Notes From Buddhist and Pali University for the 3. year

Copy-written, commented and edited by ven. Czech Sarana

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Sociological theories on religion

Marxist theory of religion

Max Weber

Émile Durkheim

Religious fundamentalism

Islamic Fundamentalism

Christian fundamentalism

Religious organizations

1. Churches and Sects

2. Denominations and Cults

Gender and Religion

The concept of God (March and April 2006)

Development and evolution of concept of god in eastern and western thought

Question: How the concept of ātman (self) varied in Hindu religious philosophical tradition?

Question: How the concept of ātman (self) varied in Hindu religious philosophical tradition?

Question: Explain the Jain view of karma using kinds of deeds (karmas)

BONUS: Sociological theories of religion

RSG. 302 – Comparative Study of Religion

Comparative religion (nature, aims and objectives)

The aims of comparative religion

Question: Explain how the subjects matter as comparative study of religious

Question: Explain what is the academic study of religion and how such type of study was evolved?

Methodology of Comparative study of Religion (2009)

?? (Study of comparative religions from the Buddhist point of view)

Question: Examine the practical issues confronted in a study of comparative religion.

Common structure of religion

An examination of the thesis on the oneness of all religions

The biological agreement to prove inequality/equality?

An examination of the thesis of the oneness of all religions (excerpt)

Religious truth and reality

Religious truth and reality

Religious truth and reality (lectured by ven. Silavamsa)

Question: Examine the reason for anxiety of the people to understand the truth since the Vedic period.

Theo-centric perspective about the nature of man, his place in the Universe

Question: Examine the objects of formation of concept as hell and heaven in religion

Question: Examine the objects of formation of hell and heaven concept in religions

Question: Compare the Buddhist concept of hell with other religious concepts of hell?
Questions

Question: Enunciate the fact of interpretation of ātman theory in hinduism to formulate an ethical conduct.

Main teaching of Hinduism (October 2001) (lectured by ven. Sīlavaṃsa) (original by ven. Anik Chakma)

Question: Point out distinguished features of Islamic religious tradition when compared with other contemporary religions. (lectured by ven. Dharmeśvar)

Question: Discuss how to differentiate Buddhist theory of Dependent Origination from other religions. (original by ven. Im Dina & ven. H. Sovanny)

Question: Discuss how to differentiate Buddhist theory of Dependent Origination from other religions. (original written by ven. Im Dima & ven. H. Sovanny)

Question: Examine the mode of view in connection with soul theory appearing in religious scriptures. (Soul theory) (original written by ven. Im Dima & ven. H. Sovanny)

Question: Examine the mode of view in connection with soul concept (theory) appeared in religious scriptures. (original by ven. Dharmeśvar)

Question: Analyze the arguments for the existence of God given by the theologians in the Western philosophy.

The concept of soul (original by ven. Dharmeśvar)

The concept of God (lectured by ven. Sīlavaṃsa) (1)

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The concept of God (lectured by ven. Sīlavaṃsa) (February & March 2006) (NOT COMPLETED)

The concept of God (lectured by ven. Sīlavaṃsa) (February 2006)

The concept of soul (February 2006)

The concept of ātman theory (February 2006)

The concept of soul (original by ven. Dharmeśvar)

Buddhist definition of ātman theory (February & March 2006) (NOT COMPLETED)

The concept of God (lectured by ven. Sīlavaṃsa) (1)

The concept of God (lectured by ven. Sīlavaṃsa) (2)

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Question: Describe briefly religious teaching on liberation of soul or mind.

Salvation and liberation (original by ven. Dharmeśvar)

Salvation and liberation (original by ven. Im. Dima & H. Sovanny)

The concept of salvation and liberation (original by ven. Dharmesh)

Question: Discuss how to differentiate Buddhist theory of Dependent Origination from other religions. (original written by ven. Im Dina & ven. H. Sovanny)

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Main teaching of Hinduism (October 2001)

Question: Enunciate the fact of interpretation of ātman theory in hinduism to formulate an ethical conduct.
I have written this series of books „Notes from Buddhist and Pāli University for the 1. year“, „Notes from Buddhist and Pāli University for the 2. year“, „Notes from Buddhist and Pāli University for the 3. year“ only with the purpose to help the students at the first year, second year and third year as well. Though at the time of first ‘CD edition’ I am only a student of the first year, I have a kind of belief that it might be helpful to all students of above mentioned grades. It might be astonishing and maybe even astounding that a student of 1. year is helping students of 2. year and 3. year. What is my explanation? I believe, that anyone who has the proper intention, proper skill and proper knowledge can help in the field which is connected with those three. My intention is to help the students, my skill is quick type-writing and my knowledge is English language. As such I could help with copy-writing the notes from English medium for the students of the Buddhist and Pāli University of Sri Lanka. I did it with all sincerity and seriousness thinking about the success of the students. Every monk should help others, if he can and if he does not want to help others he should help himself – to attain the Nibbāna (ayam pada me attano matte). I spent more than thousand hours preparing this kind of ‘help’, but still there is much to do and much to improve. Moreover, I take this work as a draft which should be checked, changed and revised for the benefit of students. By this way I would like to ask anyone to contribute in this manner and either contact me on my telephone number – 0778212445 (Sri Lankan number) or e-mail me on hostov@seznam.cz. Any corrections, ideas, critique or editions are cordially welcomed.

We can understand religion as one angle from which we understand the truth. We all have closed eyes, as we still didn’t realize the real knowledge, we still didn’t attain the Nibbāna. Thus, like people with closed eyes, we try to realize the truth. We are like them, the people with closed eyes, who are trying to understand the nature of an elephant. Like this bunch of people, staying at various places and trying to understand the elephant according to what they perceive by their blind touching by hands, the same way we try to understand the truth either by religion (belief), science (facts realized by our six senses) or philosophy (thinking) as different points of view. But no way of these three is leading to real understanding, like no way of touching the elephant will help the people with closed eyes to understand the elephant. What these people should do, they should open their eyes and just see the elephant as it is. The same way we, if we want to see the truth of the world, we should attain the Nibbāna and thus see the world as it is.

First and foremost I should thank to all the students who dedicated their precious time to type their hand-writing and then distributed it among other students (and thanks to that I had the opportunity to compile them in a book-form). I should be thankful to all those who contributed the notes so that I could copy-write them here or who gave me the electronic notes which I have implemented here. Especially I am thankful to ven. Khim Jimmy (Cambodia), ven. Asabha (Myanmar), ven. Bopitiye Samitha (Sri Lanka), ven. Samnang Phy (Cambodia), ven. Nemeinda (Myanmar), ven. Premlim (Cambodia), ven. Maitri (Nepal) and many, many others. I would like to express my great thanks to teachers at the Buddhist and Pāli University of Sri Lanka, apart from those whose ideas are in the notes in these books especially to ven. Mavatagama Pemananda (mainly teacher of Sanskrit) who went to my present residence just to settle all the misunderstandings I had with the chief incumbent there. I should not forget to mention the English teachers who never received sufficient amount of praise from the other teachers at the university – Mr. Svarnananda Gamage, Mr. Ratnasiri and not less Mr. Pradeep Gunasena who encouraged and supported me enormously during writing this work for example by allowing me to work on it in their office (as we still do not have any study hall in our 'modern' university).

I wish all the beings to see the Truth,
I wish all the beings to attain Nibbāna.
A survey, under the following topics of the historical development of the Indian Buddhist philosophy from its inception up to the emergence of Mahāyāna is expected here.

I. Early Buddhist teachings and trends which paved the way for the emergence of Abhidhammic traditions
II. Abhidhammic theory of dhamma and its off-shoots: Puggalavāda, Sarvastivāda and Vibhajjavāda
III. The emergence of Sautrantic tradition as a reaction to the Abhidhamma; critical approach and mind-oriented trends that arose from it.
IV. Lokottaravāda developments of the concept of the Buddha; contribution made thereto by the Mahāsaṅghikas and allied Nikāyas.
V. Mahāyāna and the impact of Buddhist thought in pre-Mahāyāna schools on its emergence.
VI. The two philosophical traditions of Madhyamika and Yogācāra and their basic concepts.
VII. Tantrism and its historical background.

* Special attention should be paid to the germinal teachings embodied in the suttas of the Dhammavāda of the Abhidhammikas; Śūnyatavāda of the Madhyamakas and Vijñānavāda of the Yogācārans.

Recommended Reading:

2. *Abhidhamma Studies* Nyanaponika, Colombo, 1949
8. *Early History of the Spread of Buddhism and Buddhist Schools* N. Dutt, New Delhi, 1980
10. *Indian Buddhism* A. K. Warder, Delhi, 1980
11. *Philosophy and Psychology in the Abhidhamma* H. V. Guenther, Delhi, 1974
12. *The Psychological Attitude of Early Buddhist Philosophy* Lama Anagarika, Govinda
13. *System of Buddhist Thought* Yamakami Sogen, Calcutta, 1952
Classification of ancient history into 5 periods by K.N. Jayatilake

1. Traditionalism (faith) (first 4(?) and last 2(?)
2. Rationalism (middle 4(?)
3. Experientalism → Upaniṣadic period
   a) sense perception
   b) extra-sensory perception

saddhā – didn't accept by Buddha (?)
nāna – didn’t accept by Buddha (?)

The ancient Indian society was a society which is very valuable for the Buddhist studies. Buddhism emerged in India and the founder of this great philosophy, the Buddha, preached the Dhamma depending on the contemporary situation. At the very beginning, in India the religious activities performed by the people were prominent. According to the traditional beliefs, people obtained what they needed through the practices. The Vedic text gives detailed account about the various religious activities. The Pali canon gives details about those activities. The suttas such as: Brahmajāla, Ariyapariyesana, Kālāma, Canki, Vimanisaka, Aggivaccagotta etc. state the contemporary religious activity with criticism made by the Buddha. The ancient history in which different rites and rituals existed can be classified under 3 headings:

1. The Vedic period
2. The Brāhmaṇa period
3. The Upaniṣad period

During the first two periods the path of action (karma mārga) was emerged/accepted(?). During the Upaniṣad period the path of knowledge (nāna mārga) was emerged/accepted(?). Karma mārga means different kinds of offerings to the gods aiming mundane happiness. Therefore, the primitive people offered different things for the satisfaction of the gods. Through these performances, they wished happiness. Among those offerings the most heinous crime was killing and offering a human being. They did this kind of assassination in sacrificial grounds. This sacrifice was called ‘purisa yāga’.

During Upaniṣadic period people became intelligent and they realized that karma mārga was useless, resultless path. Through that path people could obtain nothing. Having realized the nature of those practices, they transformed or changed into the ‘path of knowledge’ (nāna mārga). That was the beginning of philosophical thoughts. By the time people went to the forst leaving their household life and practised the life of celibacy (Brahmacariya) and austerities. Through the path they wanted to know the real nature of the world and being. According to the Ariyapariyesana Sutta in Majjhima Nikāya the Buddha as an ascetic practice the knowledge (nāna mārga).(?)

Upaniṣadic period was the period where the different sources of knowledge would be available. Accordingly, the ten sorts of traditional sources of knowledge were spread. Considering all the sources of knowledge, Prof. K.N. Jayatilake classified them as follows:

1. Traditionalism
2. Rationalism
3. Experientialism

Traditionalists were those who followed the tradition. They accepted what came by the tradition.

Rationalists were those who followed the logic or the logical proposition. They are the logicians. They accepted only what could be proved with the logical statements.

Experientialists were those who depended on experience. As they accepted the experience, sensory perception and extra-

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1 Note that there are only 3 periods mentioned.
sensory perception, rejected both traditionalism and rationalism.

Anyway, whatever they have accepted, traditionalist and rationalist view – if they were main possible with the experience. (?) Here, extra-sensory perception is the higher knowledge (abhiññā).

The first two, traditionalism and rationalism were named as authority and reasoning respectively. In the Kālāma Sutta of Aṃguttara Nikāya the authority and reasoning which are called 'ten sources of knowledge' existed in India during the time of the Buddha. The 'ten traditional sources of knowledge' are:\(^2\)

1. Anussavena – report
2. Itikirāya – tradition
3. Paramparāya – hearsay
4. Piṭakasampadānena – scriptures
5. Takka – logic
6. Naya – inference
7. Ākāraparivitakkena – reason
8. Diṭṭhinijjhānakkhantiyā – reflection
9. Bhabbarāpatāya – testimony
10. Samano no garū – reverence

**QUESTION:** Give an interpretation to 'Abhidhamma' and discuss the reason which led to engaging it as separate Pitaka. ((Original by Ven. Suvanny))

The Pāli term Abhidhamma comprises of teachings which are collectively known as Dhamma, the doctrine or the teaching of the Blessed One. 'Dhamma' is the teaching that can purify the mind from defilement, attachment and craving etc. and can lead to the achievement of the everlasting peace and happiness. And the prefix 'Abhi' is used in the sense of 'great', 'excellent', 'ultimate' etc. So,

the Abhidhamma means great, excellent, marvelous doctrine or teaching of the Enlightened One and is the teaching which makes the correct knowledge about the being and the world in detail more explicitly than suttas.

By dividing into citta, cetasika, rūpa and Nibbāna of analytical system in Theravāda is not accepted by all traditions as some teachers they have various arguments. Therefore, Theravāda was identified as Vibhajjavāda. For instance, Sarvāstivādins did not believe in Theravāda's Abhidhamma and they had other seven Abhidhamma books presented in Sanskrit language. And Sautrāntikas also rejected Abhidhamma teaching. Therefore, some traditions they did not discuss Abhidhamma Pitaka but they believed in the Sutta Pitaka as their own doctrine.

When we discuss about Abhidhamma tradition the Theravāda Abhidhamma was with the Pāli sutta literature and also the oldest Abhidhammic literature because the Theravāda tradition is the oldest in Buddhist history. The other Abhidhamma traditions developed their Abhidhamma literature after forming their schools separately.

The next important thought is that the Theravāda teaches the four paramattha dhammās and only one asankhāta dhamma, but Sarvāstivāda accepts the sect(?) for dhamma and citta vippayutta dhammā and increased asankhāta dhammā into three:

1. Pratisankhya nirodha
2. Apratisankhya nirodha
3. Ākāsa

All together, they believed, there are 75 dhammās.

Another important thing, Abhidhamma literature is named as Śāriputta Abhidhamma. Now it is available in Chinese language only, but it is not decided whether it belongs to Mahāsaṅghikas, Sammītiya or Dhammaavuddha schools as all three sects have Abhidhamma literature. According to inscription. the Mahāsaṅghikas rejected Theravāda Abhidhamma. They had also Mātikā Pitaka, it is said that „The sub-schools Mahāsaṅghika, Gokulika etc. developed Abhidhamma.“

Further, the Sautrāntika rejected and tried to solve Abhidhamma problem, but according to the suttas, we have to accept that they also followed the Abhidhamma to some extent. Vasubandhu who wrote Abhidhamma kośa for Sarvāstivādins also accepted the Sautrāntika dhammā theory.

besides that Yogācāra school has discussed the Abhidhamma and accepted theory of a hundred dhammās. Therefore, the Theravāda Abhidhamma is considered as the oldest, complete and original Abhidhamma literature, but the other Abhidhamma schools derived from Theravāda they analyzed dhammās according to their own traditional belief.

The Pali term Abhidhamma is composed of Abhi Dhamma The prefix “Abhi” is used in the sense of great, excellent, ultimate etc. so the Abhidhamma means great, excellent, marvelous doctrine or teaching of the enlightened one and is a teaching which makes the correct knowledge about the beings and the world in detail more explicitly than Sutta. Thus it is the higher Doctrine

The analysis of phenomena into Citta, Cetasika, Rūpa and Nibbana in Theravada is not accepted by all traditions as some teachers presented have various arguments. Therefore, Theravadins were identified as Vibhajja vadins. For instance, Sarvastivadins did not believe Theravada Abhidhamma and the them seven Abhidhamm Books presented in Sanskrit language. And Sautrāntikas also rejected Abhidhamma teaching. Therefore, some traditions did not discuss Abhidhamma Pitaka but they believed the Sutta Pitaka as their own doctrine.
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Another important, Abhidhamma literature is named as Sriputta Abhidhamma now available in Chinese language only but not certain whether it belongs to Mahasanghika, Sammitiya or Dhammavutka schools as all three sects have Abhidhamma literatures. According to inscription, the Mahasanghika rejected Theravada Abhidhamma. They had also Matika Pitaka, it is said “the sub-schools of Mahasanghika, Gokulika etc. developed Abhidhamma”. Further, the Sautrantika rejected and tried to solve Abhidhamma problem but according to the sutta, we have to accept that they also followed the Abhidhamma to some extent and Vasubhandu who wrote Abhidharmakhosha for Sorvastivadins also accepted the Sautrantika Dhamma theory.

Beside that Yogacara School has discussed about Abhidhamma and accepted a hundred Dhammas. Therefore, the Theravada Abhidhamma is considered as the oldest, complete and original Abhidhamma literature but the other Abhidhamma schools derived from Theravada and they analyzed the Dhamma according to their own traditional belief.

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The word ‘Abhidhamma’ is found in Digha Nikaya (silakkhandha) i.e. Abhivinaya and Abhidhamma, it is also found in Majjhima Nikaya and Sutta Nipata.

According to B.C. Law, the History of Pali Literature, the authentic of Abhidhamma is found in Digha Nikaya and Suttanipata. The word Abhidhamma means higher doctrine and Abhivinaya meand higher discipline.

The Buddha’s teaching goes deeper step by step, i.e.
1. Anupubbasikkha -- gradual doctrine
2. Anupubbakiriya -- gradual activity
3. Anupubbapatipada -- gradual discipline.

Abhidhamma is not preached by the Buddha, it is a scholar work by monks.

Seven books of Theravada Abhidhamma (Sattapakarana) are…and there are three commentaries (Atthakatha) on these seven books.

What is the function of atthakatha? To clarify the meaning of difficult words in Tipitaka (only words give explanation)

Tika = Subcommentary; Sangaha = compendium (written including the important teaching of Abhidhamma). The Compendium of Abhidhamma are:
1. Abhidhammavatara
2. Abhidhammattharikasini
3. Namarupasamasas
4. Namarupapariccheda
5. Abhidhammasangaha.
6. Abhidhammattavibhavini

Why did they do these works?
1. Any religion philosophy has two aspects:
   a. Define the nature of man
   b. Define the nature of world
2. Based on that analysis, it recommends a way of life.
   Philosophy: West - Theory, i.e. define the things, describe how the world is or the nature of man.
   East - Theory and practice, i.e. define the world, also gives a way of life.

Brahmasahavyata -- eternal soul, after death the soul comes to this place.
   God - Brahma -- creator
   Soul - Atma -- the element within us.

Buddhism -- anatta , paticcasamuppada (causality)

Buddha analyzed the human personality in four divisions:
1. Nama-rupa
   What is man? Namarupa, it is anicca, dukkha and anatta. Therefore it is sukha and dukkha.
2. Pabckkhandha (five aggregates): rupa, vedana, sabba, savkhara, vibbana.
   rupa (rupa) the other four is define as nama.
3. Chaindriya: cakkhu, sota, ghana, jivha and kaya (rupa), the last one mana is nama.
4. Dvadasayatana (12 institution)
cakkhu-ayatana -- rupayatana (rupa)
sota-ayatana -- saddhayatana
ghanayatana -- ghandhayatana
jivhayatana -- rasayatana
kayayatana -- phothhabbayatana
manayatana -- dhammayatana

(e) Attharasadhatu (18 elements)
cakkhudhatu -- rupadhatu -- cakkhuvibbanadhatu
sotadhatu -- saddhadhatu -- sodavibbanadhatu
ghanadhatu -- gandhadhatu -- ghanavibbanadhatu
jivhadhatu -- rasadhatu -- jivhavibbanadhatu
kayadhatu -- photthabbadhatu -- kayavibbanadhatu
manadhatu -- dhammadhatu -- dhammavibbanadhatu

Madhupindikasuta of Majjhima Nikaya:
“cakkhubca paticca rupe appajjati cakhuvibbananaj” base on eye in forms comes the eye consciousness.

- Mind lives in heart -- said by Buddhaghosa, not by Buddha.
  “guhasayaj” (sleep in the cave) -- found in athakatha.

- Rupa -- 28
  vedana sabba 52
  savkhara vibbana -- 89/121

- Sagathavagga of Sajyutta Nikaya explains “Death” in following manner:
  “Ayu usmaca vibbanaj
  yada kayaj jahanti maj
  apaviddo tada seti
  niratthajva kalimgaraj

  ayu = life-span; usmaca = breath; vibbana = consciousness

- Mulapariyayasutta of Majjhima Nikaya -- Philosophical analysis of sutta.
  i.e. at the end of the sutta, the monks could not understand the sutta and thus unhappy

- How to explain the word “ayu” stated in the above:
  In Abhidhamma, rupa is analysis into 28, one is Jivitindriya. Therefore the explanation of ayu is in the term of Jivitindriya.

- In early Buddhism, there are 8 rupa: pathavi, apo, tejo, vayo, vanna, gandha, rasa and oja (nutriment).
  While in Abhidhamma, there are 28 rupa.

- 6 heavens: catummaharajika, yama, tusita, nimmanarati, paranimmitta and vasavatti.

- 4 hells: naraka, tiraccana, peta and asura.
In Abhidhamma we say mostly about 4 great matters:

- Citta (mind)
- Cetasika (mental concomitants)
- Rupa (matter)
- Nibbana

During the time of the Buddha, there were 2 main philosophical groups,

1. Sassatavada
2. Ucchedavada

Sassatavada means eternalism, it practices self-mortification – attakilamathanuyoga.

Ucchedavada means Nihilism, it practices self-indulgence – Kamasukhallikanuyoga.

Theory explains what is the nature of the world and practice explains how we conduct according to the theory.

1. Sassatavada believed there were some eternal things in the world. E.g. soul, Atma, Brahma and 7 things like, pathavi (earth), apo (water), tejo (fire), vayo (wind), sukha, dukkha and jiva. So their philosophy is called eternalism. They practice their views and those difficulty activities in order to eternalize their soul in the next life. Most Jainism practices this teaching.

2. Ucchedavada thinks that everything comes to the end with death. There is nothing left after death. Among the six heretics 4 are belonging to this theory, such as Puranakassapa, Makkhaligosala, Ajitakesakambala and Pakudhakaccayana. The teacher of the gods called Brhaspati. It is he who produced the theory of materialism on the heaven. He taught Sura about this theory in order to against Asura, because Asura always against the Gods.

3. According to Buddhism, the Buddha preached in his first sermon, he said that we should avoid above 2 extreme. Foreword, he presented his middle philosophy called Paticcasamuppada. It is also called central philosophy. The middle practice is Majjhimapatipada (middle path). The Buddha says everything is conditioned. So we have to practice in the middle way, according to the Central Philosophy. When He explains the nature of the world, he criticizes the former 2 ideas. Buddhism adopts two methods of ways of explaining the world of experience, one is the method of analysis, and another is the method of synthesis. According to Paticcasamuppada, everything is inter-related and everything is impermanent. He analyses the whole world including the human beings into some elements to show everything is impermanent. Such elements are: 5 aggregates, 12 bases, 18 elements and 4 great elements. If only say the impermanence of the world, it may be easy to fall into the extreme way of Nihilism. So the Buddha uses another method of synthesis to explain how the world and elements come into being again and again. And they continued in the world again and again without stopping. E.g. reborn. This theory of continuity is established through the method of synthesis without involving the eternalism.

The Buddha rejected the theory of Eternalism through the method of analysis and its related practice- self-mortification.

Again the Buddha refused the theory of Nihilism through the method of synthesis and its practice –self-indulgence. He presented the law of cause and effect and explains that everything is Dependent Origination.

In Theravada Abhidhamma, we only talk about the 5 matters:

1. Citta ------ 89 – 121
2. Cetasika --- 52
3. Rupa ------ 28
4. Paccayakaranaya – 24 kinds of relations among the cause and effects.
5. Nibbana ---- 1. This is the middle path.

The Buddha explains the citta, cetasika and rupa by using the method of analysis. When he explains the theory of Paccayakaranaya, he uses the method of synthesis.
Lectured by Pro. G.Sumanapala
20/03/2001

Topic 1. Clarify the ethical basis of the analysis of mind in Abhidhamma.

Topic 2. Define the Abhidhammic concept of citta and clarify the difference between citta and cetasika.

Lecture 1. Historical background of Abhidhamma
Lecture 2. Philosophical contact of Abhidhamma with early Buddhism.

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The Pali term Abhiddhamma is composed of Abhi Dhamma The prefix “Abhi” is used in the sense of great, excellent, ultimate etc. so the Abhidhamma means great, excellent, marvelous doctrine or teaching of the enlightened one and is a teaching which makes the correct knowledge about the beings and the world in detail more explicitly than Sutta. Thus it is the higher Doctrine

The analysis of phenomena into Citta, Cetasika, Rupa and Nibbana in Theravada is not accepted by all traditions as some teachers presented have various arguments. Therefore, Theravadins were identified as Vibhajja vadins. For instance, Sarvastivadins did not believe Theravada Abhidamma and the them seven Abhidhamm Books presented in Sanskrit language. And Sautrantikas also rejected Abhidhamma teaching. Therefore, some traditions did not discuss Abhidhamma Pitaka but they believed the Sutta Pitaka as their own doctrine.

When we discuss about Abhidhamma tradition the Theravada Abhidhamma is in Pali. It also is the oldest Abhidhammic literature because the Theravada tradition is the oldest in Buddhist history. The other Abhidhamma traditions developed their Abhidhamma literature after forming their schools separately. The next important is though the Theravada teaches the four Paramattha Dhammas and only one Asankhata Dhamma the Sarvastivada accepts a new category of Dhamma called Citta Viprayutta Dhamma and increased Asankhata Dhamma into three Pratisankhya Nirodha, Apratisankya Nirodha and Akasa. All together they believed seventy-five Dhammas. Whereas the Theravadins accepted 82.

Another important, Abhidhamma literature is named as Sriputta Abhidhamma now available in Chinese language only but not certain whether it belongs to Mahasanghika, Sammitiya or Dhammavutka schools as all three sects have Abhidhamma literatures. According to inscription, the Mahasanghika rejected Theravada Abhidhamma. They had also Matika Pitaka, it is said “the sub-schools of Mahasanghika, Gokulika etc. developed Abhidhamma”. Further, the Sautrantika rejected and tried to solve Abhidhamma problem but according to the sutta, we have to accept that they also followed the Abhidhamma to some extent and Vasubhandu who wrote Abhidharmakhosha for Sorvastivadins also accepted the Sautrantika Dhamma theory.

Beside that Yogacara School has discussed about Abhidhamma and accepted a hundred Dhammas. Therefore, the Theravada Abhidhamma is considered as the oldest, complete and original Abhidhamma literature but the other Abhidhamma schools derived from Theravada and they analyzed the Dhamma according to their own traditional belief.

The Pali term Abhiddhamma is composed of Abhi, which are collectively known as Dhamma the doctrine or the teaching of
the blessed one. Dhamma is the teaching that can purify the mind from defilement; attachment and craving etc. and can achieve the lasting peace and happiness. And the prefix “Abhi” is used in the sense of great, excellent, ultimate etc. so the Abhidhamma means great, excellent, marvelous doctrine or teaching of the enlightened one and is a teaching which makes the correct knowledge about the beings and the world in detail more explicitly than Sutta.

By dividing into Citta, Cetasika, Rupa and Nibbana of analytical system in Theravada is not accepted by all traditions as some teachers they have various arguments. Therefore, Theravadins were identified as Vibhajja vadins. For instance, Sarvastivadins they did not believe Theravada Abhidamma and the other seven Abhidhamm Books presented in Sanskrit language. And Sautrantikas also rejected Abhidhamma teaching therefore, some traditions they did not discuss Abhidhamma Pitaka but they believed the Sutta Pitaka as their own doctrine.

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EXPLAIN THE PHILOSOPHICAL BASIS OF THE THERAVADA ABHIDHAMMA. (931) – 71

Buddhism as a religion or as a science is unique in the importance attached to philosophy and metaphysical inquiry. As such it is often regarded as the most advanced of the philosophic system in India.

In Theravada Buddhism, the Abhidhamma constitutes the results of an inquiry into the nature of human experience, both sensory and extra-sensory. Since the results are stated and interpreted in terms of language and logic, it allows the Abhidhamma the justification to be considered as philosophy. The function of philosophy, if the latter is to be practically useful and ethically edifying, is not to indulge in speculative cogitation or mere intellection but to understand nature. This understanding cannot be obtained or developed without reference to the observation of the world within and around us in the way it actually functions. The principles that govern nature are not made available to sense perception directly except through instances and illustration in one’s daily experience, such as seeing falling mangoes and decaying bodies. They can be discovered only through the philosophic methods of analysis and synthesis. In this regard the Abhidhamma can be introduced as a critical and descriptive philosophy.

During the time of the Buddha almost all religions belief in some sort of soul or self which is permanent, eternal and substantial. In order to make clear the point, Buddha set forth the theory of non-self in Buddhism. Thus, in the teaching of the Buddha, two methods of analysis and synthesis are employed to reject
in view of Eternalism and Nihilism.

(1) **The Analytical method**

Early Buddhism divided an individual composed of nama and rupa. Here the rupa is physical material of earth, water, heat and air; and nama includes the sensation, perception, mental formation and consciousness. These 5 constituents are called the 5 aggregates which are impermanent, all constantly changing. Therefore, what we call a ‘being’ or ‘I’ is only a convenient name or level given to the combination of these 5 groups. There is nothing behind them that can be called a permanent soul or atman. In the teaching of Abhidhamma, an individual is analyzed into three main categories as citta, cetasika and rupa. This analysis is based on the early Buddhism conception of 5 aggregates. Among the five aggregates, rupa is analyzed into 28 rupa; feeling, perception and mental formation are analyzed into 52 cetasika. Consciousness (citta) has 89 or 121 sub-derivations.

1. Rupakkhandha – 28 rupa
2. Vedanakkhandha
3. Sabbakkhandha + 52 cetasika
4. Savkharakkhandha
5. Vibbanakkhandha – 89 or 121 citta

(2) **The Synthetical method**

One’s individual is the combination of the 5 aggregates and it is produced through causal processes, just as a seed grows because of conditions in the soil. Thus, with the explanation of the existing of the being, 12 factors of paticcasamuppada are formulated. They are:

1. avijja
2. sankhara
3. vibbana
4. namarupaj
5. salayatanaj
6. phassa
7. vedana
8. tanha
9. upadana
10. bhava
11. jati
12. jara-marana

Each of these factors is conditioned by others as well as conditioning others, they are all relative, interdependent and interconnected, and nothing is absolute or independent, hence no first cause or the only cause is accepted. Thereby the eternal soul is rejected.
According to the teaching of Abhidhamma, the compendium of conditionally is twofold, i.e., the method of dependent arising and the method of conditional relations. The first method is explained as the 12 factors in early teachings, the second method are set forth in the Patthana, the last part of the Abhidhamma Pitaka. In contrast to the method of dependent arising, which deals only with the conditioning states and conditioned states and the structure of their arising, the method of Patthana also deals with the conditioning forces (paccayasatti). Therefore, the early Buddhist teaching of dependent origination has been explained as 24 causal relations in the Abhidhamma. They are:

1. Root condition 因緣
2. Object condition 所緣緣
3. Predominance condition 增上緣
4. Proximity condition 無間緣
5. Contiguity condition 等無間緣
6. Conascence condition 俱生緣
7. Mutuality condition 相互緣
8. Support condition 依止緣
9. Decisive support condition 親依止緣
10. Prenascence condition 前生緣
11. Postnascence condition 後生緣
12. Repetition condition 數數修習緣
13. Kamma condition 業緣
14. Result condition 異熟緣
15. Nutriment condition 食緣
16. Faculty condition 根緣
17. Jhana condition 禪緣
18. Path condition 道緣
19. Association condition 相應緣
20. Dissociation condition 不相應緣
21. Presence condition 有緣
22. Absence condition 無有緣
23. Disappearance condition 離去緣
24. Non-disappearance condition 不離去緣

The final goal of Buddhism is explained under the topic of Nibbana. In early Buddhist teaching, the attainment of the final goal is explained by walking the Middle path or Eightfold path, and one can end of suffering (dukkha). In the teaching of Abhidhamma, the Buddhist path has been introduced by practicing two
methods of concentration (samadhi) and insight (vipassana). The path, therefore, occupies a very important and prominent place within Buddhist thought. In Buddhism, the path leads from samsara to nibbana has been split up into four sections counted as four paths, i.e., sotapatti, sakadagami, anagami and arahant.

The Abhidhamma is therefore, to a deep thinker, the most important and interesting, as it contains the profound philosophy of the Buddha’s teaching in contrast to the illumination but simpler discourses in the Sutta Pitaka. In its most characteristic parts it is a system of classification, analytical enumeration and definition, with no discursive treatment of the subject matter.

Thus, Abhidhamma is the totality of the philosophical teachings of Buddhism. Without a knowledge of the Abhidhamma, the nature and development of Buddhism must ever remain wanting in clearness. ‘Things as they really are’ is the subject dealt with in the Abhidhamma. By studying the Abhidhamma and turning these studying into personal experience by meditation, we can reach the liberation knowledge that gives ‘peace’.

666* EARLY HISTORY OF THE SPREAD BUDDHISM AND BUDDHIST SCHOOLS

* Evolution of the schools of Buddhism
Prof. -Elukewala Dhammaratana thera

Noted by Ven. Oeu Sam Ath

The origins of the various story was developed of the t6ime of the Buddha after the Buddha’s death there was non who was able to take this place there were high learned followers must of them and cam e from Brahmana families. They knew the Brahmanic philosophy and there were learned members of various religious orders like as the Jatilas, Jainas, Ajibakasl. They could not remind with current interpretation of the teachings of the Buddha. They have paid their attention of the specific world of the teachers (Buddha). The leading Buddhist teachers were enable to explain therefore this Buddhist teachers took arguments from the teaching of the Buddha. But all to them agreed with this prepositions.

1-All is momentary (Sarvam Kshanikam)
2- All is suffering (Sarvam Dukkham)

By the time, there arise different opinions both Dhamma and Vinaya with those three agreements. The formations of Buddhist schools most namely to the following factors.

1-The supreme headship of Buddhism of the Buddha’s death.

2- The Gopaka Moggallana sutta (MN) explains that Dhamma and Vinay will be the support in the sutta venerable Ananda answered the question asked by Yasska Brahmana. He asks is thee even one who was designated by the Buddha as your support Mahaparinibbana sutta in (D.N) Buddha has mentioned that Dhamma and Vinaya will be your teacher after my Parinibban. According to the Samagama sutta of (M.N) the disagreement arouse in the Jaina community just after the death Nigantanathaputta.

Yuan Chwang notices the on auspicious day the Abhidhammika’s worshiped Sariputt, the Samadhists worshiped Moggallana and so on. The principles point of resemblance between the follow3ers and their preceptors have given and there were the points for the distinctions among them without any doctrinal differences, it gave right to the full-fledged schools.

According to the school of Sarvastivadins derived from Sariputta it was the origina division of abhidhammikas. The Sthaviravadins
This is confirmed that the origin of schools dates back as earlier the first council. These separated groups developed into separate religious schools of Buddhism. Vinayadharas has developed as Theravadins, the Sautrantikas had developed as Sautrantikas but all the divisions mentioned about are not developed into religious schools.

As an acetic, Buddha laid allow severe austerity for few years which could never fulfill his mission in this way austerities is crept in the Buddhism in early time and the adoption of these let to the formation of schools. The schools of rules of Buddhist that adapted the rituals natural … apart from other religions. These factors have been generalized during the three and half centuries after the Buddha’s death.

When dispute arise among the disciples, the lord Buddha sent favorite disciples Ananda, Sariputta and Moggallana who settle those disputes. Buddha was in the opinions that the wicked and selfish Bhikkhus introduced new principles to the Dhamma and Vinaya. Every quarrel or different of opinions among the Bhikkhus was not characterized by the Buddha as Sanghaveda during the Buddha life time dissensions of minor character took placed in the Buddhist Sangha only two of them attracted his attention. They are called Sanghaveda which is heinous crime. The first dissention was in Kosambi between two monks among Dhammkatthika and Vinayadhara. The next dissention was with Devadatta who requested more austere discipline.

Within the period of Buddha’s ministry various discourses were already at work for the formation of schools. Therefore, it can well imagine that in the actions the great teachers, the monastic order had to give way to the growth as many as twenty schools or more.

2nd The early Buddhist teaching and the evolution of Abhidhamma

Discourses found in the Suttapitaka have namely been classified according to the eternal teacher. When taken as a whole the discourses are given in a conventional from of language though some of them can be considered purely doctrinal and philosophical. The reason for this deliverly of the discourses is that they were delivered on different occasions for various purposes on the nature of the audience.

The above mentioned complicated nature of the discourses creates differently in understanding their through sense discourse evidence even during the time of the Buddha. A monk called Sati held the view that the consciousness transmigrate from existence to existence. And a carpenter called Pacakanga held the view that there are only two kinds of feelings as to the teachings of the Buddha against the view held by the monk Udaya. The view of the monk is that there are only three kinds of feeling in Buddhist teachings. That is mentioning in Bahuvedaniya sutta of the Majjhima Nikaya.

At the late period as recorded in Kathavattupprakarana misinterpretation of the as discourses was a prominent case among the various Buddhist sects. For example some interpreted the term “Puggala person” in the discourses as representing and agent out of the five aggregates which transmigrate from existence to existence. The emergent of various Buddhist schools was mainly due to the different interpretations of the Buddha’s teachings.

The interpretation of the Buddha’s discourses has been a point of controversy since the time of the Buddha. The evolutions of Abhidhamma as a separate canon should be identified as a result of the gradual development of the discourses and search of a methodology for accurate interpretations of the Buddha’s teachings. The process of Abhidhamma can be basically explains under three headings.

1- As a process of systematization of the Buddha’s teachings.

2- As a process of searching for a reliable basis for the human factions, responsibility and rebirth.
3. As a process of searching for a methodology for accurately interpreting the early Buddhist discourses.

The different Buddhist sects interpreted the teachings of the Buddha in various places. These various interpretations and theories are recorded in the *Katavattupprakarana* the seven books of the Abhidhamma.

The definition arises and interpretations of the doctrinal facts by the various Buddhist sects were different from each other. The *Katavattupprakarana* was compiled by venerable Moggaliputtatissa in order to establish Theravada point of view regarding such controversial points. Further there was no unanimity among the Buddhist sects regarding the number of doctrinal aspects so far collected on classified in a course of time. The collections, classifications and definitions of different sects were preserved as separate canonical texts. And they were introduced by a new term called Abhidhamma. The Sutta and Vinaya are very similar to a certain extent but Abhidhamma collections are very different of each other. It is proved that the Abhidhamma came into being as process of interpretations of the early Buddhist teaching by different Buddhist sects.

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**POINT OUT REASON FOR THE EMERGENT FOR THE VARIOUS VIEWS ON BUDDHA-DHAMMA?**

All three councils indicate this aspect of memorization with great effect. Later it became the way that Buddhist education continue whenever necessary there was discussion but the future generation held by memory. The elder Thera were keen to all the first Buddhist council as there were no chief disciple such as Sariputta, Mogalan or any other Bhikkhuni, they had already passed away. The union of the recently ordained community undoubtedly raised down in the senior monks.

The Tibetan Dulva records the passing away of about one lakh fifty thousand senior Bhikkhus and Bhikkhunis even before the passing away of Buddha; this incident was also one reason for emergent of unorganized view concerning the Buddha-Dhamma.

Individual discipline to be practiced by the realization of the Dhamma was held appreciate then following a leader. this idea was expressed by the Buddha even at the last moment (yowo anandamaya dhammo ca vinayo ca tesito panntatto sovo mamaccayena sattha); here clearly the Buddha rejects a personalized leader. It is evident in the very character of the Buddha that one needs to behavior for own sake. The adverse result of a personalized leader was seen in the time of the Buddha which created some problems in Budhasasana and which cause eruption of personal view.

At that time Nigandhaputta passed away at Bava, the Nigandha that were divided that after his death, used abusive language against each other in disagreement (you do not dhamma and discipline) it is me who knows, it is obvious that the Buddha understood such situation to avoid such as calamity among discipline after his passing away proclaim the four great Apadesas(criterion), (1) one must not accept merely because he heard from the Buddha himself but do accept it if agree with the dhamma and vinaya. (2) do not accept merely because it was heard from the Sangha. (3) do not accept merely because scholar says. (4) do not accept merely because a scholarly monks said.

The situation in the Jain community is seen in a great disappointment due to disagreement the ordain community even the lay community became divided through the lag of direction should be given by elderly monks. At the same time without having the opportunity and skill and necessary understanding to realize the meaning of some terms include in Suttapitaka and Vinayapitaka was also one reason to point out some personalized idea of the relevant scholastic monks, as an Ex. There were Nithadesana which means the meaning and concept include in some terms were not clear when they were not clear some monks interpret them according to their personalize idea which pave the way create variety of view on that personalized idea.

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**THE EMERGENT OF NEW SCHOOL, THERAVADA AND MAHAYANA.**

After the second Buddhist council held in favor of orthodox monks (clinging traditional teaching). Vajjians were expelled from Sangha community, the monk who oppose orthodox view held another council which approximately ten thousands monks participated, they were named as Mahasanghika, and they taught conformity that their decision was more orthodoxy than Theravadin. In the course of time these two sects caused formation of several schools, eleven sub sects were connected with Theravadin and seven out of Mahasanghika. This development to place within three or four hundred years after the demise of the Buddha **Theravadin**

According their main characteristic, they seem orthodoxy which means that they did not like to change the basic teaching of the Buddha they wanted to analyze the basic teaching of the Buddha in Abhidhamma philosophy Pali literature include commentary, sub commentary and Pakarana text belong to them. The doctrinal matter included in commentary and sub commentary were not agreed with those of early Buddhist teaching absolutely but the inclusion of this latter additional text ease the understanding as analytical method. At the same time the analysis included in Vishudhimagga and some other scriptures led the emergent various
interpretations connected with Buddh-dhamma.

In addition to doctrinal matter some Theravadin wanted to examine the personalize of the Buddha which pave the way to add new idea Buddhavamsa and Cariyapitaka are included about the superficial characteristic pertaining Buddha life the Buddha as the human being depict human quality but he posses super human quality also.

The teaching of Theravadin it is clear that they wanted to clarify Buddha teaching following simple method as an example always they wanted to interpret how to follow, Sila, Samadhi and Panna in order to describe this matter.Ven. Buddhaghosa compiles vishudhimagga to analyze the verse, silepattathayya sarosa panno which is including Samyuttanikaya. Although Buddhaghosa composes vishudhimagga there were some contradictory ideas when compare with early Buddhism as an example when we analyse the difference between Bhava and Jati and law of causation. There are various views among this scholar.

Anyway vishudhimagga is very popular book among the Theravada Buddhism.

The council of Pataliputta the teaching of this school was Pali source to be those of Vibhajjavadha School. The psycho-ethical philosophy of this school is AbhidhamathaSangaha written by Anuthacariya, this psycho-physical formation into four folds, grouped as Citta mind, Cetasika mental property, Rupa material quality and Nibbana. Anyway regarding the four fold division of Abhidhamma when compared with early Buddhism, Citta,Cetasika and Rupa can not be understood as reality because they are also changeable.

*There are different approaches to the Buddha’s elucidation of fact. Such as Anardesana,Vohadesana,Paramatthadesana Vinaya, convention (Samuti) Absolute(Paraamaththa) respectively. Also there are two methods as Neyyatadesana( the meaning could be understood through interpretation) and Nitatthadesana( the meaning already have been given. Furthermore Neyyatta meaning those expositions that conducts toward elucidation. Nitattha means those that elucidated critic believe that these two methods have been taken one for the other and the different sects arose as the result all 18 sects admitted the diversity of the absolute Dhamma they differ from each other.

666HISTORY OF INDIAN BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY

According to the different teaching of various Buddhist sects in India it is possible to divide them into three main divisions as, (1) absolute (2) relative (3) consciousness.

The history of arising of various sects can be traced to about 483 B.C if we consider beginning to be from the date of passing away of the Buddha in 543 B.C there could be a problem. Hence the exact date could be considered after the first break away by Mahasangika in 380 B.C. the first 18 sects that aroused were similar to the extend that they all rejected the permanent soul. Create God etc. The Mahasangika aroused hundred years after the passing away in 483 B.C with the second Buddhist council though it is accepted that the division arouse due to Vinaya question, it can be said that Dhamma itself was really the cause, but they are described as those against Vinaya by Theravadin it must be admitted that this is not soul because Mahasangika are known to protect 100 rules more than Theravadin the ten points of Vinaya controversy are mentioned in Chinese text therefore we may surmise that different sects arose not due to Vinaya but due to Dhamma.

100 years after the arising of Mahasangika 18 different sects were in 283 B.C the text Kathavathupakarana is an important source book which mentions the presence of the individual self of Samitia sect (puggala uppalopati saccikatena paramathenati) this view was criticized by other Buddhist sects. This view was known as Puggalavada which was regarded as that there was individual transmigration from birth to birth Mahayana arose in first century A.D. the Madhyamika tradition arose in second century A.D under the famous master such as Nagajuna, Aredeva, Sangadeva and some other scholars.

By the 4 century A.D the Vijnavada of Yogacara arose. At the beginning of the Madhyamika and Yogacara were one and the same. Maitrinatha, Asanga and Vashupandu were the first teachers of Madhyamika philosophy. These 18 sects were presented even in the 7 century is evident in Yuan chuan recorded. He described that the large number of adherence were of Puggala Vada in India at that time.

After the arising of Mahayana tradition all these sects along side, Sarasavadin gave right to Sutrantika and Vaippasrika tradition Madhyamika taught the doctrine of voidness(Sunyata), according to them there is no existence apart from condition relative(sapesakatavada) the Yogacara philosophers maintain that all lives and living is a mentality or mind only(Citamatrika). There is no external world, physical world all that exist is only a mental concept the Yogacara and Madhyamika tradition prove parallel till the 7th and 8th century Tantrayana arose in 8th and 9th century. Their theory depicts mysteries meaning.

The traditional text show that the various sects arose due to Vinaya disagreement also they say that greedy self seeking. Thinkers of wrong views were instrumental in bringing dissention and sectarianism there is no evidence to prove that their reason are valid the Mahasangika themselves admitted that the ten points of controversy are unethical and against Vinaya, and it is mentioned in their text. It is therefore evident that these ten points of controversy were not the reason for the arising of sects. Then what is the reason? It is possible to say that the reason lies with the Dhamma according to this variety views they can be categorized as follow:
Ves through five hundred and fifty births, realized by the Buddha goes to the length of claiming that the seven treatises of the Buddha ascribed the systematic historical evolution. The traditional claim, shared alike by the recitation and memorization. This was the method that was adopted. There are no separate sections such as Sutta, Vinaya and Abhidhamma mention. The popular method among Brahman was administration. There is also no evident to prove that there is no organize system of compilation of Sutta and Vinaya during his life concerning the Buddhist thought because Buddha did not appoint a teacher as the religious leader after his passing away. There is no for edification of the students of history of Buddhism. All the events that result various philosophical ideas are very important thus has been accomplished by the first school as known as Theravadin after the Buddha passing away. The second council discourse of the Buddha to prove this theory, thus we can analyze in brief some stage in development of the Buddhist thought. An not exist and therefore all his voice they concluded that only mind exist and reject all the other Dhamma. They may use some Mahayana. Those that accepted the Dhamma said that only absolute Dhamma exist Madhyamika said that even absolute Dhamma did argue if something as the relative existence (depending each other) it can not be regarded as having and independent existence of Dhammavada) these two continue for even 500 years. They based their argument on the logic of causality(Padiccasamuppada) they arise,(1) do phenomena have a quality or special feaure.(2) can dhamma has a quality or special feature?(3) how the conditionality or causality interact among Dhamma??(4) what is the life spent of dhamma? These sorts of question appear in Buddha’s exposition and each of the teacher advanced theories according his knowledge and understanding to resolve them. Thus we see the cause for the arising of sect as an attain to interpret the Buddha teaching. According to Theravada source and Mahayana source we can understand that most of the controversy idea erupted because of the various exposition of Dhamm. Tibetan and Chinese source (agama literature reveal much about this controversy.

666HISTORY OF BUDDHIST THOUGHT

There are different approaches to the Buddha’s elucidation of fact. Such as Anardesana, Vohadesana, Paramatthadesana Vinaya, convention (Samuti) Absolute(Paraamaththa) respectively. Also there are two methods as Neyyatadesana( the meaning could be understood through interpretation) and Nitatthadesana( the meaning already have been given. Furthermore Neyyatta meaning those expositions that conducts toward elucidation. Nitatta means those that elucidated critic believe that these two methods have been taken one for the other and the different sects arose as the result all 18 sects admitted the diversity of the absolute Dhamma they differ from each other according to the number of these differences. Therefore critic all the eras of reality philosopher all its era of universality of differentiation Mahayanist argue the Theravadin as uphold of from view they argue that since all phenomena are impermanent and causally arisen the absolute has no existence of its own and can not be described as entity thus they see the contradiction in the Theravada. This universal differentiation of Dhamma was a controversy that continues for more than 500 years. At the end of that era their arose the era of concept of relativity and conditionality of the phenomena (Sabbekatavada and Dhammavada) these two continue for even 500 years. They based their argument on the logic of causality(Padicasamuppada) they argue if something as the relative existence (depending each other) it can not be regarded as having and independent existence of each own and they prove logically that all is avoided subsequent to this view, came the Vinnavadin. It is a philosophical aspect of Mahayana. Those that accepted the Dhamma said that only absolute Dhamma exist Madhyamika said that even absolute Dhamma did not exist and therefore all his voice they concluded that only mind exist and reject all the other Dhamma. They may use some discourse of the Buddha to prove this theory, thus we can analyze in brief some stage in development of the Buddhist thought. An important thus has been accomplished by the first school as known as Theravadin after the Buddha passing away. The second council was held by the king Kalasoka and third during Dhammasokka and the fourth council was held by king Kanaskal it is accepted that the first three councils were held by Theravadin and fourth was held by Mahayanist this council that were held in India are essential for edification of the students of history of Buddhism. All the events that result various philosophical ideas are very important concerning the Buddhist thought because Buddha did not appoint a teacher as the religious leader after his passing away. There is no evident to prove that there is a record all the teaching and Vinaya rule that the Buddha proclaimed through out 45 years of its ministration. There is also no evident to prove that there is no organize system of compilation of Sutta and Vinaya during his life time. There are no separate sections such as Sutta, Vinaya and Abhidhamma mention. The popular method among Brahman was recitation and memorization. This was the method that was adopted.

THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF ABHIDHAMMA TRADITION (ORIGINAL BY VEN. Suvanny)

The origin and devleopment of the Abhidhamma extended over a considerable period of gradual and systematic historical evolution. The traditional claim, shared alike by the Theravādins and the Sarvāstivādins ascribed the Abhidhamma, both in regard to its historical origin as well as in regard to its literary form, to the Buddha himself. The Āṭṭhasalīni of the Theravādins, which describes the Buddha as the first Abhidhammika, goes to the length of claiming that the seven treatises of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka were themselves uttered by the Buddha.

According to them, the Abhidhamma was inspired by the earnest aspiration for enlightenment, matured through five hundred and fifty births, realized by Buddha at the foot of the Bodhi tree, in the month of Vesākha. It was reflected upon by the omniscient Buddha while he was on the seat of enlightenment during his
weeks stay at the Jewelled Mansion. It was taught in heaven, that is in the Realm of the Thirty-Three Gods. It was received by the gods and it was studied by the venerable seekers after perfection as well as by the virtuous worldly folk.

It is the word of the Buddha and it has been handed down by the succession of teachers and their pupils. Through Sāriputta it has been successively handed down by Bhaddaji, Sobhita, Moggaliputta, Revata and others up to the time of the Third Council and thereafter by their pupils. Through the traditional succession in India it was brought to the island of Ceylon by Mahinda. It is generally accepted that the Abhidhamma originated and developed out of the Dhamma. The term Dhamma in its normative aspect bears the widest meaning and comprises the entire teaching of doctrine. The Dhamma was capable of being understood and grasped only by the wise especially because of the fact that the greater part of the Dhamma was taught in a free style. The rich and varied contents of the suttas as the word of the Buddha gradually grew into a religion and philosophy professed by an increasing number of people.

The richness of the philosophical content of the Buddha's discourses allowed the possibility of divergence of opinion even among the Buddhist monks themselves. That this was actually so is indicated by the early history of the emergence of the Buddhist schools. This process was probably accelerated after the council of Vesālī, which was exclusively devoted to the discussion of ten points of monastic discipline. It was at the council of Pātaliputra, during Asoka's reign, that controversial points were settled and incorporated in the canonical texts under the name Kathāvatthupakarana. The differences came to be more exaggerated when each school held its own closed sessions to decide the import of the doctrine. The earlier life of settled monasticism and the life of leisure thus secured induced the monks to engage themselves in philosophical and literary pursuits and the geographical isolation of the monasteries resulted in the growth of independent schools of thought.

This explains at once many of the disparities between the various schools in regard to the Abhidhamma. In view of the differences among the schools on the subject of the Abhidhamma each felt the need for the compilation of a separate pitaka for the special and elaborated doctrine. Even from the point of view of literature, we see the contrast between the Dhamma and Abhidhamma. We can therefore say that while the Dhamma belongs to the period of undivided Buddhism of the earliest days, the Abhidhamma belongs to the period of divided Buddhism. From its very inception and throughout the medieval and modern periods, the Abhidhamma evolved and developed in the isolation of the separate schools.
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The Origin and Development of Abhidhamma Tradition:

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The tradition is that was reflected upon by the omniscient Buddha, while he was on the seat of enlightenment, during his weeks stay at the Jeweled Mansion. It was first taught in heaven, and then studied by the venerable seekers after perfection as well as by the virtuous worldly folk.

It is the word of the Buddha and has been handed down by the succession of teachers and their pupils. Through Sariputta it has been successively handed down by Bhaddaji, Sobhita, Moggaliputta, Revata and others up to the time of the third council and thereafter by their pupils. Through the traditional succession in India was brought to the island of Ceylon, that is, by Mahinda. It is generally accepted that the Abhidhamma originated and developed out of the Dhamma. Because of the fact that the greater part of the Dhamma was taught in a free style, it provided room for different interpretation.

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The early Buddhist discourses were delivered for the sake of different characters on different occasions. They are not interconnected as a systematic philosophy. The problems that arose in regard to their definition and internal coherent were solve by the Buddha and its leading disciples at that time. After the Buddha passing away, the perpetuation of the doctrine was the most important task that fell into the hands of disciples because the Buddha had clearly expressed that the Dhamma and Vinaya could be the leader of the Order after his demise. Taking these instructions into consideration the Ven. Mahakassapa and other leading disciples determined to hold the first council where they could collect almost all the discourses delivered by the Buddha.

The collection of the discourses initiate the scholastic approach to Buddhist philosophy on cause of time not only the collection but also classification of the discourses took places. Thus collection and classification had been a very important task during the period of first and the second Buddhist councils. The third step of the processes of preserving early Buddhism was to derive the main philosophical aspects from the discourses. The
discourses had been delivered in the common form of language including in them the concept of persons and places, narratives and other form of communication. Because of this nature of language embodied in the discourses they could be interpreted in various ways. The leading disciples understood the danger of such a form of language for the possibility of misinterpreting the discourses. For this reason they made an attempt to abstract the doctrinal aspects from the discourses and composed new sutta which are called Dhamma sutta (the discourses of Dhamma). They included only the doctrines such as five aggregates, twelve bases and eighteen elements listed in technical terms without common interpretation. This Dhamma sutta could be found in the Pali canon itself. The Savgiti Sutta and the Dasuttara Sutta of the Digha Nikaya are but only two clear examples of these. The Savgiti Sutta lists the doctrine of the discourses in a numerical order as follows:

1. The teaching including one doctrine: e.g., Sabbe satta aharatthitika – all beings depend on cause.
2. Two doctrines: namarupa (name and form); avijjabhavatanha (ignorance and craving).
3. Three doctrines: lobha, dosa, moha (greed, hatred, ignorance); alobha, adosa, amoha (non-greed, non-hatred, non-illusion)
4. Four doctrines:
   2. Kayanupassana – contemplation on body
   3. Vedanapassana – contemplation on feeling
   4. Cittampassana – contemplation on consciousness
5. Five doctrines: Rupa, Vedana, Sabba, Savkhara, Vibbana

Thus Sangiti Sutta presents various lists of the doctrine in the numerical order as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of doctrines</th>
<th>Number of sets of doctrines</th>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>30</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>60</td>
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<td>9</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
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When taken as a whole the Sangiti Sutta itself gives a list of about 818 doctrines. The Dasuttara Sutta also includes similarly of doctrines. It is important to know that is two discourses were been delivered by the Buddha disciples after the passing away of the Jain leader, Nigantha Nathaputta, his disciples has disputed among them regarding the teaching of their leader. The Ven. Ananda considering this incident asked the Buddha about the steps that should be taken in the same situtation occurs after the Buddha passing away. Following the Buddha’s advised Ven. Sariputta delivered this Sangiti Sutta in order to present such dispute among the disciples. This is further confirmed by the recurrent statement of the Sangiti Sutta after each and every lists of doctrines that “all should not make discourse on these sets of doctrines”. After composing of a number of Dhamma Sutta there arose a necessity defining and explain those listed of doctrines. If for this purpose the common usage of language is used once again therefore could arose different views and interpretation. Therefore the leading disciples made used of a highly technical form of language to define and explain those doctrines. By the third of Buddhist council, there had been a considerable amount of such
definition and explanation supplied to those Dhamma Suttas. This new literature were different in style from
the discourses. Therefore by the adding prefix ‘Abhi’ to the term ‘Dhamma’, it was introduced as
‘Abhidhamma’. The Ven. Moggaliputta Tissa added Kathavatthupakarana to this literature at the 3rd council
and finalize Theravadin canon of Abhidhamma which consists of seven texts are as follows:

1. Dhammasangani
2. Vibhavga
3. Dhatukatha
4. Puggala-pabbatti
5. Kathavatthu
6. Yamaka
7. Patthana

- Paramattha defines in Abhidhamma commentary in this term ‘Paramo uttamo aviparito attho, paramassa va
  uttamassa banassa attho gocaroti paramattho. – the four realities become the object of highest knowledge.
- The Abhidhamma analysis five aggregates to the first three realities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theravada</th>
<th>Sarvastivada</th>
<th>Sautrantika</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Citta</td>
<td>89/121</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cetasika</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rupa</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>11</td>
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<td></td>
<td>cittaviprayuktsamkara 14</td>
<td>Savkhara – 20</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(non-mental non-material elements)</td>
<td>Vibbana – 6</td>
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666 SOURCES OF ABHIDHAMMA 10/10/97

Here we proposed to introduce in brief the most important original sources of Abhidhamma both in Pali
and Sanskrit traditions. The Theravada sources of Abhidhamma are compiled in Pali and printed in many
characters, such as Sinhalese Devanagari, Burmese and Siamese. The Theravada canon of Abhidhamma
consists of seven texts:

(1) Dhammasangani – Specification or Enumeration of phenomena.
   It has 4 sections: cittuppada, rupa, nikkepa and attakatha. Among them, citta and rupa sections analyse
   mental and material phenomena respectively and the other two sections point out the main doctrines
   related to a specific terms such as ‘wholesome things’ etc.

(2) Vibhavga – The Book of Treatises. It has 18 analysis, such as aggregates, bases, elements, truths and senese

(3) Dhatukatha – Discussion with the reference to the elements. It explains the five aggregates in various ways,
   pointing out their connection with the bases, elements etc.

(4) Puggala-pabbatti – Discription of Individuals. It has 6 sections, dealing with the concept of aggregates,
   bases, elements, truths, senses and individual. The book is named after the last item because except for the
   concept of individuals, the other concepts have already been dealt with in the other texts of the
   Abhidhamma. Here only the concept of individual dealt with in detail. In a given language all kinds of
   terms referring to realities or concepts come under the category of pabbatti.

(5) Kathavatthu – Points of Controversy. Which is the only text of the canon ascribed to a disciple. Content 210
   controversies connected with the Theravada as well as the other schools of Buddhism such as Puggalavada,
Sabbathivada and Suttantika. The subject matter of this controversy generally belonged to both the philosophical and religious aspects of Buddhism.

(6) Yamaka – Book of pair. In the form of questions and answers dealt with the same subjects such as aggregates, bases and elements pointing out their interconnection. It includes pairs of questions.

(7) Patthana – The Book of Origination. It explains the various ways of religions that exist among the facts of phenomena.

Now, it should be clear that the Dhammasangani, Vibhanga, kathavatthu, Puggala-pabbatti and Yamaka generally deal with the analysis of phenomena, and the Patthana deals with synthesis.

The most important sources are the Pali commentaries and sub-commentaries written in Sri Lanka and Burma. Almost all the Pali commentaries explain the early Buddhist discourses on an Abhidhammic basis. For example, the Visuddhimagga written as a common commentary on the four Nikayas or agamas presents Abhidhammic basic of phenomena and noumenon 本體, 實體 under the topics Samadhi and Pabba.

There are three commentaries written on the canon of Abhidhamma, i.e., the Atthasalini, Sammohavinodani and Pabcappakaranatthakatha. Among them the first text is important as it supplies the detail introduction to the evolution of the Abhidhamma.

There are two kinds of sub-commentaries in pali literature. One written in the commentaries and the other on Abhidhammic compendiums. As far as the evolution of the Theravada Abhidhamma is concerned, the sub-commentaries of the compendium are more important than the other sources. In the mediaeval period the Theravada Abhidhamma came to be presented in a series of compendium called Sanghaganthas. They differ from the commentary and sub-commentary as they could be understood without references to another texts. According to Burmese tradition, they are 9 such texts known as ‘Little fingers manuals’. They are as follows (reference available in Encyclopaedia of Buddhism I, I, p. 79):

1. Abhidhammatavara – 入阿毘達磨論 Vikasinitika – by Buddhadatta
2. Ruparupanibhaga – 色非色分別論 – by Buddhadatta
5. Paramatthaviniçchaya – 第一義抉擇論 – by Anurudha
7. Saccasavkhepa – 諦要略論 – by Dhammapala
8. Namacaradipaka – 名行燈論 – by Saddhammajotipala (Burmese monk)
9. Mohaviccchedani – 斷痴論 by Kassapa (Sinhalese monk)

Among the sub-commentaries on these compendiums the Vikasinitika the commentary on the Abhidhammatavara is of great important as it contains detailed explanation on the fundamental of Abhidhamma. The Vibbavinitika the commentary on the Abhidhammasangaha thought more concise than the above is important in the many other respects, especially in the method of its exposition. The Savkhepanannana another commentary of the Abhidhammasangaha, although very concise is very useful for the study of evolution of the conception of Dhamma.

Paramatthamabjusa, the Abhidhammasangahani and the madhutika are the some of the important sub-commentaries on Abhidhamma. Of them, the first is important as it contains many evolutions to the doctrines of the other schools of Abhidhamma. The other have been written in Burma, and are important in respect of the exposition of the theory of Dhamma. Manisaramavyusa, a sub-commentary on the Vibhavganitika written in Burma is a very useful source of in clarifying many obscure methods in the Abhidhammasangaha and its commentaries.
The Abhidhammasangaha-sannaya a Sinhalese paraphrase on the Abhidhammasangaha and the Visuddhimaggasannaya as Sinhalese paraphrase on the Visuddhimagga are all of additional details regarding the subject matter of Abhidhamma. As far as Sanskrit sources are concerned, the Abhidhammakowa of acariya Vasubandhu with its Bhasaya, and the commentary on it by Yasomitra, Abhdhammadipa with its commentary Vibhasaprabhavrtti, Abhidhammasamuccaya of acariya Asavga, with its bhasaya by Yosamitra. Tattvasangraha of acariya Santaraksita with its Pabjika by Kamasila are worthy of consideration.

- Theravada = Abhidhammasangaha
- Sarvastivada = Abhidhammakowa
- The course of development of Abhidhamma in Theravada into 3 stages:
  1. The seven fundamental Abhidhamma texts.
  2. The commentaries on the seven books and manuals
  3. Their sub-commentaries.

Abhidhamma is a class of literature which deals with philosophical and theological topics. In other words, it is a highly developed form of annotated texts. It is likely that Abhidhamma originated from matika. It has a long history of development.

Abhidhamma is the third, and historically the latest, of the three “baskets,” or collections of texts, that together comprise the Pali canon of Theravada Buddhism, the form predominant in Southeast Asia and Sri Lanka (Ceylon). Unlike Sutta and Vinaya, the seven Abhidhamma works are not generally claimed to represent the words of the Buddha himself but of disciples and great scholars. Nevertheless, they are highly venerated, particularly in Burma.

These are not systematic philosophical treatises but a detailed scholastic reworking, according to schematic classifications, of doctrinal material appearing in the Suttas. As such they represent a development in a rationalistic direction of summaries or numerical lists that had come to be used as a basis for meditation--lists that, among the more mystically inclined, contributed to the Prajñaparamita literature of Mahayana Buddhism, the form predominant in East Asia. The topics dealt with in Abhidhamma books include ethics, psychology, and epistemology.

**Question: Some discourses of early Buddhism led the way for the emergence of later Buddhist philosophical traditions. Discuss.**

Though Mahāyāna Buddhism appeared as a new phase of the religion at about 2nd or 1st century BC along with nikāyas dated about 487 BC and compiled from Buddha's discourses at the First Buddhist Council, there are however definite traces that Bhagavan Buddha had at the back of His mind the philosophical outlook of Mahāyāna Buddhism. Lets see how Mahāyāna traces in early Buddhism: in the Mūlaparīyāya Sutta it is stated that a person regards earth as earth and establishes a relation with it.
same way he does with the other four elements (ṣadbhūtas), the different kind of meditation as meditation etc.

Even an Arhant regards Nibbāna as Nibbāna and thinks that he has attained Nibbāna. Bhagavan Buddha however knows earth etc. but does not establish a relation with them because the Tathāgata is free from all ideas or conceptions while an Arhant is not, hence, this is the difference that exists between an Arhant and Tathāgata. In the Aлагaddāpāma Sutta Buddha taught that all dharmā, the various sāstra, even all dedicational practices of a bhikkhu are mere añā like a raft with the have(?) of which as well as by psychical exertion a person crosses the stream and after reaching the other shore the person throws away the raft. Likewise a bhikkhu by means of several ethical and meditation practices becomes a Sotāpanna and strives to attain the highest knowledge. In the Aggivacchagotta Sutta the Buddha does not give an answer to Vācchagotta Paribbājaka's question: sassato loko or assassata loko; antavā loka or ananta loka and so forth.3

Buddha then explained it by a simile: take, for instance, a fire burning of a faggot is exhausted and the fire is extinguished, where does the fire go? Likewise, the Tathāgata is composed of saṅkhāras and when the saṅkhāras are eschewed by Him, He disappears in the unknown, unfathomable. In the Kevaddha Sutta in Digha Nikāya it is stated that all the elements and mind and form are comprehended by an Arhant with the help of the law of causation that they are substanceless (sabbe dharmā anattā) as this is essential for attaining Nibbāna. In the Majjhima Nikāya it is stated that those who are in the first stage of sanctification (Sotāpanna) have no chance of retrogression from that stage and they are destined to attain the highest emancipation (sambodhī).

The other Mahāyānic terms, sūnyatā (voidness), animitta (void of characteristics) and appanīhita (absence of desire for worldly objects), which are also non-existent. These terms occur in the Dīgha Nikāya and Majjhima Nikāya, Suññatā Sutta. In the Sañyutta and Āṅguttara Nikāya occurs the statement that the Suttantas delivered by the Tathāgata are deep, supremundane and closely connected with suññatā. In the Sañyutta Nikāya while givin a discourse on the nature of the unconstituted (asakāra) the Buddha said that the Gangese is a large river, carrying on the surface of its water a mass of foam which is useless and insubstantial. Like the foam and bubbles are the material constituents viz. matter, feeling, perception, impressions (dispositions) and consciousness.

In another passage of the same nikāya the following words appear: "Dhammāṃ hi passato maṃ passati, maṃ passati. Maṃ passato dharmam passati.« - "He who realizes my teaching visualizes me and he who visualizes me realizes my teaching."4 These instances distinctly show that there were Mahāyānic traces in the nikāyas. It should also benoted that Mahāyāna Buddhism was divided into two philosophical schools viz. Sūnyatāvāda of Nāgarjuna and Vijñānāvāda of Asanga and later it developed into Vijñānāpattatratavāda – absolute pure consciousness – by Vasubandhu.

666 "SOME DISCOURSES OF EARLY BUDDHISM LED THE WAY FOR THE EMERGENCE OF LATER BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHICAL TRADITIONS" DISCUSS:

Though Mahayana Buddhism appeared as a new phase of the religion about the 2nd or 1st century B.C., along with a Nikayas, dated about 487 B.C. and compiled from Buddha's discourses in the first Buddhist Council, there are however definite traces that Bhagavan Buddha had at the back of his mind the philosophical outlook of Mahayana Buddhism. Let see how Mahayana traces in early Buddhism: in the Mulapariyaya Sutta, it is stated that a person regards earth as earth and establishes a relation with it. In the same way he does with the other four elements (Shabhurstas), the different kind of meditation as meditation etc.

Even an Arhant regards Nibbana as Nibbana and thinks that he has attained Nibbana. Bhagavan Buddha, however, knows earth etc. But does not establish a relation with them because the Tathagata.

Buddha then explained it by a simile: Take, for instance, a fire burning off a faggot, when the faggot is exhausted and the fire is extinguished, where does the fire go. Likewise, the Tathagata is composed of Saṅkhāras and when the Saṅkaras are eschewed by him, he disappears in the unknown, unfathomable. In the Kevvaddha Sutta in Digha Nikaya, it is stated that all the elements and mind

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3 Kim nu kho, bho gotama, 'sassato loko, idameva saccaṃ moghamaniḥnti – evamādiṭṭhi [evamādiṭṭhi (sī. syā. kaṃ. ka.)bhavam gotamo]’ti. ‘Na kho aham, vacca, evamādiṭṭhi – 'sassato loko, idameva saccaṃ moghamaniḥnti’nti.


and from are comprehended by an Arahant with the help of the law of causation that they are substance less (Sabbe Dhamma Anatta) as this is essential for attaining Nibbana. In the Majjima Nikaya it is stated that those who are in the first stage of sanctification (Sotapanna) have no chance of retrogression from that stage and they are destined to attain the highest emancipation (Sambodhi).

In another passage of the same Nikaya appear the following words: Dhammam hi passato mam passati. Mam passato Dhammam Passati (he who realizes my teaching visualizes me, and he who visualizes me realizes my teaching). These instances distinctly show that there were Mahayanic traces in the Nikayas. It should also be noted that Mahayana Buddhism was divided into two Philosophical schools, Viz, Sunyatavada of Nagarjuna and Vijanavada of Asanga and it was later developed into Bijnaptimatrata-vada-absolute pure consciousness by Vasubandhu.

Though Mahaayana Buddhism appeared as a new phase of the religion about the 2nd or 1st century B.C., along with a Nikayas, perhaps 487 B.C. and compiled from Buddha’s discourses in the first Buddhist Council, there are however definite traces that Buddha had at the back of his mind the philosophical outlook of Mahayana Buddhism. Let’s see the Mahayana traces in early Buddhism: in the Mulapariyaya sutta, it is stated that a person regards earth as earth and establishes a relation with it. In the same way he does with the other four elements (shabhutas), the different kind of meditation as meditation etc.

Even an Arhat regards nibbana as nibbana and thinks that he has attained nibbana. Bhagavan Buddha, however, knows earth etc. but does not establish a relation with them because the Tathagata is free from all ideas or conceptions while an Arahat is not, hence, this is the difference that exists between an Arahat and a Tathagata. In the Alagaddupama Sutta Buddha taught that all dhamma, the various Sastra, even all dedicational practices of a Bhikhu are mere aid like a raft to be used means for crossing the ocean of samsara. In the Aggi-vacchagotta sutta the Buddha does not give answer to Vacchagotta paribbajaka’s question: sassata loka or asassata loka; antavan or ananta loka and so forth.

Buddha then explained it by a simile: Take, for instance, a fire burning off a faggot, when the faggot is exhausted and the fire is extinguished, where does the fire go. Likewise, the Tathagata is composed of samkharas and when the Sangaras are eschewed by him, he disappears in the unknown, unfathomable. In the Kevaddha Sutta in Digha Nikaya, it is stated that all the elements and mind and form are comprehended by an Arahant with the help of the law of causation that they are substanceless (Sabbe dhamma anatta) as this is essential for attaining Nibbana.

The well known words: Dhammam hi passato mam passati. Mam passato dhammam passati (he who realizes my teaching visualizes me, and he who visualizes me realizes my teaching). These instances distinctly show that there were Mahayanic traces in the Nikayas. It should also be noted that Mahamayna Buddhism was divided into two Philosophical schools, Viz, Sunyatavada of Nagarjuna and Vijanavada of Asanga and it was later developed into Vijnaptimatrata-vada-absolute pure consciousness by Vasubandhu.
The schools of Indian philosophy have sprung from two or rather three original sources or traditions. The Brahmanical systems based on the Atman doctrine of the Upanishads and the Buddhist school on the nairatmya doctrine of Buddha conceives reality on two distinct and exclusive patterns. The Upanishads and the systems drawing their inspiration from them conceive reality on the pattern of an inner core of soul (Atman), immutable and identical amidst an outer region of impermanence and change to which it is unrelated or but loosely related. This may be termed the substance view of reality (atmvada), in its radical form, as in the Advaita Vedanta, it denies the reality of the apparent, the impermanent, and the many, and equates them with the false. The Samkhya does not go so far; still it inclines more towards the substantial, the permanent, and the universal. The Nyaya with its empirical and pluralistic bias accord equal status to both substance and modes. Not only do these systems accept the atman, but what is more, they conceive all other things too on the substance pattern. The Atman is the very pivot of their metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics in epistemology, substance makes for unity and integration of experience; it explains perception, memory, and personal identity better than other assumption. Bondage is ignorance of the self or the wrong identification of the self with the non-self (atmanyanatmadhyasa). Freedom is the discrimination between the two. The other tradition is represented by the Buddhist denial of substance (Atman) and all that it implies. There is no inner and immutable core in things; everything is in flux. Existence for the Buddhist is momentary, unique it is discontinuous, discrete, and devoid of complexity. Substance (the universal and identical) is rejected as illusory, it is but a thought-construction made under the influence of wrong belief (avidya). This may be taken as the modal view of reality. The Buddhists brought their epistemology and ethics into full accord with their nairatmya metaphysics their peculiar conception of perception an inference and the contemporary doctrine of mental construction are necessary consequent of their deny of substance heroic attempt have been made to fit in this theory with the doctrine of Karma and rebirth. Avidya, which is the root cause of pain, is the wrong belief in the Atman. The wisdom is eradication of this belief the term logy employ above is after the base Jana epistemological treatise philosophical view they say are principally two substances view and the model view. Its view carried to the extreme deny the reality of the other and emphasis the universal and the continuous to the exclusion of the changing and the difference and the other hole the opposite view the Davaydanta is cited as the exponent of the extreme from of the substance view and the Buddhism represent the exclusive model view.

**Rise of the philosophical schools**

The terminology employed above is after the best Jaina epistemological treatises. Philosophical views, they say, are principally two-the dravyarthika-naya (substance view) and paryayarthika-naya (modal view). Each view, carried to the extreme, denies the reality of the other. One emphasizes the universal and the continuous to the exclusion of the changing and the different, and the other holds the opposite view. The Vedanta is cited as the exponent of the extreme form of the substance view; and Buddhism (tathagatamata) represents the exclusive modal view. The Jaina system ostensibly reconciles these two opposed views by according equal reality to substance and its modes. There is no substance without modes, nor are there modes without substance. Reality is manifold (anekantatmaka), it is not of one nature, it is unity and difference, universal and particular, and permanent and changing. The Jaina philosophy shaped its epistemology on this pattern and formulated the logic of the disjunction of the real (syadvada). This view may be said to constitute the third stream of Indian philosophy, lying misway between the two extremes of the (atmavada) and the anatmavada. Seemingly partaking of the nature of both, it was essentially un-Brahmanical and un-Buddhistic. It was un_Bramanical in that it accepted a changing Atman and even ascribed different sizes to it; no Brahmanical system could ever accept that. It was un-Buddhistic in that it accepted a permanent entity, atman, besides change. As a result, the Jaina found favour with neither. The synthesis of two views is a third view, and is no substitute for either. The Jaina system had comparatively little influence on the course of Indian philosophy, and was little affected by other systems. Jainism has remained practically stationary down the ages.
Indian philosophy must therefore be interpreted as the flow of two vital streams—one having its source in the Atman doctrine of the Upanishads and the other in the anatmavada of Buddha. Each branched off several sub-streams. There were lively sallies and skirmishes, but no com mingling of the two streams. Throughout the course of their development they have remained true to their original inspirations. The Brahmanical systems are wedded to being, Buddhism to becoming; the former espous e the existential and static view of reality, the latter the sequential and dynamic, for the one space, for the other time is the archetype. The Brahmanical systems are relatively more categorical and positive in their attitude (vādhamukhena), while the Buddhists are more negative (nīsedhamukhena). Again, the former are more domatic and speculative, the latter empirical and critical. Subjectively minded, Buddhism is little interested in cosmological speculations and constructive explanations of the universe. The Brahmanical systems are bound to an original tradition; they all accept the authoritarian character of the Vedas. Buddhism derives its inspiration from a criticism of experience itself. The tempo of development is quicker and intenser in Buddhism than in the Upanishadic tradition.

An opposite view has been advocated by a not incon siderable section of the schools of Indian thought. They interpret Indian philosophy as having developed out of one tradition, the Upanishadic. Buddhism and Jainism are treated as deviations, rather than radical departure, from the atmavada of the Upanishads. This, however, ignores the sharp differences and exclusive attitudes inherent in these systems. Similarly it overlooks the internal differences within the fold of Buddhism, and considers it one unitary system instead of a matrix of many systems. Nairatmyavada is the genus of which the different Buddhist systems—the vādhamukha, the Sautrantika, the Madhyamika, and the Yogacara—are the species; they are the various attempts to express the same denial of substance. The entire course of the development of Indian philosophy is proof of our contention. No Buddhist system did ever accept the reality of Atman, the permanent and the unchanging. No non-Buddhist system except the Carvaka, on the contrary, could ever reject it as unreal.

It may be said that this state of affairs is true of the later scholastic phase of Buddhism, and not of the original teachings of its master. Reliance may be placed on certain texts affirming the Atman. But we have to consider, as against this, more numerous passages which deny the self in unmistakable terms. It will not do therefore to select those texts that favour a preconceived interpretation and to ignore the others. A systematic exegesis of the texts and a synthesis of the doctrines can alone prove fruitful. Such syntheses have been made by the Buddhist systems from time to time, notably by the Abhidharmika, the Madhyamika, and the Vijnanavada systems. The modern exponent has to take these into account, as prima facie they claim to embody and express the original teachings in the case of Buddhism too, we must accept the law of evolution that the later phases are potentially contained in the earlier. The theory of a primitive soul-affirming Buddhism followed by a soul-denying schasticism does not solve any problem; it adds one more. In the attempt of bridging the difference between the Upanishads and Buddha we would have immeasurably increased the distance between Buddha and Buddhism. Nor can we find any adequate reason for such a gross misunderstanding of Buddha by his followers.

It may be said that the denial of the self is beset with such insuperable difficulties that it could not have been seriously maintained by any philosopher. The answer is that the doctrine of an entity, immutable and impervious to change (atmavada), is also beset with equally insuperable difficulties, though of an opposite kind. The Buddhist schools have made very consistent and commendable efforts to explain phenomena on their in the opposite direction. The deep opposition between these radical standpoints stimulated the systems on ether side; they gained in depth and maturity. It also helped the emergence of the dialectical consciousness, which we find in a systematic form in the Madhyamika philosophy. Dialectic is the consciousness of the total and interminable conflict of the ideas of reason, of philosophical view. It presses towards their resolution in the absolute which is the negation of the opposites (advaita, advaya). The Advaitic turn in the Buddhistic and Brahmanical system is a necessary outcome of this.

666* Early history of the spread Buddhism and Buddhist schools

* Evolution of the schools of Buddhism

Prof: -Elukewala Dhammaratana Thera
Noted by Ven. Oeu Sam Ath

The origins of the various story was developed of the t6ime of the Buddha after the Buddha’s death there was non who was able to take this place. there were high learned followers most of them and cam e from Brahmana families. They knew the Brahmanic philosophy and there were learned members of various religious orders like as the Jatilas, Jainas, Ajibakas. They could not remind with current interpretation of the teachings of the Buddha. They have paid their attention of the specific world of the teachers (Buddha). The leading Buddhist teachers were enable to explain therefore this Buddhist teachers took arguments from the teaching of the Buddha. But all to them agreed with this prepositions.

1-All is momentary (Sarvam Kshanikam)
2- All is suffering  
(Sarvam Dukkham)

By the time, there arise different opinions both Dhamma and Vinaya with those three agreements. The formations of Buddhist schools most namely to the following factors.

1- The supreme headship of Buddhism of the Buddha’s death.

2- **The Gopaka Moggallana sutta (MN)** explains that Dhamma and Vinay will be the support in the sutta venerable Ananda answered the question asked by Vasska Brahmana. He asks is thee even one who was designated by the Buddha as your support Mahaparinibbana sutta in (D.N). Buddha has mentioned that Dhamma and Vinaya will be your teacher after my Parinibban.

According to the **Samagama sutta** of (M.N) the disagreement arouse in the Jaina community just after the death Nigantathaputta.

Yuan Chwang notices the on auspicious day the Abhidhammika’s worshiped Sariputt, the Samadhists worshiped Moggallana and so on. The principles point of resemblance between the follow3ers and their preceptors have given and there were the points for the distinctions among them without any doctrinal differences, it gave right to the full-fledged schools.

According to the school of **Sarvastivadins** derived from Sariputta it was the origina division of abhidhammikas. The **Sthaviravadins** belongs to Upali, Mahasngikas belongs to **Mahakassapa** and Sammitiya belongs to **Mahakaccayana**.

This is confirmed that the origin of schools dates back as earlier the first council. These separated groups developed into separate religious schools of Buddhism. Vinayadharas has developed as Theravadin, the Sautranta has developed as Sautratika but all the divisions mentioned about are not developed into religious schools.

As an acetic, Buddha laid allow severe austerity for few years which could never fulfill his mission in this way austerities is crept in the Buddhism in early time and the adoption of these let to the formation of schools. The schools of rules of Buddhist that adapted the rituals natural …apart from other religions. These factors have been generalized during the three and half centuries after the Buddha’s death.

When dispute arise among the disciples, the lord Buddha sent favorite disciples Ananda, Sariputta and Moggallana who settle those disputes. Buddha was in the opinions that the wicked and selfish Bhikkhus introduced new principles to the Dhamma and Vinaya. Every quarrel or different of opinions among the Bhikkhus was not characterized by the Buddha as Sanghaveda during the Buddha life time dissentions of minor character took placed in the Buddhist Sangha only two of them attracted his attention. They are called Sanghaveda which is heinous crime. The first dissention was in Kosambi between two monks among Dhammakatthika and Vinayadhartha. The next dissention was with Devadatta who requested more austere discipline.

Within the period of Buddha’s ministry various discourses were already at work for the formation of schools. Therefore, it can well imagine that in the actions the great teachers, the monastic order had to give way to the growth as many as twenty schools or more.

**QUESTION:** EXAMINE THE MAIN VIEW POINTS OF TWO SCHOOLS, **THERAVĀDA** AND **MAHĀYĀNA**

The term **Theravāda** means ‘the school of elders’. As the name suggests, it is an orthodox, traditional school. This name was adopted by the traditional senior group of monks after the 2nd Buddhist council. It is evident that the Sangha who remained as a single group divided themselves into two as a consequence of the disagreements that arose at the 2nd Buddhist council. The orthodox group came to be called the Theravāda. The breakaway group was called Mahāsāṅghika.

**Theravāda** Buddhism belongs to the period of sectarian or nikāya Buddhism. Therefore, it is not early Buddhism. Scholars point out Theravāda as an attempt by the orthodox seniors to interpret early Buddhism in the way they thought was proper.

This Theravāda group began to split into numerous sub-groups, by the time of emperor Asoka there were 11 or 12 such groups. These included Sarvāstivāda, Sautrāntika adn so on. So, among these schools also there were different opinions. The Vibhajjavāda which came to Sri Lanka, is also considered by some as a division of the Theravāda.

**Mahāyāna** is the school that arose in opposition to Theravāda. The beginnings of some Mahāyāna ideas such as dharmakāya are traceable to the early suttas. The Mahāsāṅghikas seem to have provided the
background for the rise of Mahāyāna as a separate tradition. In Mahāyāna the Buddha is raised to a transcendent level. Compassion is emphasized over wisdom. The Bodhisatta ideal is stressed. The highest aim of followers was to attain Buddhahood. While Theravāda upheld the Arahant ideal, Mahāyāna upheld the Buddha ideal through Bodhisatta practices.

While Theravāda Buddhism possesses Tipiṭaka, Mahāyāna does not possess a canon as such, though there are certain sūtras which are considered important. Thus, the Mahāvaipulya Sūtra or the Nava Dharmas are considered as very important.

There are two main Mahāyāna schools. One is Madhyamika. This was founded by Nāgarjuna. Its main teaching is Śūnyatā, which is generally rendered as 'emptiness'. However, there is much controversy regarding the exact interpretation of Śūnyatā doctrine. Some scholars say that Śūnyatā amount to nihilism, non-existence of anything, total 'nothingness'. Others maintain that Śūnyatā is the denial of the existence of an entity, a permanent substance. Madhyamikas emphasize both pudgala-nairātmya (absence of an individual soul) as well as the impermanency of dharmās (dharma-nairātmya).

The other Mahāyāna school is Yogācāra, the idealistic school. This arose in reaction to the doctrine of Śūnyatā. Yogācāra maintained that though everything is sūnya, the mind exists as the only real thing. Hence, they came to be called 'mind only' school (Vijñāptimātra).

**VARIOUS ABHIDHAMMA TRADITIONS (LECTURED BY VEN. INDASARA)**

Abhidhamma is a teaching which makes the correct knowledge about the being and the world. In Sutta Piṭaka the beings are divided and discussed as khandha, dhātu and āyatana etc. The aim of such division is to reveal anicca, dukkha and anattā or three characteristics of existence. Therefore, the suttas explained all the saṅkhāras as impermanent and all the dhammās as solulless. This explanation in Sutta Piṭaka is not complete explanation of either being or world, therefore, the Abhidhamma explains material things which exist in the world. By dividing into citta, cetasika, rūpa and Nibbāna the way of these analyses were used by Theravāda tradition. Therefore, they were identified as Vibhajjavādins. This analytical system was not accepted by all the traditions. Some of the teachers had various arguments. Theravādins' seven books of the Abhidhamma were not accepted by other traditions. For instance, Sarvāstivādins did not believe in Theravādins' Abhidhamma Piṭaka. The another seven Abhidhamma books were presented in Sanskrit language but although Abhidhammic traditions did not come to common theory, they traditionally argued concerning the explanations of citta, cetasika etc. Therefore, some of the traditions did not discuss Abhidhamma Piṭaka and believed in the Sutta Piṭaka as their own doctrine. Sautrāntikas were one of the traditions who rejected the Abhidhamma teaching. When we discuss Abhidhammic traditions the Theravādins Abhidhamma Piṭaka is the Abhidhamma which was with the Pāli sutta literature. The oldest tradition in Buddhist history is Theravāda tradition, therefore, the oldest Abhidhamma literature is also Theravādins Abhidhamma. The other Abhidhamma traditions have developed their Abhidhamma literature after forming their schools separately.

Next important Abhidhamma tradition are Sarvāstivāda Abhidhammadikas. Though Abhidhamma Piṭaka has been introduced at first time by Theravādins, Mahāyāna also could not follow the Abhidhamma. They also had influenced their Abhidhamma. Theravādins teach the Dhamma of citta, cetasika, rūpa and Nibbāna in Abhidhamma. Sarvāstivādins also accepted the section of dhammās and citta vippayutta dhammā. They have increased the number of asankāta dhammās. According to Pāli Tipiṭaka there is one asankhāta dhamma (that is Nibbāna), but Sarvāstivādins
have three. They have named it as pratisankhya nirodha, apratisankhayā nirodha and ākāsa. Altogether they believed in 75 dhammās /Citta – 1; cetasika – 46, rūpa – 11, cittavippayutta – 14, asankhāta - 31.

Another important Abhidhamma literature was named as Sariputra Abhidharma. Now it is available in Chinese language. Only it is not decided whether this Abhidharma literature belongs to Mahāsaṅghika school or Sammātiya school or Dharmavutika. All the three sects had Abhidharma literature. According to inscription, though the Mahāsaṅghikas rejected Theravādins' Abhidhamma they also had Mātikā Piṭaka. It is said that the sub-school of Mahāsaṅghika Gokulika and Bahu Śrītya have developed their Abhidharma. Vātsiputriya school belonging to Theravādins' tradition had Abhidhamma Piṭaka.

Among the Mahāyānist Yogācāra school who discussed the Abhidhamma, according to their view external world is nothing but mind made and it is only Vijñāptimātra. They did not accept the absolute existence of external world. According to their belief there are 100 dhammās /Citta – 8; cetasika – 51; rūpa – 11; cittavippayutta – 24; asaṃśṛta – 6.

Sautrāntikas. It is true that Vasubandhu personally accepted Sautrāntika dhammā theory. Today there is no written evidence about dhamma analysis of Sautrāntika beside Śivañāna Siddhi /Name of the book which analysis the dhammās into rūpa – 8; arūpa – 2, vyavahāra – 2, Nirvāṇa – 2/.

According to scholars there is no disease or exception concerning the Abhidhamma teachings of the Buddhist schools. They have analyzed the dhammās according to their own traditional belief. The oldest Abhidhamma literature is the Theravādins' Abhidhamma Piṭaka, the other schools' Abhidhamma literature was derived from Theravāda tradition. Theravāda Abhidhamma is considered as complete and original Abhidhamma literature.⁵

666Who is Abhidharmika?

The scope and methodology of Abhidharma

The study and specialized topics of Abhidharmika:-

1. svabhūva
2. svalakṣāla
3. Saṅgraha
4. Saṃprayoga
5. Hetu, pratayaya and Phala
6. Samanvīgama

In brief, these are scope of study of Abhidharma. Svabhūva and svalakṣāla are inter-connected. Ultimately svabhūva is equal to svalakṣāla. Svalakṣāla is that aspect which can be experienced by us or can be observed either directly or indirectly. Directly in the sense, for instance, rūpa – visible, resistance, subject to deterioration. This is the svalakṣāla.

There are things which cannot be directly observed. For example, vedanā, saḷāyāna, etc. These are forces. They are forces neither mental nor physical, such as, a force of arising (not just a concept). Arising is that force which make thing arise. Of course, in arising of anything, being a Buddhist, you have to understand there must be existence of various conditions. They argued that these assembled conditions are external factor which make possible for the arising of a dharma. That force in the universe is called ‘arising’. A thing called arising is a force that exist in the arising of anything at all. Anything arises in the phenomenal world, whenever it arises, there is this force that operates. Likewise there is a force called decay – make a thing deteriorate/vanish. There is also a force called duration – make a thing to stay for a while. Put them together you have forces operating on each and every conditioned dharma making it momentary.

Why is a thing momentary? Why a thing last only one moment? First, the fact that arises in a phenomenal world is due to arising. This dharma abides in their true nature (intrinsic nature) throughout times. That is called arising in space times. There is a force called duration. What we observe is that everything is momentary, then there is a force that make it perishes. When we say a thing perishes, it does not mean that it is totally extinct. It perishes from phenomenal existence, but it continues to abide in its intrinsic

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⁵ This is what is considered by Theravādins...
nature. This idea is the powerful concept, or convenient concept for the explanation of various things.

It is mainly this concept that is attacked by Nāgārjuna. This is called svabhāva. There are different names: dravya, svarūpa, ītman, etc. Svabhāva stressed more on the essence aspect (aspect of a thing in itself.) Svalakāśa stresses more on characteristics that can be perceived directly or indirectly.

Sāgraha

It is an extremely important methodology device for Abhidharmika. Sāgraha means inclusion, sub-ordination, subsumation. Given various things in the universe, there must be a way to classify them, because Abhidharmikas wanted to study things systematically. They must be able to find out the exact nature and put them in the proper places. In fact, Sāgraha is the method for the study of svabhāva. Given a non-Abhidharmic example, supposing you have one person, who is known by various names, he is called the boss, father, artist, etc. There are various appellation of that person. But all these various appellation refer to one single person. So to study the diversity in names, and we come to conclude that all these can be subsumed/subordinate to one.

Thus, they come to the conclusion that there is a dharma called prajñā. Prajñā means faculty of understanding. But in the sūtra, various terms are used to describe in understanding, for instance, the Buddha says, īdāna, prabhā, etc. There are various different stresses also, but it refers to one substance. They have a very interesting concept called ‘ākliśa-ajñāna’ (non-defiled ignorance). The Sarvāstivāda and other Abhidharmikas think that there is a different between the wisdom of the Buddha and the Arhat though they both are liberated. There is still a subtle ignorance in Arhat. Look at the Mahādeva’s 5 position.

Sāgraha is the study of the diverse elements in the universe, and find out the specific nature (svabhāva) that is unique. This is how they arrived at the lists of distinct dharmas. Sāgraha is the study of intrinsic nature of thing. That is called dharma-pravicaya (examination of dharma). Understand the dharmas mean you understand what is its intrinsic nature.

Sāprajyoga (conjunction/association/connection) & Hetu - prataryana

These 2 concepts are applied to study the dynamic inter-relationships among different dharmas. Whereas Sāgraha earlier, we saw, is applied to study individual thing in themselves. Sāprajyoga in the abhidharma comes to the topic that pertains to the domain of citta-caitita (mental domain) [caittita: what pertains to the mind, i.e. mental factors / concomitants] [cetas + ika > caitasika]

The theory of Abhidharmika is that thought or mind (citta), whenever citta arises, it does not arise alone. It arises with a constellation of mental factors (caittas). Whenever it arises, there is a minimum of 10 associates. Among these associates, one can be dominant. For instance, the function is feeling something, the vedanā is dominant. When the mind is forming the idea/concept, then sajñā is dominant. When the mind is making a will/volition, the cetanā is dominant. This is in brief the citta-caitita topic.

Sāprajyoga refers to the association of the mental factors with the mind and also among the mental factors themselves. Citta is said to be associated with the mind. At the same time, the mental factors are associated among themselves. So there is a study:-

“When I am happy, what happened?”

“When I am angry, what happened?”

This is psychology. They study the mind in minute detail about the mechanism of the mind. Even among defilements, they are divided into primary and secondary defilements. How they are inter-related. This phenomena of inter-relation is called Sāprajyoga. We shall see that they talked about certain conditions for you to say certain factor is associated with the mind. For instance, they said one condition is that there must be simultaneous. We can’t talk about 2 factors belonging to 2 different moments in association. Next, the 2 factors or the factors must be there on the same object. If I am angry with this person, my feeling is also about this person. My perception is also about this person. All directed at the same person. The perception of object is the same. For that matter, the sense of faculty (indriya) associated is also the same. There must be a single substance, for instance, pleasurable is another feeling, unpleasurable is another feeling, neutral is also another feeling. But at the same time, you have only one type of feeling. In another word, there is a singularity of substance. In this way, they arrived at a set of conditioned for factors to be in conjunction with mental association. This is the study specially applied in the field of thought and mental factors.

hetu, prataryana and phala.

Talking about dynamic inter-relationship among dharmas, yet another important concept called hetu, prataryana and phala. In their conception, even dharma is a force. They are real. There must be causal efficacies (a force that itself serve as a force produce
The Buddha did not call his followers Buddhists and in fact recommended Buddhism to be called as Vibhajjāvāda, which means „doctrine of analysis.“ The followers would be called Vibhajjavādins, which would basically means „analysts“ or „those who analyze.“ The ultimate origin of the word Vibhajjavāda is described in the Subha sutta of the Majjhima nikāya. It is said that the Buddha declared himself to be a Vibhajjavādin on the question of the relative advantages of the household life and renunciation life. According to this point, the Buddha is not an Ekamsavādin. Again, in the Vajjiyamahaśita sutta of the Aṅguttara Nikāya, it is stated that the Buddha criticizes all practitioners of asceticism so he is a Vibhajjavādin.

The third Buddhist council, under the leadership of ven. Moggalliputattissa Thera emphasized this analytics (vibhajjāvāda). But some schools such as Sarvāstivāda, Mahāsaṅghika and Sammūtiya did not accept it because they regarded the Vibhajjavāda as a wrong view, according to the Kathāvatthu ascribed to ven. Moggalliputattissa Thera. After the third Buddhist council, the Vibhajjavāda gradually evolved into four groups namely the Mahāsāsakā, Kāśyapiya, Dharmaguptaka and the Tāmraparnīya.

On the other hand, some sources suggest that Mahāsāsaka, Kāśyapiya and Dharmaguptaka did not evolve directly from the Vibhajjavāda but due to their respective Vinayas. According to Sinhalese tradition, Buddhism under the name of Vibhajjavāda was brought to Sri Lanka by Mahinda, who was the son of Emperor Asoka in 3rd century BC. The Theravāda has derived from Vibhajjavāda and represented doctrine of the orthodoxy too. In the Kathāvatthu, the arguments between Vibhajjavāda and Sarvāstivāda recorded that some parts of Sarvāstivādin doctrines were refused.

From that time onwards, Vibhajjavāda was popular in Buddhism. Later on, there were so many scholars to analyze in Vibhajjavāda according to their understanding. Among them, as it is said in ven. Buddhaghosa’s commentary of Ceylong chronicle, that in the account of the third council, Vibhajjavādins were declared to be orthodox monks and one of sect in Buddhism. In this passage, the Vibhajjavādins were those who spoke after distinguishing because they spoke truly about the Dhamma. The Prof. Paussin said that position of Vibhajjavāda was not different from the original doctrine of the Buddha but did not common(?) with the doctrine of the Sarvāstivādins, Mahāsaṅghikas and others. He added that Theravādins preffered to be called Vibhajjavādins.

Sautrāntika

In the Pāli tradition, the Sautrāntika is described as the Kassapika from Sankantika branch of the Suttavādins. Vasumitra noted, that at the beginning of the 4th century AD there was one school named Sautrāntika called Samkrantivāda too, from Sarvastivāda. The name Sautrāntika is referred to those who take the suttas as valid authority rather than Abhidhamma. The founder of this school declared: „I take Ānanda their preceptor is Ānanda Thera,“ so it seems that Suttavādins were identical with the Sautrāntika. Monks, who described themselves as Sautrāntikas entered the higher ordination from Sarvastivāda rite and they were suspecting the Abhidhamma Pitaka regarding the word of the Buddha.

Vasumitra characterizes that Sautrāntika is distinguished from the Sammūtiya sect and opposed to the doctrine of the early Buddhism. In Sautrāntika, it is said that the khandha does not pass from one existence to another and the original form khandha is only one nature. In other words, the five khandhas end in the attainment of Nibbāna. This view is allied to the doctrine of the Sammūtiyas that the puggala ceases in the attainment of Nibbāna. For this doctrine of transference of khandhas through several existences, the Sautrāntika is also called Sankrantiyakas.

The present scholars favoring Sautrāntika showed the doctrine positions are not identical with

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6 Heh, there the author of the original wrote „Sautrāntikas interred the higher ordination“ :-D.
ordination lineages and the followers of Sautrāntika rejected the existence of dhamma as the present such as the present dhamma exists, the past dhamma existed and the future dhamma also will exist. However, the Sautrāntika took from the Sarvāstivādins' idea that the present dhamma lies in the dhamma exerting its characteristic activity.

Though Vasubandhu belonged to Sarvāstivāda school, in his writing to the Sautrāntika views, he pointed out the differences between the Sarvāstivāda and Sautrāntika views:
1. Sautrāntika does not accept the Sarvāstivādins as authoritative
2. Sautrāntika believe, that there is no existences
3. Sautrāntika denied the citta-vippayuttras as not associating with the mind as mentioned by the Sarvāstivādins' view.
4. Sautrāntika rejected the view of Sarvāstivādins that the past and future exist
5. Sautrāntika asserted the existence of the subtle citta and explained thereby the working of the formula of causation
6. Sautrāntika carried on the ksaniktva (?) doctrine. As stated above, the Sautrāntika plazed an important role in ancient time.

