, the nature of the man-woman relationship and the nature of morality and the source of sin.

In *Rgveda* which contains the earliest religious literature of the Indians, the dominant characteristic is found to be an explanation of natural phenomena by a process of deification involving the positing of wills behind the dynamic forces of nature. However, sceptical questions appear to have been raised about the absolute origin of things even at this early age as evidenced by the

*Nāsadīya* hymn of the *R̥gveda*. An attempt to trace even certain conventional divisions of society to divine origins is marked in the *R̥gveda*, itself. According to the *Puruṣa Sūkta* of the *R̥gveda*, the four castes, *Brāhmaṇa* (priests), *Rājanya* (rulers), *Vaiśya* (common people) and *Sūdra* (menials) were created respectively out of the mouth, the arms, the thighs and the feet of the Primeval Person. This idea is repeated in the *Atharvaveda* and came to be fully established in the period of the *Yajur Saṁhitās* and the *Brāhmaṇas*. There is an attempt in the *Brāhmaṇas* to give a monotheistic explanation for the origin of the universe. In the *Brāhmaṇas* are found many legends about **Prajāpati** creating the universe. In the beginning was **Prajāpati** and nothing but **Prajāpati**; he through the performance of austerities, created the worlds. In some legends waters seem to have been believed to be coeval with **Prajāpati**. The *Upaniṣads* turn to be more philosophical in tracing the beginnings of existence to the abstract principles of *Ātman* and *Brahman*. In the *Upaniṣad* creation is attributed to *Ātman* in the shape of man (*puruṣa*). *Puruṣa* finds delight in multiplying Himself. Thereupon He becomes husband and wife and created all beings that exist in pairs. In the *taittiriya Upaniṣad* the sequence is given as *Brahman*, space, wind, fire, water, earth, food, seed, men and all creatures. The *Sāṅkhya* system is also an attempt to give an evolutionary account of man and the physical universe in terms of two primordial realities called *prakṛti* (matter) and *puruṣa* (spirit).

Buddhism appears to have held that all speculative thinking about the absolute beginnings of things inevitably lead to unverifiable dogmas (*diṭṭhi*). The *Brahmajāla sutta* of the *Dīgha Nikāya* makes an enumeration of pre-Buddhist views classifying them broadly as speculations about the past (*pubbantakappikā pubbantānudiṭṭhino*) and speculations about the future (*aparantānukappikā aparantānudiṭṭhino*). **The Buddha** is said to have understood all the variety of such speculative views but transcended them not holding dogmatically to any one of them. There is reason to believe that Buddhism consistently refrained from formulating any speculative theories about the absolute origin of things primarily due to its epistemological outlook. It is characteristic of the early Buddhism of the Pāli canonical *suttas* that it claims to base its theory of reality on the data of experience alone. Experience, however, includes in the Buddhist view what Buddhism describes as the experience of *abhiññā* (higher knowledge or super cognition) in addition to the ordinary sensory experiences. revelation, scriptural authority, and speculative reason are not recognized as dependable ultimate sources of knowledge. **The Buddha** claimed to have the ability to remember the past beyond one life time back into a beginningless series of past lives if he so wished to relive those memories. he also claimed the super-cognitive ability to use clairvoyant vision (*dibbacakkhu*) to observe the present, unhindered by the physical or physiological limitations of ordinary vision. He did not claim (at least according to the material contained in the early stratum of canonical doctrine) to possess a faculty of knowing by which one could directly witness the past or the future. In accordance with this epistemological position, the first beginning of any individual life series which is subject to the *saṁsāric* process is said to be unknown (*anamataggo ayaṃ saṁsāro, pubbā koṭi na paññayati*). With regard to the individual, one can only speak of the origination or production (*samudaya*) of the unsatisfactory process of *dukkha* but not of any metaphysical soul or ego entity like in religious systems which have the concept of an immortal self. This process is to be accounted for by discovering the immediately perceivable conditions related to it. The canonical *suttas* contain a number of formulations stating the causal dependencies which explain the genesis of *dukkha* and the *saṁsāric* process. No particular causal factor is to be taken as the unconditioned first cause. Buddhism holds the same view about the evolution of the physical universe. It does not postulate an absolute beginning. It explicitly rejects the theory of divine creation. In the *Pātika sutta* **the Buddha** claims to know the beginning of things (*aggaññā ca ... pajānāmi*). here, he rejects the view that one could account for the beginnings in terms of creation by God or *Brahma* (*issarakuttaṃ brahmakuttaṃ*). In the Buddhist view it is possible to speak only of relative beginnings. The Buddhist story of Genesis in the *Aggañña sutta* may be said to be purported to state in form of legendary history the relative beginnings and the gradual evolution of the physical world, sentient existence and man and his social institutions. its significance ought to be judged not for the historical accuracy of what it states, but for the underlying philosophical conceptions of the nature of man and the universe and the laws governing evolutionary processes of nature in the physical, social and psychological spheres. In this account may be found some of the deepest philosophical intuitions of Buddhist thought including the most noteworthy aspects of its social and political philosophy.

According to early Buddhist cosmology, the physical universe consists of innumerable world systems extending in the form of galactic clusters. The Buddhist conception of the universe does not accord with a narrow geocentric view which was common to most prescientific cultures. The world systems are said to be in a continuous process of evolution and involution over incalculable aeons going through periods of „opening out“ (*vivattaṃāna*) and „closing in“ (*saṅvattaṃāna*). the recognition of the fact that despite the immensity and the apparent order and stability of our physical world, it is subject to the law of universal change is a reaffirmation of the Buddhist doctrine of transience (*aniccā*). The *Aggañña sutta* states that during a period of involution, the larger part of sentient beings survives in the abode of luminous existence (*ebhuyyena sattā ābhassara-saṅvattanikā honti*). This view is in accordance with the Buddhist theory of survival that until a living being eradicates craving it has to wander in the cycle of *saṃsāra*. It is said that when after a long period of time the world begins to evolve the beings from the luminous abode pass away and are reborn in this world. According to the description given in the *sutta* these beings possess no gross physical bodies, have a kind of astral or spiritual existence and do not feed on any material food but on joy. The *Sutta* says:

„Now at that time, all had become one world of water, dark and of darkness that maketh blind. No moon or sun appeared, no stars were seen, no constellations, neither was night manifest nor day, neither months nor half months, neither years nor seasons, female nor male. Beings were reckoned just as beings only.“

It says that after a time just as scum forms on the surface of boiled milky rice that is cooling, the earth begins to form on the

expanse of water. Here Buddhism is putting forward a naturalistic notion of physical evolution in place of the current *Brahmanical* theories of divine origins of the natural world. However, as the description proceeds, the peculiarly Buddhist world view comes into focus in its assertion that even the physical and physiological changes are to be accounted for in terms of the motives and desires of sentient beings. The interaction between the psychical aspects of sentient existence and the physical environment is brought out in the legendary story that follows. The sensory qualities of colour, odour and taste are said to appear in the evolving earth-matter, giving rise to the psychological response of craving for the savoury earth. Thus the Buddhist story about the beginnings suggests that moral evil in the world is not due to the intervention of any supernatural agency benign or malign, but it is part of the process of dependent origination. Elsewhere in the suttas where deeper psychological analysis occurs, the origin of moral evil is traced to the process of sense perception beginning with the contact of the senses with the external world.

The *Aggañña sutta* further says that the self-luminance of the first beings in the period of evolution disappears as a consequence of their craving for the savoury earth. When the self-luminance disappears the sun and the moon and stars and constellations become manifest giving rise to changes of season and the conventional distinctions between months, half months and years. When living beings feed on material food of the earth, they are said to have gradually undergone change in their physical constitution and appearance. This brings about distinction in the physical appearance of living beings. There comes a stage when the savoury earth also disappears and beings live on the vegetative outgrowths which appear subsequently on the surface of the earth. After a long process of evolution in which varieties of vegetation serve as the food for living beings, one being replaced by another, finally rice becomes their staple food.

Of special significance is the view presented in the *sutta* about the appearance of sexual distinction. The *sutta* says:

„And in measure as they, thus feeding, went on existing, so did the bodies of those beings become even more solid, and the divergence in their comeliness more pronounced. In the female appeared the distinctive features of the female, in the male those of the male. Then truly did woman contemplate man too closely and man, woman. In them contemplating over much the one the other, passion arose and burning entered their body. They in consequence thereof followed their lust (ibid. p. 85).

Buddhism explains the emergence of sex distinction as a consequence of an evolutionary process involving psychophysical interaction. This is in marked contrast to the biblical view that it is an original distinction attributable to God, the supreme Creator. In the narrative itself the Buddhist attitude towards sex is expressed by saying that in the first occurrence of the sexual act it met with common disapproval. This is a reaffirmation of the early Buddhist position that sexual pleasures have to be transcended in order to attain the higher levels of spiritual maturity. The *Aggañña sutta* account is in accord with the early Buddhist position that the higher religious life (*brahmacariya*) requires the transcendence of the vulgar pleasures of sexual union (*virato methuna gāmadhammā*).

The Buddhist story goes on in gradual stages to account for the evolution of the economic and social life of man from which some of the most important principles of Buddhist social and political philosophy can be derived. A crucial stage in the process of social evolution is the beginning of private property. The *sutta* says that the practice of common consumption of the produce of the earth is later replaced by a system of private property. People erect fences and demarcate the boundaries of their own property. This marks the beginning of the evil practices of theft. Human greed leads to the evil practice of stealing the property of another person. This in turn marks the beginnings of a political order to regulate harmonious social and economic relationships. The first ruler, according to this Buddhist legend, is one elected by the people (*mahājanasammato*). By this story Buddhism appears to be challenging the predominant view about the nature of the authority of a ruler implicitly suggesting that the ruler's authority is derived from the people themselves, in the form of a social contract, decided on a political order headed by a king. Buddhism presents through this legend a radically different account of the source of political authority. The Buddhist legend gives strength to a democratic conception of the origin of political authority whereas the well known *Brahmanical* accounts seek to derive the authority of kings from a divine source. A peculiarly Buddhist etymology is suggested for the term *rājā* (king) saying „one is called *rājā* because he delights people by his adherence to justice“ (*dhammena janaṃ rañjetiti rājā*).

It is at this point that the main intention of the *sutta* is thrown into clearer focus. In the introductory section of the *sutta* which briefly states the circumstances under which **the Buddha** preached it, **the Buddha** asks one of his disciples named **Vāsetṭha**, who had entered the Buddhist Order from a *Brahmin* family, about the common *Brahmin* reaction to his decision to lead a religious life under **the Buddha** who was a non-*Brahmin* teacher. **Vāsetṭha's** answer suggests that it was definitely hostile reaction coloured by notions of the caste superiority of the *Brahmins* who claimed to be the direct progeny of **Brahma**, the creator God himself. (ibid. p. 78). It is at this point that **the Buddha** remarks that the *Brahmins* display such an attitude because they are ignorant of the past (*porāṇaṃ asarantā*) and proceeds to speak of the origins of things. The Buddhist story rejects with subtle irony that *Brahmanical* view of a static, divinely ordained social order along with the social inequalities consisting of the privileges and immunities for the upper classes justified by the *Brahmanical* view of the nature and origin of society established on the authority of the sacred scriptures. The most striking feature of the Buddhist story is its explanation of the four caste groups then recognized in Indian society as a product of natural social processes. The story suggests that conventional social stratifications are not static features of the natural

order of events, but depend on social conventions and socio-economic contingencies. In this connection, too, the Buddhist story introduces new etymologies with more concern for a moral purpose than their factual correctness. Rejecting the *Brahmanical* view about the nature of society, the *Aggañña sutta* quite emphatically declares that the different castes arise out of beings who were originally equal and like unto each other (*tesaññeva sattānaṃ sadisānaññeva no asadisānaṃ*). As against the *Brahmanical* view Buddhism maintains that human beings belong to one species. The Buddhist account ends with emphasis on the supremacy of moral values insisting that the person who is endowed with right knowledge and good conduct is the highest among gods and men (*vijjācaraṇa sampanno so seṭṭho devamānuse*).

It may be said that the Buddhist story of Genesis illustrates clearly the contrasting paradigm of a non-theistic religious system like Buddhism when viewed in relation to theistic cosmogonies. The story gives expression to the non-authoritarian and humanistic character of Buddhism as a religious system. The view it presents about the nature of the cosmos and the processes of cosmic evolution may not have been intended to be based on historical facts. It represents an account of origins in keeping with the fundamental doctrinal tenets of Buddhism. It reaffirms the Buddhist positions that the question of absolute origins of things is unanswerable, that explanations in terms of creation by a supreme being are unsatisfactory, that change is a universal feature of all existence and that reference to material factors alone is incomplete as an explanation of changes in the sphere of sentient existence as well as its material and social environment. The role of the will and desire of beings in the processes of evolution is emphasized. A humanistic account of the nature of political authority as well as social institutions is presented with a view to affirming the overriding nature and the primacy of moral values in all human activities and relationships.

**P. D. Premasiri**

**BONUS: NIRVĀNA (WRITTEN BY W. L. HARE, EXTRACT WRITTEN BY VEN. CZECH SARANA)**

*Nirvāna* cannot be confined within the limits of our intellect. The precise truth may not yet have been stated.

*Nirvāna* is derived from Sanskrit roots, which mean „outblown“ or „extinguished“ in relation to a flame. This particular fire symbology was adopted by the Buddha to refer to a spiritual state.

At the time of the Blessed One's enlightenment India was held fast by four ancient ideas. Each of these doctrines was modified by the Buddha.

Ancient ideas:

1. The belief in the *ātman*, the soul

2. The belief in *Samsāra*, „together wandering,“ i.e.,

the transmigration of the soul.

3. The belief in *Karma*, or a doctrine as to the significance of deeds.

4. The belief in *Moksha*, the liberation of the soul by its rebirth according to deeds.

not being reborn.

3. *Karma* was very much strengthened, and in certain ways adapted to the denial of the existence of the soul.

4. Instead of *Moksha* or liberation of the soul *Nirvāna* was substituted.

Buddha's modification:

1. The existence of the soul was ignored or denied.

2. Transmigration was replaced by the doctrine of

According to the sermon preached by the Buddha in Gayā - „Fire Sermon“ (*Agni sutta*) the whole of sentient existence is explained as „a burning.“ Everything burns, everything is a flame-like in-force, a form of energy, claimant, affirmative, in a state of perpetual change and combustion, a fire kept alight by fuel being continually added to it. Life and death are fire, out of fire comes misery and suffering. *Nirvāna* is the dying down of the flames, the assuagement of the misery.

According to Introduction to *Jātakas I. 58* there are five fires and they lead us to believe, that there are many others. But later on the fires were reduced to three in number:

1. That which refers to all degrees of craving or attachment – just, infatuation and greed (*lobha*)

2. That which refers to all degrees of antipathy – hatred, anger, vexation or repugnance (*dosa*)

3. That which refers to all degrees of ignorance – delusion, dullness and stupidity (*moha* or *avijjā*)

- The first and second fires relate to the emotions and the third fire relates to all ideas that are removed from the truth.

In other passages of *Tipiṭaka* the symbol „fire“ has been replaced by others - „excited,“ „furious,“ „blinded,“ „overwhelmed,“ „enslaved“ - but their antithesis „done away“ is expressed by *Nirvāna* the opposite of „fire.“ Deeds of a certain kind add fuel and keep the furnace raging, the cessation of those deeds and the performance of others facilitate the extinction of the fire, or let it die out. Thus bad *karma* makes for fire, good *karma* makes for *Nirvāna*. Lust is thirst for sensual indulgence, Hatred is annoyance sprung because of one's actions, actions of someone else or groundlessly. Ignorance is the lack of knowledge about the four great truths. The removal of any of these mental states will be a step towards *vidya*, and the making of good *karma*.

Inasmuch one does not cleave for sense pleasures in him Craving (*taṇhā*) ceases, and by the cessation of Craving Grasping (*upādāna*) ceases and by the cessation of Grasping Becoming (*bhava*) ceases and when Becoming has ceased, birth ceases, and with its cessation old age, death, sorrow and despair cease to exist. Cessation is *Nirvāna*. Thus *Nirvāna* is much more than moral *Nirvāna*.

The Buddha never told us of a cause out of which *Nirvāna* could be said to be produced. *Nirvāna* is unproducibile, and no cause for its origin has been declared. It is uncompounded, not made of anything. *Nirvāna* is not past, present or future and it is not perceptible to any of five senses.

The Buddha was teaching in one of his sermons: »I teach annihilation, the annihilation namely, of greed, the annihilation of anger, the annihilation of delusion as well as the annihilation of the manifold evil, unwholesome conditions of the mind.«

The Buddha described the *Nirvāna* thus: »Verily, Brothers, there is a condition, where there is neither the solid (*pathavī*), nor the fluid (*Āpo*), neither heat (*Tejo*) nor motion (*Vāyo*), neither this world nor any other world, neither sun nor moon. .... There is neither substance nor development nor any basis. This is the End of Suffering.« »If, Brothers, there were not this unborn, this unoriginated, that has not become, that has not been formed, escape from the world of the born, the originated, the become, the formed, would not be possible.«

Other synonyms for *Nirvāna* are:

1. The land of bliss
2. The other shore
3. The untrodden country
4. The place, where having gone one does not grieve
5. The immortal peace
6. Salvation
7. The imperishable
8. Eternally perfect state
9. The perfect world

The earlier *Hīnayāna* directs most of its attention to „moral *Nirvāna*,“ whereas *Mahāyāna* texts speak more about the „ultimate *Nirvāna*,“ and its remotness.

Some Buddhist schools teach about two or three kinds of *Nirvāna* (that for *Arahats*, another for *Pacceka Buddhas* and another for *Sammā Sambuddhas*) but according to the Buddhas teaching, there is only one kind of *Nirvāna*.

„We were contented with a little of *Nirvāna*, we required nothing higher, nor even cared for it. But the Friend of the world has taught us better: „This is no blessed Rest at all, the full knowledge of the highest men, that is blessed Rest, that is supreme beatitude.“

### BONUS: PUDGALAVĀDA

Like the *Sarvāstivādins*, the *Sammitīyas* also differed on many doctrinal points from the *Theravādins* and other sects. These have been discussed in the *Kathāvatthu* and mentioned in treatises on sects written by **Bhavya**, **Vasumitra** and **Vinīta**. The *pudgalavāda* gave a rude shock to the other sectarian teachers, who regarded it as almost heretical and a negation of the *anātma-vāda* of **Buddha**, and was bitterly criticized by many writers like **Vasubandhu** and **Śāntarakṣita**.<sup>59</sup> We have to make out from the criticisms what the exact position taken up by the *Sammitīya-Vātiputrīyas* was regarding the conception of soul and its transmigration from one existence to another. The publication of **Prof. Venkataraman's** translation of the *Sāmmītiya-nikāya-sāstra* in Chinese has been very helpful.

The *Sammitīyas Vatsīputrīyas* stated, that **Buddha** admitted the existence of an impermanent soul quite different from the *Upaniṣadic* conception of an eternal and changeless soul, which continued unchanged through all the existences of a being unless and until it attained full emancipation and merged in the *paramātmān* or *Brahman*. The *Sammitīyas* therefore preferred to name their changing soul as *pudgala*, distinguishing it from the *Anattā* doctrine of **Buddha**.

In the *Kathāvatthu* the view of *Sammitīyas* is given thus:

The *Pudgalavādins* rely on the following words of **Buddha**: »*atthi puggalo attahitāya paṭipanno*« (there is a person who exerts for his own good): »*ekapuggalo loke uppajjamāno uppajjati bahujaṇahitāya bahujaṇasukhāya lokānukampāya*« etc. (there appears a person who is reborn for the good and happiness of many, for showing compassion to the world of beings). Basing on such words of **Buddha**, the *Sammitīyas* (henceforth abbreviated as the *S.*) state '*puggala*' of the above-mentioned passages is something positive; it is neither a mirage nor a hearsay: it is neither the unconstituted reality like *Nibbāna* or *Ākāśa* nor a constituent material element (*rūpa*), feeling (*vedanā*) etc. The '*puggala*' is not real in the highest sense (*paramārtha*). On the one hand, it is not something apart from the constituents (*khandhas*) of a being, and as such it is not possible to establish a relation between the *puggala* and the *khandhas* like that between the container and the contained. On the other hand, though it possesses all the characteristics of the *khandhas*, it is neither like them caused and conditioned (*sahetu sappaccaya*) nor is it like *Nibbāna* uncaused and unconditioned (*ahetu appaccaya*). Again, it is neither constituted (*saṃskṛta*) nor unconstituted (*asaṃskṛta*). Though it is different (*añño*) from the constituents it possesses certain characteristics of a constituted being such as happiness and unhappiness. It has certain aspects of the unconstituted inasmuch as it is not subject to birth, old age and death. It ceases only when the individual attains final emancipation (*Nirvāna*).

In the *Abhidharmakośa* and its commentary, the relation between *pudgala* and *skandhas* is explained by the simile of fire and fuel. Fire exists as long as its fuel lasts, so the *pudgala* exists as long as there are the constituents, but fire is different from fuel inasmuch as it has the power of burning an object or producing light, which the fuel by itself does not possess. Fire and fuel are co-

<sup>59</sup> **Moggaliputta Tissa** is the celebrated compiler of the *Kathāvatthu*, while **Vasubandhu** is the author of the *Abhidharmakośa* and its *Bhāṣya*, and its *Vyākhyā* by **Yaśomitra**. **Śāntarakṣita** is author of *Tattvasaṃgraha* and its commentator is **Kamalaśīla**.

existent, and the latter is a support for the former, and just as one is not wholly different from the other because fuel is not wholly devoid of fiery element (*tejas*), in the same way stands 'pudgala' in relation to the constituents of a being. The *S.* quote the *Bhārahārasūtra* and explain that burden (*bhāra*) refers to the constituents (*skandha*) while their carrier (*hāra*) is the pudgala. Unloading of the burden is effected by the cessation of desires, attachment and hatred. This 'pudgala' bears a name, belongs to a family and is the enjoyer of happiness and unhappiness.<sup>60</sup>

In discussing the *Bhārahārasūtra*, **Śāntarākṣita** and **Kamalaśīla** state that **Buddha** used the word 'pudgala' as a mere concept (*prajñapti*). He did not state expressly that it was non-existent as nobody enquired of its real nature. He had in mind the aggregation of five constituents and to these collectively he referred as 'pudgala'. It is not subject to origin and decay, hence it has no past, present and future. It is neither eternal (*nitya*) nor non-eternal (*anitya*). It is inexplicable and indeterminable. It is not included in the constituents but appears only when all the constituents are present.

In the *Kathāvattu* it is stated that the *S.* point out that their 'pudgala' has a material form in the world of men and gods, who have got material bodies (*rūpa*), and it is without any material form in the world of higher gods, who are without material bodies (*arūpī*). They state that the 'pudgala' corresponds to the entity called a being (*sattva*) and also to the vital force (*jīva*) of a living being, but at the same time it is neither identical with, nor different from, the body (*kLya*), for **Buddha** rejected both the views of identity, and difference of vital force (*jīva*) and body (*sarīra*) »*taṃ jīvaṃ taṃ sarīraṃ aññaṃ jīvaṃ aññaṃ sarīraṃ*«. They rely on another statement made frequently by **Buddha** that a monk while practising mindfulness (*smṛtyupasthāna*) remains always aware of what is passing within his body »*so kāya kāyānupassī viharati*«. In this statement **Buddha** uses the word 'so' meaning „he“, i.e. 'pudgala', which watches the contents and movements of his body. This 'so' is not a mere concept (*prajñapti*), it refers to actual 'pudgala'.

The *S.* now take up the problem of transmigration. They hold that 'puggala' passes from one existence to another, but the 'puggala' of two existences is neither the same nor different. The reason adduced by them is that person, who has attained the *Sotāpatti* stage of sanctification, continues to be a *sotāpanna* in his future existences, whether in this mortal world or in heaven (*rūpadhLtu*). A *sotāpanna* man may be reborn as a *sotāpanna* god, i.e. *sotāpannahood* remains unchanged from those of a man to those of a god. The transition of *sotāpannahood* from one existence to another cannot take place unless the existence and continuity of 'puggala' are admitted.

In support of this contention the *S.* rely on the following utterances of **Buddha**:

- (i) There are four pairs of (saintly) persons or eight (saintly) persons »*santi cattāro purisayugā aṭṭha purisapuggalā*«. This statement refers to **Buddha's Saṅgha**, which consists of disciples who have attained the preparatory stage and fruits (*maggā, phala*) of sanctification.
- (ii) A *sotāpanna* has to be reborn seven times at the most to attain full emancipation »*so sattakhattuparaṃ sandhāvitvāna puggalo dukkhassantakaro hoti*«. The *S.* lay stress on the words *sandhāvitvāna puggala*, i.e., the transmigration of soul (*puggala*).
- (iii) The cycle of existence (*saṃsāra*) of a being is without a beginning, which is not apparent to beings immersed in desires »*anamataṅgo ayaṃ saṃsāro pubbā koṭī na paññāyati sattānaṃ tanhā-saṃyojanāṃ*«. The *S.* pick up the words 'saṃsāro' and 'satta' and deduce therefrom that **Buddha** admitted the transmigration of soul of beings.
- (iv) Lastly, **Buddha** very often spoke of the acquisition of higher powers of knowledge (*abhijñā*), one of which was the power of remembering one's previous existences (*pubbe-nivāsañāna*). He himself referred to his previous existences and often said, „When I was **Sunetra**, etc.“ This also established their contention that there must be a soul (*puggala*), continuing through several existences and **Buddha** is able to remember his past births. Memory of past existences is not possible for the constituents (*skandhas*), which change every moment, not to speak of the drastic change that the beings undergo when passing from death to rebirth. The *S.* add that admission of memory (*smṛti*) also implies the existence of 'puggala'.

The *S.* state that their 'puggala' is the percipient but it is different from mind (*citta, Vijñāna*), one of the constituents of a being. It is also not momentary (*kṣaṇika*) like mind but is perceivable in every momentary thought. It is the 'seer' whether the eyes are

60 *Samyutta*, III. p. 25 :

»*Katamo bhikkhave bhāro ?*

*Pañcupādānakkhandhā ti'ssa vacanīyaṃ.*

*Katame pañca ? Seyyathidaṃ, rūpupādānakkhando, vedanupā, saññupā, saṅkhārupā, viññānupā. Ayaṃ vuccati, bhikkhave, bhāro.*

*Katamo ca bhikkhave bhārahāro ?*

*Puggalo ti'ssa vacanīyaṃ. Yo'yaṃ*

*āyasmā evaṃ nāmo evaṃ gotto. Ayaṃ*

*vuccati bhikkhave bhārahāro.*«

In the *Tattvasaṅgraha* (p. 130, It. 349) **Kamalaśīla** quotes:

»*Bhārahārah katamah pudgalah ?*

*Yo'sāvāuṣmānnevaṃ nāmā,*

*evaṃ jātih, evaṃ gotra, evamāhāra,*

*evaṃ sukhadukkhāṃ pratisaṃvedī,*

*evaṃ dīrghāyur ityādinā pudgalo vyākhyātah.*«

functioning or not, because **Buddha** said, »I see by my divine eyes beings appearing and disappearing.« Here 'I' is 'puggala' of the *S.*

Then *S.* take up the problem of capacity for effective action (*arthakriyākṛitva*) of the soul. In conformity with **Buddha's** teaching that the world is not a creation of God (*Īśvaranirmāṇa*) they do not want to attribute to 'puggala' any function of a doer or a creator. They, however, point out that the 'puggala' of a parent or a teacher is in a sense the doer or creator (*kartā, kāretā*) of a being. The 'puggala' has no independent function like that of mental properties. It is not an enjoyer of fruits. 'Puggala' and 'fruits' are not two distinct entities, though 'puggala' is said to be feeling happy or unhappy, because the conglomeration of diverse elements, which make a being, cannot have the feeling of happiness or unhappiness. There may be a doer (*kāraka*) or feeler (*vedaka*), but it is not to be distinguished from deed or feeling. The doer and the deed are neither identical nor different. The *S.* mention this stance of theirs in refutation of the opponent's argument that a semi-permanent soul like the eternal soul cannot have any activity. It is only the impermanent, momentary (*anitya, kṣanika*) soul that can have any activity (*arthakriyākāritva*).

**Śāntaraksita** in his *Tattvasaṅgraha* (pp. 336-349) writes that the 'puggala' of the *Vātsīputrīyas* is neither identical with, nor different from, the constituents (*skandhas*). In his comments, **Kamalaśīla** states that the 'puggala' of the *Vātsīputrīyas* is the doer of deeds and enjoyer of their fruits. During transmigration it leaves one group of constituents to take up another. It is not separate from the constituents, for, in that case, it would be eternal. Again, it cannot be the same as the constituents, for in that case, it would be not one but many. It is therefore for in that case, it would be not one but many. It is therefore inexplicable. The exposition of **Kamalaśīla** is supported by *Prajñākaramati* in his commentary on the *Bodhicaryāvatāra*.

In this connection **Kamalaśīla** has discussed also the criticism of *Uddyotakara* in his *Nyāyavārttika* (III. 1. 1) that a soul must be postulated if it is not identified with one of the constituents. **Candrakīrti**, however, does not dismiss the *pudgalavāda* of the *Sammitīyas*<sup>61</sup> as wholly untenable. He even admits that **Buddha** as an expedient taught the *pudgalavāda* as he later propounded the idealistic doctrine of *Vijñānavāda*.

The *Sammitīyanikāyaśāstra* (**Venataraman's** translation) mentions and discusses all possible views thus (p. 21):

- (i) There is no real self.
- (ii) The self is indeterminable (*avyākṛta*).
- (iii) Five constituents and the self are identical.
- (iv) Five constituents and the self are different.
- (v) Self is eternal (*śāśvata*).
- (vi) Self is not eternal (*aśāśvata*) and impermanent (*anitya*).
- (vii) Self is actually existent though not eternal.

Of these views the last is held by the *S.* In this text, the non-*Sammitīya* views have been briefly stated without any comment or criticism while its own view has been fully dealt with thus:

- (i) The 'puggala' is the product of five constituents, and it is neither eternal nor wholly impermanent.
- (ii) **Buddha's** denial of self was enunciated to counteract the wrong views that the self was based on mental impressions (*saṃkhārās*) or that it was identical with the body or five constituents.

He admonished his disciples to remove the notion of „I-ness“ and „Mine-ness,“ which was based on the notion of a false self, to which worldly beings bore a strong attachment, but he did not refer to that self (*puggala*) which, strictly speaking, could not be the object of passionate seeking.

Then, again, in **Buddha's** sayings, the term 'non-existence' was used in a different context, e.g., he said that some were absolutely non-existent like sky-flower and horns of a hare, and again some were really non-existent but existent relatively like long and short, seed and sprout. So **Buddha's** denial of soul does not necessarily refer to the absolute non-existence of 'puggala'. It is sometimes referred to as inexplicable because of the fact that it can neither be identified with, nor differentiated from, the constituents, which only are apparent to the unenlightened. Again, if 'puggala' be regarded as permanent or impermanent, constituted or unconstituted, it would be adhering to one of the two extreme views of existence and non-existence, both of which were discarded by **Buddha**. Hence, 'puggala' as relatively existent was admitted by **Buddha**.

The *S.* contend that if self be wholly non-existent there would be neither killing of beings nor a killer, neither the attainment of fruits of sanctification nor a saint, consequently, neither a **Buddha** nor his teachings.

In this treatise the *Bhārahāra-sutta* has been mentioned and discussed and emphasis has been laid on the word 'puggala' used in it. On the basis of the *Sūtra*, the *S.* contend that a distinction has been made by **Buddha** between burden (*bhāra*) and its carrier (*hāra*), the 'puggala' carrying the burden. This *sūtra* clearly establishes that the carrier of 'puggala' is not identical with the burden of the constituents (*skandhas*). Again, the carrier and the burden are inseparable; they are interdependent and hence 'puggala' is not distinguished or separated from the *skandhas*.

It has been further pointed out that the acquisition or removal of impurities like attachment (*rāga*) or thirst (*trṣṇā*) is effected not by the 'puggala' alone to the exclusion of the constituents. But at the same time it should be admitted that the 'puggala' and the 'skandhas' are neither identical nor different, for **Buddha** denied the identity and difference of the vital force (*jīva*) and body (*sarīra*).

The treatise now takes up for discussion the conception of 'puggala' from three standpoints:

- (i) The Self is designated by its support (*āśraya-prajñāpta-pudgala*), i.e., the self is sometimes given an appellation or description on the basis of its *āśraya* or *ālambana*, as fire is named and described by its fuel, e.g., forest-fire, coal-fire. In a living

61 *Mādhyamikavṛtti*, p. 276, see also pp. 148, 192.

being, the impressions (*saṃskāras*) are fuel and the '*pudgala*' is the fire, which derives its attributes and appellation in accordance with the impressions. A being is called a man, *nāga* or a god in accordance with the type of body possessed by him. The self is the receiver of the material form (*rūpa*) but the 'self' and '*rūpa*', being interdependent and inseparable, exist together and at the same time. It is not clear why **Candrakīrti** stated in the *Mādhyamikārti* (p. 192) that the *Sammitīyas* held that the receiver of the constituents appeared prior to the constituents to receive them.

(ii) The Self in transmigration (*saṅkramaṇa-prajñāpta-pudgala*) implies that the self passes from one existence to another. The '*pudgala*', whose mind (*citta* or *Vijñāna*) carries with it the effects of his moral observances (*śīla*) and meditational practices (*samādhi*), is reborn in a higher sphere. On his death his five constituents after disintegration accompany the self to a sphere of excellence. His meritorious deeds and spiritual acquisition are his treasures, which follow him in his next existence. Thus his self does not go alone. If the self be different from the constituents, it would have nothing to stand by in his future existences. Likewise, if the self be real and eternal or unreal and evanescent, the self can take nothing with it when it passes from one existence to another.

The transmigration of self is expressed in many statements of **Buddha**, e.g., he said, »In this world one performs good deeds and as a result enjoys happiness in the next world,« »one who controls his sense-organs gains a happy stat in his next life,« »a dying person arises again«, etc. **Buddha** himself often spoke of his past existences, in which he perfected himself in many *pāramitās*. He foretold **Ajita** that in future he (**Ajita**) would become the **Maitreya Buddha**. He referred also occasionally to miserly persons possessing wealth, but when death approaches them, they have to part with everything and go alone all by themselves. It is clear from such statements of **Buddha** that he had in mind a '*pudgala*' which transmigrated from one existence to another, accompanied by the resultant impressions (*saṃskāras*) of the past life, i.e., *karmic* effects.

(iii) The self in extinction (*nirodha-prajñāpta-pudgala*), i.e., when it ceases and has no more rebirth. This happens in the case of an *Arhat* the perfect, who has removed all his impurities (*kṣīṇāsrava*) and has attained *Nirvāna*, and therefore, cannot have any more rebirth.

In the same treatise has been discussed another statement of **Buddha**, in which he said that the cycle of existences has no beginning »*anamataḥ saṃsāra*« and deduced therefrom that it had a beginning, which was unknowable to the unenlightened, and so also, **Buddha's** declaration of the non-existence of *ātman* implied that the self (*pudgala*) was unknowable to the imperfect. It has been argued by the *S.* exponents that the reality or unreality of an object should not be questioned because of the fact that it is unknowable by men of average intelligence. It indicates only lack of knowledge on the part of the imperfect and not existence or non-existence of the real, or even of an unreal object. It is true that the *Arūpa* sphere is unknowable by beings of the *Rūpa* sphere, and so it is not proper to infer from that unknowability that *Arūpaloka* does not exist. Similarly, self (*pudgala*) is unknowable by the unwise, but that does not establish that '*pudgala*' is non-existent. Then, again, a minute speck of dust, tip of a hair, mines within the earth, shores of ocean, a handful of salt dissolved in water, a jewel hidden behind a wall, bodies of spirits or ghosts, even the eye-lids which are so close to the eyes are not seen by the common physical eyes, but that does not prove their nonexistences. They are seen by those who possess divine eyes (*divyacakṣu*). Likewise, the beginning of the cycle of existence is unknowable by the unwise but is knowable by the fully enlightened **Buddha**. **Buddha** said that the world has no beginning, mainly with a view to seeing that his disciples did not take to the beliefs of eternalism and negativism and to seeing that they might not harbor any notion like „I was, I am and I shall be.“ If the beginning of the world had been non-existent like the sky-flower or horns of a hare, **Buddha** would not have cared to state that the world had no beginning, as one does not say that there is no sky-flower or horns of a hare. A spherical object has no beginning but no one says it does not exist, so also with the world of existence (*saṃsāra*). Lastly, if the cycle of existences has no beginning or end, it would be identical with *Nirvāna*, which is also without a beginning or end. From all these arguments, the author of the *Sammitīya-nikāya śāstra* established that **Buddha** did not fully explain many of his deeper ideas, and the existence of self '*pudgala*' is one of them. **Buddha's** reticence, therefore, should not be taken as the denial of the existence of a '*pudgala*' as conceived by the *Sammitīyas*.

**Profs. Stcherbatsky and La Vallée Poussin** have furnished the materials of the *Abhidharmakośa* in English and French translations, and at present we have also the original Sanskrit text of its *Vyākhyā*, edited by **Prof. Wogihara**. On the basis of these three texts, a gist of the arguments of this school for establishing the existence of *pudgala* is presented here. This will be followed up by a summary of the arguments and counter-arguments given in the *Kathāvatthu*, which has not so far received any attention.<sup>62</sup> The *Kośa* opens the controversy with the question, whether the *Vātsīputrīyas* can be regarded as Buddhists and whether they are entitled to emancipation (*mokṣa*)? As has been pointed out above, they were regarded by some as Buddhists while by others as non-Buddhists.

The Buddhists believe that since there is no *mokṣa* outside the pale of Buddhism, the non-Buddhists cannot have emancipation, and that is mainly because the non-Buddhist teachers like **Kapila** and **Uluka** believe in the existence of a permanent soul, which, according to them, is different from the constituents of a being and is not a term indicating the flux of elements<sup>63</sup> (*skandhasantāna*). The soul, the Buddhists assert, can neither be established by direct perception (*pratyakṣa*) nor by inference (*anumāna*).

**Vasubandhu** (henceforth abbreviated as **V.**) first defines the contention of the *Vātsīputrīyas* (henceforth abbreviated as *Vā.*) thus: „Is the *pudgala* of the *Vā.* real (*dravya*) or nominal (*prajñāpti*)?“ By real (*dravya*) existence he meant existence like that of

62 *Kathāvatthu* (P.T.S.), pp. 1-69, translated in *Points of Controversy* by **Mrs. Rhys Davids**.

63 *Vyākhyā* (Jap. ed.), p. 697 quotes a *stotra*.

*rūpa* and such other elements, and by nominal (*prajñapti*) he meant existence like that of milk, house or army, which has no separate existence of its own apart from its constituents.

If the soul of *VL.* be of the former category (*dravya*), it would be different from the *skandhas*, as *vedanā* is from *rūpa*, and is not also all the *skandhas* taken together. Now, in that case, it should be either *saṃskṛta* (constituted), or *asaṃskṛta* (unconstituted). It cannot be the latter, for it would make the *Vā.* hold the *śāśvata* view, which is heretical.

If the soul of *Vā.* be of the latter category (*prajñapti*), its existence is dependent on the *skandhas*, and so it cannot have any independent existence of its own, i.e., it does not exist »*pudgala iti prajñaptir asat-pudgalah prāpnoti*).

The *Vā.* contend that their soul is real (*dravya*), but it is neither identical with, nor different from, the *skandhas* as fire is from the fuel. Fire exists as long as the fuel lasts, so also the soul (*pudgala*) exists as long as there are *skandhas*, otherwise, *pudgala* would be either *asaṃskṛta* (constituted), *aśāśvata* (= *uccheda* = annihilating).<sup>64</sup> Fire is different from the fuel inasmuch as it has the power of burning an object to ashes or to produce light, which the fuel does not possess.

**Vasubandhu** argues that, fuel and fire appear at different times (*bhinnakāla*) like seed and sprout. Hence fire is impermanent, and the difference between fuel and fire is one of time and characteristic (*lakṣaṇa*), and again one is the cause of the other.

He then states that according to the *Vā.*, fuel is constituted of three *mahābhūtas*, while fire is of the fourth (*tejas*) only: then it follows that fire is different from fuel.

The *Vā.* reply that fire and fuel are co-existent and the latter is a support of the former (*upādāya; āśritya*), and that one is not wholly different from the other, for fuel is not totally devoid of the fiery element; in the same way, *pudgala* should be distinguished from *skandhas*. **Vasubandhu** challenges the *Vā.* by citing the instance of a burning log of wood and saying that it represents both fuel and fire. That is why they are identical (*ananya*).

According to the *Vā.*, *pudgala* is neither to be described as *anitya*, which is sub-divided into past, present and future nor *nitya*, eternal. It is *avaktavya*, indeterminable, inexplicable. It is not included in the list of the constituents of a being, but is perceived when only all the constituents are present.

The question next raised is, can the *pudgala* of the *Vā.* be cognized by any sens-organ (*indriya*). If so, by which? The *Vā.* reply that it is perceived by all the six sens-organs. They contend that eyes do not see *rūpa* (object) or recognize it unless the mind (*mana-indriya*) is there. Eyes act as the dominating factor when the visual action takes place, hence it is not correct to say that eyes alone see *rūpa*, or for the matter of that each of the five sense-organs cannot function in their respective spheres independent of the mind.<sup>65</sup> For cognition of *pudgala*, the *Vā.* state that all the sense-organs point to the mind indirectly that there is a *pudgala*; e.g., eyes discern the *rūpa* (colour-figure) of a body and thereby induce the mind to cognize the presence of an individual (i.e. *pudgala* which is neither identical with, nor different from *rūpa*).<sup>66</sup> **V.** argues that if *rūpa* be the cause of cognition of *pudgala* »*rūpānām kāraṇatvam adhikriyate*«, one should not say that *rūpa* and *pudgala* are different (*anyam*).<sup>67</sup> Again, if cognition of *rūpa* leads at once to the cognition of *pudgala* »*rūpānyaupādāya pudgalopalabdhir iti*«, one should also say that *rūpa* and *pudgala* are identical (*ananya*),<sup>68</sup> in other words, one is only a modification of the other (*rūpāntaravāt*). The *Vā.*, however, would neither identify *rūpa* (color-figure) with *pudgala* nor treat them as different; in the same way, they would neither regard the perception of *rūpa* (color-figure) as identical with the perception of *pudgala* nor look upon them as different.

**V.** asserts that if *pudgala* be an entity, it should be either material (*rūpa*) or non-material (*nāma*), but **Buddha** says *rūpa* or *vedanā* or *saṃjñā* or *saṃskārā* or *Vijñāna* is not self – all *dharmas* are without self – there is no *pudgala*. He further states that *sattva, jīva, pudgala* is a *prajñapti* (designation) applied to the false notion of a self cherished by the unenlightened.

The *Vā.* in reply state that they were not prepared to accept the statements attributed to **Buddha** as authentic<sup>69</sup> as these were not to be found in their *Piṭaka*. They referred to statements, in which **Buddha** spoke of a person's past existence or recognized *pubbenivāsañāna*<sup>70</sup> as one of the higher acquisitions of an adept, and asked, who is it that remembers? Is it *pudgala* or the *skandhas*? They further argue that if **Buddha** be regarded as omniscient, i.e., he knows everything past or present, of every place, of every being etc. it also implies a continuity of something. In other words, it implies the existence of a *pudgala*. The *Vā.* further state that unless there were some form of *pudgala*, why the disciples should be instructed to avoid thinking of »*rūpavān ahaṃ babbhūvātīte 'dhvani*«

64 Cf. the quotation in the *Kvu*, p. 34:

»*Khandhesu bhijjamānesu so ce bhijjati puggalo*  
*Ucched bhavati dīṭṭhi yā Buddhena vivajjitā*  
*Khandhesu bhijjamānesu no ce bhijjati puggalo*  
*Puggalo sassato hoti nibbānena samasamo.*«

65 See above; Cf. Masuda, p. 23n.

66 See *Kośa* (Fr. transl.) ix, p. 231 fn.

67 Just as light, eyes and mind, which cause the visualisation of an object, are not different from the object. *Ibid.*, p. 238n. See *Vyākhyā*, p. 701.

68 *Ibid.*, p. 239 n. See *Vyākhyā*, pp. 701-2.

69 Cf. *Vyākhyā* : *mūlasaṅgītibhramṣāt*.

70 Cf. *Majjhima*, I, p. 22 : »*so evaṃ samāhite citte parisuddhe pariyodāte anaṅgane... pubbenivāsānussarati-ñānāya cittaṃ abhininnāmeti*.

(in the past I possessed a body) and so forth.<sup>71</sup>

**V.** refutes this contention by saying that *pudgala* here refers only to *skandha-santāna* (continuity of *skandhas*), not to anything else. The *Vā.* then cite the *Bhārahārasūtra*, and assert that by *bhāra* is meant the constituents (*skandhas*) of a being and by *hāra* the individual (*pudgala*), who is known by a name, *gotra* etc.<sup>72</sup> If *bhāra* (= *skandhas*) included *bhāra-hāra* (= *pudgala*), there was no need of distinguishing the two, and so *pudgala* exists apart from *skandhas*; it is neither identical with, nor different from, *skandhas*.

The *Vā.* admit the existence of *aupapādika* beings and *antarābhava*,<sup>73</sup> and prove thereby the existence of *pudgala*. They also cite the passage »*ekapuggalo bhikkhave loke uppajjamāno uppajjati bahujanahitāya*« (*Aṅguttara*, i. 22) and lay stress on the word '*puggala*', saying this '*puggala*' is born (*uppajjati*) and hence there is besides the *skandhas* something, which may be designated as '*puggala*'. **V.** refutes all these by appropriate quotations and arguments.

The *Vā.* further state that if *pudgala* be only a word meant to designate the five *skandhas*, then why *Bhagavān* did not identify *jīva* with *śarīra*. **V.** cites the discussion on the topic from the *Milindapañha*. The *Vā.* further argue that why '*pudgala*' has been declared by **Buddha** as indeterminable (*avyākṛta*), if it does not exist at all. **V.** in reply comments on the *Vatsagotrasūtra* (= Pāli: *Vaccha-gotta sutta*) and other *sūtras* dealing with the indeterminable problems.

The *Vā.* point out that the statement *ātmā* does not exist in reality (*satyatah sthititah*)<sup>74</sup> is a wrong view, it indirectly implies the admission of the existence of *pudgala*.

The *Vā.* next raise the question, if '*pudgala*' does not exist, who is it that transmigrates from one existence to another? If the elements only exist, how do you explain when **Buddha** says, »I was at that time the **master Sunetra**?« In that statement why is the 'I' of the past identified with the 'I' of the present? Does it indicate that the elements of the past are the elements of the present? **V.** refutes it by saying that just as fire passes from one wood to another, though it never remains the same, so the elements pass from one existence to another, nothing remaining identical. If, according to the *Vā.*, *Buddhas* admitted the existence of '*pudgala*', they would be subject to the wrong belief of *satkāyadrśti*.

The *Vā.* now ask, how can memory be explained without the conception of '*pudgala*'? Who is it that remembers? **V.** answers that it is *sañjñā* that remembers – *sañjñā* with attention directed to the object, an idea etc. is similar to, or connected with it, provided there is no corporal pain to impair its capacity.

The *Vā.* are of the opinion that there must be an agent, a doer, a proprietor of memory. There must be a cognizing agent, an action must have a doer. „**Devadatta** walks,“ implies the existence of an individuality. **V.** replies that it is not so. He states that just as when a fire traverses from one forest to another, no question of individuality arises, similarly **Devadatta** is a *prajñaptī* (like fire) applied to a conglomeration of elements passing from one existence to another and has no individuality.<sup>75</sup>

Now, we shall pass on to the arguments of the *Vā.* and the counter-arguments of the *Theravādins* as presented in the *Kathāvatthu* (I. i), which is of a much earlier date than that of the medieval and modern dialectical works.

The first question put by the *Theravādins* to the *Vātsīputrīyas* known in the Pāli texts as *Sammitīyas*, is as follows: „Can the *puggala* be known in the same way as *that* which is real and ultimate, e.g., *Nibbāna* (or *Rūpa*) is known? (para 1).<sup>76</sup> In other words, the *Theravādins* want to ascertain whether the *Sammitīyas* (henceforth abbreviated a *Sam.*) admit the existence of *puggala* either as the unchangeable, ever-existing reality like *Nibbāna*, or as a constituted (*sappaccaya*, *saṃkhata*) object like *rūpa*, or regard it as false like a mirage (*māyāmarīci viya*), or look upon it simply as a hearsay. The *Sam.* deny practically all the four possibilities, though they assert that the *puggala* is known as a real and ultimate fact (*saccikaṭṭha-paramaṭṭhena*).

The *Sam.* now assail the *Th.* with the counter-question whether they would admit that *puggala* is *not* known in the same way as *that* which is real and ultimate. The *Th.* answered in the affirmative, as, according to them, *puggala* is not even an object like *rūpa*; it is a mere *paññatti* (concept), a *sammutisacca* (conventional truth).

But when the same question is repeated by the *Sam.* (as in paras 2 and 6),<sup>77</sup> the *Th.* reply in the negative by saying „*na h'evam*,“<sup>78</sup> because the answer is to be given to a question, which included both *sammutisacca* (conventional truth) and *paramatthasacca* (the highest truth). The questions and answers which follow next have mixture of both *sammuti* and *paramattha* truths, and so they appear contradictory to a superficial reader.

Now the *Th.* give up the logical tricks and put the question straightaway (para 11) thus: „whether *puggala* is a *paramatthasacca*“<sup>79</sup> or not, i.e. whether or not *puggala* is known in the same way as the real and ultimate *everywhere* (*sabbattha*) in and outside *rūpa* (material parts of the body), *always* (*sabbadā*) in this and the following existences, and in *everything* (*sabbesu*),

71 Cf. *Majjhima*, I, p. 8 : »*ahosin nu kho aham atītam addhānaṃ ... kiṃ hutvā kiṃ ahoṣiṃ nu kho atītam addhānā, etc. etc.*

72 Cf. *Vyākhyā* (Jap. ed.), p. 706, »*bhārah katamah. pañcopādāna skandhāh ... bhārahārah katamah. pudgala iti syād vacanīyaṃ yo 'sav āyuṣman evaṃnāmā evaṃjātyā evaṃgotra*« etc.

73 Cf. *Kośa*, iii, 10, 12, 18-19, quoting *Sapta-sat-puruṣa-gati-sūtraṃ*.

74 Cf. *Majjhima*, i, p. 8: »*Attā me attā ti vā'ssa saccato thetato diṭṭhi uppajjati, natti me attā ti vā'ssa saccato thetato diṭṭhi uppajjati*« etc.

75 *Kośa-vyākhyā* (Jap. ed.), p. 710: *yathā tu kṣaṇiko 'gnir iti*, etc.

76 „Para“ refers to the paragraphs marked in the P. T. S. edition of the *Kathāvatthu*.

77 The remaining paras 3-5 and 7-10 are mere logical rounding up of the questions and answers put in paras 1 & 2.

78 The question is, - *Yo saccikaṭṭho paramaṭṭho tato so puggalo n'upalabbhati saccikaṭṭha-paramaṭṭheṇātī ti?*«

79 Perhaps like the *jīvātman* of the *Vedānta* school of philosophy.

i.e., in all *khandhas*, *āyatanas*, *dhātus*, etc. The answer of the *Sam.* is also definitely in the negative, i.e., they do not consider 'puggala' as real in the highest sense, and as existing *everywhere*, *always* and *in everything* as pointed out by the *Th.*

The next attempt of the *Th.* is to find out whether the *Sam.* regard *puggala* as something existing like any of the 57 elements,<sup>80</sup> and in support of their contention they quote from the *Nikāyas* (*Dīgha*, iii, 232; *Majjhima*, i. 341; *Āṅguttara*, ii. 95) the passage »*atthi puggalo attahitīya paṭipanno*«, which indicates that *puggala* exists but not apart from the elements. The *Th.* also do not clearly state that *puggala* (as a *paññatti*) is different from the elements, the reason assigned by **Buddhaghosa**<sup>81</sup> is that the questions of the opponents have a mixture of *sammuti* and *paramattha* truths, and as such the *Th.* have no other alternative but to leave them unanswered (*thapanīya*).<sup>82</sup>

The next attempt of the *Th.* is to show that the *Sam.* should advocate either *Ucchedavāda* or *Sassatavāda*. With this end in view, the *Th.* put the questions whether *puggala* is identical with or different from *rūpa*, or *puggala* is in *rūpa* (like the container and the contained) or vice versa. The *Sam.* reject all the four propositions as, otherwise, they would become either an *Ucchedavādin* or a *Sassatavādin*. Though, according to the *Sam.*, *puggala* is of the same nature (*ekadhammo*) as *rūpa* and other elements,<sup>83</sup> they would not treat it as an element separate from, and independent of, the 57 elements.

The *Th.* now assail their opponents by questioning on *lakkhaṇas* of *puggala*, and ask whether *puggala* is *sappaccaya* (caused) or *appaccaya* (uncaused) like *Nibbāna*. The *Sam.* deny both and ask how the *Th.* would explain the 'puggala' in the statement of Buddha: »*Atthi puggalo attahitīya paṭipanno ti.*« Is the 'puggala' referred to in this passage *sappaccaya*, *saṃkhata* or *appaccaya*, *asaṃkhata*? The *Th.* deny both, as in their opinion the term *puggala* is only a *sammutisacca*, and as such it is non-existent.

The next argument put forward by the *Th.* is, whether the statement „*puggala* perceives“ is the same as the statement „that which perceives is *puggala*“<sup>84</sup> i.e. whether the two statements are identical as *citta* is with *mano* or different as *rūpa* is from *vedanā*. **Buddhaghosa** interprets the position of the opponents thus: the *Sam.* hold that *puggala* perceives, but not everything that perceives is *puggala*; e.g., *rūpa*, *vedanā*, etc. are not *puggala*, but *puggala* perceives and that which perceives refers only to the percipient (*puggala*), and not to *rūpādi*.<sup>85</sup> The opponents, however, rely on the statement »*atthi puggalo attahitīya paṭipanno ti*« which again is countered by the *Th.* by saying that the *Sam.* should equally rely on the statement »*suññato lokam avekkhassu*«, etc. and admit that there is no *puggala*.

The *Th.* now proceed to examine the *paññatti* (description) of *puggala*. In answer to the question, whether the *puggala* of the *Rūpadhātu* is *rūpī* and likewise of the *Kāmadhātu* is *kāmī* and of the *Arūpadhātu*, *arūpī*, the *Sam.* affirm the first and the third but not the second. The *Sam.* argue that *puggala* = *satta* = *jīva* and *kāya* = *sarīra*. Though they do not admit either the identity of, or difference between, *jīva* and *sarīra*, they hold, though not logically tenable, that *kāya* must be different from *puggala* as there are such statements as »*so kāye kāyānupassī viharati*« and so forth, in which *so* cannot but refer to *puggala*.

The next discussion relating to *upādā-paññatti* (rebirth) of *puggala* raises the question of transmigration. The *Sam.* affirm that *puggala* passes from this existence to next but it is neither the self-same *puggala* nor a different *puggala* – a statement similar to what the *Th.* would say about the passing of the *khandhas* – avoiding the two heretical opinions of *sassatavāda* and *ucchedavāda* as also the *ekaccasassatikavāda* and *amarāvikkhepikadiṭṭhi*.<sup>86</sup> In support of their contention the *Sam.* quote the passages in which a 'puggala' is said to pass from one existence to another (*sandhāvati saṃsarati*).

According to the opinion of the opponents that the self-same, of a different, *puggala* does not pass from one existence to another, the *Th.* point out that they admit that some form of *puggala* referred to in the above-mentioned passages, does pass from one existence to another. This *puggala* can then have no death, it once becomes a man and then a god and so forth, which is absurd.<sup>87</sup> In reply, the *Sam.* point out that a *sotāpanna manussa* is known to take rebirth as a *sotāpanna-deva* and question how can this *sotāpannahood* pass from one existence to another unless there exists some form of *puggala* to carry the qualities. In order to show the unsoundness of the statements, the *Th.* ask whether the passing *puggala* remains identical in every respect<sup>88</sup> and does not lose any of its qualities.<sup>89</sup> The opponents first negative it on the ground that a man does not continue to be a man in the *devaloka*; but on second thought they affirm it in view of the fact that the carrier of certain qualities from one existence to another is a *puggala*, an

80 »*Samayasuttavirodham disvā paṭikkhepo paravādisa*«, *Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 16

81 See his *Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 16.

82 *Kvu.*, pp. 14-17, paras 130-137 dilate on the above question, comparing 'puggala' with each of the 57 elements.

83 *Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 18.

84 »*Puggalo upalabbhati (yo yo) upalabbhati (so so) puggalo ti ? Kvu.*, p. 24

85 *Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 20: The opponents say: »*Mama puggalo, atthi puggalo 'ti satthuvacanto upalabbhati. Yo pana upalabbhati, na so sabbo puggalo. Atha kho ke hi ci na puggalo ke hi ci na puggalo 'ti. Tattha kokāratthe kekāro hikāro co nipātamatta. Koci puggalo koci na puggalo 'ti ayam pan ettha attho. Idam vuttam hoti : puggalo pi hi rūpādisu pi yo koci dhammo upalabbhati yeva. Tattha puggalo 'va puggalo rūpādisu pana koci pi na puggalo 'ti.*

86 See my *Early Monastic Buddhism* (1941), I, pp. 63 ff.

87 See my *Early Monastic Buddhism* (1941), I, p. 63 f.

88 *Anañño= sabbākārena ekasadiiso.*

89 *Avigato=ekena pi ākāreṇa avigato.*

*antarābhava-puggala*.<sup>90</sup> The *Sam.* take care to keep clear of the two extreme views; »*taṃ jīvaṃ taṃ sarīraṃ*« and »*aññaṃ jīvaṃ aññaṃ sarīraṃ*«. They affirm that the transformed *khandhas* and *puggala*, and not the identical *khandhas* and *puggala*, pass from one existence to another. The *khandhas* are, however, impermanent and constituted, while the *puggala* is not so, but it is not permanent and unconstituted either. Without *khandha*, *āyatana*, *dhātu*, *indriya* and *citta*, *puggala* cannot remain alone but for that reason, the color and other qualities of the *khandha āyatana*, etc. do not affect the *puggala*. Again the *puggala* is not a shadow (*chāyā*) of the *khandhas*.

In reply to the question, whether the *puggala* is perceivable in every momentary thought, the *Sam.* answer in the affirmative, but they would not accept the inference drawn by the *Th.* that the *puggala* in that case would have momentary existence (*khaṇika-bhāvaṃ*), i.e., would disappear and re-appear every moment like *cetasikas* (thoughts).

The *Sam.* now ask the *Th.* whether they would admit that one (*yo*) who sees something (*yaṃ*) by means of an organ of sense (*yena*) is the *puggala* or not. The *Th.*, after assenting to it as a conventional truth (*sammuti-sacca*), put the same question in the negative form thus: „One (*yo*), who<sup>91</sup> does not see anything (*yaṃ*) by means of an organ of sense (*yena*), is not a *puggala*. The *Sam.*, however without arguing further, quote a few passages, in which **Buddha** said: „I (i.e. the *puggala*, according to the *Sam.*) see by means of my divine eyes (*dibbena cakkhunā*) beings appearing and disappearing,“ and so forth, and infer therefrom that the seer is *puggala*.

Their next discussions related to *purusakāra*. The *Th.* do not admit the existence of any *doer*, so they asked the *Sam.* whether the latter would subscribe to the same opinion. On their denial the *Th.* ask whether the *Sam.* would admit the existence of the *doer*, and a *creator* of the *doer*, which is negated by the *Sam.* on account of the heretical doctrine of *issaranimmāna* (God the creator of the world) but which on second thought is affirmed by them in view of the fact that the parents, teachers etc. are also in a sense the makers (*kattā*, *kāretā*) of a person. The *Th.* without going into the implied sense of the replies, say that such a state of things (i.e., a *doer* having a *doer* and a *deed* which implies not just a *deed* but also a *doer*) would lead to the conclusion that so long as there is *deed* (*kamma*), there is its conclusion that so long as there is deed (*kamma*), there is its *doer* (*kāraṇa puggala*), and hence there can be no end to *puggala-paramparā* and that would falsify the fact that by the stoppage of the wheel of actions, *dukkha* can be brought to an end. Then again *Nibbāna*, *Mahāpaṭhavī*, etc. must also have a *doer*. All the inferences drawn by the *Th.* are rejected by the *Sam.* In conclusion, the *Sam.* deny that the *deed* and the *doer* can be distinct, just to avoid admitting that the *puggala* has mental properties.

While in the above discussion, the *doer* of a *deed* is enquired into in the following discussion it is the identity of the *doer* of a *deed* with the enjoyer of its fruit that is enquired into.

The *Th.* deny the existence of a feeler or enjoyer apart from *vipāka-pavatti* (that which is realized, that fructification of an effect). The *Sam.* hold that *patisamveditabba* is *vipāka* (result) but the *puggala* is not *vipāka*.<sup>92</sup> They further state that *Nibbāna* or *Mahāpaṭhavī*, etc. is not *vipāka* like divine happiness (*dibbasukha*) or human happiness (*manussasukha*) so none of them is an object of enjoyment of the *puggala* but again the *Sam.* do not admit that *sukha* is distinct from the *sukha-enjoyer*. The *Th.* logically wanted to make their opponents admit that there must not only be an enjoyer of a fruit but also an enjoyer of the enjoyer of the fruit and so on like an endless chain; in other words, according to them, as shown above, *dukkha* can have no end.

The *Th.* now put the crucial question thus: whether the *doer* of a *deed* is identical with, or different from, the enjoyer of its fruit. The opponents first deny both to avoid contradiction in **Buddha's** saying: »*sayam kamaṃ param kamaṃ sukhadukkham*« etc. but on second thought, in view of their theory that there is a common element keeping the link between the present and the future life, they admit it. In short, the *Sam.* affirm that there is a *kāraṇa* (*doer*) and *vedaka* (feeler or enjoyer) of a *deed*, but the two are neither identical nor different, neither both identical and different, nor not both identical and different.

The *Sam.* next apply the test of *abhiññā* (supernormal powers), *ñāti* (relatives) and *phala* (attainments) and put the arguments thus:

- (i) How can a person perform certain miracles keeping his organs of sense, etc. inert and inactive, unless there is something else a *puggala*.
- (ii) How can one recognize the existence of parents, castes, etc. without positing that there is a *puggala*, and
- (iii) How can a *phalastha* continue to be the same in more than one life, unless the existence of a *puggala* is admitted.

The *Th.* avoid the issues by submitting the counter-argument to the effect that one who cannot perform miracles is not a *puggala*. In this way they refute the other two arguments.

The next question of the *Th.* is whether the *puggala* is constituted (*saṃkhato*) or unconstituted or neither constituted nor unconstituted (*n'eva saṃkhat nāsaṃkhato*). The *Sam.* affirm the last alternative but would not treat the *puggala* as something apart (*añño*) from the *saṃkhat khandhas*. They state that the *puggala* has certain aspects of *saṃkhata*, e.g. it is subject to *sukha*, *dukkha*, and so forth; again it has certain aspects of *asaṃkhata*, e.g., it is not subject to birth, old age and death (*jāti*, *jarā* and *maraṇa*).

In reply to the *Th.*'s question whether a *parinibbuto puggala* exists in *Nibbāna* or not, the *Sam.* negative both, as the affirmation of either would make them either a *Sassatavādin* or an *Ucchedavādin*.

90 The self which exists between death and rebirth. See above pp. 114, 125.

91 E.g., a blind man, an *asaññisatta*

92 But it may happen that *puggala*, who is in the enjoyment of his fruits (i.e. merits), may be again an object of enjoyment of another *puggala*, e.g. a son enjoying the fruits of his actions may be the object of affection of his mother, and so forth. This explanation of **Buddhaghosa** should be compared with the above like the *kāretā* or *kattā*.

Now the *Sam.* put the counter-question: Does not a person say that he is feeling happy or unhappy and so forth? How can a person say so unless he is a *puggala* and not a mere conglomeration of separate *khandhas*? In refuting this contention, the *Th.* put the same question in a negative form thus: Well, if a person does not feel happiness or unhappiness, then there is no *puggala*. The *Th.* further ask whether *Sam.* would treat *sukha* and *puggala* as something separate and distinct. The *Sam.* evade a direct answer and ask: Well, when a *puggala* (*koci* or *so*) is said to be *kāye kāyānupass viharati*, does it not affirm the existence of a *puggala*?

The controversy is then closed by citation of passages from the *Nikāyas*, the *Th.* quoting only those which clearly express *anattā* of all things, while the *Sam.* quote those passages in which the word *puggala* or *attahito* or *so* appear.

Through these controversies, it is apparent that the *Sam.* are seeking to establish that the five *khandhas* which are distinct from one another cannot give rise to the consciousness of I-ness, a unity. The facts that a person acts or thinks as one and not as five separate objects, that in many passages **Buddha** does actually use the words *so*, *attā* and *puggala*, that a person's attainments like *sotāpanna* continue to be the same in different existences, and that one speaks of his past existences, and so forth, do lead to the conclusion that, besides the five *khandhas*, there exists some mental property which forms the basis of I-ness, and maintains the continuity of *karma* from one existence to another. That mental property, however, is changing *khandhas* but in view of the fact that one can think of his past, even of the events of his past existences, the changing *khandhas* alone cannot be made responsible for the memory. The *Sam.* therefore affirm the existence of a sixth (mental) property and call it *puggala*, which can remain only along with *khandhas* and so must disappear when the *khandhas* disappear in *Nibbāna*. As this mental property or *puggala* is not *ksāṇika* (constituted, momentary object) and again, as it is not also unchanging and ever existing like *Nibbāna*, so it is not *asaṃkhata*. Therefore the *puggala* must be admitted to be neither *saṃkhata* nor *asaṃkhata*.<sup>93</sup>

Referring to the *pudgala-vāda* of the *Sam.*, **Śāntarakṣita** in his *Tattvasaṅgraha*, ch. vii (f) remarks jokingly that the *Saugatas* (i.e. the Buddhists) as the upholders of the *anattā* doctrine should bother their head with identity and difference of the *doer* of a *deed* and the enjoyer of its fruit. **Śāntarakṣita**, of course, dismisses both *anattāvāda* and *pudgala-vāda* from the standpoint of the *Vedānta* school of philosophy, according to which the eternality of *ātman* is maintained.

**Vasumitra** summarizes the doctrines of the *Sammitīyas* or the *Vātsīputrīyas* thus:

1. The *pudgala* is neither the same as the *skandhas* nor different from the *skandhas*. The name *pudgala* is provisionally given to an aggregate or *skandhas*, *āyatanas* and *dhātus*.
2. *Dharmas* cannot transmigrate from one existence to another apart from the *pudgala*. These can be said to transmigrate along with the *pudgala*.

## **BONUS: THE BODHISATTA IDEAL IN THERAVĀDA AND MAHĀYĀNA (BOOK: ZEN AND THE TAMING OF THE BULL PP. 71-77)<sup>94</sup>**

There is a widespread belief, particularly in the West, that the ideal of *Theravāda*, which is conveniently identified with *Hīnayāna*, is to become an *Arhant*, while that of *Mahāyāna* is to become a *Bodhisattva* and finally to attain the state of a *Buddha*. It must be categorically stated that this is incorrect. This idea was spread by some early Orientalists at a time when Buddhist studies were beginning in the West, and others who followed them accepted it without troubling to go into the problem by examining the texts and living traditions in Buddhist countries. The fact is that both *Theravāda* and *Mahāyāna* unanimously accept the *Bodhisattva* ideal as the highest.

The terms *Hīnayāna* (Small Vehicle) and *Mahāyāna* (Great Vehicle) are not known to the *Theravāda* Pāli literature. They are not found in the Pāli canon (*Tiṭṭaka*) or in the Commentaries on the *Tiṭṭaka*, not even in the Pāli Chronicles of Ceylon, the *Dīpavaṃsa* and the *Mahāvāṃsa*. The *Dīpavaṃsa* (about the fourth century AC) and some Pāli Commentaries mention *Vitaṇḍavādins*, evidently a sect of dissenting Buddhists holding some unorthodox views regarding some points in the teaching of **the Buddha**. The *Vitaṇḍavādin* and the *Theravādin* both quote the same authorities and name the *sūtras* of the *Tiṭṭaka* in order to support their positions, the difference being only in the mode of their interpretations. The *Mahāvāṃsa* (fifth century AC) and a Commentary on the *Abhidhamma* refer to *Vetulla-* or *Vetulya-vādins* (Sanskrit: *Vaitulyavādins*) instead of *Vitaṇḍavādins*. From the evidence of the texts, it may not be wrong to consider that these two terms – *Vitaṇḍa* and *Vetulya* – represented the same school or sect.

We learn from the *Abhidharma-samuccaya*, an authoritative *Mahāyāna* philosophical text (fourth century AC), that the terms *Vaitulya* and *Vaipulya* are synonyms, and that *Vaipulya* is the *Bodhisattva-piṭaka*. Now, the *Bodhisattva-piṭaka* is definitely *Mahāyāna*. Hence *Vaitulya* undoubtedly denotes *Mahāyāna*.

93 Cf. **Obermiller's** *Analysis of the Abhisamayālamkāra*, III, p. 380, referring to *Tarkajvālā* and **Schayer**, *Kamalaśīlā's Kritik des Pudgalavāda*. **Obermiller** writes 'the *Vātsīputrīyas*, *Bhadrayānikas*, *Sāmmityas*. *Dharmaguptas* and *Samkrāntivādins* are those that admit the reality of the 'individual.' They say that the 'individual' is something inexpressible, being neither identical with the five groups of elements nor different from them. It is to be cognised by the six forms of *Vijñānas*, and is subject to *samsāra* (phenomenal existence).

94 I have omitted footnotes.

So, we can be certain that the terms *Vitaṇḍa* and *Vetulya* used in the Pāli Chronicles and Commentaries refer to *Mahāyāna*. But the terms *Hīnayāna* and *Mahāyāna* were not known or ignored or unrecognized by them.

It is universally accepted by scholars that the terms *Hīnayāna* and *Mahāyāna* are later inventions. Historically speaking, *Theravāda* already existed long before these terms came into being. This same *Theravāda* considered to be the original teaching of **the Buddha**, was introduced to Ceylon and established there in the third century BC, during the time of **Emperor Asoka** of India. At that time there was nothing called *Mahāyāna*, which appeared much later, about the beginning of the Christian Era. Without *Mahāyāna* there could be no *Hīnayāna*. Buddhism, that went to Ceylon, with its *Tipiṭaka* and Commentaries, in the third century BC, remained there intact as *Theravāda* and did not enter the scene of the *Hīnayāna-Mahāyāna* dispute that developed later in India. It seems therefore illegitimate to include *Theravāda* in either of these two categories. However, after the inauguration of the World Fellowship of Buddhists in Ceylon in 1950, well-informed people, both in the East and in the West, use the term *Theravāda* and not the term *Hīnayāna* with reference to the Buddhism prevalent in South-east Asian countries like Ceylon, Burma, Thailand and Cambodia. (There are still some outmoded people who use the term *Hīnayāna*.)

*Mahāyāna* deals mainly with the *Bodhisattvayāna* or the Vehicle of the *Bodhisattva*. But it does not ignore the other two, *Śrāvakayāna* and *Pratyekabuddha-yāna*. For example, **Asaṅga**, the founder of the *Yogācāra* system, in his *magnum opus*, the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra*, devotes two sections to *Śrāvaka-bhūmi* and *Pratyekabuddha-bhūmi* just as he devotes one section to *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, which shows that all three *yānas* are given due consideration in *Mahāyāna*. But the state of a *Śrāvaka* or a *Pratyekabuddha* is inferior to that of a *Bodhisattva*. This is quite in keeping with the *Theravāda* tradition which, too, holds that one may become a *Bodhisattva* and attain the state of a Fully Enlightened Buddha; but if one cannot, one may attain the state of a *Pratyekabuddha* or of a *Śrāvaka* according to one's capacity. These three states may be considered as three attainments on the same Path. In fact, the *Sandhīnirmocanasūtra* (a *Mahāyāna sūtra*) clearly says that *Śrāvakayāna* and *Mahāyāna* constitute one *yāna* (*ekayāna*) and that they are not two different and distinct 'vehicles'.

What are these three terms *Śrāvaka*, *Pratyekabuddha* and *Bodhisattva*? Very briefly:

A *Śrāvaka* is a disciple of a *Buddha*. A disciple may be a monk or a nun, a layman or a laywoman. But for his liberation, a *Śrāvaka* follows and practises the teaching of the *Buddha* and finally attains *Nirvāṇa*. He also serves others, but his capacity to do so is limited.

A *Pratyekabuddha* (individual *Buddha*) is a person who realizes *Nirvāṇa* alone by himself at a time when there is no *Samyaksambuddha*, a Fully Enlightened *Buddha*, in the world. He, too, renders service to others, but in a limited way. He is not capable of revealing the Truth to others as a *Samyaksambuddha* does.

A *Bodhisattva* is a person (monk or layman) who is in a position to attain *Nirvāṇa* as a *Śrāvaka* or as a *Pratyekabuddha*, but out of great compassion (*mahā karuṇā*) for the world, he renounces it and goes on suffering in *samsāra* for the sake of others; perfects himself during an incalculable period of time and finally realizes *Nirvāṇa* and becomes an *Arhant*, *Samyaksambuddha*, a Fully Enlightened Buddha. He discovers the Truth and declares it to the world. His capacity for service to others is unlimited.

The definition of the three *yānikas* (followers of the three *yānas*) given by **Asaṅga** is instructive and clarifies some points. According to him, a *Śrāvakayānika* (one who takes the vehicle of disciples) is a person who, living according to the law of the disciples, having by nature feeble faculties (qualities), bent on his own liberation through the cultivation of detachment, depending on the Canon of the Disciples (*Śrāvaka-piṭaka*), practising major and minor qualities, gradually puts an end to suffering. A *Pratyekabuddha-yānika* (one who takes the Vehicle of the Individual *Buddhas*) is a person who living according to the law of the Individual *Buddhas*, by nature having moderate faculties, bent on his liberation through the cultivation of detachment, having the intention of attaining Enlightenment exclusively, through his own mental development, depending on the *Śrāvaka-piṭaka*, practising major and minor qualities, born at a time when there is no *Buddha* in the world, gradually puts an end to suffering. A *Mahāyānika* (one who takes the Great Vehicle) is a person who, living according to the law of the *Bodhisattvas*, by nature having sharp faculties, bent on the liberation of all beings, depending on the Canon of the *Bodhisattvas*, matures other beings, cultivates the pure *Buddha*-domain, receives predictions or declarations (*vyākaraṇa*) from *Buddhas* and finally realizes the perfect and complete Enlightenment (*samyaksambodhi*).

From this it can be seen that anyone who aspires to become a *Buddha* is a *Bodhisattva*, a *mahāyānist*, though he may live in a country or in a community popularly and traditionally regarded as *Theravāda* or *Hīnayāna*. Similarly, a person who aspires to attain *Nirvāṇa* as a disciple is a *Śrāvakayānika* or *Hīnayānist* though he may belong to a country or a community considered as *Mahāyāna*. Thus it is foolish to believe that there are no *Bodhisattvas* in *Theravāda* countries or that all are *Bodhisattvas* in *Mahāyāna* countries. It is not conceivable that *Śrāvakas* and *Bodhisattvas* are limited to particular geographical areas.

Further, **Asaṅga** says that when a *Bodhisattva* finally attains Enlightenment (*bodhi*) he becomes an *Arhant*, a *Tathāgata* (i.e. *Buddha*). here it must be clearly understood that not only a *Śrāvaka* (disciple) but also a *Bodhisattva* becomes an *Arhant* when he finally attains *Buddhahood*. The *Theravāda* position is exactly the same: the *Buddha* in an *Arhant* – *arahaṃ sammāsambuddho* 'Arhant, Fully and Perfectly Enlightened *Buddha*'.

The *mahāyāna* says unequivocally that a *Buddha*, a *Pratyekabuddha* and a *Śrāvaka* (disciple), all three are equal and alike with regard to their Enlightenment (*bodhi*), with regard to their purification or liberation from defilements or impurities (*kṣēyāvaraṇaviśuddhi*). This is also called *vimuktikāya* (liberation-body), and in it there is no difference between the three. That means that there are not three different *Nirvāṇas* or *Vimuktis* for these three persons. *Nirvāṇa* or *Vimukti* is the same for all. But only a *Buddha* (not the *Śrāvakas* and *Pratyeka-buddhas*) achieves complete liberation from all the obstructions to knowledge (*jñeyāvaraṇaviśuddhi*). This is also called *dharmakāya* (*Dharma-body*). It is in this and many other innumerable qualities, capacities and abilities that the *Buddha* becomes incomparable and superior to *Śrāvakas* and *Pratyekabuddhas*.

This *Mahāyāna* view is on all fours with the *Theravāda* Pāli *Tipiṭaka*. In the *Samyutta-nikāya* **the Buddha** says that the *Tathāgata* (i.e. *Buddha*) and a *bhikkhu* (i.e. *Śrāvaka*, disciple) liberated through wisdom are equal with regard to their *vimutti* (liberation); but the *Tathāgata* is different and distinguished from the liberated *bhikkhu* in that he (*Tathāgata*) discovers and shows the Path (*magga*) that was not known before.

These three states of the *Śrāvaka*, the *Pratyekabuddha* and the *Buddha* are mentioned in the *Nidhikaḍa-sutta* of the *Khuddaka-pāṭha*, the first book of the *Khuddaka-nikāya*, one of the five Collections of the *Theravāda Tipiṭaka*. It says that by practising virtues such as charity, morality, self-restraint, etc., one may attain, among other things, 'the perfection of the disciple' (*sāvaka-pāramī*), 'Enlightenment of the *Pratyekabuddha*' (*paccekabodhi*) and 'the *Buddha*-domain' (*buddha-bhūmi*). They are not called *yānas* (vehicles).

In the *Theravāda* tradition these are known as *Bodhis*, but not *Yānas*. The *Upāsakajanālaṅkāra*, a Pāli treatise dealing with the ethics for the lay Buddhist, written in the twelfth century by a **Thera** called **Ānanda** in the *Theravāda* tradition of the *Mahāvihāra* at Anurādhapura, Śrī Laṅkā, says that there are three *Bodhis*: *Sāvakabodhi* (Skt. *Śrāvakabodhi*), *Paccekabodhi* (Skt. *Pratyekabodhi*) and *Sammāsambodhi* (Skt. *Samyaksambodhi*). A whole chapter of this book is devoted to the discussion of these three *Bodhis* in great detail. It says further that when a disciple attains *Bodhi* (Enlightenment), he is called *Sāvaka-Buddha* (Skt. *Śrāvaka-Buddha*). A disciple, even without the attainment of *Bodhi*, if exceptionally well versed in the *Tipiṭaka*, is sometimes referred to as *Suta-Buddha* which means 'a *Buddha* (an enlightened one) by learning' – obviously and courtesy title in respectful recognition of his deep erudition in the *Buddha's* teaching (*DA III (PTS)*, p. 745; *MA I, Tripiṭaka Publication Press, Colombo 1933*, p. 209).

*Theravāda*, just like *Mahāyāna*, places the *Bodhisattva* in the highest position. The Commentary on the *Jātaka*, in the tradition of the *Mahāvihāra* at Anurādhapura, provides a precise example: In the dim past, many incalculable aeons ago, **Gotama the Buddha** during his career as *Bodhisattva*, was an ascetic named **Sumedha**. At that time there was a *Buddha* called **Dīpaṅkara** whom he met and at whose feet he had had the capacity to realize *Nirvāṇa* as a disciple (*Śrāvaka*). But **Sumedha** renounced it and resolved, out of great compassion for the world, to become a *Buddha* like **Dīpaṅkara** to save others. Then **Dīpaṅkara Buddha** predicted that this great ascetic would one day become a *Buddha* and offered eight handfuls of flowers to **Sumedha** and made *pradaḱṣiṇā*. Likewise, **Dīpaṅkara Buddha's** disciples, who were with him and who were themselves *Arhants* offered flowers to the *Bodhisattva* and made *pradaḱṣiṇā*. This story of **Sumedha** distinctly shows the position a *Bodhisattva* occupies in the *Theravāda*.

Although *Theravāda* holds that anybody can be a *Bodhisattva*, it does not stipulate or insist that all must be *Bodhisattvas* – which is considered not practical. The decision is left to the individual whether to take the Path of the *Śrāvaka* or of the *Pratyekabuddha* or of the *Samyaksambuddha*. But it is always clearly explained that the state of a *Samyaksambuddha* is superior and that the other two are inferior. Yet they are not disregarded.

In the twelfth century AC in Burma (a strictly *Theravāda* country) **King Alaungsithu** of Pagan, after building the Shwegugyi Temple, set up an inscription in Pāli verse to record this act of piety in which he publicly declared his resolution to become a *Buddha* and not a *Śrāvaka*.

In Śrī Laṅkā, in the tenth century, **King mahinda IV** (956-972 AC) in an inscription proclaimed that 'none but the *Bodhisattvas* would become kings of Śrī Laṅkā (Ceylon)'. Thus it was believed that kings of Śrī Laṅkā were *Bodhisattvas*. Earlier, according to two rock inscriptions at Vessagiriya in Śrī Laṅkā about the fifth or sixth century A.C., two ordinary people, after performing some meritorious act, had expressed their wish to attain *Buddhahood*.

A *Thera* named **Mahā-Tipiṭaka Cūlābhaya** who wrote the *Milinda-Ṭīkā* (about the twelfth century AC) in the *Theravāda* tradition of the *mahāvihāra* at Anurādhapura, says at the end of the book in the colophon that he aspires to become a *Buddha*: *Buddhobhareyyaṃ* 'May I become a *Buddha*', which means that this author is a *Bodhisattva*.

At the end of some palm-leaf manuscripts of Buddhist texts in Śrī Laṅkā there are the names of even a few copyists who have recorded their wish to become *Buddhas*, and they too are to be considered as *Bodhisattvas*.

At the end of a religious ceremony or an act of piety, the *bhikkhu* who gives benedictions, usually admonishes the congregation to make a resolution to attain *Nirvāṇa* by realizing one of the three *Bodhis* – *Śrāvakabodhi*, *Pratyekabodhi* or *Samyaksambodhi* – as they wish according to their capacity.

There are many Buddhists, both *bhikkhus* and laymen, in Śrī Laṅkā, Burma, Thailand and Cambodia, which are regarded as *Theravāda* countries, who take the vow of resolution to become *Buddhas* to save others. They are indeed *Bodhisattvas* at different levels of development. Thus one may see that in *Theravāda* countries all are not *Śrāvakas*. There are *Bodhisattvas* as well.

There is a significant difference between *Theravāda* and *Mahāyāna* with regard to the *Bodhisattva* ideal. *Theravāda*,

although it holds the *Bodhisattva* ideal as the highest and the noblest, does not provide a separate literature devoted to the subject. The teachings about the *Bodhisattva* ideal and the *Bodhisattva* career are to be found scattered in their due places in Pāli literature. *Mahāyāna*, by definition, dedicated to the *Bodhisattva* ideal, has not only produced a remarkable literature on the subject, but also created a fascinating class of mythical *Bodhisattvas*.

#### QUESTIONS

- Explain the function of consciousness in the process of the arising of a sentient being.
- Describe the characteristic of perfections (*pāramitā*) as appearing in *Mahāyāna* scriptures which are leading to full enlightenment.
- Examine whether it is possible to compare *Tathāgata Garbha* in *Mahāyāna* with evolving consciousness (*saṃvatanika viññāṇa*) in early Buddhist texts.
- Enunciate the mode of definition on the concept of Nirvāṇa in Mahāyāna Buddhism.

# BPG. 302 – BUDDHISM AND CONTEMPORARY THOUGHT

The basic aim of this study is to unfold the visionary concept existing in contemporary society, Buddhist attitude and response to its philosophical trends.

The following matters are taken into consideration in this regard: Marxist attitude towards religion and sociological analysis; Buddhism and analytical western philosophical traditions; Buddhism, modern science, Buddhist attitude regarding empiricism, para empiricism, scepticism, agnosticism; materialism.

## Recommended Reading:

1. *Early Buddhist Jurisprudence* Durga Baghavat, Poona, 1940
2. *Fundamentals of Buddhist Ethics* Gunapala Dharmasiri, Singapore, 1996
3. *Women Under Primitive Buddhism* I. B. Horner, London, 1930
4. *The Principles of International Law in Buddhist Doctrine* K. N. Jayatilake, Academy of International Law: extract from *Recueil des Cours*, Vol. II. 1977
5. *Dharma, man and Law* K. N. Jayatilake, Singapore, 1992
6. *Buddhism and Race Question* K. N. Jayatilake and G. P. Malalasekara, UNESCO race series, Paris, 1958
7. *Philosophical Implication of Pancasila* G. P. Malalasekara, „Sambhava“ P. 266-273
8. *Crime and Punishment in the Buddhist Tradition* Nandasena Ratnapala, New Delhi, 1992
9. *Buddhist Ethics* Hammakawa Saddhatissa, London, 1970
10. *Ethics of Buddhism* S. Tacibana, London, 1926
11. *Individual and Society in Buddhism* W. G. Weeraratna, Colombo, 1977
12. *Buddhism and Society* Hienz Bechert, Kandy, 1977
13. *Precept and Practice* Richard Gombrich, Oxford, 1971
14. *Ethics in Buddhist Perspective* K. N. Jayatilake, Kandy, 1972
15. *Ethics and Class Conflict in Sri Lanka* Kumari Jayawardhan
16. *Buddhism and Social Action* Ken Jones, Kandy, 1981
17. *Social Problems* Joan Wand Moore, New Jersey, 1982
18. *Buddhism in Life* Martin Southwold, Surrey, 1983
19. *Sociology of Religion* Max Weber, London, 1976
20. *Aspects of Buddhist Social Philosophy* K. N. Jayatilake, Kandy
21. *An approach to Buddhist Social Philosophy* Robert and Beck, London, 1979
22. *Buddhism and Sex* M. O. C. Walshe, Kandy
23. *Small is Beautiful* E. F. Schumacher, Harper and Row, 1973

specialized study or as inspired by it the revival of interest Buddha understandable it has profound by influenced philosophy and religion of India down the ages the interested in Buddhism is not merely historical, a matter of curiosity and national pride thinkers find in Buddhism plentiful, first solving social and religious problem that afflict us today 2500 anniversary of lord Buddha's Parinibana(great decease)has searched as an additional stimulus to this interest. The abiding valuable of Buddhism lies, we can think in its typing certain this norm of thought. These norms are not outmoded, no religious or philosophical norm is. They may not exactly be impatient no. but patient like season and the weather changes quickly and the so-called outmoded forms have a curious and persistent way of coming back philosopher should not succumb to changing passion but has to fix his attention on the abiding norm. There are elements in Buddhism which are capable of beings disengaged from they are purely historical and accidental environment and apply to present day condition. The purely moral and humanistic attitude of Buddhism strongly apply to moral man in Buddhism we have a religion without god, without any extraneous appear to revelation and dogma it takes its stand on law as an intrinsic and universal norm of all existence the enthusiastic welcome that it received in 19<sup>th</sup> century and is still continue to receive is in great measure due to this moral standpoint the egalitarian stand taken by Buddhism, in regard to the cultivation of spiritual life is in closer conformity with the idea of today Mahayana Buddhism is justly celebrated for the ideal of the Bodhisattva and this is an answer to the often repeated but untrue accusation that Hindus religion are more intent on private, salvation and do not concern themselves with the good of fellow beings if anything spiritual ideal is more universal and non-sectarian.

Hypothesis of evolution of Vedanta absolute by a criticism of Sankhya dualism and earlier Vedanta of pre Sankhya commentator can not be ruled out. It happens that Madhyamika and Yogacara absolutism had already been evolved in Buddhism.

It is however difficult to conceive how philosopher belonging to Atman doctrine can borrow doctrine from those of opposed Anatma tradition the vadantics state everything on reality of Atma and accept authority of Upanishad Buddhist denied reality of Atma in any form. The barrier was always there besides it is ready assumed that there is no different between absolutism of Nagarjuna, Sankra and Yogacara a closer analysis should bring out their different as much as their generic affinity

Madhyamika and Yogacara also had theory of illusion to account for emergency of appearance knowledge of this turn in Buddhism must have sent Vedant thing back to his own text and enable him to perceive true meaning of Upanishad in Advadism there has been borrowing of technique and not of tenets.

500 words

### AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY (LECTURED BY VEN. PAÑÑĀLOKA)

The contemporary thought which has new and complex system of human thought has given birth to many new subjects. These new subjects have made the life of the man complex and military(?) them ever before. We can see the birth of all these subjects in the age of science called philosophy. Philosophy means 'love of wisdom' as it is translated from its original form. In the eastern philosophy the term *dassanā* (sight) is used for this discipline to promote the human beings as looking at the life in a new way. The thinker who explained the life in a new way like **Plato, Cicero, Aristotle** in Greece, **the Buddha** and **Mahāvīra** in India are called 'philosophers'. The ancient philosophy in human thought is derived from three sources or traditions of philosophy. They are:

1. Greek classical philosophy
2. Indian classical philosophy
3. Chinese classical philosophy

Philosophy has five branches of study, which shows the vast subject area that's covered by this discipline:

1. Ethics – it is the branch of philosophy that studies about human's behavior. In general sense, human behavior differs from culture to culture and from society to society. This branch studies the system of morality that is applicable around the world.
2. Aesthetics – the second branch of philosophy, that studies the concept of beauty. It has given many new insights to the subjects like music, art, culture and architecture.

3. Epistemology – the third branch of philosophy, that studies knowledge. It discusses the validity of our knowledge and the validity of present way of imparting knowledge.
4. Metaphysics – studies the topic of what is beyond the physical world. Their main topics are god and rebirth, which are very influential on human life, but unverifiable by sensual experience.
5. Logic – the last of the branches of philosophy, which studies the valid ways of obtaining correct knowledge. Mathematics is the most powerful branch under this section.

The philosophical discussion under these five branches have given birth to many subjects. Therefore philosophy is called 'the father of all sciences'.

Notes:

- |                 |   |   |
|-----------------|---|---|
| 1. Ethics       | = | study of human behavior                   |
| 2. Aesthetics   | = | study of beauty                           |
| 3. Epistemology | = | theory of knowledge                       |
| 4. Metaphysics  | = | study on topics beyond sensory experience |
| 5. Logic        | = | theory of valid ways of thinking          |

#### AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY (FEBRUARY 2006)

In the human history there are three subjects which represent human knowledge and human experience. They are:

1. Religion
2. Philosophy
3. Science

In these three subjects we can see how the human being realized his nature and also the nature of human environment.

Religion was the most ancient way through which human being understood the nature of human life and the world. The origin, nature, aim and distinction fo human life and world are explained by ancient religion. Therefore, human being trusted the religious authority of scriptures or priests for the sake of knowledge.

In an around sixth century BC there were some philosophers from India, China, Middle East and Greece. The main question, the theory and ideas were presented by religion. They wanted to see the world in a new way and they did not want to accept anything without reason. They did not accept belief. Their methodology was based on knowledge and logic.

The philosophers who were in India were **Siddhatta Gotama, Nigaṇṭha Nāthaputta, Pūraṇa Kassapa, Ajita Kesakambalī, Pakudha Kaccāyana, Sañjaya Bellaṭṭhiputta** and **Makkhalī Ghosāla** and others. In China there were **Confucius** and **Lao Tze**. In Middle east there was **Zarathustra**. In Greece there was a line of philosophers beginning from **Thāles, Anaximander, Anaximenes, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle**. In recent time there were (in Europe) **Karl Marx, Sigmund Freud** and others. They are called 'individual philosophers' according to their names chuch as 'the philosophy of **Socrates**', 'Buddhist philosophy', 'Jaina philosophy' etc.

These scientific ideas later came to be developed as different sciences. For example, psychology which studies human mind scientifically was not a separate subject some time ago. With the development of ideas on the subject it separated from philosophy as a science. All the other science subjects also first were included in philosophy and later became separated as different sciences and introduction to the definition and origin of philosophy.(?)

#### INTRODUCTION TO THE DEFINITION AND ORIGIN OF PHILOSOPHY (FEBRUARY 2006)

The term philosophy comes from Greek word '*phileo*' (love) and '*sophia*' (wisdom). Therefore, philosophy means love, desire or likeness for new knowledge. Philosophers are people who learn new knowledge and who see things in a new way.

The father of western philosophy was **Thales** and he was lived ancient Greece. He did not believe the explanation given by the religion in his society on the origin of the universe. At that time the religion was saying that the world and all it contained was created by the God. **Thales** did not believe it and said that God was not the first cause and presented a new idea that the first cause of everything was water. He presented his theory in more logical and scientific way, because he presented a new idea and his arguments were strong and valid. He was considered to be a philosopher.

We have philosophers in the East, in China and India. **The Buddha** is considered to be a philosopher because he looked at the world in a new way in many aspects. When He was born, the human society was divided into four castes according to the creation of **the Brahmā**. The members of four castes were considered and treated differently. **The Buddha** did not agree with what Brahmanism said and all the people of four castes were equal as human beings (*cattāro vaṇṇā samasamā honti*)<sup>95</sup>. This was new way of looking at the existing social environment. Those philosophers who discovered new things, those who presented things in a new way are called philosophers and their thinking is called philosophy.

There are five branches of philosophy. They are as follows:

1. Ethics
2. Aesthetics
3. Epistemology
4. Metaphysics
5. Logic

Ethics means the principle of behavior. All the philosophers in the world have given new interpretation to the ethics available in the society in which they lived. Especially different form of ethics coming from the ideas of philosophers is that what we call 'Buddhist ethics' as the **Buddha's** teaching of ethics. Similarly, we have Hindu ethics, Christian ethics and also there are ethical principles related to different professions like legal ethics, business ethics, political ethics, medical ethics etc. Human ethics is very complex to study because the behavior of fathom(?) of the human being differs from religion to religion, society to society and country to country.

The second main branch in philosophy is aesthetics (the study of beauty). The concept of beauty differs from person to person, country to country and religion to religion. Each ethics in philosophy tries to develop a universal concept of aesthetics. The philosophical ideas on beauty are found in western philosophy as well as in eastern philosophy. **Plato, Socrates** and **Aristotle** were

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95 This utterance appears many times in *Tipiṭaka*. One of them is *Majjhima Nikāya – Majjhimaṇṇāsapāli – 4. Rājavaggo – 4. Madhura Sutta* – paragraph 318

three philosophers who presented their ideas on beauty in western philosophy. **Bāratamuni** and **Anadabardhana** were two eastern philosophers who enriched the concept of beauty in eastern philosophy. All these new ideas on beauty, its understanding and interpretation in philosophy have come out. Its new ideas tried to build up a common, universal idea of beauty. Such theories were discussed and interpreted in the aesthetics.