**Sautrāntika (May 2009)**

1. Inference (anumāna)
2. Perception (pratyakṣa)
   a) eyes
   b) eye consciousness
   c) object, form

1) eye consciousness
2) contact
3) feeling
4) perception
5) volition
6) one-pointedness

*Sautrāntikas* introduced their own teaching called „theory of momentariness“ (kṣanavāda). According to them the momentary things represent their annihilation. That means the destruction of the form of the momentariness which appears along with the thing itself. Everything ceases as soon as it rises, it doesn't survive in the next moment of something existed or stayed on, it is eternal. According to the common theory, the sky or ākāsa (space) exist, but causes are actually non-existent in the form of entities and they are devoid of all potentiality. They cannot be called even momentary, because it is like „a son of a barren woman.“

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7 It is important to distinguish between Dhamma (the ultimate truth taught by the Buddha) and dhamma (a phenomenon).
There is a two-fold source, given by the Sautrāntikas to realize the nature of the world:

a) inference (anumāna)
b) perception (pratyakṣa)

The perception is accepted even in Theravāda tradition. In Matubindika Sutta there are given three constituents which must be present for a complete perception:

1) The physical eye (cakkhu)
2) The eye consciousness
3) A form

Furthermore, there are given six other processes:
1) Cakkhu viññāṇa
2) Phassa (Skt. Sparśa)
3) Vedanā
4) Saññā - »Yaṃ vedeti taṃ sañjānāti.«
5) Vitakka - »Yaṃ sañjānāti taṃ vitakketi.«
6) Papañca - »Yaṃ vitakketi taṃ papañceti.«

Sautrāntikas depending on the perception, classify the dhammās. Therefore, there are these dhammas:

1) Rūpa are 8 - 4 kinds of subjective forms (upādāna) and 4 kinds of objective forms (upādāya)
2) Vedanā are 3 – sukha, dukkha and na sukha na dukkha.
3) Saññā are 6 – 5 senses and viññāṇa.
4) Viññāṇa are 6 as 5 kinds of consciousness and mind consciousness.
5) Saṅkhārā are 20 – 10 wholesome and 10 unwholesome.

According to the Sautrāntikas, language can do nothing for the perception. Because with the language, we are going to understand something that we experienced. And their view is that we can experience the world without language.8

The Sthaviravādins or Theravādins give the following statement regarding the nature of world:

»Yaṃ kiñci samudayaṃ dhammaṃ, taṃ sabbam nirodha dhammaṃ«
(Anything originated changed)9

»Anicca vata sankhārā, uppāda vaya dhammino.«
(All originated things are impermanent, they arise and vanish.)

»Uppattiyyā sahevedaṃ, maranaṃ āgataṃ sadā.«
(With the birth it gets the death.)

Sautrāntikas have given a statement to explain the nature of the world: „Kṣanikānaṃ nāsti deshāntaragamanaṃ yatrayivothpattīh tattrayīva vinashah.“ (The nature of vanishing is begun with the origination.) In Theravāda tradition there is given a time for the existence. Intsutarattu Sutta gives the following question:

»Tattha rūpaṃ daṇḍa nirodham gara parivattūti cittaṃ khippaya nirodham lahu parivattan’ti.«
(The matter is changing slowly, but consciousness (citta) is changing quickly.

8 In short – language is not a part of process of perception.
9 Any originated phenomenon – all of them are ceasing phenomena.
Nāhaṃ bhikkhave aṇṇaṃ eka dhammam’pi samanu passāmi. Evaṃ lahu pariyattam yathidam bhikkhave cittaṃ.

"Monks! I cannot see anything, which changes more rapidly than consciousness."

As it is given in Abhidhammattha Saṅgaha, Mahā Cittakkhana has three characteristics:
1) uppāda (birth, rise, appearing)
2) ṭhīti (existence, process, being)
3) bhaṅga (death, destruction, disappearing)

17 such cittakkhanas are one moment of rūpa’s existence. That means that rūpa’s moment lasts the duration of 51 consciousnesses (17 cittakkhanas x 3 (uppāda, ṭhīti, bhaṅga) = 51).

Sautrāntika (original by Ven. Suvanny)

Sautrāntika is one of the sub-sects of Theravāda school, emerged around the time of 3rd century BC. The Sautrāntika school is so named because it gave pre-eminence to the Sutta portion of the canon. Its followers trace their school back to Ānanda, a close disciple of the Buddha. For them, the karmic factors are insubstantial and momentary; disappearing as soon as they have been manifested only to reappear again to give rise to a new aggregate. There is continual motion by virtue of which a person passes from one condition to another. Every thought or act is pervaded by a very subtle impregnation that in turn is capable of impregnating the subconsciousness so as to generate new correlated psychic situations. The school is of great importance, because its tenets were precursors of the Vijñāṇavāda.

Sautrāntikas don’t accept Abhidhamma as the Buddha’s teaching. The rejection of Abhidhamma by Sautrāntikas was a great challenge to Sarvāstivāda who strongly believed in Vibhasas(?). As the theory of dharmā, Sautrāntikas developed Kṣanavāda, by this they refuted all other theories which were made by other schools. According to them, everything changes at every moment with reference to the existence of Dhamma. Only two things can be considered, they are utpāda (uppāda) and vyaya (vaya). Based on this theory of moments, Sautrāntikas say that we cannot know the existence of physical world in its ultimate sense, the only way we can know the world is inference.

The Vaibhāsika doctrine of eternal elements is believed to be in consistence with the fundamental teaching of the Buddha. The Sautrāntikas insist on the non-eternity of the dharmā as well. The past and future dharmā do not exist, and only those present do. The so-called unconditioned dharmās are mere absences, not positive entities. Thus, the Sutratnikas seem to be the only major school of Buddhist philosophy that comes near to regarding Nirvāna as entirely negative in their epistemology. Whereas Vaibhāsikas are direct realists, the Sautrāntikas hold a sort of interpretations, according to which the external world is only inferred from the mental conceptions that alone are directly apprehended.

This school produced no independent literature; instead they ahve translated early discourses into Sanskrit. It is believed that there was Harivarman, who established an independent tradition called 'Satyasiddhi'. The Satyasiddhi school probably derived from the earlier Sautrāntika school, based on the Satyasiddhi Śāstra, a work attributed to Harivarman, a 3rd - 4th century Indian writer and known only in its Chinese version (4th - 5th century). It gave birth to a school in China called Cheng-Shi, which maintained that all things were merely designations devoid of reality. Human beings were enveloped in the illusion that either the ego (puggala) or the world (dharmā) were real, whereas in fact nether was. The past does not exist, the future has not yet come to be and the present as soon as it comes into being it disappears. Hence, the sense of
continuity is illusory.

**Harivarman** like the Lokottaravādins postulated voidness, both of the dharma and of the ego – no dharma of any sort exists. Thought from the point of view of relative truth dharma may appear to exist. In China this doctrine was sharply attacked by its opponents as destructive nihilism.

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**Sautrantika School of Buddhism**

Sautrantika are one tradition of Buddhist thought which come under the Theravada school. As they considered only early discourses except any commentary they are called Sautrantikas. Sanskrit was their medium of language. They were momentarists, among the 18 schools of Buddhism, for the first time we find the name of their schools. Kumaralabha who was a contemporary to Nagarjuna, the founder of Madhyamika tradition is considered to the founder of this tradition. As some places, his name has been mentioned as Kaumaralabdha or Kumalatha. Among the great exponents of this tradition, the name of Srilabha, Dharmatrata, Buddhdeva, Harivarma and Yasomitra are often mentioned. According to some historians they were the disciples of Kumaralabha. Harivarma established an independent tradition called ‘Satyasiddhi’. The tradition which was pioneered by Srilabha is called ‘Drshtantika’ with the emergence of new tradition, the school established by Kumaralabha was called ‘Mula- Sautrantika’.

This school processes no independent literature, instead they have translated early discourses into Sanskrit. The lack of their own literature is one difficulty to recognize what their teachings really were. The later scholars came to know their teachings through the works of other schools. the sub-commentary on Abhidharmakowa which was written by Yasomitra introduces some fundamental aspects of Sautrantika teachings.

Kalpanamanditika-drshntapanti written by Kumaralabha is one fundamental work in this tradition. Another work called Sautrantika-vibhasa author by Srilabha is another significant work of Sautrantikas. Apart from these theoretical matters faith towards the Buddha have been emphasized in these works, at present only the Chinese translation of above works remain.

Sautrantikas don’t accept Abhidhamma as the teaching of the Buddha. According to them, Abhidhamma is not necessary to understand the teachings of the Buddha. The teacher has preached enough for the liberation. Therefore, the commentarial explanation do not serve any purpose as far as the liberation is concerned. The refues of Abhidhamma by Sautrantikas was a great challenged to Sarvastivadins who strongly believed in Vibhasas. As the theory of Dharma, Sautrantikas developed Khanavada (the theory of moments). By this they refused all the other theories which were made by other schools. According to them everything changes at every moment with reference to the existence of the Dhamma, only two things can be think of, they are Utpada and Vyaya.

Based on this theory of moments, Sautrantikas say that we cannot know the existence of physical world, in its ultimate sense, the only way we can know the world is inference. This theory by Sautrantikas was directly put against the Dharma theory of Sarvastivadins. The characteristic of a Dharma sthit and jarata as explained by the Sarvastivadins were denied by Sautrantikas. Dharms have no an existence during all the three phases of time, they exist only in the present. The past and future according to them are only concepts. They are make by our thought. The existence of the world is only an illusion. If there is no arising, existence, decaying and ceasing, the idea of physical world cannot occur. Sautrantikas presented subtle arguments against the Vaibhasikas dharma theory. When there is no a physical world, the emptiness of it which is discusses by Madhyamika is meaningless. It’s like saying that barren 不育 woman has no children.

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1. **Analysis of Dharma by Sautrantika Tradition**

The theory of 5 aggregates is common to both Sthaviravadins and Sautrantikas. But their order and
classification differ from each other. According to them, rupa is eye, ear, nose, tongue and their object. The aggregate of vibbana, the process of existence of alaya-vibbaba and pravrtti-vibbana.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nature/fundamental</th>
<th>very harmful</th>
<th>develop</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lobha</td>
<td>anunaya</td>
<td>abhijja</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dosa</td>
<td>patigha</td>
<td>vyapada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moha</td>
<td>vitakka</td>
<td>micchiditthi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>metta bhavana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>asubha bhavana</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- the first group (nature) that the mind is healthy; the second group (harmful) that mind is sick.
- vitakka: according to Sautrantika this is the alayavibbana.

Alayavijnana is the idea of ‘I’ and ‘me’ which is the basic of consciousness. Pravrtti-vibbana means the functioning of consciousness with reference to physical world.

19/7/99 (continue):

The description of Four Noble Truths which we come across in Theravada literature was not accepted by Sautrantikas, while the Theravadins mentions 4 Noble Truths as Dukkha, Samudaya, Nirodha and Magga, Sautrantikas have given it differently. According to the Sautrantika explanation, the 4 Noble Truths are given as follows:

1. Dukkha – suffering
2. Dukkhayatana – institution of suffering
3. Samudaya – causes
4. Magga – path

In their explanation of Dukkha, they have given the description about 5 aggregates. For the 2nd, Dukkhayata or the institution of suffering are given 12 in number, i.e., they are 5 indriyas, 5 visayas (objects), manas and buddhi (wisdom). The cause of suffering as Sautrantika mentioned comprises of defilements which are inherent in the consciousness of the being. Raga (lust), Dresha (hatred), mada (intoxicated), mana (pride) are such defilements. All the condition things exist only for a moment. The Fourth Truth Maga was explained as established Vasana (fortune), i.e., sthira vasana: danakatha, silakatha, saggakatha and kamanaj adinava.

In later Abhidhamma literature, Sautrantika contributions in the development of Buddhist theory of atom can be seen. Apart from Theravada and Sautrantika, Sarvastivadins has developed this theory in greater detail.

- Paramana – cannot be divided anymore, even can divided into four great elements.
- Sanghata paramana – collection of other atoms, became bigger. Later science divided the atom into electron, proton, neutron.

In their debates, which Sautrantikas criticized the classification given by other schools, they employed a system of logic based on a theory of their own. According to their views, the truth can be expressed through the common language. The language is mage by man based on his experiences, guided by ignorance. It was used only as an instrument, to exchange different ideas among men. Therefore, it does not represent what is ultimately Truth. A system of logic that is used by a scholar comprises of language, therefore no system of logic can be believed in search of the Truth, the logic they built criticized all the existed valid ways of knowledge.

The Sautrantika enumeration of dharma differs from that of others, excepting only two levels of knowledge called Pratyaksha and Anumana (direct and inference). They show 4 fundamentals:

1. Rupa
2. Arupa
Unlike the Sarvastivadins, their number of dharmas was very few. All dharmas consist of 43 factors:

1. Rupa 8:
   (a) upada (primary) – 4
   (b) upadaya (secondary) – 4

2. Vedana 3: sukha, dukkha and nadukkhanasukha.


4. Samskhara 20:
   (a) Kusala 10: body 3, speech 4 and mind 3, i.e., 10 wholesome actions (十善業)
   (b) Akusala 10: ten wholesome actions (十不善業)

5. Vijbana 6: 六識

During the history of Buddhist thought, many attempts have been done to identify Sautrantikas either as Mahayanists or Theravadins. According to some scholars they belong to neither, they maintained a middle independent position criticized in both Theravada and Mahayana traditions. With reference to their doctrine, it has become a difficult task to categorize them under any group. The fundamental teachings of both schools (Theravada and Mahayana) and their classifications have been totally refuted by Sautrantika, no school they believed to have presented the correct teachings of the Buddha. Based on their own logic they presented what they believed to be true.

《Mulamadhyamikakarika》Translation and Annotations 注解 by David. J. Kalupahana. Another is by kennath K. Indada.

- In Kacana sutta of Sajyutta Nikaya mentioned the name of Nagarjuna.

Sautrantika is one of the sub-sects of the Theravada school, emerged around the time of 3rd century B.C. the Sautrantika School is so named because it gave pre-eminence to the Sutta portion of the canon. Its followers trace their school back to Ananda, a close disciple of the Buddha. For them, the karmic factors are insubstantial and momentary; disappearing as soon as they have been manifested only to reappear again to give rise to a new aggregate. There is continual motion by virtue of which a person passes from one condition to another. Every thought or act is pervaded by a very subtle impregnation that in turn is capable of impregnating the subconscious so as to generate new correlated psychic situations. The school is of great importance because its tenets were precursors of the Vijñānavada.

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The Vaibhasika doctrine of eternal of eternal elements is believed to be in consistent with the fundamental teaching of the Buddha. The Sautrantika insist on the non-eternity of the dharma as well. The past and future Dharma do not exist, and only present ones do. The so-called unconditioned dharmas are mere absences, not positive entities. Thus, the sautrantikas seem to be the only major school of Buddhist philosophy that comes near to regarding Nirvana as entirely negative. In their epistemology, whereas the Vaibhasikas are direct realist, the Sautrantikas hold a sort of interpretations, according to which the external world is only inferred from the mental conceptions that alone are directly apprehended.

This school processes no independent literature; instead they have translated early discourse into Sanskrit. It is believed that Harivarman who established and independent tradition called “Satyasidhi”. The satyasiddhi school, probably derived from the earlier
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Harivarman, like the lokottaravadins, postulate a void, both of the dharma and of the ego: no dharma of any sort exist, thought from the point of view of relative truth dharma may appear to exist. In China this doctrine was sharply attacked by its opponents as destructive nihilism.

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**666 Sautrantika (517)**

The Sautrantika school is so named because it gave pre-eminence to the sutra portion of the canon. Its followers trace their school back to Ananda, a close disciple of the Buddha. For them, the karmic factors are insubstantial and momentary, disappearing as soon as they have been manifested only to reappear again to give rise to a new aggregate. There is continual motion by virtue of which a person passes from one condition to another. Every thought or act is pervaded by a very subtle impregnation that in turn is capable of impregnating the subconscious so as to generate new correlated psychic situations. The school is of great importance because its tenets were precursors of the Vijñanavada.

Sautrantikas don’t accept Abhidhamma as the teaching of the Buddha. the refuses of Abhidhamma by Sautrantika was a great challenged to Sarvastivada who strongly believed in vibhasas. As the theory of Dharma, Sautrantikas developed Khanavada, by this they refuted all other theories which were make by other schools. According to them, everything changes at every moment with reference to the existence of the Dharma. Only two things can be think of, they are utpada and vyaya.

Based on this theory of moment, Sautrantikas say that we cannot know the existence of physical world in its ultimate sense, the only way we can know the world is inference.

The Vaibhasika doctrine of eternal elements is believed to be inconsistent with the fundamental teachings of the Buddha. The Sautrantikas insist on the non-eternity of the dharma as well. The past and the future dharmas do not exist, and only the present ones do. The so-called unconditioned dharmas are mere absences, not positive entities. Thus, the Sautrantikas seem to be the only major school of Buddhist philosophy that comes near to regarding Nirvana as entirely negative. In their epistemology, whereas the Vaibhasikas are direct realists, the Sautrantikas hold a sort of representationism, according to which the external world is only inferred from the mental conceptions that alone are directly apprehended.

This school processes no independent literature, instead they have translated early discourses into Sanskrit. It is believed that Harivarman who established an independent tradition called ‘Satyasiddhi’.

The Satyasiddhi school, probably derived from the earlier Sautrantika school, is based on the Satyasiddhi-shastra, a work attributed to Harivarman, a 3rd-4th century Indian writer, and known only in its Chinese version (4th-5th century). It gave birth to a school in China called Cheng-shi which maintained that all things are merely designations devoid of reality. Human beings are enveloped in the illusion that either the ego (pudgala) or the world (dharmas) is real, whereas in fact neither is. The past does not exist, the future has not yet come to be, and the present, as soon as it comes into being, disappears. Hence, the sense of continuity is illusory.

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A philosopher and poet who is considered India's greatest poet and the father of Sanskrit drama. He occupies a unique position not only in the history of Buddhist thought but also in the whole tradition of Sanskrit poetry. According to I-tsing that in his time this beautiful poem was ‘widely read or sung throughout the five divisions of India, and the countries of the Southern Sea’. Today, Asvaghosa is known to us as one of the most eminent poets of Sanskrit literature.

**666 Sautrantika**

Sautrantika and Santrativadin were identical. According to Vashumitra, this school believes in Sankranti transmigration of substance from one life to another of five khandha of an individual there is only one subtle which transmigration from birth to birth
this school teacher back every man has potentiality of becoming Buddha and next school is Madhyamika school, Madhyamika and Yogacara school are the real Mahayana school. The Madhyamika system emerge to emphasize the middle path introduced by the Buddha but their interpretation on middle path is somewhat different from that of early Buddhist teaching. Madhyamika describes middle path for the non acceptance of the two views concerning the existence and non existence eternity and non eternity. Its teacher neither the theory of reality nor unreality but merely of relativity. Madhyamika school originated with the teacher Nagarjuna in second century A.D. Arydeva, Buddhapalita, Chandrakiti, and Santibe are the leading teacher of Madhyamika school Molamadhyamikakarika is written by Nagarjuna which is considered as one of the masterpiece of Madhyamika philosophy which is included Sunyata philosophy the doctrine voice.

Sautrantika is one of the Sub-sects of the Theravada school, emerged around the time of 3rd century B.C. the Sautrantika School is so named because it gave pre-eminence to the Sutta portion of the canon. Its follows trace their school back to Ananda, a close disciple of the Buddha. For them, the Karmic factors are insubstantial and momentary; disappearing as soon as they have been manifested only to reappear again to give rise to a new aggregate. There is continual motion by virtue of which a person passes from one condition to another.

Sautrantikas don’t accept Abhidhamma as the Buddha teaching. The refuses of Abhidhamma by Sautrantika were a great challenged to Sarvastivadins who strongly believe in Bibhasas. As the theory of Dharma, Sautrantika developed Khanavada, by this they refuted all other theories which were made by other schools. According to them, everything changes at every moment with reference to the existence of Dhamma. Only two things can be thinking of, they are Upāda and Vyaya.

The Vaibhasika doctrine of eternal elements is believed to be in consistent with the fundamental of the Buddha. The Sautrantika insist on the non-eternality of the Dharma as well. The past and future Dharma do not exist, and only present ones do. This school processes no independent literature; instead they have translated early discourse into Sanskrit. It is believed that Harivarman who established and independent tradition called “Satyasidhi”. The Satyasiddhi school, probably derived from the earlier Sautrantika school, is based on the Satyalidhi-Shastra, a work attributed to Harivarman, a 3rd – 4th century Indian writer, and known only in its Chinese version (4th – 5th century). It gave birth to a school in china called Cheng Shi, which maintained that all things are merely designations devoid of reality.

Harivarman, like the Lokottaravadins, postulate a void, both of the Dharma and of the ego: no Dharma of any sort exists, thought from the point of view of relative truth Dharma may appear to exist. In China this doctrine was sharply attacked by its opponents as destructive nihilism.

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THE EMERGENCE OF SAUTRĀNTIC TRADITION AS A REACTION TO THE ABHIDHAMMA; CRITICAL APPROACH AND MIND-ORIENTED THRENGDS THAT AROSE FROM IT. (LECTURED BY VEN. INDASARA) (ORIGINAL BY VEN. ANIK CÄKMA) (JUNE 2004)

Those who have accepted teaching of the suttas as most important of the Buddha’s teaching are called Sautrāntikas. They did not accept Vibhāca(? of Sarvāstivādins. Abhidhamma of Sarvāstivādins is not believed to be the teaching of the Buddha by Sautrāntikas. The Dhamma, which comes in sutta teaching analysis and as a result of that Abhidhamma teaching was formerly taught by Sautrāntikas, therefore by criticizing the teaching of the Sarvāstivādins. (?) The Sautrāntikas formed independent dhamma concept. They have presented new system of dhammā analysis. They paid attention from new mean of knowledge. They identified pratyakha and anumāna as the means of knowledge. They have divided them into four broad groups as:

1. Rūpa
2. Arūpa
3. Nirvāṇa
4. Vyavahāra
Again, they divided rūpa into groups as upādāna and upādāya.\(^\text{10}\) Upādāna rūpa was again divided into four as:

1. Paṭhavī
2. Āpo
3. Tejo
4. Ākāsa

Upādāya rūpa was divided into four as:

1. Rukṣatā
2. Akaraśana
3. Gati
4. Uṣnatā

There are two arūpa dhammā as citta and karma. The Nirvāṇa was also divided into two – sopadisesa and anupadisesa. Vyavahāra was divided into two as satya and asatya. This was the Sautrāntikas’ dhammā analysis. When they analyzed dhammā, they paid special attention to kṣanavāda or ‘momentariness’. The Buddha explained that everything is impermanent. When Buddha explained the world He used the word aniccā to explain the impermanency of the things. Whatever the dhammā exist in the world as formed, as a result of cause and effect, such dhammā sankhāta do not remain without change. The Buddha mentioned the characteristic of such a dhammā: »Uppādo paññāyati, vayo paññāyati, ṭhitassa aññathattaṃ paññāyati.«\(^\text{11}\) To reveal the impermanency these three characteristics have been taught. These three events have been analyzed as uppāda, ṭhiti and bhanga. In Buddhaghosa commentaries there is explained how the idea on momentariness edeveloped. Theravāda tradition and Sarvāstivāda tradition have developed the concept of moments according to their own way. The Sarvāstivāda tradition mentions four moments as uppāda, ṭhiti, jara and aniccātā.

According to Sautrāntika view there is no moment as ṭhiti, they believed only two moments – uppāda and vaya as the characteristics of sankhāta dhammā. They believed whatever dhammā appeared as soon as it itself disappeared.\(^\text{12}\) The nature of disappearing comes with the existence of dhammā.

»Kṣantikanam nasti desanantara gamanam vatraivospatthi tatraiva vināśa.«

»Yām kiñci samudayaṃ dhammaṃ sabbaṃ tam nirodhā dhammaṃ.«

This is the traditional teaching of Theravāda. Theravāda tradition also accepted the two moments - »Anicca vata sankhārā uppāda vaya dhammino.« Further it is explained that sankhāta dhammā are impermanent because their nature is uppāda and vaya. In Satipaṭṭhāṇa Sutta it is taught how to see it: »Samudayaṃ dhammānaṃ upādissi saññā puttassati.« They advise us to see the dhammā according to the nature of appearing and disappearing - »Uppattiya sahevedam maranaṃ āgataṃ sadā.« - „With birth the death is also coming.“ Sautrāntika tradition rejected the theory of momentariness of Sarvāstivādins. Sautrāntika tradition faced another problem when they developed the theory of momentariness, because according to their explanation of sankhāta dhammā, how it is possible to perceive the external object? ‘Bahyartha anumeyavāda Sautrāntikas’ introduce the theory of Bahyartha anumeyavāda to perceive external world. The external world should be understood according to the inference.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sautrāntika</th>
<th>Sarvāstivāda</th>
<th>Theravāda (Skt. Sthaviravāda)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Uppāda</td>
<td>Śthiti</td>
<td>Thiti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vaya</td>
<td>Jarā-Aniccatā</td>
<td>Bhanga</td>
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»Tattha rūpaṃ dandhanirodham garuparivatti, cittaṃ khippanirodham labhaparivatti.«\(^\text{13}\)

Rūpa or form slowly change, mind or citta change quickly, therefore ṭhiti kanat (?) of mind and form is not similar - slight duration of time is the difference between each other. In this way they have decided because of early Buddhist teaching. In early

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10 Notice, that vayo is missing.
12 This sounds like a miracle. How can something appear as soon as it disappears? The teacher probably wanted to say that Sautrāntikas’ belief was that things disappear as soon as they appear.
Buddhism: »Nāham, bhikkhave, aṅṇam ekadhammampi samanupassāmi yaṃ evaṃ lahuparivattam yathayidaṃ cittam.«— „There is no dhamma, which would change (so quickly) like mind."

Bahyartha anumeyavāda, the theory of inferability of the external object is commented by early Buddhism thus:

»Evamevakho bhikkhave cakkhuñca paṭicca rūpeca uppajjati viññāṇaṃ.«

The theory of inferability of the external object doesn't agree with the Theravāda tradition and also doesn't agree with Sarvāstivāda teaching of the same, but external object can be perceived. Theravāda said, according to Mathupiṇḍika Sutta – because of cakkhu and rūpa, eye consciousness is there, when these three come together there is a contact, because of the contact there is a feeling, due to that feeling one recognizes the object and then one reasons in it. As a result of reasoning one observes it, then one perceives with desire and one concedes a view. As a result of all those things one perceives the object. Assutavantu Sutta explained the different moments of citta and form.

According to the Theravāda tradition moment thiti of viññāṇa is shorter than the thiti of rūpa. In Abhidhamma one citta moment consists of uppāda, thiti and bhanga. Such seventeen citta-khana or seventeen mind-moments are similar to rūpa-dhammās of existence, that means when mind is equal to rūpa-dhammās. Sautrāntikas did not claim non-existence of external world. They believed in the external world but it should have been perceived through inference. According to their tradition the teaching about the (character of) language also has taken new concept or notion. According to them language is nothing but made concept through the world; the common characteristics of the things can be explained, therefore, the language is an invented concept of the world. Further Sautrāntika tradition doesn't accept (the description of) Nibbāna explained by the Sarvāstivādins. Pratisaṅkha nirodha and apratisaṅkha nirodha, these two kinds of Nibbāna were rejected by the Sautrāntika tradition.

**Sautrāntikas’ approach to ‘object’ (June 2006)**

Sautrāntikas wanted to emphasize the perception of the object. According to the school the perception is the cognition of the ultimate reality of the dhammās. But these dhammās are not static. Accordingly, perception is three processes:

1. Perception is a natural process
2. The result is the perceptual knowledge
3. These process take numerous moments

As the first statement, the object comes into contact with the mind. Contacting the mind is the second state and the third state is the cognition of the object. The cognition is no longer in the mind. This is process which goes endlessly. One moment cannot possibly know another moment. Every successful moment is unaware of the pervious moments. Therefore, actually moment of preception is left behind. When the following moment emerges, the object is left far behind muchless (?) the knowledge of it. In such a case nothing is known. This is momentariness of thought.

The teaching given by Sautrāntikas were helpful for the emergence of Madhyamika and Yogacara tradition. According to A.K. Chatterjee the development of Madhyamika philosophy is stated as follows:

„The Madhyamika is a very extreme position. The Sautrāntika and Yogācāra are both speculative systems and are spiritually akin. The Madhyamika is champion in their criticism entailing the rejection of all metaphysics. Yogācāra is therefore the natural sequence to Sautrāntika logic; the interpretation of Madhyamikas is an accident, which would/we had been dispensed with.(?) Sautrāntikas prepared the ground of the emergence of idealism also in another important respect.“

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14 Āṅguttara Nikāya – Ekakanipātapāli - 5. Paṇihitacchavaggo - paragraph 48
15 (Paramatthadīpanī - Saṅgaha mahāṭīkā pāṭha – Pathamagāthā-paramatthadīpanī - [35] Vibhāvaniyam pana - paragraph 31)
The Sautrāntika school had it difficult when advocating the theory of momentariness, whereas Madhyamikas took a very extreme position in declaring that everything is unreal and empty.

These two processes of realitic and critical reasoning really paved the way for the emergence of Yogācāra viññānavāda.

Madhyamika philosophy rejected always (?) elements of existence (dhammā). A.K. Chatterjee observes in this connection:

„The denial by the Madhyamikas of all metaphysics seems to be unqualified nihilism and barren skepticism and we have the third swinging (?) of the whin (?) represented by Yogācāra idealism.“(?)

**Sarvāstivāda (September 2009)**

As we know:

1) Hīnayāna – Sarvāstivāda (developed in Māgadha), Theravāda, orthodox school
2) Mahāyāna – non-orthodox school (developed in Kaśmīr)

Hīnayāna – Vaibhāṣika X Sautrāntika, Sarvāstivāda

Mahāyāna – Madhyamika X Yogācāra

According to Tibetan work:

1. Ārya – Sarvāstivāda
2. Mahāsaṅghika
3. Ārya – Sammātiyas
4. Ārya – Sthavira (Theravāda)

1. Sarvāstivādins had a vast (?). Their language, grammar was in Sanskrit.
2. At the council they have added three major texts:
   a) Upadeśa Sūtra (to Sūtra Piṭaka)
   b) Vinaya vibhāṣa sāstra (to Vinaya Piṭaka)
   c) Abhidharma vibhāṣa śāstra (to Abhidharma Piṭaka)

Abhidharma Piṭaka – there were manuscripts; according to Chinese tradition:

1. Sangīti Pariyāya (Mahākaustīla)
2. Dhātukāya (Pūrāṇa)
3. Prajñāpti Sāra (Maudalyāṇa)

a) Vijñānakāya (Devaśarman)

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16 This is probably in Pāli Mahā Kassapa.
17 This is maybe Pūraṇa Kassapa.
18 This is probably Mahā Moggallāna.
- sabbaj atti – dharma exists in past, present, future.
- In Sautrantika, they accepted uppada, vayaya, uppada, thiti

Notes:

In the study of Theravada Abhidhamma, to understand the different stages in which Abhidhamma philosophy developed. Today we have two important Abhidhamma traditions. The first of them is Sarvastivada tradition, their literary medium was Sanskrit, with the patronage of king Kanishka (1st century A.D.). This school flourished in northern India. During the reign of king Kanishka, the pioneers of this school are said to have held a council under the guidance of elder Vasumitra. As that time the text their teachings were large in number. The teachings which they accepted as Sutra, Vinaya and Abhidharma were engraved on sheet of copper and deposited inside a cetiya.

They got the name Sarvastivada as they advocated the view “sarvaj asti”. It means all things exist in all the three phases of time. This theory they developed based on the original teaching of the Buddha. They like the Theravadins were realists among Buddhist. Sarvastivadins revolted against the dominants of the arahants like it was done by Sammitiyas, Vastiputrayas, Mahasanghikas. The transcendantal powers which were ascribed to the Buddha and Bodhisattvas by the Mahasanghikas were denied by Sarvastivadins, in this aspect, they agreed with Theravadins. They believed in Antara-bhava and interim existence between this life and the next. They maintained that the Bodhisattvas were still ordinary people and even the arahants were not freed from the effect of past actions and still had something to learn.

《History of Buddhist Thought》E.J. Thomas;

1. Abhidhamma of Sarvastivada.

Sarvastivada are also called Vaibhasikas. In their Abhidhamma there are 7 texts. for the each text the author has been given, they are ascribed to the disciples of the Buddha. although the number is similar to Theravada Abhidhamma, the contents of those 7 texts differ from that of Theravada teachings. The 7 texts are:

(1) Jbana-prasthana / banaprassthana – Aryakatyaniputra.
(2) Savgiti-paraya – Mahakaushthila
(3) Prakarana-pada – Vasumitra
(4) Vijbana-kaya – Devasharma
(5) Dhatu-kaya – Purna
(6) Dharmaskhandha – Aryashariputra
(7) Prajbaptisastra – Aryamaudgalyayana.
Apart from these primary 7 texts, there is a large number of secondary Abhidhamma texts which areelonged to the Sarvastivada school. The names of some of those texts are:
1. Abhidharmakowa
2. Abhidharmakowa-bashya
3. Abhidharmayayanu-wastra
4. Abhidharmasamayadipika
5. Abhidharmayayanu-wastra
6. Abhidharmartawastra
7. Abhidharmahrdayawastra
8. Abhidharmadipa

A.C. Banerjee has given a detail introduction to the Abhidharma literature of Sarvastivada in his book name ‘Sarvastivada literature’.

**Fundamental Teachings of Sarvastivada.**

In a study of fundamental teachings of the Abhidharma traditions of Theravada and Sarvastivada will reveal special features that have been developed with in the traditions. As Sarvastivada Abhidharma is of great interest among western scholars, it is significant to understand fundamental differences and the identities of present tradition as well as of others. Following is the summarizes sketch of fundamental teachings of Sarvastivada Abhidharma:

(1) Citta – 1
(2) Caitta – 46
(3) Rupa – 11
(4) Citta-viprayutta-samskara – 14
(5) Asajskrtadharma – 3

Three moments of things in different schools:

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<tr>
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<th>Sautrantika</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Uppada (birth)</td>
<td>uppada (birth)</td>
<td>uppada (birth)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>thiti (stage)</td>
<td>sthti (stage)</td>
<td>vaya (destruction)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>bhanga (destruction)</td>
<td>jarata (decay)</td>
<td>anityata (destruction)</td>
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According to that two descriptions of dhamma given above, it can be seen that the Abhidharma of Theravadin differs from that of Sarvastivadin. Above mentioned divisions are based on the five aggregates analysis which originally occur in the Sutta Pitaka. Vibbana in five aggregates analysis has come in Abhidhamma as Citta. The words Caitta and Cetasika are used to represent the aggregates vedana, sabba and savkhara. To name the physical aspect of pesonality both the canon and Abhidhamma has used the word Rupa. There is no a division called Citta-viprayuttasamskha in Theravada Abhidhamma. According to Sarvastivadins 14 Cittaviprayuttasamskha dharmas neither belong to Citta nor to Rupa. They are name as a set of very subtle forces. This makes clear that these 14 dharmas are extra from 5 aggregates analysis. It is often mentioned in the Suttas that nothing exist extra to the five aggregates. Some dharmas which are presents among these 14 are given in the Theravada Abhidhamma too. But they are included in the 5 aggregates analysis. For example, the two forces prapti and aprapti being included in Bhavanga concept come under the analysis of consciousness. The concept of Jivita has been given as two under the analysis of rupa and analysis of mental-concomitants.
The four characteristics that are explained by the Sarvastivadins: utpada, sthiti, jarata and anityata are included under anipphana-rupas.

In the rupa analysis of Sarvastivadins, five sense organs and their subjects together with Avijbapati rupa have been presented. The first 10 of these 11 are similar to the explanation of early Buddhism. There is no Avijbapati-rupa in early discourses. This has been considered as an unknown dharma which holds the wholesome and unwholesome actions. The 28 fold analysis of matters in the Theravada Abhidhamma has not exceeded the teaching of early discourses.

Cataromahabhuta, pabcindriya, pabcavisaya, bhavarupa, Jivitarupa and ahararupa are given and defined according to the canonical descriptions. Some others which are not real rupas such as akasarupa, kayavijbapti and vaccivijbapti, the four characteristics utpada, sthiti, jarata and anityata and the three kinds of changes: lahuta, muduta and kammayata are included under the anipphana-rupas.

Comparitively, the number of cetasikas of Theravadins is more than that of Sarvastivadins. The Theravada analysis seems to be more petentive and authoritative. For example, Sarvastivadins have given 10 kinds of caitta called cittamahabhumaka caitta. They are associated with all the kinds of consciousness. The 10 are as follows:

1. Vedana – feeling
2. Sabba – perception
3. Cetana – volition
4. Sparsha – contact
5. Canda – desire, will
6. Prajba – wisdom
7. Smrtti – memory
8. Moksa – decision
9. Samadhi – concentration
10. Ekagrata – one-pointedness

On the contrary, Theravadin present 7 cetasikas called sabbacittasadarana which are associated with all the kinds of consciousness: passa, vedana, sabba, cetana, ekaggata, Jivindriya and manasikara. According to the research scholars the Theravada view is more closes to Sutta teachings. The addition which are make by Sarvastivadins has been considered as exceeding.

Under the unconditioned dharmas, Theravadins include only one dhamma i.e., the nibbana. Sarvastivadins have included akasa (space) under the unconditioned dharmas. The other two according to them are pratisamkyanirodha and Apratisankhyanirodha. The latter two are reasonable because they explained them as two stages of attaining emancipation. In the first, one is able to make trshna (tavha) feeble. In the second complete eradication of defilements take place. Living space under unconditioned dharmas is not reasonable as akasa is only a moment which shows the emptiness according to Theravadins. According to the Theravada analysis aspect of two Abhidhamma tradition as explained above shows the differences of explanation that came into existence in later times.

Apart from that, there are a large number of theoretical facts which make Theravada Abhidhamma exceed away from Sarvastivadins. Sarvastivada means ‘everything exist’ (sarvaj asti vada) i.e., the theory of existence of everything. The dharmas according to them exist thoughly during the phases 時期 of time, i.e., past, present and future. Here dharma means the analysis of mind and matter in Abhidhamma texts. according to the explanation of existence in the dialogues of the Buddha, past is a thing which is already cease to exist, future has not come yet, hence only the present exist. The scholars by comparing the view of Sarvastivadins with the Sutta explanation come to the conclusion that they have given a self-nature to the dharmas.

Among the Sarvastivada teachers who developed the present theory: Dharmatrata, Ghosa, Vasumitra and Buddhadeva are very important. They have developed four theories to prove the existence of Dharmas.
truly. The 4 theories are as follows:

1. Bhavanyatavadaya – theory of changing nature
2. Lakshananyatavadaya – theory of changing characteristic
4. Apekkhanyatavadaya (also as anyathananyathavada) – theory of changing due to other causes.

《sphutarthatika》Yasomitra (four theories is given in detailed in this book)

1. Bhavanyatavadaya – the theory of changing nature, by Dharmatrata. According to him, the nature of a thing changes, still a fundamental nature remains unchanging. They explained this situation with the following similies:

   Although what is made of gold changes one from the other such as ring, necklace, the gold nature does not change.

2. Lakshananyatavadaya – every dhamma has its characteristics according to the time such as past characteristic, present characteristic and future characteristic. When that changes from past, only those characteristics of time changed, some fundamental characteristic remain unchanged. They explained with the following simile: A man who is in loved with one lady also likes other women.

3. Avasthanyathavadaya – theory of changing occasions. A thing changes only in a particular time, it takes characteristic which belonged to that occasion, still there is a nature unchanged in it according to occasional difference. E.g. a ball (flour or clay) taken as one, it is considered as a single thing, when it is taken as ten, it is considered according to that number.

4. Apekkhanyatavadaya – due to the effect of other causes, all reason things are considered as changed. E.g. a lady to her mother is daughter, to her son she is mother, to her grandson she is grandmother. In this manner, a thing changes due to other reasons.

According to Sarvastivadins, the reason for present thing, the above four theories was that they wanted to explain the function of some fundamental Buddhist concepts. There are three of them which are very fundamental:

(1) karitradharma – continuous activity of a given thing. According to the Buddhist teachings, a being has a continuous existence. His present life has been resulted from past existence. The future will be decided depending on present behaviour. To prove this continuous existence, excepting the theory that dharmas exist during all the three phases of time is necessary. this necessity has been explained with karitradharma.

(2) Karmavada – the actions, which a being volitionally performs, bring due results. This as the Buddha explained one has to reap as he sows. To explain this kamma theory, the existence of dharmas has to be accepted according to Sarvastivadins.

(3) Abhijba (highest knowledge) – when a person develops his spiritually and develops mind to the mind culture, he comes to a state where abhijba called super-knowledge are obtainable. When a person has cutupapatabana, he can examines the birth and the death of people. He will come to know where a certain being is going to be born. By understanding this wrongly, the recluses at the time of the Buddha strongly believed in a permanent soul.

Buddhism too accepts highest knowledges for this, the view of Sarvastivadins was needed very much according to them. As a result of these theoretical interpretations, different division of Sarvastivadins came into existence. Abhidhammakowa records five such groups:

(1) Kashmira Sarvastivadins
(2) Gandhara Sarvastivadins
(3) Mathura Sarvastivadins
(4) Mula-Sarvastivadins
and gave some kind of solution. The late period. But between these two books we find some traces of development and change. The period. Chinese tradition makes concerns with mental attitudes while the subject matter of the three states of time. The expresses for the first time the thought of 'the existence of phenomena in three states of time'.

The origin of Sarvāstivāda school is not known. Some scholars believe this school came to be after the Second Buddhist Council. By the time of Third Council this Theravāda got division into various branches and Sarvāstivāda was one of them. The Abhidharma doctrine of this school had much developed along with scholastic Buddhism. This school is considered the most representative of the entire Buddhist schools. Even the Mahāyāna schools were influenced by the doctrines of this school both positively and negatively.

Originally, the basic proposition of the Sarvāstivāda school was, as its name signifies, the doctrine of 'sarvam asti' (all things exist). From this popular and plain proposition the school developed a rational and detailed doctrine. The seven Abhidharma books as the fundamental Abhidharma of Sarvāstivāda are:

1. Śāntipariyāya
2. Dharmasandhi
3. Prajñāpāti
4. Viññānakāya
5. Dhātukāya
6. Prakarana
7. Jhānaprasthāna

These seven treatises were divided into three groups: 'early', 'middle' and 'late' according to their doctrinal contents and their form of expression.

(1) Early Abhidharma – from the fact that the first three treatises are all attributed to the immediate disciples of the Buddha, such as Śāriputra (Śāriputta), Maudgalyāyana (Moggallāna), Katyāyana (Kaccāyana), we should infer that even if they were not the actual authors, early Abhidharma was developed from the methods of discourses practiced by those disciples. They were versed in Abhidharma and they were described as the authors of these books, because their discourses provided the prototype for them. The Śāntipariyāya is a collection of technical terms, arranged in numerical order in exactly the same manner as that of the Śāntī Sūtra of Dīgha Āgama (Dīgha Nikāya). The definitions and expositions are more elaborate and minute and what may be called Abhidhammic definition has been adopted. The dharma-skandha is a collection of important doctrines and theories of the early Buddhist period as found in the āgama. They dealt with the precepts and faith of the lay people, matters concerning the practice and enlightenment of disciples how/or(?) members of the order, and the seven bodhyaṅgas (bojjhaṅgas), thus dealing with the fundamental theory and doctrine of Buddhism.

(2) Abhidharma of the middle period – however, we find characteristic which distinguish them from each other. The Viññānakāya and the Dhātukāya nature(?) which are the Abhidharma books of Sarvāstivāda school of the middle period. The Viññānakāya clearly expresses for the first time the thought of 'the existence of phenomena in three states of time'. Sarvāstivāda philosophers maintained that not only present, but past and future phenomena also have real existence throughout the three states of time. The Dhātukāya concerned with mental attitudes while the subject matter of the Viññānakāya was the mind itself.

(3) Abhirharma of the late period – the Prakarana Śāstra and the Jhāna Prasthāna Śāstra belong to the Abhidharma of the late period. Chinese tradition makes Vasumitra the author of both of the Dhātukāya of the middle Abhidharma and the Prakarana of the late period. But between these two books we find some traces of development and change. The Dhātukāya introduced the problem and gave some kind of solution. The Prakarana re-examined them and gave other solutions. The last śāstra, the Jhāna Prasthāna in

666 Sarvasavadin

Sarvasavadin are also close to Theravadin but they have some additional interpretation of Abhidhama the literary medium of Sarvasavadin is Sankrit because their teaching are to be understood by the scholar who are known as in the high standard of educational field. Vashubandu compiles Abhidhammaghosa in Sankrit language. Vashubandu is the great scholar in this school and he was converted to Mahayana Buddhism under the influence of his brother Asangha, this school developed in India especially in Punca north and west frontier of during the reign of king Kanisaka who was the patron of this school. The 4th Buddhist council was held during his rule period it is said that at this council under the patronage of Vashubandu, Buddhist text of Sutra,Vinay and Abhidhama were ordered to be engraved on sheet of Copper and deposited inside stupa which let to emergent of later Tantrayana Buddhism the theory of Saravan Asti is presented by Sarvasavadin which is known as generally called the dhamma are presented in present and future. Theravadin and Sarvastivadin are regarded as realists. They believed in Nairatmya (the absent of permanent soul). In the individual, they believe in Antarabhava concept (intermediate exception between this life and the next).
this book, all the topics discussed in the Sarvāstivāda school are treated as whole in the eight chapters:
1. Kṣudrada (miscellany)  
2. Saṅyojana (letters)  
3. Jñāna (wisdom)  
4. Karma (action)  
5. Mahābhūta (four elements of matter)  
6. Indriya (controlling principles)  
7. Samādhī (meditation)  
8. Drṣṭi (views)

**SARVĀSTIVĀDINS’ TEACHING ON 'INDIVIDUAL’ – WORD & BEING (2009)**

According to the Sarvāstivādins:
1. The existence of five dhāmmas are:
   a) citta
   b) cetasika
   c) rūpa
   d) visamprayuktasankhāra
   e) Asanskṛuta
2. The being and the objects constituted out of the dhāmmas at a particular time.
3. The being and the objects are subjected to disintegrate.
4. The dhāmmas do not disintegrate.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theravāda</th>
<th>Sarvāstivāda</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Rūpa</td>
<td>Rūpa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Vedāna</td>
<td>Caitasika</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Saññā</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Saṅkhārā</td>
<td>Visampsayutta Saṅkhārā</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Viññāna</td>
<td>Asavikāra citta</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The dhāmmas exist in their subtlest state.

The arguments given in Kathāvatuppakarana:
Sarvāstivādins: „All the five dhāmmas exist but not always and not everyware and in the sense of form.” (This theory is called by Theravāda 'Suddhikāya' = 'pure logic'.
Theravādins: „If the material aggregate does not give up its materiality (rūpabhava) then rūpabhāva becomes permanent, eternally existing like Nibbāna.”
Sarvāstivādins: „Rūpabhava is different from Nibbānahāva." Thēravādins: They asked whethe the past (atīta) gives up its pastness (atītabhāva).
Sarvāstivādins: „No, it doesn't. When the atītabhāva exists, anāgatabhāva and paccuppanabhāva do not exist like atītabhāva, when the anāgatabhāva exists atītabhāva does not exist like anāgatabhāva.”
SARVASTIVADA ABHIDHAMMA (SHORT NOTES)

- rūpa – 01; cetasika – 11; Nirvāṇa, asaṅkhāta – 3; citta viprautta – 14
- Four views regarding the dhāmmanās:
  1. Bhavanyata (Ācariya Dhammatralā) – the future dhāmmanās do not exist continuously
  2. Lakṣanayata (Ācariya Ghosa) – dhāmmanās bear tri-kāla (past, present, future)
  3. Avasthānyatha (Ācariya Vasumitra) – dhāmmanās change in tri-kāla
  4. Anyatanyata (Ācariya Bhudadeva) – dhāmmanās exist all in tri-kāla

SABBATTIVĀDA (PĀLi)/SARVASTIVĀDA (SANSKRIT)

Sarvastivāda was a Hīnayāna school with its Piṇ̄kas in Sanskrit. The Sarvastivādins adopted grammatical Sanskrit as their literature and they possessed canon in three divisions, namely Sutra, Vinaya, Abhidharma. The Sarvastivāda maintained that the Dhamma exists all time in the past, present and future, but the Theravādins did not accept it. Sarvastivādins accepted the fundamental teaching of the Dhamma such as anattā and aniccā. They said that the beings and objects were constituted out of the dhāmannas, but dhāmannas always exist in their subtlest states. For instance, vedanā may be kusala, akusala and avyākata, so the dhamma exists all the time.¹⁹

The first argument between Sarvastivāda and theravāda was the existence of the dhāmannas. While Sarvastivādins said, that the dhāmannas existed all the times, in that sense Theravādins did not agree and stated that if the dhāmannas existed all the time, then micchā diṭṭhi and sammā diṭṭhi should have existed together too. Again they added that if the past and future existed in the same time, existence should have been predicated in the same way at present too. Then Sarvastivādins denied that point and said that the past and the future existed but not exactly in the same form like one would speak at the present.

Moreover, Theravādins started second argument, saying that let the present material aggregate (paccuppanna-rūpa) exist as one inseparable object. But after that, this material aggregate becomes the past and gives up its presence (paccuppanna-bhava). For this argument, Sarvastivādins agreed with the Theravāda’s view. Nevertheless, Sarvastivādins denied that the material aggregate would give up its materiality (rūpa-bhava). They have shown an example, that let a piece of white cloth be regarded as one inseparable object and when this cloth would change its color, it would give up its white color.

Then touching that, Sarvastivādins gave the example of Sakadāgāmi, as an illustration. A Sakadāgāmi person reduced rāgalośa, dosa, moha ato be lesser and his following rebirth continues from the past dhāmannas. Without the dhāmannas in the past, the present does not come to be proceeding. Otherwise, it would be an Arahant, who completely free from moral defilements such as rāgalośa, dosa, moha, but according to Theravādins these defilements are destroyed forever, whereas according to Sarvastivādins they persist through an effect(ive?) form. So the defilements may reappear and cause from(?) Arahant. As mentioned above, that is the main point for Sarvastivāda in Buddhism.

SARVASTIVADA (SHORT NOTES)²⁰

It is very important Buddhist school that broke away from the main Theravāda school, sometime around 3rd century BC. The Buddhists of that time were facing the problem of explaining some of the fundamental doctrines such as rebirth, kamma, memory etc. As Theravādins accepted the anattā doctrine and also held that only the present time is real, it became a problem as to show how past kamma gives results in the furute, if there is no soul, how is rebirth possible.

¹⁹ Here, indeed, a note is needed. The dhamma here is any phenomenon, any thing. The Sarvastivādins simply believed, that all things in the world are regardless whether they can be cognized by human senses or not. They assume that all the things are already existing and then, consequently the things just take a form which we cognize.