The third branch of philosophy is epistemology (theory of knowledge.). Both western and eastern philosophers have discussed the origin, the nature, the function, the validity and the limits of human language. They have culminated as the philosophy of education. Education is scientific branch emerged from epistemology. Such theories and new ideas related to human knowledge are discussed under epistemology.

The fourth branch of philosophy is metaphysics. 'Meta' means 'beyond'; 'physic' means the things and experience in the physical world. Under these titles the area of philosophy which discusses topics beyond physical experience are rebirth, God, psychology etc. All these are discussed in this area of philosophy.

The fifth and last branch of philosophy is called logic. Logic is the method of reasonable knowledge. Logic has developed the science called 'mathematic' which has been very much helpful in discovering the new knowledge about the world. Logic as a subject developed well in both East and West.

### **PHILOSOPHY MEANS „LOVE OF WISDOM“ - PHILOSOPHER IS THE LOVER OF WISDOM<sup>96</sup>**

The word philosophy is more accurately defined in eastern philosophy according to Hindu philosophy. Philosophy should be the correct knowledge. It does not accept tradition as a path to obtain knowledge, like we can see in *Kālāma sutta* – rejection of *paramparāya* (tradition) as a mean of getting concept lemewlet(?). No one should accept teaching that came from the tradition without verifying it.

Philosophical teaching is opened for criticism, whereas a religious person can not for example inquire about the existence of the god. Religious person has to accept the existence of god through faith, belief and vision, as we can see in *Vīmaṅsaka sutta* in *Majjhima Nikāya*, Buddhist teaching of personality.

There are different philosophers and there is no leading philosopher even in Buddhism. **The Buddha** never wanted to appoint a chief of his teaching. There is no much room for criticism in religion. In religion it is god who helps the man. Here in Buddhism man has to get his salvation. **The Buddha** is only teacher, not the power.

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96 Here „philosophy“ is from Greek terms „*phileo*“ (love) and „*sophia*“ (wisdom)

**QUESTION: INTRODUCE PHILOSOPHY AND DISCUSS WHETHER BUDDHISM CAN BE CALLED A PHILOSOPHY (LECTURED BY VEN. PAÑÑĀLOKA) (ORIGINAL BY VEN. IM DINA & VEN. H. SOVANNY)**

Is Buddhism a religion or philosophy? It is often questioned whether Buddhism is philosophy or religion. In most cases these arguments follow **the Buddha's** position as a philosopher and religious teacher. Here we are going to examine whether we can categorize Buddhism into these two systems of thought.

In the previous lessons we came to know that philosophy has five branches. Accordingly we can see Buddhist teaching related to those five areas. Most of the time **the Buddha** was giving ethical instruction to people. In the *Buddha Vagga* of the *Dhammapada* there is a stanza which represents the message<sup>97</sup> of Buddhism in brief: »*Sabba pāpassa akaraṇaṃ kusalassa upasampadā sacittapariyodapaṇaṃ etaṃ buddhāna sāsanaṃ.*« (verse 183) - „To refrain from doing evil, to indulge in doing good, to cleanse one's mind – this is the teaching of all *Buddhas*.“ We can consider this stanza<sup>98</sup> to represent the entire Buddhist teaching. It is as system of ethics as given here. Regarding aesthetics Buddhism has its own independent view. Buddhist verses contain different views on it as given by **the Buddha** and His disciples. In the *Mahāparinibbāna Sutta* **the Buddha** praises natural beauty of the environment. The *Sāgatavagga* in *Samyutta Nikāya* presents the following idea:

»*Ramaṇīyāni araṇṇāni, yattha na ramatī jano;*

*Vītarāgā ramissanti, na te kāmagavesino.*«<sup>99</sup>

On epistemology, Buddhism has developed and preached the most developed theory of knowledge in the Indian system of philosophical thought. The fact of knowledge taught by **the Buddha** never comes to be disproved by the modern advancement of human knowledge. The more science advances, the Buddhism comes to truth. Therefore, in the world now Buddhism is conceded to be of the best form of epistemology with presented new and thorough knowledge about human mind, its functions, universe, its evolution etc. To say that **the Buddha** was a philosopher is not reasonable in complete sense when others became like of **the Buddha** with the behavior of other philosophers.(?) **The Buddha** said what He did and what He said he did, therefore we call him *yatavadī tathākāri, yathakartha thavadī.* (*Samyutta Nikāya, Theragāthā*)

Another factor which makes **the Buddha** a great philosopher is that He could produce many like Him while He was living. At the last stage of **the Buddha** He has produced a great number of good disciples. In this sense Buddhism is not a religion, it believes neither in creator nor in creation. In the *Raṭṭhapāla Sutta* of *Samyutta Nikāya* it is clearly said that this world was not created - »*Attano lokoanabissara.*« The *Attavagga* of *Dhammapada* records the following *gātha*: »*Attāhi Attano nātho kōhi nitho parasiya attanavā sudantena nāthaṃ labhati dullabhaṃ.*« - „Oneself, indeed is one's saviour, for what other savior would there be? With oneself well controlled one obtains a savior difficult to find.“ So, in this sense Buddhism does not believe in creator or creation. Thus in western point it is difficult to say that Buddhism is a religion. The observation of scholars on this problem has produced these conclusions:

1. Buddhism is philosophic
2. Buddhism is a religion
3. Buddhism is a philosophy

The conclusion number one and two are one side's conclusions, because they can see only a part of Buddhist practice, as it is available today. In modern Buddhism the philosophical and religious characteristic are inter-connected. It is not easy to separate the religious aspects of Buddhism from its philosophy. Although Buddhism does not have main characteristics like that of other theistic

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97 In the original there was 'massage'...

98 In the original there was 'stinger'...

99 (*Khuddakanikāya – Dhammapadapāli – Arahanṭavaggo* – paragraph 99) this stanza written in the original was seriously full of mistakes and I even could find it neither in the *Sāgatavagga* nor even anywhere in *Samyutta Nikāya*. The reference to the *Sāgatavagga* is in the original two times – before the quotation and after the quotation. I didn't mention the second reference, as it is same like that one before the quotation and also because the reference is invalid.

religions with the development of Buddhist history, different features of culture developed in relation to Buddhism. Those later developments do not live long, there is no sound philosophy.

QUESTION: INTRODUCE PHILOSOPHY AND DISCUSS WHETHER BUDDHISM CAN BE CALLED AS A PHILOSOPHY.

The word philosophy is from the Greek words *phileo* + *sophia*, which mean 'love of wisdom'. Perhaps this was first used by **Pythagoras**. In Indian tradition the commonest word used to denote philosophy is *Dassanā*. That means sight, what comes through perception, though basically it may have meant what is seen with the eyes. Around 6<sup>th</sup> century BC there were many philosophers appearing in the world. In East and West, the function of philosophy is to investigate for new knowledge. All the new ideas and theories of knowledge are first discussed under the subject of philosophy.

It is often questioned whether Buddhism is a philosophy or religion. In most cases, these arguments follow **the Buddha's** position as a philosopher and a religious teacher. Here, we are going to examine whether we can categorize Buddhism into these two systems of thought. Philosophy has five branches:

1. ethics
2. aesthetics
3. epistemology
4. metaphysics
5. logic

Hence we can see Buddhist teachings is related to those five areas. Most of occasions **the Buddha** was giving ethical instructions to people. In *Dhammapada* 183, this stanza states the message of Buddhism in brief: to avoid all evil, to cultivate good and to purify one's mind. Such teaching is a system of ethics.

Regarding aesthetics, Buddhism has its own independent view. Buddhist verses contain different view on beauty as given by **the Buddha** and his disciples. In *Mahāparinibbāna Sutta*, **the Buddha** praises natural beauty of the environment.

On epistemology, Buddhism has developed theory of knowledge in the Indian system of philosophical thought. The facts of knowledge taught by **Buddha** never came to be disproved by modern advancement of human knowledge.<sup>100</sup> More science discoveries come to be proved by Buddhism. In the world, therefore, Buddhism is now considered to be one of the best forms of epistemology, which presented new and true knowledge about human mind, its functions etc. Metaphysics, logics which are beyond the sense experience are also discussed in buddhist teaching.

In Buddhist teaching we see the system of logic as well. For example, **the Buddha** stated that there isn't anything permanent in everything; all subjects are changing but Brahmin youth said that there is a soul in the mind which is unchanging. **The Buddha** shows that all these five aggregates '*pañcakkhandha*' are constantly changing. Therefore, there is no entity called 'soul' which would be unchanging. That's why one can assume that Buddhism with method of logic is a philosophy.

Above four characteristics which made the Buddha different from other philosophers mentioned the fact clear that he was much greater than other philosophers. But **the Buddha** is not a normal philosopher. He is the philosopher par-excellence in the human history. Therefore, we can conclude that Buddhism has the characteristics of philosophy in full. Thus, from the above mentioned facts are making it evident that Buddhism can be called as a philosophy.

666INTRODUCE PHILOSOPHY AND DISCUSS WHETHER BUDDHISM CAN BE FALLING A PHILOSOPHY?

Is Buddhism a religion or philosophy: it is often question whether Buddhism is philosophy or religion. In most cases these arguments follow the Buddha's position as a philosopher and religious teacher. Here we are going to examine whether we can

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<sup>100</sup>This of course is not true. Many things in *Tipiṭaka* are completely wrong from the point of view of modern science and some of these things are also contrary to each other. Just check *Parinibbāna Sutta* the explanation about earthquake. Then see any scientific book about earthquake. You will find two completely different theories. But please, do not forget that the scientific theory (in this case) is perfectly proved and thus is not a theory, but a scientific explanation of an obvious fact.

categorize Buddhism into these two systems of thought.

In the previous lesson we came to know that philosophy has five branches. Accordingly we can see Buddhist teaching related to those five areas. Most of the time the Buddha was giving ethical instruction to people. In the Buddha vagga of the dhammapada there is a stanza which represent the message of Buddhism in brief: “ Sabba-papassa akaranam-kusalassa upasampada Sacittapariyodapanam- Etam Buddhān Sasanam” to refrain from doing evil, to indulge in doing good, to cleanse one’s mind- this is the teaching of all Buddhas. We can consider this stinger to represent the entire Buddhist teaching. It is a system of ethics as given here. Regarding aesthetics Buddhism has its own independent view. Buddhist verses contain different views on it as given by the Buddha and his disciples. In the mahaparinibbana Sutta the Buddha praises natural beauty of the environment. The Sagatha vagga samyutta nikaya present the following idea: “Rammiyam arannani, yatthana ramati jino, vitaraga ramissanti; nate kamagavesino.” (Ref-sagatha vagga S.N.).

On epistemology, Buddhism has developed and preached the most developed theory of knowledge in the Indian system of philosophical thought. The fact of knowledge taught by the Buddha never comes to be disproved by the modern advancement of human Knowledge. More science advances Buddhism came to truth. Therefore in the world now Buddhism is conceded to be of the best from of epistemology with presented new and through knowledge about human mind, its function, universes, its evolution etc. To say that the Buddha is a philosopher is not reasonable in complete sense when others became like of the Buddha with the behavior of others philosopher. The Buddha said what he did and what he said we called him yavadi tathakari, yathakartha thavadi (S.N theragatha).

Another factor, which makes the Buddha, a great philosopher is that he could produce many like him while he was living. At the last stage of the Buddha he has produced a great number of good disciple. In this sense Buddhism is not a religion it believes neither in creator nor in creation. In the Ratthapala Sutta of M.N. it is clearly said that this world has no created “Attano lokoanabhissara.” The Atta vagga of Dhammapada records the following gatha: “Attahi Attanonatho Kohi nitho parasiya Attanava sudantena Natham labhati dullabham” oneself, indeed is one’s saviour, for what other saviour would there be? With oneself well controlled, one obtains a saviour difficult to find”. So in this sense Buddhism does not believe in creator or creation. Thus in western point it is difficult to say Buddhism is a religion.

The observation of scholar on this problem has produce their conclusion:

1. Buddhism is a philosophic
2. Buddhism is a religion
3. Buddhism is a philosophy.

The conclusion number one and two are one side’s conclusion because they can see only a part of Buddhist practice, as it is available today. In modern Buddhism the philosophical and religious characteristic are inter connected. It is not easy to separate the religious aspect of Buddhism from its philosophy. Although Buddhism does not have main characteristic like that of other theistic religious with the development of Buddhist history different feature of culture develop with related to Buddhism. Those later developments do not live long there is no sound philosophy.

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#### QUESTION: IS BUDDHISM A PHILOSOPHY?

The word ‘philosophy’ is derived from Greek word *phileo* + *sophia*, meaning ‘love of wisdom’. This term was first used by **Pythagoras**, a Greek philosopher. In India the commonest word used to denote philosophy is *Dassanā*, which means ‘sight’, which comes from sense-perception. There were many philosophers, who appeared in the world around 6<sup>th</sup> century BC in the East and West. The function of philosophy is to investigate new knowledge. All the new ideas and theories of knowledge are first discussed under the subject of philosophy.

Often it is asked, whether Buddhism is a philosophy. In this case, this argument follows **the Buddha's** position as a teacher of philosophy. Here we are going to examine whether we can categorize Buddhism into this system. Philosophy has five branches:

1. Ethics
2. Aesthetics

### 3. Epistemology

### 4. Metaphysics

### 5. Logics

Hence, we can see Buddhist teaching as related to these five areas. On some occasions **the Buddha** was given ethical instruction to the people, which can be seen in the *Dhammapada* - »*Sabba pāpassa akaraṇaṃ, kusalassa upasampadā.*« - Not to do any evil, to cultivate good and to purify one's mind. This stanza is stated as ethical message of Buddhism.

Regarding Aesthetics, Buddhism has its own independent view. Buddhist verses contain different view on beauty as given by **the Buddha** and his disciples. In the *Mahāparinibbāna Sutta* **the Buddha** never came to be disproved by modern advancement of human knowledge. Thanks to Science advance Buddhism came to be proved in the world. Therefore, Buddhism is considered to be one of the best forms of epistemology.

Metaphysics, some topics which are beyond the sense, these experiences are discussed in Buddhist teachings.

System of logics, as well for example, **the Buddha** stated: „there is nothing permanent in anything; all objects are changing“, but a Brahmin youth said that „there is a soul in the mind, which is unchanging.“ **The Buddha** showed that „all these aggregates (*nāmakhandha*) are constantly changing.“ Therefore, there is no entity called soul which would be unchanging. That's why we can assume that Buddhism is concerned with a system of logics.

Above all characteristics which made **the Buddha** different from other philosophers is the fact that he was much greater than the other philosophers. **The Buddha** was not a normal philosopher – he was the philosopher par-excellence in the human history. Therefore, we can conclude that Buddhism has characterized philosophy according to what is mentioned above. Thus, regarding the facts mentioned above it is evident that Buddhism can be called as philosophy.

QUESTION: EXAMINE WHETHER BUDDHISM CAN BE CONSIDERED AS A PHILOSOPHY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE WESTERN DEFINITION.  
(ORIGINAL BY VEN. DHARMEŚVAR)

The term philosophy is made from two words of Greek origin – *phileo* + *sophia* which mean 'love of wisdom'. In western tradition whenever a new form of knowledge occurred or came into existence such ideas first were discussed under philosophy. In western tradition there have been philosophers from that time earlier than six century BC and there were western philosophers even today. All the new subjects before they were developed as independent disciplines were discussed under the subjects of philosophy.

Five aims or branches of philosophy:

1. Ethics – study about good and bad
2. Aesthetics – study about beauty
3. Epistemology – study about knowledge
4. Metaphysics – study about things beyond physical experience
5. Logic – study about reasonable things

The Sanskrit name for philosophy is *Darśana* which means 'seeing'. It stands for the idea of seeing new things in new way. In India from the beginning of history of philosophy there were thinkers who presented either new knowledge or a new way of looking at things. Buddhist discourses furnish information about such philosophers who held independent views on man and world and they were contemporary to **Gotama Buddha**.

The first branch of philosophy ethics study about the behavior of human beings, their activities, their judgment and values differ from society to society, religion to religion and culture to culture. One action which is considered good in one philosophy or

culture might be a vague concept in another culture. For example, Buddhism discourages killing beings and intoxicating but Catholic religious tradition recommends both actions, not that they would be ethically wrong.<sup>101</sup> This shows the difference of ideas prevailing in different cultures. philosophy in its study on ethics looks for universally acceptable concept of ethics. The criteria of ethical value judgment again differs from one thought to the other. Philosophy tries to identify criterias of ethics to be applicable to whole the world. The second branch of philosophy is the aesthetics try to recognize the ideas of beauty as they are universally applicable because generally available ideologies of beauty differs again from culture to culture. Thirdly under the branch of epistemology, theory of knowledge, an attempt is made to develop broad ideas to get and develop knowledge.

In the eastern philosophy we observe distance from early times. When **prince Sidhatta** renounced the world, he had two questions to find the answer they were: what is the best truth - '*kim sacca gavesi*' and what is the highest good '*kim kusala gavesi*', although there were many available theories on truth and good, he found they were not universal truth. Therefore, he wanted to recognize and find new knowledge of man and universe, highest good that man can perform. He named that research as 'the noble quest'. The same was done by western philosophers to find new knowledge about man and universe under the fourth branch, namely metaphysics. Some topics which were beyond the same experience for example concept of life, mind, rebirth, God and *Nibbāna* cannot be experienced through the normal sense organs but we have our day-to-day knowledge derived from sensual experience. Metaphysics therefore is the branch of philosophy which studies about supernatural subject and they tried to arrive into conclusion to positive assumption.

The last and the fifth branch of philosophy is logic. It is the art of systematic and reasonable thinking. Mathematics is the practical science produced by logic. It has asked to calculate any amount of things, sizes or proximities on logical basis. For example, we cannot measure the distance from Earth to Jupiter, but we can calculate it on logical basis by using mathematics. With that we can assume almost possible answer which is a production of human thinking. The discussion so far clearly shows that Buddhism is the philosophy where are available all branches of philosophical subjects.

#### 666 EXAMINE WHETHER BUDDHISM CAN BE CONSIDERED A PHILOSOPHY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE WESTERN DEFINITION.

The term philosophy is made from words of Greek origin Philo+Sophia, which means love of wisdom. In western tradition whenever a new form of knowledge occurred or came into existence such ideas first were discussed under philosophy. In western tradition there have been philosophers from earlier than six century B.C. and there are western philosophers even today. All new subjects before they were developed as independent disciplines were discussed under subjects of philosophy.

The five branches of philosophies are:

1 Ethics-study about good and bad, 2 Aesthetics-study about beauty, 3 Epistemology-study about knowledge, 4 Metaphysics-study about things beyond physical experience, 5 Logic-study about reasonable things.

The Sanskrit's name for philosophy is Darsana, which means seeing. It stands for the idea that seeing new things in new way. In India from the beginning of philosophical history there were thinkers who presented either new knowledge or a new way of looking at things. Buddhist discourses furnish information about such philosophers who held independent view on man and world and they were contemporary to Gotama Buddha.

One action, which is considered good in one philosophy or culture, might be a vague concept in another culture. For example Buddhist discourages killing beings and use of intoxicating drinks, but Catholic religious tradition recommends both actions not to be ethically wrong. The criteria of ethical value judgment again differ from one thought to the other. Philosophy tries to identify criteria of ethics to be applicable to whole world. The second branch of philosophy is aesthetics, when try to recognize the ideas of beauty, as they are universally applicable because generally available ideologies of beauty differ again from culture.

The thirdly under the branch is epistemology, theory of knowledge, an attempt is made to develop broad ideas to get and develop knowledge. Buddha's aim was find new knowledge of man and universe, highest well that man can perform. He named that research as noble quest the same is done by western

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<sup>101</sup> I bet the teacher is joking. I don't believe that the teacher was serious when saying such an obvious nonsense. Of course that Catholic religion disproves killing and intoxication. Catholic religion as well as all the other famous Christian sects disprove killing, stealing and all the things that are mentioned in *pañca sīla*. Regarding the teaching of the Holy Bible, there are some controversies as to the permission for killing (similarly it is in Holy Qur'ān), but generally Catholic Christian is unhappy about killing in the same way as a *Theravāda* Buddhist.

philosophers to find new knowledge about man and universe. The fourth branch, namely metaphysics ca, which are beyond the sense experiences. For example concept life, mind rebirth, God and Nibbana, cannot be experienced through normal sense organs but we have our day-to-day knowledge derive from sensual experience and studies about super normal subjects, The fifth branch of philosophy is logic and Buddhism use logic and reasoning when necessary thinking. The discussion so far clearly shows that Buddhism is the philosophy where all branches of philosophical subjects are available.

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1.Ethics-subject about good and bad, 2 Aesthetics-study about beauty, 3 Epistemology-study about knowledge, 4 Metaphysics-study about things beyond physical experience, 5 Logic-study about reasonable things.

The Sanskrit name for philosophy is Darsana, which means seeing. it stands for the idea that seeing new things in new way. In India from the beginning of philosophical history there were thinkers who presented either new knowledge or a new way of looking at things. Buddhist discourses furnish information about such philosophers who held independent view on man and world and they were contemporary to Gotama Buddha.

One action, which is considered good in one philosophy or culture, might be a vague concept in another culture. For example Buddhist discourages killing beings and use of intoxicating drinks, but Catholic religious tradition recommends both actions not to be ethically wrong. The criteria of ethical value judgment again differ from one thought to the other. Philosophy tries to identify criteria of ethics to be applicable to whole world. The second branch of philosophy is the aesthetics, when try to recognize the ideas of beauty, as they are universally applicable because generally available ideologies of beauty differ again from culture.

The thirdly under the Branch is epistemology, theory of knowledge, an attempt is made to develop broad ideas to get and develop knowledge. Buddha aim was find new knowledge of man and universe, highest well that man can perform. He named that research as the noble quest the same is done by western philosophers to find new knowledge about man and universe. The fourth branch namely metaphysics came topics, which are beyond the sense experiences. For example concept life, mind rebirth, God and Nibbana, cannot be experience through the normal sense organs but we have our day-to-day knowledge derive from sensual experience and studies about super normal subjects,

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1 Ethics-study about good and bad, 2 Aesthetics-study about beauty, 3 Epistemology-study about knowledge, 4 Metaphysics-study about things beyond physical experience, 5 Logic-study about reasonable things.

The Sanskrit name for philosophy is Darsana, which means seeing. It stands for the idea that seeing new things in new way. In India from the beginning of philosophical history there were thinkers who presented either new knowledge or a new way of looking at things. Buddhist discourses furnish information about such philosophers who held independent view on man and world and they were contemporary to Gotama Buddha.

One action, which is considered good in one philosophy or culture, might be a vague concept in another culture. For example Buddhist discourages killing beings and use of intoxicating drinks, but Catholic religious tradition recommends both actions not to be ethically wrong. This shows the difference of ideas prevailing in different culture. Philosophies in its study on ethics look for universally acceptable concept of ethics. The criteria of ethical value judgment again differ from one thought to the other. Philosophy tries to identify criteria of ethics to be applicable to whole world. The second branch of philosophy is the aesthetics, when try to recognize the ideas of beauty, as they are universally applicable because generally available ideologies of beauty differ again from culture. The thirdly under the branch of epistemology, theory of knowledge, an attempt is made to develop broad ideas to get and develop knowledge.

. When prince Siddhatta renounced the world, he had two questions to find answers they were: what is the best truth “ kim saccagavesi” and what is the highest good “kim kusalagavesi”, although there were many available theories on truth and good, he found they were not universal truth. Therefore, he wanted to recognize and find new knowledge of man and universe, highest well that man can perform. He named that research as the noble quest the same is done by western philosophers to find new knowledge about man and universe under the fourth branch, namely metaphysics. Some topics, which are beyond the sense experiences for example concept life, mind rebirth, God and Nibbana, cannot be experience through the normal sense organs but we have our day-to-day knowledge derive from sensual experience. Metaphysics therefore is the branch of philosophy, which studies about super normal subjects,

The last and the fifth branch of philosophy is logic. It is the art of systematic and reasonable thinking. Mathematics is the practical science produced by logic help us to calculate things, sizes or proximities on logical basics. For example, we cannot measure the distance from mars to the Jupiter but we can calculate it on logical basics by using mathematics. With that we can assume almost possible answers, which is a production of human thinking. The discussion so far clearly shows that Buddhism is the philosophy where all branches of philosophical subjects are available.. 564

## 666DISCUSS THE PHILOSOPHICAL BACKGROUND THAT LED TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF SKEPTICAL THOUGHTS.

Skepticism is very developed form of philosophical thought. A skeptic is a person who normally doubts and questions accepted opinions. A skeptic in the philosophical sense refers to a person philosopher who denies the possibility of knowledge or even rational belief in certain spheres, taken in this the words agnostic and agnosticism, too, denote similar meanings. In its widest sense an agnostic is one who believes that nothing is known or can be known of the existence or nature of God. God is considered the ultimate and absolute truth. It is generally considered the essence, the crux of religion though. This means that both skepticism and agnosticism accepts the unknown ability of the ultimate truth.

The basic premise, on which this philosophy is built, is the belief that human knowledge is limited and therefore it does not have the capacity to know absolutely about anything, especially about subtle metaphysical issues. In India of the Buddha's time there had been a very famous skeptic. He was Sañjaya Belatthiputta. He did not make any absolute declaration on any important philosophical issue. This was because he felt that human knowledge is incapable of understanding such matters completely. He held that if he was to make an absolute statement on such matters, and later if he was to be proved wrong, he would be looked upon as a liar.

This is why he came up with indefinite answers when deep philosophical issues are presented. If someone were to ask him whether there is next life, he would not give an absolute answer. He would say, 'there would be'. Again if one were to ask him whether there is no next world, he would answer saying, 'there may not be'. Thus, he took no definite and firm position. Because of these undecided attitudes of his the Buddhist texts describe Sañjaya Belatthiputta as an Amara-Vikkhepika-an Eel-wiggler-a rather derogatory term. Sutta such as the Samaññaphala describes him as a fool, an ignorant person who knows nothing. But this may not be the truth, for he, too, was a respected teacher among the 6 teachers.

Besides, even Jainism in its epistemology presents a method called Sapta-bhangi-naya-a process in which something could be viewed in 7 different perspectives. Buddha himself did not always give absolute answers. Some questions he left aside without answering. This is not because the Buddha was a skeptic but because he did not wish to deal with irrelevant issues. From all this, what is clear is that skepticism is not a philosophy of the foolish and ignorant, but an opinion of learned men who considered human knowledge as imperfect to make absolute statements.

According to the scholars and historical evidence there are some different(?) most similarities between the buddhism and science, because of fundamental purpose. In the Buddhism *Nibbāna* is the final goal. But in the science there is not such a thing. There is a conventional method into the science. Empiricism is the foundation in the science, basically which we experience through our senses. If they can't prove research or find out any teaching or concept, they don't accept according to the science, but in the Buddhism it has accepted sense perception as well as extra-sensory perception. Science has not developed it to accept extra-sensory perception.

The science will change their method of theories time to time. Hence, they have to change their previous conduction too. Therefore, there is no final decision which regarding any matter in the science. Basically the science points out concerning the data, but Buddhism has given their main intention to the virtuous of the person God conduct of the society.(?) The Buddhism has a main intention to the virtuousness of the person God conduct of the society.(?) The Buddhism has a final goal which is called *Nibbāna*. The Buddhism has researched the way how person can finish his rebirth *insamsāra*. Although Buddhism has discussed concerning the *Nibbāna*, it has not rejected social life as a lay person. Buddhism explained world, society, person, economy, environment, politics, culture, marriage etc.

**The Lord Buddha** has said to the *Kālāma* people in the *Kālāma Sutta*: „Don't accept anything without research of your own.“ That means that Buddhism has given permission to the people to do research, observe but not about the world, social etc.(?) When we investigate there is no final goal or aim in the science, because there is not a final decision in the science. According to the science they want to research everything in the world. Especially regarding the material things. But Buddhism investigated both material things and immaterial things, which was important to attain the *Nibbāna*.

Therefore, Buddhist teaching or concept which was founded by **the Buddha** can't be changed in the present or in the future. Because **Buddha** has considered(?) about the real truth. Hence, *Dhamma* is eternal, so that it is suitable for the past, present and future. **The Lord Buddha** also has followed some blind logic system.(?) According to **the Buddha**, it is said: „Don't insert(?) anybody because I don't like that is I don't like that other also does not like.“(?) Basically Buddhism has originated, developed an experience according to the dependent origination or cause and effect. That was the main theory of Buddhist philosophy. **The Lord Buddha** has preached *Dhamma* and practice according to the method of *Dhamma*.

The Buddhism was not for the past or present or future; it is suitable for all the time in the life or world. Because it was the real truth, but there is no real truth in the science – it may change, or be revealed as false at any moment. In addition, fundamental teachings of **the Buddha** has been confirmed by the scientists; there is *kamma*, *rebirth*, dependent origination, Four Noble Truths etc.<sup>102</sup>

Some scholars have considered Buddhism as a science, but actually it cannot be compared to any kind of science, because it is only Buddhist science. It has some kind of research of the real truth in the world. It was found by **the Buddha** 2500 years ago and its basic purpose is called *Nibbāna*. The science is not moral or immoral, but as moral, Buddhism admired virtuousness, good conduct etc., therefore we can mention fundamental similarities and differences between the science and Buddhism as follows:

1. The science and Buddhism have conventional theories
2. The science has dependence on empiricism, but Buddhism has accepted sense-perception and extra-sensory perception.
3. The science and Buddhism has followed some kinds of logic system that is not some entirely.(?)
4. There is no final goal in the science, but *Nibbāna* or the final goal of the person is in Buddhism.
5. The Buddhism has limited its research, but science has to research even in the future.
6. There is no aim in the science, but Buddhist aim is the *Nibbāna*.<sup>103</sup>
7. The theories and scholars in the science may change their ideas or be revealed as false in the present or in the future, but *Dhamma* will never be found false forever.<sup>104</sup>

As a theory, both Buddhism and science have followed one way.

### **QUESTION: COMPARE AND CONTRAST RELIGIOUS TEACHING WITH MODERN SCIENCE, PAYING SPECIAL ATTENTION TO BUDDHISM**

There are at least five major world. Religions. These are Hinduism, Buddhism, Judaism, Christianity and Islam. Except Buddhism the other four are theistic religions. In these four religions faith, to be more precise the infallibility of the God's teaching plays a dominant role. The God in these religions is considered to

<sup>102</sup>I do not believe that *kamma*, rebirth, dependent origination or Four Noble Truths have been proved by science. I demand the scientific proofs for those concepts. If those concepts are really proved, all other religions would collapse, which still did not happen.

<sup>103</sup>This is number 4 in other words.

<sup>104</sup>In some places in *Tipiṭaka* the teachings have already been found wrong (check *Parinibbāna Sutta* , the talk about earthquake).

be omnipotent, omniscient and omnipresent. He is the creator, sustainer and destroyer of everything. He is the Lord, the law-maker, the ruler.

With such a supreme Godhead at the top the man is mere puppet in his hand.<sup>105</sup> There is no room to exercise his(?) free(?) and it is believed that man has no free will. He is not given freedom of thought and investigation, blind faith is what is encouraged. To question the God, His teaching is considered as blasphemy. Islamism says that free thinking is the freest hindrance to one's happiness here and here-after.<sup>106</sup>

Such religions are, therefore, based on faith and metaphysical teachings. They are not at all scientific. Not open to investigation and inquiry which are the hallmarks of science whatever the Holy Scriptures say whether it is the *Gīta*, the Bible, Qur'ān etc. The faithful has to believe, with no questions. Therefore, they are far away from the scientific approach.

Buddhism is different. The *Dhamma* is described as *ehi passika*, inviting the followers to come and examine **the Buddha**, encouraged to freedom of thought as seen from the *Kālāma Sutta*.<sup>107</sup> He even encouraged the disciples to investigate **the Buddha** Himself as seen from the *Vīmaṃsaka Sutta*. These are features of the scientific approach adopted by Buddhism.

By rejecting the divine creation theory Buddhism presented a theory of evolution. This theory presented in *Aggañña Sutta* is more in accord with modern scientific findings. Rejecting the divine creations of different castes and thus different species of human. **The Buddha** using scientific arguments attempted to establish the oneness of mankind.

Buddhism is rationalistic: it is scientific in its approach to problems. It does not encourage blind faith, but asks followers to use rational or reasoned faith (*akāravatī saddhā*). Yet one should not mistake Buddhism to be a science. It is not. It is a spiritual way. Hence, it does not totally depend on scientific and rational approach. It uses experience, intuitive experience which is called *Vipassanā*.

In this, it differs from science. It employs extra-sensory perception which science does not use. It is through these *Abhiññā* that it enables one to see and know the real nature of things.

#### **BUDDHISM AND MODERN SCIENCE (ORIGINAL BY VEN. DHARMEŚVAR)**

The evolution of western philosophy resulted in producing a number of scientists who began their discourses with philosophical discussion. In the modern time most of the philosophers are scientists as well. They made a great contribution through scientific enquiries to form new knowledge widening the understanding of man himself and material world around him.

In a comparative study between Buddhism and modern science, we can observe similarities as well as dissimilarities in the two teachings. Buddhism is the thought preached by a great human being and a seer. Modern science on the other hand has been enriched by the intellectual contribution of many thinkers in the West. Buddhism discloses the true nature of existence of the being and teaches the way out of unsatisfactoriness. Science discloses secret of the material world and teaches how the matter would be changed for the benefit to man and to manufacture material goods to satisfy wants and needs of the man. Both systems have given great insight to human knowledge as a whole. The methodology followed by both the systems to discover the truth resembles similarities(?) as well.

In discovering the secret of material world, modern science has employed two systems: 1. analysis 2. synthesis. Analysis

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105 It is my duty to sharply disagree with the teacher in this matter. Man is not a puppet of God, as the God gave 'free will' to man.

God is the great, the mighty, and unlike man he can give his creation 'free will', which is something we, limited beings can't imagine. 'Free will' is the great gift of God and that is also the reason why we should worship Him as the almighty and wise... :-)

106 It is interesting that the teacher doesn't mention that in Buddhism free thinking is also not supported. See *Cintana Sutta* and *Vitakka Sutta* both in *Sacca Saṃyutta*. Buddha limited man's thinking maybe even more than other religions, especially if we concern thinking of monks. As an example, if a *Sāmanera* has wrong view (*micchā diṭṭhi*), he must be expelled from the monks' order. There is no free thinking in Buddhism. But there are freely thinking Buddhists, that is true...

107 *Kālāma Sutta* was preached to *Kālāmas* and doesn't mention anything like 'free thinking'.

means to classify the component parts of some objects into various parts in order to see its reality. Synthesis means showing the interrelationship among analyzed data. The scientific laboratory employs both of these matters. Buddhism also uses both these methods to show the reality related to the phenomena. For example, most of the religions at this time believe in some forms of soul. Those who accepted soul as permanent are called 'eternalists' and those who hold it as temporary are called 'nihilists'. To refuse both of these false views which are unreal **the Buddha** employed analysis (*vibhaṅga*) and synthesis (*saṅghaha*).

Both Buddhism and modern science don't depend on mere belief or blind faith. The science verifies everything to discover the truth and it wants the truth to be clear and transparent. The Buddhist teaching schools emphasize open mindedness and enquiry. The teaching of **the Buddha** is open and all are invited to come and see - »*Ehi passiko*.« **The Buddha** did not discourage freedom of thought and enquiry. Instead He promoted free thinking and questioning in the study of his teaching as can be observed from many discourses such as the *Mahāparinibbāna Sutta* of *Dīgha Nikāya*, *Upāli* and *Vīmaṅsa Sutta* in the *Majjhima Nikāya* and the *Kālāma Sutta* in *Aṅguttara Nikāya*.<sup>108</sup>

Another similarity between Buddhism and science is accepting the theory of causality. In Buddhism the causality is called the central philosophy. **The Buddha** said whether **the Buddha** was born or not, the theory of causality would be there in nature. The Buddhist teaching on rebirth, *kammic* retribution, morality and liberation becomes meaningful only in the light of the philosophy of causality. Buddhism teaches its theory of synthesis. Through that the teaching of Dependent Co-origination (*Paṭiccasamuppāda*). In modern science the causality is well established theory. By observing it, scientists are able to change the natural function of many environmental theories.

Another immense contribution made by both science and Buddhism is widening the horizon of human knowledge on himself and the world. It is because of science that we know more about the world today. It has resulted in another way by reducing diseases, expanding the human life-span etc. Also, because of science the human life has become comfortable more than ever before. With the teaching of **the Buddha** which enormously gave knowledge about human and the world, it came to the experience of humanity when he realized the truth.

In above written data we see some characteristics similar between Buddhism and science. By this some want to come to the conclusion that Buddhism is scientific or that Buddhism is a science. Yet it is not reasonable to come to the theistic(?) conclusion as Buddhism is a science because there are harmful aspects of science continuity(?) of nature that are never shared by Buddhism. There are modern scientists who say that the damage done by scientific and technological manufacturing, to the nature in last two century which more than the consumption of natural resources by the humanity in its entire history. If this is going to be infected without change surely the life will disappear from earth in the next century. Therefore, the present journey of science and technology should be controlled in order to functioning the life on earth without much damage.

#### **BUDDHISM AND MODERN SCIENCE (LECTURED BY VEN. PAÑÑĀLOKA) (ORIGINAL BY VEN. IM DIMA & VEN. H. SOVANNY)**

Until the beginning of the last century, Buddhism was confined to countries untouched by modern science. Nevertheless, from its very beginning, the teachings of **the Buddha** were always open to scientific thinking. One reason why the teaching can easily be embraced by the scientific spirit is that **the Buddha** never encouraged rigid, dogmatic belief. He did not claim to base His teaching on faith, belief, or divine revelation, but allowed great flexibility and freedom of thought.<sup>109</sup>

The second reason is that the scientific spirit can be found in **the Buddha's** approach to spiritual truth. **The Buddha's** method for this covering and testing spiritual truth is very similar to that of the scientist. A scientist observes the external world objectively and would only establish a scientific theory after conducting many successful practical experiments. Using a similar approach 25 centuries ago, **the Buddha** observed the inner world with detachment and encouraged his disciples not to accept any teaching until they had critically investigated and personally verified its truth. Just as the scientists today would not claim that his experiment cannot be duplicated by others, **the Buddha** did not claim that his experiment cannot be duplicated by others, **the Buddha** did not claim that his experience of enlightenment was exclusive to Him. Thus in His approach to truth **the Buddha** was analytical as the present day scientists. He established a practical, scientifically worked

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108In Buddhism there is no freedom of thought. According to Buddhism if one has *micchā diṭṭhi* (wrong view/thought) he will reborn in hell or as an animal.

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out method for reaching the ultimate truth and the experience of enlightenment.

While Buddhism is very much in line with the scientific spirit, it is not correct to equate Buddhism with science. It is that the practical application of science has enabled mankind to live more comfortable lives and experience wonderful things never dreamt about before. Science had made it possible for man to swim than the fish, fly higher than birds and walk on the moon. Yet the sphere of knowledge acceptable to conventional, scientific wisdom is confined to empirical evidence. And scientific truth is subject to constant change. Science cannot give man control over his mind and neither does it offer moral control and guidance. Despite its wonders, science has indeed many limitations not shared by Buddhism.

In a comparative study between Buddhism and science we can observe similarities in the two teachings. Buddhism is the thought preached by a great human being and a seer. Modern science on the other hand is enriched by the intellectual contribution of many thinkers in the West. Buddhism discloses the two natures of existence of the being and teaches the out(?) of unsatisfactoriness. Science discloses secret of the material world and teaches how the matter would be changed for the benefit of man and to manufacture material good to satisfy wants and needs of the man. both systems have given great insight to human knowledge as a whole.

In discovering the secret material world science has employed the two systems: (1) Analysis (2) Synthesis. Analysis means to classify the component parts of some objects into various parts in order to see its reality. Synthesis means showing the relationship among analysis data. The scientific laboratory employs both of these matter. Buddhism also uses both of those methods to show the related to the phenomena.(?) For example, most of the religions at the **Buddha's** time believed in some forms of soul.

Both Buddhism and modern science don't depend on any belief or blind faith. The science verifies everything to discover the truth and it wants the truth to be clear and transparent. The Buddhist teaching schools emphasize one opened mindedness and enquiry. The **Buddha's** teaching is opened and all are invited to come and see – »*Ehi passiko*.« **The Buddha's** didn't discourage freedom of thought and enquiry. Instead he promoted free thinking and questioning in the study of his teachings as can be observed from many discourses such as *Mahāparinibbāna Sutta* of *Dīgha Nikāya*, *Upāli* and *Vimāna Sutta* in *Majjhima Nikāya* and *Kālāma Sutta* in *Aṅguttara Nikāya*.<sup>110</sup>

Another similarity between Buddhism and science is accepting the theory of causality. In Buddhism the causality is called 'the central philosophy'. **The Buddha** said that whether **the Buddha** was born or not, the theory of causality is there in nature. Buddhism teaches its theory of synthesis. Through that the teaching of Dependent Coorigination (*Paṭiccasamuppāda*). Another immense contribution made by both science and buddhism is widening the horizon of human knowledge on himself and the world. It is because of science that we know more about the world today. It has resulted in another way by reducing diseases expanding the human life span etc. Also, because of science that the human has become comfortable more than every before.

In above data we see characteristic similar to Buddhism and science. By this some want to come to the conclusion that Buddhism is a scientific conclusion as Buddhism is a science. Yet it is not reasonable to come to the theistic conclusion, as Buddhism is a science because there are harmful aspects of science on humanity and nature that are never shared by Buddhism. There are modern scientists who say that the damage done by scientific and technological manufacturing to the nature in last two centuries which more than the consumption of natural resources by the humanity in its entire history.(?) If this is going to be infected, it without change surely the life will disappear from earth in the next century.(?) Therefore, the present journey of science and technology should be controlled in order to continue the life on earth without much damage.

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<sup>110</sup>In other religions such as Christianity, Islam and many others the people also asked their religious teachers and they got satisfactory answers.

Prepared by Ven. Im Dina

Printed by Ven H sovanny

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While Buddhism is very much in line with the scientific spirit, it is not correct to equate Buddhism with science. It is that the practical application of science has enabled mankind to live more comfortable lives and experience wonderful things undreamed of before. Science had made it possible for man to swim better than the fishes, fly higher than the birds, and walk on the moon. Yet the sphere of knowledge acceptable to conventional, scientific wisdom is confined to empirical evidence. And scientific truth is subject to constant change. Science cannot give man control over his mind and neither does it offer moral control and guidance. Despite its wonders, sciences have indeed many limitations not shared by Buddhism.

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Prepared by Ven. Im Dina

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In discovering the secret material world science has employed the two systems. 1, Analysis. 2, Synthesis. Buddhism also uses both these methods to show the interrelated of phenomena. Both Buddhism and modern science don't depend on blind faith. Science verifies everything to discover the truth and it wants the truth to be clear and transparent. The Buddhist teaching also emphasizes open mindedness and enquiry. The Buddha's teaching is open and all are invited to come and see "Ehipassiko" The Buddha didn't discourage freedom of thought and enquiry. Instead he promoted free-thinking and questioning in the study of his teaching as can be observed from many discourses such as. Mahaparinibbana sutta of D.N, Upali and Vimamsaka Sutta in M.N and Kalama Sutta in A.N.

Another similarity between Buddhism and science is accepting the theory of causality. In Buddhism the causality is called "the central philosophy" The Buddha says whether the Buddha are born or not, the theory of causality is there in nature. Buddhism teaches its theory of synthesis through that the teaching of dependent co- origination (paticcasamudpada). Another immense contribution mad by both science and Buddhism is widening the horizon of human knowledge on himself of the world. It is because of science that we know more about the world today. It has resulted in another way by reducing diseases expanding the human life span etc. although, because of science that the human life has become comfortable more than ever before.

Thus we see characteristic similar to Buddhism and science. By this, some want to come to the conclusion that Buddhism is a scientific conclusion as Buddhism is a science. Yet it is not reasonable conclusion, because there are harmful aspects of science on humanity and nature that are never shared by Buddhism. Buddhism is totally beneficial to man as well as to environment, whereas science is not so Science is concerned only about material well being of people, whereas Buddhism aims at both material and spiritual well being, making a fine balance between them. 445

#### 666SHOW WITH EXAMPLES WHETHER MODERN SCIENCE IS A CHALLENGE TO BUDDHISM.

Until the beginning of the last century, Buddhism was confined to countries untouched by modern science. Nevertheless, from its very beginning, the teachings of the Buddha were always open to scientific thinking. One reason why the teaching can easily be embrace by the scientific spirit is that the Buddha never encouraged rigid, dogmatic belief. He did not claim to base his teaching on faith, belief, or Devine revelation, but allowed great flexibility and freedom of thought.

The second reason is that the scientific spirit can be found in the Buddha's approach to spiritual truth. The Buddha method for this covering and testing spiritual truth is very similar to that of the scientist. A scientist observes the external world objectively, and would only establish a scientific theory after conducting many successful practical experiments. Using a similar approach 25 centuries ago, the Buddha observed the inner world with detachment, and encouraged his disciples not to accept any teaching until they had critically investigated and personally verified its truth. Just as the scientist today would not claim that his experiment cannot be duplicated by others, the Buddha did not claim that his experience of enlightenment was exclusive to him. Thus, in his approach to truth, the Buddha was as analytical as the present day scientist. He established a practical, scenically worked-out method for reaching the ultimate truth and the experience of enlightenment.

While Buddhism is very much in line with the scientific spirit, it is not correct to equate Buddhism with science. It is that the practical application of science has enabled mankind to live more comfortable lives and experience wonderful things undreamed of before. Science had made it possible for man to swim better than the fishes, fly higher than the birds, and walk on the moon. Yet the sphere of knowledge acceptable to conventional, scientific wisdom is confined to empirical evidence. And scientific truth is subject to constant change. Science cannot give man control over his mind and neither does it offer moral control and guidance. Despite its wonders, sciences have indeed many limitations not shared by Buddhism.

QUESTION: INTRODUCE THE FREEDOM OF THOUGHT IN BUDDHISM

It is generally believed that in Buddhism there is freedom of thought, which differs from other religions. In the modern world there is a common view that religion is the main obstacle which locked the progress of human knowledge. The believed - thus religions don't allow people to think in a new way. This idea is mainly developed toward theistic religion like Hinduism, Christianity and Islam.

Islam says that free thinking is the great hindrance to one's happiness here and hereafter. In these religions they have creators and revealers. But the followers are not allowed to question their creator or revealer. Therefore, in such religions there is no room for free thinking, to look for new knowledge rather than what the religious teacher said.

Buddhism does not belong to theistic religions. **The Buddha** was only human being who attained enlightenment and saw the things in the world as they are. His teaching is an opened doctrine that can be questioned. In *Kālāma Sutta* there is evidence that **Buddha** encourages everyone to come, see and examine his teachings by their eyes. Therefore, Buddhism forms the freedom of thought than any other religions.

*Mahāparinibbāna Sutta* of *Dīgha Nikāya* records teachings called four great authorities - '*Cattāro mahāpadesa*'. *Buddhapadesa*, *Saṅghapadesa*, *Sambahulatherapadesa* and *Ekatherapadesa*. In such teachings if one feels the teaching is true, he may accept it. The teachings that should be examined also encourages free thinking. Because of the freedom of thought all the words of **the Buddha** are opened for individual to examine.

In *Upāli Sutta* of *Majjhima Nikāya* there is an episode where **Buddha** met a householder, **Upāli**. Having a conversation with **the Buddha** about soul, **Upāli** realized that the **Buddha's** ideas were correct and requested to be **Buddha's** follower. But **the Buddha** remained silent up to third time and asked him to examine well. This clearly shows that **the Buddha's** attitude toward free thinking and encouraging people to think well and decide well.

Buddhism rejects blind faith. In *Kālāma Sutta* of *Aṅguttara Nikāya* **the Buddha** gives ten advices to **Kālāma** – not to accept anything by hearsay, tradition, report, texts of logic, reason of theory, reason of appearance, own view, suitability and respect for teacher.<sup>111</sup> Having given then principles, **the Buddha** advises him not to depend on any of these sources but to compare and verify them through personal knowledge.<sup>112</sup> By examining the given knowledge one can verify it for himself. Thereby, it is the correct form of knowledge for oneself.

The above sources given are very clearly showing that **Buddha's** teaching encourages free thinking, examination and opens path to knowledge. **The Buddha** didn't like anybody to accept anything just as blind people. This critical and open attitude of Buddhism is never seen in other world religions.

<sup>111</sup>Therefore there is no way to accept anything... it seems ...

<sup>112</sup>If we do not believe anything mentioned before, then how can we ever have 'personal knowledge'?

QUESTION: INTRODUCE THE **B**UDDHIST ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE FREEDOM OF THOUGHT. (LECTURED BY VEN. PAÑÑĀLOKA)  
(ORIGINAL BY VEN. IM DINA & VEN. H. SOVANNY)

Among the founders of religions **the Buddha** (if we are permitted to call Him the founder of a religion in the popular sense of the term) was the only teacher who did not claim to be other than a human being, pure and simple. Other teachers were either gods or his incarnations in different forms or they were inspired by Him. **The Buddha** was not only a human being; He claimed no inspiration from any god or external power either. He attributed all his realization, attainments and achievement to human endeavour and human intelligence. A man and only a man can become a *Buddha*.

It is on the principle of individual responsibility that **the Buddha** allows freedom to His disciples. In the *Mahāparinibbāna Sutta* **the Buddha** says that He never thought of controlling the *Saṅgha* (order of monks) nor did He want the *Saṅgha* to depend on Him. The freedom of thought allowed by **the Buddha** is unheard of elsewhere in the history of religions.<sup>113</sup> This freedom is necessary because according to **the Buddha** man's emancipation depends on His own realization of any external power as a reward for His obedient good behavior.

The *Kālāma Sutta* of *Anguttara Nikāya* recorded ten principles by **the Buddha** given to *Kālāmas* at the village called Kesaputta. These ten principles of *Kālāma Sutta* are as follows:<sup>114</sup>

1. Do not accept hearsay
2. Do not accept tradition
3. Do not accept report
4. Do not accept texts
5. Do not accept reason of logic
6. Do not accept theory
7. Do not accept appearance
8. Do not accept own view
9. Do not accept suitability
10. Do not accept teacher's words

„But, oh, *Kālāmas*, when you know for yourselves that certain things are unwholesome (*akusala*) and wrong and bad, then give them up... and when you know for yourselves that certain things are wholesome (*kusala*) and good, then accept them and follow them.“

**The Buddha** was always eager to dispel doubt. Even just a few minutes before His death He requested His disciples several times to ask Him if they had any doubts about His teaching and not to feel sorry later that they could not clear those doubts. But the disciples were silent. Not only the freedom of thought, but also the tolerance allowed by **the Buddha** is astonishing to the student of the history of religions. The wealthy householder named *Upāli*, a well-known lay disciple of **Nigaṇṭha Nāthaputta (Jaina Mahāvīra)** was expressly sent by **Mahāvīra** himself to meet **the Buddha** and defeat Him in argument on certain points in the theory of *kamma*. **Upāli** at the end of the discussion was convinced that the views of **the Buddha** were right and those of his master were wrong.

In the *Jnanasara Samuccaya* states: „As the wise test gold by burning, cutting and rubbing it (on a piece of touchstone), so are you to accept my words after examining them and not merely out of regard for me.“ The source given above very clearly shows that Buddhism encourages free thinking, critical examination and open path of knowledge. **The Buddha** didn't like anybody to accept anything just as blind men. He invites everybody to open the eyes and see the things themselves. This critical attitude of Buddhism is never seen in other world religions.<sup>115</sup>

THE **B**UDDHIST ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE FREEDOM OF THOUGHT (ORIGINAL BY VEN. DHARMEŚVAR)

The freedom of thought allowed by **the Buddha** is unheard elsewhere in the history of religions.<sup>116</sup> This freedom is

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113Regarding the teaching of *micchā diṭṭhi* (wrong view) which is to be leading to rebirth in animal realm or hell I claim that in Buddhism there is no freedom of thought.

114Indeed, if one follows this advice, He would have to be completely without any view, but also without any possibility to acquire any new knowledge...

115Muslims and Christians would argue as they also provide maximum support for enquiry to all those who strive to understand the 'truth'.

116There is no freedom in Buddhism. For example, if a *Sāmanera* has wrong thought (*micchā diṭṭhi*), he must disrobe. If a lay person has wrong thought (*micchā diṭṭhi*) or wrong thinking (*micchā saṅkalpa*) he will be reborn as an animal or in a hell. There is no freedom of thought in Buddhism.

necessary because according to **the Buddha** man's emancipation depends on his own realization of truth and not on the benevolent grace of God or any external power as a reward for his obedience and good behavior.

**The Buddha** said that one is one's own refuge. He taught, encouraged and stimulated each person to develop oneself and to work out one's emancipation, for man has the power to liberate himself from all bondage through his own personal effort and intelligence. In *Mahāparinibbāna Sutta* of *Dīgha Nikāya* **the Buddha** says: „You should do your work, for the *Tathāgatas* only teach the way.“ This also provides important evidence to show the special place for freedom of thought in Buddhism.

In the *Upāli Sutta* of *Majjhima Nikāya* there is an episode where **Buddha** met a householder **Upāli**. Having a conversation<sup>117</sup> with **the Buddha** about soul, **Upāli** realized that **the Buddha's** ideas are correct and then he requested and wanted to be a **Buddha's** follower. But **the Buddha** remained silent up to the third time and asked him to examine well. This shows that **the Buddha's** attitude towards free thinking and that he always encouraged people to think well and decide what they think.

In the *Kālāma Sutta* of *Aṅguttara Nikāya* **the Buddha** gave ten advices to *Kālāmas* –<sup>118</sup>

1. Not to accept anything by hearsay
2. Not to accept anything by tradition
3. Not to accept anything by report
4. Not to accept anything by texts
5. Not to accept anything by reason of logic
6. Not to accept anything by reason of theory
7. Not to accept anything by reason of appearance
8. Not to accept anything by own views
9. Not to accept anything by suitability
10. Not to accept anything by respect for teacher

Having given ten principles **the Buddha** advised to the *Kālāmas* not to depend on anything of these sources but to compare and verify it through personal knowledge.<sup>119</sup> Thereby one has the correct form of knowledge for oneself.

**The Buddha** went even further. He told the *bhikkhus* that a disciple should examine even the *Tathāgata* himself, so that he might be fully convinced of the true value of the teacher whom he follows. According to *Vīmaṃsaka Sutta* **the Buddha** was always eager to dispel doubt. Even just a few minutes before His death He requested His disciples several times to ask Him if they had any doubts about his teaching.

Buddhism is a unique teaching because it encourages inquiry and grants freedom of thought. The '*ehi passiko*' quality, the express of the *Dhamma* to free investigation and observation bears evidence to the importance attached to freedom of thought in Buddhism. And the emphasis laid on individual realization of the truth - *»paccattaṃ vedītabbo viññūhīti.«*

The sources given above are very clearly showing that Buddhism encourages free thinking, critical examination and open path of knowledge. **The Buddha** did not like anybody to accept anything just as blind faith. This critical and open attitude of Buddhism is never seen in other world religions.<sup>120</sup>

## 666INTRODUCE THE BUDDHIST ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE FREEDOM OF THOUGHT?

Prepared by Ven. Im Dina

Printed by Ven H sovanny

Among the founders of religions the Buddha (If we are permitted to call him the founder of a religion in the popular sense of the term) was the only teacher who did not claim to be other than a human being, pure and simple. Other teachers were either God, or his incarnation in different forms, or inspired by him. The Buddha was not only a human being; he claimed no inspiration from any god or external power either. He attributed all his realization, attainments and achievement to human Endeavour and human intelligence. A man and only a man can become a Buddha.

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117In the original there was 'conservation'...

118Having followed these pieces of advice one has no possibility to get any knowledge or even for *saddhā*. This is a contradictory *Sutta* in *Tipiṭaka*, because it contradicts with other *Suttas* where the follower is given an information and belief in an information as given by teacher is not proper according to *Kālāma Sutta*. Therefore I claim, that *Kālāma Sutta* is very contradictory *sutta* in *Tipiṭaka*.

119How can one get a 'personal knowledge', if he can't accept anything of the ten sources given above? *Kālāma Sutta* is, indeed, very strange *sutta*.

120Muslims would argue strongly against such a statement. Allāh is showing his presence by the world which is around us and giving us the possibility to explore it and discover new and new things. Islam as well as other religions like Christianity etc. are supporting the inquiry and they are ready to answer any kind of question (though sometimes not satisfactorily, like in Buddhism we also don't get some answers for some questions). Inquiry, at least in the world religions is, indeed, supported.

It is on the principle of individual responsibility that the Buddha allows freedom to his disciples. In the Mahaparinibbana Sutta the Buddha says that he never thought of controlling the Sangha (order of monks) nor did he want the Sangha to depend on him. The freedom of thought allowed by the Buddha is unheard of elsewhere in the history of religions. This freedom is necessary because, according to the Buddha, man's emancipation depends on his own realization

The Kalama Sutta of A.N recorded ten principles the Buddha gave to Kalamas at the village called Kesaputta. These ten principles of Kalama Sutta as follows: Don't accept by hearsay, Tradition, Report of text, reason of logic, theory, appearance own view, suitability and teacher. But, O Kalamas, when you know for yourselves that certain things are unwholesome (akusala), and wrong and bad, then give them up ... and when you know for yourselves that certain things are wholesome (kusala) and good, then accept them and follow them.

The Buddha was always eager to dispel doubt. Even just a few minutes before his death, he requested his disciples several times to ask him if they had any doubts about his teaching, and not to feel sorry later that they could not clear those doubts. But the disciples were silent. Not only freedom of thought, but also tolerance allowed by the Buddha is astonishing to the student of the history of religions. The wealthy householder named Upali, a well-known lay disciple of Nigantha Nataputta (Jain Mahavihara), was expressly sent by Mahavira himself to meet the Buddha and defeat him in argument on certain points in the theory of Karma. Upali, at the end of the discussion was convinced that the views of the Buddha were right and those of his master were wrong. But the Buddha cautioned him to think further.

The Jnanasara. Samuccaya states: "as the wise test gold by burning, cutting and rubbing it (on a piece of touchstone), so are you to accept my words after examining them and not merely out of regard for me". The source given above very clearly shows that Buddhism encourages free thinking critical examination and open path of knowledge. The Buddha didn't like anybody to accept anything just as blind men. He invites everybody to open the eyes and see the thing of themselves. This critical attitude of Buddhism is not seen in other world religions.

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#### 666 THE BUDDHIST ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE FREEDOM OF THOUGHT

The freedom of thought allowed by the Buddha is unheard of elsewhere in the history of religions. This freedom is necessary because, according to the Buddha, man's emancipation depends on his own realization of truth and not on the benevolent grace of a god or any external power as a reward for his obedient good behavior.

The Buddha said that one is one's own refuge. He taught, encouraged and stimulated each person to develop himself and to work out his own emancipation, for man has the power to liberate himself from all bondage through his own personal effort and intelligence. In Mahaparinibban Sutta of D.N the Buddha says: 'You should do your work, for the Tathagatas only teach the way.' This also provides important evidence to show the special place to freedom of thought in Buddhism.

In the Upali Sutta of M.N. there is an episode where Buddha met a householder, Upali. Having conversation with the Buddha about soul, Upali realized that the Buddha's ideas are correct and then he requested and wanted to be Buddha's follower. But the Buddha remained silent up to third times and asked him to examine well. This shows the Buddha attitude towards free thinking and always encouraged people to think well and decide the think.

In the Kalama Sutta of A.N the Buddha gave ten advices to Kalama not to accept anything by hearsay, tradition, report, texts, reason of logic, reason of theory, reason of appearance, own views, suitability and respect for teacher. Having given ten principles, the Buddha advised to the Kalamas not to depend on anything of these sources but to compare and verify it through personal knowledge. Thereby, he is the correct form of knowledge for himself.

The Buddha went even further. He told the Bhikkhus that a disciple should examine even the Tathagata himself, so that he might be fully convinced of the true value of the teacher whom he followed, according to the Vimamsaka Sutta. The Buddha was always eager to dispel doubt. Even just a few minutes before his death, he requested his disciples several times to ask him if they had any doubts about his teaching.

Buddhism is a unique teaching because it encourages inquiry and grants freedom of thought. The Ehipassiko quality, the express of the Dhamma to free investigation and observation, bears evidence to the importance attached to freedom of thought in Buddhism.

And the emphasis laid on individual realization of the truth “Paccattam veditabbo Vinnuhiti”

The sources given above are very clearly shown that Buddhism encourages free thinking, critical, examination and open path of knowledge. The Buddha did not like anybody to accept anything just as blind faith. This critical and open attitude of Buddhism is never seen in other world religions.

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### RELIGION AND INTRODUCTION (MARCH 2006)

Religion is a social phenomenon in any of the societies in the world. Many people follow a religion in practice. Therefore, religion became a very important social factor in the modern world.

The term 'religion' which represents the western idea of religious institutions comes from two Greek words – *re* + *ligio*. 'Re' means 'again' and 'ligio' means 'to connect'. According to the western understanding of the origin of world the human being was created by God because the man committed sinful deed prohibited by the God and therefore he was condemned to live on earth. Since then heaven and hell became separated. Yet the creator wants to give message to the created one to pray to the God to fulfill the gap (between man and heaven) by the connection of two worlds. They have the institution called religion.

Its function is to reconnect religion and people in order to make a connection between heaven and human world or between the God and man.

Classification of the religion: In the study of the concept of religion the religion has been classified in various ways. Some such classifications were done based on the internal characteristic of the religion. Some others are based on the scriptures and composition of the religion. The others are based on scientific studies on religion.

According to the following classification the religion is classified into three. They are as follows:

1. Theistic religion
2. Atheistic religion
3. Non-theistic religion

This classification is based on theism (belief in the creator God).

The religion in the group no. 1 believes in the God and his Creation. According to them the most important, everlasting and permanent entity in the universe is Him. These religions present their system of ethics based on the concept of God.

The second group of religion neither believes in the God nor in the ethics as taught by the God. **Ajita Kesakambali** and **Pakudha Kaccāyana** who lived at the time of **the Buddha** taught belief and practice pertaining to the second group.

The third group does not believe in the God but they present a system of ethics in order to achieve self-realization based on their theory.

the following classification is based on the type of people who believed and practiced the religion:

1. Tribal religion
2. National religion
3. Universal religion

Tribal religion means the religion which is trusted by a particular tribe of people. We can draw example for tribal religion from all the major cultures in the world. Islam is an example for the second group of national religion. They are the religion of particular nation.<sup>121</sup> The identity of the nationality of such nation is greatly related to that religion. A universal

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<sup>121</sup>That long time not a true. Maybe already from eight century Islam is not national religion. Nowadays Islam is in France, England, Germany, America, Sri Lanka, India, Burma. Therefore it is purely evident, that Islam is not a national religion, but the universal religion like Christianity or Buddhism. Hindus, Buddhists (and Buddhist monks), Christians and others become followers of Islam. The aim of Islam is to eradicate all other religion in the world and be the only religion in the world. Let's go and worship

religion means nay(?) religion that goes over the boundaries of tribes, nationalities etc.

QUESTION: DEFINE THE TERM RELIGION AND DESCRIBE HOW CAN WE CONSIDER **BUDDHISM** AS A RELIGION

Religion is a social phenomenon in any of the societies in the world. Many people apply the religion in practice. Therefore, religion became a very important social factor in the modern world. The term religion, which represents the western idea of religious institutions, comes from the Greek words *re* (again) + *ligio* (connect). According to the western understanding of the origin of world, human has been created by God. As the man committed a sin, he was condemned to live on the earth. Since then heaven and hell became separated. Yet the creator of man wants to give a message and also he created people to pray to God to fulfill the gap thus by connecting the two worlds.(?)

They have the institution called 'religion'. Its function is to reconnect religion and people in order to make a connection between heaven and human world or the God and Man. In the study of the concept of religion the religion has been classified in various ways. Some such classifications are done based on the scriptures and composition of the religion. The others are based on scientific studies of the religion. According to the following classification the religion is classified into three. They are as follows:

1. Theistic religion
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The religion in group's(?) number one believes in the God and his creation. According to them He is the most important, everlasting and permanent entity in the universe. These religions present their system of ethics based on the concept of God.

The second group of religion neither believes in the God nor in the ethics as taught by the God. **Ajītakasakambālī** and **Pakudhakaccāyana** who lived during the life of **Buddha**, might belong to this group.

The third group does not believe in the God, but they present a system of ethics in order to achieve self-actualization(?) based on their theory. The following classification is based on the type of people who believed and practiced the religion - 'tribal religion', 'national religion' and 'universal religion'. Tribal religion means the religion which is trusted by a particular tribe of people. We can draw example for a tribal religion from all the major cultures in the world. Islam is an example for the second group of national religions.<sup>122</sup> A universal religion means any religion that goes over the boundaries of tribe's nationalities etc. Buddhism as a religion is neither a religion in the sense in which that word is commonly understood, for it is not a system of faith and worship owing to any allegiance to a supernatural being. Buddhism does not demand blind faith from its adherents. Here mere beliefs are dethroned and are substituted by confidence based on knowledge, which, in Pāli is known as *saddhā*.

In buddhism there is not, as in most other religions, and almighty God to be obeyed and feared. **The Buddha** did not believe in a cosmic potentate, omniscient and omnipresent. In Buddhism there are no divine revelations or divine messengers. A Buddhist is therefore, not subservient to any higher supernatural powers which control his destinies, and which arbitrarily rewards and punishes. Since Buddhists do not believe in revelations of divine beings, Buddhism cannot therefore strictly be called a religion, because it is neither a system of faith and worship, nor th outward(?) etc.

#### PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION (NOT COMPLETED)

Philosophy of religion means the branch of philosophy in which we study the religion in scientific way.

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Allāh... :-/

<sup>122</sup>That is not reality in the modern time, 20<sup>th</sup> and 21<sup>st</sup> century. Islam developed from 'national religion' (religion followed by a particular nation) to 'universal religion' either by threatening the people if they wouldn't accept Islam or simply by various kinds of converting and missionaries.

At the very beginning of the history of every religion they have fostered the human life and society with ethical and spiritual values. Yet in the history of each and every religion there had been influence of changes and modifications and practices paving the way of fanaticism, racism and violence. Any noble tool when it became owned by human came to be subject to change, manipulation and corruption. The same happened in the case of religion – religion became an offensive cultural tool against some sections of humanity.

As a result of the scientific study of the religion, of the questions how it can be meaningful and the value of faith and truth for human life this branch of study which came to existence was called 'the philosophy of religion'. Therefore, it is called an intellectual and logical interpretation of religious experience. It is against dogmatism, irrationalism and in human practices cooperates with theory, interpretations and institutions of the religion. It tries to study the religion with scientific tool and it shows that given data are verifiable and provable with clear data.

The philosophy of religion employs scientific tools in discussing the things related to religion. It emphasizes logic and logical tools, science and scientific tools in order to discover the truth of the religion. Its main aim is identifying the principle of religion in order to prove it as scientifically practicable for human life. According to their theory the religion and ???

#### **CONDITION BETWEEN RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY**

There are many conditions between the religion and philosophy. In order to understand what philosophy is, firstly we have to divide three kinds of philosophy. They are as follows:

1. Indian philosophy
2. Chinese philosophy
3. Western philosophy

According to Indian philosophy, the term philosophy is defined as *Darśana* and *Vivikṣiki*. They are equal to Sanskrit words. The surface meaning of *Darśana* is just looking. Its deep meaning is 'seeing the truth or reality'. The word *Anvikṣiki* is a kind of philosophers who used reasoning. They wholly rejected the hearing or tradition and the *Vedic* scriptures (as a true knowledge) they only recognized logical truth and they accepted the reasoning as a proper knowledge. Philosophy is a subject dealing with knowledge. The word *Darśana* contains deeper meaning than that meaning of *Anvikṣiki*. The western philosophy is derived from two Latin words: *phileo* (loving) and *sofia* (wisdom). So, philosophy is the 'love of wisdom' (or love and wisdom). According to Chinese philosophy, it was used to recognize moral philosophy or ethics.

In ancient times religion and philosophy (with each other) couldn't recognize with each other (two subjects – religion and philosophy). There are many religions in the world. However, the function of religion is also to realize the absolute truth. If we compare above mentioned we can see close affinity between religion and philosophy. Religion can be interpreted as a result of human endeavor (attempt) to establish relationship between universe and man himself (their life is depending on external factors, and external factors are more powerful than one). In this way they started to worship the nature as gods.

We can identify lots of similarities between philosophy and religion in ancient time. In Greek mythology and religious beliefs were mixed(?) with traditional beliefs. But that philosophy was separated from religious texts regarded as father of philosophy due to many reasons, that separating religion and philosophy is the first time.(?) Greek mythology and various types of religious beliefs were separated from philosophy. Independent thinking of human beings were developed during this period. Natural disasters and objects like mountains, rivers, trees, they were recognized as gods by the religion, but philosophers disagreed with this beliefs and started to explore natural happening in a more scientific way. In philosophy scientific and logical attitudes were developed rather than in religion. This attitude made philosophy and religion (two different subjects) even in India.(?) In India ancient beliefs were mixed(?) with philosophical thinking. Even ancient scriptures, *Vedas* and *Upaniṣads* were developed through philosophical period. We can identify their philosophical tendency.

Therefore, even in ancient India, we can see the philosophical religious movement as two subjects, then we go back to Indian tradition and we can identify ancient religion and philosophy (were mixed(?) together). But if we study briefly, we can identify, that:

in religion:

- a) religion is based on god or super-human power
- b) worships, sacrifices, offerings
- c) holy scriptures
- d) expectation
- e) organized institution
- f) leader
- g) special dress, clothes

in philosophy:

- a) philosophy
- b) critical discussion
- c) logical reasoning
- d) clarification of ideas
- e) related to science and logic
- f) truth

There are many different schools, there are many views in philosophy.

**WHAT ARE THE MAIN SUBJECTS INVOLVED IN PHILOSOPHY? NATURE OF PHILOSOPHY**

Nature of Philosophy is a widely discussed topic among Scholar Students. Religion and Philosophy is closely connected with each other but we must know basic nature of Philosophy. Philosophy is the study about knowledge. After many years, following specifications were added to Philosophy.

(1)--Philosophy is a subject of clarification of ideas. Clarification means to understand clearly. In the modern period, many scholars define Philosophy as a subject of clarification of idea. If you can't understand the complex idea, you need to clarify it into simple and logical idea. That's why object of philosophy is clarification of ideas. Therefore, nowadays, Philosophy means getting more simple ideas.

(2)--The modern philosophers argue that Philosophy is a subject connected to analysis of philosophical concept. In Philosophy, analysis plays an important role. If you accept any idea without analyzing it properly, then it is becoming

dogmatic. In religion, there is no analysis. Everything, you accept according to religious leaders' teaching, has no analysis. If you analyze any statement, you will divide it by part by part and separate it for understanding. Therefore analysis is important function in Philosophy. In modern period, many philosophers took the direction for the analytical philosophy. In modern western thinking, they recently emphasize on philosophical analysis.

(3)--Burden Russel was a prominent British Philosopher. He, in his century, introduced logic and reason as a part of Philosophy. He said "Without applying logic and reason, Philosophy is not valuable, not worth. Due to this argument, logic became important part in Philosophy. Nowadays, many people believe without logic and there is no philosophy. An analysis must base on logic. Success of Scienc became important because they do logic. Without using logic, there is no rational and logical process of thinking in Philosophy. Therefore, step by step, philosophers have to use logic and reasoning to their abilities. How and why are the two most important questions. Though Philosophy is a subject connected to free thinking, thinking must be done through logical approach. Otherwise, the whole system will collapse. Philosophy needs rational and logical thinking.

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(4)--Epitimology Theory of knowledge is a main subject in Philosophy. Epitimology means origin, nature, function and limitation of human knowledge which is a central theme in discussion. Burden Russel wrote a book and argued that in any human knowledge, there is a limit and it is important. Without going into detail about human knowledge, there is no value in Philosophy. Human knowledge is a central theme in Philosophy. In ancient time, love of wisdom became the central teaching. After Greek period, knowledge became central discussion. In medieval period concept of God was important but in modern period the concept of human knowledge became important.

(5)--At the same time, there is another argument that Philosophy has to concentrate on metaphysical thinking. The famous philosophers called W-T Stace and A-C wing argued that most important part of Philosophy is metaphysics. Metaphysics means beyond physics. The medieval philosophers like Thomas Aquians, St-Ansele, St-Augustine and St-Peter Abbey comprise the God in Philosophy. God is beyond our experience and it is regarded as a metaphysical concept. That's why even today, it is important in Philosophy. Therefore, in Philosophy, there are many important features and natures we can identify.

#### RATIONAL NATURAL THEOLOGY

The knowledge of existence of god derived by process of reasoning. The rational nature theology is a deduction of people's ideas about the god. *Vedic* religion is rational theology – the concept of god in *Vedic* thinking evolved as a result of the attempt made by Aryans who tried to understand the nature. In revealed theology there is not much to be discussed. The revealed theology is not opened to inquiring and criticism. (One believes in God, who simply exists.) Revealed theology is more powerful than natural theology, as scriptures of revealed theology are considered as holy and no one can change/discuss(?) the appearance of God in the holy scriptures.

Ideas of natural theology are evident in the philosophy of **Plato** (4<sup>th</sup> century BC) since he argues about existence of God and the basis of natural theology and reaches different conclusions. Some of them are as follows:

1. The competence to reason the God's existence is unanswered.
2. In certain cases there is no evidence of God

There is no cassation/occasion(?) to justify that belief on rational rounds there are may be many ways tardier(?) it.(?) Study of religion through philosophical view point is assented, because in the history many people

tried to find answers for philosophical questions through theological belief:

- „What shall I believe?“
- „Is the answer always the word „God?““
- „What shall I do?“
- „Is always answered by the will of God where did the words com from?“(?)
- „The creator was God. Is there an answer for what will happen with me after I die?“

In these ways the ideas of God entered into human thinking. The Go has been always used to answer critical and ultimate questions. The idea of God has functioned as an ultimate principle of explanation of the ultimate principle. Answers given by religion on those ultimate questions can be verified and inquired only by philosophy.

It is the duty of the philosophy to prove, that answers appearing in the religion are correct. Philosophy of religion inquires about the existence of god. It tries to find whether the God exists or not. There are two types of belief in theism – *poly-* and *mono-* theism.

The idea of more than one god in polytheism is that there may be large number of gods like in Hindusim, but they are different from their duties and responsibilities. Monotheism then is the belief in one powerful God.

According to monotheism God is the most powerful being, he is supreme and there is no one higher than the god. Supreme God has three major qualities, which no other person or being possesses:

1. Omnipotence (has all the power)
2. omnipresent (exists everywhere)
3. omniscient (knows everything)

The God is powerful enough to do anything in the world. God is the creator of the world, sustainer and detacher of the world.

#### **QUESTION: EXPLAIN SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES BETWEEN RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHERS**

*Deism* - belief in existence of one or many divinities. Deism is the belief that the god exists but he does not interfere with the human life or with the law of the universe.

*Agnosticism* - holds, that the belief of existence of God is unknown as the existence or non-existence cannot be proved.

*Atheism* - That is not believing in any god.

**Aquinas** used his philosophical knowledge to explain the existence of God. He answers the question: „does god exist?“ We cannot prove the existence of God directly. It should be proved by by direct insight. The existence of god can be inferred. With a view to prove the existence of God **Aquinas** introduces five arguments:

1. The argument of change.
2. The argument of cause.
3. The argument of contingency.
4. The argument from degrees of excellence.
5. The argument from design.

#### **1. The argument from change**

The change is the undoubted fact in the nature. Anyone can experience the change in the physical world. It is not easy to prove that the present changes are related to the previous changes, but we all may accept the change as an ultimate aspect that doesn't require any explanation.

#### **2. The argument of cause**

We may refer every case of change to some prior cause.

#### **3. The argument of contingency**

We may assume the basic of reasoning of „unmoved mover“ or „prime mover“<sup>123</sup> who will be never changed. Among them **Aquinas** appreciated the third argument.(?)

**Aquinas** rejects the first two arguments, argument of natural theology which inferences from the same fact about the existence of God from the fact of change. **Aquinas** argues to conform the existence of God. The second argument for the existence of God is the argument of causation.

According to the argument of causation God is the first cause of everything. He has created the contingency. The argument of contingency begins with the fact that things in nature may appear uncertain, accidental and independent.

While a man is walking on the road he is inquired by someone who inquired because of that man's presence. A man dies due to a gunshot – speaking about his death we say that he had an accident. This might be happened is the Vikings did not come to the sense it the bullet was hot tired.(?)

According to **Aquinas** contingency is not an ultimate fact about nature neither requiring nor permitting any explanation. The argument of the degrees of excellence, when we examine the nature of things we experience difference even of excellence(?) God(?) better(?) best(?).(?) Usually one thing is excellent than the other, the nation(?) of the degrees of the excellence is related with the idea of perfection. To protect the existence of God **Aquinas** agrees that nothing is perfect in the universe, only the God is perfect.

The fifth argument is about the harmony in the nature. It's nature exhibits different levels of excellence. Then it must be the case that the nature is also perfect. On the hypothesis that the God created the nature it ought to be perfect, if this God is omnipotent and perfect person of the world. Why the nature has become imperfect? According to **Aquinas** the perfect God created the imperfect world to give change to his men to prove their working abilities.

#### NATURAL THEOLOGY – RATIONAL THEOLOGY

Natural theology evolved as a result of people's reasoning about nature.

Among those theologies the natural theology is older than the revelation theology.

*Vedic* theism is a natural theology. It evolved as a result of the reasoning about nature. *Aryans* who migrated to India did not know much about the weather and the climatic changes of the Indian Sindhu Valley. As they were moving from place to place, feeding their sheep and cattle, wherever the green grass grew, they moved there. to feed their animals. Therefore, there was no need for them to study the changes of nature. When they became permanent settlers of the Sindhu Valley, they experienced the changes of climate and the weather. At the beginning those climatic and weather changes were new for them. Those changes influenced their lives heavily, e.g., the drought season and rainy season. So, they were compelled to study the nature. At the first stage they applied their own life style to the forces of nature. that is called „anthropomorphism.“ Later these forces of nature were promoted to the position of gods. the gods were more powerful than human. This thinking developed up to the concept of one supreme god, who was supposed to be the creator of the universe, sustainer of the universe and the destructor of the universe.

#### REVELATION THEOLOGY

In the revelation theology god reveals himself to the people.

Religions such as Judaism, Christianity and Islam are based on revelation theology. According to some scholars the concept of god was established in religion to answer the unsolved questions of human reasoning.

The God is capable of answering the questions that man is unable to answer. This proves the incompetency of human beings.

The philosophy of religion attempts to safeguard the existence of God through reasoning. **Aristotle** introduced the argument of „unmoved mover“ to prove the existence of God.

It was **St. Thomas Aquinas** who introduced many arguments to prove the existence of God. **Thomas Aquinas** answered the question: „Does the God exist?“ According to him the existing of the existence of the God cannot be known directly.

There are places built for veneration in all religions.

Every religion has its center of excellence:

In Judaism - synagogue  
In Christianity - church  
In Islam - mosque  
In Hinduism - temple

In Judaism - Jerusalem  
In Christianity - Roman Church (Vatican)  
In Islam - Mecca  
In Hinduism - River Ganges

Those places are considered as holy and sacred. In some of these holy places there are statues or other emblems for

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123Here the „unmoved mover“ or „prime mover“ refers to the creator God, to the one, who was the first cause for emergence of the world.

reverence.

There are symbols to identify each religion:

In Judaism	-	✡	(Star of David)
In Christianity	-	✝	(Christian cross)
In Islam	-	☪	(Star and Crescent)
In Hinduism	-	☸	(Trisula)

Most devotees believe that those symbols have a magical power.

Religion always tries to keep its devotees under control by supreme powers. Men always have to seek help from those powers. No man is able to find his freedom without the help of the God.

Religion develops fear among many of its devotees. According to those religions, the God will punish the man's misbehavior and no-one will be able to escape from the punishment.

- all the religions are conservative
- religion protects itself from criticism
- no follower is permitted to question about the teachings of his religion<sup>124</sup>
- religion tries to keep the uneducated under its control, while they try to answer the questions of the educated
- religion fulfills the needs of both educated and uneducated communities.

### THEORY OF SOUL AND MIND (ORIGINAL BY VEN. ANIK CHAKMA)

Some kind of distinction between physical body and immaterial or symmetrical soul seems to be as old as human culture. The existence of such distinction is indicated by the mineral(?) of burial of the earliest human skeletons yet discovered. Anthropologists of various conjectures about the origin of the distinction.(?) Perhaps it was first suggested by memory to the dead person, by dream of them by the sight of reflection of oneself in water and on other bright surface or by meditation up to the significance of religious rites, which grew up spontaneously in face of the death.(?)

It was **Plato**, the philosopher who has most deeply and lastingly influenced western culture, which systematically developed the body-mind theory and first attempted to prove the immortality of soul. **Plato** argued that although the body belongs to the sensible world and shares its changing and impermanent nature, the intellect is related to the unchanging reality of which we are aware when we think not of a particular good thing but of goodness itself. One who devotes one life to the contemplation of eternal reality rather than to the gratification of the desire of the body will find at death and the soul connected with that position depart from that material body.(?)

The type of reasoning has been criticized on several grounds. **Kant** pointed out that although it is true that a simple substance cannot disintegrate, consciousness might nevertheless cease to exist after death of a person. Modern psychology has also denoted the existence of consciousness as a psychic factor in the function rebirth concept.

The body-soul distinction first formulated as a philosophical doctrine in ancient Greece was baptized into Christianity and entered the modern world as an evident truth and redefined according to various interpretations presented by western philosophers such as **Descartes**.

The doctrine of rebirth can be made with(?) for(?) the first time in the Hindu tradition in *Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad* where three classes of soul are distinguished:

1. Those that have faith in the eternity of the *āgama*
2. Those that perform their *Vedic* duties of sacrifice
3. Those that are devoid of both those ways

The first are liberated from the round of birth and death, the second are reborn in human form and third

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<sup>124</sup> This, of course, is not true. In any religion the follower can ask about (usually) any part of its teachings. Especially we can see such phenomenon in Christianity, where a vast and huge philosophy and number of books were written explaining and clarifying literally anything what the follower could ever ask about. Moreover, if the follower still wants to ask, the priests and the clergy are obliged to help him.

are condemned to the life of worms and insect. However, we also find here a description of the various places where the soul has to wander before taking rebirth. The description is as follows: „The first kind of soul purified by the fire that has consumed its gross body passed on into the flame. The day, the world(?) of the God then into the lightened(?). A spiritual person conduct(?) him to the world of *Brāhman* of him there is no return. (?) The second kind of soul however passes into smoke, the night, and the world of further and finally into the moon. There it becomes the food of the world but when it passed away from space into the air form air into the rain and from rain into the earth. But those who do not any these two ways become worm-biting serpents.(?)“ How far this detail is really significant and true may be a matter of controversy. But a path from any such controversy it may be said safely that here there is a clear idea of rebirth taught in Hinduism.

### THE EARLIER GREEK PHILOSOPHY (ORIGINAL BY VEN. DHARMEŚVAR)

Like every other philosophical tradition in the world, Greek philosophy also grew out of religion. The earlier period of Greek philosophy was more scientific where the philosophers were treating the source of the world as water, air, fire, atoms etc.

The earliest important philosophers were:

**Thales** He was considered to be the father of Greek philosophy). According to **Thales**, the earth and everything on it originated from water and it has happened in a time before million years.

**Anaximander** He was the second greatest philosopher in ancient Greece. He agreed with **Thales** in the fact that universe has come from a material cause other than God. Yet he said it is not only water, but many other elements which he called '*apeiron*'.

**Anaximenes** The third philosopher in Milesian school and he was a pupil of **Anaximander**. He disagreed with his predecessors on the cause behind existence and according to him the all powerful element of existence is air. From air all the things have come into it.

**Pythagoras** and his *Pythagorean* school represented the next important movement. They maintained that the origin of the universe is number. **Russell** things that, according to **Pythagoras**, these constituents might be atomic. The *Pythagorean* conception of number was crude and naïve, being that of shapes(?).

**Heraclitus** was the next Greek philosopher. He maintained that change, or becoming, is the source of the world. He believed that thought is universal, common to all. Fire and the world are one and the same. **Heraclitus** said: „I have searched myself,“ and after the search he must have found the truth. There is another interesting idea in **Heraclitus** philosophy. According to him, sleep is better than life and death.

**Protagoras** is well known for his enunciation that „Man is the measure of all things, of that which is, that is and that which is not, that is not.“ He further expressed: „Truth is a manifestation for consciousness. Nothing is in and for itself one, but everything has a relative truth only.“

**Gorgias** maintained that:

- (1) There is nothing
- (2) Even if there is something, we cannot know it
- (3) Even if it is and can be known, we cannot share that our knowledge with to others

**Socrates** The method he adopted was that of *dialectic*. He maintained the doctrine that „virtue is knowledge.“ Knowledge is the necessary and sufficient condition of the good.

**Plato** was an enthusiastic disciple of **Socrates**. He mastered<sup>125</sup> the philosophy of **Socrates** and after death of his teacher he opened his own place of teaching or Academy. He is known as the first great philosopher in the West. All his new ideas were recorded in two pieces of literature called '*The Dialogue and Thirteen Letters*'. He was one of the most influential philosophers in ancient Greece.

125 In the original there was 'mustered'.

**Aristotle** was a pupil of **Plato**. He was considered as a scientist, an economist and a logician. The ancient Greek philosophy came to the end of this great philosopher's period and began the succeeding time of the Western philosophy called the 'medieval era'.

**QUESTION: SHOW THE SPECIAL CHARACTERISTIC IN THE GREEK PHILOSOPHY IN THE EARLIEST PERIOD (LECTURED BY VEN. PAÑÑĀLOKA) (ORIGINAL BY VEN. IM DIMA & VEN. H. SOVANNY)**

In ancient Greece there were two schools of philosophical thought. The first one was called ' Milesian school of philosophical thought'. They produced something in a new way, being different from contemporary knowledge, which was limited to primitive religious belief.<sup>126</sup>

**Thales** (624-550 BC) – This philosopher is considered to be the father of Greek's philosophy. He did not want to accept explanation given by the traditional religion on man and his existence. Therefore, he said that he employed his power of thinking and logic to find the answer to the following questions:

1. From what the world originated
2. What is the nature of function of the universe
3. What is the destination of universe in his thinking and logical reasoning

To find the answers to the above questions he said there is one physical factor in material form, which is the cause of all animate and inanimate things. In the world that factor is water. According to **Thales**, he said that the earth and everything on it originated from water which has happened in a time of million of years. **Thales'** theory of first cause, which is water, is represented in the following three sentences:

1. Everything has come from water and will go back to water
2. The earth flows as a log on water
3. Everything is full of God

In these sentences **Thales** did not mean what they reflected as direct meaning. Indirectly, he wanted to say that everything has come from the power of water and everything depends on the power of water.

**Anaximander** (611-547 BC) – He was the second greatest philosopher in ancient Greece. He was influenced by his contemporary **Thales**. Yet he had his own interpretation. **Anaximander** agreed with **Thales** in the fact that universe has come from a material cause other than God. Yet, he said it is not only water but also many other elements. He disagreed with **Thales** and he asked if everything has come from water, how do we explain the origin of fire. Therefore, **Anaximander** proposes that there is huge collection of elements, which he called '*apeiron*'. The term means 'unlimited elements and sources'. From the idea of this philosopher a new dimension was opened for explaining the material truth behind the existence.

**Anaximenes** (588-524 BC) – This was the third philosopher in Milesian school and he was the pupil of **Anaximander**, but he disagreed with his teacher on the cause behind existence and according to him the all-powerful element of existence is 'air'. From 'air' all the things have come into being. This philosopher introduced the air as the basic element of first origin of the universe. According to him, everything emerged from the source called 'air'. For example, he said that all the beings concluding human breath without breathing none is able to survive. Therefore, air is the vital force of life. Through these passages we see the characteristic of Greek philosophy and showed the different ideas in which to pave the way of human knowledge.

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<sup>126</sup> As usually the philosophers found the origin of the Universe as a kind of development of certain element (fire, water, air) we call this kind of philosophy „elements philosophy.“

Prepared by Ven. Im Dina

Printed by Ven H sovanny

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Thales philosopher is consider to be the father of Greek’s philosophy. He did not want to accept explanation given by the traditional religion on man and his existence. Therefore, he said that he is employing his power of thinking and logic to find the answer to the following questions (1) from which the world originated. (2) What is the nature of function of the universe? (3) What is the destination of universe in his thinking and logical reasoning?

To find the answer to the above questions he said there is one physical factor in material form, which is the cause of all animate and inanimate things. In the world that factor is water. According to Thales, the earth and everything on it originated from water and it has happened in a time of million of years. Thales theory of first cause, which is water, is represented in the following three sentences: (1) everything has come from water and will go back to water. (2) the earth flows as a log on water. (Everything is full of God. In this sentences Thales does not mean what they reflect as direct meaning. Indirectly, he wants to say everything has come from the power of water and everything depends on the power of way

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#### ECLESIAN SCHOOL OF GREEK PHILOSOPHERS (LECTURED BY VEN. PAÑÑĀLOKA) (ORIGINAL BY VEN. IM DIMA & VEN. H. SOVANNY)

There are three major philosophers coming under this school:

1. **Xenophanes** (576 BC) – This philosopher also greatly disagreed with the traditional idea of religion. His criticism was mainly against the God-central theistic idea recorded in traditional Olympian scriptures. According to **Xenophanes** the truth cannot be known from the God who does not exist. The reality as is should be known by human mind itself.
2. **Parmenides** (around 514 BC) – **Parmenides** was influenced by **Xenophanes**. This philosopher presented his new thinking in way of a poem. He thought of unchanging reality behind the changing phenomena. Everything changes, then what would be the only unchanging phenomena related to human personality.
3. **Anaxigoras** (about 500 BC) – This is the third philosopher in idealistic trend of thought in ancient Greek philosophers. He also agreed that consciousness is primary. He talked about two forms of consciousness: 1. universal consciousness, 2. individual consciousness. The universal consciousness, which is called higher consciousness is the creator duty, order; organization... etc.

Individual consciousness is presented in each of us and is produced by the universal consciousness.

## HERACLITUS' PHILOSOPHY (SHORT NOTE) (ORIGINAL BY VEN. DHARMEŚVAR)

**Heraclitus** (5<sup>th</sup> century BC) was the next Greek philosopher. He maintained that change or becoming is the source of the world. Yet the essence of the world is everlasting fire, which is the moral judge as well. „Fire coming upon us will judge and convict all things.“ He believe dthat thought is universal, common to all. He propounded the doctrine of the world, or logic, saying that it is one and everlasting. Fire and the world are one and the same. **Heraclitus** said: „I have serached myself,“ and after the serach he must have found the truth.

**Heraclitus** seems to have been a mystic of a peculiar kind. He was a rationalistic mystic, for the 'ultimate' is still the *logos* – reason, word. He seems to have arrived at this conception by searching within himself. Yet by calling the 'ultimate' by the name 'fire' he retains a kinship with the early cosmoklogists, although fire is not conceived by them as one of the elements. However, it was for him God Himself, like Water and Air for **Thales** and **Anaximenes**.

There is another interesting idea in **Heraclitus'** philosophy. According to him, sleep is better than life and death. „Night has been called *Euphrone*, because at that time the soul has rest from the perceptions of senses, turns in upon itself and has a greater share of wisdom (*phronesis*).“ This reminds us of the *Mandogya Upaniṣad* which says that the soul becomes *prajñā* in deep sleep, conscious, solid and integrated and is full of bliss (*ānanda*).

## 666HERACLITUS AND HIS PHILOSOPHY

Prepared by Ven. Im Dina

Printed by Ven H sovanny

Eclian School of Greek philosopher

There are three major philosophers coming under this school.

- 1, Xenophanes (576 BC), this philosopher also greatly disagreed with the traditional idea of religion. His criticism was mainly against the God central theistic idea recorded in traditional Olympian scriptures. According to Xenophanes the truth cannot be known from the God who does not exist. The reality as it should be known by human mind itself.
- 2, Parmenides (around 514 B.C), Parmenides was influenced by Xenophanes. This philosopher presented his new thinking in way of a poem. He thought of unchanging reality behind the changing phenomena. Everything change then what would be the only unchanging phenomena related to human personality.
- 3, Anaxigoaris (about 500 B.C), this is the third philosopher in the idealistic trend of thought in ancient Greek philosopher. He also agreed that consciousness is primary. He talks of two forms of consciousness. 1, universal consciousness. 2, individual consciousness. The universal consciousness, which is called higher consciousness, is the creator duty, order; organization...etc. individual consciousness that presented in each of us has produced by the universal consciousness.

### Sophist .

Sophists were one of the most important political, social and intellectual forces in ancient Greek. On the other hand, they are recognized as a group of intellectuals who facilitated ideological necessity of the new democratic ruler. On the other hand, they were representation of new social economical and political changed of the Greek, especially in Athans. The original meaning of the term sophist was: 1, teacher of wisdom. 2, A group of people who thought for money even immoral and unethical things. 3, Group of people who were optimistic and creedy. 4, A group of teachers who teach rich people and powerful politicians. 5, a group of intellectuals hired by rich and powerful people for their purpose. 6, A group of professional teacher who study debating school for money.

Sophist taught only to rich people. Sophist also acted as lawyer in ancient Greek and thereby also they help the rich. The history of this movement is divided into two periods. They are called old sophists and young sophists. Among the well-known old sophists come Proeajros (481-411 B.C), Gorjias (483-375B.C), and young sophists are Alcidas and Critias.

## AGNOSTICISM

(From the Greek *a* (without) and *gnosis* (knowledge).) It is the philosophical view that the truth-value of certain claims – particularly metaphysical claims regarding theology, after-life or the existence of God, gods, deities or even ultimate reality – is unknown or, depending on the form of agnosticism, inherently unknowable due to the nature of subjective experience.

Agnostics claim either that it is not possible to have ‘absolute’ or ‘certain’ knowledge of the existence or non-existence of God or gods; or, alternatively, that while individual certainty ‘may’ be possible, they personally have no knowledge. Agnosticism in both cases involves some form of skepticism. Demographic research services normally list agnostics in the same category as atheists and non-religious people, although this can be misleading depending on the number of agnostic theists who identify themselves first as agnostics and second as followers of a particular religion.