²⁰ This ‘note’ was among the notes for second year, but I believe that for third year students it will be more useful.
To explain these problems fractions of monks came up with the theory that not only the present, but also past and future periods are real. On this they explained that everything exists in all three periods of time. Thence their name ‘all exist in all three periods of time’.

To show that they are different from soul-theorists they came up with the theory of svabhāva (own-nature) and kārita (the functional nature of dhammās). On this they explained how dhammās prevail throughout their own-nature and how they appear in the presence due to kārita.

This became a very influential school and it is this school that came to be criticized by Nāgarjuna.

666 Point out the specific characteristic of the Sarvastivada Abhidhamma. (818)

Abhidhamma is a class of literature which deals with philosophical and theological topics. In the past there were many Abhidhamma texts of the various sects. However, only those of the Theravada and of the Sarvastivada remain today.

The number of Abhidharma texts of Sarvastivada is just the same in that of the Theravada, the difference being that the latter collections consists of seven independent works while the former of one principal treatise the Jbana-prasthana-wastra of Katyayaniputra with its six padas or supplements. The 7 texts are:

1. Jbanaprasthana-wastra
2. Savgiti-paryaya-pada-wastra
3. Dharmaskandha-pada-wastra
4. Prajbapti-pada-wastra
5. Jbanakaya-pada-wastra
6. Dhatukaya-pada-wastra
7. Prakarana-pada-wastra

According to the Sarvastivadins everything exists forever (sarvaj sarvada asti). It means that all dhammas exist in the three periods of time, and the emphasis put on the reality (svabhava) of dhammas is indicative of the conception that not only their present, but their past as well as future transition, too, represent something real.

The specific characteristic of the Sarvastivada Abhidhamma is that the Sarvastivadins made an entirely new classification in which the whole of existence is treated under the 5 dharmas which exist at past, present and future. The 5 dharmas again sub-divided into 75 as follows:

(1) Rupa – matter, divided into primary and secondary → 11
(2) Citta – consciousness → 1
   sajskrta 72
(3) Caitasika – mental factors → 46
   (conditioned)
(4) viprayukta-sajskara – elements which are neither matter
The dharmas are divided into two major groups: sajskrta and asajskrta dharmas. The sajskrta dharmas are those which are caused, conditioned, mundane, impermanence, non-eternal and associated with asravas (taints). The asajskrta dharmas are those which are not subject to cause or condition and therefore are transcendental, unchanging, eternal and free from asravas. According to Vasubandhu, the sajskrta dharmas are real (sasvabhava) while the asajskrta dharmas are not real but a concept (prajbaptisat) only.

The sajskrta dharmas are also called adhva, kathavastu, sanihsara and savastuka.

(a) They are called ‘adhva’ because they are subject to change.
(b) They are called ‘kathavastu’ as they are subject to Hetu-pratyaya and the objects of discourses of past, present and future.
(c) They are called ‘sanihsara’ as they, including the 4 Noble Truths and the Noble Eightfold Path, are subject to annihilation, because not only from the impure dharmas but also from the Noble path annihilation is necessary.
(d) They are called ‘savastukas’ as they are dependent of causes.

The 75 dharmas, 72 of them sajskrta are divided into four groups: rupa, citta, caitasikas and citta-viprayukta, and three asajskrta being a new class of forces which were not classed as mental or material.

The different classification of dharmas between the Sarvastivada and Theravada Abhidhamma are show below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sarvastivada</th>
<th>Theravada</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Rupa</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Citta</td>
<td>01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Caitta</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Viprayukta</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. asajskrta</td>
<td>03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td>170/192</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The theory of moment, according to the Sarvastivadins describes as four forces: jati, sthiti, jara and nasa. With the emergence of the conception of substance (svabhava), the Sarvastivadins made full use of this concept to explain the problem of continuity of phenomena, which they analyzed into momentary existences. Four theories were suggested by the four famous Sarvastivada teachers:

1. Vasumitra held that a dharma passing through the three periods of time, having come to each state or
condition is called past or present or future. The state or condition is determined by the causal efficiency or causal activity. If the causal efficiency is present, it is called the present; if the causal efficiency is no more, it is called the past; and if the efficiency is not yet manifest, it is called the future.

2. Ghosa propounded a theory of change of characteristics. A past dharma, according to him, is possessed of the characteristic of pastness, but dispossessed of the characteristics of presentness and futurity, like a man who is attached to one woman, but is at the same time unattached to other woman.

3. Dharmatrata upheld a theory of change of existences. He maintained that when a dharma passes through the three periods of time, there is change of existence or state, but not substance. For example, the gold, which may be seen in various shapes or forms, while the gold itself remains unchanged.

4. Buddhadeva proposed a theory of a change of relations. A dharma is said to be past in relation to the present and future, present in relation to the past and future, and future in relation to the past and present. It is like a woman who is a mother in relation to her daughter and a daughter in relation to her own mother.

A mastery survey of the Sarvastivadin’s thought was elaborated by Vasubandhu in his Abhidhammakowa-wastra and became the basic text for the development of Sarvastivada in China and Japan. He then produced a commentary ‘Abhidhammakowa-bhasya’, which offered an incisive critique of it from a largely Sautrantika viewpoint.

666Abhidharma of the Sarvastivadin:
The origin of Sarvastivada School is not known. Some scholars believe this school comes rose the 2nd Buddhist council. By the time of 3rd council this Theravada got division into various branches and Sarvastivada was one of them. The Abhidharma doctrine of this school developed along with scholastic Buddhism. This school is considered the most representative of the entire Buddhist schools. Even the Mahayana schools were influenced by the doctrines of this school both positively and negatively.

Originally, the basic proposition of the Sarvastivada School was, as its name signifies, the doctrine of “sarvam asti” (all things exist). From this popular and plain proposition the school developed a rational and detailed doctrine. The seven Abhidharma books as the fundamental Abhidharma of the Sarvastivada. They are:
1 the Sangiti-paryaya, 2 the Dharmaskandha, 3 the Prajnapati, 4 the Vijnanakaya,
5 the Dhatukaya,    6 the Prakarana,          7 the Jnanaprasthana.

A Early Abhidharma: The first three treatises are all attributed to the immediate disciples of the Buddha, such as Sariputra, Maudgalyayana, Katyayana, and this shows that early Abhidharma was developed from the method of discourse practiced by those disciples. They were versed in Abhidharma and they were described as the authors of these books because their discourses provided the prototype for them. The Sangiti-paryaya is a collection of technical terms, arranged in numerical order in exactly the same
manner as that of the Sangiti-sutra of the Dirgha Agama (Digha Nikaya). The dharma-skandha is a collection of important doctrines and theories of the early Buddhist period, as found in the agama.

B Abhidharma of the middle period: The Vinna-kayasatra and the Dhatu-kaya. The Vinnakaya clearly expresses for the first time the thought of “The existence of phenomena in three states of time.” The Saravistivada philosopher maintained that not only the present, but past and future phenomena also have real existence through out the three states of time. The Dhatu-kaya concern with mental attitudes while the subject matter of the Vijnna-kaya was the mind itself.

C Abhidharma of the late period: the Prakarana Sastra and the Jnana-prasthana sastra belong to the Abhidharma of late period. Chinese tradition makes Vasumitra the author both the Dhatukaya of the middle Abhidharma and the prakarana of the late period. But between these two books we find some trances of development. The Prakarana re-examined them and gave other solutions. In the last sastra, the Jnana prasthana, in this book, all the topics discussed in the Sarvastivada School are treated as a whole, in the eight chapters of ksudrada (miscellany), samyojana (fetters), jnana (wisdom), karma (action), mahabhuta (four elements of matter), indriya (controlling principles), Samadhi (meditation) and drsti (view).

666(SARVASTIVADA DOCTRINE AND ABHIDHAMMIC TRADITION)27.08.07

the sarvastivada is a Buddhist school that originated in the period Abhidhama Budhism, around 2nd century B.C the central of this school that, dharma exist in all the three periods of time, here dharma means sankhatadharma and asankhatadharma(conditionality and unconditionality). at least by the time of Kateyaniputra. this school evolved theory of causality which enumerated five different causes as fellow:

1. the co-existence(sahabhu hetu)
2. the conjoint cause(samprayataka hetu)
3. the homogeneous cause(sabhava hetu)
4. the universal cause(saravatra hetu)
5. The retribution causes (vipaka hetu).

of the five co-existences cause of which the conjoin cause is a sub-sect confine to the mental domain represent a doctrine of simultaneous cause relationship this doctrine was of great doctrinal significant for the Sarvastivada among other things it land support to their doctrinal of direct perception .

on the later again reinforce their doctrine pluralistic realism. For the sarvastivadin one can be absolutely certain about the existence external object our five senses directly perceive them.

Existence of external object
Thus within a single moment of visual perception. the visual faculty, the object and corresponding visual consciousness all arise simultaneously,

All three functions as co-existence cause just as the five physical sense, the mind too, perceive mental object directly (Manitri and Manovinna) one of the major argument of the sarvastivadin for their theist of tri-temporary existence is that the object of the perception must be existence. they maintain that the power of an object to cause a cognition (bodhi)in us is the trust mark o the real, the fact that the mind can think of past and future object then constitute an important prove for the reality in existence of past and future dhamma.

the sautrantika, another Abhidamika school on the insisted that causality necessary involved a temporal sequent this basic premise couple with the doctrine of momentary (ksanikavada) lead them to an epistemological theory indirect perception if everything is momentary and is a cause necessary percept and effect then the inevitable conclusion is that we can never ever have direct knowledge of external reality.
what we actually perceive is only a mental image left behind in the mind by perceptual object as it arise only to perish within a moment . this sautrantika theory presented a serious threat to sarvastivada realism and contributed significantly to the Mahayana doctrine( around 4th century A.D) of Vijnatrimatrika, that external reality nothing but a projection of the mind but if our perception is necessary indirect and depend on a mental image as the actual object, then the very treasure of the tri-temporary existence of dhamma is as stated or doubtful because it follows among other things that we can not show certain as world the sarvastivadin are object our perception are always and necessary really, the sautrantika hold that the reality of the external object can only being infer(bakya tameya). indeed, a sautrandika views that object of perception may or may not real.

from the about outline of the fundamental different in the epistemological position between two abhidhamma school we can readily appreciate how the validity or otherwise of the type of simultaneous causation as educated by the sarvastivadin because dispute more importantly however this doctrine is in dispensable for the fundamental theist of sarvastivada of the four majors argument put forward for the theist it is divided into four parts. (1) uktatvat (2)dveaya (3)sadvisayat (4)phata.

the first is simply and inference from the Budha mention of past and future object, C and D are the only two logical arguments and lost one essential has the same stress as supported by the Buddha on a statement, argue that since the object of any perception must be existence, the fact that the mind can think of past and future object then proof the reality of past and future dhamma and argues that past dhamma must exist since a past Karma is causally, in generally in present vipaka now must know that these two logical argument can not stand unless the simultaneous causality exemplified by the sahabhuhetu is considered , both required the cause and effect be existing simultaneously. at the same time , though they may belong to different time period with respect to their own temporal of reference that is A may be past present of future and B may also past or present of future but they must co-existence where A and B are necessary co-existence, both existence at the same time present moment we have the category known as the sahabhutahetu, in fact in the sarvastivada conception all dharma in their nature have always been existence , it is only a matter of their arising through cause and condition.

(Continue topic)

In conclusion he states that Sahabhutu is not a theory of causation and as part of its definition, in several ability. expressed as usual cause and effect in actuality concerning the dharma can not included in the theory of law of causation.

1. What is the essential nature of sabhava of sahabhutu?
   (Answer), all the conditions (samskruta dharma).
2. what is the meaning of sahabhuta?
2. sahabhu means not mutually separate or sharing the same effect or mutually according with one another . This sahabhuta is definitely found in the three periods of time and produce the varies effects
3. What is the conjoint cause?
3. All the dharma which are taught on the thought concomitant (citta and cetasika).
4. Why are the thought and thought concomitant mutually conjoint to one another?
4. Because they are reciprocally cause resent to emerge their mutual nourished, mutual strength, and mutual dependent.

They can accomplish their activity only through mutual dependent, if we were to ask sensation (vedana) without conception (sanna) can use expressed object?

The answer would be known the some question apply to the thought and thought concomitant.
The teaching of Sarvastivada

Sarvastivada was one of the 4 main branches. Sarvastivadins were the leaders during the 4th council of Kanishka. Sarvastivada gave rise to Vaibhasika.

The main theme in their doctrine is “Sarvaj sarvada asti” which means everything exists in three periods of time, and the emphasis put on the reality (svabhava) of dhammas is indicative of the conception that not only their present, but past as well as future transition, too, represent something real. The word ‘sarvaj’ (all) is something beyond the general acceptance. Sarvaj means skandha, dhatu, ayatana etc. According to them all dhammas belong to cause and effect and are existing e.g. namarupa consists of 5 skandhas and are of cause and effect. Sarvastivada considered what is internal and external as dhammas.

According to them, dhamma denotes ‘all’ and they say that it exists truthfully, and they are obvious and realistic. Since they considered all dhammas as absolute, according to them, they can be considered as realistic. Since they are connected with Abhidhamma, they put forward this type of intricate thought.

Sarvastivadins accept an extreme realistic view. According to them, subject and object (senses and sense-objects) are both existing. The Ksanavada (momentary) of Sarvastivadins takes a new outlook. They believe that one can know the outer world by means of realization and understanding. Thus they are against Sautrantikavadins who based mainly on Ksanavada. The Sautrantikas say one cannot know the outer world by realization, because it is momentary. Sarvastivadins say, through the contact of sense and sense-object, one can understand outward things (dhamma). Sarvastivada accept the lasting (stitthi) of dhammas, but not Sautrantikas, and this is their major difference.

The Sarvastivadins give up ‘puggalavada’ while the Sammitiyas tried to prove ‘puggalavada’ on various themes. The Sammitiyas considering memory, the paramitta, good and bad actions, to make ethic fruitful, brought about the puggalavada. They being within anamatvada tried to become puggalavadins. But Sarvastivadins were against them. The Sarvastivadins believe that there is dharma but not a puggala. Therefore, they are called ‘pudgala-nairyatmaka-vada’. The pudgalavadins (sammitiyas) and the Sautrantika who are ksanavada are against Sarvastivada. According to the concept of time, Sarvastivada say dhamma exists in the past, present and future.

Sarvastivadins give a prominent place to Abhidhamma, because it is in Abhidhamma we get the categorization of dhamma. According to Vasubandhu’s Abhiddhammakosa, abhidhamma is called ‘Amala prajba’, which in term means
Nibbana. Abhidhamma is the path to Nibbana. According to them, there is no nibbana apart from the division of dhamma, which is called ‘dharma pravaca’. There is no giving up of defilement without it. Rupa is divided into many ways, namely one’s own characteristic, general characteristic, there are divisions as sawrava and anawrava, sajkruta and asajkruta. This has been explained in the Abhidhammakosa.

Sarvastivadins do not accept the division of dhamma in the Theravada. According to the Theravada, the paramatta amount to 4, according to Sarvastivada amount to 5 (including the viprayukta-samskara i.e. elements which are neither matter nor mental).

Sarvastivadins give both:

1. The general characteristic of all dhamma
2. An individual characteristic of one and each dhamma.

Sarvastivadins say that the material world and the mental world are both separated from each other. One does not expect the other, one does not exist because of the other. Critique says that they are accepting both general characteristic and one’s own characteristic which are in contradiction.

With regard to Sajsara and nirvana, Sarvastivada accept satvada. Although they say sarvaj asti, there are arguments about the existence of dhamma with regard to various teachers.

1. Bhavayata – Dharmatrata
   The anagata dhammas do not stay there throughout. They come to present, then there is no future characteristic, they are called present. The present soon becomes past, then they are called past, but their root does not changed. Milk becomes curd and though the taste is different but the colour is the same.

2. Lakshanyata – Ashvagosha
   Those of the past are of past characteristic but there are also instances of present and future. The dhamma of future has characteristic of future but not devoid of present and past. The dharma of present is of present characteristic there also has past and future instances. A man who is in love with one woman, is not devoid of affection to other women.

3. Avasthanyata – Vasumitra
According to instances the dhamma of the three colour, (i.e. past, present, future) differs. But the root forms do not changed. The ‘aggala’ is one but it can be separated into small fragments.

4. Anyathanyata – Buddhadeva

He says that the dhamma when coming to various periods (i.e. past, present and future) they take various names but they only denote the time and it is relative.

**666**Compare and contrast the Sarvastivada Abhidhamma with that of Theravada.

Originally, the basic proposition of the Sarvastivada School was, as its name signifies, the doctrine of “Sarvam Asti” (all things exist). From this popular and plain proposition the school developed a rational and detailed doctrine. The seven Abhidhamma books as the fundamental Abhidhamma of the Sarvastivada. They are: 1. the Sangitiparyaya, 2 the Dharmaskadha, 3 the Prajnapati, 4 the Vijnanakaya, 5 the Dhatukaya, 6 the Prakarana, 7 the Jnanaprasthana. These seven treatises divided into three groups: early, middle and late, according to their doctrinal contents and their form of expression.

Early Abhidharma: from the fact that the first three treatises are all attributed to the immediate disciples of the Buddha, such as Sariputra, Maudgalyayana, Katyayana, we should infer that even if they were not the actual authors, early Abhidharma was developed from the method of discourse practiced by those disciples. They were versed in Abhidharma and they were described as the authors of these books because their discourses provided the Prototype for them. The Sangiti-paryaya is a collection of technical terms, arranged in numerical order in exactly the same manner as that of the Sangiti-Sutta of the Dirgha Agama (Digha Nikaya)…

Abhidhamma of the middle period: however, we fine characteristic, which distinguish them from each other. The Viñña-kayasatra and the Dhatu-kaya nature which the Abhidhamma books of Sarastivada school of the middle period. The Vinnakaya clearly expresses for the first time the thought of “the existence of phenomena in three states of time”. The Sravistivada philosopher maintained that not only the present, but past and future phenomena also have real existence through out the three states of time. The Dhatu-kaya concerned with mental attitudes while the subject matter of the Vijnna-kaya was the mind itself.

Abhidharma of the late period: the Prakarana Sastra and the jhāna-prasthana Sastra belong to the Abhidhamma of late period. Chinese tradition makes Vasumitra the author both the Dhatukaya of the middle Abhidharma and the prakarana of the late period. But between these two books we find some trances of development and change the Dhatu-kaya introduced the problem and gave some kind of solution. The Prakarana, in this book, all the topics discussed in the Sarvastivāda School are treated as a whole, in the eight chapters of Ksudrada K(Miscellany), Samyojana (fetters), Jhāna (wisdom), Kamma (action), Mahabhuta (four elements of matter), Indriya (controlling principles), Samadhi (meditation), and Drsti (view).

**666**Point out the significant differences between the dharma classification of Theravadins and Sarvastivadins. (940)

Sarvastivada detached itself from the Theravada around the time of Asoka (3rd century B.C.) selected Mathura as the venue of their early activities. Taking a different tack than the Sthaviravada monks, the
Sarvastivadin scholastics developed their own set of canonical texts which adopted Sanskrit for their literary medium.

The number of Abhidharma texts of Sarvastivada is just the same in that of the Theravada, the difference being that the latter collections consists of seven independent works while the former of one principal treatise the Jbana-prasthana-wastra with its six padas or supplements. The Sarvastivada’s Abhidhamma exist only in Chinese version. The seven books of both are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theravada</th>
<th>Sarvastivada</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Dhammasangani</td>
<td>Savgiti-paryaya-pada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Vibhavga</td>
<td>Dharmaskandha-pada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Dhatukatha</td>
<td>Dhatukaya-pada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Puggala-pabbatti</td>
<td>Prajbapti-pada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. kathavatthu</td>
<td>Vijbana-pada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Yamaka</td>
<td>Prakarana-pada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Patthana</td>
<td>Jbana-prasthana</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to the classification of Dhamma in the Abhidhamma, the Theravadins classified into four categories or the four ultimate realities as rupa, citta, cetasika and nibbana, whereas the Sarvastivadins classified into 5 categories as rupa, citta, caitta, viprayukta-sajskara and asajskrtas.

The specific characteristic of the Sarvastivada Abhidhamma is that the Sarvastivadins made an entirely new classification in which the whole of existence is treated under the 5 dharmas which exist at past, present and future. However, according to the Theravadins, there is no existence of cosmic elements in the past and future, but exist in the present only.

The different classification of dharmas between the Sarvastivada and Theravada Abhidhamma are shown below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sarvastivada</th>
<th>Theravada</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Rupa</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Citta</td>
<td>01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Caitta</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Viprayukta</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. asajskrta</td>
<td>03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td>170/192</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The main different is that the Sarvastivadins divided dharma into two major groups, i.e., sajskrta and asajktra dharmas.

(1) Rupa – matter → 11
(2) Citta – consciousness → 1

\[\text{sajskrta} 72\]
The sajskrta dharmas are those which are caused, conditioned, mundane, impermanence, non-eternal and associated with asravas (taints). The asajskrta dharmas are those which are not subject to cause or condition and therefore are transcendental, unchanging, eternal and free from asravas. According to Vasubandhu, the sajskrta dharmas are real (sasvabhava) while the asajskrta dharmas are not real but a concept (prajbaptisat) only.

Rupa

According to the Theravada Abhidhamma, rupa is the 3rd reality. The Theravadins recognize 28 kinds of material phenomena. Four of these are called primary, 24 are secondary. The secondary kinds are dependent on primary. These 28 kinds of rupa are divided into two classes, 18 are real (nipphannarupa), 10 are unreal (anipphannarupa).

The rupa in the Sarvastivada is divided into 11 categories. The first five are called visaya (five sense objects), the following five are called indriya (five sense organs), and the last one is called avijbapti (unmanifested matter).

Citta

The Theravada distinguishes citta into a variety of types, are reckoned as 89 or 121. The consciousness is classified under four divisions according to the plains in which it is experienced, they are:

(i) sense-sphere consciousness → 54
(ii) fine-material sphere consciousness → 15
(iii) immaterial sphere consciousness → 12
(iv) supramundane consciousness → 8

With respect to the nature of the above four divisions, they are divided itself into four classes, i.e. 12 akusala, 8 kusala, 23 vipaka and 11 kiriya.

Unlike the Theravadins who recognized every conceivable instance and aspect of mind as different dhammas, the Sarvastivadins, while accepting the existence of six types of sense-perception, considered citta to be a single dhamma.
Cetasika

The Theravada Abhidhamma lists 52 kinds of cetasikas. One is vedana, another is sabba. The remaining 50 are grouped together under the term savkhara. The 52 cetasikas are classified into four board categories as follows:

i. 7 universals
ii. 6 occasional
iii. 14 unwholesome factors – first 4 are wholesome universals, the rest 10 are unwholesome occasions.
iv. 25 beautiful factors – sub-divided into beautiful universals (19), abstinences(3), illimitables (2) and non-delusion (1).

The Sarvativadins recognized 46 cetasika which are again sub-divided into 6 categories:

i. mahabhumi - 10
ii. kusalamahabhumi - 10
iii. klesamahabhumi - 6
iv. akusalamahabhumi - 2
v. upaklesahumika - 10
vi. aniiyatabhumika - 8

According to the Sarvastivadins, the 46 caittas of which the first ten present in every moment of consciousness and are comparable to the common cetasikas of the Theravada list. Another ten of kusalamahabhumi are comparable to the kusala cetasikas of the Theravadins. Six are klesamahabhumi which are not always absolutely unwholesome; they are sometimes neutral in the progress towards final deliverance, but are nevertheless always obscured by promoting the belief in the existence of a personality. Two caittas are present in every moment of unwholesome consciousness and are called akusalamahabhumi. Ten are secondary passions called upaklesahumika, and the remaining eight caittas are capable of entering into various combinations; they are called the aniiyatabhumika.

Viprayukta-sajskara

The category of fourteen viprayukta-sajskaras in which 14 dhammas are included in the Sarvastivadins Abhidhamma. There is no such classification is found in the Theravada Abhidhamma.
Nibbana \ Asajskrtas

Nibbana is the fourth ultimate reality in the Theravada Abhidhamma. In this state, nìbbana is unconditioned and it is neither created nor formed which is free from suffering and rounds of rebirth. And this is a state which is not subjected to the laws of birth, decay and death.

According to the Sarvastivadins, the unconditioned state is called asajskrtas, under 3 categories of akasa, pratisajkhyanirodha and apratisajkhyanirodha. This asajskrta being a new class of forces which were not classed as mental or material. In early Buddhism ‘asajskrta’ meant nirvana, in this state, it came to mean permanent, not-changing entities.

A mastery survey of the Sarvastivadin’s thought was elaborated by Vasubandhu in his Abhidharmahidharmakowa-wastra, became the basic text for the development of Sarvastivada in China and Japan. He then produced a commentary ‘Abhidharmakowa-bhasya’, which offered an incisive critique of it from a largely Sautrantika viewpoint.

Non-analytical cessation (Apratisaṅkya Nirodha) – No conditions for the production of defilements (2009)

Mahiśāsaka: „Nirvāṇa is unconditioned, because the practices established by the Buddha were eternal truth.“

Sarvāstivāda: „Though the Nirvāṇa … wisdom, Buddha really was conditioned and not eternal.“(?)

Unconditioned dhammā of Sarvāstivāda:
1. Partisāṅkya nirodha (analytical cessation)
2. Apratisāṅkya nirodha (non-analytical cessation)
3. Ākāsa (space)

Theravāda – Unconditional dhammā – Nirvāṇa

Unconditional dhammās are mentioned in Kaukatika, Lokuttaravāda, Ekavyavahāya(?), Mahiśāsaka

(a) Analytical cessation
(b) Non-analytical cessation
(c) Space
(d) Realm of infinity of space
(e) Realm of infinity of consciousness
(f) Realm of infinity of nothingness
(g) The reality of neither consciousness nor non-consciousness
(h) The law of Dependent Origination
(i) The law of Eightfold Noble Path
is a Sanskrit term literally meaning 'practice of yoga' or 'practitioner of yoga.' It most often refers to one of the two main doctrinal systems of Indian Mahāyāna Buddhism, the other being the Madhyamaka ('Middle Way') school. What distinguishes Yogācāra from other doctrinal systems is its denial of reality to objects external to the consciousnesses perceiving them. All other Buddhist philosophies assert that an object of, for example, a visual consciousness acts as a stimulus to that consciousness and is one of its causes. However, this school rejects such objective causality and says that a sense consciousness and its object occur simultaneously, having been produced from a single internal cause, and are thus the same substantial entity. Liberation will be attained when all objects of consciousness are perceived in this way. Another important Yogācāra doctrine is that of describing all phenomena in terms of three natures: imaginary, dependent, and absolute. The latter corresponds to emptiness.

The oldest use of the term 'yogacara' is in its literal meaning and refers to those who practice standard forms of meditation -- on such things as the impurity of the body, universal love, and interdependent-arising. 'Yogācāra' is first seen in its doctrinal use in the title Yogācārabhûmi, the name given by Asanga to his massive compendium of doctrine and practice. Asanga (ca. 310-390 C.E.) is the founder of the system, although tradition declares him to have learnt it from the Bodhisattva Maitreya and to have relied on the Samdhinirmocana Sūtra ('Sutra Unravelling [Buddha's] Thought') which is ascribed to the historical Buddha Shakyamuni. Asanga is reported to havetravelled, having first meditated for twelve years, to the Pure Land of Maitreya, where he received teaching from Maitreya and brought back to the mundane world five books, three of which teach Yogācāra principles. Asanga's brother Vasubandhu is another major writer of the Yogācāra persuasion.

Since the main emphasis in this school was the phenomenology of consciousness, their contribution to Buddhism as a whole is in this area. They introduced the doctrine of the transformation of ordinary consciousnesses into enlightened consciousnesses, as well as that of ten stages on the way to Buddhahood. Much of what is later seen in Buddhist Tantra (or Vajrayana) can be traced back to Yogācāra.

Yogācāra is often said to be Buddhist Idealism. It can, however, be argued that most Buddhist philosophies are idealist in the sense that they agree that the universe as experienced arises according to the laws of karma. Since karma, according to most Buddhist philosophers, is intentional action, the universe rests, in the final analysis, on mental intention and not on physical matter.
YOGĀÇĀRA PHILOSOPHY (ORIGINAL BY VEN. SUVANNY)

Ācariya Asaṅga and Vasubandhu were regarded as the founders of Yogācāra school who lived in the 4th century AD. Vasubandhu was an adherent of Sarvāstivāda school in the very beginning, then he became a strong supporter of Yogācāra Buddhist school. This school refused the Sarvāstivādins' 'realistic teaching' and Madhyamikas' 'Śūnyatavāda' and advocated that nothing but consciousness is the ultimate reality in this world – „Sarvam buddhimayam jagat.” - „The whole world is ideal.” Vijñāptimatratavāda of Yogācārins came into existence as a result of practical method used by them to examine human mind. This philosophy can be regarded as the result of earlier Buddhist teaching because further it was developed by Yogācārins theorectically and practically. This school maintains that only viññāṇa is existent and object 'vijneya' or external phenomena are non-existent. But according to Sarvāstivādins, as consciousness is real, the object is also real in such existence.

The Madhyamikas' standpoint is that the subjective worlds as well as the objective world are unreal and void. But the above concepts regardin gthe internal and external world are denied in this school. According to the concept, „citramatra nidān sarvam” clearly they say that only consciousness is real in this world and the other objects are unreal and the creation of our mind. Thus they say that the three worlds (kāma, rūpa, arūpa) exist in our mind. Although consciousness is the unchanging reality in this world, various aspects of it can be observed on different occasions. Thus they had divided viññāṇa into 8 factors, they are:

1. Cakkhu 5. Kāya
2. Sōta 6. Mano
4. Jīvā 8. Alayaviññāṇa

All the above kinds of consciousness depend on alayaviññāṇa, which is a constantly changing stream of consciousness. Thus Yogācārins have explained consciousness as eightfold way when they dealt with the very subtle nature of human mind. According to this school, concepts such as puggala, satta and concepts such as khandha, āyatana, dhātu are mind made. They are only the results of the constant changing stream of consciousness. In the Lankāvatara Sutta the knowledge that a person gets through his sense faculties is compared to a dream or mirage. And the concept ofātmā in Buddhism can be compared to a long dream.

Although Yogācārins rejected the 'puggala-nairātmya' - 'non-existence of self' and 'dharma-nairātmya' - 'non-existence of things in the world', they advocated the concept of alayaviññāṇa, which has a similarity to Ātmavāda according to some schools of Buddhist thought. The consciousness which they think existed in reality is of three kinds:

1. Prauttiviññāṇa
2. Manaviññāṇa
3. Alayaviññāṇa

Prauttiviññāṇa is the 'ordinary consciousness' that arises as a result of the contact of relevant sense organs and sense object. 'Manaviññāṇa' is also called as kliśtamanoviññāṇa. The Manaviññāṇa is the place were the idea of self existed. This school advocates that all phenomena are nothing but the manifestation of see of karma and that all the karmic seeds constitute the alayaviññāṇa and it is the relinking consciousness of our future birth.

The school teaches that alayaviññāṇa is like the stream and it flows changing constantly. Thus until one attains Nibbāna, alayaviññāṇa flows constantly as the underlined reality in being. This idealistic school analyses the nater of the conceived by the human consciousness into 3 realms. All the objects of world whether they are mental or physical are conceived by the world in 3 ways, they are:

1. Parikalpita svabhāva – illusory nature of things or false attribution of an imaginary idea to an object produced by its causes and conditions. This exists only in one's imagination.
2. Paratattra svabhāva – that which is devoid of a permanent substance, but is the product of dependent origination.
3. Parinīśpanita(!?): the ultimate reality of being

YOGACARA TRADITION 2/8/99

Arya Asavga is known as the founder of Yogacara tradition. His teacher was Maitreya ‘Maitri” according to Mahayana tradition is considered as a Bodhisattva. asavga has written the famous Mahayanic philosophical
treatise, the Yogacarabhumiwastra. Apart from this the authorship of several other works is attributed to him.

Vasubandhu who as a Sarvastivadin in the 1st part of his life became later as an exponent of Yogacara school. He is known as a brother of Asavga. For Yogacara tradition, Vasubandhu’s contribution was Vijbaptimatrasiddhi. These two (Vasubandhu and Asavga) are recorded as the earliest and foremost teachers of Yogacara tradition.

Dinnaga, Dharmapala, Sthiramati and Shankara are known as the other famous Buddhist philosophers in Yogacara School. Due to the contribution of the above mentioned teachers, Yogacara tradition has a massive literature. All these works are attempts to establish the view that consciousness is primary. This theory is known as Vijbanavada.

According to the scholars who examined the history of Yogacara tradition, vijbanavada is a development of some philosophical teachings which occurred in Lankavatara Sutra. This Sutra is one of the earliest Mahayanic sources.

As it is revealed from the name of this school for the realization of truth, they rely on 2 methods, namely:
(1) Yoga – concentration
(2) Acara – tradition

In other words Vijbanavada is a subtle way of thought based on meditation and logical reasoning. By the term ‘yoga’ it is meant by right concentration. Ascetic monks have developed concentration well are believed to have developed this theory. By the term ‘acara’, the tradition is explained. ‘Tradition’ means the text, the theories embodied in early discussion have been developed based on logic. For e.g. in early Buddhism, the Buddha says in the Dhammapada ‘mind is the forerunner’.

Vijbanavadins accepted vijbana or consciousness to be the only real substance in the world. Apart from vijbana nothing exist really. Therefore there is no a thing called world. The phenomena we considered is unreal. Bahyadharma – everything except consciousness not be observed in ultimate sense. The only real phenomena is vijbana. It exists in the ultimate sense. Vijbanavada philosophers divided the real substance in 3 parts:
   1. Pravrtti vijbana – functional consciousness
   2. Manana vijbana – ego
   3. Alaya vijbana – subliminal

1. **Pravrtti vijbana**

The normal function of the consciousness of the ‘being’ is described with ‘pravrtti vijbana’. It is also called alambana-vijbana. The mind we understand is these feeling, experiences are 1st welcome by pravrtti vijbaba. According to the explanation given in the Yogacara tradition, pravrtti vijbana can be divided into 6 aspects, they are:

   (1) Caksu vijbana - visual consciousness
   (2) Srota vijbana – auditory consciousness
   (3) Ghana vijbana – olfactory consciousness
   (4) Jivha vijbana – gustatory consciousness
   (5) Kaya vijbana – tangible consciousness
   (6) Mano vijbana – mental consciousness

2. **Mananas-vijbana**

It is called sattama-vijbana (7th consciousness). According to vijbanavadins it is our hidden ego-consciousness. The ideas of ‘I’, ‘me’ and ‘mine’ are engraved in manana-vijbana. It exists between pravrtti and
alayavijbana. The 7 universal consciousness (sabba-citta-sadharana) are arising on manana-vijbana. All the concepts related to self are derived from it (manana-vijbana). Another name given to this is Klista-manovijbana. It prevents the being from realizing the truth excepts arahants to all the others, this consciousness is common.

3. Alaya-vijbana

Much of the Vijbanavada commentaries have attempted to explain the nature and the function alayavijbana. With this concept Vijbanavadins explain the theory of action (kamma) and result, and the continuity of the being (rebirth). Alayavijbana is responsible for the continuous of the being. It is also called vipaka-vijbana. It is an unbroken process. to explain this the simile presented was a water source until the being attains the final liberation. It works as the link from one birth to another. Rebirth is caused by alaya-vijbana.

The word alaya occurs in early discourses in another sense. According to the original meaning alaya means ‘love’ or ‘affect’.

Yogacara School

This school is branch of Madhyamika school founder by Maitrey or Maitray in fourth century A.D Dinaka, dhammapala, dhammakita and sangrabcito are the foremost teacher of the school the appellation of Yogacara is given by Asanga and term vijnavada is given by Vashubandu the term Yogacara means Yoga or meditation and Acara practice which are very effective for the attainment of the higher truth. This school is also named as Vijnavada because vijnata matrika nothing but consciousness is regarded as ultimate reality. Literary source pertaining to various Buddhist school. Buddhist literature origination translation into Pali. Pure mixed and Tibetan Chinese source can be regarded as the primary source Pali tripitaka is the the treasure of the Buddhist literature the commentary and sub commentary connected the Tripitaka text have been written in Pali Sankrit and other language. In addition to this there are canonical literature in Pali such as Malinapanha, Nitipakarana, Vishudhimagga and chronicle of srilanka like Dipavamsa and Mahavamsa. Among the work of grammar Kaccayana, Mogalana rupasdi are also well-known.

Sarvastivadin possessed agama corresponding to seven books of Pali abhidhama and Mullasarvastivadin possessed vinaya pitaka in sankrit language. The text which belong to Hinayana or Mahayana school appeared a the whole text or as fragment Mahavastu belong to lokutaravadin or Mahasangika but its subject matters is show various that we find in it some sutra corresponding to some in dishanikamadhyamika, Majimaniikaya and the suttanipata as well as story corresponding to palijatakalitalavistra is regarded as unorthodox, describe on form part of Vaipunasutra. Thousand of Buddhist literature book, written in paliSankrit and mixed Sankrit had disappeared because of some reasons as follow:

(2) The study of this literature is confined to only monk living in monastery.

(3) They are preserved only in Manuscript and later destroyed.

This manuscript are also destroyed with destruction of the monastery most of valuable manuscript that we study come outside India like Sri Lanka, siem, Cambodia, Burma and Nepal some manuscript are engraved in cope and kept in stupa in Tibet and were meant to worship and not to study.

Yogacara tradition has accepted consciousness only. They have rejected emptiness of the Madhyamika schools and „everything exist“ as the belief of Sarvastivāda tradition.

Asaṅga was the founder of the Yogacāra school and his teacher was Maitreya Nātha. Maitreya Nātha was mentioned as a Bodhisatta.

According to the scholars Yogacāra school originated the concept of consciousness depending on Lankāvatāra Sūtra. They have given new philosophical interpretation and developed their teaching according to the Lankāvatāra Sūtra.

The thinkers who accepted this tradition believed in the existence of the consciousness as an ultimate
sense. They divided consciousness into three:

1. Pravurti viññāṇa
2. Mānana viññāṇa
3. Ālaya viññāṇa

(1) Pravurti viññāṇa means mental activities in the day-to-day life of a person. They are:

   a) eye consciousness
   b) ear consciousness
   c) nose consciousness
   d) tongue consciousness
   e) body consciousness
   f) mind consciousness

(2) Manana consciousness means that it is hidden (latent, potential) mental activities and it is mentioned as a 'seventh consciousness'. In addition it exists between the pravurti viññāṇa and ālaya viññāṇa.

(3) Ālaya viññāṇa means that it is reaction consciousness. This consciousness continues until Nibbāna and it continues during death and birth of a person. But that is not soul ??

Examine is there any idealistic trend in Yogacāvībanavada. 529

What is meant by ‘citta-matra’ (mind only)? The answer is found in the Lavkavatara-sutra, for instance:

1. Mind is the measure of all things, it is the abode of their self-nature, and has nothing to do with causation and the world; it is perfect in nature, absolutely pure.
2. Mind is beyond all philosophical views, is apart from discrimination, it is not attainable, nor is it ever born. There is nothing but mind.
3. Of Buddhas, Wravaka-forms, Pratyekabuddha-forms, and other various form, that they are nothing but mind.

The general idea to what the doctrine of ‘Mind only’, the sutras sometimes makes summary statements like this:
1. Cittamatraj lokaj – the world is nothing but mind.
2. Cittabhyadarwanaj – nothing is to be seen outside the mind.
3. Svacittamatraj traidhatukaj – the triple world is mind itself.
4. Cittajh traidhatuka-yonih – mind produces the triple world.
5. Tribhavacittamatraj – the triple existence is nothing but mind.

From the above statements, it is clear that the theory of ‘mind only’ is a form of pure idealism.

The origin of idealism can be traced back to the Sautrantiya School. According to Sautrantikas, object does not come into contact with the sense organ directly because the object is without any duration. This is a good supporting evidence for an idealistic theory which holds that external object is a mere mental fabrication (manomaya).

Madhyamika too, contributed to the development of Yogacara idealism. Their analysis of concept leading to the view that they do not designate any reality, or that they are empty of content, or they do not reveal the nature of phenomena, was welcomed by Yogacara. They differ from Madyamikas in maintaining that the mind is real.

Vasubandhu’s vijbatamatrasiddhi is devoted to a refutation of the realistic position, and it is a philosophical justification of the idealistic standpoint. He begins his work by stating that everything is ideation only (vijbatimatram). He maintains that the whole concept of the three worlds is nothing but a mere ideation. He quotes a statement of the Buddha himself and gives ideation the synonyms of mind, thought and consciousness. The external object is merely an appearance like the double visions on the part of whose eye-sight is with ailment.

Vasubandhu seems to have been interested in refuting the realistic argument on space, time, individuality and empiric standpoints by using metaphysical dialectic argument (e.g. dream, hell etc.) to justify the existence of Absolute idealism.

The recognition of the superiority and transcendence yogi intuition contributed greatly to the theory of Yogacara. Vasubandhu maintains that while dreaming, we cannot know that dream objects are as real to the dreamer as any object is to a person who is awake. The difference between the dreaming consciousness and the awakening consciousness is that in the former, a person’s mind is overwhelmed by torpor (thinamiddha). Similarly compared with a person in the states of yogi concentration, worldly people are slumbering in ignorance, they do not realise that the world of sense-experience does not exist in reality.

The highest knowledge yields the realization that reality is pure and undiscriminated consciousness. This leads Vasubandhu to deny not only the validity and possibility of sense perception but also of extraordinary perception.

666The Ultimate Truth of the Buddha’s teaching is the consciousness only, describe above topic according to the Yogacara idealism (Vinnanavada).

The Ultimate truth of the Buddha’s teaching is the consciousness only. As said above the topic, according to
Yogacara, the idealism is Vinnanavada.

"Sarva idam cittamatram."

This whole existence is mind only.

According to Yogacara school the ultimate Truth of the Buddha’s teaching is mind only or consciousness only. The first teacher of idealism is Vausbandhu. He analyzes the process in three stages:

1. Six sense consciousness (Sadindriya vinnana) caksu vijnana, sota, ghana, jhiva, kaya and mano.
2. Manana consciousness (sub-consciousness) thinking
3. Alaya consciousness (stored house- consciousness) Smrti- seeds of memory, Karmabija- seeds of karma and Kilesa bija- seeds of defilement.

Karma bija is responsible to one’s Samsaric existence, kilesa bija is responsible to one’s happiness and suffering and Smrti bija is responsible to next existence (future). The whole existence is mind only. Alaya vijnana comes to being because the three seeds mentioned above stored inside. Sunnyata is similar to Asvabhava, and Asvabhava is similar to Abhava. Likewise, the Alaya vijnana is too, similar to Tathagata ghabha.

Tathagatagharbha means coming in the same way from immeasurable past existence. Vasubandhu says the reason for the existence is because of Alayavijnana that is Tathagatagharbha. But Nagarjuna says the reason for the existence is due to hetu and phala, the cause and effect. In the Pail Buddhism, we can see Bhavanga Citta, but in the Mahatanhasamkhaya Sutta(M.N), the analysis of consciousness is up to six senses only. Once time, Ananda asked the Buddha why there were only six senses explained and why not go beyond that. The Buddha replied, “O! Ananda, it is very deep and too much for you”. The main purpose is to get rid of the impurities in the mind and not to go deep into it. According to Pali Buddhism, Alaya is not bhavanga. Bhavanga is some kind of mind, which is sometimes appearing and disappearing. For the technical term regarding the Alaya vijnana, there are three terms such as reason of existence, mind of impurities (Kilesa manas) and mind of maturity (Vipakavijnana). In the maturity, there are two positions which mind depends on. They are:

1. Chuti Cita- going
2. Pratisandhi Citta- coming to existence; coming more and more with one’s age. One day you will die. Then the mind will go with him. According to Vasubandhu when a person die the next mind is going into a mother’s womb (matukacci).

Vasubandhu shows there is no Atman. The whole existence is mind only. Then he also shows the 3 ways of activity of the mind.

666The Vijnanavada Conception Of "Consciousness-Only"

Vijnanavada gets its name ("consciousness teaching", or "Consciousness-ism") from its theory of a psychological emanation from an original universal consciousness (usually called the Alaya-vijnana). It is in fact the only Buddhist school that incorporated emanationist ideas; especially in later, Sinicized form.

According to the Lankavatara Sutra, all the three worlds (of Desire, Pure Form, and Formlessness) are the result of subjective imagination (vikalpa). No external objects exist in reality; only consciousness [Chandradhar Sharma, A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy, p.109], reality being "mind-only" (Cittamatra).
A similarity can be pointed out here with the eighteenth century Scottish empirical philosopher Bishop George Berkeley, who argued that no objective physical reality exists at all; the world being a sort of collective dream, and God as the over-consciousness holding the whole thing together. Not surprisingly, in the materialistically orientated West, Berkeley's philosophy (which came to be called "Idealism", although it has little in common with the Idealism (Idea-ism) of Plato) did not really catch on.

In the Lankavatara, as with Berkeley, the consciousness in which all things exist is not in-dividual consciousness but Absolute Consciousness. This Absolute Consciousness (Berkeley's "God") is the immortal and unchanging consciousness that transcends duality, and is realised through transcendent Knowledge (jnana) [Dr Chandradhar Sharma, A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy, pp.110-111]. It is variously termed the Alaya-vijnana (storehouse consciousness), Chitta (Mind), or Tathagata-garba (Womb or Seed of the Buddhas) - which is not an ontological reality but rather the potential or seed or cause leading towards enlightenment [Whalen Lai, "The Meaning of "mind-only" (wei-hsin): An analysis of a sinitic Mahayana phenomenon", Philosophy East and West 27, no 1; p.74]).

The Alaya-vijnana is the universal storehouse consciousness, so-called because it is the repository of the vasanas, the impressions or tendencies carried over from past lives. As D. T. Suzuki ex-plains, "every act, mental or physical, leaves its seeds (bijas) behind, which is planted in the Alaya for future germination under favourable conditions" [D. T. Suzuki Studies in the Lankavatara Sutra, p.483].

Through the activity of vasanas, the seven individual consciousnesses - the five sense-consciousnesses, the manovijnana or mind-consciousness, and the klishto-manovijnana or "defiled mind-consciousness" - arise from the Alaya-vijnana like waves from the ocean [Chandradhar Sharma, A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy, pp.111].

In the systematised Yogachara school of Maitreyanatha, Asanga and Vasubandu, the pristine Absolute Consciousness or Vijnaptimatrata is the Absolute Reality. Through individual Ignorance (Avidya), Vijnaptimatrata appears as the three vijnanas; viz: Alayavijnana, Manas or Kliśhto-manovijnana, and Pravṛtti-vijnana, by which is meant the six consciousnesses - the five sense-consciousnesses (seeing, hearing, etc) and the manovijnana or mind-consciousness - that make up mental and sensory reality [Ashok Kumar Chatterjee, The Yogachara Idealism, p.87]. Here the Alayavij-nana is no longer the Absolute but one of the facets of relative Consciousness; the repository of the vasanas or bijas. As Chatterjee explains, "none of these eight vijnanas is ultimate. Consciousness is disturbed owing to the impact of a wrong idea", and once this is eliminated and the agitation calmed down, consciousness "regains its eternal quiescence" [Ibid p.107]. There is the parallel here with (and obviously a derivation from an early form of) Samkhya, in which the purusha or consciousness-principle is distinct from the principles of nature and psycho-physical existence (or prakriti). The difference is that whereas Samkhya implies of multiplicity of consciousnesses, Yogachara, like Advaita Vedanta, refers to only one, which is also the underlying substratum of existence. It is not the case that Advaita influenced Yogachara however; more the reverse

In the Yogachara psycho-metaphysics, it is the Kliśhto-manovijnana, or Manas, that is the cause of the false idea of a separate "I" or self or ego. Through the intellectual activity (manana) of this "defiled mind-consciousness" the vasanas that are latent and indeterminate in the Alayavijnana are actualised, or come into consciousness, and take the form of objects of the senses [Ashok Kumar Chatterjee, The Yogachara Idealism, pp.102-3]. Creation is therefore cyclic. The Alayavijnana is the receptacle of vasanas or impressions from past vijnanas, and in turn generates further vijnanas through the ripening of vasanas [Ibid p.88]. The cycle of karmic forces and their actualisation is an infinite one, like the cycle of the tree and its seed [Ibid p.107].

In its sequence of vijnanas there is an obvious parallel between Buddhist emanationism (Vijnanavada) and Hindu emanationism (Samkhya) with its unfolding tattwas. But Vijnanavada or Yogachara replaces the Samkhyan dualism with monism by uniting the disparate purusha and prakriti in the single Alaya-vijnana, but otherwise follows the Samkhyan ontology. As in Samkhya there is the emanation from an original but undifferentiated universal state (Alayavijnana = Prakriti = Buddhi) through the mediating state of separative egotism (Kliśhto-manovijnana = Ahamkara) to manifold phenomenal reality (manas and the senses).
The origin and development of Vijnanavada

The development of the Vijnanavada began around 150 C.E. with the Sandhinirmochana Sutra. In the next few centuries this was followed by the very important Lankavatara sutra in the early 4th century, and the Abhisamayalankara (a Prajnaparamita commentary) and Avatamsaka sutras later in the century [Edward Conze, Buddhism, its Essence and Development, p.164].

The Sandhinirmochana and Lankavatara sutras were especially influential in the formulation of the doctrines of the Yogachara school, founded by two brothers, Asanga and Vasubandu (the latter, because of his great learning, was given the singular honour of being called "the second Buddha"), natives of North-West India, in the 4th or 5th century. Another source of Yogachara teachings was Asanga's little-known teacher Maitreyanatha, who has been called the true founder of the school [Chandradsahr Sharma, A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy, p.108]. Asanga and Vasubandu were encyclopaedic systematisers, who developed ideas already established in older writings, such as the Abhidharma, the Prajnaparamita, and the Lankavatara, and gave definitive form to earlier Mahayanist concepts like the ten stages (bhumis) of development of the Bodhisattva, the three states or levels of self-being (swabhava), and the theory that reality is consciousness-only [Edward Conze, Buddhist Thought in India, p.250; and Buddhism, its Essence and Development, p.164]. This last is the most important aspect of Vijnanavada/Yogachara, for this school differs from the Prajnaparamita and the anti-metaphysical Madhyamika approach in that it gives a positive, qualitative description of the Absolute Reality, which is described as being of the nature of pure Consciousness (vijnana); "consciousness-only" (vijnanamatrata, vijnaptimatrata); or "Mind-only" (Chittamatra).