### Qualifying agnosticism

Enlightenment(?) philosopher **David Hume** proved that meaningful statements about the universe are always qualified by some degree of doubt. The fallibility of human beings means that they cannot obtain absolute certainty except in trivial cases where a statement is true by definition (as in „all bachelors are unmarried“ or „all triangles have three angles“). All rational statements that assert a factual claim about the universe that begin „I believe that ...“ are simply shorthand for „based on my knowledge, understanding, and interpretation of the prevailing evidence, I tentatively believe that...“

For instance, when one says: „I believe that **Lee Harvey Oswald** shot **John F. Kennedy**,“ - the speaking person is not asserting an absolute truth, but a tentative belief based on interpretation of the assembled evidence. Even though one may set an alarm-clock prior to the following day, believing that the sun will rise the next day, that belief is tentative, tempered by a small but finite degree of doubt (the sun might explode; the earth might be shattered in collision with a rogue asteroid or that person might die and the sun will never rise.)

What sets apart agnosticism from the general skepticism that permeates modern Western philosophy is that the nature of God is the crux of the issue, not whether god merely exists. Thus, the nature and attributes of god are of foremost concern, not whether God is merely „out there.“ Agnosticism maintains that the nature and attributes of god are beyond the grasp of man’s finite and limited mind; those divine attributes transcend human comprehension.

The concept of God is just too big a subject for a person to wrap his or her mind around. Humans might apply terms such as those found in the Catholic Encyclopedia, that attempts to characterize God in terms such as ‘infinitely perfect spiritual substance’, ‘omnipotent’, ‘eternal’, ‘incomprehensible’, ‘infinite in intellect and will and in every perfection’ but, the agnostic would assert, these terms only underscore the inadequacy of our mental equipment to understand so vast, ephemeral<sup>127</sup> and elusive concept.

Many mainstream believers in the West embrace an agnostic creed. As noted above, for instance, Roman Catholic dogma about the nature of God contains many strictures(?) of agnosticism. An agnostic who believes in God despairs of ever fully comprehending what it is in which he believes. But some believing agnostics assert that that very absurdity strengthens their belief rather than weakens it.

Agnosticism can be subdivided into several subcategories. Recently suggested variations include:

- Strong agnosticism (also called ‘hard agnosticism’, ‘closed agnosticism’, ‘strict agnosticism’, ‘absolute agnosticism’) - the view that the question of the existence or non-existence of an omnipotent God and the nature of ultimate reality is unknowable by reason of our natural inability to verify any experience with

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<sup>127</sup>„Ephemeral“ is word that doesn’t fit here, it has completely different meaning than the other two words.

anything but another subjective experience. A strong agnostic would say „I don't know, and neither do you.“

- Weak agnosticism (also called 'mild agnosticism', 'soft agnosticism', 'open agnosticism', 'empirical agnosticism', 'temporal agnosticism') - the view that the existence or non-existence of God or gods is currently unknown but is not necessarily unknowable, therefore one will withhold judgment until/if more evidence is available. A weak agnostic would say „I don't know, but maybe you do.“

- Apathetic agnosticism – the view that there is no proof of either the existence or non-existence of God or gods, but since any God or gods that may exist appear unconcerned for the universe or the welfare of its inhabitants, the question is largely academic anyway. An apathetic agnostic would say, „I don't know, and who cares anyway?“

- Model agnosticism – the view that philosophical and metaphysical questions are not ultimately verifiable but that a model of malleable assumption should be built upon rational thought. This branch of agnosticism does not focus on a deity's existence.

- Agnostic theism (also called 'religious agnosticism') - the view of those who do not claim to 'know' existence of God or gods, but still 'believe' in such an existence. An agnostic theist would say „I don't know, but I think so.“ (See *Knowledge vs. Beliefs*)

- Agnostic atheism – the view of those who do not know about the existence or non-existence of God or gods and do not believe in them. An agnostic atheist would say: „I don't know, and I don't think so.“

- Ignosticism – the view that a coherent definition of 'God' must be put forward before the question of the existence of God can meaningfully be discussed. If the chosen definition isn't coherent, the ignostic holds the non-cognitivist view that the existence of God is meaningless or empirically untestable. It should be noted that **A.J. Ayer, Theodore Drange** and other philosophers see both atheism and agnosticism as incompatible with ignosticism on the grounds that atheism and agnosticism accept - „God exists“ as a meaningful proposition which can be argued for or against. The ignostic would say: „I don't know what you're talking about when you refer to 'God'.“

According to the historical information during the period of the *vedas*, skepticism has originated due to the ignorance of the philosophers or thinkers who accepted this concept as a good way to solve problems in the society and it was the best way to evade (*maga ha'*) from the questions of the people. There were different views concerning some concept such as after-world, rebirth, *kamma*, *ātman* etc. among the scholars as well as normal people since the time of the *Brāhmaṇas*.

During the time of **the Buddha** as well as *Brāhmaṇa* there were very famous skeptics and different views with regard to the after-world and as a result of that skepticism had originated in the world for the first time. According to the historical evidences they had questioned whether there is something remaining to connect one life with next life without destroying or dying if the person exists after the death.(?)

There was a school where it was believed very deeply in the after-world and similarly there were some thinkers who rejected it. Consequently, both schools tried to establish their view with most powerful evidences. In consequence of that there were skeptics in regard of the truth. Thus, different views originated and as a result of that skepticism too originated.

In the Pāli language skeptics are named as „*amarāvikkhepika*“, because during the time of **the Buddha** there were thinkers who accepted the skepticism. **Prof. Rhys Davids** translated it as ‘eel-wrigglers’. There are two meanings in the commentary about the ‘eel-wrigglers’. According to the first interpretation of the commentary, it has been translated as some special fishes who can swim in the water very quickly. Thus skeptics are mentioned as a group who wriggle out of questions and can’t come to the exact conclusion.

The Buddhist Pāli books have mentioned the different schools with different views, which followed the skepticism and there had been some monks who evaded from the questions like eels.

It has been mentioned in the Buddhist literature as follows:

„There was a monk who could not understand what is good and what is bad, therefore, he thinks: „I don’t know what is right and what is wrong exactly. Hence, if I decide that this is right or this is wrong, it may be a decision which is understood according to my preference and non-preference; consequently it may be wrong according to the real truth, therefore it may be a cause for my repentance (*pasutevilla*). Also it may be not beneficial (*hitakara*) for me according to the good conduct (*sadācariya*).“ Consequently he feared and didn’t give any answer. But he evades from the questions and he has replied in different ways such as „I don’t say so, I don’t say in another way, I don’t say that not,“ etc.

According to that interpretation, we can get clear meaning about skepticism and skeptics as well as their views. In addition, it has been explained very clearly, why they have given such answers. Apart from that another skeptical school has argued as follows:

„I have to argue with the monks who argue very expertly. If I say that this is correct or this is wrong without knowing the real truth. Then I can’t explain them very correctly. Consequently, it may be wrong according to the real truth. Therefore, it may be a cause for my repentance (*pasutevilla*). Additionally, it may not be beneficial (*hitakara*) for me according to the good conduct (*sadācāriya*).“ Thus he doesn’t like to give any answer, because of fear to debate with others.“

According to some *suttas* of the *Tipiṭaka*, skeptics have been given same answers to the questions of the people, such as:

1. *Evampi me no* – I don’t say so

128 From the original note I got the notion that this note was lectured by **ven. Kogalle Vijita**. But then I found another note, where only the first paragraph was same (other parts were different) and the lecturer there was **ven. Paññāloka**. Not to increase someone's *māna* or not to hurt one's dignity I left the place of lecturer's name empty.

2. *Tathapi me no* – I don't say thus
3. *Annathapi me no* – I don't say in the other way
4. *Notipi me no* – I don't say 'not'
5. *No notipi me no* – I don't say 'not not' etc.

During the time of **the Buddha**, there was a very famous skeptic named **Sanjāya Bellatṭhiputta** and he has followed the theory of eel-wrigglers or skepticism. He had not any conclusion about some concepts such as divine world, after-world, wholesomeness, merit etc. His teaching was named as '*amarāvikkhepavāda*' and normally he has given answers to any questions as follows:

1. Existence (*asti*)
2. Non-existence (*nasti*)
3. Existence and non-existence (*asti nasti*)
4. Non-existence and non-non-existence (*nivasti na nasti*)

He has followed this theory and evaded from any questions without giving any exact reply. When somebody asked a question, he replied:

„Is this wholesome – yes, it may be wholesome,  
 is this unwholesome – yes, it may be unwholesome,  
 is this wholesome or unwholesome – yes, it may be wholesome or unwholesome,  
 is this another thing except wholesome or unwholesome – I don't have such a belief.“

#### SKEPTICISM (LECTURED BY VEN. PAÑÑĀLOKA) (1)

According to the historical information during the period of the *Vedic* skepticism it originated due to the ignorance of the philosophers or thinkers who accepted this concept as a good way to solve problems in the society and it was the best way to evade (*mage ha*) from the questions of the people. There were different views concerning some of the concepts such as after-world, rebirth, *kamma*, *ātman* etc. among some of the scholars as well as normal people since during the time of the *Brāhmanic* period.

In the Pāli language skeptics were named as *amarāvikkhepika*, because during the time of **the Buddha** there were thinkers who accepted the skepticism. **Prof. Rhys Davids** has translated it like 'eel-wrigglers'. According to the first interpretation of the commentary, it has been translated as some special fishes who swim

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1. *Evampi me no* (I don't say so)
2. *Tathapi me no* (I don't say thus)
3. *Annathapi me no* (I don't say in the other way)
4. *Notipi me no* (I don't say „not“)
5. *No notipi me no* (I don't say „not not“) etc.

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1. Existence (*asti*)
2. Non-existence (*nasti*)
3. Existence and non-existence (*asti, nasti*)
4. Neither existence nor non-existence (*nivasti na nasti*)

Buddhist attitude towards the skepticism. According to the *Tipiṭaka* **Buddha** rejected very deeply this philosophy because nobody can solve their problems with the skepticism where is no exact conclusion about any concept.<sup>129</sup>

#### SKEPTICISM (LECTURED BY VEN. PAÑÑĀLOKA) (2)

Skepticism is very developed form of philosophical thought. A skeptic is a person who normally doubts and questions accepted opinions. A skeptic in the philosophical sense refers to a person, philosopher who denies the possibility of knowledge or even rational belief in certain spheres, taken in this the words agnostic and agnosticism, too, denote similar meanings. In its widest sense an agnostic is one who believes that nothing is known or can be known of the existence or nature of God.<sup>130</sup> God was considered the ultimate and absolute truth. It was generally considered the essence, the crux of religious thought. This means that both skepticism and agnosticism accept the unknowability of the ultimate truth.

The basic premise, on which this philosophy is built, is the belief that human knowledge is limited and therefore it does not have the capacity to know absolutely about anything, especially about subtle metaphysical issues. In India of **the Buddha's** time there had been a very famous skeptic. He was **Sañjaya Bellaṭṭhiputta**.

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129 Fine, **the Buddha** rejected skepticism as useless, but if one has wrong view (*micchā diṭṭhi*) **Buddha** foretold about such people great suffering in hell or, if they were lucky, rebirth as an animal. It reminds me Islam – „You must follow this religion or you are wrong.“

130 Agnostics as well as skeptics believed that our senses are limiting our ability to gain correct knowledge. Therefore, they believed that there is nothing that we can understand perfectly, not only God.

He did not make any absolute declaration on any important philosophical issue. This was because he believed that human knowledge is incapable of understanding such matters completely. He held that if he was to make an absolute statement on such matters and later he was proved wrong he would be looked upon as a liar.

This is why he came up with indefinite answers when deep philosophical issues were presented. If someone were to ask him whether there is next life, he would not give any absolute answer. He would say „there would be.“ Again if one were to ask him whether there is no next world, he would answer saying, „there may not be.“ Thus, he took no definite and fixed position. Because of these undecided attitudes the Buddhist texts describe **Sañjaya Belatthiputta** as an *Amarāvikkhepika* (an eel-wiggler), which is rather a derogatory term. *Suttas* such as the *Sāmaññaphala* describe him as a fool, an ignorant person who knows nothing. But this may not be the truth for he, too, was a respected teacher among the 6 teachers.<sup>131</sup>

Besides, even Jainism in its epistemology presents a method called *Saptabhangi Naya* – a process in which something could be viewed in 7 different perspectives. **Buddha** himself did not always give absolute answers. Some questions he left aside without answering. This is not because **the Buddha** would be skeptic, but because he did not wish to deal with irrelevant issues. From all this, what is clear is that skepticism is not a philosophy of the foolish and ignorant, but an opinion of learned men who considered human knowledge as imperfect to make absolute statements.<sup>132</sup>

## 666SKEPTICISM

Skepticism is very developed form of philosophical thought. A skeptic is a person who normally doubts and questions accepted opinions. A skeptic in the philosophical sense refers to a person philosopher who denies the possibility of knowledge or even rational belief in certain spheres, taken in this the words agnostic and agnosticism, too, denote similar meanings. In its widest sense an agnostic is one who believes that nothing is known or can be known of the existence or nature of God. God is considered the ultimate and absolute truth. It is generally considered the essence, the crux of religion though. This means that both skepticism and agnosticism accepts the unknowability of the ultimate truth.

The basic premise, on which this philosophy is built, is the belief that human knowledge is limited and therefore it does not have the capacity to know absolutely about anything, especially about subtle metaphysical issues. In India of the Buddha's time there had been a very famous skeptic. He was Sañjaya Belatthiputta. He did not make any absolute declaration on any important philosophical issue. This was because he held that human knowledge is incapable of understanding such matters completely. He held that if he was to make an absolute statement on such matters, and later if he was to be proved wrong, he would be looked upon as a liar.

This is why he came up with indefinite answers when deep philosophical issues are presented. If someone were to ask him whether there is next life, he would not give an absolute answer. He would say, 'there would be'. Again if one were to ask him whether there is no next world, he would answer saying, 'there may not be'. Thus, he took no definite and fixed position. Because of these undecided attitudes of his the Buddhist texts describe Sañjaya Belatthiputta as a *Amara-vikkhepika* - an Eel-wiggler - a rather derogatory term. *Suttas* such as the *Samaññaphala* describes him as a fool, an ignorant person who knows nothing. But this may not be the truth, for he, too, was a respected teacher among the 6 teachers.

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131 Here we can see, that even the teachers at Buddhist and Pāli University do not agree with **the Buddha**. And then they would argue that **Buddha** was omniscient... Wasn't he? If he was not omniscient, then how can we ever believe things which are written in *Tipiṭaka*? So, who is wrong? **Buddha** or 'highly educated Professors' at Buddhist and Pāli University? Or is the *Tipiṭaka* wrong? Or those who have written *Tipiṭaka*? Buddhists? Monks? ... Are you going to punish me for my free-thought? Or will I reborn in a hell for my opinions? Didn't **the Buddha** teach the freedom of thought? So... what is the truth???

132 Are you going to think, that this teacher will reborn in hell for his disagreement with **Buddha's** opinions? Or am I going to reborn in hell for teasing you? :-)

Besides, even Jainism in its epistemology presents a method called Sapta-bhangi-naya- a process in which something could be viewed in 7 different perspectives. Buddha himself did not always give absolute answers. Some questions he left aside without answering. This is not because the Buddha was a skeptic but because he did not wish to deal with irrelevant issues. From all this, what is clear is that skepticism is not a philosophy of the foolish and ignorant, but an opinion of learned men who considered human knowledge as imperfect to make absolute statements.

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## 666SKEPTICISM

Skepticism is very developed form of philosophical thought. A skeptic is a person who normally doubts and questions accepted opinions. A skeptic in the philosophical sense refers to a person philosopher who denies the possibility of knowledge or even rational belief in certain spheres, taken in this the words agnostic and agnosticism, too, denote similar meanings. In its widest sense an agnostic is one who believes that nothing is known or can be known of the existence or nature of God. God is considered the ultimate and absolute truth. It is generally considered the essence, the crux of religion though. This means that both skepticism and agnosticism accepts the unknowability of the ultimate truth.

The basic premise, on which this philosophy is built, is the belief that human knowledge is limited and therefore it does not have the capacity to know absolutely about anything, especially about subtle metaphysical issues. Thus there have been a class of thinkers never gave absolute answers regarding deep and profound philosophical problem. In India of the Buddha's time there had been a very famous skeptic. He was Sañjaya Belatthiputta. He did not make any absolute declaration on any important philosophical issue. This was because he felt that human knowledge is incapable of understanding such matters completely. He held that if he was to make an absolute statement on such matters, and later if he was to be proved wrong, he would be looked upon as a liar. Thus out of his virtue he did not want to come out with any absolute opinion without fully knowing about it.

This is why he came up with indefinite answers when deep philosophical issues are presented. If someone were to ask him whether there is next life, he would not give an absolute answer. He would say, 'there would be'. Again if one were to ask him whether there is no next world, he would answer saying, 'there may not be'. Thus, he took no definite and firm position. Because of these undecided attitudes of his the Buddhist texts describe Sañjaya Belatthiputta as a *Amara-vikkhepika*- an Eel-wiggler- a rather derogatory term. Suttas such as the *Samññaphala* describes him as a fool, an ignorant person who knows nothing. But this may not be the truth, for he, too, was a respected teacher among the 6 teachers.

Besides, even Jainism in its epistemology presents a method called Sapta-bhangi-naya- a process in which something could be viewed in 7 different perspective. Buddha himself did not always give absolute answers (*ekamsa vyakarana*). Some questions he left aside without answering. This is not because the Buddha was a skeptic but because he did not wish to deal with irrelevant issues. From all this, what is clear is that skepticism is not a philosophy of the foolish and ignorant, but an opinion of learned men who considered human knowledge as imperfect to make absolute statements.

## 666SKEPTICISM (WHEN YOU DOUBT THAT SOMETHING IS TRUE OR USEFUL)

According to the historical information during the period of the Vedic skepticism has been originated due to the ignorance of

the philosophers or thinkers who accepted this concept as a good way to solve problems in the society and it was the best way to evade (mage ha) from the questions of the people. There were different views concerning the some concept such as after world, rebirth, kamma, atman, etc. among the some scholars as well as normal people since during the time of the Brahman.

During the time of the Buddha as well as Brahman there were very famous skeptics (someone who doubt that a belief or an idea is true or useful) and different views with regarding the after world and as a result of that skepticism had originated in the world at the first time according to the historical evidences. They had questioned that is there something remaining to connect to the next life without destroy or die if the person exist after the death.

There was a school who had believed very deeply about the after world and were some thinkers who had rejected in the same way, same concept. Consequently both school tried to establish their view with most powerful evidences in consequence of that there were skeptic with regarding the truth. Thus different views had been originated and as a result of that skepticism too had been originated.

In the Pali language skeptics has named as “amaravikkhepika” because during the time of the Buddha there were thinkers who accepted the skepticism. Professor Rees Kaves has translated it like eel-wrigglers. There are two meanings in the commentary about the eel-wrigglers. According to the first interpretation of the commentary, it has translated as some special fishes whom swimming in the water very quickly. Thus skeptics has mentioned as a group who wriggle out of questions and can't come to the exact conclusion.

The Buddhism Pali books has been mentioned concerning the different schools with different views who followed the skepticism as there had been some monks who evade from the questions like eels. It has been mention in the Buddhist literature as follow:

“There was a monk who could not understand that this is good and this is bad therefore he thinks so, I don't know that what is the right or wrong exactly. Hence if I decide that this is right or this is wrong it may be a decision which understood according to my preference and unreferenced consequently it may be wrong according to the real truth therefore it may be a cause for my repentance (pasutevillā). Also it may not be beneficial (hitakara) for me according to the good conduct. (sadaraya) consequently he was feared and doesn't give any answer. But he evades from the question and he has replied in different way such as “I don't say so, I don't say in another way, I don't say that not, not etc.

According to that interpretation, we can get clear meaning about skepticism and skeptics as well as their views. In addition, it has explained very clearly, why they have given such an answers apart from that another skeptical school has been argued as follow:

“I have to argue with the monks who argue very expertly if I say that this is correct or this is wrong without knowing the real truth. Then I can't explain them very correctly. Consequently it may be wrong according to the real truth therefore it may be a cause for my repentance. (sadaraya) thus he doesn't like to give any answer because of fear to debate with others”.

According to the some sutras of the Tripitaka skeptics has been given same answers to the questions of the people such as,

- 1 Evampi me no-I don't say so.
- 2 Tathapi me no-I don't say thus.
- 3 Annathapi me no-I don't say in the other way.
- 4 Notipi me no-I don't say “not”
- 5 No notipi me no-I don't say “not, not”etc.

During the time of the Buddha there was a very famous skeptic named Sanjaya bellatthi putta and he has followed the theory of eel-wriggles or skepticism. He had not any conclusions about some concepts such as Divine world, after world, wholesome etc. his teaching has named “amaraviakkhepa vada” and normally he has given answers to any questions as follows:

- 1 Existence (asti)
- 2 Non existence (nasti)
- 3 Existence and non existence (asti, nasti)
- 4 Non existence and non existence. (nivasti nasti)

He has followed this theory and evade from any question without giving a exact reply. When somebody asks a question he has replied as, “is this wholesome-yes it may be wholesome, is this wholesome-yes it may be unwholesome, is this wholesome or unwholesome-yes it may be wholesome or unwholesome, is another thing except wholesome or unwholesome-I don't have such a belief”.

Buddhist attitudes towards the skepticism. According to the Tripitaka Buddha had rejected very deeply this philosophy

because anybody can't solve their problems with the skepticism. There is no exact conclusion about any concept. According to the early Buddhist philosophy anybody can say that Buddhism had accepted the skepticism because Buddha has not answered some questions. Therefore there some views about skepticism of the Buddhism. But it can be called skeptical only in similarly specific sense. Strictly speaking, Buddhism is not skeptical about substances (saraya) and essences (avasya kotasa) etc. and it rejects or denies (paratikshepak) them. But when it comes to the problems of limits of human knowledge Buddhism seems to admit a sort of skepticism. The well-known concept of "unthinkabale matters" (achetaniya) also supports this.

According to the Pali Sutras Buddha had exacted some question. They are called Avyahrut prama that "is body and soul an one thing or is it different from the body" it has been mentioned by the Buddha as a question which can't reply exactly. Because at the one stage of higher knowledge anybody can't create psychological souls out of this body. It has been compound with grass and it's bud. Because if we want it cam separate, but it exist as a one thing. But it has two have. It has given as the example as fallow:

In addition. Surd and case cam named as a two. Thing and separate thus although surd is in the case.

## **666WRITE SHORT NOTES ON SCEPTICISM AND ANVEYABANA.(593)**

### **Scepticism(312)**

The Brahmajala Sutta mentions 62 views in which four of them are referred to the schools of sceptics. The Pali term 'Amaravikkhepika', seems to be a nickname of scepticis and has translated as 'eel-wrigglers'. However, it meaning is obscure and the commentary offers two explanations of it. It is said that it may means 'those who are confused by their endless beliefs and words'. The alternative explanation is that amara stands for a species of fish, which are in the habit of running about in the water, constantly emerging and diving down so that it is difficult to get hold of them and that similarly this theory (scepticism) runs hither and thither without arriving at a definite conclusion.

There are four schools of Sceptical thinkers mentioned in the Pali Nikaya who adopted scepticism primarily:

- (1) through fear of falsehood (musavadabhaya),
- (2) through fear of involvement (upadanabhaya), (3)
- (3) through fear of interrogation in debate (anuyogabhaya), and
- (4) the philosophy of Sabjaya.

The first three schools seems to have some conception of good life, their sceptical attitude seems at least regards as psychologically desirable in promoting one's peace of mind. Sabjaya on the other hand may have been a more thorough-going sceptic, who made no pretence about the desirability of scepticism as a way of life.

The propositions of the Sabjaya's philosophy are arranged in a four-fold order of expression and the logical alternatives are not confined to simple assertion or denial, but also the combination of both and the deny of denial e.g.,

1. there is (atthi) a next world
2. there is no (natthi) next world,
3. there is and is not (atthi ca natti ca) a next world
4. there neither is nor is there no (n'ev'atthi na n'atthi) next world.

This fourfold scheme was not the innovation of Sabjaya but was held in common by all schools of sceptics.

### **Anvayebana(281)**

The term 'anvayabana' occurs in both the Nikayas and the Abhidhamma Vibhanga. By this is meant the inferential or inductive knowledge that a causal sequence observed hold good in a number of present instances would have taken place in the (unobserved) past and will take place in the future also.

In Sajyutta Nikaya, knowing the causally correlated phenomena such as the paticcasamuppada of 12 factors is called 'the knowledge of phenomena' (dhamme bana SN.II.58). By this dhamme banaj, one draws an inference (nayaj neti) with regard to the past and the future (atitanagate) and this constitutes one's inductive knowledge (idam assa anvayebanaj).

These inductive inferences are therefore based on a theory of causation, which play a central role in early Buddhism. They are made on the data of perception, both normal and paranormal. All the knowledge that the Buddha and his disciples claim to have in 'knowing and seeing', except for the knowledge of Nibbana, appears to be of this nature. Therefore, the doctrines of Buddhism may be considered epistemologically derived from direct inferences based on normal and paranormal perceptions.

In Pali texts, direct inferences based on the data of normal perception include the statements:

1. On account of birth, there is decay and death— SN.II,
2. All conditioned things are impermanent—Dhammapada,
3. Among human beings there aren't the usual characteristics, which constitute species—Vasettha sutta.

There are also many doctrines of Buddhism claimed to be inductive inferences based on the data of extra-sensory perception e.g., the doctrines of dukkha, anatta, karma etc. However, it is possible to make both valid and erroneous inferences on the data of normal or paranormal perception, this is what has happened in other traditions.

#### AGNOSTICISM OR SKEPTICISM IN BUDDHISM (ORIGINAL BY VEN. DHARMEŚVARA)

In reality. **Buddha's** approach to life, which is an actual conflict, is a process of experience. **Buddha's** aim was not merely the discovery and analysis of this conflict experience, but in analyzing and tracing its origin and cause it was an attempt to prove that this conflict was not real, but based on a delusion. **The Buddha** on the other hand was not interested in phenomena as such, but only in so far as they affected and constituted the process of life. Such discovery was a system of knowledge which was neither skepticism nor dogmatism, and we find here once more the Middle Path between the two extremes of denial and affirmation.

There are several occasions when **the Buddha** left a question unanswered. The question whether He knows that the world is eternal or not eternal, or He does not know whether the world is eternal or not eternal, comprehensive as it seems and forcing a solution – a mere 'yes' or 'no' answer would have disposed of the question but not of the problem which gave rise to the question. The question raised about the eternity of the world or the everlasting life has a much deeper root than the superficial enquiry about the presence or absence of a time-limit. The psychological cause of the question is the problem in the mind of the enquirer who is seeking confirmation of the continuation of life. And with the solution of this problem by **the Buddha's** teaching of soullessness (*anattā*) the earlier question becomes meaningless and hence does not require an answer.

On another occasion **the Buddha** was asked: „Is there a self?“ And **the Buddha** remained silent. Again He was asked, „Is there not a self?“ But **the Buddha** remained silent. Only when **Ānanda** pressed(?) for an explanation at least(?) of His silence did **the Buddha** say that affirmation of self would mean siding with eternalists or dogmatists while the negation of a self would mean siding with the annihilationists or skeptics. Neither reply would have been in accordance with the knowledge that all things are impermanent. In a teaching of which the most fundamental thesis is the process of becoming an impermanency, the question 'to be or not to be' cannot be put and has to remain unanswered (*avyākāta*).

Questions similar to those about the 'self' were put by **Ānuruddha** about the existence or otherwise of an accomplished one (*Tathāgata*) after His death. And here, too, reply is to the effect that the question cannot be answered as the enquiry assumes the real existence as an entity of that which is only a process in actuality: „As a *Tathāgata* is not met with in reality, it is not proper to pronounce of Him that He exists after death or does not exist after death or that He both does and does not exist after death or that He neither exists nor does not exist after death.“ The question therefore cannot be conceived. The actual origin of such theories does not lie in a sincere desire for higher wisdom (*paññā*) but in hastily formed opinions (*diṭṭhi*), opinions based on ignorance and blindness, personal feelings as a result of craving with excitement and skeptical agitation.

Scepticism (from the Greek – *skeptesthai* ‘to examine’) is the philosophical view that it is impossible to know anything with absolute certainty, or to know the world as it ‘really’ is. The word can also mean a general reluctance to accept anything on face value without sufficient proof (as in „He heard that Jim had run the 100m in under ten seconds, but he remained sceptical.“)

However, Scepticism (with a capital „S“) began in the 5<sup>th</sup> century BC in Greece where certain philosophers came to express doubts about how certain we could be about our knowledge. **Protagoras of Abdera** (480-411 BC), for instance, is reported to have said that „man is the measure of all things“ (i.e., that we make the world in our own image) and **Gorgias** (485-380 BC) that „nothing exists: if anything does exist, it cannot be known; if anything exists and can be known, it cannot be communicated.“ Many such thinkers arose from the group known as the Sophists, men who would hire their skills in debate and argument out to anyone for the right fee. From this point of view, this form of scepticism is based on the fact that with enough skill any argument can sound convincing.

Next came the **Pyrrhonists**, so called after **Pyrrho of Elis**, founder of that school, who argued that since we can never know true reality we should refrain from making judgments. His pupil, **Timon of Phlius**, followed this by adding that equally good arguments could be made for either side of any argument (so it was impossible to decide). The New Academy in the 2<sup>nd</sup> century BC, founded by **Carneades** (214-129 BC), taught only that some arguments were more probable than others. Later sceptics include **Aenesidemus** (1<sup>st</sup> century BC), who put forward ten arguments in support of the sceptical position, and the Greek physician **Sextus Empiricus** (3<sup>rd</sup> century AD), who argued the use of common sense over abstract theory.

When we reach the Renaissance we can see the influence of Greek scepticism in such thinkers as the French essayist **Michel de Montaigne** (1533-1592), but the sceptical issues only fully resurfaced with the French philosopher **René Descartes** (1596-1650). **Descartes** attempted to use sceptical arguments in order to establish a firm ground for knowledge. So, **Descartes** reasoned, „if we attempt to subject everything to doubt, we will hopefully discover at some point if there is anything that cannot be doubted.“ This he claimed to achieve in his assertion that it is impossible to doubt that we are thinking beings – which proves that we exist (*Cogito ergo sum*. - which is from Latin, it means „I think, therefore I am“). By employing this ‘method of doubt’, as he called it, **Descartes** merely used scepticism as a mean to find something certain, and was not therefore actually a sceptic.

The sceptical cause was once again championed by the Scottish empiricist, philosopher **David Hume** (1711-1776), who argued that certain assumptions – such as the link between cause and effect, natural laws, the existence of God and the soul – were far from certain. What little we know that seems certain, **Hume** argued, was based on observation and habit as opposed to any logical or scientific necessity. The German philosopher **Immanuel Kant** (1724-1804), influenced by **Hume** set limits to human knowledge by arguing that certain things – such as if there was proof for God, or if the world had a beginning – did not make sense to be asked.

The German philosopher **Friedrich Nietzsche** (1844-1900) argued that objective knowledge did not actually exist, and his scepticism influenced in turn that of French existentialists such as **Jean-Paul Sartre** (1905-1980). The American philosopher **George Santayana** (1863-1952), argued that all belief – even that in oneself – is irrational (even though it seems the most natural thing).

Modern day philosophy, although it does not generally take extreme sceptical arguments very seriously, still retains the influence of earlier sceptical thinkers.

### Buddhist attitude towards the skepticism

According to the *Tipiṭaka*, **the Buddha** had rejected very deeply this philosophy because nobody can solve their problems with the skepticism. There is no exact conclusion about any concept.

According to the early Buddhist philosophy somebody might say that Buddhism accepted the skepticism, because **Buddha** has not answered some questions. Therefore, there are some views about skepticism regarding the Buddhism. But it can be called ‘skeptical’ only in a specific sense. Strictly speaking, Buddhism is not skeptical about substances (*sāraṇa*) and essences (*avaśya koṭasa*) etc. and it rejects or denies (*pratikṣepa karaṇa*) them. But when it comes to the problems of limits of human knowledge, Buddhism seems to admit a sort of skepticism. The well-known concept of „unthinkable answers“ (*achetaniya*) also supports this.<sup>134</sup>

133 This is a very valuable note. I even dare to say that until now I never encountered such a valuable note about Western philosophy in Sri Lanka.

134 Scepticism is a philosophical school which, we can see, has appeared in Ancient Greece long time before Jesus Christ’s birth. The scepticism means ‘the rejection of possibility to see the truth’. Thus agnostics or skeptics believed that there is no possibility to see or to understand the truth as we, people, have limited powers for that. But in Buddhism there is no such thing like skepticism, as in Buddhism one can attain *Nibbāna* or even *Buddhahood* and thus have any kind of knowledge. The conclusion of this topic seems to be completely wrong.

The term 'Vedic' as used in scholastic sense, implies the period confined to the time when the 4 Vedas were composed (1200-1000 BC) or includes the latest Atharveda composed around 1000-800 BC. However, when the term 'Vedic thinkers' is used, it should include all the Upanisadic thinkers (800-600 BC), as they were the successors of the Vedic tradition. In this regard, Vedic thinkers can be grouped into 3 categories under epistemology grounds:

1. Traditionalists—Brahmanas who derived their knowledge wholly from a scriptural tradition (anussava) and interpretations based on it.
2. Rationalists—Aranyakas and early Upanisads who derived their knowledge from reasoning (takka), speculating (vimajsa), and inferring (anumana).
3. Experientialists—Middle and late Upanisads who depended on extrasensory perception.

All these Vedic thinkers can be further divided into 2 main groups i.e. Karmamarga (the Way of Ritual) and Jbanamarga (the Way of knowledge). All Traditionalists belonged to Karmamarga, the Rationalists and the Experientialists belonged to Jnanamarga. However, Rationalists relied on intellectual knowledge whereas the Experientialists on intuitive knowledge. Followings are the common features of these Vedic thinkers:

### 1. Traditionalists

The arguments of these traditionalists regarding the authority of Vedic scripture are:

- (1). It is eternal, flawless and irrefutable in that it has no personal author or authors, human or divine,
- (2). It is revealed by an omniscient and perfect Being,
- (3). It is accepted by reliable wise and good person

From the context of Cavkisutta, it is clear that the Brahmins' claiming the absolute authority and validity of Vedic scripture were not merely out of faith in a tradition, but out of faith in a sacred, holy or revelational tradition. It is stated in the Chandogya Upanisad that Vedic knowledge comes from Brahma, who disclosed it to Prajapati, who in turn told Manu (the first man), who in his turn passed it down to human beings. This knowledge embodying in the Vedas were handed down from generation to generation through a long and unbroken tradition of sages. Thus the traditionalists derived their knowledge wholly from the scriptural tradition and its interpretation. These were the Brahmins who upheld the sacred authority of the Vedas, one of the most important features of the Aryan tradition.

### 2. Rationalists

As stated in the Taittiriya Aranyaka and the Chandogya Upanisad, atman can be rationally understood by thinking (e.g. vijajbau). Even Wavkara's comment on 'mantavyo nididhyasitavyah' is that it can be known through 'argument and reasoning' (tarkanopapattya).

The common features of reasoning and inference are given below:

- (1). Takka—rational argument. According to the Atthakavagga of the Suttanipata, there were people who employed takkha (reasoning) to judge the truth or falsity of speculative theories. According to Buddhaghosa, there were 4 types of reasoners:

- (i). Anussutiko—one who reasons on a premise based on traditional authority, report or hearsay
- (ii). Jatissaratakki—one who reasons on a premise based on recognition.
- (iii). Labhitakkiko—one who reasons on a premise based on jhanic experience
- (iv). Suddhatakkiko—the pure reasoners.

- (2). Anumana—metaphysical inference. This metaphysical inference has the known as its priori. It is through the known to know the unknown. In the Chandogya Upanisad, it is said that atman could be seen if it was a matter of seeing your figure in a pan of water or it could be heard or heard of, if it was a case of hearing from the sound as of a fire blazing on closing one's ear. From the normal perception, they inferred further that the atman was in all things.

Another group of Vedic thinkers are the vimajsa—this refers to the people who were critical and fact-finding. They employed their dialectical skill to speculate the truth or falsity of theories. According to K.N. Jayatilleke, they are not rationalists but investigators who used reasons to find out facts. Thus this term is often used conjointly with takki (takki vimajsi)

### 3. Experientialists

The Ultimate Goal of the Vedic thinkers of all periods is to realize the atman and to be unified with it (jagadatman). The seeing of this atman by the Middle and the Late Upanisad is through 'intuition' (yaga). The atman which is hidden within all things and does not shine forth is seen (drwyate) by the subtle seers with their subtle awakened intuition (Katha, 1.3.12). One sees (pawyate) while in meditative rapture (dhyayamanah) by the sense-organs (Mund, 3.1.8). As the Wvetasvatara puts it, one would see (pawyet) God hidden as it were by practicing the drill of meditation (dhyana).

According to the Kalamasutta, there are 10 methods to obtain knowledge during the time of the Buddha i.e.,

### 1. Anussava

This denotes the authority of the Vedic scriptures. The Cankisutta states that anussava had become a sacred tradition which was systematized, ceremonially chanted, and authoritatively handed down by a successive line of teachers. The Tevijja sutta, Cavki sutta and Sandaka sutta record how the Buddha criticizes this source of knowledge

### 2. Paramparaya

It means 'unbroken succession of the teaching'. In the Kesaputtiasutta and the Bhadiyyasutta of the AN, it is criticized as the acceptance of a tradition in general on the ground that it has been successively handed down or the belief in a teacher on the ground that he belongs to a successive line of teachers. In the Suttanipata, it refers to both the lineage of the Wrmana and the Brahmana.

### 3. Itikiraya

It means 'hearsay or rumour'. As a means of knowledge, it is a sub-class of itihitiha, an authoritative knowledge. In the Kalama Sutta and the Mahavagga of the AN, the Buddha criticizes it as: 'not personally realized and directly verified by oneself.'

### 4. Pitakasampada

This denotes a form of traditional authority associates with the Vedic tradition. It is the acceptance 'on the authority of the scriptural text', presumably on the principle that whatever propositions agree with these texts are true and whatever disagree are false.

### 5. Takkahetu

The Atthakavagga of the Suttanipata states that people come to judgement about the truth or falsity of speculative theories by employing takkha. Buddhaghosa commenting on the term 'takki' as four types of reasoner, namely: anussutiko, jatissaratakki, labhitakkiko and suddhatakkiko.

### 6. Nayahetu

There are two senses of nayahetu with an epistemological import. One is the sense of 'standpoint' as found in the school of the Trairasika Ajivikas and the Jains, while the other was the sense of 'inference'. It is also mentioned in the Samyutta Nikaya and in one place in the Jatakas.

### 7. Akaraparivitakka

This is the accepting of something thinking this is a good reason for accepting it. In the Majjhima Nikaya, 'akara' is used to denote the 'reasons' which are adequate for one to have a rational belief (saddha), but not amounting to knowledge.

### 8. Ditthinijjanakkhanti

It is explained as: "because it agrees with our theory accepted after consideration and after being convinced of it." In the Pabaccattaya sutta, 16 theories listed are said to be accepted on this ground. In the Ccavki Sutta it was said to have a 'twofold result of true or false.

### 9. Bhavyarupataya and 10. Samano garu

Bhavyarupata stands for the acceptance of someone's words considering him to be a competent person. Samano no garu may be translated as 'our prestigious teacher'. Both forms of authority can be considered under verbal testimony, which was recognised as a means of knowledge in the late Indian philosophical tradition under aptopadesa or aptavacana.

Apart from these 10 means to knowledge, the Cavki sutta mention 2 additional sources of knowledge i.e. saddhaya (faith) and like (raciya), along with anussava, akara-parivitakka and Ditthinijjanakkhanti. With regard to the schools of teachers, Savgaravasutta

mentions three classes of thinkers whose means to knowledge in ancient India are all included i.e.,

1. **Traditionalists**—Those who derived their knowledge wholly from a scriptural tradition and interpretations based on it. These were the Vedic thinkers.
2. **Rationalists**—Those who derived their knowledge from reasoning and speculation. These were the Early Upanisadic thinkers, the sceptics, the materialists and most of the Ajivikas.
3. **Experientialists**—Those who depended on direct personal knowledge and experience, both sensory and extra-sensory. These include the Middle and Late Upanisadic thinkers, some Ajivikas, Jains and empirical materialists.

#### **The Buddhist critique on authority with reference to Pali sources. (487)**

There are 6 ways of claiming knowledge shown in the Kalamasutta under the heading of authority. The Buddha's attitudes towards these 6 kinds of authorities are explained as follows:

#### **The authority of tradition—(1). anussava and (2). paramparaya**

Anussava refers to Vedic tradition and paramparaya refer to traditions in general. In the Tevijja Sutta, it is said that none of the teachers of the Vedic tradition have had a direct vision of Brahma. They have not claimed to have 'seen Brahma face to face' (Brahma sakkhidittho) and they did not say, 'we know this, we see this where, in which direction and in which place Brahma is'.

In the Canki Sutta, the Buddha asserting that a belief based on anussava and paramparaya can have twofold result of turning out to be either true or false even if the assertion is from the most reliable revelation or tradition.

It is also stated in the Sandaka Sutta that revelation, tradition or report which is handed down may be well-remembered or ill-remembered and this can seriously affected the content of it and thus it was distorted and became false.

#### **The authority of scriptural texts (3). Pitakasampada**

Pitakasampada which denotes a form of traditional authority is also used in close association with the Vedic tradition. In the Kalama Sutta and the Mahavagga of the Anguttara (vol.II, p.191-193), the Buddha criticized pitakasampada as an invalid means of knowledge. The reason given by the Buddha is that, 'it is not personally realized and directly verified by oneself (samaj sayaj abhibbatam attapaccakkhadhammaj). And it may turn out to be true or false.

#### **The Authority of competent persons (4). Bhavyarupataya and (5). Samano no garu.**

According to the Avuttara Nikaya Atthakatha (vol.II p.305) bhavyarupata stands for the acceptance of someone's words considering him to be a competent person. Samano no garu, which may be translated as 'our prestigious teacher' is similar to the former. Both forms of authority can be considered under verbal testimony as aptopadesa or aptavacana. Again, they are criticized by the Buddha as having twofold consequences of true and false, therefore they are no guarantee of valid knowledge.

#### **The authority of common belief (6). Itikiraya**

As a common belief of the masses, Itikiraya means 'hearsay or rumour'. It is also criticized by the Buddha as 'not personally realized and directly verified by oneself and having twofold consequences of true or false'.

Apart from the above 6 kinds of authority, Buddhism also denies the authority of an omniscience teacher (sabbabbuta). Nigantha Nataputra is said to have claimed to be such an omniscient one. In the Sandaka Sutta, the Buddha criticizes him as having met with undesired occasions e.g., gets no alms-food, bites by a dog, does not know the names of people and places and the ways to get there. Thus, it is plain that the claim of omniscience is easily rebuked even by the simplest test of common sense by the Buddha.

**666 EXPLAIN THE NATURE OF INTERPRETATION ADOPTED BY THE BUDDHA WHEN EXPLAINING HIS TEACHING TO THE COMMON PEOPLE.**

In the Mahavagga, the Buddha says that his Dhamma is ‘profound, difficult to realise, hard to understand.....,subtle and comprehensible only by the wise’. Then what methods did he adopt when he decided to preach to the people?

Traditionally, it is said that the Buddha adopted figurative language and applied method ((pariyaya) with similes and metaphors to make his preaching simple and understandable for the public. For the common people, he employed the ‘anupubbikatha’ to preach gradually, starting with dana-katha, then sila-katha and finally sagga-katha. After these gradual-talks, he pointed out the danger, degradation and corruption of sense-desires, then the profit of renunciation. Only after the listener’s mind was ready, free from the hindrances, joyful and calm, he then preached the Dhamma (4 Noble Truths) in brief (samukkajjika dhamm-desana).

Regarding the questions raised by the listeners, it is said in the Anguttara Nikaya (p.216) that, the Buddha treated them in 4 ways:

1. Some should be answered directly
2. Others should be answered of analysing them
3. Yet others should be answered by counter-questions
4. Lastly, there are questions which should be put aside.

The Buddha was not a computing machine giving answers to whatever questions were put to him by anyone at all, without any consideration. He was a practical teacher, full of compassion and wisdom. He did not answer questions to show his knowledge and intelligence, but to help the questioner on the way to realization. He always spoke to people bearing in mind their standard of development, their tendencies, their mental make-up, their character, their capacity to understand a particular question. This is what we can observe when we read the Vacchaggottasutta of the S.N. (IV. p.400-401) where the Buddha did not answer the question put forward by Vacchgota regarding the existence of Soul. And furthermore, when he asked Kisagotami to search for some mustard seeds which are impossible to obtain to cure her dead son. These are some of the pragmatic approaches adopted by the Buddha to help people to realize the Truth by themselves.

All the doctrines taught by the Buddha only mean to end the suffering and to attain Nibbana. The simile of raft in the Alagaddupamasutta of the M.N. (sutta No. 22) tells us that, all the teachings of the Buddha is meant to carry man to safety, peace, Happiness, Nibbana. That is why, in the Simsapasutta of the S.N.(vol.V.p.437-438) , the Buddha told the monks that what he knew was just like the leaves in the Sijjasa forest, but what he taught to them was only a little like the few leaves he held in his hand. Because what he preached are useful, and what he did not preach are not useful, not leading to Nibbana. This is the pragmatic attitude of the Buddha.

In the Cula-Maluvkyasutta of the MN, the Buddha explained to Maluvkyaputta who was anxious to know some metaphysical answers that, it is more important to get oneself free from suffering rather than to engage in metaphysical proposition which is useless and meaningless. And of course, he invited everyone to come and to see (ehi passiko) by themselves rather than to believe in him. This is the attitude of the Buddha when he preached.

**666 EXPLAIN THE FOLLOWING TERMS :SABBA, VIBBANA, PABBA AND PARIBBA.**

The truths of the Buddha are distinguished from other truths by describing them as Noble Truths (ariyasaccani). While using a variety of terms signifying a variety of cognitive activity, Buddhism emphasised emancipating knowledge. It is necessary to understand how this emancipating knowledge is different from other forms of knowledge that Buddhism itself refers to by a variety of cognitive terms.

P.D. Premasiri on his paper “Early Buddhist Analysis of Varieties of Cognition” writes :

“The pali Nikaya express distinctions in modes of knowing varying the prefix which is attached to the root jba, each variation indicating that it signifies activity taking place at a particularly distinctive level, or from particularly distinctive perspective.”

Then he lists out the terms :

- |      |                       |           |                   |
|------|-----------------------|-----------|-------------------|
| saj  | + jba = sabba (noun), | sabjanati | (verb)            |
| vi   | + jba = vibbana       | (noun),   | vijanati (verb)   |
| abhi | + jba = abhibba       | (noun),   | abhijanati (verb) |
| pari | + jba = paribba       | (noun),   | parijanati (verb) |

pra + jba = pabba (noun), pajanati (verb)

The world of experience can be known through the sabba way, the vibbana way or the abhibba way etc. Sabba and vibbana are not forms of knowing which give emancipating knowledge, but to bondage and suffering. The remaining three are ways to noble truths.

### **(1) The Sabba way**

The Pali Nikayas explain sabba as that mode of cognition which arises on the occasion of the meeting of a particular sense organ with the corresponding sense object. In the Majjhima Nikaya, the process of this cognition is described as follows :

“Cakkhubca paticca rupe ca uppajjati cakkhuvibbanaj . Tinnaj savgati phasso . phassapaccaya vedana . Yaj vedeti taj sabjanati”

Depending on the eye and material forms there arises visual vibbana. By the coming together of these three arises sense impingement. Depending on sense impingement arises sensation. That which one senses are ‘knows in the sabba way.