Vijnanavada Buddhism contributed two important emanationist ideas: the metaphysical idea of emanation from an original universal consciousness (the Alaya-vijnana), and the theological idea of the Trikaya, the Three Bodies of the Buddha. As a philosophical school, Yogacara argues that all that exists are minds and their experiences. If there are no mind-independent things, why do people seem to have similar experiences (e.g., why do you and I both see the candle flame, and we both feel pain when we touch it)? The explanation offered is that previous experiences create a storehouse consciousness (alaya-vijnana, sometimes identified with the tathagatagarbha) which encourages people to have similar experiences in the future.

Late Yogacarins (Dignaga and especially, Dharmakirti, Shantarakshita, Kamalashila and Ratnakirti) were not only logicians but experts in epistemology, theory of consciousness and the Tantric yogins as well. The Mahasiddhas (Great Perfect Ones) in some aspects were also adherents of the Yogacara school.

A.Chinese Vijnanvada

The Yogachara metaphysic, thus formulated in India, was further developed in China, where, due to an artifact of translation and interpretation, the Tathagata-garbha (in Chinese fo-hsing - "Buddha-womb" - the womb of the Buddha or storehouse of the Buddha, the potential for Buddhahood which all beings possess.), was distinguished from the Alaya-vijnana. In Indian texts such as the Lankavatara and the Mahaparinirvana sutras the Tathagata-garbha was specifically identified with the Alayavijnana, and referred to the potential or cause leading or pointing towards enlightenment, rather than an actual state or reality. In Chinese, due to Mencian Confucian and Chuang-tze Taoist preconceptions, it came to mean "Buddha-nature", an ontological reality or essence, like the Vedantic Atman [Whalen Lai, "The Meaning of "mind-only" (wei-hsin): An analysis of a sinitic Mahayana phenomenon", Philosophy East and West 27, no 1; p.73-74]. The Alayavijnana then came to be seen as a lower or impure level of Consciousness, the "tainted consciousness" (shih) relative to the Tathagatagarbha or innately pure Absolute Buddha Mind (hsin) or Buddha-nature.

Tathagatagarbha or Mind or hsin thus became a "ninth consciousness" or original principle over and above the other eight. This idea of the superiority of Mind (hsin) over consciousness (shih) was used by the
Mind-Only schools of Hua-yen and Ch'an to claim superiority over the consciousness-only school of Wei-shih (Chinese Yogachara) [Ibid, pp.65, 79]. In all this we see the development of an emanationist cosmology more like Neoplatonism or Kashmir Shaivism than original Yogachara Mahayana. But the anti-metaphysical emphasis of even the most elaborate Buddhist schools prevented this modified Yogachara from ever becoming as sophisticated as those other two systems.

**B. Vijnanavada and the West**

In the Nineteenth century, elements of Vijnanavada, such as the Alayavijnana and the Manas, were adopted in modified form by H. P. Blavatsky, the founder of Theosophy. As was mentioned earlier, Blavatsky was also influenced by the Vedantic idea of koshas, so Yogachara can be seen to be a second source of inspiration. More recently, young Buddhist-orientated Westerners have made much of the parallel between the Alaya-vijnana and the Collective Unconscious of the psychologist-mystic Carl Jung. Certainly there are many parallels (e.g. in both there is a universal substratum, a sort of Un- or Super-consciousness, behind the surface consciousness; and the repository of subconscious impulses to manifestation). But there are also important differences too. Jung's archetypes are universal transpersonal religious or mythological motifs, more equivalent to the "gods" of polytheism then to the karmic seeds or vasanas; and Jung's positive assessment of the ego - the ego being a necessary state in the development of self - and higher consciousness, is diametrically opposed to the ego-transcending perception of the various Indian philosophies.

@ Yogachara Glossary

**Alaya-vijnana, or "store consciousness"** -- one of the central technical terms of Yogacara (Vijnanavada, Vijnaptimatra) philosophy of Mahayana Buddhism. Early Buddhists taught about existence of six-fold consciousness, that is the consciousness of five types of perception (visual, audial, etc.) and of "mind" (manovijnana). The Yogacarins analysing the source of consciousness added two more kinds of consciousness. They are: klistamanovijnana, or manas, that is the ego-centre of an empirical personality, and alaya-vijnana which is the source of other kinds of consciousness. Alaya-vijnana is above subject-object opposition but it is not a kind of absolute mind: alaya-vijnana is momentary and non-substantial. Every sentient being with the corresponding to this being "objective" world can be reduced to its "own" alaya-vijnana. Therefore, classical Yogacara states the existence of many alayas.

The Alaya-vijnana is a receptacle and container of the so-called "seeds" (bijas), or elementary units of past experiences. These bijas project themselves as an illusionary world of empirical subjects and corresponding objects. All other seven types of consciousness are but transformations (parinama) of alaya-vijnana. In the course of its yogic practice a Yogacarin must empty alaya-vijnana of its contents. Thus the Yogacarin puts an end to the tendency of external projections of alaya-vijnana changing it into non-dual (advaya) wisdom (jnana) of Enlightened mind.

**Svalaksana** (self quality, self-sign, self-characteristic, etc.)

in early Buddhist philosophy -- an elementary single quality identical to dharma, or a quantum of psycho-physical experience. In the philosophy of late Yogacara (logico-epistemological school of Dignaga and Dharmakirti) it is a designation of reality as such (tathata) given in the momentary act of perception (prior to the beginning of the process of mental constructing -- kalpana, and even to the subject-object duality; therefore svalaksana is advaya, non-duality).

**Tathagatagarbha** (Tathagata -- Thus Coming One -- one of the titles of the Buddha; garbha -- 1) embryo, fetus; 2) womb, matrix) -- one of the most important terms of Mahayana Buddhism. It is embryo, or sprout of
the Buddha-nature in every living being, its "precious nature" (ratna gotra); the name for the absolute reality of the One Mind (ekacitta) of Buddha identical to Buddha's Dharma-body (dharmakaya) and tathata, Suchness (reality as it is).

As the One Mind Tathagatagarbha is a substratum of every being (every dharma), that is, dharmata, dharma-nature. It is endowed with innumerable good qualities such as eternity (nitya), bliss (sukha), essence, or Self (atman) and purity (subha). in the doctrine of Tathagatagarbha alaya-vijnana can be understood as defiled garbha. This theory was extremely popular in the Chinese schools of Buddhism (T'ian-t'ai, Hua-yen, Ch'an / Zen) but the Tibetan tradition knows only a hybrid of Yogacara--moderate Madhyamika--Tathagatagarbha thought. The Tibetan Jonang-pa school (which based its teaching exclusively on the garbha theory) was forbidden in XVII century by dGelugs-pa school as "Hinduized" and "heretical".

Vasana (energy of habit) -- beginningless tendency immanent to the "seeds" / bijas (see "Alaya-vijnana") contained in alaya-vijnana to external projection of their contents. This tendency is a cause of the illusory (parikalpita; "mentally constructed") existence of the subject-object duality and samsaric world of births-and-deaths.

**Vijñāptimātrata** (original by Ven. Santa)

**Vasubandhu** was one of the greatest thinkers in the Buddhist tradition. His philosophically most sophisticate were *Vijñāptimātrata Siddhi* that is 'establishment of mere concept'. According to the interest of scholars, philosophic and psychological content of **Vasubandhu's** *Vijñāptimātrata Siddhi* remains unparallel in several respects. Its profound clarity and above all, utilizing oly twenty two verses **Vasubandhu** was able to analyze the various implications of two metaphysical views that were eternalism and nihilims, which confused philosophical thinkers of 4th century and in another 30 verses he expounded the teaching of the **Buddha** as embodied in thousand of discourses.

Here, **Vasubandhu** is achieving several things:
1. He is disallowing the absolute correspondence between a conception and object of experience.
2. He is melting down the aboslute line of conception
3. With the example of dream experience he illustrates the possibility of existence of an empty concept; alongside concept that(?) have empirical content(?) so that the short connection between the particular(?) and universes can be broken down. (?)

The existence of a real object is presupposition of common sense as well as metaphysical realism. The real object is not simple object of perception but that corresponds exactly exists.(?) Whether or not it is perceived by **Vasubandhu** who beggins by refusing common sense realism which claims the determination of time and space.(?)

**Vasubandhu** maintains that „all this is mere conception“ (vijñāpti mātraṃ evaitid). Here the term mātra (‘mere’ or ‘only’) has a philosophical significance in usage. **Buddha's** explanation of objective experience and His definition of conception had an influence to **Vasubandhu.** **Vasubandhu** realized the significance of the **Buddha.** Inside(?) he utilized the same term in order to surmount the problem created by realism and idealism, thus it is not intended to deny the object but rather to accommodate the concept. This philosophical argument that is the exstablishment of mere conception is gained not by simple speculation, but by following the discipline of the **Buddha**, namely analysis of the psychology of human experience.

If **Vasubandhu** maintained that all ideas arise depending on consciousness, then he would immediately be characterized as an idealist. He carefully avoided this by claiming wrong evolution of consciousness (Vijñāna parināma). The statement that all ideas occurred in that transformation of consciousness does not
entail the denier of human body in which consciousness occurred, nor it does imply that there is no eternal object. (?) Vijñāna parināma is philosophical significance for other reason as faith. (?)

This will become evident when the description of that process of evolution is analyzed. The process is explained in terms of three functions:

1. Resultant (vipāka)
2. Mentality (mana)
3. Conception of the object (visayasya vijñapti)

The resultant is then identified as the alayavijñāna and further defined as conveyer of all its seeds (sarva bhījaka). (?) The description of the evolving consciousness has a result inteded to avoid extremists. This evolution of alaya consciousness is determined by vasna and karma. (?)

How did Wasubandhu establish the concept of Vijanptimatra or mere conception?

Wasubandhu is one of the greatest thinkers in the Buddhist tradition his philosophically most sophisticate were Vijnapatimatra sitthi that is establishment of mere concept has wrong the interest of scholars philosophic and psychological contempt Wasubandhu’s Vijnapatimatra Sitthi remain unparallel in several respect its profound, clarity, and about all, utilizing only twenty two verses Wasubandhu was able to analyze the various implication of two metaphysical view that is externalism and nihilism that have confused philosophical thinking 4th century which another 30 verses he expounded the teaching of the Buddha as embody in thousand of discourses.

Here, Wasubandhu is achieving several things: 1. He is disallowing, the absolute correspondence between a conception and object of experience. 2. He is malting down the absolute line of conception. 3. With the example of dream experience he illustrating the possibility of being empty concept along side concept that has empirical content so that the shat connection between the particular and universes can be broken down. The existence of a real object is presupposition of common sense as well as metaphysical realism the real object is not simple object of perception but that correspond exactly exist whether or not is it perceive Wasubandhu begging by refusing common sense realism which claiming that the determination of time and space.

Wasubandhu maintains that “all this is mere conception” (Vijnapti Matram Evaitid). Here the term Matra (mere or only) has a philosophical significance in usage Buddha’s explanation of this object experience and his definition of conception have in influence to Wasubandhu. Washubandhu realizing the significance of the Buddha inside utilizes the same term in order to surmount the problem created by realism and idealism thus it is not intended to denies the object but rather to accommodate the concept this philosophical argument that is the establishment of mere conception is gained not by simple speculation but by following the discipline of the Buddha namely analysis of the psychology of human experience.

Wasubandhu maintains that all ideas arise depending on consciousness then he would immediately be characterized as idealism he carefully avoids this by speaking wrong evolution of consciousness (Vijnana Parinama). The statement that all ideas occurred in that transformation of consciousness does not entail the denier of human body in which consciousness occurred no it does it’s imply that there is no eternal object. Vijnana Parinama is philosophically significance for other reason as faith.

This will become evidence when the description of that process of evolution is analyzed the process is explained in terms of three functions: 1. resultant (Vipaka) 2. mentation (Mana) 3. conception of the object (Visayasya Vijnapti). The resultant is then identified as the Alavijnana further define as conveyer of all its seeds (Sorvabeijaka). The description of the evolving consciousness as a resultant intended to avoid extremists. This evolution Alaya consciousness determine by Vasna and Karma.
The Yogācāra idealism was founded by Asanga. In Yogācāra it is maintained, that there is no unsurmountable difficulty in accepting idealism. According to Yogācāra idealism viññāṇa is the sole reality. Therefore it is accepted, that viññāṇa only is existing. Still it is perceived, that it cannot be measured and viññāṇa is not the plurality.

Yogācāra accepts three lands(?) of viññāṇa:

1. Ālaya viññāṇa
2. Mano viññāṇa
3. Pravrtti viññāṇa

Just as none of these viññāṇa which as the gradual development has and absolute existence. Therefore these 3 viññāṇa are not ultimate. The gradual development of the viññāṇa itself is not ultimate, because they wanted to prove the Buddha's teaching on anātmavāda.

Ālaya viññāṇa

Ālaya viññāṇa is the most fundamental of these three viññāṇa. It is called ālaya, because it is the place, in which are contained the impressions (vasana). Vasana means any kamma, whatsoever we did. Whether it is good or bad and also indifferent (sukha, dukava(?) ātava(?) manuka(?)...) therefore it's called sarva bijaka, it gives the results. On the other hand it can be taken as vipāka, the deeds done by the individual in any sphere of existence leaves with the ālaya. Therefore ālaya viññāṇa is escorting whatever we did.

Nibbāna

Four realities:

citta - mind - 89 (Kāmavacara (54), Rūpavacara (15), Arūpavacara (12), Lokuttara (8))
cetasika - mental factors - 57
rūpa - form - 24
Nibbāna - - 1

In the cosmic proces Ālaya has two functions:

1. It is the receptor of the impressions of past viññāṇa.
2. In turn it gives rise to further viññāṇas by nurturing these impressions.

The accumulation of seeds of viññāṇa in ālaya is called the hetu parināma and phala parināma. Hetu parināma is the development and maturity of vāsanas in the ālaya. Phala parināma is the emerging in to existence of their respective effects.

Vāsana is the motive force governing evolutionary classes. It is of two kinds:
1. Vipāka vāsana

Vipāka vāsana is more ultimate, it keeps going the stream of mental process. Therefore the conternity(?) of the individual happens through the cycle of birth. The activity of the vipāka vāsana process the ālaya viññāṇa new stream. It begins from the next birth of the individual. Nihsyanda vāsana is the function of the present experiences. Therefore nihsyanda vāsana supplies the content of each birth.

Pravṛti viññāṇa is been conscious experience. It can lay both shorts of vāsanas in the ālaya viññāṇa only a conscious experience can be good or bad and can supply the seeds of future experiences. Therefore pravṛti viññāṇa determinates awareness of the object.

Mana viññāṇa is more or less a function. It supplies only the Nihsyanda vāsana, therefore it implies the present experience. Anyway, there is a difference between pravṛti viññāṇa and mano viññāṇa. With the pravṛti viññāṇa it takes the world as an imaginary while the mano viññāṇa takes face(?) what comes to the mind.

YOGĀCĀRA IDEALISM

The Yogācāra idealism was founded by Asaṅga and to rejecting the view of the Abhidhammika teaching, he made developing of the Yogācāra idealism. Nāgārjuna was the founder of Madhyamika philosophy and he has proved that we are living in an imaginary world so nothing exists. In this case, Asaṅga asked the question whether there is nothing which is responsible for the deed of the being. He added that all the beings are collecting merits and demerits. Because of it, the beings should be responsible for their doing. According to Yogācāra idealism, it is accepted as eight kinds of viññāṇa and it can be classified into three groups, namely:
1. Alayaviññāṇa
2. Manoviññāṇa
3. Pravrtiviññāṇa.

According to the Abhidhammic explanation, there are cetasika called sabbascitasadharana:
1. Phassa
2. Vedanā
3. Saññā
4. Cetanā
5. Ekaggatā
6. Jīvitindriya
7. Manasikāra.

Out of these seven, according to cetanā we can see and decide whether what we did was kusala (wholesome) or akusala (unwholesome). Among the three groups of viññāṇa, kusala and akusala are done by the manoviññāṇa, which is associating with alayaviññāṇa. If one is doing a good deed, one attains Nibbāna supported by alayaviññāṇa. Therefore alayaviññāṇa is the most fundamental to get enlightened through the manoviññāṇa and pravrtiviññāṇa. There are two functions of alayaviññāṇa:
1. Vāsana
2. Viññāṇa

Of them, viññāṇa is called hetuprinama and other one is phalaprināma.

After that, manoviññāṇa directly associates with the alayaviññāṇa and in the abhidhammic explanation, it is also an element. Through the senses, the element is done by the mind and it is mind-setup therefore it is very similar with early Buddhist teaching as »mano pubbaṅgamā dhammā«. In the manoviññāṇa it can be seen the concept of the soul and in this point, the mean of the soul is ‘I-ness’, ‘mine’ etc. With the cetanā, it is possible to do decision of the deed as good or bad.

The last one, pravrtiviññārtina is the third stage and it is determined the awareness of the object. So pravrtiviññāṇa is classified into six:
1. Cakkuviññāṇa
2. Sotaviññāṇa
3. Ghānaviññāṇa
4. Jivhāviññāṇa
5. Kāyaviññāṇa
6. Manoviññāṇa

Due to these six senses and their objects, manoviññāṇa is emerged when we whatever perceive, but through(?) them(?) it cannot be judged as the truth. These six senses can be classified into two as external and internal. Of them, external are the five consciousnesses corresponding to the five sense-organs and through them, we know all the information about the world. The sixth, manoviññāṇa is the internal consciousness and through it, we can get the knowledge of ideas.

YAGACARA PHILOSOPHY :

Acariyas Asanga and Vasubudu are regarded as the founder of Yogacara School. They lived in the 4th century A.D. This school refuses the Sarvastivadins, ‘realistic teaching’ and Madhyamaka ‘sunyata’ and Vijnaptimatratava of Yogacarin came into existence as a result of practical method used by them to examine human mind. This philosophy can be regarded as a result of earlier Buddhist teaching because. These were further developed by Yogacarins theoretically and practically. This school maintains that only

The Madhyamikas standpoint is that the subjective worlds as well as the objective world are unreal and void. But the above concepts regarding the internal and external world are denied in this school. According to the concept, ‘citramatra midam sarvam’ clearly they say that only consciousness is real in this world and the other objects are unreal and the creation of our mind. Thus, they say the three worlds (kama, rupa, arupa) exist in our mind. Although consciousness is the unchanging reality in this world, various
aspects of it can be observed on different occasion. Thus they had divided viññana into 8 factors, they are cakkhu, sota, Ghana, Jivha, kaya, mano, klish tamano and alayavinnana.

All the above kind of consciousness depends on Alayavinnana, which is a constantly changing stream of consciousness. Thus Yogacarins have explained consciousness in an eightfold way when they dealt with the very subtle nature of human mind. According to this school, concept such as pudgala, satta skandha, ayatana, dhatu are mind made. They are only the result of the constant changing stream of consciousness. In the Lankavatara Sutta, the knowledge that a person gets through his sense faculties is compared to a dream or mirage. And the concept of Samsara in Buddhism can be compared to a long dream.

Although Yogacarins rejected the Puggala-nairatmya “non-existence of self” and Dharma nairatmya “non-existence of thing in the world.” they advocated the concept of Alayavinnana, which has a similarity to Atma vada. The consciousness, which they think existed in reality, is of 3 kinds: 1 Prauttivinnana, 2 Mananavinnana, 3 Alayavinnana. Prauttivinnana is the ‘ordinary consciousness’ that arise as a result of the contact of relevant sense organs and sense object. ‘Manavinnana’ is also called as klistamanovinnana. The Manavinnana is the places were the idea of self existed. This school advocates that all phenomena are nothing but the manifestation of seed of karma and that all the karmic seeds constitute the Alayavinnana and it is the re-linking consciousness of our future birth.

The school teaches that Alayavinnana is like the stream and it flows changing constantly. Thus until one attain nibbana, Alayavinnana flows constantly as the underline reality in being. This idealistic school analyses the nature of the conceived by the human consciousness into 3 realms. All the objects of world whether they are mental or physical are conceived by the world in 3 ways, they are:

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1 Parikalpita svabhava: Illusory nature of thing or false attribution of an imaginary idea to an object produced by its causes and conditions. This exists only in one’s imagination.

2 Paratantra svabhava: that which is devoid of a permanent substance, but is the produce of dependent origination.

3 Parinishpanna: the ultimate reality of a being.

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666 THE MAIN TEACHING OF YOGACARA(743)

Yogacara is a form of Absolute Idealism. The philosophy of Nagarjuna is said to have contributed to its development. Idealism developed from the 2nd century A.D. and reached culmination with Asavgha and Vasubandhu. The main sources of Yogacara idealism are:

1. Vasubandhu’s vijbamptonaratadasiddhi.
2. Asavgha’s Abhidhamma samuccaya.

Vasubandhu, who was the chief exponent of Yogacara was a Sautranta but he was converted to the new faith by his elder brother, Asavgha. Sautranta’s theory of representative perception leads to idealism. According to Sautranta, object does not come into contact with the sense organ directly because the object is without any duration. This is a good supporting evidence for an idealistic theory which holds that external object is a mere mental fabrication (manomaya).

Madhyamika too, contributed to the development of Yogacara idealism. Their analysis of concept leading to the view that they do not designate any reality, or that they are empty of content, or they do not reveal the nature of phenomena, was welcomed by Yogacara. They differ from Madyamikas in maintaining that the mind or consciousness is real.

Since the Absolute (paramatta) is looked upon as non-dual (advaya) and non-conceptual (nirvikalpa) and as transcending worldly experience, Yogacarins say that it can only be realized in the highest state of yogi rapture where there is undiscriminated consciousness without subject-object dichotomy. The name Yogacara means ‘Practice of Yoga’, they emphasized the traditional methods of yoga to realize the Absolute.

Vasubandhu’s vijbamratatasiddhi is devoted to a refutation of the realistic position, and it is a philosophical justification of the idealistic standpoint. He begins his work by stating that everything is ideation only (vijaptimatra). He maintains that the whole concept of the three worlds is nothing but a mere ideation. He quotes a statement of the Buddha himself and gives ideation the synonyms of mind, thought and consciousness. The external object is merely an appearance like the double visions on the part of whose eye-sight is with ailments.

Vasubandhu seems to have been interested in refuting the realistic argument on space, time, individuality and empiric standpoints by using metaphysical dialectic argument (e.g. dream, hell etc.) to justify the existence of Absolute idealism. The recognition of the superiority and transcendence yogi intuition contributed greatly to the theory of Yogacara. Vasubandhu maintains that while dreaming, we cannot know that dream objects are as real to the dreamer as any object is to a person who is awake. The difference between the dreaming consciousness and the awakening consciousness is that in the former, a person’s mind is overwhelmed by torpor (thimaddha). Similarly compared with a person in the states of yogi concentration, worldly people are slumbering in ignorance, they do not realise that the world of sense-experience does not exist in reality.

The highest knowledge yields the realization that reality is pure and undiscriminated consciousness. This leads Vasubandhu to deny not only the validity and possibility of sense perception but also of extraordinary perception.

Yogacara avocated 3 main kinds of vibbana.

Pravrtti-vibbana

This includes the 5 vibbana of the 5 senses which are evolved by the Alayavibana.
Manas

Also known as ‘clishta manana vibbana’. It is associated with 4 types of defilements, namely perception of self (atmadṛṣṭī), confusion regarding to self (atmamoha), self-pride (atmamāna) and self-love (atmasneha). The saba-citta-sadharana (phassa, vedana, sabba, cetana, etaggata, jīvitindriya and manasikara) are operating in this vibbana.

1. Alayavibbana

This is the store-consciousness, the basis of all the conscious and unconscious processes. It is called vipaka (resultant) because it represents the germination of seed (bijā) which are the dispositions (vasana) of good and bad actions that attained maturity (paripaka). Thus Alaya is that receptacle of all dispositions, which, as seeds, ripen and produced their fruits. When it evolves, it develops touch, then mental activities (monaskara), feeling (vedana), sensation (sabba), and volitional activity (cetana).

The existence of sajsara is therefore explained in term of store-consciousness. The evolution and transformation of this store-consciousness is without a beginning (anādīgara). The cyclic evolution takes place in the following manner: as the seeds mature in the store-consciousness, the evolution of manana takes place, then comes the third stage, the evolution of perceptive consciousness which is called pravṛtti-vibbana consists of subject-object discrimination.

Yogacara also introduced 3 degrees of knowledge i.e.,
1. Parikalita—false projection of imaginary object which is regarded as illusion
2. Paratantra—knowledge one get produced by cause and effect which is empirical
3. Parinispanna—the highest Truth which is also known as tathata

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**Vijñāṇavāda**, also known as *Yogācāra* is the school of Buddhist thought founded by Ācariya Asaṅga in the 4th century. This school's thinker was also Vasubandhu. The fundamental teaching of this school is called *Vijñāptimātra* or *Cittamātra*, generally translated to English as 'mind only'.

This school gives predominance of mind, its creative ability. Therefore, it holds that everything is created by the mind. The whole objective world is a mind-creation. This does not mean that *Vijñāṇavāda* would deny this existence of objects and an objective world. According to their teaching it is a kind of idealism. The objective world is there, but we see as particular objects are all mind-made.

As evidence for their view quoted the early teaching of the Buddha in early Buddhism, the mind also plays a very dynamic role. The *Dhammapada* clearly teaches that the mind is the forerunner of all mental thoughts - »*mano pubbaṅgamā dhammā«*, the mind is supreme - 'mano setṭhā' and everything is mind made - 'mano mayā'.

*Abhidhamma* also explains the creative ability of the mind. The world according to early Buddhism is a vivid creation of the mind. Suttas say that all are under the control of the mind. Each one is maker of one's own world and this is done by one through one's mind. These ideas have been further developed in *Vijñāṇavāda*. What is implicitly stated in early Buddhism, *Vijñānavāda* made explicit by citing jhānic experiences, dream experiences as evidence.

In different *jhānas* the practitioner is in a different mental plain. In dreams we create our own world. Besides, they also used the perceptions that are found in different spheres as evidence to prove their point. They showed how the same objects appeared differently when viewed from different levels of perception. Thus glass of milk to a human being might appear as nectar (*amṛta*) for gods. Through such examples they argued that it is consciousness that produces objects.

**Vijñaptimatrata**

Vashubandhu is one of the greatest thinkers in the Buddhist tradition. His main philosophically teaching is that only mind is real. The main text is Vijnapatimatrata siddhi. In this utilizing only twenty two verses Vashubandhu was able to analyze the various implication of two metaphysical view that is eternalism and nihilism that have confused philosophical thinking 4th century which another 30 verses he expounded the teaching of the Buddha as embodied in thousand of discourses.

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21 In the original there was 'Argue'...

22 I dare to comment here the *Vijñāptimātra* philosophy. I would like to express the idea, that if the world is created by our consciousness, it might easily happen that our world experience might be completely different from experience of person eventually being next to us – that means that the objective experience and subjective experience might collide with each other or that the subjective experience of two people in the same occasion under same conditions might be different. But, on the other hand, in the first verse of *Dhammapada* it is said, that world is mind made (*mano mayā*). This I understand as that this world, as our *kamma-vipāka*, was made by our previous *kamma*, which (in its root) was originated by our mind.
Here, Vashubandu is achieving several things: 1- He is disallowing, the absolute correspondence between a conception and object of experience. 2- He is melting down the absolute line of conception. 3- with the example of dream experience he illustrating the possibility of being empty concept along side concept that have empirical content. The existence of a real object is presupposition of common sense as well as metaphysical realism. The real object is not simple object of perception but that correspond exactly exist whether or not is it perceive.

Vashubandu maintains that “all this is mere conception” (vijnapti matram idam). Here the term matra (mere or only) has a philosophical significance in usage Buddha’s explanation of this object experience and his definition of conception have influenced to Vashubandu. Vashubandu realizing the significance of the Buddha inside utilizes the same term in order to surmount the problem created by realism and idealism thus it is not intended to deny the object but rather to accommodate the concept. This philosophical argument that is the establishment of mere conception, is gained not by simple speculation but by following the discipline of the Buddha namely analysis of the psychology of human experience.

Vashubandu maintains that all ideas arise depending on consciousness. Yet his teaching is not idealism. He avoids this by speaking of wrong evolution of consciousness (Vijnana parinama). The statement that all ideas occurred in that transformation of consciousness does not entail the denier of human body in which consciousness occurred no it doe it imply that there is no eternal object. Vijnana parinama is philosophically significance for other reason as faith.

This will become evident when the description of that process of evolution is analyzed. The process is explained in terms of three functions: 1- Resultant (Vipaka) 2- mentation (Mana) 3-conception of the object ( Visayasya vijnapti). The resultant is then identified as the Alavijnana. Further define as conveyer of all its seeds (sarva beijaka). The description of the evolving consciousness as a resultant is intended to avoid extremists. This evolution Alaya consciousness is determined by Vasna and karma.

Vasubandhu is one of the prominent Buddhist idealist, lived in about 4th century who is the founder of this theory of Vijnaptimatratara, his most sophisticated work Vijnaptimatrata siddhi means establishment of mere conception present the true nature of yogacara idealism. His argument in the text indicated that he was not a metaphysical idealist because he reviews only the physical thing that is in the external world. Man normal tendency is to divide the world into two paths, as I and external world. This has done due to delusion. Accordance to idealism, there is no such and so called external world beyond me. This world is only a projection of mind.

Vasubandhu could avoids the metaphysical idealism because he is seen to have been able to read the discourse for the Buddha more accurately, for Ex. the Buddha never considers the terms Citta, mana and vijnana as synonym.

Vasubandhu realizes the significant of the term of Vijnapti as a means of expressing the proper function of a concept namely intimately what is available through a cognition(vijnana) all these four terms are sometime taken together and defined as synonym but Vasubandhu clearly distinguish the function of these psychological activity, the term thought is found in Lankavatava sutra is also a unique term found in Yogacara idealism, there is no better way to make an idealist out of Vasubandhu, the philosophical psychological content of Vasubandhu, Vijnaptimatrika siddhi a work that remains unparallel in several respects its profoundly clarity and about all precision only 30 verses. Vasubandhu was able to analyze the various implications of two metaphysical view, nihilism and eternalism.

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The scheme of Vedanta philosophy is surprisingly similar to the idealism of Vasubandhu (280-360 A.D.) as taught in his Vimsatika with a short commentary of his own and Trimsika with a commentary of Sthiramati on it. According to this Vijnanavada (idealism) of Vasubandhu all appearances are but transformations of the principle of consciousness by its inherent movement and none of our cognitions are produced by any external objects which to us seem to be existing outside of us and generating our ideas. Just as in dreams one experiences different objects in different places and countries without there being any objective existence of them or as in dreams many people may come together and perform various actions, so what seems to be a real world of facts and external objects may well be explained as mere creations of the principle of intelligence without any objective basis at all. All that we know as subjective or objective are mere ideation (vijnapti) and there is no substantive reality or entities corresponding to them, but that does not mean that pure non-conceptual (anabhilapyenatmana) thought which the saints realise is also false.

It is possible that the awareness of anything may become the object of a further awareness, and that of another, but in all such cases where the awareness is significant (arthavati) there are no entities or reality as represented by them; but this should not be interpreted as a denial of the principle of intelligence or pure knowledge as such. Vasubandhu then undertakes to show that the perceptual evidence of the existence of the objective world cannot be trusted. He says that taking visual perception as an example we may ask ourselves if the objects of the visual perception are one as a whole or many as atoms. They cannot be mere wholes, for wholes would imply parts; they cannot be of the nature of atoms for such atoms are not; separately perceived; they cannot be of the nature of the combination of atoms, for the existence of atoms cannot not be proved. For if six atoms combine from six sides, that implies that the atoms have parts, for if six atoms combine with one another at one identical point, it would mean that the combined group would not have its size bigger than that of an atom and would therefore be invisible. Again if the objects of awareness and perception were only wholes, then succession and sequence would be unexplainable and our perception of separate and distinct things would remain unaccountable. So, though they have no real objective existence, yet perception leads us to believe that they have. People are dreaming the world of objects in the sleep of the instinctive roots of the habit of false imaginative construction (vitathavik-alpabhyasavasanandraya) and in their dreams they construct the objective world and it is only when they would become awake with the transcendent indeterminate knowledge (lokottaranirvikalpajnanalabhat prabuddho bhavati) that they would find the world-construction to be as false as the dream-construction of diverse appearances. In such a view there is no objective material world and our cognitions are not influenced by outside objects; how then are our minds influenced by good instructions and associations, and since none of us have any real physical bodies, how can one kill another? Vasubandhu explains this by the theory that the thought-currents of new person can sometimes determine the thought-yam na sidhyati Ibid., p. 7. currents of another. Thus the idea of killing of a certain type may produce such a disturbance of the vital powers of another as to produce a cessation of the continuity of one's thought-processes which is called death. So also the good ideas of one may influence the ideas of another for good.

In the Trimsika of Vasubandhu and its commentary by Sthiramati, this idealism is more clearly explained.

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23 Vijnaptimatratasiddhi containing two treatises of Vi and Trimsika. Paris 1925.
24 Yo balair dharmanam svabhavo grahyagrahahakadhi parialpitas tena kalpitena tena nairatmyam na tvanabhilapyenatmana yo buddhanam visaya iti. Commentary on Vimsika, p. 6.
25 Napi te samhata visayibhavanti, yasmat paramanurekam dravyam na sidhyati. Ibid., p.7.
It is said that both the soul (or the knower) and all that it knows as subjective ideas or as external objects existing outside of us are but transformations of pure intelligence (vijnanaparinama). The transformation (parinama of pure intelligence means the production of an effect different from that of the causal moment simultaneously at the time of the cessation of the causal moment\(^{27}\). There is neither externality nor subjectivity in pure intelligence, but still these are imposed on it (vijnana-svarupe parikalpita eva atama dharmasca). All erroneous impositions imply that there must be some entity which is mistaken as something else. There cannot be erroneous impositions on pure vacuity; so these erroneous impositions of various kinds of external characteristics, self etc. have to be admitted to have been made on the transformations of pure intelligence\(^{28}\). Both Vasubandhu and Sthiramati repudiate the suggestion of those extreme idealists who deny also the reality\(^{29}\) of pure intelligence on grounds of interdependence or-relativity (samvrti). Vasubandhu holds that pure consciousness (vijnaptimatra) is the ultimate reality. This ultimate consciousness is a permanent entity which by its inherent power (sakti) undergoes threefold transformation as the inherent indeterminate inner changes (vipaka) which again produce the two other kinds of transformation as the inner psychoses of mental operations (manana) and as the perception of the so-called external sensibles (visayavijnapti).

The apprehension of all appearances or characterised entities (dharma) as the cognised objects and that of selves and cognisers, the duality of perceivers and the perceived is due to the threefold transformation of vipaka, manana and visayavijnapti. The ultimate consciousness (vijnaptimatra) which suffers all these modifications is called alayavijnana in its modified transformations, because it is the repository of all experiences. The ultimate principle of consciousness is regarded as absolutely permanent in itself and is consequently also of the nature of pure happiness (sukha), for what is not eternal is painful and this being eternal is happy\(^{30}\). When a saint's mind become fixed (pratisthita) in this pure consciousness (vijnaptimatra), the tendency of dual thought of the subjective and the objective (grahyagrahakanusaya) ceases and there dawns the pure indeterminate (nirvikalpa) and transcendent (lokottara) consciousness. It is a state in which the ultimate pure consciousness runs back from its transformations and rests in itself. It is divested of all afflictions (klesa) or touch of vicious tendencies and is therefore called anasrava. It is unthinkable and undemonstrable because it is on one hand pure self-consciousness (pratyatmavedya) and omniscience (sarvajnata) as it is divested of all limitations (avarana) and on the other hand it is unique in itself\(^{31}\). This pure consciousness is called the container of the seed of all (sarvabija) and when its first indeterminate and indefinable transformations rouse the psychosis-transformations and also the transformations as sense-perceptions, these mutually act and react against one another and thus the different series rise again and again and mutually determine one another. These transformations are like waves and ripples on the ocean where each is as much as the product of others as well as the generator of others\(^{32}\).

In this view thought (vijnana) is regarded as a real substance and its transformations are also regarded as real and it is these transformations that are manifested as the selves and the characterised appearances\(^{33}\). The first type of transformations called vipaka is in a way the ground of the other two transformations which

\(^{27}\) Karanaksannirodhasamakalah karanaksanavilaksanakaryasya atmalabhah parinamah. Sthiramati's Commentary on Trimsika, p.16.

\(^{28}\) Upacarasya ca niradharayasambhavad avasyam vijnana parinamo vastuto'sty upagantavyo yatra atmadharma-pacarah pravarttate. Na hi niraspad a mrgatrsnikadayah. Ibid. Compare Sankara's Commentary on Gaudapada's Karika.

\(^{29}\) Thus Lankavatara, one of the most important works on Buddhistic idealism, denies the real transformation of the pure intelligence or alayavijnana. See Lankavatara, p. 46.

\(^{30}\) Druvo nityatvat aksayataya; sukho nityatvad eva ya-danityam tad duhkham ayam ca nitya iti asmat sukhah. Sthiramati's commentary on Trimsika, p. 44.

\(^{31}\) Alayavijnana in this ultimate state of pure consciousness (vijnana-primatrata) is called the cause (dhatu) of all virtues, and being the ultimate state in which all the dharmas, or characterised appearances, had lost all their limitations it is called the dharmakaya of the Buddha (mahamueh bhumpiramitadibhavanaya klesajneyavarana-prahanat...sarvadharmavibhutualabhata's ca dharmakaya ity ucayate).

\(^{32}\) Tac ca varvke srotasanghavat. Ibid., p. 21.

\(^{33}\) Avasyam vijnanaparinamo vastuto'sty upagantavyo yatrmatmadharinopacarah pravarttate. Ibid., p.16.
contain the indeterminate materials out of which the manifestations of the other two transformations appear. But as has already been pointed out, these three different types of transformations again mutually determine one another. The vipaka transformations contain within them the seeds of the constructive instincts (vikalpavasana) of the selves as cognisers, the constructive instincts of colours, sounds etc., the substantive basis (asraya) of the attribution of this twofold constructive instinct as well as the sense-faculties and the localisation of space-determinations (sthanavijnapti or bhajanlokasannivesa-vijnapti). They are also associated in another mode with sense-modifications involving the triune of the sense (indriya), sense-object (visaya) and cognition (and each of these triune is again associated with a characteristic affective tone corresponding with the affective tones of the other two members of the triune in a one to one (relation), attention (manaskara), discrimination (samjna), volition (cetana) and feeling (vedana)\(^3\). The vipaka transformations have no determinate or limited forms (aparicchinnalambanakara) and there are here no actualised emotional states of attachment, antipathy or the like which are associated with the actual pleasurable or painful feelings. The vipaka transformations thus give us the basic concept of mind and its principal functions with all the potentialities of determinate subject-object consciousness and its processes. There are here the constructive tendencies of selves as perceivers, the objective constructive tendencies of colours, sounds etc., the sense-faculties etc. attention, feeling, discrimination, volition and sense-functioning. But none of these have any determinate and actualised forms. The second grade of transformations called manana represents the actual evolution of moral and immoral emotions and it is here that the mind is set in motion by the ignorant references to the mental elements as the self, and from this ignorance about the self is engendered self-love (atma-sneha) and egoism (atma-mana). These references are again associated with the fivefold universal categories of sense functioning, feeling, attention, volition and discrimination. Then comes the third grade of transformations which are associated with the fivefold universal categories together with the special manifestations of concrete sense-perceptions and the various kinds of intellectual states and moral and immoral mental states such as desire (chanda) for different kinds of sense-experiences, decisions (adhimoksa) in conclusions firmly established by perceptions, reasoning etc., memory, attentive reflection (samadhi), wisdom (prajna), faith and firm will for the good (sraddha), shamefulness (hri) for the bad etc. The term alayavijnana is given to all these three types of transformations, but there is underneath it as the permanent passive ground the eternal and unchangeable pure thought (vijnaptimatrata).

It may be pointed out here that in this system of philosophy the eternal and unchangeable thought substance undergoes by virtue of its inner dynamics three different orders of superficial changes which are compared with constantly changing streams and waves. The first of these represents the basic changes which later determine all subjective and objective possibilities; the second starts the process of the psychosis by the original ignorance and false attribution of self-hood to non-self elements, self-love and egoism, and in the third grade we have all the concrete mental and extra-mental facts. The fundamental categories make the possibility of mind, mental processes and the extra-mental relations evolve in the first stage of the transformation and these abide through the other two stages of the transformation and become more and more complex and concrete in course of their association with the categories of the other transformations. In analysing the knowledge situation, Vasubandhu does not hold that our awareness of blue is only a

\(^3\) Feeling (vedana) is distinguished here as painful, pleasurable, and as the basic entity which is neither painful nor pleasurable, which is feeling per se (vedana anubhavasabhava, sa punar visayasya ahlada- kaparitapakatadubhayakarivivikasvarupasaks kaparita This feeling per se must be distinguished again from the non-pleasurable- painful feeling existing along with the two other varieties, the painful and the pleasurable. Here the vipaka transformations are regarded as evolving the basic entity of feeling and it is therefore undifferentiated in it as pleasure or pain and is hen recalled "feeling as indifference (upeksa)\(^4\) and undifferentiated (avyakrta). The differentiation of feeling as pleasurable or as painful takes place only as a further determination of the basic entity of feeling evolved in the vipaka transformations of good and bad deeds (subhasubhakarmavipaka). Good and bad (subhasubha) are to be distinguished from moral and immoral as potential and actual determinations of virtuous and vicious actions.

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modification of the "awareness" but he thinks that an awareness has always two relations, a relation with the subject or the knower (grahakagraha) and a relation with the object which is known (grahyagraha). Blue as an object is essential for making an awareness of blue possible, for the awareness is not blue, but we have an awareness of the blue. But Vasubandhu argues that this psychological necessity is due to a projection of objectivity as a necessary function of determinate thought and it does not at all follow that this implies that there are real external objects existing outside of it and generating the awareness as external agent. Psychological objectivity does not imply ontological objectivity. It is argued that if the agency of objective entities in the production of sense-knowledge be admitted, there could not be any case where sense-knowledge can be admitted to be produced without the operation of the objective entities, but since in dreams and illusions such sense-knowledge is universally regarded as being produced without the causal operation of such objective entities, no causal operation can be admitted to the objective entities for the production of sense-knowledge.

**666 SAMMITIYAS**

The Sammitiyas differed on many doctrinal points from the Theravadin’s and other sects. The Sammitiyas preferred to name their changing soul as Puggala, distinguishing it from the Anatta doctrine of the Buddha. In the Kathavattu. The view of the Sammitiyas is given thus. The Pudgalavadin’s rely on the following words of the Buddha “*Attipuggla attahitaya patipanno*” there is a person to exerts his own good.

Their appear a person who is reborn for the good and happiness of many, for showing compassion to the world of beings. Being on such words of the Buddha, Sammitiyas state “Pudgala” of the above mentioned passages is something positive.

In the Abhidharmakosa and its commentary, the relation between Puggala and Skandhas its explains by the simile of fire and fuel. Fire exists as long as its fuel lasts. So the Puggala exists as long as there are the constituents. But fire is different from fuel in as much as it has the power of burning and objects or producing light, which the fuel by itself does not possess. Fire and furl are co-existent, and the later is a support for the former, and just as one is not wholly from the other because fuel is not wholly devoid of fierily element (Tejas), in the constituents of a being.

In the Kathavattu, it is stated that the Sammitiyas point out their puggala has a material from in the world men and god. Therefore, the Sammitiyas states that “Puggala” corresponds to the entity called a being (Satva) and also to the vital-force (jiva) of a living being.

Now the Sammitiyas take as the problems of transmigration. They hold that (Puggala) passes from one existence to another but the Puggala of two existences is neither the same nor difference

In support of this contention the Sammitiyas rely on the following utterances of the Buddha:

- “Santi sattaro purisayaga attapurisa puggala” meanings there are four pairs of person or eight persons.
- “So sattakattuparamo Sandhavitva puggalo dukkhassantakaro hoti” meanings a Sotapanna has be born seven times at the most attain full emancipation so it is here the transmigrations of the soul (puggal).
- “Anamataggo ayam samsaro pubbakoti na pannayati sattanam tanha sanyojanam” meanings the cycle of existence of a being is without a beginning which is not apparent to beings immersed in desired. The Sammitiyas pick up the birth (samsaro satta to admit the transmigration of soul of being.
- “ pubbenivasa nana” Buddha is able to remember his first birth and others.
The Sammitiyas state that the Buggala is the percipient but it is different from mind (Citta vinnana). It is one of the constituents of a being. It is also not momentary (Kshanika) like mind. But it is perceivable in every momentary thought. It is the “Seer” whether the eyes are functioning or not. Because Buddha said “I see by my divine beings appearing and disappearing”. Here “I” is (Puggala) of Sammitiyas.

The transmigration of self is express in many statements of the Buddha. The Buddha said “In this world one performs good deeds and as a result enjoys happiness in the next world”, “One who controls his sense organs gains a happy stage in his next life”, “dying person arises again” etc. It is clear from such statements of Buddha that he had in mind A” Puggala” which transmigrated from one existence to another.

Though there were controversies, it is apparent that the Sammitiyas are seeking to establish that five Kandhas which are distinct from one another can not vive to the consciousness of I-ness the unity of the acts a person acts or thinks as one and not as separate objects. Buddha does actually use the words “So” Atta, and puggala.

However, the mental poverty is changing Kandhas but in view of the fact one can think of his past, even of the events of his past existences. The changing Kandhas alone can not be made responsible for memory. Therefore, Sammitiyas affirm the existence of a sixth (mental Poverty) and called it Puggala, which can remain only alone with Kandhas and so must disappear when the Kandhas disappear in Nibbana. Accordingly the individual or “Puggala” is something perusable, being neither identical with five groups of elements nor different from them.

Date Mon 12-05-2008. The End 1st term

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666Give a detail account of Sammitiya Buddhist school.

The first division in the Buddhist community occurred as a result of the second council, held 100 years after the Buddha’s death, at Vesali, when the followers of the traditional teaching split away from the Sthaviravadins and formed their own school, known as the Mahasavghikas.

A sub-division within the Sthaviravadins emerged in the 3rd century B.C, when the Sarvastivadins broke away from the Vibhajyavadins. The prominent offshoots of the Sthaviravadins were the Vatsiputriyas and the Sammatiyas, both known for their theory of puggala.

The Vatsiputriyas or Puggalavadins probably split off sometime during the 3rd century BC. They affirmed the existence of an enduring person (puggala) distinct from both the conditioned (sajskrta) and the unconditioned (asajskrta); the sole asamskrta for them is nirvana. The puggala really exists and can transmigrate from life to life, unlike all other things, none of which possess this property.
The Sammatiya school, a derivation of the Vatsiputriya school, had a wide diffusion. According to the reports of Chinese Buddhist pilgrims Hiuen-tsiang in the 7th century, its followers were numerous along the Ganges valley. The school flourished in Gujarat and in eastern India, as well as in Champa, located in what is now central Vietnam. And a 16th century Tibetan account states that it still flourished during the Pala dynasty that ruled Bengal up to the end of the 11th century. The Sammatiyas maintained that an act vanishes but that it leaves a thrusting, a commitment to fructify, to have consequences. A person (puggala) is an essence not wholly identical with its components. Thus, the Sammatiyas have tendencies toward an ontological concept of the puggala – that it is real though undefinable. They also posit an intermediate existence between death and rebirth.

Sammatiya believed that though an individual does not exist independently from the five skandhas, or components that make up his personality, he is at the same time something greater than the mere sum of his parts. The Sammatiya were severely criticized by other Buddhists who considered the theory close to the rejected theory of atman, and was taken up by the Kathavathu as the first question to be refuted by arguments favouring the Theravada standpoint.

The school apparently had popular support, for the Chinese pilgrim Hiuen-tsiang described it in the 7th century as one of the four main Buddhist sects of that time. Its members were also known as Puggalavadins. It had 4 sub-schools; the Vatsiputriyas (presumably named after their teacher, Vatsiputra) are in some accounts referred to as the parent branch of which the Sammatiyas are an offshoot. The 4 sub-schools are:

8. Dhammottariya
9. Bhadrayanika
10. Channagarika
11. Sammitiya

Of these, Sammitiya became the most important and influential school. The cardinal doctrine of this school is that besides the elements composing a being, there is a ‘puggala’ (individuality or a self) which is indefinable and which persists through all the existences.

This ‘puggala’ is not real in the highest sense (paramartha), it is neither identical with nor different from, the khandhas. Though it possesses all the characteristics of the khandhas, it is neither like them caused and conditioned (sahetu sappaccaya) nor is it like Nibbana uncaused
and unconditioned (ahetu appaccaya). Again it is neither constituted (sa jskrta) nor unconstituted (asajskrta). Though it is different (abbo) from the khandhas (constituents), it possesses certain characteristics of a constituted being such as happiness and unhappiness. It has certain aspects of the unconstituted inasmuch as it is not subject to birth, old age and death. It ceases only when the individual attains final emancipation (Nibbana).

Sammitiyas quote the Bharaharasutta of the Sajyutta Nikaya (III. p.28) and explain that burden (bhara) refers to the khandhas (constituents) while their carrier (hara) is the puggala. It is this puggala that remembers, feels, does and enjoys the fruits of all actions.

Sammitiyas also adduce other evidences from Pali texts to prove the existence of puggala, e.g.

1. The Buddha spoke of Sumedha as a puggala who got the prediction at the feet of Dipamkara in the virtue of the Savgha.
6. The statement of “attha-purisa puggala”.
7. Sopatanna has been explained by “paramo ayaj puggala”
8. “So kaya kayena passi viharati” here ‘so’ refers to ‘puggala’.
9. The statement of “sandhavitvana puggala”.
10. “Anamataggo ayaj sajsaro pubhagoti na pabbayati sattanaj”, here the ‘satta’ which goes in sajsara refers to puggala.
11. The Buddha’s knowledge of “pubbenisesena bana”, i.e., the memory of past births is not possible if there is no puggala.
12. Assako loko sabbaj pahaya gamaniya – if people depart everything and go alone in the sajsara, it is clear that there is a ‘puggala’.

The Sammitiyas take the problem of transmigration. They hold that puggala passes from existence to another, but the puggala of the two existences are neither the same nor different. The reason given by them is that a person who has attained the sotapatti stage, continuous to be a sotapanna in heaven. A sotapanna man may be reborn as a sotapanna god, thus the sotapannahood remain unchanged though the constituents of his body have changed from those of a man to those of a god. The transition of sotapannahood from one existence to another cannot take place unless the existence and continuity of puggala are admitted.