Thus it is clear that sabba is a subsequent stage in the process of perceptual activity.

In the Potthapada Sutta, it is said that by training, some types of sabba could emerge and other types could cease to be. The training mentioned in this context refers to a systematic meditative cultivation of the mind. Sabba is altered in accordance with certain mental determinations. From an ethical point of view, sabba has to be transcended, and this can be done at a stage of meditative rapture of the mind where sabba is completely ceased.

In the Madhupindika Sutta, it is said that sabba leads to knowledge and suffering through the process of papabca, a process which involves a proliferation of concepts in the mind linked to the notion of self and associated with the unwholesome emotions of craving (tanha), conceit (mana) and dogmatic belief (ditthi)

Sabba is contrasted with two cognitive perspectives of paribba and abhibba. In the Suttanipata, the disciples are advised by the Buddha to cultivate paribba with respect to sabba in order to attain Ultimate Freedom.

### **(2) The Vibbana way**

Vibbana is usually regarded as the bare sensitivity and awareness which is aroused by the contact of the sense-organ with the object. Depending on the eye and the material form arises visual vibbana (cakkhubca paticca rupe ca uppajjati cakkhuvibbanaj). There is no special efforts required for such awareness to arise except an act of attention (samannahara).

Vibbana, like sabba is a causally conditioned cognitive response. This response involves no intelligently trained insight into the nature of things. It is therefore, a much more passive type of cognitive response than pabba or even sabba. Vibbana unlike pabba is not a perspective to be cultivated. The vibbana response is also said to be associated with similar danger as the sabba response. Therefore, vibbana ought to be fully comprehended (paribbeyyaj) whereas pabba ought to be positively cultivated (bhavetabba)

### **(3) Higher Form of Cognition - Paribba**

In the Mulapariyaya Sutta, it is stated that enlightened persons like the Buddha and the Arahants, who have eradicated the cankers have attained paribba regard to all the data of experience. In the Pali Text Society’s Dictionary, ‘paribba’ is defined as “accurate or exact knowledge, comprehension, full understanding.” Bhikkhu Banamoli translates it as “full knowledge”. According to Visuddhimagga, it is of three kinds ;

- i. Bataparibba – full knowledge of the known ;
- ii. tiranaparibba – full knowledge as judgement ;
- iii. pahanaparibba –full knowledge as abandoning.

In the Mahadukkhakkhadha Sutta, these three kinds of full knowledge are clearly explained by the Buddha :

“And what, bhikkhus, is the gratification in the case of material form? Suppose there were a girl of the noble class or the brahmin class or of householder stock, in her fifteenth or sixteenth year, neither too tall nor too short, neither too thin nor too fat, neither too dark nor too fair. Is her beauty and loveliness then at its height? ”

“yes, venerable sir.”

“And what, bhikkhus, is the danger in the case of material form? Later on one might see that same woman here at eighty, ninety, or a hundred years, aged, as crooked as a roof bracket, doubled up, supported by a walking stick, tottering, frail, her youth gone, her teeth broken, grey-haired, scanty-haired, bald, wrinkled, with limbs all blotchy. What do you think, bhikkhus? Has her former beauty and loveliness vanished and the danger become evident?”

“yes, venerable sir.”

“And what, bhikkhus, is the escape in the case of material form? It is the removal of desire and lust, the abandonment of desire and lust for material form. This is the escape in the case of material form.”

In the same Sutta, sensual pleasure (*kama*) and feeling (*vedana*) are also fully comprehended. Thus, *paribba* is a cognitive term frequently used in the Pali Nikaya to signify the comprehended understanding of the nature of thing. And according to *Visuddhimagga*, this cognition belongs to the mundane level as it is still in the way of purifying the view i.e. *Maggamagga-banadassana-visudhi-nidessa* ( purification by knowledge and vision of what is the path and what is not the path).

#### **(4) Highest Form of Cognition - Pabba**

In the Pali Text Society’s Dictionary, the term *pabba* is defined as ‘intelligence, comprising all the higher faculties of cognition’. The Dictionary further explains the term as :

“As in technical term in Buddhist Psycho-Ethics it comprises the highest and last stage as 3<sup>rd</sup> division in the standard “Code of religion practice” which leads to Arahantship or Final Emancipation.”

Here, the three divisions in the standard code of Buddhist practice are virtue (*sila*), concentration (*samadhi*) and wisdom (*pabba*).

In the *Culasaropamasutta*, these three divisions of Buddhist practices are operating in a causal process i.e. one first ‘obtains the attainment of virtue’ (*Silasampadaj aradheti*) ; this is followed by ‘the attainment of concentration’ (*samadhisampadaj aradheti*), and subsequently by ‘the attainment of knowledge and insight’ (*banadasianaj aradheti*). Here ‘knowledge and insight’ refers to *pabba*.

Since virtue is a prior requirement for the development of concentration, a causal relationship is established between them. In the *Avyutha Nikaya*, it is said that “wisdom become brighter with conduct” (*apadane sobhati pabba*); and the *Digha Nikaya* also says “wisdom is cleansed by virtue and virtue is cleansed by wisdom --- where there is virtue, there is wisdom and where there is wisdom there is virtue” (*silaparidhota...pabba pabbaparidhotaj silaj yattha silaj tattha pabba yattha pabba tattha silaj*). While compare to *vibbana*, it is said in the *Mahavedallasutta* that: “*pabba* is to be cultivated and *vibbana* comprehended, this is the difference” (*pabba bhavetabha vibbanj paribbeyaj, idaj nesaj nanakaranaj*)

In other words, *vibbana* seems to be general term for ‘cognition’ while *pabba* is more or less restricted in connotation to the cognition of spiritual truths. In the *Mahavedallasutta*, the verb ‘*pajanati*’ is selected to explain the Four Noble Truths. Thus it is clear that, the emancipating knowledge which is insightful and goal-directed, culminating in the destruction of the cankers is invariably described as *pabba*. Here, one should take note that, the *asavakkhayabana* which classed among the *abhibba* can be synonyms with *pabba*.

## **666 CLARIFY THE MOTIVE OF INVESTIGATION OF KNOWLEDGE IN BUDDHIST THOUGHT AND EXAMINE HOW IT INFLUENCES THE ETHICAL LIFE.**

*Nibbana* is the summom bonum of Buddhism, all teachings taught by the Buddha and all practises formulated by the Buddha are aiming at the attainment of this Ultimate Truth which, is considered as the Total Freedom from all kinds of sufferings. It is also sometimes known as the realization of Ultimate Truth which, in an epistemology term, the attainment of Noble Knowledge (*Ariya Knowledge*).

Since the only motive for the attainment of such Noble Knowledge is to attain *Nibbana*, we can say that Buddhist epistemology is *Nibbanic-orientated*. Under such a Realistic Principle of attaining *Nibbana*, Buddhist epistemology thus influences the conducts of its followers.

The ethical life of the Buddhists is very different from the followers of other religions who aim at Heavenly Bliss. In order to attain such a Heaven Bliss, what the followers of other religions need to do is to have Faith in their God or in their Sacred Scriptures.

In other words, their ethical life subscribed by God is God-orientated. However, the observance of precepts (sila) and the practice of mind culture (samadhi) for a Buddhist are not to show the obedience to God in order to gain His Bless to enter Heaven, but to built up the foundation necessary for the realization of Ultimate Truth.

Buddhism regards heaven of any sort is still in the reign of Impermanence, is subject to Unsatisfactoriness. Therefore, a true Buddhist will never aim to born in such a heaven though it is regarded as a happier place to enjoy.

For the common people, the Buddha employed the 'anupubbikatha' to preach, starting with dana-katha, then sila-katha and finally sagga-katha. After these gradual-talks, he pointed out the danger, degradation and corruption of sense-desires, then the profit of renunciation. Only after the listener's mind was ready, free from the hindrances, joyful and calm, he then preached the Dhamma (4 Noble Truths) in brief (samukkajjika dhamm-desana). Therefore, Buddha preached saggakataj only meant for the cultivation of mind (bhavana) and it is treated as the foundation of realization of Four Noble Truths. Saggakataj is not for the purpose of attaining Heavenly Bless.

In order to attain Nibbana, one should have right understanding. In Buddhism, a complete ethical life is denoted by the Noble Eightfold Path, which includes right understanding of Facts and the purification of mind. Right understanding, as in its epistemological sense, the understanding of rebirth, kamma and causality etc. In the Apannaka sutta of the Majjhima Nikaya (sutta No.60), the Buddha explains to the Brahmin householders of Sala that holding the views of 'there is another world, there is kamma, there is causality, there is the cessation of being i.e., Nibbana' is having right understanding or samma ditthi. With this knowledge one gains through self-effort or through the 'hearing of the Dhamma' (suta-maya-pabba), one's conducts will definitely adjust in accordance with his understanding. Therefore, Buddhist ethical life is based on the understanding of Fact and the Value of actions, it is not the commandment of any God.

#### SOPHISTS (LECTURED BY VEN. PAÑÑĀLOKA)

Sophists were one of the most important political, social and intellectual forces in ancient Greece. On the other hand, they were recognized as a group of intellectuals who certified ideological necessity of the new democratic ruler. On the other hand they were representation of new social, economical and political change of the Greece, especially in Athens.

The original meaning of the term of this word might be:

1. Teacher of wisdom
2. A group of people who talk about money and even about immoral and unethical things
3. Group of people who are optimistic and greedy
4. A group of intellectuals who are higher in terms of property and power
5. A group of professional teachers who study debating and are skilled in the subject of money

Sophists were supposed to be the rich people, who needed debating skills in order to participate debates in democratic politics. The parliament and senate, they were in function at that time, although traditionally Greece teachers did not charge money. (?) Sophists charged money for what they taught. Sophists also acted as lawyers in ancient period and thus they helped the rich people.

The history of this era is divided into two periods – period of old sophists and period of young sophists. Among the well known old sophists were **Protagoras** (481-411 BC) and **Gorgias** (482-375 BC) and among young sophists **Alcitas** and **Crtias**.

#### SUTAMAYA AND CITTAMAYA PAÑÑĀ (LECTURED BY VEN. ABHAYATISSA)

Before going to examine the difference between these two wisdoms, *sutamaya paññā* and *cittamaya paññā* firstly the explanation of 'wisdom' is necessary to be done. Indeed, we will not get clear definition unless we take an account of the meaning of wisdom herein.

As far as I understand, the wisdom (*paññā*) is understanding and knowledge. Further more, wisdom (*paññā*) has much to do with thought, with intelligence and with learning; it is, therefore, a kind of knowledge. Therefore, some eminent scholars consider wisdom as 'good', 'power', 'tower'(?), 'light', 'gem' and so on. Whatever the explanation of wisdom may be, in Buddhism we can divide it into two kinds: *sutamaya* and *cittamaya paññā* regarding *Petakopadesa*.

The meaning of *sutamaya paññā* is the knowledge, hearsay, knowledge which came directly from other and got by listening, no matter from whom and where. (On one hand)(?) *cittamaya paññā* is created by thinking knowledge, the knowledge that

is created by our constructive mind. Seeing the definition of *paññā*, which I have mentioned above, we can consider the *sutamaya paññā* which relies on others while the knowledge, *cittamaya paññā* relies on one's own personal thinking. So, we can see the difference between these two kinds of knowledge.

Anyway, this knowledge is a radical tool for analysis of the truth, nature of reality, the *Dhamma*. By this knowledge we can uplift our knowledge, which we wish to get more. Without this knowledge we are like a blind man and like a building without foundation. As we understand, a man without eyes cannot distinguish the way, which he is walking on. Moreover, he does not know the way where lead to him.(?) The building without foundation cannot exist any more. Similarly, a person without these two primary knowledge cannot elevate his additional requirements of knowledge. Therefore, these are essential kinds of knowledge for all.

nevertheless, if one who tried to see with right wisdom (*yathā bhūta*) and crossed over the doubt, he who knows, right understanding. Therefore, it is ultimately to the understanding of the Four Noble Truths. This understanding is the highest wisdom, which sees the ultimate reality of *Nibbāna*.

## THE PHILOSOPHY OF PLATO

**Plato** was born in a prominent and wealthy family in Athens. In his youth he studied common subjects such as justice, grammar(?) etc. In his young age he went through teachings of Greek philosophers like **Heraclitus** and **Thales**. Thus he was interested in philosophy and became a student of **Socrates**. After the death of his master **Socrates** he also delivered his knowledge and he is known as first great philosopher in the West.<sup>135</sup>

If I had to mention one thing in his philosophy of education, it would be that **Plato** emphasized that four subjects should be taught to all children. They are:

1. Mathematics
2. Music
3. Physical exercises
4. Philosophy

Intellectual human has two factors – the emotional factor and the intellectual factor. To understand the idea is through one's own intellectual experience.

**Plato** taught how to analyse problems in scientific way and how to find the best answer out of alternatives. He taught how to apply this methodology to individual and social problems, analyzing in the border contact of historical, critical and comparative perspective.(?)

**Plato's** philosophy is not a doctrine or even a method in the modern sense of the world, but a mode of life, a perspective from which to view the world, or at least the search for such perspective. **Plato's** philosophy is too wide to study at the glance. His thought is significant not because all what he said is accumulated and valuable today, but because it has given some new inside(?) to look at the human problems for the first time.

## PLATO'S PHILOSOPHY

**Plato** was born in a prominent wealthy family in Athens. In his youth he studied common subjects such as gymnastics, grammar, music etc. In his young age he read the thoughts of Greek philosophers like **Heraclitus** and **Thales**. Thus he was interested in philosophy and became student of **Socrates** as young student. He mastered<sup>136</sup> the philosophy of **Socrates** and after death of his teacher he opened his own place of teaching or Academy, he kept on teaching there and form of the discourses he delivered there. he was known as the first great philosopher in the West. All his new ideas were recorded in two pieces of literature called „*The Dialogue and Thirteen Letters*.“ He was one of the most influential philosophers in ancient Greece.

**Socrates** explained the truth as a universal concept, **Plato** expressed his views in a different way. He held the ideal, the reality as something different from concrete individual objects. The reality (according to him) is something psychological and metaphysical.

According to **Plato** the difficulties and violent experience by man comes from two bases. They are inherent human weakness and structure deficiency. He said that Athenian government was like a wrecked ship. It did not bring satisfaction to the people. It also did not develop the society as a whole. Therefore, **Plato** proposed the political structure to be renewed.<sup>137</sup> According to **Plato** there were three individual categories in a country. They were the philosophers (intellectual people), soldiers and common

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<sup>135</sup>First great philosopher in West is **Socrates**, but **Plato** is the first great philosopher, who has written down his philosophy (**Socrates** didn't write down his philosophy).

<sup>136</sup>In the original there was 'mastered'.

<sup>137</sup>Though **Plato's** plans of state government were not applied by any country or nation, they were applied by Catholic church and are put to practice even today.

people. Philosophers should be given the change to guide the society than the intelligents convert to bring the human society to satisfaction and development.

**Plato** emphasized the need of entire society to work as a family. According to him the individuality and craving increase conflict among human beings. So, the social structure should be organized in such a way that all the individuals feel entire society as own family. In his philosophy of education **Plato** emphasized that four subjects should be taught to all children. They are: mathematics, music, physical exercise and philosophy.

**Plato's** philosophy is too vast to study and only a few aspects of it could be observed at a glance. His thought is significant because it has given some new insights to look at the human problems. For the first time **Plato** thought how to analyze the problems in scientific ways and how to find the best answer out of alternatives. He taught to apply this methodology to individual and social problems analyzing them in the broader context of historical, critical and comparative perspective.

### **QUESTION: EXAMINE THE PLACE OF EMPIRICISM IN BUDDHIST THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE**

Empiricism is a branch of knowledge that believes in sense-perception, meaning the knowledge is gained through sense experience. Empiricists are very critical about ideology and ideological understanding. In their view to accept something, it must be experienced through sense-organs of man for himself.

Buddhism too uses empirical knowledge to verify true factors of existence. In the *Aṅguttara Nikāya* the *Kālāma Sutta* gives many instructions not to accept anything because it is just recorded or believed, but verify it for themselves. According to Buddhism, the knowledge that comes from experience is very significant. Therefore, Buddhism teaches to experience and see. In the *Nikāya* literature we find many examples where **the Buddha** encourages the empirical knowledge as knowledge of reality. In *Samyutta Nikāya* **the Buddha** claims that the knowledge of somebody should be well-known by experience or discussion - »*Sākacchāya bhikkhave paññā veditabbo.*«

Buddhism does not think that empiricism is always a correct way to gain knowledge as human senses have their own limits. Eye cannot see everything on earth, ear cannot hear all the sounds etc. Therefore, knowing the limit of human sense-organs, Buddhism further recommends developing extra sensory perception (ESP) as a valid way of correct knowledge. Extra sensory perception (*atindriyāñāna*) includes divine eye, divine ear etc., which are the power to see and hear things that cannot be perceived by normal sense-organs.

Buddhism also recognizes the power of developing in internal or spiritual faculty to get the knowledge rather than physical sense-faculty (which is impossible to physical sense faculty).(?) Internally, there are five faculties for the development:

1. Confidential faith (*saddhā*)
2. Mindfulness (*sati*)
3. Effort (*vīriya*)
4. Concentration (*samādhi*)
5. Wisdom (*paññā*)

Through the development of these spiritual faculties human can widen the horizon of sense of experience and know more about himself and the world.

With the development of internal faculties, impurities of mind are washed away, thereby human beings are able to bring out the hidden power of the mind.

The two recommendable for purification of mind is mental culture it does purifies the human mind in three steps;(?)

1. Temporary freedom from defilement (*tataṅgabbaha*)
2. Long-term freedom from defilement (*vikmpanabbaha*(?))
3. Permanent giving up of defilement (*samuccedabbahana*)

In the second and third level, human being experiences extra sensory perception, thus one can get to know the world better.

## RATIONALISM

The word „rationalism“ is derived from the Latin word „*ratio*,“ which means reasoning. Reasoning or inquiry is very important to understand the truth and to obtain correct knowledge according to the rationalists. The rationalism have existed throughout the ancient philosophy and later developed in the modern era. As it appears in the Oxford English Dictionary, „rationalism is the practice of explaining the supernatural powers.“

Rationalism in the western philosophy is very much related to the field of mathematics.

Rationalists raise their arguments standing upon axioms:

- Rationalism brings knowledge without the help of the outer world
- It is not the knowledge, that comes through sense experience
- The knowledge that one gets through sense organs is not considered as the true knowledge by rationalists
- Man might misunderstand a rope as a snake, therefore, the knowledge one gets through his sense organs can mislead the person.

According to rationalists, the true knowledge and the zeal to understand arises in the mind without the help of the outer world.

### 1. *A priori* knowledge

*A priori* knowledge is one of the theories on which the rationalism is based.

According to the *a priori* knowledge, some ideas are true without the help of sense experience, that come through sense organs.

While rationalists do not deny that the sense organs might be able to give a significant information about the world, they do not consider them as the sole source of knowledge.

Rationalists think that the knowledge that comes through sense organs might be misleading and wrong.

They argue that the knowledge independent from sense experience could be more trustworthy, because it has to do nothing with the sense organs.

### 2. Innate ideas

Rationalists believe that some ideas are born in the mind with the birth of a person – e.g., **Albert Einstein**

Innate ideas are born in the mind of a person without much influence of the physical world.

According to the **Descartes**, the idea of the existence of God is one of the ideas that is present in the human mind.

### 3. Logical necessity

Something cannot be conceived as otherwise.

When something is logically necessary, it should have proved its correctness through definitions, for example the statement: „All bachelors are not married.“ It is necessarily true because that is how the world is defined.

This idea of logical necessity is very much influenced by mathematics.

There is no logical necessity if we take this statement: „Work hard to get through your exams.“

#### 4. Metaphysical necessity

This type of necessity is helpful to rationalists, because rationalists deal with concepts, ideas that go beyond the logical certainty. For example, the idea of God is metaphysical.

It is logically possible to say that God exists – the idea of God presupposes perfect being.

Only a perfect being can create a perfect, systematical world.

If the God is imperfect, his creation would also be imperfect.

Therefore, a perfect God should exist.

Rationalism in the western world existed even during the Greek period. There were rationalists during the day of **Buddha** and before – **Takkhe**.

Concept of the creator God in the *Vedic* thought was based on rational argument.

Sages of the *Vedic* thought argued for the existence of a creator being.

Rationalism became popular in the modern western philosophy with the scientific revolution.

There were three popular rationalists in the West:

1. **René Descartes**

2. **Baruch Spinoza**

3. **Wilhelm Gottfried Leibniz**

**Descartes** was a rationalist. He attempted to understand the world through rational thinking. There was not much space for rationalism before **Descartes** (like a medieval philosophers tried to prove their teaching of God through faith and devotion) tried to prove his teachings.

In the *Ariyapariyesana Sutta* of the *Majjhima Nikāya* the personal experience gained by **the Buddha** is recorded in details. **Buddha** speaks about his knowledge gained through his experience also in *Mahā Sīhanāda Sutta* and in the *Mahā Saccaka Sutta* in *Majjhima Nikāya*.

As described in the *Mahā Sīhanāda Sutta*, in order to reach a state free from grief (*asoka*), free from death (*amata*), free from defilements (*asaṅkilitha*) person has to practice penence(?) of self mortification. It was on examination and on experimentation that **the Buddha** emphasized the reality of the world. The theory of impermanence is the result of the higher experience gained by **Buddha**. Buddhism is neither a kind of metaphysical speculation nor a revelation, but a teaching based on empirical facts and that is to be experienced.

### RATIONALISM

We haven't seen the God, but we accept that God exists. **Aristotle** tried to prove the existence of God through rationally. **Aristotle** introduced the idea of „unmoved mover“ (God does not move but he may moved the world.) The rational ideas of **Aristotle** were disproved with the emergence of scientific evolution - modern philosophy revised the ideas. There the philosophy helped to scientific thinking.

The three major rationalist philosophers in modern Western philosophy were:

1. **René Descartes** (1796 – 1850)

2. **Wilhelm Leibniz** (1646 – 1716)

### 3. Baruch Spinoza (1632 – 1677)

All these three philosophers accepted that the world could be understood through logic arguments. This doesn't mean that they neglected scientific methods such as experiment, aberration(?), mathematics as subject classified under science mathematical knowledge is accepted as asthmatic/basic(?) knowledge. Rationalism argued that mathematics is based on axioms based on rational logical arguments.

According to rationalists knowledge can be gained without the empirical factor. For example:  
„Bowen(?) women do not give birth is(?) children.“

This type of knowledge is known as „optional knowledge.“ Optional knowledge is independent from experience, which rationalists accept. Knowledge that we receive through our sense organs are not considered as the only way of receiving knowledge.

Rationalists argue that the knowledge a person gains through sense experience might not always be correct. For example:

„---nirape(?)“

There might be watchers(?) in the sense organ. For example:  
„color blunduen(?)“

Therefore the knowledge independent from sense experience is much stronger than the knowledge that is gained through experience. For example:

„ $2 + 2 = 4$ “ ; „I think, therefore I am.“

#### Innate Ideas

According to **Descartes** some ideas exist from the day of the birth of a person. Such ideas do not require any sense experience, they are „inborn ideas.“ **Descartes** argues that the idea of the existence of God is also innate. Another important idea of rationalists is „necessity.“ Students have to work hard to get through their exams. here passing the exam is the empirical necessity, while the working hard is the rational and logical necessity. The aim of rationalists is to find the logical necessity more than empirical necessity, because logical necessity always helps to find solutions for metaphysical and moral problems.

When something is logically necessary, it should be defined accordingly. For example:  
„All lecheries(?) are numerical.“

#### Logical necessity

Something cannot be conceived(?) without otherwise(?). When something is logically necessary it will become true through definition. „All sacht(?) are unmarried.“ ; „Barman(?) women do not bare children.“ All mathematical drum(?) are of the same kind. Through rational arguments man is able to understand the reality behind physical things that are not subject to ever(?) organ(?).

**Descartes** was a modern rationalist who attempted to understand the world through rational thinking. He held the view that the truth can be understood only through rational thinking. He was doubtful about everything that came without rational thinking. He claimed:

1. To accept nothing as true which was not clearly recognized to be so, to accept nothing more than what was presented to one's mind so clearly and distinctly that he would have more occasion to doubt it
2. Divide each problem into as many parts as possible
3. To commence one's reflection to the object
4. To make enumerations

This shows the inference of machination(?) of **Descartes**. His ideas on rationalizing are very close to scientific thinking. **Descartes** was of the view that nothing could be accepted as true in external world. He had doubts about his own sense experience.

He thought that every man's experience might not bring the true knowledge. He determined to doubt everything until the doubt becomes impossible. To being(?) pushed(?) that(?) there(?) once he said: „I know I exist,

therefore I am.<sup>138</sup>

**Descartes** believed that body and mind were two different substances, where the mind interacted with the body. The question is who is responsible for that interaction. His reply was – the God. **Spinoza** describes the argument of **Descartes** saying that the mind and body are in fact substances made out of the same substance.

### Philosopher Leibniz

According to **Leibniz** there are various substances in the world, rather innumerable substances. He called them „*monads*“.<sup>139</sup>

In Buddhist teaching the word *talclu*(?) is used to quite clearly for rationalism the sense(?) of reasonal(?).(?) In Buddhism metaphysical theories are constructed on reasoning. In this sense the word *talclu*(?) and *vimans*(?) go together in Buddhist teaching. There are four such theories appearing in *Brahmajāla sutta*:

»*Idha ekacca samaṇo vā brāhmaṇo vā talelca hah vino so talcla paniyāhataṃ vimameasāritatn sayam brāhmaṇaṃ wan āha sarato āha ca loko ca vamyho lcutahro santhavandi te ca sotta sansaranti sansaranhi gavanti upijavanti.*«

Here in certain recharge(?) of *brāhmaṇa* reasoner and speculator by the exercise of reasoning and speculative inquiry he rises the following self evident conclusion the soul and the world are eternal, independent state(?) food(?) as mortals peaty(?) and turn(?) as pillars(?). These beings transmigrate and fare(?) on(?) die and reborn and exist for ever and ever.

### **RATIONALISM (ORIGINAL BY ĀNANDA)**

The word rationalism is derived from the Latin word '*ratio*', which means „reasoning.“ Reasoning or inquiry is very important for understanding the truth and obtaining correct knowledge. According to rationalists, it has existed through the ancient philosophy and later it developed in the modern era.

Rationalism in the western philosophy is very much related to the field of mathematics. Rationalism brings knowledge with the help of the outer world. The knowledge of rationalism does not come through sense experience. The knowledge that one gets through sense organs is not considered as the true knowledge by rationalism. Man might understand rope as a snake – therefore, the knowledge one gets through his some organs might mislead the man. According to the rationalists the true knowledge and the real understanding arises in the mind with without the help of the outer world.

*A priori* knowledge is one of the theories on which rationalism is based. According to *a priori* knowledge there are some ideas that arose without the help of any experience coming through sense organs. While rationalism does not deny that the sense organs could be able to give significant information about the world, they do not consider that as the sole knowledge. Rationalism supposes that the knowledge coming through sense organs could be false, misleading and wrong.

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<sup>138</sup>In the original, Latin language, it was: „*Cogito ergo sum.*“ (I think, therefore I am.)

<sup>139</sup>**Leibniz** believed, that everything is made out of small parts (*monads*), very small parts which together constitute the world.

They argued that the knowledge independent from sense experience could be more trustworthy, because it has to do nothing with the sense organs. Something cannot be conceived of as otherwise. When something is logically necessary it should prove its collecting(?) through by definition.(?) For example: the statement „all bad leaders are unmannered“ is necessarily true, because that is how the world is defined. That idea of logical necessity is very much influenced by mathematics. There is a logical necessity if we take this statement: „work hard to get through your exams.“

This type of necessity is helpful for rationalists because rationalism deals with the ideas that go beyond the logical certainty. Rationalism in the western world existed even during the Greek period. There were rationalists during the day of **the Buddha** and before **Takla**. The concept of the creator God in the *Vedic* thought was based on rational arguments. Sages of the *Vedas* thought argument(?) for the existence of a creator being. Rationalism became popular in the modern western philosophy with the scientific revolution. There are three popular rationalists in the West:

- a) **René Descartes**
- b) **Baruch Spinoza**
- c) **Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz**

However, rationalists attempted to understand the world through the rational thinking. There was not much place for rationalism before **Descartes** as immaterial philosophers tried to prove their teaching of God through faith and evolution.

## 666RATIONALISM

Religious people believe in God through faith and devotion they do not inquire whether god exist or not. Rationalism attempt to prove the existence of god using rational argument. Rationalism comes from the lātāñ word “ratio” which means reason.

In philosophy, reasoning is very much important. It is one of the way that Gods to the connect understanding philosophers shared the idea of rationalism as a way to discuss concepts that cannot be experienced through sense organs.

Aristotle was one of the Greek philosophers who used rationalism to explain his philosophical theories. Aristotle accepted the existence of god through rational argument. Philosophers in the Upanishad also used rationalism to prove the existence of Brahman. They introduced rational arguments to explain the existence of Brahman, the creator of the universe. Rationalistic arguments appear in the Brhadāranyaka Upanishad with a view to explain the existence of Brahma.

They argued that it was Brahman who keeps the identity of the empirical world. About the mango tree: it has ill own identity, even among mango trees there are number of varieties. Each variety has its own identity. Rationality taught that knowledge exists inside the mind not in the external world. Therefore one person close exist in the external world.

The mathematical arguments are not in the external world. There are based axiom

Established by mathematicians. The rational argument introduced by enter philosophers disprove with the emergence of modern science. For example Galilee took a pound of cotton and climbed up the pick of ....and release them at the same time and let them fall to the ground. This disprove the rational argument of Aristotle. There fore, modern rationalistic philosophers approach with the help of modern science are based on experiment, observation and introspection. There are 3 modern rationalists:

- 1- Rene Descartes (1506-1650)
- 2- Liebiz (1646-1716)
- 3- Spinoza (1632-1677).

All these 3 philosophers shared the belief that a person can understand the world through logic and reasoning, his does not mean these 3 philosophers were not interested in sciences and experiments.

On the other hand, these rationalists were interested on modern sciences and discusses done paying attention becomes .... Science had disproved the facts agreement got should .... By the ancient philosophers. Sciences has different the all the idea of God in the Bible and the theory introduced by Aristotle. Once Aristotle preached the theory about the center of the Universe. They said that the center of the Universe is clear and the planets and sun move around the earth.

### Modern Rationalities teachings

No one has seen God but “we” accept that God exist. Aristotle endeavored to prove the existence of god through rational equipment. No one has seen the god. We accept that god exist.

1-The rational Andean of Aristotle were disproved with the emergence of scientific revolution as a result of that modern philosopher revised their philosophy with the help of scientific thinking. The major rational philosopher in the modern western philosophy are  
1Ren’s Descartes (1596-1650).

2- Willhelm Lieniz (1646-1716)

3- Willhelm Spinoza (1632-1677)

All these three philosopher accepted that the world could be understood through logic and argument. This doest not mean that they neglected scientific methods such as experiment, observation. Mathematic is a subject classified under science mathematical knowledge is accepted as a systematic knowledge. Rationalist knowledge can be given without the empirical factor. For example: Berreu women do not give birth children. This type of knowledge is known as person knowledge. Person knowledge is independent from experience. While rationalist accept the knowledge that we receive through our sense organs they do not consider tat as the only way of receiving knowledge. The agued that the knowledge a person gain through sense experience might not always be correct. For example: Mirage. These might be weaknesses in blindness therefore the knowledge that is independent form sense experience is much stronger then the knowledge is given through sense experience. For example:  $2+2= 4$ (I think therefore I am).

### Innate Ideas

According to Descartes some ideas exist from the day of the birth of a person such Ideas do not esquire any sense experience. They are informing ideas .so for example argue that the idea of the existence of god is also innate. Another important idea of rationalist is necessity. Students have to work hard to get through their exams. These passing the exam is the empirical while the working hard is the rational necessity and logical. The aim of rationalist is to find the logical necessity then the empirical necessity. Because logical necessity always helps to find solution metaphysical and moral problems when something is logically necessary it should be defined accordingly. For example: all batchers are unmarried.

### Suite

3- Logical necessity something cannot be conceived without otherwise when something is logically necessary, it will become true through by definition. For example All bachelors are unmarried, Barren women do not base children. All mathematical truths are also this type. Through rational argument man will be able to understand the reality behind physical things that are not subject to sense organs.

Descartes was a modern rationalist who attempted to understand the world through rational thinking. The hold the view that the truth can only be understood through rational thinking. He was doubtful about every thing that comes without rational thinking.

He says my first rule was to accept nothing as true which did not dearly recognize to be so. To accept nothing more than what was presented to my mind to clearly and distinctly that I could have no occasion to doubt it.

-Second rule: divide each problem into as many parts as possible.

-Third rule: To commence my reflection with the object.

-The 4<sup>th</sup> rule: To make enumerations so complete this shows the influence of mathematics on Descartes. His ideas on rationalism is very much close to scientific thinking. Descartes was of the view that nothing could be accepted as true in external world. He was doubted about his own sense o9f experience. He thought that everything man experiences might not bring him true knowledge. He determined to doubt everything until the doubt becomes impossible to being pushed farther once he said that “I know

that I exist therefore I am.”

Descartes believed the body and the mind are two different substances. Mind interacts with the body. The question is who is responsible for intention. His reply was the God Spinoza revised the argument of Descartes saying that the mind and the body are in fact substances of the mode of the same substances.

According to Leibniz, there are various substances. The world was composed of an innumerable number of substances instead of one or two. He called them Monads. In Buddhist teaching the word “talk” is used quite clearly for rationalism. The sense of reasoned, according to Buddhism they construct metaphysical theories based on reasoning.

In this sense, the word *talcki* (reasons) and *Vimansi* speculator go together. In Buddhist teaching, there are 4 such theories appearing in the *brahajāla sutta*: “*idha ekacco samano vā brahmano vā takke hoti vimamsi. So takka pariyāhatam vimamsā nucaritam ayam patibhānam evam aha sasato attā ca lokoca vangho kutotho.* Here in a certain Recluse of brahmana a reasoner and speculator by the exercise of reasoning and speculative inquiry he arrives at the following self evident (conclusion).the soul and the world are eternal, independent, steadfast as mountain pocks and firm as pillars, these beings transmigrates and fare on die and reborn and exist for ever and ever.

This theory is a product of rational thinking and metaphysical speculation (*takka pariyāhatam vimamsānu caritami*) and it is also said to be self evident (*sayaampati bhavam*). This is similar to with the ....reasoning that appears in the western philosophy. “*Sato natthi vihasa asalo natthi sambhavo*” According to the teaching of the Buddha, reasoning (*takka*). Should not be considered as a way of teaching knowledge of the truth. This idea is classified in the *sandaka sutta* of the M.N. it is said that one of the 4 types of reasoning could be correct. “*sutakkatam tatha - well reasoned true*”. “*Dutakkitam annatha – well reasoned false*.” “*dutakkitam tatha – ill reasoned true*.” “*Dutakkitam aññatha – ill reasoned false*.”

According to *sandaka sutta*, reasoning cannot be considered as a way that leads to the correct knowledge. In the *Kalama sutta*, the rational approach of testing the teaching are put to be aside the Buddha has often been called a rationalist. but the reason for calling the Buddha as rationalist is different from scholar to scholar. They have called the Buddha a rationalist for different reasons:

1- The Buddha is called a rationalist for being non-dogmatic.

2- According to *Bhattacharya* the Buddha is a rationalist because he would not like to live anything as dogmatic truth. But always based this views on the strong ground of reasoning.

3- *Radhakrishnan* has also described the Buddha as a rationalist. According to him, the Buddha is a rationalist as since the Buddha wished to study reality without any reference to spiritual revelation. None of these descriptions are 100% correct.

4- Another reason to why the Buddha is called rationalist because he refuted all metaphysical views such as: *sasato loko, asassato loko, antavā loko anantavā loko*” (the 10 unanswered questions, *Dasa avyakita prashna*). It is difficult to make such significant statement about the Buddha as a rationalist or a non rationalist without a proper study. The word rationalism is used in philosophy is opposition to empiricism. Rationalism is defined as a theory in philosophy in which the basis of truth is not sensory but intellectual and deductive. This is usually associates with an attempt to introduce. Mathematical methods to philosophy.

It is clear that we cannot make any significant statement about the Buddha being a rationalist or not unless there is a clear and not consistent use of the term rationalism. In trying to determine whether the Buddha was a rationalist in this sense, we have to think whether the Buddha in any sense considered premises as self evidently true. Rational metaphysics existed during the day of the Buddha, were the systems evolved out of *takka*.

Thus empathically concept that were described with the help of logic and rational arguments are mentioned in Buddhist teachings as follows “**Takka pariyatahatam vimansānu caritam sayam patihhanam**” many to these arguments are best on *opinoiḍn* (thinking) reasoning. When we examine the Buddha was thus a traditionalist in this sense it is clear the Buddha rejected such claims. The Buddha was introduced as a rationalist by scholars not because he was a person who preached his dharma though apriat knowledge which he today rejected but because he opened doors for inquiry without limitation. (*Vimansala sutta M.N*).

On the other hand he rejected all traditional method argument that was used to clarify concepts *kalama sutta*. According to the teachings of the Buddha one should not come to conclusion because it has come from the tradition. *Mapanuparāya*. According to the words of the Buddha one has to admit concepts that come though the tradition only when he understands himself that those concepts are true and concepts.

It is clear that the Buddha recommends doctrines which are claimed doctrines true is an empirically or experimentally verifiable. The Buddha reject the *takka* as an interment explain the reality. But this does not mean *takka* is totally considered as a useless method to explain ideas. The Buddha advised *Ven.Ananda* that so far as anything can be ascertained by reasoning you have ascertained (***yāvakatam takkaya patlabbam anuppattam taya***) the *culakamma vibhanga sutta* of the *Majjhima nikāya* appear to be used rational argument for rebirth and kamma.

In that Sutta, the Buddha as a question, that as the among human beings despite their belongs human the reply is being inherit there kammās and kamma divides beings in respect of their high and low. This seen to be said following rational and ethical argument consisting of an ethical empirical grounds. According to Buddhism rebirth is not rational concept. It is a personal experience of the Buddha and anyone who attempt to the higher stages of meditation also could be able to experience it. This is explained in the Angutara nikāya Val II as thus:

1-The decease and the survival of beings to be verified by one own (clairvoyant visan). With this visam the Buddha has explained beings who are suffering in the hell as a result of their in is deeds. On the other hand the Buddha is a rational because.

### Empiricism

Is a theory of knowledge emplacing the experience specially the sense perception. Empiricism discounts innate knowledge. In the philosophy of science empiricism is a theory of knowledge which emphasizes these aspect of scientific knowledge that are closely related to experience. The term empiricism has dual etymology.

1- It comes from the Greek word “imperia”

2- The Latin word is experimented.

This word is divided from experience .the Greek word experience

## 666RATIONALISM AND THE BUDDHIST THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. 299

The Rationalists are those who derived their knowledge from reasoning and speculation without any claims to extrasensory perception. They can be identified with some of the metaphysicians of the early Upanisadic period and other independent thinkers who denied the reliability of the orthodox Vedic tradition such as the materialists the sceptics and most of the Ajivikas.

In the *Kalama Sutta*, out of the claims to knowledge made on ten grounds rejected by the Buddha, four grounds are claimed to knowledge on the basis of some kind of reasoning. This appears to be in agreement with the Buddha’s contention that he does not belong to the class of teachers who are reasoners (takki) and speculators (vimajsi), who base their knowledge on reasoning and speculation. The four grounds of knowledge rejected are:

- (1) takkahetu,
- (2) nayahetu
- (3) akaraparivitakkena
- (4) ditthinijjhanakkhantiya.

According to Buddhist theory of knowledge, the world of experience can be known through the sabba way, the vibbana way or the abhibba way etc. Sabba and vibbana are ordinary senses and not the forms of knowing which give emancipating knowledge, but to bondage and suffering.

In Buddhism, apart ordinary perception, there is a recognition of extrasensory perception, as a valid means to knowledge called ‘abhibba’. There are 6 abhibba mention in Buddhism:

- (1) *Iddhividha*
- (2) *Dibbasota*
- (3) *Cetopariyabana*
- (4) *Pubbenivasqnussatibbana*
- (5) *Dibbacakkhu or cutupapatabana*
- (6) *asavakkhayabana*

Buddhism appears to have given special importance to the last three of the 6 abhibba classing them under the concept of *tevijja*. The first two had a special significance to Buddhism because they were believed to be the means of experientially verifying the truths of rebirth and kamma, which in turn was believed to contribute to the attainment of the final knowledge as asavakkhayabana.

The Buddha is described as one who knows and sees (janaj janati passaj passati). Those who follow the holy life prescribed by the Buddha are expected to do so in order that they may know, see, attain, realize or comprehended. He was interested in a special

variety of truth, namely, truth that leads to liberation.

The truths of the Buddha are distinguished from other truths by describing them as Noble Truths. While using a variety of terms signifying a variety of cognitive activity, Buddhism emphasised emancipating knowledge. It is necessary to understand how this emancipating knowledge is different from other forms of knowledge that Buddhism itself refers to by a variety of cognitive terms.

### THE BUDDHA AS RATIONALIST

This theory is a product of rational thinking and empirical speculation.

»*Takka panyahataṃ vimeno āhu cantamis.*«

And it is also said to be self evident (*sayam paṭibhanāṇi*). This is similar to with(?) the(?) apron(?) reasoning that appears in the Western philosophy.

»*Sata natthi vinan asato natthi sambhava.*«

According to the teaching of **the Buddha** reasoning (*takka*) should not be considered as a way of teaching knowledge of the truth. This idea is classified in *Sandaka sutta*, reasoning can not be considered as a way to the correct knowledge. In the *Kālāma sutta* the rational approach of teaching tearing(?). The teaching are put to be states as »*mā takka hetu.*«

**The Buddha** has often been called rationalist, but the reason for calling **the Buddha** as rationalist differs from scholar to scholar. They called **the Buddha** a rationalist for different reasons:

1. **The Buddha** was called rationalist for being non-dogmatic. According to **Bhutto(?) Carry's(?) the Buddha** was a rationalist because he would not like to give anything as dogmatic truth, but he always based his view on the strong reasoning queries.
2. **Radhakriśnan** also described **the Buddha** as a rationalist. According to him **the Buddha** was a rationalist since **the Buddha** tried to think objectively without any reference to religious conventions. His revelations and descriptions were a hundred percent correct.

Another reason why **Buddha** was called rationalist, because he refuted all metaphysical views, such as *sassato loko, asassato loko, anuttaro loko, annuttaro loko.*<sup>140</sup>

It is difficult to make such significant statement about **the Buddha** as a rationalist or a not-rationalist without a proper study. The word „rationalism“ is used in philosophy in connection with empiricism. Rationalism is defined as a theory in philosophy in which the certain truth is based on truth not sensory but intellectual and deductive.

This is usually associated with an attempt to introduce mathematical methods to philosophy. It is clear that we cannot make any significant statement about **the Buddha** being a rationalist or not under revisions of the term „rationalism.“

In trying to determine whether **the Buddha** was a rationalist, in this sense we have to think whether **the Buddha** in any sense considered premises as self(?) evidently true. Rational metaphysics existed during the days of **the Buddha**, where the systems evolved out of *takica(?)*.

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<sup>140</sup>Here I do not agree with the lecturer, because **the Buddha** actually did not refuse these views. He only did not recommend to think that way - first one should extinguish his or her craving and ignorance.

## 666 EXAMINE THE REASONS FOR BUDDHA'S DISLIKE OF FORMATION OF LOGICAL PROPOSITION FOR REALISTIC UNDERSTANDING.

In Pali Nikayas, we can see that though the Buddha sometimes used logical method to explain some Buddhist concepts of impermanent, unsatisfactoriness and non-self, he never formulated any logical proposition. In the Cula-Maluvkyaputta sutta of the MN, he refused to answer the 10 metaphysical questions forwarded by Maluvkyaputta proves that he was never interested in useless logical propositions. To him, logical proposition only hindrances the realistic understanding of Truth. Cc

In the Sandaka Sutta and in the Mahavagga of the Anguttara, the Buddha criticized logical proposition as an invalid means of knowledge. The reason given by him is that, 'it is not personally realized and directly verified by oneself (samaj sayaj abhibbatam attapaccakkhadhammoj)'.

In the Mahavagga, the Buddha says that his Dhamma is 'profound, difficult to realise, hard to understand.....,subtle and comprehensible only by the wise'. Then what methods did he adopt when he decided to make people to realize the truth?

Traditionally, it is said that the Buddha adopted figurative language and applied method ((pariyaya) with similes and metaphors to make his preaching simple and understandable for the public.

In most of the sutta, he employed the 'anupubbikatha' to preach, starting with dana-katha, then sila-katha and finally sagga-katha. After these gradual-talks, he pointed out the danger, degradation and corruption of sense-desires, then the profit of renunciation. Only after the listener's mind was ready, free from the hindrances, joyful and calm, he then preached the 4 Noble Truths in brief (samukkajjika dhamm-desana).

In the Abhidhamma tradition, it is said that the Buddha adopted both 'analysis' and 'synthesis' methods to help people to realize the reality. This tradition is considered the tradition of the Buddha which the Theravadins called "vibhajjavada".

Whatever method the Buddha used to make people to understand the reality of the world, some questions were raised by the listeners. Regarding these questions, it is said in the Anguttara Nikaya (p.216) that, the Buddha treated them in 4 ways:

4. Some should be answered directly
5. Others should be answered of analysing them
6. Yet others should be answered by counter-questions
7. Lastly, there are questions which should be put aside.

The Buddha was not a computing machine giving answers to whatever questions were put to him by anyone at all, without any consideration. He was a practical teacher, full of compassion and wisdom. He did not answer questions to show his knowledge and intelligence, but to help the questioner on the way to realization. He always spoke to people bearing in mind their standard of development, their tendencies, their mental make-up, their character, their capacity to understand a particular question. This is what we can observe when we read the Vacchagottasutta of the S.N. (IV. p.400-401) where the Buddha did not answer the question put forward by Vacchgota regarding the existence of Soul. And furthermore, when he asked Kisagotami to search for some mustard seeds which are impossible to obtain to cure her dead son. These are some of the pragmatic approaches adopted by the Buddha to help people to realize the Truth by themselves.

In the Mahaparinibbana sutta of the Digha Nikaya II, the Buddha tells Subhadda that: ' In whatever Dhamma and discipline the Noble Eight-fold Path is not found, no ascetic is found of the first, the second, the third or the fourth grades. But such ascetic can be found, of the first, second, third and fourth grade in a Dhamma and discipline where the Noble Eight-fold Path is found'. This statement of the Buddha clearly points out the fact that the Noble Eight-fold Path is the 'Path' to the Ultimate Truth.

All the doctrines taught by the Buddha only mean to end the suffering and to attain Nibbana. The simile of raft in the Alagaddupamasutta of the M.N. (sutta No. 22) tells us that, all the teachings of the Buddha is meant to carry man to safety, peace, Happiness, Nibbana. That is why, in the Simsapasutta of the S.N.(vol.V.p.437-438) , the Buddha told the monks that what he knew was just like the leaves in the Sijjasa forest, but what he taught to them was only a little like the few leaves he held in his hand. Because what he preached are useful, and what he did not preach are not useful, not leading to Nibbana.

In the Cula-Maluvkyasutta of the MN, the Buddha explained to Maluvkyaputta who was anxious to know some metaphysical answers that, it is more important to get oneself free from suffering rather than to engage in metaphysical proposition which is useless and meaningless. And of course, he invited everyone to come and to see (ehi passiko) by themselves rather than to believe in him.