The Sammitiyas say that the ‘self’ (puggala) is designated by its support (khandhas), just
as fire by its fuel. We get various types of fire, e.g., forest fire, coal fire, wood fire in the same way a being is called either a man, a god or a naga according to the body. The self and the rupa are inter-dependent and inseparable, they exist at the same time.

Buddha speaks of self in extinction in Nirodha, there is no rebirth when there is complete nirodha. It has been argued by the Sammitiyas that reality or unreality of an object should not be questioned because it is unknowable by average intelligence. It is true that arupa loka is not known by means of rupa-loka, therefore it is not correct to say that arupa loka does not exist. Similarly, the ‘puggala’ is unknowable by the unwise, but that does not mean that it is not exist. The Buddha did not explain deeply the existence of puggala because the common people cannot understand, but this does not mean that Buddha denies the existence of puggala. These are all the arguments put forward by the Sammitiyas.

Reference:

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**Puggalavāda**

According to Puggalavādins, Sammitiyas were the most prominent school of the Puggalavāda. These schools became popular and widespread during the reign of Harśavāda/Harśavāda(?). They lived in Matura and Sārana, where was the first center of the Theravāda as mentioned by some inscriptions. The Sammitiyas ascribed the origin of their school to ven. Mahā Kaccāyana, the famous monk Saraṇa, Yuan Chwang tribes.

Most of the passages sighted in the Kathāvatthu and their views were also traced to the Pāli Tipiṭaka. Their Sutta Piṭaka is similar to Pāli of Thāravāda tradition. According to Kathāvatthu, their main teaching is that there is a persisting soul (puggala), passing from one existence to another. They said, that it is not possible for the khandhas transmigrate without the puggala. They however adhere to the doctrine of an antarā-bhava, which was not agreed by the Theravādins and Mahāsaṅghikas.

The Sammitiyas also referred to name their changing soul as puggala. To prove this, they have given the Buddha’s words:

»There is a person, who observes for his own benefit.«

And:

»There appears a person who was reborn for the good and happiness of many, who, showing compassion to the world of being.«

Based on these, they said the Buddha accepted the existence of puggala. Further Sammitiyas quote the Bhārahāra sutta of Saṃyutta Nikāya and explain that burden refers to the constituent khandha, while their carry (hāra) is the puggala unloaded of the burden who is affected by the cessation of desire, attachment and hatred. This puggala bears a name, belongs to a family and is the enjoyer of the happiness and unhappiness.

Discussing this sutta, Theravādins say that the Buddha used the word puggala as a mere concept. Buddha had in mind the aggregation five constituents and to them he collectively refers as puggala. It appears only when all the constituents are present. The Sammitiya nikāya also discussed other possibilities of existence of puggala. They viewed that there is no real self, the self is indeterminable five constituents and the self are identical. The five constituents and the self are different etc. Theravādins rejected at once all their dogmas.

Buddha admonished his followers to remove the notion of 'I-ness' and 'my-ness' which was based on the notion of self. He did not refer puggala to that self. He was teaching the term of 'non-existence', which was used in different contact. So he denied that a soul would be necessary to refer to absolute non-existence of puggala.
PUDGALAVĀDA (MARCH 2009)

Rūpa, vedanā, saññā, sankhārā and viññāna are always changing.

1. Kathāvatthu (Sammiṭiyas)
2. Bhavya (Vasumitra and Viniṭadeva) – Pudgalavāda

Ātma – negation of Anātmavāda

1. Vasubandhu – Abhidharma kośa
2. Sāntarakṣita – Tatrasaṅgaha
   “There is a person who exerts for his own good.”
2. »Eka puggalo loke uppajjamāno uppajjati, bahujana hitāya bahujanasukāya lokānukampāya.«
   “There appeared a person who reborn for the good and happiness of many for showing compassion to the world of beings.”

Sammiṭiyas’ interpretation of puggala is 'changing soul'.

In Kathāvatthu:
1. »Attī puggalo attāhitāya paṭipanno.« - „There is a person who exerts for his own good.“
2. »Eka puggalo loke uppajjamāno uppajjati, bahujana hitāya bahujanasukāya lokānukampāya.«
   “There appeared a person who reborn for the good and happiness of many for showing compassion to the world of beings.”

Shortnote

The nature of the puggala:
1. It is neither a mirage nor a hearsay
2. It is neither an unconstituted reality like Nibbāna nor a constituted material like rūpa.
3. It is not real in the highest sense (paramattha)
4. It is not something apart from five aggregates
5. It is not possible to establish a relation between puggala and khandha.
6. Though it possesses a characteristic of khandha, it is neither like that caused and conditioned (sahetu, sappaccaya) nor it is like Nibbāna, uncause and unconditioned (ahetu, appaccayā).
7. It is neither constituted (saṅkhāta) nor unconstituted (asaṅkhāta)
8. Though it is different from the constituents it possesses certain characteristics of a constituted being (happiness and unhappiness)
9. It is not subject to birth, old age and death
10. It ceases only when the individual attains Nibbāna.

_Puggala and khandha – Abhidhamma and its commentary, in Bhāra Sutta, Saṃyutta Nikāya:
1. Bhāra (contained – khandha – as burden)
2. Hāra – contained – puggala – as carrier)_

Fire and fuel – _puggala_, five aggregates – they have own characteristic
1. Fire exists as long as its fuel lasts → _puggala_ exists as long as there are five aggregates
2. Fire is different from fuel
3. Fire has the power of burning something (an object)
4. Fire and fuel are co-existent
5. Fuel is a support for the fire
6. Fuel is not wholly devoid of fiery element → _puggala_ stands in relation to the constituent of a being.
   _Puggala_ is affected by desires, attachment, hatred etc.
   _Puggala_ bears a name, belongs to a family, enjoys happiness and unhappiness.

_Sammītiyas: „Puggala has a material form.“_
1. _Rūpāvacara_ – material sphere – material form
2. _Aripañvacara_ – immaterial sphere – immaterial form
   »Taṃ jīvaṃ tam sarīraṃ; aṇṇām jīvaṃ, sarīraṃ« - „Puggala is neither identical nor different from the body.“
   »So käye kāyānupassī viharati.«

The problem of transmigration:
1. _Puggala_ passes from one existence to another
2. _Puggala_ of two existences is neither the same nor different.
3. A Sotāpanna man will be reborn as a Sotāpanna. This takes place because of the existence and the continuity of puggala.

**Buddha's utterances regarding puggalavāda**
1. »Yadidam cattāri purisa yugāni attha purisa puggalā.« - „There are four pairs of people or 8 persons.“
2. »So sattakkhattu paramo sandāvitrāna puggalo dukkhassantakaro hoti«
3. »Anamataggoya saṁsāro pubbakoṭi na paññāyati.«

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The special features of 'puggala':
1. It is different from mind, but it is the percipient (it has the ability to understand things)
2. It is not momentary. It can perceive every momentary thought.
3. It is the 'seer'\(^{35}\).
4. It is the 'doer'. (It does not have an independent nature.)
5. It is only the impermanent, momentary 'soul', that can be any activity.(?)

**PUGGALAVĀDA (ORIGINAL BY VEN. SÚVANNY)**

Pioneer of the Puggalavāda was Vatsiputra, the elder. The Vatsiputriyas school is one of the 18 schools that arose in India before the 3rd century BC. According to Puggalavāda the puggala exists neither within nor without the five aggregates. The Puggalavādins were careful in how to avoid the allegation that their theory might be another form of Ātmavāda. The orthodox monks vehemently opposed the Puggalavāda, to them it was nothing but a visiting/vision(?) of Ātmavāda. In the Kathāvatthu the view of Vatsiputriyas is given thus - The Puggalavādins rely on the following words of Buddha: «Atthi puggalo attāhitāya patipanno.» - „There is a person who exerts for his own good.“ Basing on such word of Buddha they stated 'puggala' of the above mentioned passage is something positive, it is neither a mirage or a hearsay, it is neither the unconstituted reality like Nibbāna or Ākāsa nor a constituted material element (rūpa, feeling (vedanā) etc.

The puggala is not real in the highest sense (paramattha). It has certain aspects of the unconstituted in as much as it is not subject to birth, old age and death. It ceases only when the individual attains final emancipation (Nibbāna). The Puggalavādins held that the self in transmigration is the self persists from one existence to another. The 'puggala' whose mind carries with it the effects of his moral observances (śīla) and meditational practice (samādhi) is reborn in a higher sphere.(?) On one's death one's five constituents after disintegration accompany the self to a sphere of excellence. His meritorious deeds and spiritual acquisition is his treasure, which follows him in his next existence. Thus his self does not go alone. The self in extinction ceases and has no more rebirths.

From all these arguments the author of Sammītiya Nikāya Śāstra established that Buddha did not full explain many of his deeper ideas and the existence of self – 'puggala' is one of them. Puggalavādins argue toward Theravādins that the first question put by the Theravādins to the Vatsiputriyas that they admit the existence of puggala either as the unchangeable, ever-existing reality like Nibbāna, or as a constituted object like rūpa or regard it as false like a mirage, or look upon it simply as a hearsay. The Sammītiyas denied practically all the four possibilities, though they asserted that the puggala was known as the real, ultimate fact (saccikamaparamatāna).

The next attempt of the Theravādins is to find out whether the Puggalavādins regarded it as something existing like any of the 57 elements, rūpa, vedanā, saññā etc. The Sammītiyas denied it saying they did not admit puggala as an element apart from the 57 elements and in support of their contention they quoted from the nikāyas the passage »Atthi puggalo atthāhitāya patipanno.« which indicates that puggala exists but not apart from the elements. The next attempt of the Theravādins was to show that the Sammītiyas might have been advocating either Ucchedavāda or Sassatavāda. The Sammītiyas rejected both of those. It was apparent that the Sammītiyas were seeking to establish that the five khandhas which were distinct from one another could not give rise to the consciousness of I-ness, a unity.

The facts that a person acts or thinks as one and not as five separated objects, that a person's attainments like Sotāpannahood continue to be the same in different existences and that one speaks of one's past existences and so forth do lead to the conclusion that, besides the five khandhas there exists some mental property which forms the basis of I-ness and maintains the continuity of kamma from one existence to another. The Sammītiyas therefore affirmed the existence of a sixth mental property and called it puggala, which could remain only along with khandhas and thus must disappear when the khandhas stop due to Nibbāna. As this mental property or puggala is not saññikā (constituted momentary object) and again, as it is not also unchanging and ever existing like Nibbāna, so it is not asaṅkhāta. Therefore, the puggala must be admitted to be neither saṅkhāta nor asaṅkhāta.

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\(^{35}\) In English 'seer' means 'forecaster'. Anyway, here 'seer' means 'the one who see'.

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The puggala is not real in the highest sense (paramartha). It has certain aspects of the unconstituted in as much as it is not subject to birth, old age and death. It ceases only when the individual attains final emancipation (Nirvana). The pudgalavadins hold that the self in transmigration is that the self passes from one existence to another. The ‘pudgala’ whose mind carries with it the effects of his moral observances (sila) and meditation practice Samadhi, is reborn in a higher sphere.

From all these arguments, the author of the Sammiyati nika sastra established that Buddha did not fully explain many of his deeper ideas and the existence of self ‘pudgal’ is one of them. Pudgalavadins argument, toward Theravadin: the first question put by the Theravadins to the Vatsiputriyas is that they admit the existence of puggala either as the unchangeable, ever-existing reality like Nibbana, or as a constituted object like Rūpa or regard it as false like a mirage, or look upon it simply as a hearsay. The Sammiyatiyas deny practically all the four possibilities, though they assert that the puggala is known as a real ultimate fact (saccikathaparamattha).

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Moggaliputtatesa is one of the earlier among the celebrated personality to appear in Buddhist tradition after death of Buddha, as the result of the deep veneration and respect his life come to be associated with miraculous event and happening. Mahavamsa, the chronicle of the Theravadin speak of the miraculous birth of the Moggaliputtatesathera, because he converted some wrong view of Puggala vadin into realistic understanding through his book kathavathu, the last abhidhamma text book

The three major doctrinal heresy were rejected in Kathavathu they are,
(1) personalist view (puggalavada)
(2) The realist view (sabbadivada)
(3) Transcendentalist view (lokutaravada) as the result of rejection of these three wrong views, Moggaliputatessa thera became one of the greatest exponent of Buddhist philosophy.

*refutation of the personalist view,
The conception a person whether ordinary or enlightenment was most training to generating and absolutistic form of thinking the Kathavathu is one of the earliest text to dealt with such emergent absolutistic tendency in Buddhist tradition. in fact the conception of person (puggala) is the first issue it takes up for lengthy debate unfortunately supta philosophical distinction ideological argument are couched in such try all defining and they were neglected for the considerable period anyway, Moggaliputatessa thera could control this personalize idea took us certain extended overlook discussion of philosophical method to kathavathu are completely influenced by idea introduced by commentator Buddhaghosa, in later period some Buddhist monks who were interested In Abhidhama reject the idea of person and formulated confirm non personalize idea (ven.Najnateloka Mahatheraguide through the Abhidhama pitaka) Buddhaghosa expose the view that the Buddha rejected the whole as being a mere samuti and the path as being real ,event though Buddha never use the term (ultimate) to refer to the path, applying this to the problem of the personal humanity some Buddhist metaphysician and modern scholar reach the conclusion that the personalities unreal, a mere convention and that the aggregate are ultimate is real

In fact, in commenting on the term Sacikata(absolutely truth and paramatha(ultimately real), Buddhaghosa introduced an essentialist explanation in term of intrinsic nature(sabhava), here no doubt is the destination between nominal and the real and and whether there is a person or not,

Before analyze the argument in Kathavathu against the conception of an ultimately real person it is necessary to examine some of the terminology utilize in the text as mention above the term Sacca(truth) and thet( reality)were used in sariputta’s rejection of the conception of the person upheld by Yamaka. In the
athavagga of suttanipata where the Buddha refuse to recognize view, conception or idea as ultimate (paramam) we find cerebral form attha the after being often used specially to refer to the fruit or consequent. Even when that term paramatha occurred in early discussion to refer Nibbana it is used in the the sense ultimate truth thus, there is clear evident that the term attha signify the distinction reality the truth, the former presenting and absolute perspective of truth, the later a primitive one. if this is any clue, then Moggaliputtateas’s selection of the form of two term sacikatha and paramatha is significant for what is being debated is the question of an ultimately real person and not any every conception of person

Keeping in mind this important philosophical using in term we can examine controversy between theravadin personalist, presenting the debate between two group as they.. Moggaliputatesa does not use any special logical formula the personalize view but simply allowed each party to speak each own language and then proceed to indicate which language is consistent with that of the Buddha the theravadin argue the base agaist personalist thus.

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DIALOGUE BETWEEN THERAVADIN AND PERSONALIST IN KATHAVATHU PAKARANA.13.08.07

(1) theravadin is a person obtained as an absolute truth, as an ultimate reality.
(2) personalist against theravadin is the person as absolute truth as an ultimate reality obtain in the way that an absolute truth, an ultimate reality is obtained.
(3) against personalist one should not say so against theravadin admit your reputation if you say that a person is obtained as an absolute truth as an ultimate reality, then you should also say that a person who obtained as an absolute truth or reality in the way that absolute truth and ultimate reality is obtained in his dialogue the personalist wanted to prove that although the person who divided into five aggregates and six sensory organs and 18 elements, there must be accepted of person because without a person one is not possible to accept that who transmigrate from birth to birth.

According to their view all the miserable condition as well as pleasant condition pertaining to persons are happening if there is a person, they wanted to denote identification of same personality having frequent changed in the life of particular person, they denoted interrelationship between two persons. the person who was in the previous birth is the same person presented and future having frequent change is his life but this idea is not accepted by theravadin because their whole teaching are depend on analysis of khandha,dhatu and ayatana.

according to personalist (puggalavada) the appearance of any living being may be formulated in various appearances, according to their karmic force but identification of their personalist is the same untill he reaches the complete cessation of collecting karma in addition this identification of person the stream of consciousness may be fluxgates, according to nature of their birth __ in karmic force the consciousness of the human being is regarded as potential but according to personalist theory as the result doing unwholesome action they may be coming down into lower level, animal life and so on. But their identification of the person is the same according puggalavada most modern interpreters.

and more recently an mislead by buddhagosa into belief that why the six statements describe two persons (puggalavada) the second referred to the aggregate (khandha) real path to which the person can be ultimately reduced. however what Moggaliputa there appear to have had in mind is something very different because he wanted to emphasize person as essential but to denote when disappear into khandha and thought clinging to a person may lead to misunderstand that there is a thought because of Moggaliputa’s intention to draw out the implication of the term. sacikatha and paramatha he wanted to reject that there is a person or puggala but all these views between theravadin and puggalavadin pave
the way to atamavada or soul theory which is a common characteristic all Buddhist schools.

(Continue)
it is significant that both the Theravadin and personalist rejected soul theory or acceptance of an essential thing or substantiality both seem to assert that one should not speak of an absolute truth or ultimate reality. Yet the personalist proceed assert a person as on absolute truth as an ultimate reality while Theravadin does not. The two standpoints may be represent person into method. this means that the personalist believed that what can not be spoken of can still be obtained or experienced, where as Theravadin insist that what is unspeakable is also not obtained or not experienced in other words, the personalist is attempting to provide empirical content for a statement left unexplain, (avya katu navatappe) by the Buddha.

it is only clarity the meaning and use of the primary term absolute truth and ultimate truth, that Moggaliputatesa continue to debate with the personalist in the format of the absolute refutation. What follow is an endless series of proposition relating to the concept of a person and so on, all couch in the language of absolute truth and ultimate reality. the actual refutation come only after the personalist caught few passage form the Buddha in support of his concept of a person. this include statement life. (there is a person who follows his own welfare) attihitaya patipanno) or there is one person who arise in the world and who is intent on the welfare of the many the happiness of the many with composition for the world for the welfare, for the benifit and the happiness of the many. Angutarani kaya ekanipata)

Moggaliputatesa regard all of them but counter with a series of causation from the early discourse that emphasize the non-substantiality (anatta) and emptiness (sunnata) of all phenomena interesting, this series begins with the famous statement of the Buddha all experiences phenomena are non-substantial(sabbe dhamma anatta) Muggaliputtatesa administer some anatta theory which is contradictory to puggalavada when the personalist admit that admit a person Moggaliputatesa emphatically denied it. Because acceptant of the puggala pave the way to Atmavada.

when the meaning of the term dhamma in dhammapada verse(subbe dhamma anatta)dhamma means phenomena world(papanca loka or sankharaloka(condition) but in angutarani kaya causation pugalavadin include Buddha also under the term dhamma in dhammapada commentary here dhamma also is common as pancakhan(dhamma kita pane khata eva athipeta), the question pertain to the author of kathavathupakarana was whether there was a person absolutely but personalist wanted to point out that where their was the term use as puggala in the language there was personalist theory. that why the buddha who was having detach mentality was also introduce as the person.

With the scholastic study of Abhidhamma, there emerged a new sect from the Theravadins during Bimbusara’s reign, i.e., at about 286 B.C. This new sect was called Vatsiputriya which was later divided into 4 schools, i.e.:

1. Dhammottariya
2. Bhadrayanika
3. Channagarika
4. Sammitiya

Of these, Sammitiya became the most important and influential school. The cardinal doctrine of this school is that besides the elements composing a being, there is a ‘puggala’ (i.e. individuality or a self) which is indefinable and which persists through all the existences.

This ‘puggala’ is not real in the highest sense (paramartha), it is neither identical with nor different from, the khandhas. Though it possesses all the characteristics of the khandhas, it is neither like them caused and conditioned (sahetu sappaccaya) nor is it like Nibbana uncaused and unconditioned (ahetu appaccaya). Again it is neither constituted (sajskrta) nor unconstituted (asajskrta). Though it is different (abbo) from the khandhas (constituents), it possesses certain characteristics of a constituted being such as happiness and unhappiness. It has certain aspects of the unconstituted inasmuch as it is not subject to birth, old age and death. It ceases only when the individual attains final emancipation (Nibbana).

Sammitiyas quote the Bharaharasutta of the Sajyutta Nikaya (III. p.28) and explain that burden (bhara) refers to the khandhas (constituents) while their carrier (hara) is the puggala. It is this puggala that remembers, feels, does and enjoys the fruits of all actions.

Sammitiyas also adduce other evidences from Pali texts to prove the existence of puggala, e.g.

1. The Buddha spoke of Sumedha as a puggala who got the prediction at the feet of Dipamkara in the virtue of the Savgha.
2. The statement of “attha-purisa puggala”.
3. Sopatanna has been explained by “paramo ayaj puggala”
4. “So kaya kayena passi viharati” here ‘so’ refers to ‘puggala’.
5. The statement of “sandhavitvana puggala”.
6. “Anamataggo ayaj sajsaro pubhagoti na pabbayati sattanaj”, here the ‘satta’ which goes in sajsara refers to puggala.
7. The Buddha’s knowledge of “pubbenisesena bana”, i.e., the memory of past births is not possible if there is no puggala.
8. Assako loko sabbaj pahaya gamaniya – if people depart everything and go alone in the sajsara, it is clear that
there is a ‘puggala’.

The Sammitiyas take the problem of transmigration. They hold that puggala passes from existence to another, but the puggala of the two existences are neither the same nor different. The reason given by them is that a person who has attained the sotapatti stage, continuous to be a sotapanna in heaven. A sotapanna man may be reborn as a sotapanna god, thus the sotapannahood remain unchanged though the constituents of his body have changed from those of a man to those of a god. The transition of sotapannahood from one existence to another cannot take place unless the existence and continuity of puggala are admitted.

The Sammitiyas say that the ‘self’ (puggala) is designated by its support (khandhas), just as fire by its fuel. We get various types of fire, e.g., forest fire, coal fire, wood fire in the same way a being is called either a man, a god or a naga according to the body. The self and the rupa are inter-depended and inseparable, they exist at the same time.

Buddha speaks of self in extinction in Nirodha, there is no rebirth when there is complete nirodha. It has been argued by the Sammitiyas that reality or unreality of an object should not be questioned because it is unknowable by average intelligence. It is true that arupa loka is not known by means of rupa-loko, therefore it is not correct to say that arupa loka does not exist. Similarly, the ‘puggala’ is unknowable by the unwise, but that does not mean that it is not exist. The Buddha did not explain deeply the existence of puggala because the common people cannot understand, but this does not mean that Buddha denies the existence of puggala. These are all the arguments put forward by the Sammitiyas.

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EXAMINE HOW FAR IS IT JUSTIFIABLE THE EXPLANATIONS GIVEN BY PUDGALAVADIN TO ESTABLISH THE EXISTENCE OF PUGGALA?
deny practically all the four possibilities, though they assert that the Puggala is known as a real ultimate fact (Saccikathapramatthana).

The next attempt of the Theravadin is to find out whether the Puggalavadins regard as something existing like any of the 57 elements, Rūpa, Vedanā, Saññā etc. The Sammātivadin deny it saying they do not admit Puggala as an element apart from the 57 element and in support of their contention they quote fro the Nikayas the passage “Atthi Puggala Atthitaya Patipanno” which indicates that Puggala exists but not apart from the elements. The next attempt of the Theravadin is to show that the Sammātivadin should advocate either Ucchedavada or Sassatavada. The Sammātivadin reject both of these. It is apparent that the apparent that the Sammātivadin are seeking to establish that the five Khandhas which are distinct from one another cannot give rise to the consciousness of I-ness, a unity.

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NOTES ON PUGGALAVĀDA

1. Kathāvatthu – Sammātivadin
2. Bhāya, Vasumitra, Vinītadeva – ātma, negation of anātmavāda

1. Vasubandhu – Abhidhamakośa
2. Śāntarakṣita – Tatvasaṅgraha
3. Moggaliputtipatissa – Kathāvatthupakarana

Paramātman or Brahman – Sammātivadin’s interpretation of puggala is a changing soul:

1. In Kathāvatthu: »Atti puggalo attahitaya patipanno.« - there is a person who exerts for his own good.
2. »Eko puggalo loke uppajjamāno uppajjati bahiyana hitaya bahujana sukhāya lokānukampāya.« - There appears a person who has been there for the happiness of good and heppinass of many for showing compassion to the world of beings.

1. The nature of the puggala – it is neither material nor sensual.
2. It is neither an unconstituted reality like Nibbāna nor a constituted matter like rūpa.
3. It is not real in the highest sense (paramātha).
4. It is not something apart from five aggregates.
5. It is not possible to establish relation between the puggala and khandhas.
6. Though it possesses all the characteristics of the khandhas, it is not like them caused and conditioned (sahetu, sappaccaya) nor is it like Nibbāna, uncaused and unconditioned (ahetu, appaccaya).
7. It is not neither constituted (sankhāta) nor unconstituted (asankhāta).
8. Though it is different from the constituents it possesses certain characteristics of a constituted being (happiness and unhappiness).
9. It is not subject to birth, old age and death
10. It ceases only when the individual attains Nibbāna

Puggala skandha
Abhidhamakośa and its commentary:

1. Bhāra – contained skandha
2. Hara – container, the puggala

1. Fire exists as long as its fuel lasts
2. Puggala exists as long as there are the constituents (five aggregates)
   - fire ~ puggala; fuel ~ five aggregates

1. Fire is different from fuel
2. Fire has the power of burning something (an object)
3. Fire and fuel are co-existent, the fuel is a support for the former
4. Fuel is not wholly devoid of fiery element

Puggala stands in relation to the constituents of a being; puggala is affected by cessation of desire, attachment, etc. Puggala bears its name, belonging to a family, enjoyer of happiness and unhappiness.
**Madhyamika**

In Mahāyāna Buddhist philosophy, śūnyatā constitutes ultimate reality. Although the concept is encountered occasionally in early Pāli texts, its full implications were developed by the 2nd century by Indian philosopher Nāgarjuna. The school of philosophy founded by him, the Madhyamika, is sometimes called the Śūnyavāda.

According to Kumārajīva’s account, Nāgarjuna was born in South India in to a Brahmin family. After Nāgarjuna learned some basic Buddhist views, but without complete satisfaction, a Mahānāga Bodhisattva—a chief nāga took pity on him and presented him with the most profound Mahāyāna verses. Nāgarjuna mastered these in a short time and propagated the true Dharma in India, successfully defeating many opponents in scholastic, philosophical debates. A common consensus gives dates for his life as AD 150-250.

Nāgarjuna has written several works. The Mūlamadhyamika Kārika is considered the most important one. It consists of 27 chapters and 488 kārika.

According to Madhyamicas, the theory of Śūnyatā based on causality was directed at refuting the four theories of causation, namely Sayamkatavāda, paraṃkatavāda, Udbhayatavāda and Abhetuvāda.

‘Śūnyatā’ means ‘nothiáness’ or ‘voidness’, but in the teaching of Nāgarjuna the complete philosophy meaning of Śūnyatā is similar to ‘no-self nature’ (asvabhāva), and it is also similar to Nirvāṇa.

According to Nāgarjuna, Nirvāṇa is abiding in a state of non-abiding. The only way of reaching the goal is to realize that in the ultimate sense there is no goal to be reached, Nirvāṇa is reality which is śūnya.

To explain the concept of Śūnyatā and no-self nature, the great philosopher Nāgarjuna put forward his ideas on the Buddha’s doctrine of Pratītyasamutpāda. The causal formula was: „This being, that arises.” Every object of thought is necessarily relative. And because it is relative, it is neither absolutely real nor absolutely unreal and nothingess, avoiding both the extremes. Thus according to Nāgarjuna, phenomena are dependent on all categories of thought as śūnyatā itself. It is the most important concept of Madhyamika philosophy.

In Mūlamadhyamika Kārika Nāgarjuna sums up his teaching about Pratītyasamutpāda in the following words:

»Apratitya samutpanno dharmah kascinna vidyate.« (MK 24,19)
- „Any existence cannot be seen without dependent origination."

There is not a single thing in the world which is unconditional, absolute, real. Everything is related to, contingent upon, conditioned by something else. Therefore, Pratītyasamutpāda is equated with Śūnyatā, it is ‘no-self nature’. Thus Nāgarjuna says:

»Yah pratītyasamutpādah śūnyatam tāṃ pracaksmahe.« (MK. 24. 18a)
- „We state that whatever is dependent arising, that is nothingness."

According to Hinayānists, they think that Nibbāna is a positive entity (bhava) and thus Nirvāṇa is the opposite of samsāra. While Nāgarjuna says that no positive entity which is not dependent on conditions cannot be discovered. If it is not bhava, it cannot be abhava either, for abhava is a relative word.

Bhava means ‘existence’, and existence is ‘samsāra’; no existence (abhava) is ‘Nirvāṇa’. Pratītyasamutpāda, viewed from the point of view of relativity is samsāra, while viewed from the point of view of reality it is Nirvāṇa. Therefore, according to Nāgarjuna philosophy, Nirvāṇa is not opposite of samsāra, there is no difference between them:

»Na saṃsārasya nirvāṇat kibcid asti viśeṣanam, Na nirvāṇasya saṃsārarat kibcid asti viśeṣanam.« (MK 25. 19)
- „Nothing of samsāra is different from Nirvāṇa, nothing of Nirvāṇa is different from samsāra."

Everything is ‘Dependent Origination’, thus, it is ‘śūnyatā’, ‘asvabhāva’. It is the middle path of the Buddha’s teaching:

»Yah pratītyasamutpādah śūnyatam tāṃ pracaksmahe, sa pramāṇāpyādāya partipat saiva madhyama.« (MK 24. 18)
- „We state that whatever is Dependent Arising, that is Śūnyatā. It is in that sense that the path is middle.“

Nāgarjuna is considered to be one of the great Buddhist thinkers all over the Buddhist world. By Mahāyānists he was called second Buddha or ‘the Sun among the Buddhist philosophers’. 
6th February 2002

The introduction to Madhyamika school

Madhyamaka refers to doctrine, whereas Madhyamika refers to school or people who are the followers of this school.

Madhyamika and Yogacara constitute the two major streams of Mahayana. Madhyamika is a school that teaches the doctrine of dnyatā (emptiness). It came into existence around by the middle of the 1st century AD. But the doctrine of emptiness was already existed prior to this period. Mahayana arose in the period of 1st century BC to 1st century AD.

Yogacara is another stream that develops a little bit later. From Yogacara, a branch was developed called Tathagatagarbha.

There is a misunderstanding saying that the doctrine of dnyatā is nihilistic, because it speaks of everything is empty - it did not mean that in each and every sense, nothing exist. In brief, what they say ‘all dharma is empty’ – mean they are without svabhāva / no intrinsic nature. This school proposes that everything is empty in its intrinsic nature, or to say, ‘the doctrine of nairatmya.’

When Mahayana arose, suddenly as it were, there was a large corpus of literature called prajñāpāramitā (Perfection of prajñā). Scholars generally agree that the common feature of Mahayana is the attainment of Buddhahood, that is by gaining prajñāpāramitā. Mahayanaists who followed the way of faith (bakti), thinking that if you faith in Amitabha, will be born in pure land. Also you have Mahayanaists who are meditators, they emphasized only dhyāna. Also you have Mahayanaists who are more philosophical, they were called Yogacara or Madhyamika.

Thus Mahayana is a very complicated movement. But there is only one common feature – it is the ideal of Buddhahood. That is the concept of Prajñāpāramitā. Prajñāpāramitā is not attained by Arhat. To attain that, you have to gain dnyatā. So that idea was already existed even before 1st century BC also. Certainly it was not a new idea that was innovated by the Madhyamika.

But it was in the period of 3rd century AD, Nāgārjuna came to expound the teaching of dnyatā, thus it came to be regarded as specific school called Madhyamika after the exposition of Nāgārjuna. So in that sense, many people regarded Nāgārjuna as the founder of Madhyamika school. We shall see Nāgārjuna himself however said that, he has nothing new to say, he taught what the Buddha has taught. Around the 1st century BC to 1st century AD, there is a literature called Prajñāpāramitā in which the doctrine of dnyatā is emphasized.

And around in later 1st century AD or early 4th century AD, you have another new group of literatures and these literatures were composed, later came to be known as Yogacara. At that time, they reacted to the early doctrine of dnyatā. They argued of ntīrtha (ppp. A teaching whose meaning has been fully drawn out/ explicit) and neyntīrtha (ppp. A teaching whose meaning is still to be drawn out/ implicit). Not only that, they debated in the period of Abhidharma subsequently. All Buddhists are arguing as to what ntīrtha and neyntīrtha really mean. Due to different understandings, they split into different schools.

The earliest Mahayanaists say ntīrtha teaching is dnyatā. But for Yogacara, that teaching became neyntīrtha. What is the ntīrtha teaching for Yogacara in the 4th century AD - doctrine of nothing exist apart from the mind. We called them as ‘Idealism’ – what appeared in the external world actually is the projection of the mind. That is in the case of dream. There is only one ultimate reality - mind. So they objected to the teaching of dnyatā. They say there is one thing not empty, that is the mind.

In another word, when come to Yogacara period, they have re-interpreted what is meant by emptiness, and what is meant by Middle way. The important aspect of development in Buddhist philosophy precisely consists of the re-interpretation of what is meant by middle way and emptiness. Since Middle way, pratītya-samutpāda, etc are taught by the Buddha, no body would deny to that. But they re-interpreted it in a way like a new innovation. Finally you find Tathāgatagarbha which teaches that the Buddha-nature is actually within everybody. They are really talked about there is a metaphysical entity called Tathāgatagarbha (womb of Tathāgata) – that the Buddha arises from the embryo. That innate nature as the metaphysical reality exists in everybody. Some schools even say it exists in every sentient beings also. Therefore there was this development subsequently.

In Madhyamika, they proposed two level of truth - saṃvṛti satya and paramārtha satya. Further in Yogacara, they proposed three levels of truth. All these show that Buddhists are trying to interpret the Buddha’s teaching, and arguing what is ntīrtha and neyntīrtha.

Historically, Madhyamika is divided into two major sub schools: 1. Prasaṅgika; 2. Svatantrika.

1. Prasaṅgika : from the word ‘prasāṅga’, from the śālaj – to attach. Prasāṅga means the logical consequence that is being led to. When you say something, others would ask you, what is the logical consequence or logical fallacy? The consequence is
resulted from a particular proposition, supposing you say, ‘cause produces effect’, or ‘karma produces vipāka’. But if you also say ‘cause and effect are entities in themselves, each having a svabhāva,’ in another words, cause is intrinsically cause, effect is intrinsically effect, that is to say, cause has a svabhāva, forever a cause; likewise phala has a svabhāva, forever a phala. If you propose like this, Nīgārjuna would show you what is the logical consequence of this? You started by saying the Buddha teaches cause and effect, but because of your proposition (premises), that cause and effect each has svabhāva, then the prasāga would be that, you can’t even establish causality at all, why? If cause has intrinsically nature, that intrinsic nature does not change, forever would be the cause, then how can cause produce an effect? That consequence came from you proposition that everything has svabhāva. If you don’t have the proposition that everything has svabhāva, you wouldn’t have this problem. Another example, spiritual life. We are pūthagjana, if you have proposition that pūthagjana has svabhāva, and that Buddhahood is something intrinsically an entity, what would happen? It would mean that there is no possibility of spiritual progress. Ultimately the prasāga is that the spiritual life is impossible. In this way, this school called prasāgika that doesn’t have his own proposition. It simply takes the proposition of opponents and shows the consequence of that. Their argument depends on the view of proposition of opponents.

When we come to the later period, Svatantrika also brought the idea from Yogācāra.

What is svabhāva? Read the [entrance]. Nīgārjuna refuted the idea of asti-svabhāvatī. In Buddhism the Buddha has taught that nothing has any īśtman, and also everything is anitya. At the same time, the Buddha has insisted that, for every karma, there is vipāka, there is saśrā, etc. Then some Buddhists later on faced the pressure from Indian tradition like Hindu, etc. For them, they have a very definite theory which can account for the rebirth, saśrā, etc. But for Buddhists, when come to the Abhidharma period, everything is klāśika (momentariness). If so, everything last for one moment, then many questions would arise? How can Buddhists account for the continuity?

One important doctrinal concept was svabhāva. If you explain in term of svabhāva, many problems would solve. For instance, in the phenomenal existence, everything is momentary, but in essence, it is still there. Because there is essence, then you can account for the continuity, etc. They argue that their concept of svabhāva is not the same as īśtman. Thus in this period, they found a conceptual device that is called the doctrine of svabhāva.

Mādhyamika in a way is a critique of the concept of svabhāva. Nīgārjuna uses the term ‘īśyatī’ as the very powerful antidotes to the notion of svabhāva. In his MMK, he attacked mainly the idea of svabhāva. In this way, the prasāga of opponents is exposed.

The standpoint of Nīgārjuna

Generally, Nīgārjuna was considered as one of the greatest Mahāyānist. Certainly from Chinese Mahāyāna school, they claimed him as the first patriarch. But in recent years, Western scholars begin to question, for example, Ak Warder wrote a paper questioning whether Nīgārjuna was a Mahāyānist? From the point of view of Professor, it is questionable whether Nīgārjuna is a Mahāyānist or not.

Unfortunately as in the case of many great ṛcīryas, many many works are said to be written by them. That is something to be watched out in the study of history of Buddhism. Sometimes a book that is totally not even authentic also was claimed to be written by Indian ṛcīryas. One famous example is “the awakening of faith 大乘起信論” in Mahāyāna, expounding the doctrine of Yogācāra’s idealism. According to Chinese tradition, it is said to have been written by Ālāvaghośa. Until in modern times, some Chinese made a research into this, and they finally conclude that it was not a real work of Ālāvaghośa. It was not even composed in India. It was a Chinese work. Nonetheless, it was still a work of great philosophical value.

According to modern researchers, this work was composed by somebody else, but ascribed to Ālāvaghośa. Historically, Ālāvaghośa was in the period of 2nd to 3rd century AD. If this is true, it means already in India at that time, this type of philosophy was existed in a highly sophisticated form. This is one reason. The second reason is, it led many scholars to claim that Ālāvaghośa was the founder of Mahāyānist. From all the other sources, the Yogācāra Buddhism developed in the middle or late 3rd century AD. It can’t be in the 2nd
In the early part of the 2nd century AD, the teaching that was prevailed was the teaching of ānyatā. In the case of Nāgārjuna, a large number of works were ascribed to him. Some were definitely not by him. However, modern scholars agree only a certain number of works are actually written by Nāgārjuna. In those works, we can see a very consistent standpoint that he teaches the doctrine of ānyatā. As to MMK, it is very special and we are on very safe ground, because everybody agreed, whether ancient or modern that MMK is authored by Nāgārjuna. MMK is the masterpiece of Nāgārjuna, and this is the standard work of the study of the doctrine of Mādhyamika.

The Buddha is the best preacher of the doctrine of Pratītya-samutpāda. And it is this pratītya-samutpāda teaching that can bring an end to prapaṭṭa (intellectual proliferation: to form more and more dhamma, or more and more speculation), and it is this tendency that binds us in sāsra. So Nāgārjuna’s whole purpose of this treatise is to help us to get out of prapaṭṭa.

Prapaṭṭa is a mental tendency to proliferate, to produce more and more views, ideas. So Nāgārjuna says the only way to stop this is the teaching of Pratītya-samutpāda (Dependent-origination; Dependent-arising; condition co-production; conditioned arising).

Pratītya-samutpāda is not a theory, nor a prapaṭṭa. It is a statement or fact. That fact, according to Buddhism, is discovered by the Buddha in his Enlightenment. Pratītya-samutpāda is not a thesis. But from the philosophical point of views, you can say that, of course, when you have a consistent view which explains things, then you can say that is a theory. From the religious practitioners point of views, it is not a theory. Theory and dhamma refers to prapaṭṭa, refers to speculation about things that we are not sure of, that we have not directly experienced.

So all these signify by the term ‘prapaṭṭa’. So Nāgārjuna says he salutes the Buddha, because he is the best preacher of Pratītya-samutpāda, and it is Pratītya-samutpāda that appeased or destroyed the prapaṭṭa. Later on, we shall see that:

Pratītya-samutpāda = middle way = ānyatā.

His whole treatise talks about ānyatā (emptiness). In fact this emptiness, from his point of view is none other than the teaching of Pratītya-samutpāda. Nāgārjuna takes the Buddha as a Guru. Even from his opening stanza, we can see his standpoint, he is not a Mahāyānist, at least judged by this stanza. We cannot say this stanza alone that he is not Mahāyānist.

No body can prove that he is a Mahāyānist at all by looking at this stanza. Another point is, there is a pair of four:

- Non-origination; non-extinction
- Non-destruction ; non-permanence
- Non-identity ; non-differentiation
- Non-coming (into being) ; non-going (out of being).

To sum up, all that can be accounted in the phenomena existence:- the experience of motion; the experience of time, diversity, identity among things exist at the same time in different space, and so on. When Nāgārjuna says there is no cessation, there is no arising, and so on. He has in brief negated all activities whatsoever, but be very careful, the negation is reference to what has svabhāva. It is not Nāgārjuna says there is nothing in the world that there are no activities. But what he says is that there are no activities which can be explained in term of svabhāva. We cannot say, ‘cause is cause in its intrinsic nature; effect is effect in its intrinsic nature, and so on.’ If you think like that, it is prapaṭṭa, then you will get into trouble. He is going to prove to you that nothing can arise.

Though 4 pairs are mentioned, we need not think that there are only these four, and no more. You can have more or less, sometimes depends also the structure of stanza.

We shall proceed to look at another stanza, the first and 24th chapter are very important. Other chapters are the further elaboration.
Once you have understood the first chapter, you really have understood the concerns of Nāgārjuna, the aims of Nāgārjuna and his methodology.

So what is empty, according to Nāgārjuna, means ‘it is without svabhāva’. Why everything has no svabhāva? Because everything is Pratītya-samutpāda. Whatever he criticizes some things, you must remember that he criticizes, or he objects only in the sense of any theory supporting the svabhāva. He is not saying there is no karma-vipāka, etc. If you explain all these things in term of svabhāva, then Nāgārjuna will oppose it. He will show you thing becomes impossible.

For the Mādhyamika, the position is that: [Existence = arising]. That means, when you say something exists, that something arises. You can’t speak of something that is hidden, something that is abide in the dormant state in essence which may arise later. But though it doesn’t arise the exist in itself, we can’t speak in those terms. We have seen in Abhidharma class, how Sarvāstivādin understand things. For them, everything exists as an essence:- it may arise or may not arise. Once it has arisen, it has become past. When it has just arisen, rather it is present. Once it has arisen and ceases, it has become past. Before it arises, it says that it is in the future. In brief, this is the Sarvāstivāda’s thinking. They have the metaphysical essence that is existent. Existence is one thing, arising is another thing. If you have the sphere of existence, the sphere of arising, you can demonstrate like this:-

Nāgārjuna says different: Existence and arising are exactly the same.

What does not arise is what does not exist. What arises is what exists. This is extremely important principle. This is where it differs from Abhidharma view point.

We shall see that in term of Abhidharma philosophy, this view is corresponded to Vibhajyavāda (distinctionist).

Vibhajyavāda is not just a term to denote Theravāda school. And it does not simply mean Analyst. Don’t think like that – the Buddha is also called Vibhajyavādin. The Vibhajya method refers to the method of answering question in 4 different ways.

1. Categorical One.
2. Vibhajya One.
3. Asking back a question, ex:-“Are all rūpa resistant?” Then you want to ask, “What type of rūpa do you want to know? ” It is present, past and future. According to Sarvāstivādin, present rūpa, what is experience is resistant. What is past and what is future, they are rūpa, but not resistant. In this way, you can ask back a question.
4. Question to be put aside. The very question is asked in a wrong way, a wrong assumption in the mind of the questioner.

In that context, you have the idea of Vibhajya. In Theravāda tradition, it means the method of analysis. But that kind of understanding of Vibhajyavāda is not in accordance with the original meaning of the term. Vibhajyavāda originated in the context of the debate about dharma – whether dharma exist in the past, present, and the future. One camp of Buddhist says that you must make distinction (Vibhajya vadanti) that is the distinction among past, present, and future dharmas. You can’t say they are all “sarvam asti”. You can only say ‘pratyutpanna dharma asti’ (the present dharma exist). By saying that, you are making distinction, you are called a Vibhajyavādin.

Another camp says, as far as the existence is concerned, the past, present and future are all the same. They are existed in essence. They may differ in term of activities. The present one has activity, the past and future do not have activity. The Sarvāstivādins don’t make distinction. They say, ‘sarvam asti’- all exist in essence (svabhavatā).

Vibhajyavādins are those who speak, having made distinction. That is the original significant of the term. For the Vibhajyavādin, in that case, Theravādin, Sautrāntika, Mahāsāṃghika, etc are all Vibhajyavādins, because they don’t believe in the theory of Sarvāstivāda.
There are these 2 camps, either Sarvāstivādin or Vibhajyavādin. Vibhajyavādin connotes a very broad community of Buddhists. All those who hold that only the present dharma is real - the only thing is what has just arisen (pratyutpanna). For them, what exists is what arises. So Nāgārjuna share the same point, as far as this point is concerned. Nāgārjuna is on a par with them. For Sarvāstivāda, they really talked about the underlying essence that continuing to persist.

Let’s look at stanza 1,

\[ Na svato nāpi parato na dvābhyyānāpyahetuka/ \]
\[ utpannā jītu vidyante bhavānāka ke cana/ \]

(Tr. No any existent anywhere have ever found to have been produced from themselves, from others, from both, and from without a reason.)

 четыре не существует 
не существует другого 
не существует и не существует другого 
не существует ни одного ни другого

Four existent things:-
1. Thing arisen from itself.
2. Thing arisen from other.
3. Thing arisen from both itself and other.
4. Thing arisen from neither itself nor other.

First, Nāgārjuna enumerates these 4 positions. In ancient India, there were different dīśas (prapañca) like that.

1. Somebody think that the thing arises by itself – we see a different thing as a Phala, from a hetu, but actually, the phala is from the hetu itself. There is no different between phala and hetu. This is the view of Śāṅkhyā philosophy.
2. Another Indian school holds that the phala and hetu are totally 2 different things. Vaiśeṣika hold this view.
3. Some held the view that thing arisen from both (itself and pratayaya). This school is Sarvāstivāda. For them, the thing already exists in essence. But it cannot arise by itself. It needs pratayaya. On the one hand, they want to be a good Buddhist – that the Buddha says everything arises from pratayaya. On the other hand, they add some thing more, saying that the thing already exist in itself, though it hasn’t arisen.
4. There are others, thing from no reason, simply arise with no cause for arising. They are Materialist.

Nāgārjuna in the very first stanza, negates all the 4 positions. [P: proposition ; ~ = negation ]

\[
\begin{align*}
P &= \text{A thing arisen from itself.} \\
~P &= \text{A thing arisen from others.} \\
P, ~P &= \text{A thing arisen from both.} \\
~(P,~P) &= ~P, ~~P \text{ (neither P nor not P)}
\end{align*}
\]

This is derived from his standpoint of anātā - that nothing has svabhāva. If nothing has svabhāva, how can something arises from itself. He appeals that “not any (na kecana) not in anyway (no kvacana). Nothing is found/experienced.”

It is a kind of Inductive logic, not the deductive logic. Nāgārjuna does not have faith in deductive logic – that means you have some abstract principles, from this, abstract premise, you deduce something/ consequence. This is not the Buddhist way of understanding thing.

The Buddhist’s way of understanding is to understand from experience – from whatever that have occurred in the universe first. This way of Inductive thinking is completely in accordance with the Buddha’s understanding. In another words, it is really based on empiricism (experience). That means, Nāgārjuna is not also a pure logician. He is not interested in being a logician.

Clearly that the first stanza is logical, on the other hand, a Western logician might question, “it has never been found”. But for Nāgārjuna, it is good enough, if nobody has ever experienced, then in term of probability, probably is that this is the fact. It is good enough for us to accept – what else is going to accept other than our own experience. What else that we can be so sure of. We can’t be any more sure about thing than we had experienced ourselves. So although you can question this logic, but Nāgārjuna is not afraid of that, he would say, “Well, look into your experience, and tell me what I say is whether contrast to your experience or not?” So he says, “no such case has ever been found that anything arises just by itself, by others, by both and by neither.”

1. Why nothing arises by itself? [Itself means something have svabhāva – a thing in itself.

Reason I:– A thing in itself, i.e. svabhāva, is something that has always been existing. Therefore there is no arising.

Reason II:– If a thing, having a svabhāva (fixed nature) can arise simply by itself (as it wishes), then everything in the same way, can arise anytime, that lead to simultaneous arising of all things at all time, which is absurd and ridiculous.
Why no thing arisen from other?

**Reason I**: If there is no arising of a thing in itself, there is also no arising from another thing – having a svabhāva.

**Reason II**: If two things totally different in their svabhāva exist, there cannot be any causal relationship. The two cannot be related as cause and effect. For if this can be possible, then it should be possible to produce fire from water, etc. This second proposition is also rejected.

For the third proposition, Nāgārjuna would not bother very much to argue, if the first proposition is not acceptable, the second proposition is not acceptable, put them together also is useless. Thus he rejected.

The fourth proposition is rejected on the empirical ground. You can’t find anything that is produced without any cause. There are always certain precedent cause for a following effect to arise. In this way, all these 4 catuḥkoli (4 corner, 4 alternatives) are:

\[
\begin{align*}
P &= \text{A thing arisen from itself.} \\
\sim P &= \text{A thing arisen from others.} \\
P, \sim P &= \text{A thing arisen from both.} \\
\sim (P, \sim P) &= \sim P, \sim \sim P \text{ (neither P nor not P)}
\end{align*}
\]

Catuḥkoli is meant to convey the idea of exhaustive possibilities. Nothing can arise by itself, from others, from both, from neither. So the conclusion is that, there cannot be any arising at all, i.e., *there cannot be any arising of anything having svabhāva*.

Conclusion: There cannot be arising of anything having a svabhāva.

*Continue…*

*Arranged by Dhammapala*

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**Madhyamika Philosophy**

*Madhyamika* philosophy originated about 65 BC, founded by Nāgārjuna. The great teaching of this philosophy was a nihilism and stated that everything is really emptiness. This teaching is not a theory but just a ladder which can reach out into the infinite. The aim of this philosophy is completed emancipation from the world around us in all aspects. This nihilism applied to the phenomenal world and generated through a result of both agnosticism and mysticism. In mysticism, they help an opinion that the highest jhāna of the Buddha was a negativistic implication.

In *Madhyamika*, Nāgārjuna has analyzed and the conception of causality as *paṭiccasamuppāda* and views of the *Sarvāstviādins*. Nāgārjuna also made a refutation of the theory of causality held in the early Buddhism. To explain it, Prof. Murti described that the work of Nāgārjuna was as an Indian philosophy and concerned not only the *Theravāda*, but also the *Sarvāstivāda*. Therefore, for him *Sarvāstivāda* was regarded as path of early Buddhism and according to the *Madhyamika*, refutation of causality is directed against the *Theravāda*. Regarding this opinion, Prof. W. S. Karunārathna mentioned that there is no evidence whatever Nāgārjuna knew or refuted the doctrine of *Theravāda*.