## 666 BUDDHIST ATTITUDE TOWARDS EMPIRICISM 262

Empiricism has two aspects of meaning:

- (1) that all concepts are derived from the experience to which they are applied.
- (2) that all knowledge of matters of fact is based on or derived from experience.

In the Savgarava Sutta of Majjhima Nikaya, the Buddha identifies himself as an Empiricist, which obtained knowledge through personal experience. Thus, the Buddha indeed is an empirical teacher, and his empiricist attitude is stated in the Sabbasutta of the Sajatjutta Nikaya. This sutta explains that one's direct perception is based on the spheres of experience and the corresponding objects.

Buddha's teaching is a form of empiricism, based broadly on both ordinary sense perception and extrasensory perception. With this form of empiricism, Buddhism is in a position to reject some views not based on experience.

Extrasensory perception is considered as a valid means to knowledge in Buddhism, known as 'abhibba'. Sensory perception as well as extra-ordinary perception both remains perception as they depend on experience. They are not given by some body outside the person. That is why one has to follow a certain course of action and develop these two signs of perception.

The Buddha clearly said in the Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta that he was able to know a certain methods, which were not known by others. This claims the Buddha based on his experience. From the life of the Buddha, we know that he went to different teachers practiced under them but he was not satisfied with their teachings. So he started his own practice and gain enlightenment. Thus he was able to speak his experience.

### BUDDHIST EMPIRICISM

Empiricism means the branch of knowledge that believes in sense experience. The emphasis of knowing which must be based on seeing or direct perceptive experience makes Buddhism a form of empiricism. We have, however, to modify the use of the term somewhat to mean not only that all our knowledge is derived from sense experience but from extrasensory experience.

**The Buddha's** radical non-substantialism (*anattavāda*) as well as the 'Middle Path' He adopted in the explanation of human experience and conception prevented Him from conceiving of sharp dichotomies. For Him there was no mind-body problem, because He did not define mind as non-material or matter as non-mental, that definition was to appear in the Buddhist tradition with the emergence of realist metaphysicians like *Sarvstivādins* or the essentialist empiricists like the *Sautrāntikas*.

In *Mathupiṇḍika Sutta* **the Buddha** drew a causal connection between peaceful living and one's attitude toward perception, namely, not allowing perception to overwhelm oneself. Questioned further, **the Buddha** explained: „Where obsessions (*papañca*) relating to perception (*saññā*) and conception (*saṅkha*) overwhelm a person, if there were to be nothing that one should be delighting in, extolling and committing oneself to, that itself is the end of a variety of tendencies such as lust, hatred, dogmatic view, perplexity, pride, lust for existence, ignorance and that itself is the end of meting(?) out punishment, taking up arms, quarrel, conflict, debate, strife, slander and falsehood. Herein, such evil and unwholesome things cease without remainder.“

The above passage clarifies **the Buddha's** view that perception and conception are not themselves reasons for the unfortunate conflicts in the world. On the contrary, it is the manner in which perception and conception are understood and treated that generates such a conflict. When **the Buddha** left the congregation after making the above remarks, the monks were still not clear as to what he meant. It is at this point, the great expositor, **Mahā Kaccāyana** comes to their rescue by analyzing in greater detail the very process of perception, conception and showing how it leads to obsessions. This explanation was subsequently approved by **the Buddha**. It is from the statement of **Kaccāyana** that one can obtain a clear understanding of how the radical empiricism of **the Buddha** can avoid the criticism of being an idealism. **Kaccāyana's** exposition reads as follows:

„Depending upon eye and visible forms arises visual consciousness. Concomitant of these three is contact. Depending upon contact arises feeling. What one feels, one perceives, what one perceives, one reflects about, what one reflects about, depending upon that, obsessed perceptions and conceptions overwhelm a person in regard to visible objects, past, future and present.“

**Kaccāyana's** description focuses upon the sense organ itself which serves the primary role of linking up the object with consciousness. This emphasis upon the sense faculty is a recognition of the centrality of sense experience in human knowledge and understanding.

The radical empiricism was **the Buddha's** solution to the problem of human conflict. It is appropriately called the 'Middle Path' that avoids the extremes in almost every sphere of philosophical speculation, in epistemology and metaphysics, in normal philosophy or ethics as well as in linguistic philosophy.

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## EPISTEMOLOGY OF IMMANUEL KANT

Epistemology is the study of the valid form of knowledge. It answers the question „How do we know?“

The origin of the word „epistemology“ comes from the Greek word 'episteme', which means „knowledge.“ Sometimes it is known as the „theory of knowledge.“

Epistemology is a branch of philosophy.

Epistemology always tries to answer the basic question: „How can a person distinguish the truth from the false?“

Right from wrong.

??? ??? unreal.

In the field of philosophy there are two major arguments established by two philosophical schools about gaining knowledge:

1. Rationalism
2. Empiricism

**Plato** who belonged to rationalist school hold the view that the knowledge is nearly an awareness of absolute universal ideas

erusting/entrusting(?) independence of any subject to apprehend them. So, therefore, knowledge of absolute cannot be reached through senses.

In the modern period two main epistemological positions dominate in philosophy:

1. Empiricism – empiricists explain knowledge as a product of a sense perception.
2. Rationalism – rationalists see it as the product of rational reflection

According to empiricism, knowledge results from a kind of reflection of external objects, through sensory organs sometimes with the help of instruments such as microscope, telescope etc.

Empirical knowledge has no *a priori* existence like in **Plato's** concept, such as the „concept of ideal state.“

It has to be developed by observation. Therefore, the ideal state of **Plato** becomes a false idea, because no one can understand it through sense experience. Likewise empiricists, **Descartes'** rationalism is a valid source of gaining knowledge.

According to rationalists, valid knowledge comes only through the mind. Rationalists hold the view that the mind is able to understand the truth, that was not placed before the sense perception of sense experience.

there are (innate) ideas which a person can know independently from his sense experience.

Mathematics and geometry are examples for abstract truths, which are known with the certainty.

**Plato** was of the opinion that ideas exist independently from the mind. Ideas, according to him, are not produced as a result of human sense experience.

these independently existing ideas are only the reality of the universe since they are absolute and unchanging. The valid knowledge (the knowledge of reality) comes when the mind grasps these ideas.

According to **Plato** the knowledge of „ideal state“ cannot be experienced through sense organs, as it does not exist in the external world. It does not exist in the mind also of human beings, but the „ideal state“ exists in the heaven. This can be grasped only through innate knowledge.

#### IMMANUEL KANT

**Immanuel Kant** emphasizes very fundamental characteristics of epistemology. He felt that it is worthy to examine the knowledge which the human mind is capable of, before attempting to solve such problems concerning the soul, the God, the origin of the world, the origin of the universe etc.

Any attempt to find a solution for those problems without dealing with the questions raised by epistemology is like attempting to navigate a ship without a compass and without a systematic study of stars to get the proper directions.

**Kant** tried to solve the problem of empiricism. His solution is a combination of fundamentals of rationalism with the fundamentals of empiricism. he attempted to combine both theories rationalism and empiricism. his new theory is called „form and matter epistemology.“

A statue can have a form as such as **Abraham Lincoln** and a matter such as marble - both these things form a matter needed for the existence of the statue of **Abraham Lincoln**.

Knowledge is gained by a form which are categories of mind and matter known as the data of sensations. Both mind and form are needed to have knowledge, argues **Kant**.

**Kant** agrees with rationalists to some extent, because a person can have an exact and certain knowledge through rationalism. He welcomes empiricism, because such knowledge is very much informative about the structure of thoughts than the about the world outside of thoughts.

**Kant** has distinguished three types of knowledge:

1. *A priori* analytical
2. *Posteriori* synthetical
3. *A priori* synthetical

*A priori* analytical – the knowledge which is exact and certain. It is not informative because it makes clear only what is contained in definitions. For example: „Barren women bear no children.“

*Posteriori* synthetical – *posteriori* knowledge conveys information about the world learned from experience, but those information could be incorrect due to the malfunction of senses.

*A priori* synthetical – the knowledge which is discovered by pure intuition and is both exact and certain, as it expresses the necessary conditions that the mind imposes on all objects of experiences.

*Posteriori* synthetical - „all crows are black.“

*A priori* synthetical - „all men are subject to death.

Philosophers before **Kant** believed that there will be a metaphysical foundation to the physical world. (?) Uniformity and the existence of universe may have compelled them to think about such metaphysical powers. As a result of that they believed in an existence of a supreme divine power who created the world. In Indian philosophy *Upaniṣadic* sages also believed in the existence of a supreme being - „*Brahman*.“ **Kant** also believed in the physical and material world with the knowledge he got through his sense-experience. According to **Kant** knowledge is performed in the mind with the help of sense perception that knowledge uncovers the appearance of objects as we experience them. But we have no power to go beyond that. Therefore the empirical knowledge has no power to explain the reality behind the material objects. Sense organs only connect objects to the mind. Therefore it is meaningless to talk about an ultimate reality of the material world through the empirical knowledge. But the rational thinking always attempts to build an unconditioned reality that runs behind the empirical knowledge we get from the physical world. The empirical knowledge reproduces ideas. With the knowledge we reproduce, we make judgment about unconditional realities. Those judgments are false due to their unstable foundation. Those concepts are not practical in the real world.

Buddhism also does not accept that the external world is based on a metaphysical ground. As it appears in the *Sabba Sutta* of the *Samyutta Nikāya*, '*Sabba*' (Skt. *Sarva*) means all, all objects that are perceived by sense organs - in other words, everything that is perceptible in the world. In that *sutta* Buddhist teachings do not attempt to make any transcendental concepts, such as everything is permanent - „*sabbaṃ atthi*“ or „*sabbaṃ natthi*.“ **Kant's** argument on metaphysical concepts is similar to Buddhist teachings that appear in the *Sabba Sutta*. The *Sabba Sutta* clarifies or explains the meaning of *Sabba*. *Sabba* includes everything in the world. Man makes his world according to the sense experience he gets from the external world. According to the teaching of **the Buddha** and **Kant** it is clear that the objective knowledge could be established in the empirical field.

## MATERIALISM AND RELIGION

The rise of natural science, that is, a rational and experimental approach to the things of the world, there was produced an ongoing debate with religion. This started with **Galileo** and **Newton**, neither of whom would have entered into the debate as it came to be in the years of the radical enlightenment. Essentially, this debate is about whether the world contains 'spirit', a non-material reality that, paradoxically, can interact with the material. In all religious traditions this reality is personal. While 'the force' of star war fame has its appeal,(?) it will never be the centre of religious activity. There are two issues here: the materiality of the world and the origin of ideas about spirit that continue to persist. It has become increasingly obvious that the materialist approach has won the day.

The world is composed of matter only. Scientists of all kinds go about their work without the hypothesis of spirit. Certainly there are scientists who try very hard to find evidence of divine agency in the world. These men and women are rarely biologists because the theory of evolution has displaced any idea of purpose. They are often physicists/cosmologists who delve into the origins of the universe, that is, they share a common preoccupation with much religion, the origin of all things. The common concern is aided by the emergence of cosmological theories that postulate a definite beginning in time.

So the quest for divine agency, while being driven from most people's lives by the experience of senseless suffering and from the scientists theories by the lack of evidence, is driven back to the big-bang. This is truly the end result of 'God of the gaps' theology and one wonders what impact this God, who may or may not have been involved in the initial expansion of the universe, has for human lives.<sup>141</sup> We have arrived at a modern 'deism'. The second issue is raised by the continuation in popular consciousness and the larger part of the church, of ideas about divine agency. One explanation is that of cultural persistence. The Judeo/Christian tradition obviously has, at its heart, the idea of divine agency. But this does not explain its persistence in the culture and that most religions of the world have a similar concern.

Evolutionary psychologists like **Pascal Boyer**, **Dan Sperber** and **Justin Barrett** are beginning to provide an explanation as to why certain religious ideas, specifically, the personal nature of 'spirit' persist in cultures worldwide. These explanations have to do with the evolved structure of the brain and how this translates to the kind of concept that is attractive to the mind. That is, there are certain concepts that our minds easily entertain. Much like language acquisition, the mind automatically receives certain concepts more readily than others.

Since **Chomsky's** work in the late 60's linguists generally acknowledge that the brain has innate structures that aid the acquisition of language. More recent work by evolutionary psychologists indicates that it is not only language that is facilitated by innate brain structures. Indeed it seems that these structures are responsible for all cognition, including the elaboration of religious ideation. This work explains why supernatural realities are always imagined to be personal because the brain is specifically structured to deal with the personality. In other words, evolution has provided us with specific adaptations that are unconscious, mandatory and fast and respond when we are dealing with others. These adaptations are intimately involved in religious ideation: that is why 'the force' will never be a key religious concept.

It would seem from the above that the outlook for religious thought is doomed, both on the basis of the materialism of the world and on an increasingly satisfying explanation of its evolutionary/cognitive origins.(?) I will argue in this column(?) that this is not the end of theology but its liberation from superstitious thought and false foundations and the beginning of a theology that is

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<sup>141</sup>According to Semitic religions in the far future God will resurrect all souls and judge them whether they go to hell or heaven.

Now it is important to believe and worship the God, or we might finish in the hell. This is the importance of believing in God.

recognised as being cultural/literary.

When we critically examine the Judeo/Christian tradition we find pointers that affirm that God is not contained by the concepts of supernatural agency, even though much of the tradition would lead us to believe so. I will further contend that orthodox theology has at its base the concepts that will lead us to a theology that will again capture the minds of men and women. Central to these conceptions is the doctrine of the Trinity, doctrine that subverts both the materialist and the evolutionary/cognitive reduction of theology. I will contend that the Judeo/Christian tradition is critical of what may be termed 'naivist' religion, that is, the religion that our minds would automatically produce. This critique may be found in the prophets' Old Testament narrative and in the ministry of Jesus. It seems that the gospel is not about being saved for the afterlife, but being saved from automatic religious thinking that is so injurious to our lives.

## RELIGION AND MARX (2009)

### Material and economic realities

Economics, then, are what constitute the base of all of human life and history – generating division of labor, class struggle and all the social institutions which are supposed to maintain the status quo.(?) Those social institutions are a superstructure built upon the base of economics. Totally dependent upon material and economic realities but nothing else. All of the institutions which are prominent in our daily lives – marriage, church, government, arts, etc. - can only be truly understood when examined in relation to economic forces.

**Marx** had a special word for all of the work that goes into developing those institutions: ideology. The people working in those systems – developing art, theology, philosophy etc. - imagine that their ideas come from a desire to achieve truth or beauty, but that is not ultimately true. In reality, they are expressions of class interest and class conflict. They are reflections of an underlying need to maintain the status quo and preserve current economic realities. This isn't suprising – those in power have always wished to justify and maintain that power.

### How do we account for religion

How do we account for religion – its origin, its development, and even its persistence in modern society? This is a question which has occupied many people in a variety of fields for quite a long time. At one point, the answers were framed in purely theological and religious terms, assuming the truth of Christian revelations and proceeding from there.

But through the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries a more 'naturalistic' approach developed. On a person who attempted to examine religion from an objective, scientific perspective was **Karl Marx**. **Marx's** analysis and critique of religion is perhaps one of the most famous and most quoted by theist and atheist alike. Unfortunately, most of those doing the quoting don't really understand exactly what **Marx** meant.

I think that this in turn is due to not entirely understanding **Marx's** general theories on economics and society. **Marx** actually said very little about religion directly; in all of his writings he hardly ever addresses religion in a systematic fashion, even though he touches on it frequently in books, speeches and pamphlets. The reason is that his critique of religion forms simply one piece of his overall theory of society – thus, understanding his critique of religion requires some understanding of his critique of society in general.

„The religious world is but the reflex of the real world.“

According to **Karl Marx**, religion is like other social institutions in that it is dependent upon the material and economic realities in a given society. It has no independent history; instead it is the creature of

productive forces. As **Marx** wrote: „The religious world is but the reflex of the real world.“

According to **Marx** religion can only be understood in relation to other social systems and the economic structures of society. In fact, religion is only dependent upon economics, nothing else – so much so that the actual religious doctrines are almost irrelevant. This is a functionalist interpretation of religion: understanding religion is dependent upon what social purpose religion itself serves, not the content of its beliefs.

**Marx's** opinion is that religion is an illusion that provides reasons and excuses to keep society functioning just as it is. Much as capitalism takes our productive labor and alienates us from its value, religion takes our highest ideals and aspirations and alienates us from them, projecting them into an alien and unknowable being called 'god'.

### Three reasons for disliking religion

**Marx** has three reasons for disliking religion.

1. It is irrational – religion is a delusion and a worship of appearances that avoids recognizing underlying reality.
2. Religion negates all that is dignified in a human being by rendering them servile and more amenable to accepting the status quo. In the preface to his doctoral dissertation **Marx** adopted as his motto the words of the Greek hero **Prometheus** who defied the gods to bring fire to humanity: „I hate all gods.“ With addition that they „do not recognize man's self-consciousness as the highest divinity.“
3. Religion is hypocritical. Although it might profess valuable principles, it sides with the oppressors. **Jesus** advocated helping the poor, but the Christian church merged with the oppressive Roman state, taking part in the enslavement of people for centuries. In the Middle Ages the Catholic Church preached about heaven, but acquired as much property and power as possible.

Religious distress is at the same time the expression of real distress and the protest against real distress. „Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature,“ „the heart of a heartless world,“ just as it is the spirit of a spiritless situation. „It is the opium of the people.“

The abolition of religion as the illusory happiness of the people is required for their real happiness. The demand to give up the illusion about its condition is the demand to give up a condition which needs illusions.

„Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature...“

„Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature...“ leaves out that it is also the „heart of a heartless world.“ This is more a critique of society that has become heartless and is even a partial validation of religion that it tries to become its heart. In spite of his obvious dislike of and anger towards religion, **Marx** did not make religion the primary enemy of workers and communists. Had **Marx** regarded religion as a more serious enemy, he would have devoted more time to it.

**Marx** is saying that religion is meant to create illusory fantasies for the poor. Economic realities prevent them from finding true happiness in this life, so religion tells them this is OK because they will find true happiness in the next life. **Marx** is not entirely without sympathy: people are in distress and religion does provide solace, just as people who are physically injured receive relief from opiate-based drugs.

The problem is that opiates fail to fix a physical injury – you only forget your pain and suffering. This can be fine, but only if you are also trying to solve the underlying causes of the pain. Similarly, religion does

not fix the underlying causes of people's pain and suffering – instead, it helps them forget why they are suffering and causes them to look forward to an imaginary future when the pain will cease instead of working to change circumstances now. Even worse, this 'drug' is being administered by the oppressors who are responsible for the pain and suffering.

Here in **Marx's** eyes religion enters. Capitalism utilises our tendency towards religion as a tool or ideological state apparatus to justify this alienation. Christianity teaches that those who gather up riches and power in this life will almost certainly not be rewarded in the next - „It is harder for a rich man to enter the Kingdom of Heaven than it is for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle...“ While those who suffer oppression and poverty in this life, while cultivating their spiritual wealth, will be rewarded in the Kingdom of God. Thus **Marx's** famous line - „religion is the opium of the people“ as it soothes them and dulls their senses to the pain of oppression.

It would not be appropriate to accept **Marx's** ideas uncritically

As interesting and insightful as **Marx's** analysis and critiques are, they are not without their problems – historical and economic. Because of these problems it would not be appropriate to accept **Marx's** ideas uncritically. Although he certainly has some important things to say on the nature of religion, he can't be accepted as the last word on the subject.

First, **Marx** doesn't spend much time looking at religion in general; instead he focuses on the religion with which he is most familiar: Christianity. His comments do hold for other religions with similar doctrines of a powerful god and happy afterlife, they do not apply to radically different religions. In ancient Greece and Rome. For example, a happy afterlife was reserved for heroes while commoners could only look forward to a mere shadow of their earthly existence. Perhaps he was influenced in this matter by **Hegel** who thought that Christianity was the highest form of religion and that whatever was said about that also automatically applied to 'lesser' religions – but that isn't true.

A second problem is his claim that religion is wholly determined by material and economic realities. Not only is nothing else fundamental enough to influence religion, but influence cannot run in the other direction, from religion to material and economic realities. This is not true. If **marx** were right, then capitalism would appear in countries proper to Protestantism because Protestantism is the religious system created by capitalism – but we don't find this. The Reformation comes to 16<sup>th</sup> century Germany which is still feudal in nature; real capitalism doesn't appear until the 19<sup>th</sup> century. This caused **Max Weber** to theorize that religious institutions end up creating new economic realities.

#### MARXISM<sup>142</sup>

Changes in Marxist attitude toward religion and the view taken of Marxist own historical role have influenced Marxist theorizing as well as the quasi-religious uses made of Marxist doctrine. The topic of Marxism and religion can involve either an analysis of Marxist theories of religion or a study of Marxism as a functional equivalent of religion. The two are difficult to disentangle. Moreover, although marxists have often distinguished between the oppressive role of established churches and the emancipatory possibilities of religious movements, they have historically linked their own worldview to both.

The positivist thrust of German social democracy fostered little sympathy for religion, although **Eduard Bernstein** and **Karl Kautsky** each wrote books on the role of religion in Reformation and Renaissance in Europe, and **Kautsky's** *Foundations of*

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<sup>142</sup>This is a note taken from an Internet website, but in the original paper from which I copied this the website's address was not mentioned.

*Christianity* (International Publishers, 1925 [1908]) discussed the influence of Roman socio-economic conditions on early Christianity. The Austro-Marxists were more sympathetic to religion, partly in the hope of attracting the large Roman Catholic working population. Their neo-Kantianism<sup>143</sup> also encouraged moral theorizing and made greater room for religious speculation.

**Lenin** wrote little about religion and viewed it primarily as an impediment to political action. However, his book *Materialism and Emperio-Criticism* (Foreign Languages Publishing 1920 [1908]) attacked current 'subjectivist' epistemologies and the cover that they provided for the reintroduction of religion. **Trotsky** approvingly analyzed the parallel, now commonly made, between the disciplined Puritan and Jesuit 'parties' and the contemporary Bolsheviks, while other Soviet marxists either saw a more positive role for religious ideals as a road to Socialism or elevated Scientific Socialism itself into a new 'religion'.

The Italian Marxist **Antonio Gramsci** developed a suggestive treatment of religion in his *Prison Notebooks* (Lawrence & Wishart 1971 [1948-1951]). His broad definition of ideological hegemony frequently included reference to religious ideas and elites. The distinction between traditional and organic intellectuals, in his theory of intellectuals, allowed him to discuss both the conservative and the revolutionary roles of religious elites. He analyzed early Medieval and Reformation Christianity, as well as modern Roman Catholicism, especially in their relationships to current Italian conditions. His discussion of the ways in which disaffected members of established religious elites (e.g., **Savonarola** and **Luther**) attack hegemonic institutions in the name of new ideals and organizations is particularly interesting.

By contrast, the Frankfurt School produced no sustained analysis of religion. Its members demonstrated a sympathy for religion as a repository of unfulfilled ideals (e.g., **Horkheimer**) and a source of theological motifs for their writings (e.g., **Adorno** and **Benjamin**). Only marginal members, such as **Erich Fromm** (in *The Dogma of Christ*, Routledge 1963 [1930]) and **Franz Borkenau** (in his study of feudal and capitalist worldviews), wrote works systematically linking religion to changing societal circumstances.

Among later Marxists, **Lucien Goldmann** (*The Hidden God*, Routledge 1964) offered a valuable analysis of **Pascal's** life and thought, one influenced by **Lukács's** Marxism and modified by categories drawn from **Piaget**. He established structural homologies between social classes and styles of thought and saw the 'tragic vision' of **Pascal** and the Jansenists as the worldview of an administrative class yoked, yet historically opposed, to the monarchy's increasing power. **Goldman's** work stands out among Marxist accounts of religion for its theoretical innovations and its thorough and sensitive treatment of historical texts.

Other Marxian-inspired efforts in the study of religion include those of **Houtart** and **Lemercinier**, two Catholic thinkers, who have adapted Marxian ideas effectively to the study of Asian religious traditions, and **Bryan Turner**, who has offered a 'materialist' theory of religion.

The rapprochement of Marxism and Christianity among eastern European intellectuals in the postwar era (e.g., **Leszek Kolakowski**) and the amalgam of Marxism and Christianity in the social reform efforts of Liberation Theology in Latin America since the 1960s (e.g., **Gutiérrez**) are only two examples of the continuing mutual fertilization of Marxism and religion. With the demise of world communism, Marxism's new, yet not unfamiliar, situation is likely to allow its proponents once again to forge links with religion.

#### Foundations of Marxism

We are here to give you a starting point, a grounding in what Marxism is about. A Marxists have a certain kind of practice, a way of living and working, that we call being a 'communist'. A Marxist's thought is based on this daily practice, a philosophy called 'dialectics'. Thus, Marxism is both a 'theory' and 'practice'. The theories of Marxism are based on a method of thought called 'dialectical materialism'; to be clear there is no one answer to a question – theory is based on a particular set of conditions that are always finite, and thus, any theory is necessarily limited. To test the validity of theory, Marxists rely on empirical evidence as the criteria of 'truth'. Using such a methodology **Marx** and **Engels** examined history, which lead them to explain theories on the class struggle, the basis of social relations through economics, and the form of society that would follow capitalism. These theories are not immutable truths, they follow something similar to the scientific method: a hypothesis that explains observable events; a hypothesis which remains valid only so long as it does not conflict with reality. Naturally, there are countless examples of Marxist theories, that have been modified, revised, or all together changed: starting with **Marx's** own changes! In this sense, in reading the classics of marxism your most important task is to comprehensively understand *the method*; having accomplished that, you'll begin to see relevant and up-to-date answers for modern times on your own.

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143A modern school based on the teachings of **Immanuel Kant**.

#### MARXISM AND PHILOSOPHY

The philosopher **Étienne Balibar** wrote in 1993 that „there is no Marxist philosophy and there never will be; on the other hand, Marx is more important for philosophy than ever before.“ So, even the existence of Marxist philosophy is debatable (the answer may depend on what is meant by „philosophy,“ a complicated question in itself.) **Balibar’s** remark is intended to explain the significance of the final line of **Karl Marx’s** *Eleven Theses on Feuerbach* (1845), which can be read as an epitaph for philosophy: „The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it.“

If this claim (which **Marx** originally intended as a criticism of German Idealism and the more moderate Young Hegelians), is still more or less the case in the twenty-first century, as many Marxists would claim, then Marxist theory is in fact the practical continuation of the philosophical tradition, while much of philosophy is still politically irrelevant. Many critics, both philosophers outside(?), Marxism and some Marxist philosophers, feel that this is too quick a dismissal of the post-Marxist philosophical tradition. Much sophisticated and important thought has taken place after the writing of **Marx** and **Engels**; much or perhaps even all of it has been influenced, subtly or overtly, by Marxism. Simply dismissing all philosophy as sophistry might condemn Marxism to a simplistic empiricism or economism, crippling it in practice and making it comically simplistic on the level of theory.

Nonetheless, the force of **Marx’s** opposition to Hegelian Idealism and to any ‘philosophy’ divorced from political practice remains powerful even to a contemporary reader. Twentieth-century Marxists and Marx-influenced theory, such as (to name a few examples at random) the critical theory of the Frankfurt School, the political writing of **Antonio Gramsci**, and the neo-Marxism of **Frederic Jameson**, must take **Marx’s** condemnation of philosophy into account, but many such thinkers also feel a strong need to remedy the perceived theoretical problems with orthodox Marxism. Such problems might include a too-simple economic determinism, an untenable theory of ideology as ‘false consciousness’ or a simplistic model of state power rather than hegemony. So, Marxist philosophy must continue to take account of advances in the theory of politics developed after **Marx**, but it must also be aware of a descent into theoreticism or the temptations of idealism.

**Étienne Balibar** claimed that if one philosopher could be called a ‘Marxist philosopher’, that one would be doubtlessly **Louis Althusser**: „**Althusser** proposed a ‘new definition’ of philosophy as ‘class struggle in theory’ ... Marxism had proper

signification (and original „problematic“) only in so far as it was the theory of the tendency towards communism, and in view of its realization. The criteria of acceptance or rejection of ‘Marxist’ proposition was always the same, whether it was presented as ‘epistemological’ or as ‘philosophical’: it was in the act of rendering intelligible a ‘communit policy’ or not.“ (*Ecrits pour Althusser*, 1991, p.98). However, „Althusser never ceased to put in question the ‘images of communism’ that Marxist theory and ideology carried on: but he did it in the name of communism itself.“ **Althusser** thus criticized the evolutionist image which made of communism an ultimate stage of history, as well as the apocalyptic images which made it a „society of transparency,“ „without contradiction“ nor ideology. **Balibar** observes that, in the end, **Althusser** joined the most sober definition of communism, exposed by **Marx** in *The German Ideology*: „Communism is not a state of the future, but the real movement which destroys the existing state of being.“

Marxist philosophy or Marxist theory are terms which cover work in philosophy, which is strongly influenced by **Karl Marx’s** materialist approach to theory which is written by Marxists. It may be broadly divided into Western Marxism, which drew out of various sources, and the official ‘philosophy in the Soviet Union’, which enforced a rigid reading of **Marx** called ‘Diamant’ (for ‘DIAlectical MATerialism’), in particular during the 1930’s. The phrase ‘Marxist philosophy’ itself does not indicate a strictly defined sub-field of philosophy, because the diverse influence of Marxist theory has extended into fields as diverse as aesthetics, ethics, ontology, epistemology and philosophy of science, as well as its obvious influence on political philosophy and the philosophy of history. The key characteristics of Marxism in philosophy are its materialism and its commitment to political practice as the end goal of all thought. **Louis Althusser**, for example, defined philosophy as ‘class struggle in theory’, thus radically disjoining himself from those who claimed that philosophers could adopt a ‘God’s eye view’ as a purely neutral judge. Just as the young **Marx** had left university and German Idealism to encounter the proletariat, which permitted him to modify his perspective on practice and theory, ‘intellectuals’ couldn’t content themselves with instructing masses from their chairs (as the ‘organic intellectual’ conception denounced by **Antonio Gramsci**), but had themselves to take part in the social struggles of their times.

#### MARXIST ATTITUDE TOWARD THE RELIGION (1)

Marxist attitude towards religion was directly aimed at the theistic religion that maintained the ideas of the human world including human being as created by the God. It functions according to the will of the God. Human beings are therefore incapable in challenging the God or changing the world that is made by the God. **Marx** maintained that minority (rich) is using various tools to oppress the majority (the poor). One such tool that was used by the rich was religion, in Europe.

The religion says „poor is the blessed.“ Therefore, he understood European religions as forces to mislead common, poor people So, **Karl Marx** wrote „Religion is opium to poor (oppressed) men.“ **Marx** has mentioned that religion is a net for the people and they see everything through this net. Therefore they cannot understand the real truth, because people normally see everything according to their religious teachings.

That is why religion has compared with the net. There is not any religion without human beings and it cannot be originated automatically. Therefore, religion has been originated by the man, not by any God. The God also is created by the man. Although man is founder of the religion, later man has become a laborer of the religion. And **Marx** has discussed about those things critically. However, religion has developed to unite the people and it against the man.(?) As a result of that man is helpless dut to the religion.

According to the above information Marxists have rejected basically the concept of God as a creator etc. and exploiting activities of the rulers and capitalists in the society.(?) In addition religion has protested higher conditions of the highest caste such as *Brāhmaṇa*, Christianity etc.(?) The responsibilities, powers, autonomy has been given to the God or another extra power. Therefore, Marxists have given the deepest criticism against religion. The criticism of **Marx** on religion was not directed at religions such as Buddhism.

According to Buddhism, the belief that God has created the world is a wrong view (*micchā diṭṭhi*). Therefore, Buddhism does not believe that world functions according to the will of God. According to the Buddhist theory human society could be changed and it can be only done by the human beings – they can think and change and become better. **The Buddha’s** coming to the world among human beings to remind them that they can change themselves and even they can change the society in which they live. Therefore **Marx** could not reject Buddhism.

## MARXIST ATTITUDE TOWARD THE RELIGION (2)

There are many different views concerning with the religion which was presented by sociologist scholars and humanity scholars. According to the Marxists' attitude toward the religion, it is quite different from the scholars' attitude, who presented their interpretations in regard to the religion. Most of the scholars accepted that Marxism was an influence to politics, economy, culture, education and religion. There is very deep concern between religion and human beings regarding the beginning of the world. Therefore, it cannot be spread religion and man because man has connected with the heart and religion.(?) Religion can be considered as the most powerful in life of society. Rulers' and capitalists' religion is used as an instrument to protect their power. Religion is justified exploiting activities of the labourers by capitalists. Marxists have discussed those things very deeply.

Therefore, Marxists have given their critical interpretations with regard to the religion exactly. There is not any religion without human beings. Religion has been originated by the people, not by the God. God is also created by man. Although man is founder of the religion, later man has become a labourer of religion. Religion has developed as an oppression to the people and it was made as well as against the man.(?) As a result of that man is helpless due to the religion. According to teaching of the religions, there is a cast system, ruler, capitalists and labourers in the society as a result of their good or bad actions.<sup>144</sup>

Marxists have mentioned religion as a net for the people and that all the fear depends on that net. They cannot understand the real truth, because people can't see everything normally because of their religious teaching. That is why **Marx** has compared the religion to a net. Some religious people have to accept the God as a creator or savior of the world. People cannot understand the real world or how human being was born or living in the world and how they become rich etc., because religion has taught that everything exists with the God. Basically Marxists rejected the concept of God, ruler, capitalists in the society and highest cast *Brāhmaṇa*, Christianity etc.(?)

According to above mentioned matter it is evident that Marxists have criticized religion very deeply. But Buddhism does not belong to religion, because **the Buddha** did not teach such a thing. Therefore Marxists do not reject Buddhism as a guide for the world. Marxists wanted to confer personal responsibility, leadership and power to the man or human, not to the God or not any other powerful thing. That has been done by Buddhism very clearly at the beginning. Therefore, many scholars have mentioned that Buddhism is not belonging to Marxist interpretation in regard to the religion.

Marxists accepted basic teaching of the Buddhism thus: „The man should attain his development and

144As a result of their good or bad actions? If it is taken from the objective point of view, it is not true, because usually the cast system and the position in society is acquired by birth – viz. cast system in India, but also any other system even in West, Europe, USA etc. But if we take it from the Buddhist point of view, then of course the position in society is according to one's deeds committed in one's previous life.

welfare by himself, not by the god. There is no eternal soul in the body or outside, there is no creator in the world, there is no any sacred things, there is no casts system.“ Finally, we can examine that Marxists wanted to explain the freedom of thought individually in the world. **Marx** wanted to give messages as **the Buddha** said that „one must rely on oneself, how can he rely on others“ - »*Attāhi attano nātho, kōhi nātho parosiyā.*«

#### MARXIST ATTITUDE TOWARD RELIGIONS AND SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS

There are different views concerning the religion which were presented by sociology scholars and humanity scholars. According to their interpretation it should complete or fulfill four kinds of parts or one of them:

1. There should be a holy place and sacred things
2. There should be a kind of belief regarding the holy place and sacred things
3. There should be practice and duties according to the belief concerning the holy place and sacred things
4. There should be an origination of the followers to follow the religious activities.

According to the marxist attitude toward the religion it is more different when we investigate it with the scholars who presented their interpretation regarding the religion. Apart from that it is different from the sociological analysis among the Marxist and other scholars. Most of the modern scholars accept that the Marxism had an influence in politics, economy, culture, education and religion etc., that is without any discussion. There is a very deep connection between the religion and human beings since in the beginning of the world and beginning of the human beings.

Therefore, it can't be separated from the man, because man is connected by heart with the religion. Consequently religion can be considered as the most powerful part in the life of society as well as in the world. So, Marxists have discussed those things very deeply. According to the Marxists ruler and capitalist religion is used as an instrument to protect their power and continue it further. In addition religion has conformed differences among the casts. The Marxists have indicated further, that religion justifies exploiting activities of the laborers by the capitalists. Consequently, religion has been considered as a unit, which conforms dependence of a person. Therefore, as it is evident, Marxists have given their critical interpretations regarding the religion.

There is no religion without human beings and it can't origin automatically. It can't exist without man. Therefore, religion has originated by the people, not by any of gods. The gods are also created by man. Although man is the founder of the religion, later man became a laborer of the religion and marxists discussed those things critically.

However, religion has developed as an oppressive unit to the people and it works as well as exists against the man. As a result of that man is helpless due to the religion, according to Marxists. The religion is an appearance of the highest evidence to conform differences among the casts. According to the teaching of the religion there is a cast system, rulers, capitalists and laborers in the society as a result of the God or because their bad action in the past (*kamma*). If any bad person becomes rich, religion will explain that he has actually been good, therefore he deserves it. If somebody became poor, it shows that he had been a bad person.

Therefore, Marxists have indicated that religion has investigated(?) their differences. Consequently people have to tolerate them due to their religion, because it has conformed them, because of the *kamma*. Therefore, religion was named 'opium' by **Marx**. In addition Marxists have shown that anybody can attain only un-eternal wealth from the religion, so there is no practical value in the religion. The Marxists have proved these views with evidences.

Marxists mentioned religion as a net for the people who see everything through this net. Therefore they can't understand the real truth because normally people everything sees according to their religious teachings, that is why religion has compared with the net. According to some religions people have to accept God as creator, leader in the world. So, people can't understand real world or how human beings are born, living in the world and how they become rich etc. because religion has taught that everything exists according to the God.

Therefore, to the above information, Marxists have rejected basically the concept of God as a creator etc. and exploiting activities by the rulers and capitalists in the society. In addition religion has protected higher conditions of the highest cast such as *Brāhmaṇa*; Christianity etc., the responsibilities, powers, autonomy, all that have been given by the God or any other extra power.

The marxists indicated further that both priests and politicians together have conformed their powers in the society, except basic teachings of the religion.(?) Therefore, marxists have given their most deep criticism against religion. But Buddhists do not belong to that religion, because **Buddha** has not taught such a teaching. Therefore, Marxists can't reject the Buddhism, rather they can get some guide from the Buddhism. The marxists wanted to glue(?) personal responsibility, leadership and autonomy, power to the man or human being, not for the God or any other power or thing. It has been by the Buddhism very clearly since the beginning. Therefore, so many scholars have mentioned that Buddhism does not belong to the marxist interpretation regarding the religion. **Ven. Kamburupīṭiya Ariyasena** has indicated that **Marx** did not have enough knowledge regarding Buddhist philosophy. The marxists have accepted basic teachings of the Buddhism as follows:

1. The man should attain his development, progress and welfare by himself, not by the God or any such power
2. There is no eternal soul in the body or outside
3. There is no creator in the world
3. There is no creator in the world
4. There is no sacred thing
5. There is no caste system

Most important matter is the food for the people. Most important thing is frugality; living in peace should develop instead of war. Everybody should have a respect to each other and everybody should think about others as his own brothers and sisters. Everybody should try to prepare welfare for other people. The democracy and freedom is very important.

**QUESTION: COMPARE MAIN TEACHING OF MARXISM WITH BUDDHISM? MARXIST CRITICISM ON RELIGION AND BUDDHISM AND RESPOND ON THAT. (LECTURED BY VEN. PAÑÑĀLOKA) (ORIGINAL BY VEN. IM DINA & VEN. H. SOVANNY)**

With the advancement of science and knowledge in recent century new theories of political and economic interest emerge in the world. **Karl Marx** in his publication *Das Capital* presents the new theory of

the evolution of political and economic history of the world. Together with his disciple **Friedrich Engels** he made the second publication – *Communist Manifesto*. It outlines the economic history of the world. His main theory was called 'the labor theory of production'.

### Philosophy of **Karl Marx**

He observed in history that there were three main streams of thought influences. **Karl Marx** generated his philosophy following three bases of thought that were predominantly functioning in Germany, England and France at that time:

1. Classical German philosophy
2. Classical politico-economic system of Great Britain
3. French communism and the trends of revolution

These three ideologies shaped the way of thinking of **Karl Marx** and he produced the new politico-economic theory named Marxism.

One of the basic principles in his philosophy was that he said: „Human economic history is nothing but combat between 'have' and 'have not'.“ To clarify this ide he classified the entire history of humanity in five stages, namely:

1. Proto-communist era
2. Slave era
3. Landlord era
4. Capitalist era
5. Communist era

**Marx** maintained that in the eras number 2, 3 and 4 the minority of rich and powerful people exploited labor of majority of poor to seek profit and happiness. **Marx** maintained that rich minority is using different tools to oppress the majority of the poors. One such tool that was used by the rich in Europe was religion. The religion says „poor is the blessed, therefore he understands European religion as force to mislead common poor people.“ So, **Karl Marx** wrote: „Religion is opium to poor (= oppressed).“ Therefore, he said that religious criticism should begin in order to achieve social change.

The criticism of **Marx** on religion was not directed at a religion like Buddhism. According to Buddhism the belief that God created the world is a wrong view (*micchā diṭṭhi*). Therefore, Buddhism does not believe that world functions according to the will fo the God. The Buddhist understanding is that natural world and human society as they are today are results of the long process of causes and conditions. According to the Buddhist theory human society can be changed and it can be done only by the human being. God cannot do that, human beings can think. They can think to change and become better. **The Buddha** is coming to the world among human beings to remind them that they can change the society in which they live.

In examining the buddhist response towards **Marx's** idea on religion first we have to contrast and compare the main principles of **Marx's** theory against Buddhism. The main theory of Marxism is the inequality between social classes. According to Buddhism this again has physical as well as psychological reasons. They could be factors like economic, social status etc. Its psychological reasons are *māna* (pride) and *micchā diṭṭhi* (wrong view). **The Buddha** says in *Āṅguttara Nikāya* that there are two reasons for *micchā diṭṭhi*:

1. Wrong information received from others (*parato gocha*)
2. Non-examination of information received from others (*ayoniso manasikāra*)

Even Buddhism understands property as a problem in human society. Therefore, *Aṅguttara Nikāya* says: „Oh monks, poverty is the suffering in the world.“ - »*Dalliddhayam bhikkhave dukkham lokasmiṃ.*« the *Kudhadanta Sutta* of *Dīgha Nikāya* records an incident where Buddhist advice is enumerated as how to overcome poverty. Their three steps are shown to overcome poverty and to establish economic stability in human society.

To rich people **Buddha** advised to practice one good moral quality for the benefit of oneself and society (*dāna*). *Raṭṭhapāla Sutta* of *Majjhima Nikāya* claims that no one can take his wealth after his death, therefore the best use of money should be made while living: »*Na mīyamānaṃ dhanamanveti kiñci, Puttā ca dārā ca dhanañca raṭṭham.*«<sup>145</sup> *Chandaka Sutta* of *Majjhima Nikāya* classified contemporary religions of **the Buddha** into two groups as follows. In this life Buddhism will not evaluate any view that is extremely materialistic and which is taught against ethics in the society. Bare materialism and absence of ethical values will come(?) human spiritual life and society in a great deal.?) Therefore, ethics in human mind has been encouraged by Buddhist teaching. **The Buddha** himself is a culmination of ethics and wisdom. From the very beginning of Buddhist way of life the development of ethic and wisdom became an essential part.

#### 666 COMPARE MAIN TEACHING OF MARXISM WITH BUDDHISM? MARXIST CRITICISM ON RELIGION AND BUDDHISM RESPOND TOWARD THAT.

With the advancement of science and knowledge in recent century's new theories of politico economic interest emerge in the world. Karl Marx in his *Das Capital* presents the new theory of the evolution of political economic history of the world. Together with his disciple Fredic Engels he made the second publication *Communist Manifesto*. It outlines the economic history of the world. His main theory was called "the labour theory of production". Karl-Marx to generate his philosophy at that time the following three bases of thought were predominantly functioning in Germany, England and France. 1, classical German philosophy. 2, classical politico economic system of Great Britain. 3, France communism and the trends of revolution. This three ideologist shaped the way of thinking of Karl Marx and he produces the new politico economic theory named Marxism.

One of the basic principles in his philosophy was that human economic history is nothing but combat between have and have not. To clarify this idea he classified the entire history of humanity in five stages namely: 1, proto-communist era. 2, slave era. 3, land lord era. 4, capitalist era. 5, new communist era. Marx maintains that in the era's number two, three and four the minority of rich and powerful people exploited labour of majority poor for sake of profit and happiness. Marx maintains that rich minority is using different tools to oppress the majority poorest. One such tool that was used by the rich was the religion in Europe. The religion says "poor is the blessed therefore he understands European religion as force to mislead common poor people. So Karl Marx wrote religion is opium to poor (oppressed). Therefore, he said religious criticism to should begin in order to achieve social change.

The criticism of Marx on religion was not directed at a religion like Buddhism. According to Buddhism God is create as of the world is a wrong view (*Micchaditthi*). Therefore Buddhism does not belief that world function according to the will of the God.

145 *Majjhima Nikāya – Majjhimapaññāsapāli – 4. Rājavaggo – Raṭṭhapālasuttam – paragraph 307)*

The Buddhist understanding is that natural world and human society as they are today are results of the long process of causes and conditions. According to the Buddhist theory human society could be changed and it can be only done by the human being. God cannot do that, human beings can think.

In examining the Buddhist response to Marx idea on religion first we have to contrast and compare the main principle of Marx theory against Buddhism. The main theory of Marxism is the in quality between social classes. According to Buddhism this again has physical as well as psychological reason like economic social status etc. Its psychological reasons are Mana (pride) and Micchadithi (wrong view). The Buddha says in Anguttara nikaya that there are two reasons for Micchadithi: 1, wrong information receives form others (Parato gocha). Non –examination of information received from others ( Ayoniso manasikara). Anguttara Nikaya says “O monks poverty is the suffering in the world” (Dalliddhayam bhikkhave dukkham lokasmin). The Kuthadanta Sutta of D. Nikaya record an incident where Buddhist advice is enumerated as a remedy to overcome poverty. establish economic testability in human society.

To rich people Buddha advised to practice one good moral quality for the benefit of oneself and society (Dana) Rattapala Sutta of M. Nikaya said no one can take his wealth after his death, therefore the best use of money should be made while living (na miyamanam danam annuathi). Chandaka Sutta of Majjhima Nikaya classified contemporary religion of the Buddha into two groups as follows. In this life Buddhism will not evaluate any view that is extremely materialistic is which taught against ethics in the society. Bare materialism and absent of ethical values will cause have spiritual life and society in a great deal. Therefore ethics in human mind has been encouraged by Buddhist teaching. The Buddha himself is the culmination of ethic and wisdom. From very beginning of Buddhist way of life the development of ethics and wisdom become an essential part.

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Prepared by Ven. Im Dina  
Printed by Ven H sovanny

#### PHILOSOPHY OF MARX AND THE BUDDHIST RESPONSE TOWARDS IT (ORIGINAL BY VEN. DHARMEŚVAR)

**Karl Marx** was a political philosopher who was born in Germany. He presented his politico-economic theory in his book named '*Das Capital*'.<sup>146</sup> On eof his followers, **Friedrich Engels** who developed the theory of **Karl Marx** to be a political strategy presented it in 1848 in his book named '*Communist Manifesto*'.