In *Madhyamika*, Nāgārjuna criticized the conception of causality that nowhere and never does a really existing the originate thing out of itself, or out of another, or out of both, or without a cause. Certainly, relating to conception of causality, in doctrine of *Theravāda*, there is not anything to refuse. In the Pāli canon as Nāgārjuna said, such as nowhere and never does a really existing the originated thing, we can see too. But *the Buddha* mentioned that a thing happens neither by itself nor by another nor by both nor by no causes:

»*Na sayam katan, na paraṃ katan, na sayam katan ca paraṃ katan ca, na hetu appaccaya.«*
The Buddha pointed out that all things are dependently originated.

In making confusion, Nāgarjuna said, that things that have been caused must be real or unreal. If a thing is real, it means that it exists. If a thing exists, it needs a cause to come into existence. But if a thing is unreal, it means that it did not exist. If there is no existing there is no cause to come into existence. The Hinayāna taught only puggala nairatma (?) (non-substantiality) applied to all dhammas.

**The Mahāyāna Madhyamika School**

According to the historical evidence eighteen Buddhist schools originated as a result of the fourth Buddhist Council and previous situations, but basically there were four Buddhist schools and one of them was Madhyamika school.

Madhyamika school originated based on different reasons, such as religious, historical, sociological and philosophical, that developed within a long period. They are roots of the Mahāyāna schools, teaching among the schools, contemporary religions and philosophical background, Mahāyāna literature of sūtras, separation of the Mahāyāna school from Theravāda school etc.

Basically, based on these reasons and evidences, there originated three teachings:

1. Concept of Buddha
2. Bodhisatta concept
3. Teaching of Trikāya
4. saṃsāra and Nirvāṇa concept
5. Concept of ‘Emptiness’

There are three Mahāyāna traditions – Madhyamika tradition, Yogācāra Viññāṇavāda and Tantrayāna. According to the historical evidences most of the scholars accept that first Mahāyāna Buddhist school originated during the time between 100-150AD. That means 600 years later after passing away of Buddha. During that period there had been different translations, revisions and accordingly first, second and third Buddhist Councils and Maññāna literature of suttas.

Thus, Mahāyāna tradition has expanded regularly and originated Madhyamika school as a result of introducing the Sāpekṣaka concept. Consequently Śūnyatā concept was too developed in this school and it depended on Upaniṣad philosophy. Madhyamika philosophy developed very quickly during the time of 150-250 AD, endowed with Nāgarjuna.

This school was named Madhyamika because Madhyamika philosophy originated dependent on the Middle Way. It has introduced and followed Middle Path, it rejected annihilation and eternity views as well as without the existence and non-existence. (?) They had introduced this name for their tradition by themselves. Madhyamika school was the most famous school in the Mahāyāna tradition and it has a very deep logic system.

Nāgarjuna is the founder (ādikatrūvarayā) of the Madhyamika tradition and he was the greatest philosopher born in this school. He was born in the Brāhmaṇa caste and attained different knowledges. Later he became a Buddhist
monk and was a very famous scholar among the western and eastern countries. Most of the scholars accepted that Nāgarjuna had written more than 40 books, but most of the books are not to be found. Mūlamadhyamika Kārika is the main book in the Madhyamika philosophy and it mentions basic concepts of the school.

When we investigate concerning the early Buddhism, some matters had been influenced the origin of the Madhyamika tradition, basically they are:

1. Attempt to introduce the new interpretation to the early Buddhist concept which depends on early Buddhist teaching.
2. Attempt to give a philosophical meaning to the emptiness ??? Prañā Pāramitā Sūtra literature of ???

8. Attempt to give an answer to the Sarvastivāda and Sautrāntika traditions.

According to the Mahāyāna philosophy, Madhyamika tradition had been constructed on the Mahāyāna praṇā pāramitā concept, but there is no consent among the scholars in regarding this view, because most of the scholars accepted that between the Dependent Origination in the early Buddhist philosophy and ‘Emptiness’ in the Madhyamika school there is no difference. In addition Mūlamadhyamika Kārika has indicated that ‘Emptiness’ in the Madhyamika tradition originated influenced by the Dependent Origination in the early Buddhism.

Apart from that Mūlamadhyamika Kārika is the main book in the Madhyamika school, which has mentioned the concept of ‘Emptiness’. But there is no information in regard to the prajñā pāramitā sūtras. But according to the Mahāyāna scholars this concept was taken from the Mahāyāna philosophy. There is no more evidence to prove it.

Mahāyāna Madhyamika tradition has accepted the concept of ‘Emptiness’ only. Therefore, we can refer to it as a basic concept in the Madhyamika school. They have rejected the concept of existence of everything - „sarvam asthi“ in the Sarvāstivāda school and the teaching of consciousness in the Yogācāra school. Because Madhyamika teaching have originated according to the Dependent Origination in the early Buddhism.

Dependent Origination is the foundation in the Madhyamika school. They have taken the theory as »asmiṃ sati idam hoti« – „if there is a cause, there is a result.“ If there is no cause, there is no result. Hence, cause depends on result, result depends on cause. There is nothing without cause on the ??? cause cannot exist alone. Result cannot exist alone. Madhyamika teachers named that as ‘relative concept’ (sāpeksaka). According to the ‘relative teaching’ there is nothing in the world alone and irrelative.

According to the Madhyamika philosophy 'emptiness' means that it is not existence or non-existence. They have indicated that their is nothing independent in the world and true in the highest or ultimate sense (paramattha) according to the Buddha was mentioned as follows: 

»Na kvachit kadācit kaṃcet, 
Dhammo buddhena desita:«

In the Mūlamadhyamika Kārika they have explained that there is no difference between the Dependent Origination. Emptiness and the Middle Way: 

»Ya: pratītya samutpāda: 
Śūnyatam tam prachaksmahe, 
Ya: praknapti rupādāya, 
Pratipatti siva madhyama.«

Nāgarjuna further mentioned that there is nothing without cause and effect in the world. In the same way there is nothing in the world without emptiness. Hence Kārika has indicated:

»Sarve dharma: śūnyatā laksanāt.«

The Mahāyāna Madhyamika tradition has discussed the concepts as emptiness and relativity according to the theory of Dependent Origination in the early Buddhism, but in a different way. Consequently they gave a new interpretations to the early Buddhist teachings. Thesamsāra and Nirvāṇa concept can be refer to as another basic teaching of the Mahāyāna Madhyamika school.
When we investigate concerning early Buddhism we see certain factors that contributed to this origin of the Madyamika tradition basic. They are:

1. Attempt to introduce the new interpretation to the early Buddhist concept.
2. Attempt to give a philosophical meaning to the emptiness which mentioned of the Praanna Paramitra sutta literature.
3. Attempt to give an answer to the Sarvastivadin sutra, Sauthrantika traditions.

According to the Mahayana philosophy Madyamaka tradition was constructed on the Mahayana Prajna Paramita concept. But there is no concentration among the scholars with regarding this view because most of the scholars accepted that between the dependent origination in the early Buddhist philosophy and Emptiness in the Madyamika School.

Madyamika tradition accepts the concept of emptiness. It rejected the concept of everything exists “Saravan Asti” of the Sarvasti School and the teaching of consciousness of the Yogarcara School. Madyamaka teachings have originated according to the depended origination in the early Buddhism exactly. Dependent origination is the foundation in the Madyamaka School. They have taken the theory of “Asmin Sati idan hoti” etc. that means if there is a cause, there is a result. If there is no cause there is no result. Hence cause depends on result depend on cause. There is no anything without cause. On the other hand cause can not exist alone. Result, too. Madyamika thinkers called their teaching the relative teaching. According to this teaching all phenomena are relative nothing has independent existence.

According to the Madyamaka philosophy ‘Emptiness’ mean neither existence nor non-existence. They have indicated that is no anything independent in the world. In the Mulamadyamika karika they have explained that there is no any different among the dependent origination, Emptiness and the Middle Way. As follows,

“Ya Prateetya Samutpada: Shunyatam tam Prachkshmahe
Ya Praknapti rupadaya Pratipte siva madyama.

Nagarjuna has mentioned further that there is no anything without cause and effect in the world. In the same way there is no anything in the world without Emptiness. Hense Kakika has indicated “Sarva dharma: Shunya ta lakchanat”

The Mahayana Madyamika tradition has discussed the concepts of emptiness and relative according to the theory of dependent origination in the early Buddhism. But in different way. Consequently it has given new interpretation to the early Buddhist teachings. The Samsara and Nirvana concept can refer as on another basic teaching of the Mahayana Madyamaka School.

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The Madhyamika’s Dependent Origination

Candrakirti, the commentator of Nāgarjuna’s verses known as ’Madhyamika Kārika’ in explaining the doctrine of Dependent Origination 'pratītyasamutpāda' as described by Nāgarjuna starts with two interpretations of the word. According to one of the word pratītyasamutpādu means the origination (utpāda) of the non-existence (abhāva) depending on 'pratītya' (causes and reasons). According to the other interpretation pratītya means each and every destructible individual and pratītyasamutpāda means the origination of each and every destructible individual. But he disapproves of both these meanings. The second meaning does not suit the context in which the Pāli scriptures generally speak of Pratītyasamutpāda for it does not mean the origination of each and every destructible individual, but the originating of specific individual phenomenon depending upon certain specific conditions.

The true meaning of pratītyasamutpāda or śūnyavāda is this, that there is no truth, no essence in all phenomena that appear. As the phenomena have no essence they are neither produced nor destroyed. They really neither come nor go. They are merely the appearance of mayā or illusion. The void (śūnya) does not mean pure negation, for that is relative to some kind of position. It simply means that none of the appearances have any intrinsic nature of their own. The Madhyamika system does not hold that anything has any essence or nature (svabhāva) of its own, even heat cannot be said to be the essence of fire, for both the heat and the fire
are the results of the combination of many conditions and what depends on many conditions cannot be said to be the essence of the thing.

Nirvāṇa on the Madhyamika theory is the absence of the existence of all phenomena, that which cannot be conceived either as anything, which has ceased, or as anything which is produced (aniruddham anutpannam). In Nirvāṇa all phenomena are lost, we say that the phenomena cease to exist in Nirvāṇa, but like the illusory snake in the rope they never exist. Nirvāṇa cannot be any positive thing or any sort of state of being (bhava), for all positive states or things are joint products of combined causes and are liable to decay and destruction. Neither can it be a negative existence.

It cannot therefore be designated either as positive or as negative for these conceptions belong to phenomena. In this state there is nothing, which is known, and even the knowledge that the phenomena have ceased to appear is not found. Even the Buddha himself is a phenomenon, a mirage or a dream, and so are all His teachings. The phenomena therefore cannot be said to be either eternalism (sasvatavāda) or nihilism (ucchedavāda) and it is for this reason that this doctrine is called the 'Middle Doctrine' (madhyamika).

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666 The Madhyamaka’s Dependent Origination:

Candrakirtti, the commentator of Nagarjuna presented in explaining “pratityasamutpada” as by Nagarjuna starts with two interpretations of the word. According to one the word pratityasamutpada means the origination ‘utpada’ of the non-existent (abhava) depending on “pratitya” reasons and causes. According to the other interpretation pratitya means the origination of each and every destructible individual. But he disapproves of both these meanings.

The true meaning of pratityasamutpada or sunyavada is this, that there is no truth, no essence in all phenomena that appear. As the phenomena have no essence they are neither produced nor destroyed. They really neither come nor goes. They are merely the appearance of Mayā or illusion. The void (suñya) does not mean pure negation, for that is relative to some kind of position. It simply means that none of the appearances have any intrinsic nature of their own. The Madhyamaka system does not hold that anything has any essence or nature (svabhava) of its own, even heat cannot be said to be the essence of fire, for both the heat and the fire are the result of the combination of many conditions and what depends on many conditions cannot be said to be the essence of the thing.

Being neither come from anywhere nor go anywhere, and go, they are in a process (samsara). The supposition that there is a self who suffers changes is not valid, for however we may search we find the five skandhas but no self. Nirvana on the Madhyamaka theory is the absence of the existence of all phenomena, that which cannot be conceived either as anything, which has ceased, or as anything which is produced (aniruddham anutpannam). Nirvana cannot be any positive thing or any sort of state of being (bhava), for all positive states or things are joint products of combined causes and are liable to decay and destruction. Neither can it be a negative existence.

It cannot therefore be designated either as positive or as negative for these conceptions belong to phenomena. In this state there is nothing, which is known, and even the knowledge that the phenomena have ceased to appear is not found. Even the Buddha himself is a phenomenon, a mirage or a dream, and so are all his teachings. The phenomena therefore cannot be said to be either eternalism (sasvatavada) or nihilism (ucchedavada) and it is for this reason that this doctrine is called the Middle Doctrine (madhyamaka).
NAGARJUNA’S CRITIQUE OF PATICCASAMUPADA

18.05.07 by Hunny

Nagarjuna takes four alternatives into his consideration in order to show the contradictory nature of cause and effect theory for e.g. in his chapter on causality in Mulamadhyamikakarika, he considers the four alternatives:

1. cause and effect are same (satkaryavada)
2. cause and effect are different (asatkaryavada)
3. cause and effect are same and different (ubayahetuvada)
4. things are produced by chance (ahetuvada)

Nagarjuna argues that if cause and effect are the same, there is no point in production the effect from the cause duplicating itself. He next takes the second alternative that is cause and effect, thing they taught in different. One can not produce the other; therefore the second alternative is unattainable.

The third alternative has the short continue of both, the first two and more. Thing can not arise by chance as the fourth alternative such as. So all the alternatives on causality are contradictory in their nature, so Nagrjuna conclude that there is no a theory of causality (na svata napiparato nadyabham nappyahetum), things are not originated by themselves nor are they originated by other neither by both nor without cause. Therefore there is no origination.

With such argument, Nagarjuna disposes all the four alternative view on cause and effect in the same way, he rejected view on motion and face, Nirvana and other conception by these means, he shows the contradictory nature of conceptual thinking and the emptiness or Sunyata is the only reality.

The structure of the conception of Sunyata

Nagarjuna was the first thinker to formulat conceptual structure of Sunyata. he was thinking of conceptual Sunyata he solves that concept are either contradictory or relative to show contradictory nature of concept he took up concept of cause and effect and subject them to a grueling critique we normally think that cause proceed effect but Nagarjuna said what actually happen is that effect proceed cause because he asks how can something we are called until there is an effect this contradiction is based on effect that concept are relative as explicitly are obvious in case like good and bad, day and night etc. if they are relative they have no independence existence, hence they are empty or Sunyata.

Hua-yen Buddhism

Chinese school try to establish a relational Sunyata, everything in world is interested to everything else they clarify profound nature of reality when they maintain that everything inter-penetrate into everything else, this relationship is said to be one of simultaneous natural identity and natural inter causality therefore nature of everything is Sunyata Sunyata can be realized in term space parameter if we imagine go to end outer space glazy and look on us we can then see experience our real nature in Sunnata similarly in term of time parameter we can go to a far distance past or future and look at our present time contact and realize these real nature as Sunyata that is an existentional entry point into Sunyata because that nullify all our accumulate or action in this realm of existence through that perspective also we can realize the nature of the Sunyata.

Philosophy of Sunyata

This established relativity as nature of ultimate reality thus the relative became the absolute. It is because of this ultimate relativity or Sunyata that it became possible or Nirvana and Samsara to be identical. Sunyata is regarded as matter of everything particularly of value, the value of something depends in proportion to its degree of non availability or non existence creation of Banyan tree from emptiness of seed is an another illustration to prove motherhood of Sunyata in Mahayana tradition Sunyata is regarded feminine she is goddess called Prajnaparamita the mother of all Buddha.

Ethic of Sunyata

Sunyata forms the basis of compassing as we are all really non existence or share quality non existence we all share an equal ontological validity no one is more important than another we all have exactly the same justification for existence. Therefore as one is holy or other are equally quality moral value originate from this holiness to be moral is to enable oneself. Hua Yen’s doctrine illustrates the necessary dependent of everything on everything else therefore my existence depend on the rest of universe the rest of universe becomes my mother and mother of everything else as well so I owe a moral application to the rest of universe this imply a pervasive basis of morality as basis of existence of universe it is this basis that keep universe going thus
morality became the nature of nature

??? (Madhyamikas’ view on Paṭiccasamuppāda)

Conditioned the succeeding one. This covers three lives. They are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Past</th>
<th>Present</th>
<th>Future</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Ignorance</td>
<td>Consciousness</td>
<td>Becoming (bhava)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Activities which produce karma</td>
<td>names and forms (personality)</td>
<td>Birth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Twelve domains</td>
<td>Aging and death</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Contact (object and senses)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Sensation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Desire</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Attachment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Paṭiccasamuppāda formula can be taken as representing three periods of time, namely the past, the present and the future. Avijjā and sankhārā belong to the past. The next seven belong to the present and the last three belong to the future. To understand these it is necessary to study different sort of conditions, because only one of them is called casual condition, for example, ignorance can determine activities as an object of condition. If one decides to reduce ignorance and then because in this life one has been ignored, and acted in such a way as to produce karma.(?) The cycle continues round again. Nibbāna is often conceived of as stopping this cycle by removing the cause for craving, craving ceases.

In the very first stanza of the Madhyamika Kārika Nāgarjuna refers to four types of causal theories:

1. Self-causation (svata utpatti)
2. External-causation (parata utpatti)
3. Both self-causation and internal-causation (ubhaya)
4. Non-causation (ahetu)

After stating the four types of causal theories to criticize, the first type, self-causation is shown by Nāgarjuna as that where are self contradictions in the theory. Nāgarjuna analyzed the nature of the causal relation and says, ,,The own nature of the existence (bhava) is not found in the causes (pratya). Through causality depends on the intrinsic existence of the elements of the causal process.“ It seems that this would violate the principles of anattā, but paṭiccasamuppāda does imply any essential realities because of the interdependence of cause and effect. It is quite meaningless to talk about them as existing separately, that is causes depend on their effect in order to be cause and effect; likewise depend on their causes in order to be effect.

However, the strict identity of cause and effect is also refuted. Since if it were the cause the process of origination could not have occurred. Therefore, Nāgarjuna explained that the emptiness (śūnyatā) of causality is demonstrated by the interdependence of cause and effect.
Candrakīrtti, the commentator of Nagarjuna’s verses known as “Madhyamika karika” in explaining the doctrine of dependent origination “pratityasamutpada” as described by Nagarjuna starts with two interpretations of the word. According to one the word Pratityasamutpada means the origination ‘Utpada’ of the non-existent (Abhava) depending on “Pratitya” reasons and causes. According to the other interpretation Pratitya means each and every destructible individual and Pratityasamutpada means the origination of each and every destructible individual. But he disapproves of both these meanings. The second meaning does not suit the context in which the Pali scriptures generally speak of Pratityasamutpada for it does not mean the origination of each and every destructible individual, but the originating of specific individual phenomena depending upon certain specific conditions.

The true meaning of Pratityasamutpada or Sunyavada is this, that there is no truth, no essence in all phenomena that appear. As the phenomena have no essence they are neither produced nor destroyed. They really neither come nor goes. They are merely the appearance of Mayā or illusion. The void (Suñya) does not mean pure negation, for that is relative to some kind of position. It simply means that none of the appearances have any intrinsic nature of their own. The Madhyamaka system does not hold that anything has any essence or nature (Svabhava) of its own, even heat cannot be said to be the essence of fire, for both the heat and the fire are the result of the combination of many conditions and what depends on many condition cannot be said to be the essence of the thing.

Nirvana on the Madhyamaka theory is the absence of the existence of all phenomena, that which cannot be conceived either as anything, which has ceased, or as anything which is produced (aniruddhham Anutpannam). In Nirvana all phenomena are lost; we say that the phenomena cease to exist. Nirvana cannot be any positive thing or any sort of state of being (Bhava), for all positive states or things are joint products of combined causes and are liable to decay and destruction: Neither can it be a negative existence.

It cannot therefore be designated either as positive or as negative or as negative for these conceptions belong to phenomena. In this state there is nothing, which is known and even the knowledge that the phenomena have ceased to appear is not found. Even the Buddha himself is a phenomenon, a mirage or a dream, and so are all his teachings. The phenomena therefore cannot be said to be either externalism (Sasvatavada) or nihilism (Ucchedavada) and it is for this reason that this doctrine is called the Middle Doctrine (Mdhyamaka).

The founder of Mashytamika tradition is Ven. Nāgārjuna, as a philosopher, he has respected by all the scholars of East and west. He has compiled more than forty books concerning Mashyamaka philosophy. Mulamadhyamikakarika Viqgrahavyaratini, Saharalekā Upāya extra is some of his compiled philosophical books. Among those books Mūlamadhya Mikarika is the most important text of Madhyamika philosophy. By compiled Mūlamadhyja Mikakārika, he expected to fulfill the virtue, which could be seen in interpretation on Buddha’s preaching.

Specially, he wanted to reply Sarvāstivādins and Sautrantika interpretations. Madhyamika main theory is Suññatā. The theory of Sarvam asti of Sarvāstivādins and vinīvāda, theory of Yogācāra are rejected by Madhyamaka.

Madhyamaka philosophy has formed on paiccasamuppāda or dependent origination of origin itself. The teaching of paticcasamupāda is most important teaching in early Buddhism. All the theories in Buddhism has based on Paticcasamuppāda. In contemporary religious society there were four kinds of theory of cause and effect.

1. Sayamkata vāda. There is not different cause and effect because the effect include in cause itself. Cause and effect is
identical. This view is similar the view of Sankya and Vedanta philosophy. This view is identified as Sakkārya vāda or identical of causality.

(2) Paramkata Vāda. There is clear difference in between cause and effect. Cause and effect can identify separately. It is two things annihilationist accepted this theory in Buddha’s time. This theory has identified as Asalkavaya Vāda.

(3) Ubhayatā Vāda. This theory formed by margin about self two theories. Once they believed cause and effect as identical and on the other hand they believed cause and effect as the different two thinks.

(4) Ahetu Vāda. They do not believe any relation in between cause and effect. They believed without having any reason something can happen in determinative. Therefore, it has been identified as in determination or (Paticcasmuppāda Vāda).

Acelakassapa Sutta in S.N Buddha has rejected all four kinds of theories Buddha preaches the Dhamma following Paticcasmuppada theory, therefore Buddha said that Yo Paticcasmuppādham Passati, so dhammam passati. Yo Dhammam Passati, So Paticcasmuppādam Passati. Here the importance of Paticcasamuppāda is explained to realize the Dhamma, without understanding Paticcasamuppāda no one can understand the Dhamma.

Therefore, Buddha rejecting all the views preached the Dhamma in middle way. Further, he has explained how the suffering arising and how it can be ceased its theory depend on cause and effect theory. Imasmam Sati, Idam Hoti. When this is presented that come to be. Imssa Upāda, Idam Ujjati. From the arising of this, that arises, Immassam asti, Idam nahoti. When this is absent that does not come to be. Immassanirodhā, Idam nirujjhati. On the cessation of this, that ceases. In this way arising of suffering and ceasing of suffering has been explained. This is the theory of dependent origination. When there is ignorance Avijā then Sankhāra or formation comes to be in that way how the Sansāric suffering is happening.

To explained individual and the social suffering analyze following this method. Madhyamika philosopher have observe this theory and introduced the theory of relativity they have applied relativism to all canalizations. According to that theory nothing can be seen independently exist in the world always all things depends on other thing maturely related each other. Whole world full of such concept it is mind made.

Examine briefly the evolution of Mahayana Buddhist philosophy up to the theory of emptiness

After the one century of the demise of the Buddha, there arose many Buddhist schools and they have their own teachings. Many great teacher and great books came into existence as the result of religious, social, philosophical etc. therefore, now it is accepted that Mahayana Buddhism came into existence either in the 1st century B.C, or A.D, and some scholars who studied origin of Mahayana cite many reason that Mahayana is a development from the Mahasanghika schools which found by Nagarjuna.

However, there are some teachings in the Mahasanghika schools, especially in the Lokuttaravada branch of Mahasanghika which are later developed in Mahayana. It is seen that two distinct features in Mahayana are Development of Buddhalogy, raising the Buddha to a superhuman level and finally making him the savior of mankind and the other is Boddhisattava idea. Similarly, the Stupa worship, which became popular after the Buddha’s passing away also, is considered as a concept of Mahayana.

Further, Madhyamika which found by Nagarjuna is the one of the most important philosophical school of Mahayana. The main teaching in Madhyamika is Sunyata. Therefore, here we pay attention about the doctrine of Sunyata that should be understood. Sunyata is interpreted differently. Generally, it is rendered into English as emptiness, void ness and nothingness. Such this rendering made Sunyata to be nihilistic or annihilationist doctrine and such this interpretation have been made during the time of Nagarjuna. In fact, this point is seen from Mulamadhyamika karika itself so Nagrijuna had to clearly say that his doctrine of Sunyata is not Uccheda or Sassatavada teaching.

The doctrine of Sunyata has been so much misunderstood that Nagarjuna warns those who mistake his teaching that would fall into great harm just as one who holds a serpent gets destroyed by the serpent itself and Sunyata is not another view but reality and true nature of all things, according to this, he rejected the Svabhava-own nature-teaching put forward by the Sarvastivada. So, Nagarjuna point-out that the view of Svabhava is totally against the Buddha’s basic teaching of Paticcasamupāda.
According to the Sarvastivadins everything is a Dharma has two aspects. One is Svabhava, a metaphysical aspect which persists during all three periods of time. The other is the Karitra, the activity aspect of Dharma that is the appearance of the Dharma in the present time. This Svabhava is always present (Sarvam Asti), so Nagarjuna pointed out this Svabhava is going to against the Aniccata teaching of the Buddha.

Besides that, Nagarjuna denied the teaching of the Abhidhamma schools that accepted the existence of Dhamma and attempted to show that their teachings are not in accordance with the Dependent Origination. For expel; Sarve Dharmh: Sunnyata Lakshana: (All the Dhamma have the characteristic of emptiness). Thus, he teach the emptiness of Dhamma as well as of Puggala (individual) and Madhyamika advocated all Dhamma are dependent on each other and devoid their own nature therefore, they are emptiness. In this sense Nagarjuna identified Sunnyat with the doctrine of Paticcasamupāda. In fact; this is the real significance of the teaching of Sunnyata.

**666The Mahayana Madhyamaka School**

According to the historical evidences eighteen Buddhist schools had originated as a result of the forth Buddhist council and previous situation but basically there are four Buddhist schools one of them was the Madyamaka school. Madyamaka School has originated based on different reasons such as religious, historical, sociological, and philosophical, that was developed within long period. They are, roots of the Mahayana schools, teachings among the schools, contemporary religious and philosophical background, Mahayana literature of Sutra, separation of the Mahayana and Theravada schools etc.

Basically based on these reasons and evidences had originated there teachings are: 1 Buddha concept, 2 Bodhisatva concept, 3 Teaching of Threekaya, 4 Sansara and Nirvana concept, 5 Concept of Emptiness etc.

There are three Mahayana traditions; they are Madyamaka tradition, Yogarcara Vinnavadaya, Tantrayanaya. According to the historical evidences most of the scholars that first Mahayana Buddhist School was originated during the time of the 100-150 century A.D. that means 600 yare later passing away of the Buddha. During that period there had been different translation, revisions accordingly first, second and third Buddhist council and Mahayana literature of Sutta.

Thus, Mahayana tradition has expended and originated Madyamaka School as a result introduction of the Sapekshaka concept. Consequently Shunyata was too developed in this school and it has depends on Upanishad philosophy. Madyamika philosophy was developed very quickly during the time of 150-250 A.D be endowed with Nagarjuna. This school has named as Madynmika because Madyamika philosophy had originated dependant on the Middle way, it had introduced and followed as the middle path except the annihilation and eternity views as well as without the existence and non-existence. They had been introduced this name for their tradition by them selves. Madyamaka School was the most famous school in the Mahayana tradition and it has very deep logic system.

Nagarjuna is the founder (adi katru varaya) of the Madyamika tradition and he was the greatest philosopher borned in this school. He has borned in the Brahmana caste and attained different knowledge. Later he had became a Buddhist monk and was a very famous scholar in the estern and western countries. Most of the scholars accept that Nagarjuna had wrote more that 40 books but more books of them is non-existent. Mulamaduamika karika is the main book in the Madyamaka philosophy and it has mentioned basic concepts in this school.

When we investigate concerning the early Buddhism some matters had been influenced to origin of the Madyamika tradition basically. They are:

1. Attempt to introduce the new interpretation to the early Buddhist concept which depends early Buddhist teaching.
2. Attempt to give a philosophical weaning to the emptiness which mentioned of the Praanna Paramitra sutta literature.
3. Attempt to give an answer to the Saravastivadin Sauthrantiika traditions.

According to the Mahayana philosophy Madyamika tradition had constricted on the Mahayana Pranna Paramita concept. But there is no concentration among the scholars with regarding this view because most of the scholars accepted that between the dependent origination in merely Buddhist philosophy and Emptiness in the Madyamika School. A punt from that Mulamadymamak karika is the main book in the Madyamaka School, which has mentioned the concept of emptiness. But there is no any information in this book with regarding the Pranna Paramita sutras. But according to the Mahayana scholars this concept had taken from the Mahayana philosophy. There is no more evidence to prove it.

Mahayana Madyamika tradition has accepted the concept of emptiness only. Therefore it can refer as a basic concept in the Madyamaka School. They have rejected the concept of everything exists “Saravan Asti” as the Sarvasti School and the teaching of consciousness of the Yogarcara School. Because Madyamaka teachings have originated according to the depended origination in the
early Buddhism exactly. Dependent origination is the foundation in the Madyamaka School. They have taken the theory of “Asmin Sati idan hoti” etc. that means if there is a cause, there is a result. If there is no cause there is no result. Hence cause depends on result depend on cause. There is no anything without cause. On the other hand cause can not exist alone. Result, too. Madyamika thinkers that has named as relative concept, according to the relative teaching there is no anything in the world along and unrelative.

According to the Madyamaka philosophy ‘Emptiness’ mean is not existence or non-existence. They have indicated that is no anything independent in the world and true in the highest or ultimate sense (Paramattha) according to the Buddha. it has mentioned as follows.

“Na kvachit kadachit kaschit Darmo Buddhena desita” in the Mulamadyamika karika they have explained that there is no any different among the dependent origination. Emptiness and the middle way. As follows,

“Ya Prateetya Samutpada: Shunyatam tam Prachkshmahe
Ya Praknapti rupadaya Pratipte siva madyama.

Nagarjuna has mentioned further that there is no anything without cause and effect in the world. In the same way there is no anything in the world without Emptiness. Hence darika has indicated “Sarva dharma: Shunya ta lakchanat”

The Mahayana Madyamika tradition has discussed the concepts of emptiness and relative according to the theory of dependent origination in the early Buddhism. But in different way. Consequently the have given new interpretation to the early Buddhist teachings. The Samsara and Nirvana concept can refer as on another basic teaching of the Mahayana Madyamaka School.

THE MAHYANA MADYAMAKA SCHOOL

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- Madya = middle. Madya + ika (belong) = Madyamika
- Sautrantika – thoery of moment, extreme thus becom nothingless
- Sarvastivada – existence
- Therefore, these two look like the theory of ucchedavada and sassatavada.
- Yogacara – vijbavada: primary. Therefore according to Nagarjuna their theories seems extreme, and he establishes middle way according to the Buddha’s teachings.
- Nagarjuna – anubuddha, i.e., the sun among the Buddhist philosophers.

Notes:

The Buddhist tradition which flourished in Northern India called Madhyamika named themselves so as they prevented all the fanatic philosophical explains. According to them, it was the Buddha’s standpoint that middle path does not flow into any extreme. The master himself introduced his teachings as Middle Path (majjhimapatipada). The intellectual milieu (surrounding) of Madhyamikas was full of different views regarding the Buddhist teachings. They attempted to hold their philosopphy in the Middle position. They neither accepted nor rejected theory and practice, but maintained the middle path. They developed into maximum, subtle, deep logic to explain the theory of voidness ‘wunyatavada’.

The founder of this tradition was Nagarjuna who is said to have lived around 150–200 A.D. He was born a brahmin having a thorough knowledge of traditional brahmin education he entered to the Order and studied the Buddhist philosophies of interest at that time. After the Buddhat education, having come to the conclusion that no school present the true words of the Buddha, he composed several discourses called Madhyamikasutra. According to the scholars like T.R.V. Murti, he has composed over 40 texts, only a very few of themremain today. Among his works, the following are well-known:

(1) Mulamadhyamikakarika
(2) Vigrahavivartani
(3) Yukti shasathika
(4) Upayakauwalya
(5) Suhrlleka

There were written in Sanskrit. Today Chinese translation of them are available. Nagarjuna is considered to be one of the great Buddhist thinkers all over the Buddhist world. By Mahayanists he was called second Buddha or the sun among the Buddhist philosophers. He was followed by the large number of students who are well-known in the history of Buddhist thought. Aryadeva the author of cataswatakata was well-known among the pupils of Nagarjuna. The scholars have found evidences to prove that Aryadeva was a Sri Lankan. There are 6 more well-known disciples of Nagarjuna.

(1) Buddhpalita
(2) Candrakriti
As many Mahayana Buddhist schools were influenced by Madhyamika teachings, it is considered as the foundation of Mahayanism. The philosophical teachings of this tradition consists of two main aspects:

1. They developed a philosophical approach to the theory of voidness which came in prajbaparamita literature.
2. They pointed out and criticized the weaknesses of fundamental Buddhist teachings of different schools.

Madhyamikas developed the theory of voidness, thereby they criticized the philosophical teachings of Sautrantikas, Sarvastivadins and Vijbanavadins. They based their philosophy on the theory of causality. They accept it as the fundamental of all the original teachings of the Buddha.

There are 4 theories which against the causality:

2. Paramkatavada – cause is one, and result is one; e.g. milk is one, ghee is one. → Theory of external-causation.
3. Ubhayatavada – cause and effect is one, cause and effect is two (the above two) → Theory of causation both (i.e., the above two).

According to Madhyamika the theory of wunyata based on causality was directed at refuting the four theory of causation, namely sayamkatavada, paramkatavada, ubhayatavada and ahetuvada. These 4 theories are refused by the Buddha in the Acetakassapasutta of Sajyutta Nikaya. In Majjhima Nikaya I, Buddha says this: “whoever that sees paticcasamuppada sees the doctrine, who sees the doctrine sees the paticcasamuppada”. Based on this, the Buddha explained the human existence and the cause for it. In the Mahavaggapali of Vinaya Pitaka, Ven. Asajji addressing young man Kolita said the following:

“Ye dhamma hetuppabhava, tesam hetu kathagato aha. Yesabca nirodho evaj vadi mahasamano”
Those things arose due to causes, the well gone one said the reason for it (he also said) they are ceasing thus is said by the great recluse.

Madhyamika developed the philosophical theory of voidness based on the words of the Buddha such as above. There by no view was accepted by them to be correct except the voidness. By the logic they employed to construct the theory of voidness, the views of other Buddhist philosophical traditions were given out. They said the Buddha has taught one and same doctrine by using two levels of language called samvrti (conventional) and paramartha / paramatta (ultimate or absolute). “vyawahana manasratya na desyate, paramarta managamy a nirvanaj nadhigamyate” (Mulamadhyamika-karika) – without using common language no ultimate truth is preached. Without understanding ultimate truth no emancipation can be realized.

Madhyamikas avoided and criticized all the extremists philosophical ideas. According to them none of them was related to the real teachings. Buddha preached the doctrine not to hold the views but dispel all the views. Views do not direct the person to the ultimate truth. Taking this early Buddhist standpoint, Madhyamika neither accept nor develop any view apart from wunyata.
After the 4th Buddhist Council held during the time of Kaniska, Madhyamika philosophy came into being. Generally, Nagarjuna (150-250 AD) is considered the founder of this school. His Mulamadhyamakakarika has devoted most in the repudiation of the doctrines of other schools on one hand, and the establishment of the doctrine of ‘Middle Way’ which is a synonym of Wunyata, on the other. However, evidences within the Mulamadhyamikakarika showing that, Madhyamika school was developed out from several sources.

In the Dhammacakappavattanasuta, the Buddha mentions that Truth does not lie in the extreme alternatives but in the Middle Path (Majjhimapatipada). Early Buddhists generally referred the concept of Middle Path in ethical sense, in the sense of avoiding two extremes of sensual indulgence and self-mortification. However, Nagarjuna based on the Kaccayanaagottasutta, emphasized the Majjhimapatipada as the Middle Path of avoiding two views i.e., bhava (existence) and abhava (non-existence). It is on this basis that Nagarjuna called his philosophy ‘Madhyamika’.

The concept of Wunyata is also not new, it is found in early Buddhism too. However, it is refer to the nature of anicca or dukkha in early suttas e.g, wubbato lokaj (Suttanipata). For Nagarjuna, what is meant by Wunyata, is actually Paticcasamuppada on its account of anatta on one hand, and the Ultimate Reality, Nirvana on the other. He employed the relativity concept of paticcasamuppada to reject both Sassatavada and Ucchedavada. By the negation of these two extremes, the theory of Majjhimapatipada thus develops into Wunyata. In this way, Paticcasamuppada, Wunyata and Majjhimapatipada are synonyms. Nagarjuna says:

Yah pratithyasamuppadah wunyataj taj pracaksmaha
sa prabaptir upadaya pratipat saiva madhyama—karika, chapter 24. verse 18.

We states that whatever is dependent arising, that is emptiness. That is dependent upon convention. That itself is the middle path. Thus, we observe that Nagarjuna modified the Dhamma in early suttas viz. paticcasamuppada, subbata and majjhimapatipada and equalized them into synonyms as the philosophy of Madhyamika school.

Historically, it was due to the repudiation of various views of both Buddhist and non-Buddhist schools that the philosophy of Madhyamika was developed, especially the views of Sarvastivada and Sautrantika.

Sarvastivada advocated an identity theory of causality (satkaryavadana) which is the first of the 4 theories (svata utpatti) rejected by Nagarjuna in his karika. The Svabhava (self-nature) of Sarvastivada is the essence of each and everything which ever exists in all periods of time. Everything changes in course of time, but its self-nature will not change i.e., the cause and the effect are having the sameness.

In Mulamadhyamikakarika, Nagarjuna employed the relativity concept of paticcasamuppada to reject the Svabhava theory. He argued that if self-nature of the effect were to be found in the cause, the production would be meaningless (vaiyartha) for there would be a duplication, but not the coming of something new. A seed would produce only another seed, not a tree which is of different nature.

Against the Svabhava theory of Sarvastivada, Sautrantika maintains that everything is ever changing, nothing has its duration of unchanging identity. Sautratika only accepts the present as real, the past and future are not real. However, the present is also without any duration. Therefore, Sautrantika maintains the nonidentity theory of substance (asatkaryavadana) i.e., the cause and effect are different.

For Nagarjuna, nonidentity is ‘parata utpatti’ and it should be rejected also. Here, Nagarjuna employed the dialectic approach in rejecting parata utpatti. He says that in the absent of self-nature, there cannot be other-nature. Self-nature and other-nature are relative, without any one of them, the other cannot exist e.g., one can speak of the day only if there is the night, if there is not day, how can there be something called night?

Thus with the basis concept of Dhamma in early Buddhism, especially paticcasamuppada, subbata and majjhimapatipada, and by the repudiation of latter concept of Dhamma in various schools, with dialectical approach, Nagarjuna successfully established his philosophy of Transcendentalism.

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**666WHETHER NAGARJUNA IS A MAHYANIST OR NOT BY PROFESSOR VAN DHAMMAJOTI 2002**

In the whole of MMK, there is no mention of any Mahayana sûtras by name nor any quotation can be identified. The second point is that, you don’t find passages or any notion that can be traced in Mahayana texts. Of course, there is a simile in chapter 24 to describe those who were terribly misunderstood the teaching of wunyata is like catching the snake from the wrong hand, or like someone harm
others by mantra. This simile is found in the Ratnakūṭa also. Is it that Nāgārjuna quoted from this sūtra? Such simile is a common simile used by various Buddhists. Thus we cannot prove that he has quoted in directly from any Mahāyāna works. This also cannot be accepted. Thirdly, there is no basically Mahāyāna terminology. What are the Mahāyānic term? Example, Bodhicitta [to give rise to Bodhicitta, means to be a real Bodhisattva in Mahāyāna sense, that is the cosmic experience in which one has the will of universal salvation arisen in him. When that arises in him, he doesn’t concern with himself, he concerns with the salvation of all beings.] Another one is Upāya-kauśalya (the skillfulness in the means). These are important Mahāyāna concepts, which convey the idea that a Bodhisattva must know what is the best way to save different types of beings. Bodhisattva is the one who is concerned with the salvation of everybody. Thus he must know beings are different, and develop different upāya-kauśalya. But in MMK, there are no such terms.

Nāgārjuna was in the period of late 2nd century AD to the early part of 3rd century AD. Anyway by this period, certainly there have been developed a large number of prajñā-pāramitā. We have seen Prajñā-pāramitā was in the period of 1st century BC to 1st century AD, with the theme of śānyatā. Nāgārjuna also talked about śānyatā. If he were a Mahāyānist, he could have been natural for him at least to quote from Prajñā-pāramitā. But no any reference to it. Also, whatever mentioned of the Buddha’s teaching can be found in the earlier texts such as 5 nikāya or āgama, for example, prāṣāda-samutpāda, four Noble truths, etc. Thus considering these facts, we can’t say Nāgārjuna was a Mahāyānist. There is no evidence to show he is a Mahāyānist. Thus this is strong enough to question them whether Nāgārjuna was teaching Mahāyāna or not.

However, there is one work which is controversial, that is the Mahāprajñā-pāramitā upadeśa (Tātra 大智度論). This is said to be Mahāyāna work that is quoted more often than any other Mahāyāna works. This work is the commentary of the Mahāprajñā-pāramitā sūtra. According to Chinese tradition, this work was ascribed to Nāgārjuna also. If indeed this work is by Nāgārjuna, then we can be sure that Nāgārjuna was a Mahāyānist. Again the authorship has been questioned by modern scholars, especially Lamotte. Lamotte questions whether that work is by Nāgārjuna or not. Because the description was only from the Chinese sources. No any Indian sources tell us that this work was by Nāgārjuna, nor even in Tibetan sources. Still it is debated.

Apart from this questionable description, all the other works agree to be authored by Nāgārjuna, we can say, there is no evidence to show Nāgārjuna was a Mahāyānist. If he is not Mahāyānist, who is he? He seems to us to be Buddhist who is interested in the real teaching of the Buddha. He saw at that time, Buddhism was developing in the wrong direction, especially Sarvāstivāda developed the idea of svabhāva. In his work, he criticizes mainly the Sarvāstivāda, others also he criticizes like Saṅkhyā philosophy, Vaibhāṣika philosophy.

On the safe side, Nāgārjuna was a Buddhist, he concerned with the wrong direction in which Buddhists were heading, and he wanted to rectify them. So his whole criticism is centered around the svabhāva, and that concept was evolved in the Abhidharma period. The first thing to stick in the mind is that, you have two opposite ways of looking at things: 1. Svabhāva way of looking at thing; 2. śānyatā way of looking at thing. Nāgārjuna wants to show, if your view point is that of svabhāva, you are going to end up with troubles, because you will not be able to establish any Buddhist doctrine at all. Of course, Sarvāstivādin was very careful to defense themselves, arguing that svabhāva is not like ātman. Svabhāva is something that involved in the time process. In brief, this is the standpoint of Sarvāstivāda. Every dharma has the aspect of svabhāva (dravya, svalakṣaṇa), the intrinsic nature does not change in time, but kārītra changes and momentary.

Nāgārjuna says, if you start from svabhāva standpoint, then, there will be no possible of change, thus cannot establish cause and effect relationship, 3-ratna, dukkha satya, samudaya satya, nirodha satya, etc. In this way, you will be negating each and every important teaching of the Buddha.

Sometimes, Nāgārjuna would not be very fair either. Sarvāstivādin also tries to be good Buddhists, they have a way to explain change. But that way is not accepted by Nāgārjuna. Sometimes, it would be unfair not to understand the opponent real standpoint. For instance, svabhāva, they say svabhāva is ‘sarvadā asti’, but not nitya. It means svabhāva is also anitya. From their own standpoint, they make it very clear that they are not talking about something that never change.

What Nāgārjuna meant when he say everything is empty? “All dharmas are śānyya (empty)” – what does it mean? All dharmas are śānyya, because they have no svabhāva. śānyya doesn’t mean nihilism. Svabhāva is understood by Nāgārjuna as something that forever doesn’t change.

According to the Buddha, everything is prataṣṭya-samutpāda. The so-called thing is just a process, just an event that takes place where the assemblage or conditions are gathered together. So the co-called thing or event is totally dependent on various factors. How can you say that thing has sovereignty, mastery or self-independent. So in that sense, ‘things are empty’.

So ‘all things are empty’ means:-
1. Because there is no svabhāva;
2. There is no svabhāva, because they are pratyaya-samutpanna. Everything is dependently arisen. This is the gist of philosophy of śānyatā. Once you have understood this, Nāgārjuna says he has nothing new to offer.

The first proposition held by Śūkhyā philosophy:- the thing of one unitary substance. That unitary substance is manifesting itself in universe in different forms. So when you say, a fruit (phala) or effect arises, there is nothing new, actually is that thing itself that manifested as an effect. Again it will change back to the self and manifest into another form. The manifestation of whole universe is from one unitary substance.

The second proposition is held by Vaiśeṣika:- they say the cause and effect are totally different entities. Some have the function of cause; some have the function of effect, etc.

The third proposition is held by Jaini. In the case of Buddhism, we have Sarvāstivāda. At least, one way of understanding of Sarvāstivāda is to speak in term of arising from both svabhāva itself as well as pratyaya. They say thing in itself existing in svabhāva, but it cannot arise, unless there are pratyaya. It is the combination of these.

The fourth proposition is held by Materialist.

When Nāgārjuna negates all these, what he has negated is the total possibility of arising on the assumption of existent having svabhāva, ie., arising is not possible if think in term of svabhāva, What he means ‘existent thing do not have svabhāva, i.e. empty.’

The first stanza spells out the fundamental thought of Nāgārjuna’s teaching of emptiness, that is, according to him, the Buddha’s teaching also.

We have seen in some details why the first case is not possible.

Further elaboration

Why an entity cannot arise by itself? [- by itself as an absolute permanent entity.]

Arising by itself as svabhāva, these two things are contradiction in terms. When you have a svabhāva, that thing is already there. So it makes no sense to talk about the arising of it. Arising and Existent in svabhāva are contradiction in terms.

If I have a thing called fruit or effect, so it must arises from a cause. So the effect is produced from a cause. That means, there must be subject (cause) and object (effect). So from this point of view, is also contradiction in terms to say there is an effect. So what does it mean by itself? Whatever that arises - never arises by itself. Whatever that by itself never arises. Because it must arises due to some causes.

When you say subject and object, how can you talk about that itself, the thing by itself has no Subject-Object. Therefore arising implies arising by a cause (subject) and effect (object). That is the ‘Subject-Object’ involved. From this point of view, it is a contradiction in terms to speak of a thing arising by itself. So this is a point that we can elaborate, pointing out the contradiction. Therefore it is the contradiction to speak of self-arising.

Secondly, when you say something arises, that something must be different from the state when it is not arisen yet. Otherwise there is no arising. It is the same state, then what is the arising? Arising means that new thing arises. From this point of view also, we can see a contradiction. But then, you are talking a svabhāva which doesn’t change in its nature. So it cannot have a different state. Thus, the arising is contradiction in term.

If I were a Sarvāstivādin, I would say Nāgārjuna is not always fair. Sometimes it is a matter of standpoint. If you study Abhidharma,
you would see they were arguing this one, they say, “Why not, a thing can be called svabhāva, at the same time, it can have different stats.” For instance, they say ‘fire’. The nature of fire is the same. But then you have straw-fire, wood-fire, etc. Likewise feeling, you have pleasurable feeling, etc. - feeling in different state. Though they assume different state, their integrity of intrinsic nature remains the same. That is the way the opponent understands. Therefore they would not accept this. But for Nāgārjuna, the different states mean different things. Because whatever that is arisen is whatever that exists. From this point of view, Nāgārjuna would say like this, “if you say there is a new thing that arises, you are saying that it is not arisen by itself, because it must have different things. Because what is svabhāva in itself never change.”

Secondly, whatever exists is whatever arises. But the different standpoint of ābhidharmika is this, they say, ‘No, we should think in terms of thing existing in itself as a svabhāva, and it arises in the phenomenal world. These two are different things. When it arises in the phenomenal world, it assumes different form, different bhava (state). Thus ābhidharmikas argue that you actually can speak of svabhāva having different forms. For Nāgārjuna, he would not allow that, because anything arising in any form is a new thing. So it involves two very different standpoints.

Ultimately Nāgārjuna would have to appeal to experience. He says, ‘logic itself can go a long way, but sometimes it can’t solve the problem in the final analysis.’ So Nāgārjuna would still have to appeal to the experience of the Buddha. The whole purpose of Nāgārjuna’s logical argument is not to win as a logician, but to press you to think for yourself that all kinds of contradiction that evolved by assuming a svabhāva. Why? Because the Buddha has taught there is no svabhāva. That is his starting point. The Buddha has taught everything is pratītya-samutpāda. So that is the purpose of his logical argument.

Thirdly, if anything can simply arise by itself, it would lead to infinite arising.

So we can see that though he mentions all the 4 possibilities, his focus is on this arising. The whole thing is the ‘P - is it arising as a svabhāva?’ He wants to disprove that. Then he can concludes that everything is empty. Having done that, Nāgārjuna continue to examine his idea of svabhāva. He tries to disprove svabhāva by arguing that there cannot be anything if there is svabhāva. Secondly for ābhidharmikas, they talked about prataya.

The third position, there are svabhāva, but then we would say svabhāva by itself cannot arise. Nāgārjuna must show that there can’t be arising from svabhāva. First he has shown there can’t be arising from svabhāva itself. The second step is that he is going to show that what you talk about as prataya, I am going to refute it, so that it is nonsensical, illogical to talk about the arising from svabhāva. When that also is done, then you have to admit there is no arising, no svabhāva.

**No arising from Prataya**

**Verse II :**  
\[
\text{catvārāḥ pratayāḥ hetevāśālampananantarāḥ} / \  
tathaivaśādhipateyaḥ ca pratayayo nāsti pācama//
\]

The second point is, ‘no arising from prataya of an entity having a svabhāva.’ According to Sarvāstivāda, they teach that thing arises from 4 types of prataya.