It is believed that three streams of European thought were influential in developing the theory of **Karl Marx**. They were:

1. Classical German philosophy
2. Classical British politico-economic system
3. France socialism and social change trends

The main thesis of his philosophy was that the history of every human society is the history of prevalence of rich upon the poor. According to **Marx** in every human society there are two social races, they are: the rich and the poor. Generally there is an inequality in distribution of wealth among the people. As a result one who has a lot of wealth and is in the rich minority, enjoys the comfort and rules over the majority of poor. Subsequently, the majority of poor is put into disregard, to do hard work, suffer and to all problems of life. To present this philosophy in a more and wider context, **Karl Marx** classified the human history into five eras:

1. Pre-communist era – classless society
2. Era of slavery – slave owners and slaves
3. Feudal era – landlords and workers
4. Capitalist era – rich businessmen and factory workers
5. New communist era – the new classless society where is no difference between poor and rich

According to the theory of **Marx** always the wealthy men change the era into new one, as a result of the struggle of poor majority against the rich minority. Therefore, **Karl Marx** suggested the poor people to organize wealth and fight against the capitalism. In his process of explanation of the struggle he said that the religion and the ethics are useless. What religion

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<sup>146</sup> '*Das Capital*' is the German name of the book. The English name would be '*The Capital*'.

has done always is intoxicating people according to the need of the rich. Therefore, **Karl Marx** said that the religion is an institution which will disappear in new communist era in face of trend-less society. The critique of **Marx** is better given in his statement „Religion is opium.“

**Karl Marx** recognized the last distinction based on economy as one of the malpractices in all the historical societies. According to **marx**, the ruling social classes who have and those who haven't were created by economic reasons. He proposed to change the existing economic systems in order to change social structure based on economic classes. In his philosophy **Karl Marx** observed only the physical causes of the creation of social classes.

Buddhism has, on the other hand, observed that there are causes other than economics which created social classes among human beings in the history. According to Buddhism pride (*māna*) is one of sub-psychological causes which causes distinction among human beings. Due to pride human beings tend to think high of themselves and condemn others. This psychological process cannot be reduced or eradicated only by changing the economical or political structure of the human society. Instead pride in human mind should be eradicated by spiritual advancement and mental purity essence, then the aim of the classless human society can be achieved. The society of nobles (*ariya*) was furnished as a good example for this fact.

Another social weakness observed by **Karl Marx** was the exploitation of the poor by the rich. In this fact Buddhism agreed with **marx** because Buddhism also did not agree with the exploitation of the poor in the society. In the Indian society in 6<sup>th</sup> century BC the minority of upper class utilized the lower classes like the *Śūdras* or *Pañcamas* for their comfort and easiness. The social group of both sects were employed to make life comfortable of the males of upper classes. To establish a good social environment for the people who suffered, **the Buddha** theoretically exchanged ideas with the people at that society to prove the fact that the social distinction that are inflicted on society as baseless. In the *Vāseṭṭha Sutta* in *Majjhima Nikāya* **the Buddha** makes clear statement that by birth none becomes a noble or outcaste - »‘*Na jaccā brāhmaṇo [vasalo (syā. kaṃ. ka.)] hoti, na jaccā hoti abrāhmaṇo [brāhmaṇo (syā. kaṃ. ka.)]; Kammunā brāhmaṇo [vasalo (syā. kaṃ. ka.)] hoti, kammunā hoti abrāhmaṇo [brāhmaṇo (syā. kaṃ. ka.)].*<sup>147</sup> In the *Ambuttata Sutta* of *Dīgha Nikāya* **the Buddha** says that all the four classes are equal - »(*cattāro vaṇṇā samasamā honti*)<sup>148</sup> Again practically **the Buddha** rejected class and caste distinction by granting equal status in the Buddhist Order to the members of all the four classes. In the light of Buddhist teaching the woman in ancient India achieved higher social positions – *bhikkhunīs, upāsikās*, mothers, wives and daughters. This information shows that **the Buddha** was a social reformist like **Marx** who rendered a great service against the exploitation of the poor and the innocent.

Surplus value was understood by **Karl Marx** as an evil in the economic of pre-communist society. The minority of rich people earns wealth by exploiting the poor and heaps an extra-income with them. Therefore, **Karl Marx** proposed that to earn all the private own enterprises to be government or common wealth by which surplus value could be abolished and extra-income could be used for the welfare of society. This philosophy of **Marx** influenced the political thinking of the world very much to emerge a system of government called 'welfare' or 'new liberal government'.<sup>149</sup>

When we examine the issue of surplus value in the light of Buddhist teaching two principles can be derived out:

1. According to the *Kudadanta Sutta* of *Dīgha Nikāya* it is the responsibility of the government to organize the economy of the country in the way that each member of society takes part in economic mechanism and thereby all live a satisfactory life.
2. It is the ethical responsibility of the wealthy person to use his extra money for welfare services.

All the second reason **the Buddha** encouraged an ethical principle in this society, that is generosity. Generosity works out with two results – one is for the individual and the other is for the society. greed is an inherent weakness of human mind that can be overcome only by its counter principle generosity. **The Buddha's** philosophy, therefore, came to be practiced in buddhist societies in many ways.

There are two other aspects of **Marx's** philosophy in which Buddhism is a vital understanding in different perspective. There are social ethics and material ethics. With the rejection of the social system in pre-communist societies **Marx** also rejects

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147 *Majjhimanikāya – Majjhimapaññāsapāli* - 5. *Brāhmaṇavaggo* - 8. *Vāseṭṭhasuttaṃ* - paragraph 460

148 This utterance appears many times in *Tipiṭaka*. One of them is *Majjhima Nikāya – Majjhimapaññāsapāli* – 4. *Rājavaggo* – 4. *Madhura Sutta* – paragraph 318

149 **Marx's** economical philosophy cannot be applied in the nowadays society. It is a philosophy which is applicable in society of people, who have no or at least very low greed. Why? Because according to **Marx** rich must give to poor and have nothing for it. According to **Marx** all people should have everything what they need, but not more. But that, of course, is not applicable in reality. As we can see, Buddhism is also not applicable in reality, viz. morality of Buddhist countries like Sri Lanka (drinking alcohol is on a high level); Thailand (market with women and human organs); Burma ('Buddhist' government which does not mind to shoot monks). Buddhism as well as Marxism are not philosophies applicable in nowadays society.

any system of ethics prevailing in those societies. Therefore, he rejects religionists. Buddhist thought looks at social problem in another way. While it recognizes the value of life of all beings, it emphasizes that human being's weaknesses should be overcome through internal transformation.

The other factor of marxism which which Buddhism could not agree with its materialistic views, as Buddhism analyses human personality is a combination of material and mental factors and says that material factors alone cannot be(?) made(?) the existence of man and to change the man. Therefore, structural and internal transformation are fundamental and essential part.

### **666DISCUSS THE BUDDHIST RESPONSE TO THE MARXIST CRITICISM OF RELIGION.**

Philosophy of Karl-Marx: history observed that three main streams of thought influences: Karl-Marx to generate his philosophy at that time the following three bases of thought were predominantly functioning in Germany, England and France. 1. Classical German philosophy. 2. Classical politico economic system of Great Britain. 3. France communism and the trends of revolution. These three ideologists shaped the way of thinking of Karl Marc and he produces the new politico economic theory name Marxism.

One of the basic principles in his philosophy was that he said human economic history is nothing but combat between have and have not. To clarify this idea, he classified the entire history of humanity in five stages namely: 1, proto-communist era. 2. Slave era. 3. Land lord era. 4. Capitalist eras. 5. New communist era. Marx maintains that in the eras number two, three and four the minority of rich and powerful people exploited labor of majority poor for sake of profit and happiness. Marx maintains that rich minority is using different tools to oppress the majority poorest. One such tool that was used by the rich was the religion in Europe. The religion says "poor is the blessed therefore he understands European religion as force to mislead common poor people. So Karl Marx wrote religion is opium to poor (oppressed). Therefore, he said religious criticism to should begin in order to achieve social change.

The criticism of Marx on religion was not directed at a religion like Buddhism. According to Buddhism God is creates the world is a wrong view. Therefore Buddhism does not believe that world function according to the will of the God. The Buddhist understanding is that natural world and human society as they are today are results of the long process of causes and conditions. According to the Buddhist theory human society could be changed and the human being can only do it. God cannot do that, human being can think.

In examining the Buddhist response to Marx idea on religion first we have to contrast and compare the main principle of Marx theory against Buddhism. The main theory of Marxism is the in quality between social classes. According to Buddhism this again has physical as well as psychological reason like economic, social status etc. The Kudhadanta Sutta of D. Nikaya record an incident where Buddhist advice is enumerated as a remedy to overcome poverty establishes economic stability in human society. Hence Marx's objection was to this kind of religious brain wash, which helped to continue the status quo that enabled the rich to live in luxury at the expense and suffering of masses.

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### **EXISTENCIALISM (AUGUST 2009)**

Existencialism is philosophical movement that developed during the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> century.

- Existencialism is a result of the combination of two words – existence and essence.
- Existencialism can be considered as a turning point of the western philosophy.
- According to the tradition all philosophers preferred to emphasize the essence than the existence. Every person has to strive to achieve the essence without paying attention to the eistence.
- Existentialists held this idea because they experienced that human beings die without reaching to any essencebecause of the world war.(?)

- Existentialists did not agree with essentialists. They were of the opinion that the essence would be different from person to person. Among them there were theists and atheists. Most of them denied that the reality could be neatly summarized to a system. Therefore, a precise definition of an essence is impossible according to them.
- Existentialism emphasizes existence of an individual and the subsequent development of the essence of the person.
- Existentialists tried to direct our attention to ourselves as individuals as they understood that man should exist first. Individuals are free to select their own path.
- Existentialists argued that man must take the risk and responsibility of their actions. In the basic existentialist teaching man is the only animal who defines about himself through the life.(?) Without life there will be no meaning.
- Existentialists believed in life and fighting for life. While fighting for the life each man has to face difficulties which are limited knowledge and time to make decision.

Human life is seen as a series of incidents and decisions which he has made without knowing what is correct, what is to be accepted or what is to be rejected. Individuals must make their own choice without any help from external standards. Human beings are completely free and responsible for the choices made by them. If thus freedom is limited, their responsibility for their beliefs, actions, decisions made by them causes anxiety.

- Existentialists accept that man is free to plan his goals. Every man has his own goal.
- In this attempt to reach the goal it is difficult – many are unable to achieve their accepted goals. This leads them to sorrow, disgust and boredom.
- Individual is unable to fulfill his needs as he wishes due to the finite and the infinite nature of the human kind.
- If man with finite abilities will not be able to reach any goal which is beyond his strength, it will lead the man to boredom.
- According to existentialism every person dies with an unsatisfied mind.

#### **EXISTENTIALISM AND BUDDHISM (AUGUST 2009)**

- Man suffers.
- There is an end of suffering.
- Suffering cannot be stopped.
- Suffering was created by God who is supreme and no one will be able to eradicate suffering.
- Man dies without satisfaction.

#### Buddhism

- Buddhism also accepts that man suffers in the physical world (*dukkha*)
- But it goes further than existentialism, because according to Buddhism not only because of the physical world, but also due to the conditional physical body of the person.

- The cause of suffering is well explained in Buddhism. The cause of suffering is attachment (*upādāna*).

»*Pañca upādānakkhandhā dukkhā.*« - This is mentioned in *Anattalakkhana Sutta* in *Samyutta Nikāya*. It was the second discourse delivered by **the Buddha** to his first mendicants.

- According to Buddhism everything is impermanent and subject to change. Therefore, there is nothing static in the world.

- Those who endeavor to reach static goals in the conditioned, unstatic world end up with an unsatisfied mind which leads to suffering.

- As existentialist understands man as miserable, unlucky, he is powerless to eradicate suffering. Buddhism does not agree with existentialists. Man is free to think about goals which are finite. But he would not be able to reach them. This is the nature of the human kind.

According to existentialists **Soren Kierkegaard** and **Albert Camus** – those who believe in the divine creation and the existence of God are of the opinion that the strength and the power of man is restricted by the God. Boredom and anxiety is also a work of the God. Those who deny the existence of the God, **Jean Paul Sartre**, said that such a thing happens due to the competition in the society.

- Even if the individual has already reached his goal, he is not satisfied with what he has got and looks forward to reach a higher goal. According to *Raṭṭhapāla Sutta* of *Majjhima Nikāya* man dies with an unsatisfied mind:

»‘*Rājā ca aññe ca bahū manussā,*

*Avītataṇhā [atittataṇhā (ka.)] maraṇaṃ upenti;*

*Ūnāva hutvāna jahanti dehaṃ,*

*Kāmehi lokamhi na hatthi titti.*«<sup>150</sup>

The king and other many people go to death with unabated lust. Reaching goals aggravate the competition in the society. This causes unrest among people. Winning person will be a victim of losers and will bring sorrow to them:

»‘*Jayaṃ veraṃ pasavati, dukkhaṃ seti parājito;*

*Upasanto sukhaṃ seti, hitvā jayaparājaya’nti.*«<sup>151</sup>

To read: *Alagaddūpama Sutta; Mahādukkhakkhandha Sutta* of *Majjhima Nikāya*

Buddhism accepts the superiority of the man - »*Attāhi attano nātho.*«<sup>152</sup> Man is his own master. According this statement man has the power to end suffering. In addition to that he can make a living in this world a peaceful life with the understanding of the nature of the world.

- Buddhism is not a bad-word teaching. It teaches man to live in the world with the awareness of impermanence of it.

- Not only that Buddhism emphasizes the total eradication of suffering, *Nibbāna*. According to Buddhism mind is unblemished, but it has become blemished as a result of the influx of defilements:

»49. ‘*Pabhassaramidaṃ, bhikkhave, cittaṃ. Tañca kho āgantukehi upakkilesehi upakkiliṭṭha’nti. Navamaṃ.*

50. ‘*Pabhassaramidaṃ, bhikkhave, cittaṃ. Tañca kho āgantukehi upakkilesehi vippamutta’nti. Dasamaṃ.*«<sup>153</sup>

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150(*Majjhima Nikāya – Majjhimapannaṅsapāli – 4. Rājavaggo*)

151This stanza appears also in several places. One of them is *Samyutta Nikāya – Sagāthāvaggapāli - 3. Kosalasamyuttaṃ - 2. Dutiyavaggo - 4. Paṭhamasaṅgāmasuttaṃ*

152This stanza doesn't tell much about superiority of man.

153(*Aṅguttara Nikāya – Ekakanipātapāli - 5. Pañhitaacchavaggo*)

- The path to purification is the Noble Eightfold Path, which leads to *Nibbāna*.

#### **BUDDHIST MYSTICISM IN MEDITATION (ORIGINAL BY VEN. DHARMEŚVAR)**

Meditation is one of the dominant mysticism in Buddhism, leading to complete concentration of mind, 'one-pointedness' or absorption (*samādhi*). Attention is progressively withdrawn from outer things, so that a man may become entirely unconscious of them and may thus enter into a state of trance. It is said that **the Buddha** was once so absorbed while walking in the open air that He was altogether unconscious of a thunderstorm, in which two farmers were struck by lightning. In *samādhi* at its highest point the consciousness of self disappears along with that of the outer world. It is the culmination of the Eightfold Path which leads to *Nibbāna*.<sup>154</sup>

The scriptures speak of different spheres of being. There are three great spheres of cosmic existence. The first and lowest is *kāma-loka*, the world of desire or senses. Above it is *rūpa-loka*, the world of form in which there is a subtle residue of matter, so that its occupants possess the power of sight and hearing but not the senses of touch, taste and smell. Beyond this is *arūpa-loka*, the formless world, in which there is no residue of matter, although its inhabitants are still subject to the limitations of cosmic existence and yet free from the *saṃsāra*.

To rise above the level of the sense-world and to enter the world of form it is necessary to pass through four stages of meditation and trance and to overcome what are known as the five 'hindrances'. The *rūpa jhānas* have been described as 'mystic rapture'. The distinctive feature of mystical experience is the consciousness of the transcendent – the immediate awareness of supreme reality. The four trances may, indeed, lead to a higher plane of being, but their characteristic quality is subjective.

The four *rūpa jhānas* are succeeded by certain exceedingly subtle states of consciousness corresponding to the planes of the formless world. In formless world, through the practice of trance they are said to attain certain supernormal faculties – for instance, of creating a mind formed body, the power of hearing distant sounds and of reading the minds of others, the memory of one's own past lives, the power to read the history of

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154 **The Buddha** learnt the higher stages of *samādhi* from **Ālāra Kālāma** and **Uddaka Rāmaputta** who did not know Noble Eightfold path. Therefore *samādhi* is not culmination of Noble Eightfold Path. *Samādhi* is a common attainment even among Christians, Muslims and in other religions, especially in religions of India.

other beings – to see their passing away and rebirth. They are regarded as a by-product of meditation.

The formless world is not ultimate. Craving for life in that world is a fetter from which man must seek release. In the *Udāna*, *Nibbāna* is described as a plane not only beyond the level of physical experience, but beyond the plane of infinite space, of infinite consciousness, of nothingness and of neither consciousness nor non-consciousness. It is said that on the last night of His life **the Buddha** himself, having passed through the four *rūpa jhānas* and the four *arūpa jhānas* entered this plane of being. He said himself, referring no doubt to his own experience of enlightenment under the *Bodhi* tree: „I reached experience of the *Nibbāna* which is unborn, unrivalled, secure from attachment, undecaying and unstained. This condition is indeed reached by me which is deep, difficult to see, difficult to understand, tranquil, excellent, beyond the reach of mere logic, subtle and to be realized only by the wise.“

QUESTION: DISCUSS THE PLACE OF MENTAL DEVELOPMENT IN BUDDHIST RELIGIOUS PRACTICE

In *Dhammapada* 35 there is: „It is good to control the mind and the controlled mind brings happiness.“ The mind is difficult to be controlled. It travels far and wide all by itself, unrealized, unrecognized and changing rapidly from one thing to another. The mind gets defiled easily by unwholesome qualities like greed, jealousy, hate etc.

In order to purify the mind, there is only one way in Buddhism – to practice meditation. *Vipassanā* – meditation of insight is very essential for those who want to get great peace in their minds and to be super-human beings. The word ‘meditation’ is a very poor substitute for the original term *bhāvanā*, which comes from the word ‘*bhāveti*’ that means ‘mental culture’ or ‘mental development’.

In Buddhism there are two forms of meditation. One is the development of mental concentration (*samatha bhāvanā*). This form of meditation existed before **the Buddha**. The second is *vipassanā bhāvanā*, which means ‘insight meditation’. That meditation only can be leading to the complete liberation of mind and to realization of ultimate truth, *Nibbāna*. This is essentially Buddhist meditation. It is an analytical method based on mindfulness, awareness, vigilance, observation.

The method of meditation is mentioned in *Mahāsatipaṭṭhāna Sutta* of *Dīgha Nikāya* and *Abhidhammasaṅgaha*. Before one begins to meditate, one must have to develop morality (*sīla*), wish to do (*chanda*), effort (*vīriya*), mind or thought (*citta*) and intellect (*vīmaṅsa*). There are many types of meditation described in Buddhist texts. According to *Abhidhammasaṅgaha*, there are 40 types of method to practice meditation.<sup>155</sup> They are:

- (a) ten *kasinas*
- (b) ten impurities
- (c) ten reflections
- (d) four illimitable
- (e) one perception
- (f) the analysis
- (g) four *arūpa-jhānas*.

In all of them we can choose one which is suitable for us. But *ānāpānasati* (mindfulness of breathing in and breathing out) is the best subject of meditation, which applies equally to all. **The Buddha** also practiced *ānāpānasati* before His enlightenment.

Modern scientific discoveries have proven that deep concentration helps to lower the heart and metabolic rates, reducing stress and help with psychiatric conditions. Through mental purification or mental healthiness one can ease stress and tension and overcome psychosomatic problems. One who practices meditation does not get as flustered, shocked or surprised as ordinary people by unpredictable sounds, even those as loud as gunshots.

According to Buddhism the man naturally is feelingless, uncontent and a slave of craving. Craving will always work in

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155 These are meditation-objects of *samatha bhāvanā* (meditation of concentration, meditation leading to *jhānas*), not *vipassanā*.

human mind to fulfill different aspirations of human thinking. They will have no end, a barrier to that process of thinking could be made only through proper understanding of reality for observing the formation of human mind.

The aim of Buddhist meditation is to calm and purify the mind so that one may gain release, freedom, from *samsāra* and get happiness. **The Buddha** says that there is only one way to get happiness and free from attachment. That is *bhāvanā*: »*Ekāyano bhikkhave ayaṃ maggo...*« (*Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta, Dīgha Nikāya*). Thus one must follow this method if one wants to reach enlightenment, *Nibbāna*.

#### THE BUDDHIST CONCEPT OF FIVE PRECEPTS AND THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (ORIGINAL BY VEN. DHARMEŚVAR)

With the welfare of 'all beings' (*sabbe sattā*) Buddhism is certainly concerned with human rights and with much more. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights as adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 10<sup>th</sup> December 1948 are enshrined in the teachings of **the Buddha**.

In fact, the Buddhist *pañca sīla* could be looked upon as the earliest pronouncement on human rights in the history of mankind. In that the *pañca sīla* embodies a recognition of:

- (a) the right to live
- (b) the right to have property

- two broad divisions within which all human rights could be reckoned. In fact, in the process of securing the wealth of mankind, as may be noted from the *Cakkavattisīhanāda Sutta*, the *Cakkavatti* monarch is said to recommend the practice of the *pañcasīla*, which means the observance of human rights. He is also said to provide ward and protection not only to man but also 'to beasts and birds'. Rights are not only for human, but for other living creatures too.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights comprises of 30 articles. Here we will discuss only articles 1, 2, 6 and 23, because they are basic to the rest of the Declaration.

#### Article 1

„All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.“

This article is basic to all human rights and is in complete accord with Buddhist thought. Buddhism upholds that every human being is born with complete freedom and responsibility. This freedom of human beings is commencing with their birth itself, and the recognition of their equality in dignity and rights by Buddhism are reflected clearly in the **Buddha's** emphasis on self-reliance. Thus **the Buddha's** approach to human rights is more humanistic than legalistic.

#### Article 2

„Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.“

In the observations of article 1 it was stated how and on what grounds Buddhism considers all human beings equal. Such a conception of equality requires that rights and freedom should remain untrammelled by considerations such as race, color, sex etc.

## Article 6

„Everyone has the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law.“

Article 6 is quite meaningful from the point of view of Buddhist ethics and Buddhist notion of justice. What matters here is the 'human-ness' (*manussattam*) of the individual concerned. The Buddhist attitude towards the law stems two conceptions:

1. The rule of righteousness
2. The happiness and well-being of mankind (*bahujanahita, bahujanasukha*)

which is unique to Buddhist thought.

## Article 23

- „1. Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favourable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment.
2. Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to equal pay for equal work.
3. Everyone who works has the right to just and favourable remuneration ensuring for himself and his family an existence worthy of human dignity and supplemented, if necessary, by other means of social protection.
4. Everyone has the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests.“

In the time of **the Buddha** people were largely self-employed, each in an activity very much determined by his or her caste, thereby participating in a sort of economic organization of society and providing for themselves as well as contributing to the well-being of the community.

As for the caste system of the day, it is well known how **the Buddha** disapproved of it. As a matter of fact it contradicted the very basic principle of Buddhism that all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and have the same rights, with no reservation at all, to strive along the Noble Eightfold Path to the ultimate attainment of *Nibbāna*.

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In fact, the Buddhist Pancasila could be looked upon as the earliest pronouncement on human rights in the history of mankind in that the Pancasila embodies recognition of (a) the right to life and (B) the right to properly-two broad divisions within which all human rights could be reckoned. In fact, in the process of securing the weal of mankind, as may be noted from the Cakkavattisihanada Sutta, the Cakkavatti Monarch- is said to recommend the practice of the Pancasila, which means the observance of human rights. He is also said to provide ward and protection not only to man but also “to beasts and birds.” Rights are not only for humans, but for other living creatures, too.

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Article 23: 1. Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favorable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment.

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**QUESTION:** SHOW THE BUDDHIST ATTITUDE TOWARDS ENVIRONMENTAL PRESERVATION. (LECTURED BY VEN. PAÑÑĀLOKA)  
(ORIGINAL BY VEN. IM DIMA & VEN. H. SOVANNY)

Here, it is intended to deal with the Buddhist attitude towards environmental preservation. Man is

protected and nurtured by the environment. man's highest legacy is the physical environment reflecting naturalness and is not contaminated by air-pollution, water-pollution, sound-pollution and soil-pollution. There is no dispute about its attitude to preservation in all respects. A number of examples for protecting the environment can be seen in the discourses of **the Buddha**.

For example, when one day a deity asked **the Buddha** the following questions: „Whose merit grows by day and night, who is the righteous, virtuous person that goes to the realm of bliss?“ The reply of **the Buddha** helps us understand the importance of preservation and nurture of the environment. According to the reply of **the Buddha**, the merit of those people who plant groves, parks, build bridges, make ponds, dwelling places, troughs etc. grows by day and night, such religious people<sup>156</sup> go to heaven. The *Upasampadā* monks (monks who have higher ordination) are prohibited to commit destruction of trees and creepers. The reason for this was that **Buddha** loved the environment.

According to *Sutta Piṭaka*, the destruction of the organic environment is not appropriate (*Dīgha Nikāya, Sāmaññaphala Sutta*, p. 112). The *Milinda Pañhā* that belongs to the post-Pāli canonical literature of Buddhists describes how trees and creepers help man. According to it:

1. It is called a tree because it bears flowers and fruits. Flowers generate beauty, and shows the reality and transitoriness of life. Fruits supply savour and energy, similarly they carry on the continuity of trees.
2. Trees provide shade to those who approach them. The shade of a tree is a natural comfort.
3. The tree provide their shadow equally to everybody. The tree that gives its shadow to both friend and foe, teaches a lesson of true loving-kindness.<sup>157</sup>

According to this, protection and nurture of trees and creepers would be of great benefit to man. Therefore, Buddhism points out a path of devotion and preservation of trees and creepers. Just as a mother takes special care of her child, just so the rain nourishes both the active person and indolent person. A good understanding of the significance of the environment and its influence on human life, influences the society to conserve it. Similarly, men should have devotion towards the environment. It is clear from the *Dhammapada* that one should live in the environment without causing any harm to it.

According to the *Raṭṭhapāla* sutta, such a person, being freed from craving, considers that his life is subjected to decay and death. He further thinks that everything is impermanent, and so lives having little desires, and being contented (*Majjhima Nikāya II, Raṭṭhapāla Sutta*, p. 420). Buddhist thought expects man to get used to such thinking. A person who has the least desires, uses the available resources moderately, eats moderately, uses only required clothes, uses dwelling places just to protect himself from flies and mosquitoes and takes medicine just to cure his diseases (*VSM*. pp. 23-27). Environmental resources are well protected in such a society.

## 666 WHAT IS THE BUDDHIST ATTITUDE TOWARDS ENVIRONMENTAL PRESERVATION

Here, it is intended to deal with the Buddhist attitude towards environmental preservation. Man is protected and nurtured by the environment. Man's highest legacy is the physical environment reflecting naturalness in contaminated by air-pollution, water-pollution, sound-pollution and soil-pollution. There is no dispute about its attitude to preservation in all respects. A number of examples for protecting the environment can be seen in the discourses of the Buddha.

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156 Religious people? Do people need to be religious to build all those things? In Europe many non-religious people build bridges, ponds etc. I am quite sure that religious conviction does not play a serious role in acquiring merit.

157 I believe that loving-kindness should be intentional...

preservation and nurture of the environment. According to the reply of the Buddha, the merit of those people who plant groves, parks, build bridges, make ponds, dwelling places, troughs, etc. grow by day and night; such religious people go to heaven. The upasampanna monks (monks who have higher ordination) are prohibited from the destruction of trees and creepers. The reason for this was that Buddha loved the environment.

According to the Sutta-Pitaka, the destruction of the organic environment is not appropriate (D.I, Sammannaphala Sutta, P.112.). The Milinda Panha that belongs to the post Pali Canonals literature of Buddhists describes how trees and creepers help man. According to it, (1) it is called a tree because it bears flowers and fruits. Flowers generate beauty, and how the reality and transitoriness of life. Fruits supply savour and energy, similarly they carry on the continuity of trees. (2) Trees provide shade to those who approach them. The shade of a tree is a natural comfort. (3) The tree provides its shadow equally to everybody. The tree that gives its shadow to both friend and foe, teaches a lesson of true loving-kindness.

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Buddhism teaches that a person, who has the least desires, uses the available resources moderately, eats moderately, uses only required clothes, uses dwelling places just to protect himself from flies and mosquitoes and takes medicine just to cure his diseases. (VSM.PP.23-27) Environmental resources are well protected in such a society. In fact the protection and preservation of environment is mentioned as a duty of a Cakkavatti-king. 466

## **666**THE BUDDHIST CONCEPT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PRESERVATION

Living in a suitable environment (Patirupadesavasa) is reckoned as one to the auspicious things in Buddhism. The commentary explains Patirupdesa as a place where the fourfold people live, namely where the monks, nuns, lay male devotees and female devotees live, where meritorious activities such as liberality prevail and where the teachings of the master are taught and studied. Such a place is called auspicious (Mangala) because people living in such areas are in a position to acquire merit.

People gather experience and knowledge from the environment in which they live and the temperaments and inclinations are developed in them in accordance with the knowledge and experience they gather from their particular environment. So in an environment where educational facilities, moral guidance, suitable means of livelihood are not found, people grow up, ignorant of what is good and what is bad, ignorant of duties and obligations to one another and they indulge in diverse corrupt practices. But in a society where these facilities are properly provide and where means of righteous livelihood are assured to all, people grow up quite well-informed of what is happening in the world, conscious of their moral obligations to one another and efficient in their handling of all work in that society. And in the Chakkavatti Sihanada Sutta is the best example.

The episode of Angulimala too, helps us to understand how the environments can fully change the nature of a being. Angulimala, who was in his early days called Ahimsaka, because a dangerous criminal, not through any fault of his own but due to the viciousness of his immediate environment. The criminal Angulimala once again became a virtuous man by his association with the Buddha; that is with the change of the environment.

Buddhism emphasized the importance of the environment factor in the spiritual development of the people, at the very outset. The Buddha set up the organization (Bhikkhusangha) in order to provide the adherents with the proper environment for spiritual culture. The environment of the house-holder's life is not one that encourages the cultivation of higher virtues. In the environment of the monastery the conditions are very favorable to the cultivation of the mind, because it is free from bonds of lay life, no distractions to wean one away from meditations to wean one away from meditation and the conditions there don not arouse one's greed and hatred.

Meditation is not possible unless the proper environment is there. A person who is keen on cultivating higher virtues to develop the mind has to withdraw to a place where the suitable environmental conditions are found.

Even in the resent day it is the custom of lay Buddhists to withdraw to the quiet atmosphere of the village monasteries to observe

the Poya day precepts (Sila). The environment in the monastery is quite favorable to that purpose, as it is devoid of various distractions found in the environment of the ordinary lay society.

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### THE BUDDHIST CONCEPT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PRESERVATION (ORIGINAL BY VEN. DHARMEŚVAR)

Living in a suitable environment (*patirūpadesavāsa*) is reckoned as one of the auspicious things in Buddhism. The commentary explains *patirūpadesa* as a place where the fourfold people live, namely where the monks, nuns, lay male devotees and female devotees live, where meritorious activities such as liberality prevail and where the teachings of the Master are taught and studied. Such a place is called auspicious (*maṅgala*) because people living in such areas are in a position to acquire merit.

People gather experience and knowledge from the environment in which they live and the temperaments and inclinations are developed in them in accordance with the knowledge and experience they gather from their particular environment. So, in an environment where educational facilities, moral guidance, suitable means of livelihood are not found, people grow up, ignorant of what is good and what is bad, ignorant of duties and obligations to one another and they indulge in diverse corrupt practices. But in a society where these facilities are properly provided and where means of righteous livelihood are assured to all people grow up quite well-informed of what is happening in the world, conscious of their moral obligations to one another and efficient in their handling of all work in that society. And in the *Cakkavatti Sīhanāda Sutta* the best example is mentioned.

The episode of **Aṅgulimāla** too helps us to understand how the environment can fully change the nature of a being. **Aṅgulimāla** who was in his early days called **Ahiṅsaka** became a dangerous criminal, not through any fault of his own, but due to the viciousness of his immediate environment. The criminal **Aṅgulimāla** once again became a virtuous man by his association with **the Buddha**, that is with the change of the environment.

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Meditation is not possible unless the proper environment is there. A person who is keen on cultivating higher virtues to develop the mind has to withdraw to a place where the suitable environmental conditions are found.

Even in the present day it is the custom of lay Buddhists to withdraw to the quiet atmosphere of the village monasteries to observe the *Poya* day precepts (*sīla*). The environment in the monastery is quite favourable to that purpose, as it is devoid of various distractions found in the environment of the ordinary lay society.

Aesthetics is a branch of philosophy that examines the nature of art and the character of our experience of art and of natural environment. It emerged as a separate field of philosophical inquiry during the eighteenth century in England and on the United States. Recognition of aesthetics as a separate branch of philosophy coincided with the development of theories of art that grouped together painting, poetry, sculpture, music, and dance (and often landscape gardening) as the same kind of thing, *les beaux arts*, or the fine arts. Baumgarten coined the term 'aesthetics' in his *Reflections of Poetry* (1735) as the name for one of the two branches of the study of knowledge, i.e., for the study of sensory experience coupled with feeling, which he argued provided a different type of knowledge from the distinct, abstract ideas studied by "logic." He derived it from the ancient Greek *aisthanomai* (to perceive), and "the aesthetics" has always been intimately connected with sensory experience and the kinds of feelings it arouses.

According to the pleasure theory (one of the theories of Arts), an artist is a person who is delighted in beauty and spends his time in the creation of beautiful objects. He finds pleasure in his work and tries to please others with his production. Those who admit or accept this theory say that the proper function of art is to give pleasure and they maintain that it is on this basis that the standard of art must be judged.

The ultimate goal of Buddhism is to get oneself deliberate from suffering. According to Buddhism, the main cause of suffering is *tanha* or desire, the instrument of enjoyment of the senses which leads to attachment. Thus in order to obtain emancipation, one has to get rid of all forms of desire.

Since the main function of art is to give pleasure or in other words, to give satisfaction to one's desire of beauty, therefore it seems that the teaching of the Buddha is in contradiction with the theory of art. However, we should accept the historical fact that Buddhist art has indeed developed and flourished with the spread of Buddhism. If Buddhism held an unfavorable attitude towards art, how can this happen? In order to make clear the fact, a further studies on the Buddhist attitude towards art, and thus toward aesthetics should be attempted.

Siddhartha Gautama renounced the world and attained the ultimate goal of emancipation, and expected his disciples to follow his example in order to achieve the same goal. But this does not mean that the Buddha totally condemned worldly things as useless. He lived among the people until his parinirvana and appreciated art, music

and beauty both physical and natural to a certain extent, because they are useful to common man.

In the Sakka-pabha sutta of the Digha Nikaya (vol. II, p.263ff), when the divine musician, *pabcasikha* was singing and playing his lute (*vina*) in the presence of the Buddha he listened and even commented favourably on it .

In the Udana (p.62) and in the Mahaparinibbana sutta of the Digha Nikaya (II, p.102), many times the Buddha had gone to see the shrine of the yakshas such as Sarandada, Capala etc, and even stayed in such places for a short while and had described them as beautiful.

In the Dhammapada (verse 99) and in the Theragatha and Therigatha, the beauty of nature was appreciated by the Buddha as well as by Arahants who lived in forests. Thus, Ven. Walpola Rahula says "He, (the Buddha) appreciated both natural and physical beauty."

On several occasions, the Buddha was moved aesthetically, and he had even told Ananda how delightful certain places were to him at Vesali and had told the bhikkhus that, if they had not seen the devas (gods) of Tavatimsa (heaven) they should look at the handsome Licchavis, who are beautifully and elegantly dressed in different colours (Mahaparinibbana sutta).

In the Cullavagga (translation p.213), we have clear evidence to prove that Buddhist monasteries were also decorated with paintings and sculptures. It is mentioned in the text that the Buddha permitted his disciples to have paintings and sculptures other than figures of love making men and women and figures of living creatures.

Immediately after the Buddha had entered parinibbana, his senior disciple Mahakassapa, considering

that Ajathasattu, the king of Magadha might faint on hearing the news, he thus, got his ministers to inform him by drawing pictures of the life story of the Buddha on a canvas. The king cried out in despair when he saw the last scene i.e. when he learnt of the Great loss.

Though the Buddha as well as his disciples held a positive attitude at a certain extent toward art, there are also some incidents showing the criticism of the Buddha upon arts. In the Anguttara Nikaya, the Buddha exhorts his disciples thus “It is a mere lamentation, a cry, brethren, is music in this Noble Training, it is a mere madness, brethren, is dancing in this Noble Training of the Ariyan.”

At another time an artist of high repute, a dancer named Talaputta, comes to the Buddha having heard from his teachers that those who dance and make people happy by virtue of their entertaining others go to a heaven called Pahasa. But the Buddha disillusionises him by reminding that such people only go to a hell by that name, for they being intoxicated themselves with lust, hatred and ill-will, cause others too to be infatuated and thereby gather evil kamma.

However, the condemnation given by the Buddha as shown above can be compared with the comment made by him to a divine musician “Admirable, Pabcasikha, is your song glorifying the Buddha, Dhamma and Sangha, and, your lovely-ditty. The music of your lute blends harmoniously with the sweetness of your voice.” This shows how far the Buddha sympathized with the material aspirations of all beings whether divine and mythical or human and real.

One can be a musician or an artist and yet be a good Buddhist. But if he is to develop spiritually, he cannot be satisfied with that. He has to train himself further. At the commencement of the good life, good emotion needs to be cultivated and in this attempt art can serve a very useful purpose. But on reaching the state of serene equanimity in the fourth Jhana, all interest in aesthetic pursuits will automatically vanish. According to Dr.O.H.de. A. Wijesekara, art as an aspect of human emotional experience, can be grouped under the Buddhist conception of sila, just as samadhi and pabba denotes very nearly “intuition” and “intellect” respectively.

Art in Buddhism can generate good emotion (saddha) is well exemplified by the status of the Buddha which signifies something serene and noble. It is not even so much the compassion of the Buddha that is symbolized as the depth of his enlightenment. The Buddha image is therefore an important object to inspire common Buddhists. However, for those who have cultivated a higher level of spiritually, Buddha image might not be necessary. A good example can be adduced from a Chinese Jhan (Zen) master who burnt the wooden Buddha image for boiling tea!

It is not the outside object which bounds one in samsara, but it is the inner defilement which obstruct man from freedom. The Buddha lived as an ordinary man, he drinks, eats and senses as other do but with no attachment. He permits art to a certain extent for common people. To grasp or to repulse is not the way to freedom, but it is the Middle Path which, is always the attitude of the Buddhist way of life!

#### 666 DESCRIBE THE CONCEPT OF ALANKARA WITH REFERENCE TO SUBHO-ALANKARA AND ITS RELEVANCE TO THE BUDDHIST CANON. (511)

The Pali term ‘alankara’ is a compound formed from ‘alam’ which means ‘suitable’ and ‘kara’ which means ‘to do’, then collectively alankara means ‘suitable to do’ which, in Pali literature it implies the ‘ornamentation of a poem or a prose’. According to the Subho-alankara, alankara is indeed, used both in the creation of prose as well as in poem, though it is used more obviously in poetic works.

In Indian tradition, a poetic creation is usually compared to a beautiful woman. A beautiful woman has to possess a beautiful figure, good qualities of personality and being decorated with beautiful ornaments as well. In the same way, a good piece of poetic creation should also possess beautiful figure (bandha), good qualities (guna) and beautiful ornaments (alankara). Here, one should also notice that, good qualities also means the absent of bad qualities. However, all beautiful poetic works may have different figures (bandha), just as all the

beautiful women might have different shapes, the judgement of beauty lies not on any particular standard, but on its collectivity as a whole piece of poetic creation or as a woman.

According to the Subha-alankara, there are ten qualities (guna) which any poem should possess, there are;

1. Pasada—pleasant nature that one is attracted to it and has the desire to read it
2. Oja—the quality of having many compounds (in fact oja is considered the life of a prose)
3. Madhurata—the quality of sweetness
4. Samata—the quality of evenness, that is to say without going to any extremes, it maintains a steadiness in its sound and meaning
5. Sukhumalata—the softness of sound
6. Atthabyatti—the clarity of the meaning which are meaningful
7. Udarata—the ways of expression which highlight the qualities
8. Silesa—the expression which has two meanings
9. Kanti—beautiful
10. Samadhi—animation of the unanimated and vice versa, including personification.

According to the Subho-alankara, again, all the 35 ornaments are divided into two main groups, i.e. direct and indirect ornaments. There is only one direct ornament and the rest are indirect. Direct ornament is called 'sobhavavutti' in Pali which, is a direct expression of natural behaviour in a poetic creation. No simile or metaphor is used in direct ornament. However similes or metaphors are used in other direct ornaments.

The main purpose of alankara in the Buddhist Canon is to clarify the doctrinal ideas. Language alone is not enough to express some obscure philosophical ideas, so similes, metaphors and such other methods are employed. People understand with their intellectual but experience with their sensation. In poetic creation, personal experience is transformed into such specific expression that people with such training can experience. According to Baumgarten, poetic creation as a form of art has to be understood through sensory experience coupled with feeling, not through logical interpretation. Thus alankara in the Buddhist Canon plays such an important role of experiencing the subtle beauty of the Buddhist Enlightened world. The Buddha himself also appreciated the creation of poetic works as recorded in the Vangisa Samyutta in the Samyutta Nikaya.

#### BONUS: RATIONALISM (EXTRACT FROM INTERNET COMPILED BY VEN. CZECH SARANA)

*Rationalism* - from the Latin „ratio,“ meaning „reason“ - is a point of view that states that reason plays the main role in understanding the world and obtaining knowledge. In *epistemology*<sup>158</sup> and in its modern sense, rationalism is "any view appealing to reason as a source of knowledge or justification.<sup>159</sup>" In more technical terms it is a method or a theory "in which the criterion of the truth is not sensory but intellectual and deductive.<sup>160</sup>" Whilst rationalism has existed throughout the history of philosophy, it is usually associated specifically with three philosophers during the Renaissance:

1. **René Descartes** (1596-1650)
2. **Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz** (1646-1716)
3. **Baruch Spinoza** (1632-1677)

All 3 of these philosophers shared the belief that we can best understand the world through logic and reasoning. Since the Enlightenment, rationalism is usually associated with the introduction of mathematical methods into philosophy, as in **Descartes, Leibniz, and Spinoza**.<sup>161</sup> This is commonly called continental rationalism, because it was

<sup>158</sup>Epistemology is a science concerned with the right way of explaining terms (words).

<sup>159</sup> Lacey, A.R. (1996), *A Dictionary of Philosophy*, 1st edition, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1976. 2nd edition, 1986. 3rd edition, Routledge, London, UK, 1996

<sup>160</sup> Bourke, Vernon J. (1962), "Rationalism", p. 263 in *Runes* (1962)

<sup>161</sup> Bourke, Vernon J. (1962), "Rationalism", p. 263 in *Runes* (1962)

predominant in the continental schools of Europe, whereas in Britain empiricism dominated. However, this does not mean that they were uninterested in science and experiment – on the contrary, both rationalists and empiricists were keen on scientific inquiry. This was because they were reacting against centuries-old traditions which tried to base an understanding of the world upon ideas put forward by the 4th century BC Greek philosopher **Aristotle** and the world view of the Bible.

Actually in the history the first rationalist was **Socrates**. **Socrates** firmly believed that, before humans can understand the world, they first need to understand themselves; the only way to accomplish that is with rational thought. The rational soul is beyond our conscious knowledge, but sometimes communicates via images, dreams, and other means. The task of the philosopher is to refine and eventually extract the irrational soul from its bondage, hence the need for moral development, and then to connect with the rational soul, and so become a complete person, manifesting the higher spiritual essence of the person whilst in the physical.

Another very important rationalist in the history was **René Descartes**. **Descartes** thought that only knowledge of eternal truths – including the truths of mathematics, and the epistemological and metaphysical foundations of the sciences – could be attained by reason alone; other knowledge, the knowledge of physics, required experience of the world, aided by the scientific method. He also argued that although dreams appear as real as sense experience, these dreams cannot provide persons with knowledge..

Whilst rationalists shared an appreciation for science and empirical inquiry, they also emphasized certain key notions that were not shared by empiricism and became the subject of keen debate between the two camps. The key notions are:

1. *A Priori Knowledge*
2. *Innate Ideas*
3. *Logical Necessity*

1. *A Priori Knowledge* – “Some ideas are true independent of experience”. Whilst rationalists did not deny that the senses give us important information about the world, they did not consider them to be the sole means of knowledge. In fact, they quite often thought that the senses mislead us. For this reason, they argued that knowledge which is independent of experience must be more trustworthy because it has less to do with the senses. Such ideas they called *a priori*, which is a Latin phrase meaning “prior to” or “before” – experience, that is. Examples of such knowledge include:

- a. Mathematical propositions ( $2 + 2 = 4$ ).
- b. Things which are true by definition (all bachelors are unmarried).
- c. Self-evident truths (such as “I think therefore I am” or “God exists”).

2. *Innate Ideas* – “Some ideas are present from birth”. Amongst those ideas which do not require the proof or suggestion of sense experience are concepts which are present from birth. These ideas – which are called *innate* – can theoretically be discovered or ‘brought out’ (the original meaning of the word “education”) from within the mind of each individual. So, for example, one of **Descartes**’ arguments for the existence of God is that the idea is present in the mind from birth, left there almost as if an artist had signed his work or left a trademark.

3. *Logical Necessity* – “Some things cannot be conceived of as otherwise”. Another important idea for rationalists is that of *necessity*. Although we may use the word everyday, the rationalists actually meant something very specific by it. So, for instance, we might say something like, “In order to pass your exams you have to study hard”. However, in reality, there are lots of ways you might pass your exams: you may have a natural talent for learning so that you don’t have to work hard; you may be lucky; you may bribe an examiner – or cheat. However, if we were to say something like, “In order to have 3 things you have to have more than 2 things,” then we are approaching more what the rationalists meant by the term. To distinguish between these two uses, philosophers generally call the first sort – passing your exams – “*empirical necessity*” (it could be otherwise); the latter sort (having 4 things) is called logical necessity. So, if we can prove that something is true because “it could not be otherwise”, then we have achieved *logical necessity* and an absolute degree of certainty. The goal for rationalists was therefore to find those “logical necessities” which would help us find certainty in the world and answer those difficult moral, religious and metaphysical questions that interest us so much.

Religious people believe in God and they do not inquire whether God exists or not. *Rationalism* tries to prove the existence of God using rational argument. *Rationalism* comes from the Latin word „ratio,“ which means „reason.<sup>162</sup> Reasoning is very important for a philosopher. **Aristotle** was one of the great philosophers, who used rationalism to explain his philosophical theories. He accepted the existence of God through rational argument. These philosophers used rational arguments to explain the existence of God (*Brahma*) and that He is greater than the Universe. *Rationalism* appears also in *Upanisad* with a view to explain the existence of *Brahmin*. The argument for the existence of *Brahmin* is, that there is an empirical world.<sup>163</sup>

Modern rational philosophy continues along with modern sciences based on experiment. The three modern rationalists were: **Descartes** (1596-1650), **Leibniz** (1646-1716) and **Spinoza** (1632-1677). All these three philosophers believed, that the reality and the world can be truly understood logically and by reasoning.

### QUESTIONS

- What are the differences between religion and philosophy?
- Clarify the two subjects presented by the two terms – philosophy and religion.
- Explain the distinguished feature in Islam when compared with the temporary religion.

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162, „Ratio“ is a verb. It means „to reason,“ „to think.“

163 Empirical world is the world, which we cognize by our five senses.