1. Hetu prataya
2. Ālambanā prataya
3. Samanantara prataya
4. Adhipati prataya

Nāgārjuna says ‘you people teach there are only 4 types of prataya. There is not a fifth one. If everything arises, it must arise by the help of one of these 4 pratayas. There isn’t a fifth one. For the time being, let me agree with you for the sake of argument. I am going to prove that each of this cannot be established. When I can prove that each of this cannot be established, and seems you say there is not a fifth one, then also it seems that you are saying that whatever that arises, arises with the help of these 4, then you have to admit that there cannot be any arising’

Nāgārjuna is going to refute / disprove the validity of each of these 4. Prataya is also talked of in term of svabhāva. In another words, prataya are things that are in their intrinsic nature - prataya. Conditions are things which are intrinsically condition. That is the way of thinking of people having the idea of svabhāva. That type of prataya, Nāgārjuna refutes. He is saying that there are no prataya which are intrinsically prataya by itself.
If you look at that, pratyaya is simply a term given to anything that helps the arising of another. If you look at that way, it is perfectly accepted by Nāgārjuna.

Sarvāstivāda teaches 6 hetu and 4 pratyaya.

1. Hetu pratyaya: It is a kind of pratyaya [pratyaya is that something that helps as a subsidiary condition] – it is a condition functioning as a main cause in the production; condition quo cause- in its capacity as a cause. For example, if you grow a tree, what is the main cause? The seed is called the hetu-pratyaya. In Sarvāstivādin system, eventually they articulate the meaning of these two, hetu and pratyaya. Hetu is the fundamental basis, that is singular; pratyaya is secondary, or just supportive. And it can be common. For example: the seed is singular (one type of seed), so the pratyaya is that: water, sunlight, human effort. Pratyaya is that something that can be shared. (we shall see them in details in Abhidharma class.)

2. Ālambana pratyaya: condition quo object - in its capacity as an object. For Sarvāstivādin, they say all 4 pratyayas are taught by the Buddha. This set of 4 are mentioned in the sūtra. When we perceive something, let’s say, the eye perceives śīla (external form). Here there are two pratyayas involved. The śīla-indriya and ālambana. That object as much as eye, both are pratyayas. Therefore object as contributing factor is called ālambana pratyaya. The object itself is contributing to the arising of effect, that itself is called pratyaya.

3. Samanantara pratyaya (immediate condition; equal and immediate condition) – here it applies to the case of citta-caitta. In citta-caitta series, supposing you have one kuśala thought, the next moment, that series goes on as a kuśala thought … . what happening is that, they say, at a particular time, ‘T’ is conditioned by this citta that precedes it immediately. The preceding one functions as samanantara-pratyaya. This is a homogeneous series of thought, where you have kuśala thought, that kuśala thought continues in a series, what happening is that, the citta in the previous kuśala function as a condition for the arising of immediately succeeding moment of thought. The next moment of thought again function as condition for the arising of next moment of thought, which again function as a condition for the arising of next moment of thought. At any time, the thought which is immediately preceding is called samanantara pratyaya.

4. Adhipati pratyaya (ādhipateya) [condition of predominant] – it sounds like the first one. It means the generic condition. If ‘A’ and ‘B’, if ‘B’ arises, through some kinds of helps of ‘A’, A can be considered as adhipati condition. In another word, it will include whatever cases which are not included above. What is more, even in the negative sense, for instance, if dharma arises by another dharma, let’s say, I have ‘X’, that ‘X’ arises mainly because of dharma ‘A’. Any other dharmas ‘B’, ‘C’, ‘D’ etc., that helps to arise can be called adhipati-pratyaya. Not only that, there may be various other dharmas, which don’t take part at all or which don’t help at all the arising of ‘X’, but they don’t obstruct the arising of ‘X’. Even by the fact that do not obstruct, that is also a contribution. Because if it obstructs, ‘X’ cannot comes out. The fact that ‘X’ can be produced is because these dharmas do not obstruct it.

Sarvāstivāda has a theory that anything arises, must arises from either one of these, or the combination of that four pratyaya. Nāgārjuna refutes their pratyaya having intrinsic nature. Nāgārjuna says, pratyaya is just a name, in the causal-relationship, when ‘A’ produces ‘B’, we say ‘A’ is pratyaya for ‘B’. A cannot be in intrinsic nature be a pratyaya, it can only be considered as pratyaya in dynamic process of production.

Continue…

Prepared by Dhammapala
the purpose of this statement is to point out the alternatives in this kind of consideration, and thereby forcing the opponents into a dilemma.

Verse 3:

如諸法自性
不在於緣中, 以無自性故, 他性亦復無

Na hi svabhāvo bhūtvān pratyayādālu vidyate/
avidyāmāne svabhāve parabhāvo na vidyate/

Lit: Indeed, the ‘svabhāva’ of existent things is not found in the conditions. When the svabhāva is not existing, the parabhāva is not found.

You can take this as the general statement of the Nāgārjuna position. There is no such thing called svabhāva. Or you can take it also as an argument in itself – that means svabhāva is not found among pratyayas. According to Mādhyamika, what exist is what arises. You can’t have a thing that doesn’t arise, and yet you can say exist. The so-called thing arises, actually an event occur when pratyayas A,B,C,D come together. You can’t find a thing inside. That is just a coming together of pratyayas of A,B,C,D. Thus, you can’t say there is a svabhāva (I entity). For example, onion. Onion has different leaves that make up the onion. You can’t find the onion inside. The so-called ‘bhūva’ (existent) is just an event occurs when conditions come together. Just as different leaves of onion (like pratyayas). You can’t find a thing inside there (onion). Thus svabhāva cannot be found in existent thing. An existent is something that arises, so that thing arises is due to the coming together of pratyayas, then you can’t find a thing called svabhāva among those pratyayas.

If ‘A’ is svabhāva, then, ‘B’ with regard to ‘A’, ‘B’ is parabhāva. From the point of view of ‘A’, the svabhāva of ‘B’ is parabhāva. From the point of view of ‘B’, the svabhāva of ‘A’ is parabhāva. It is just looking svabhāva from the different point of views. They are relative. If you understand that there is no svabhāva of anything, then you can’t say there is parabhāva. In this verse, Nāgārjuna immediately negates the idea of svabhāva and parabhāva. Parabhāva is simply the concept relative to svabhāva.

This verse is an important statement because he started by saying there is no svabhāva in any existent thing.

Nāgārjuna put the opponents into a dilemma. He must give an alternatives.

Verse 4:

果為從緣生, 為從非緣生, 是緣為有果, 是緣為無果

kriyā na pratyayavati niḥpratyayavatā kriyā /
pratyayā niḥkriyāvanti kriyāvantiḥca santyuta/

Lit: Either the causal activity possess pratyaya, or not possess the pratyaya. Pratyaya do not possess causal activity, nor they possess causal activity.

The Sanskrit translation is a bit ambiguous. Then look at the Chinese translation:-

Chinese translation:-

Is the fruit (phala) produced from pratyaya, or is it produced from apratyaya? Does the pratyaya contain the fruit, or does the pratyaya does not contain the fruit?

The first alternative dilemma:- You have a thing called ‘X’ from which a fruit is produced. Look at the nature of this, is it a ‘pratyaya’ or ‘apratyaya’? In fact, Nāgārjuna wanted to show both are impossible. The other alternative dilemma :- ‘Y’ as a fruit comes from ‘X’. Is ‘Y’ already inside, or is not inside? Without going through the answer that follows, we can see Nāgārjuna tried to put the opponent to the corner.

If ‘Y’ fruit is already in pratyaya, then why is the meaning of talking about fruit arising? - It is already there, if the fruit is not in the pratyaya, from where it comes? In another word, ‘X’ and ‘Y’ are completely different, then you can’t link the two together. Thus we can anticipate in both cases, there are problems.

These two verses are in the form of general statement to put the opponent into difficult situation. Having stated this, he proceeded to prove one by one. First, he is going to refute the hetu-pratyaya (from verse 5-7). Hetu-pratyaya is a primary cause.
A fruit (phalam) is produced, depending on these [A, B, C, D], thus, these are called pratyayas. So long as the phala is not produced, there, to that extent, why they are not apratyaya?

In other word, pratyaya is not something that has that power to act as the primary cause in itself. A pratyaya is called pratyaya only in dynamic process. Depending on A, B, C, D, then ‘Y’ arises. When you have process where a fruit ‘Y’ arises from various pratyayas, in that condition, A, B, C, D is the pratyaya of ‘Y’. Only when they are doing the function of producing a fruit, then we can call them a pratyaya. We call something a pratyaya only when it is doing that work of producing a fruit. In that dynamic causal relationship of process, that activity is not inherent in the pratyayas. Likewise, the pratyaya-ness (the nature of pratyaya) is not something that is static, that inherent, in that activity. In other word, a thing called pratyaya has meaning only in that very actual process where you have a fruit arising from various conditions.

So we don’t have pratyayas in the sense of svabhāva by nature they are pratyaya. Example: when cakṣu sees the rīpa, and produce cakṣu-vijñāna, then both the cakṣu and rīpa become pratyaya. So neither cakṣu nor rīpa by nature is pratyaya. But when they worked together and produced a phala, and at that time only you can call them pratyaya. Outside the situation, you can’t call the pratyaya. So nothing is inherent here.

You have various dharmas called A, B, C, D, then they give rise to a fruit ‘X’. Nāgārjuna says actually A, B, C, D, you can’t say they are pratyaya in inherent nature. But when it is happening like this in the causal process when A, B, C, D come together and give rise to ‘X’, at that time only you can say A, B, C, D are pratyayas.

At the time when fruit is not arisen, why not call them apratyaya – so long as the fruit is not produced, why not called them apratyaya?

Therefore we can see ‘pratyaya’ and ‘apratyaya’ are just concept. They have meaning only when they perform the function.

Pratyaya can only has meaning in the actual dynamic process where they are doing the function of producing the fruit. Outside the situation, why not call them apratyaya?

Thus there is no a thing called pratyaya as inherent nature.

**Verse 6:**

果先於緣中，有無俱不可，先無為誰緣，先有何用緣

naivāsato naiva satāḥ pratyayo ‘rthaśya yuyate/

(na-eva-asatāḥ na-eva satāḥ pratyayāḥ arthaśya yuyate)

asatāḥ pratyayāḥ kasya satāca pratyayena kī //

Lit. Neither the pratyaya of a thing which is non-existing, nor of a thing which is existing, is logical / possible. Of what is a pratyaya of something which is non-existing, and what is the use of pratyaya of something which is already existing.

- Means we can’t have ‘X’ pratyaya of ‘Y’ if ‘Y’ is sat (existing) or asat (non-existing), both cases is not possible also. The 2 cases are, either you say ‘Y’ already in ‘X’ or ‘Y’ is not in ‘X’. When you have pratyaya produces a fruit, you inquire there are these two possibilities:-

1. Fruit is already existing in pratyaya;
2. Fruit is not existing in pratyaya.

Nāgārjuna says both - ‘na yuyate’. Why? The second line of verse 6 is explained.

Considering the fruit is non-existing in pratyaya, means there is nothing. How can you talk about pratyaya of something which is nothing. If ‘P’ produces ‘F’, then we say ‘P’ is pratyaya of ‘F’. If ‘F’ is not existing, what is that P of what? (kasya)

The another alternative, on the other hand, if you say the fruit is already in pratyaya, it is already there. It doesn’t mean a pratyaya is already existing. So ‘pratyayena kī’ – what is the use of pratyaya?
That means, whether you take the first or the second alternatives, both cases are meaningless. Nīgārjuna says, if you consider pratyaya as something really having pratyaya that has the ability or function of producing a fruit, and that is the primary one, if you think like that in term of intrinsic nature, then you have logical problem.

Verse 7:

若果非有生，亦復非無生，亦非有無生，何得言有緣

Na sannāsanna sadasandharmo nirvartate yaddi

Verse 9:

Lit. When a dharma (fruit) arises, neither as something already existing, nor as something non-existing, nor as something both sat and asat. How is the hetu produces? How it is possible (eva sati)?

Nīgārjuna has proved that, the combination sat and asat is also no possible. So when dharma (fruit) arises, you cannot say fruit arises as something that is existing (sat) or as something that is non-existing (asat), or as something as both ‘sat and asat’. Then how can there be a hetu that produces (nirvartaka)?

If you take a fruit as something having a svabhāva, what does it mean? Thus you will be caught as phala having a svabhāva.

Nīgārjuna only can refute this because he takes the position of opponent that bhava (existent thing) has a svabhāva. If you think, you have all these logical troubles, you can say pratyaya produces a thing that is first already existing, you can’t say phala of pratyaya producing a thing that is non-existing. Thus you can’t establish a thing called hetu-pratyaya that serve as a primary cause or condition for the arising.

To be continue …

By Dhammapala

The refutation of 4 pratyayas by Nīgārjuna

Summary of lecture 6

I. Hetu-pratyaya

Verse 5 to 7 tend to refute the hetu-pratyaya. The main idea is that hetu-pratyaya has meaning only in the dynamic process when ‘A’ is producing ‘B’, or ‘A’ is acting as the condition of the ‘B’. Outside that process, it has nothing. We can’t say, ‘A’ without doing anything, is in its intrinsic nature a hetu-pratyaya.

It is explained that from the arguments, it follows that whether you consider phala as already existing in pratyaya and they are arising; or not having first existed and then arises. In both cases, it is not possible. In this way, the hetu-pratyaya is refuted.

II. Ālambana-pratyaya

Nīgārjuna goes on to refute this. What is the meaning of ālambana-pratyaya? Ālambana means object that serve as condition for the arising of our consciousness. When eyes see a rūpa, there is a cakāra-vijñāna. So in that process, there are 2 pratyayas - cakāra and rūpa. So the outside object-rūpa is also a pratyaya. That kind of pratyaya is ālambana-pratyaya. This doctrine implies that for us to have any knowledge, or for us to have any vijñāna, there must be an outside object. That outside object serve as the condition.

Verse 8:

anālambana evīyā san dharma upadiyate/
athā ālambane dharma kuta ālambana puna //
Lit: It is pointed that this true (existing) dharma (sat-dharma) is definitely without an ālambana. Then, when the dharma does not take an ālambana, where is the ālambana (-pratyaya)?

Nāgārjuna’s argument here is really not logical in the Western logic. Why? Because he appeals to the Buddha’s experience. He is trying to show that there must be an outside ālambana (real object) which serve a condition for the arising of consciousness. He wants to show that idea is wrong. In showing that, what does he do? He appeals to the experience of the Buddha. What does the Buddha say? The Buddha has taught in the highest spiritual realization, there is no subject and object. In the sat-dharma (true dharma), dharma as the ultimate reality that we experience, that so-called reality is not anything at all, it is śūnya (empty). In the highest experience, there is no subject-object. Seeing is just pure seeing – not because eye sees something outside. No distinction between subject and object. This is what he meant by true-dharma. So this true dharma is without any object (na ālambana). If that is true, since it is the highest experience of the Buddha. Being a Buddhist, you have to accept it. Because the Buddha has pointed out in the highest experience, everything is empty. Thus he refuted ālambana-pratyaya.

In Buddhist logic, there are 3 pramāṇa (valid mean of knowledge). In another word, how do I know the knowledge that I get is correct? What are the criteria?

1. Pratyakṣa (Direct-perception)
2. Anumāna (Inference – on the basis of what we have known directly). Ex. Fire and smoke. If far away, there is a smoke, I can infer there is a fire.
3. Ābda (Scriptural authority) It is also a kind of inference. But we rely on the words of ārya, particularly the Buddha’s words.

Nāgārjuna is using ābda – to say the Buddha has pointed out: when the Buddha is enlightened, there is no distinction between subject and object. Everything is śūnya. For us, we think there must be object for us to have vijnāna. But if we take the words of the Buddha, when he sees the true-dharma, the Buddha says it is without ālambana. Therefore the words of the Buddha can be accepted, then there is no such thing at the highest standpoint. Thus Nāgārjuna refutes the ālambana-pratyaya.

III. Samanantara-pratyaya [Lit. completely without gap-immediately]

There is another type of causal situation. That is the type obtained in the mental states. For instance:- ‘C1’ - kuśala citta. This ‘C1’ goes on in the series. So next moment ‘C2’, ‘C3’...It goes on in the series. Supposing you take ‘C3’, one says ‘C2’ is the pratyaya for ‘C3’, because without ‘C2’, you can’t have ‘C3’. ‘C2’ is immediately before ‘C3’. That kind of situation is found in the series of mind (mental series). Saṃvatsāra-dharmas call it as ‘Samanantara-pratyaya’. Nāgārjuna wants to show logically, it is valid to think of the kind of pratyaya-

Verse 9

anutpanneḥu dharmoḥu nirodho nopapadhyate/
manvantaramato yuktaḥ niruddhe pratyayaḥ ca kalai //

果若未生時 則不應有滅
滅法何能緣 故無次第緣

Lit : When the dharma has not arisen, the nirodha is not possible. It is not logical to talk about nirodha when dharma has not arisen. When it is ceasing, what kind of pratyaya it is?

In this situation, you say ‘C2’ is pratyaya for ‘C3’. [‘C3’=present, ‘C2’=ceased / past] The problem is, at the time when ‘C3’ has not arisen, that mean ‘C2’ is still existing, thus ‘C2’ is not nirodha (/ has not ceased). According to this definition, ‘C2’ must cease in order to give way to ‘C3’. Thus it is not logically to say that.

The important point here is ‘C2’ and ‘C3’ is totally disconnected. For pratyaya, the condition must be adding on something that is real, therefore, in this situation, it is not possible. When a dharma has not arisen, there is no cessation. There is no condition be called by Saṃvanatara-pratyaya.

The opponent would say, ‘Can’t I say when ‘C2’ is just ceasing, not having completely ceased yet, so is not totally a nirodha; as is ceasing, it functions as pratyaya. When ‘C3’ has not arisen, ‘C2’ is not a nirodha. When ‘C2’ is not extinction, according to your definition, you don’t have saṃvanatara-pratyaya, that is because the two things (C2 and C3) are disconnected. One must arise and the
other must cease. In that case, how can you talk about 'C2' serving as condition for 'C3'.

The second line of verse 9: some one would say, ‘Can’t I say like that – I am not saying ‘C2’ must be a completely nirodha to act as a cause. I agree if it is completely extinction, something is completely extinct, is something that is non-existence. It cannot act as a cause. I agree, but I am saying when it is just ceasing, how about that. ’ (niruddhe pratayaa ca kaal)

When something is ceasing, how can at the same time it take an object? That also is not logical, because it is in the process of ceasing. It is something that is disappearing, how can it be a condition? In another words, in both cases, it is not possible. ‘C2’ must cease first to give rise to ‘C3’. But then the problem is, if ‘C2’ is ceased, it cannot act as pratyaya. But the thing is, you can’t have ‘C3’ without first having ‘C2’ cease.

In the first consideration, it is illogical. There is a discontinuity. In the second consideration, the opponent might say, ‘I am not saying that ‘C2’ has complete ceased, I am saying when it is ceasing, it serve as a pratyaya for ‘C3’.’ Now Ñgírjuna questions, ‘when it is ceasing, is it disappearing already, how can it act as a condition?’ Given that, therefore is not logical. So this kind of idea – ‘C2’ immediately before ‘C2’ and ‘C2’ serving as condition for ‘C3’, that is not logical.

The main thing is, from the Ñgírjuna point of view, there is no connection between ‘C2’ and ‘C3’ (the one before and the one immediately after). That is only because if you think of ‘C2’, ‘C3’ as entities (svabhava). Two things are totally distinct from each other. When one ceases, another arises, etc. There is no continuity. You can’t connect the two. Thus, you can’t talk about conditionality.

IV. ādhipateya-pratyaya (adhipati-pratyaya)

“Dominant” in the sense - because of ‘A’, ‘B’ arises (in the general sense). Note the different:-

The hetu-pratyaya emphasize the idea that it is the direct, primary and the main cause. In the fourth pratyaya, whatever arises ‘B’ when ‘A’ is present. Even if ‘A’ does nothing, as long as it does not obstruct the arising of ‘B’, it still giving some kind of contribution to the arising (it is an Indirect-contribution).

This pratyaya involves two situation:-

1. Positive (direct) – in any general sense if it makes a contribution.
2. negative (Indirect) – though it does not make a direct contribution, as long as it does not obstruct.

Sarvástivādin takes the Buddha’s teaching of Pratītya-samutpāda,

“asmīn satī, idaṁ bhavatī”

Lit. when this is existing, it arises / this being, it comes to be

Whenever you have ‘A’, then you have ‘B’. In that case, ‘A’ is the adhipati-pratyaya of ‘B’. This is the idea of ādhipateya-pratyaya. Let’s us see whether you can establish this or not. That is to say, if you think in term of svabhava.

Verse 10

bhūvānāṁ niśvabhūvānāṁ na sattāḥ vidyate yataḥ /
satīdamasmin bhavatīyetannaiwopapadyate //

諸法無自性　故無有有相
說「有是事故　是事有」不然

Lit : When the existential status (/ real-ness) of existent things (dharmas) which are without svabhava, cannot be found. “sati idaṁ asmin bhavati” – this one definitely would not be possible.

It is not logically in fact only because if you think in term of svabhava. If you don’t think of ‘this’ or ‘it’ as fixed entity called svabhava, then it is alright. You are just describing the general process. Ñgírjuna had refuted all these four so-called pratayayas. Ñgírjuna has proved that, this idea of prataya, according to Sarvástivādin, as something that produces phala is not acceptable.

Verse 11, 12 and 13 are not possible to think of prataya as producing phala.

Verse 11

Na ca vyastasamastelā pratyayelāvasti tatphalaḥ/
pratyayebhāyāḥ kathaṁ taccā bhavenna pratayelāḥ yat//

略廣因緣中　求果不可或缺

147
Lit. That phala does not exist among the conditions either separately or collectively. How can that arises from condition, that which is not in the pratyaya.

666**Nágárajuna’s declaration of **śunyatā**

[Pratītya-samutpāda = śunyatā = pratipat-madhyamā]

May 2002 by Professor Ven. Dhammajoti Arranged by Dhammapāla bhikkhu

In the whole book, only in the chapter 24, we see Nágárajuna saying something very directly and positively about his doctrine of śunyatā. Elsewhere, basically he just takes up the position of the opponents and attacked and refuted their position. In the chapter 24, what he means when he says everything is śunyatā? And he gives very clear answer. Most scholars quote this chapter to explain about the Mahāyāna’s doctrine of śunyatā. Thirdly, Nágárajuna explicitly equates his explanation of śunyatā with the teaching of the Buddha.

Opponents says if you say everything is empty, then the consequence is disastrous, ultimately it amounts to the destruction of 3 jewels, the whole notion of spiritual practices and progress, the whole notion of merit, demerit, virtue and nothing remained in the world. Nágárajuna says, ‘you have all these troubles in your mind because you have not understood the meaning of śunyatā.’

Nágárajuna now is explaining his position. Firstly, in Verse 8, the teaching of the Buddhas are based on two truths:- lokasaṃvāti-satya (conventional truth) and paramārtha satya (absolute truth). Ex: When the Buddha says, ‘no self’, the Buddha speaks about absolute truth, but there is an empirical self. In a way, the conventional truth is also aspect of absolute truth. What is true is what accord with facts. At the saṃvāti-satya level, it is said to be conventional, because the idea of something being true or false is based on convention.

Historically speaking, ‘saṃvāti’, originally from भन – ‘think’; saṃ- together. People think collectively together, so is the collective idea. Later on, somehow became saṃvāti, due to the way it was used perhaps among those who speak different dialects. Today, you have saṃvāti (व – to cover; to obstruct). The idea is, at this level, we are completely covered as it were in our seeing, covered by ignorance, blinded by ignorance. So it is conventionally. But it is an aspect of truth – there is a common understanding.

Parama-artha (第一義) [highest sense; absolute sense]. ‘Self’ in the highest sense does not exist, but ‘self’ in empirical sense does exist. It is dependently originated. In this way, Nágárajuna points out, to understand the Buddha’s teaching properly, first of all stick in the mind that there are these two truths. If you don’t make distinction, you will never understand the Buddha’s teaching.

Verse 9 says those who don’t understand these distinction, they don’t understand the profound nature of Buddha’s teaching. The whole idea of understanding is in term of two truths. It is very important.

Another important thing in Verse 14, he says, to whom śunyatā is logically acceptable, to him everything is logically acceptable (yujyate); to whom śunyatā is illogical, to him everything is illogical/ impossible/ unacceptable.

If a person can accept śunyatā, then he can establish everything. For instance, cause and effect. If I say, ‘karma is a cause gives vipāka (fruit)’. If I don’t accept śunyatā, how can I explain these process of causation that a cause produces an effect. Because for one thing, if it is not śunyatā, it means it is forever the same. It is existing eternally, always non-changing like tāman, how can you talk about the arising of that thing? You can’t explain the phenomena of the process of change. Also you can’t relate two things (cause and effect) absolutely distinct. Then there must be a necessarily relationship there. So the process of change is at all possible when you don’t think in term of fixed nature, i.e. when you think in term of emptiness. Emptiness means there is nothing fixed. It is not nihilism. When Nágárajuna says everything is empty, it doesn’t mean he denies everything, what he means is everything is Pratītya-samutpanna (originated by condition), the notion that everything is relatively. Thus you don’t get into any extremes. This is the gist of verse 14.

Verse 18 is the most important of the whole book.

yaḥ pratītyasamutpādaḥ śunyatāḥ śū c pracākṣa-mahe/
śū prajāaptirūḍhyā pratipatsaiva madhyamāḥ/

Lit. that which is Pratītya-samutpāda, we declare that as śunyatāt. It (ie. śunyatāt) is only a derived concept (prajāapti), and it is also pratipat-madhyamā.

37 **yuj – to join. What conjoined with truth.**
Pratītya-samutpāda = ānyatā = pratipat-madhyamā – This is the precisely what the Buddha teaches.

ānyatā here is not a doctrine of nihilism. It is the doctrine of Dependent-origination. There is no fixed nature, also the ānyatā is just a prajāapti. He never get attached to it. Thus he has no any position. What he says about ānyatā, don’t think of ‘the view’. It is only the concept. Even emptiness is a concept.

To conclude:-
1. Everything is empty (ānyatā) because everything has no fixed/intrinsic nature (svabhāva);
2. Everything has no fixed nature because everything is dependently originated (pratītya-samutpāna).

The second line of verse 18 says, ‘emptiness is also empty’, it is still a concept. Don’t think that emptiness itself is not empty, but everything else is empty. In fact, even that emptiness itself is also empty, because it is only a relative concept.

To conclude:-
i.e. It is not that everything else is empty, except ‘emptiness’ itself.
i.e. ‘Emptiness’ doesn’t have any ontological status. It is only a relative concept.

Thus he makes his declaration, his teaching of emptiness is the same as the Buddha’s teaching of pratītya-samutpāda. And that emptiness is just a concept, to try to express the Buddha’s teaching of pratītya-samutpāda and also, the import of emptiness is that of Middle way, not to attach to extremes, that in fact is the same import of the doctrine of pratītya-samutpāda.

The implication of Nāgārjuna’s declaration of ānyatā

[Pratītya-samutpāda = ānyatā = pratipat-madhyamā]

ānyatā is a prajāapti (concept, name). This is the real standpoint of Nāgārjuna. According to his standpoint, he is not teaching anything new. He just follows the Buddha’s teaching of pratītya-samutpāda. That is why, in the beginning, he salutes the Buddha who is the best speaker. It is because through the pratītya-samutpāda, that prapaṭṭa can be appeased.

In Chinese, there are 2 commentaries. One is by Piṅgala, he comments on the verse 18 of MMK,

yaḥ pratītyasamutpādaḥ ānyatāḥ tṝ̄ṇā pracakāmahe/
sū ṭ̄̄ prajāaptirupādya pratipatṣaiva madhyamāḥ//

Lit. that which is Pratītya-samutpāda, we declare that as ānyatā. It (ie. ānyatā) is only a derived concept (prajāapti), and it is also pratipat-madhyamā.

He says, "what is pratītya-samutpāda, that we say non other than emptiness. Emptiness also is empty; it is only in order to guide the sentient beings that a concept (prajāapti) is utilized for the teaching (on emptiness). As it (emptiness) is separated from two extremes [asti; nāsti], it (ānyatā) is said to be the middle way."

The first line is simply taken from the stanza. What is meant when it is emphasized emptiness is also empty? The concept is not a real thing. The commentator says “concept vs reality”. Concept is what is meant by a mind; reality is whatever is real, when we experience something real, we try to express it, even the Buddha had to do that, otherwise he could not communicate with the world. He only uses the concept / names. But the problem is ‘we confuse concept with reality’ – whatever we think in our mind, we think that is real. Reality is not really exists, concept is simply made by the mind, it can be changed, it is relative.

Therefore Nāgārjuna says ānyatā = prajāapti, this is really what he meant. We must not think, simply because he says nothing exist except ānyatā. When he says like that, some people might think ānyatā is absolute thing, if you attached like that, you misunderstood him. It is very dangerous. It is like grasping the snake from the wrong end. Therefore this must be spells out clearly that emptiness is also empty.

ānyatā is not a word started by Nāgārjuna. The word ‘ānya’, ‘ānyatā’ were already in the sūtra. Especially in Mahāyāna, there were a
large group of literature called prajñā-pāramitā (the Perfection of wisdom). The main theme is ānyatā. For Mahāyāna, they talked about prajñā in a perfect form. Thus they say prajñā attained by Arhat is inferior, and it is differ from the real prajñā of the Buddha. The real prajñā of the Buddha had to be understood as prajñā-pāramitā. What is the difference? In the highest perfect prajñā, ānyatā is understood properly. In their theory, they say, there are two-fold ānaya:-

1. Pudgala-ānyatā-nairūtmya;
2. Dharma-nairūtmya-ānyatā.

What they are saying is, the prajñā of Arhat can understand only the pudgala-ānyatā-nairūtmya (there is no pudgala, no āsma). According to Professor, it is really unfair to say Arhat’s ideal is inferior by this scheme, ie. Arhat can only understand the first, not the second.

The so-called Hīnayānist say, there is no āsma, no pudgala, why? Because there are only 5 skandhas. Skandhas are real. But not the pudgala, not the āsma. What are the skandhas? Skandhas are the dharmas. So they are saying dharmas are real, though the dharmas are put together on the basis of which we have a prajñāpti called pudgala is not real. Therefore this is a type of so-called wisdom that is attained by Arhat. But they don’t realize that even the skandhas are also ānaya. Therefore their prajñā is inferior. This is from the Mahāyāna’s standpoint. But the Mahāyāna’s criticism would be justified/ fair if it is directed to certain bhīdharmikas, not to Theravāda.

Dharmas, according to early Buddhism, is simply an occurrence according to the process of pañcicca-samuppada. Conditions come together, something arises. We call it a dharma.

Mahāyāna developed this scheme, and applied to all those who are not Mahāyānist. This is not appreciated by Professor. On the other hand, it is also their contribution to point out that something went wrong among certain groups of bhīdharmikas.

If a person can realize pudgala is ānyatā, it is impossible that he cannot realize dharma - ānyatā. Another example, “ ātman; ātmāya. ”

The so-called Hīnayānist can realize the ātman is ānaya. They cannot realize the ātmāya. How can it be? If a person can realize that there is no āsma, then there can’t be anything that belong to that person (ātmāya). Therefore if you admit that a person can realize the emptiness with regard to ātman, you got to accept logically that a person must also accept the emptiness of ātmāya, ie. Dharmas. ātma is like the point of reference, once there is no point of reference, you can’t have thing referred to, ie. Dharmas.

In the prajñā-pāramitā-hūdaya sūtra, at the very beginning, the Bodhisattva look down, and openly declare that 5 skandhas are empty. In the wisdom of the Bodhisattva of Mahāyāna, what He sees is that, not only that āsma, pudgala are empty, but also the 5 skandhas that go to form that pudgala, ātma are also empty.

Later on, in the school of Yogācāra, they also have a different interpretation. They thought that, when this Mūdhyamika led by Nīgīrjuna, preaching that everything is empty, they said that is not right. In their understanding, there is absolute reality. We can’t say they are wrong. It is only the different opinions, and based on different experience, because that kind of teaching is not purely theoretical teaching, it is based on meditational experience. They really go to the meditation. The mind is real, external reality is not real, then you can say external reality is empty. But in their meditational experience, the consciousness is real, that is the pure-consciousness. Thus their standpoint is different from Mūdhyamika, it is not intellectual, is based on experience.

Yogācāra says emptiness is not prajñāpti. It is a real thing, that is a pure mind (cittamātra). Everything comes from the mind.

Emptiness here means moral detachment to views. Everything is dependent on conditions. If emptiness is not empty, then it would have become extreme. Nīgīrjuna is not taking emptiness as a view. It is because emptiness is also empty, that you can have a middle way.

There is nothing that can be fixed. When no right views are based on any fixed thing, then views are just relative. Therefore you can avoid extremes, avoiding the extremes is the middle way. So the teaching of ānaya is the teaching of middle way.

Verse 19:

apratītya-samutpanno dharmaḥ kaścinna vidyate /
ysmītasmidaśayo hi dharmāḥ kaścinna vidyate //

Lit. As there exists no dharma which is arisen without being conditioned. Therefore there indeed exists no dharma which is not empty (ānaya).

Or
There is not any dharma that is found to have been arisen without having been conditioned (independently of pratītya).
Because of this, therefore, there is not any dharma that is found to be non-nya.

In the earlier verse, nyat is the same as Prattya-samutpda. In this verse, he goes on to explain what is meant by nya? The meaning of nya is that everything is dependently risen/originated.

Then he begins to answer those objections. He counter-attacks one by one in the following verses-

Verse 1 is correspond to the verse 20
Verse 1: Yadi nyam idam sarvam udaya na-asti na vyaya / catrm ryasatynm abhva te prasajyate //
Sarvstivdin says if everything is empty, then it means nothing that arises; nothing to cease. It means there is no 4 Noble Truth.

Verse 20: yadyanyamidasarvamudaya nsti na vyaya / catrmryasatynmabhvaste prasajyate //
Ngrjuna says in opposite, if everything is anya, there is no arising and ceasing. There is no 4 Noble truth.

Verse 21
aprattya samutpanna kuto dukha bhaviyate / anityamukt dukha hi tatsvbhvye na vidyate //
Lit. Whence (how) will what is arisen without being conditioned become dukha? For, what is impermanent is said to be dukha – that does not exist in what exists as a svabhva.

A thing that is arisen without being dependent, from where there is dukha, because dukha is said to be anitya, in that real nature (exist forever), you can’t find anitya (you can’t find dukha). Hence it is in this way, you (Sarvstivdin) deny dukha, by denying dukha, you deny the 4 Noble Truth.

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Lecture 11: Mdhyamika by Professor Ven. Dhammajoti
Arranged by Dhammadla bhikkhu

Ngrjuna says, if you say ‘everything is not empty’ – means everything has svabhva, svabhva means no change. No change means no dukha. What is dukha? Dukha is impermanent, they arise and cease, are changing. Therefore they are dukha. If you say everything is fixed, how can there be arising and ceasing? There is no change whatsoever. The whole idea of change is not possible.

Thus according to Ngrjuna, Sarvstivdin destroy the whole of Buddha’s teachings. ‘Change’ is the basis fundamental Buddhist standpoint.

Verse 21
aprattya samutpanna kuto dukha bhaviyati / anityamukt dukha hi tatsvbhvye na vidyate //

Lit : Whatever that is arisen, without being dependent on condition, from where will the dukha arise? For, dukha is said to be anitya (impermanent); in the case of there being self-nature, that dukha will not be found.

Verse 20 and verse 21 explain how if you say that everything is not nya, thus you destroy the first truth.

Verse 22
svabhva vidyamn ki pun samudelyyate /
tasmitsamudayo nsti nyat pratibdhata //

Lit : If something is existing in its intrinsic nature (/in term of svabhva), why again it will arise. Therefore for one who is destroying nyat does not have samudaya.
Thus you destroy the second truth – the origin of suffering.

Verse 23

Na nirodhaḥ svabhāvena sato duḥkhasya vidyate /
svabhāvavaparyavasthitāṃ nnirodhaḥ pratibhādhasa //

苦若有定性 則不應有滅
汝著定性故 即破於滅諦

Lit : No nirodha of dukkha which is existing in term of self-nature is found. Because of the attachment to svabhāva, you destroy the nirodha.

In this way, you destroy the nirodha, because a thing that always exist in its own nature, how can you have an extinction of dukkha.

Verse 24

svabhāvye satī mūrgasya bhūvanā nopapadyate /
thīśau bhīvyate mūrgaśvabhāvyātī te na vidyate //

苦若有定性 則無有修道
若道可修習 即無有定性

Lit : There being the notion of svabhāva, the cultivation of the path is not possible. …

For Nīgārjuna, svabhāva is something that is not pratītya-samutpanna. It has sovereignty, it is completely independent by itself, it would never change. If there is something like that, everything would not be possible. Thus you destroy the Buddhism.

Nīgārjuna wants to point the fallacy of opponents. Of course Nīgārjuna is not fair from the point of view of Sarvāstivāda. But Nīgārjuna finds very clearly what he means, the type of notion that he opposed to.

Verse 25

yad duḥkhaḥ samudayo nirodha ca na vidyate /
mūrgo duḥkhanirodhatvāt katuṣṭamāḥ prīpayati //

若無有苦諦 及無集滅諦
所可滅苦道 竟為何所至

Lit : When dukkha, samudaya and nirodha do not exist, what path is it that will lead on to, as a result of the fact of cessation of dukkha.

In the earlier verse, Nīgārjuna says there cannot be a path for bhūvanā, because there is no idea of change. Everything is fixed, ex. pūthājana will be forever be pūthājana.

Verse 26

svabhāvena pariṣṭānaḥ yadi tasāḥ punaḥ katham /
pariṣṭānaḥ, nanu kila svabhāvāḥ samavasthitaḥ //

若苦定有性 先來所不見
於今云何見 其性不異故

Lit : If the non complete knowledge is intrinsic, how again there be a complete knowledge of it; is it not the case that svabhāva remains fixed.

To overcome dukkha, first you must know it fully. The non perfect knowledge is by nature so, how can there be later on a full knowledge of it. It means if dukkha is something that in its intrinsic nature, cannot be known fully, that it will forever remains not capable of being fully known. (i.e. you can’t talk about overcoming it later.)

According to Nīgārjuna, you can’t say first something cannot be known fully, later on (punar) it can be known fully. Thus, you can say that only if you accept that ‘nothing is fixed.’

Verse 27

prahūtasūkṣmatakaḥ bhūvanā caivameva te /
parijñavanna yujyante catvāryapi phalāni ca //

如見苦不然 斷集及證滅
修道及四果 是亦皆不然

Book trans: Just as in the case of knowledge (of suffering), therefore, your knowledge of abandoning perceptual confirmation, practice, and the four fruits (i.e. religious attainment) cannot be possible.

Conclusion: if you talk about something having fixed nature, you can’t talk about knowing it fully, you can’t talk about abandoning it, you can’t talk about realizing it, you can’t talk about cultivating towards it. Likewise even the four fruits also. If the fruits are there, there is no need to cultivate it. Therefore all these notions will be negated if you attached to the idea of svabhāva.

Verse 28
svabhāvenānadhigataḥ yatphalaḥ tatpunāḥ kathāḥ /
īśakyatām samadhigantāḥ syāt svabhāvāḥ parighāhataḥ //

是四道果性 先來不可得
諸法性若定 今云何可得

Lit: that fruit (spiritual attainment) which has not been attained in term of svabhāva, that one, again, how could it be attained for one who is being attached to svabhāva?

If you try to explain all these things in term of svabhāva, then you have all these problems, ie. spiritual attainment is not possible. The argument is that if that fruit also has a fixed nature. When there is no spiritual attainment, there is no aryapudgala.

Verse 29
phalaḥ phalasthāno na santi pratipannakā /
saṅgho na stīti na cetsanti te 'ūtāu puruṣapudgalā //

若無有四果 則無得向者
以無八聖故 則無有僧寶

Lit : In the case of the absence of phala, there would not be those who are abiding in the phala [Stream-entrant, etc], nor destined for that attainment (pratipannakā). If these 8 puruṣapudgalā do not exist, there is no Saṅgha.

Verse 30
abhīvaceṣṭrasatīnāḥ saddharmo 'pi na vidyate /
dharma cilasati saṅge ca kathāduḥ bhaviyati //

無四聖諦故 亦無有法寶
無法寶僧寶 云何有佛寶

Lit : Because of the absence of the four Noble truth, the true dharma also does not exist. When there is no dharma and no Sangha, how will the Buddha be?

Nāgārjuna has shown that by insisting that things are fixed, you have denied the four Noble Truths. If you denied it, you destroyed the true dharma. First you denied the Sangha, then I have shown you that, by insisting on the fixed nature, you have destroyed the saddharm. If you destroyed the Sangha and Dharma, how will one become the Buddha? Thus you are destroying the possibility of one becoming the Buddha.

Verse 31
apratītyā bodhi ca tava buddhā prasajyate /
apratītyā buddha ca tava bodhi prasajyate//

汝說則不因 菩提而有佛
亦復不因佛 而有於菩提

Lit : For you, it would lead to the consequence that there could be the Buddha even without depending on Bodhi; and for you, Bodhi would be logically possible [i.e. logical fallacy] without even depending on the Buddha.

From the line of argument that Nāgārjuna has shown, you have denied the Buddha. When you have denied the Buddha, but yet there
is a Bodhi, you should be saying logically that you should be implying that there can be Bodhi without the Buddha and there can be Buddha without the Bodhi.

Verse 32

yaś[cuddhāḥ] svabhāvena sa bodhīya ghaṭannapi /
na bodhisattvacaryāyāḥ bodhīte ’dhigamīyati //

雖復勤精進 修菩提道
若先非佛性 不應得成佛

Lit : He who is not enlightened in term of self-nature, will not attain the Bodhi by practice of the Bodhisattva way.

**Summarize:**

All these result from, if you are thinking that in term of svabhāva (by nature so / intrinsically so). There is no possibility of change. When there is no possibility of change, it means no progress is possible. It means there are no four Noble Truths, no triratna, etc. That is the Nāgārjuna’s argument in a nutshell.

For Sārvaśīvādins, though they talked in term of svabhāva, it doesn’t amount to the denial of all these things, ie. 4 Noble Truths, etc. They still can be changed. [Read Entrance - appendix]

But Nāgārjuna is very strict about the word ‘svabhāva’. For him, svabhāva is something that never changed, eternal, fixed, independent. He argued from that standpoint.

All we can say is that, though it might not be fair by Sārvaśīvādin, but it would be fair by those who have this kind of notion of svabhāva, at least. There were various conception of svabhāva, ex. ītman. Nāgārjuna was from the beginning, not really a Mahāyānist, nor Hinayānist. He was concerned with the wrong direction in which these Buddhists were heading for, ie. scholastic argument in Abhidharma, etc., In the process of refining their position and attempting to defeat the opponents, they got arguments from various sources, like Vaiśeṣika, Saṅkhyā. They were heading towards ītma. That’s why, Nāgārjuna wanted to correct that direction. Thus he wrote MMK.

If you want to avoid these problems, what must you do? You must think in term of ītma. These phenomena are dependently originated (緣生). It denied the metaphysical position. Then everything is possible. That is called the Middle way = the way of ītma. Mahāyānī means avoiding extremes. That avoiding extremes consist in understanding things in term of ītma.

The end of Mādhyaamika

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**Madhyamika’ View towards an ’Object’**

*Madhyamika* philosophy was founded by Nāgarjuna in 1500 AD. The origin of this school is the result of *Theravāda* teaching. *Buddha* said to *Kaccāyana*, that one extreme is to believe that everything exists and another extreme is that nothing exists. The *Tathāgata* preached the truth from the middle position. Accordingly *Madhyamikas* with the rejection of the theory of moments they introduced the world as illusion – their perception is śūnyatā.

T.R.V. Mūrti states following: „The idealism of *Yogācāra viṃśanavāda* school had to be understood as a significant modification of the *Madhyamika śūnyatā* on the constructive basis.“

The position of the *Viṃśanavādins* on an object is that any external object has two different images. The two are:

1. Perceptual image
2. Conceptual image
Perceptual image projects before our eyes. The image is the exact dimensional picture of the object of external world. There is another image which is known as conceptual image. The conceptual image is not as it appears. As far as the theory of knowledge is concerned, the conceptual knowledge cannot be of any service. Therefore, unreal consciousness is the soul-reality. The object is only a mode of consciousness. The external appearance of the object is a transcendental illusion, because of which consciousness is deteriorated into subject-object duality. Consciousness is creative and its creativity is giving illusionary idea of the object. The process of idealism takes place through these three states of consciousness:

1) Alayaviññāṇa
2) Kliṣṭamanoviññāṇa
3) Pravrtiviññāṇa

Madhyamika’s Examination of the Four Noble Truth (Aryasatyā parikṣā)

by Professor Ven. Dhammajoti

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In many ways, this is one of the most important chapter. First of all, in the earlier chapter, Nāgarjuna did not really explain what he meant by ñyātā properly. It is in this chapter that he tells us something positive, and shows us how others have misunderstood his notion of ñyātā, and how ñyātā is to be properly understood. Hence this chapter is important.

Also in this chapter, we will come across many passages and similes which are opt quoted by Mahāyānist when they want to explain the Madhyamika doctrines. Thirdly it is in this very chapter that Nāgarjuna explicitly states his standpoint saying his teaching of ñyātā is none other than the Buddha’s teaching of Pratītya-samutpāda.

This chapter, first begins by stating the opponents’ position – those who oppose to his teaching of ñyātā. What are the reasons? Why are they afraid of teaching of ñyātā? What do they think is the danger of this teaching of ñyātā?

Verse 1

Yadi ñyātā idam sarvam udayaḥ na-asti na vyayaḥ / catāśṭhiṁ ñyātāṁ bhūte prasajyate //
若一切皆空 故無生亦無滅
如是則無有 四聖諦之法

Lit: If this all is empty, there is no arising, no ceasing. For you, there would be the consequence of the non-existence of the Four Noble Truth.
Note: This is a clear objection. The opponents say if you say everything is empty, then all the 4 Noble Truth cannot stand. For the early Buddhists as well as ābhidharmikas during that period, all Buddhists are concerned with the 4 Noble Truths – central scheme of doctrine. If someone negates the whole of 4 Noble Truth, then he has negated the whole of Buddhism. The opponents say when you preached the doctrine of 无常, you are actually negating the Buddha’s teaching of 4 Noble Truth. The opponents are going to elaborate in the verse 2.

Verse 2

pariṣiṣṭa ca prahātam ca bhūvanī śālikārma ca /
catūrthām āryasatyānāṁ abhūvīt na-upapadyate //

以無四諦故 見苦與斷集
證滅及修道 如是事皆無

Lit : The complete knowledge, the abandonment, the cultivation, and the realization is not possible because of the absence of 4 Noble Truth.

dukkha → pariṣiṣṭa
samudaya → prahātam
niruddha → śālikārma
mṛga → bhūvanī

Pariṣiṣṭa - literally means complete knowledge (/ full understanding 遍知) Another term is called ‘abhismaaya (現觀)’ in connection with the realization of the 4 Noble Truth. It is the direct real spiritual insight.

According to Early Buddhism, liberation comes about when you can realize dukkha directly. There is the understanding face to face (abhi). Most important is the complete understanding in the sense of direct Insight of the 4 Noble Truth. So pariṣiṣṭa is connected with dukkha.

Prahātam – abandoning of the cause. Śālikārma – the direct realization of niruddha (the unconditioned). In early Buddhism, it means nibbāna.

In Sarvāstivāda abhidharma, niruddha is not just the absence of dukkha. It means a real dharma that can be realized. Śālikārma corresponds to niruddha.

Bhūvanī - cultivation / practice - cultivation of mṛga. So to achieve niruddha, we have to practice mṛga. When you negated the 4 Noble Truth, you also have negated these possibilities that can be perfect insight which enable us to understand dukkha, you have negated the fact that defilements can be abandoned. You have negated the fact that we can reach the goal. There is nothing to realize. And also, since there is no path, there would not be any cultivation of path. Cultivation would make no sense.

By negating these 4, you negate other 4 as well. Go back to verse 1, if all is अन्यत्त, there is no arising and no ceasing of dukkha – unsatisfactoriness. When there is no arising, no ceasing, there is no dukkha.

A stanza in Pali,

Aniccā vata saṅkhāra
upādāvayadhāmmino
upājīvā nirujjhanti
tesaṁ viñāsamo sukhino

Lit – All saṅkhāra are aniccā. They are of the nature of arising and ceasing [this part is about dukkha]. Having arisen, they (saṅkhāra) ceased, the cessation of that is happy (/ appeasement which is nibbāna).

This gāthā explains the saṅskāra-dukkha. There are 3 dukkha:-
1. dukkha-dukkhatā
2. viparītāsma-dukkhatā
3. saṅskāra-dukkhatā - all saṅskāra in their very nature is dukkha. Saṅskāra means anything exist in the universe. Whatever that exist at all, all the 5 skandhas are actually dukkha in their intrinsic nature.

If there is no arising, no ceasing, what are you negated? You have negated dukkha. If there is no dukkha, there is no cause of dukkha, also there is no cessation of dukkha. If there is no nirodha, there is no path to lead to nirodha. In this way, by negating the idea that
there is something arises and ceases, you have negated duśka, and as a consequence, you have negated all the other 3 truths also.

In verse 2, says there are 4 also would be negated. These 4 are spiritual life/practice and realization. You are negating the whole idea that there is invalidity for any one to follow the spiritual life. In this verse 2, the objection is voiced powerfully. Then the opponents continue-

Verse 3

Tat-abhiśvīt na vidyante caturyaphalalīni ca /
Phala-abhiśve phalasthī no na santi pratipannakām //
以是事無故 則無四道果
無有四果故 得向者亦無

Lit : Because of the absence of that parijāta of duśka, etc, the 4 Noble fruits also are not found. When these attainments do not exist, there would not be those who are in the attainment.

If there is no spiritual life, if realization is not possible, how can you have steam-entrant, etc? Only when there is a spiritual life, a method is correct, there is a real goal to achieve, then you can talk about this attainment. But you have negated the whole concept of spiritual life and realization. There are altogether 8 ārya-pudgalas - 4 pratipannaka (those who are destined to become) and 4 phala 果.

When the 4 phala are not there, you cannot talk about the 4 pratipannakas. They are the preliminary stage of that attainment. Since the attainment itself is negated, you have negated the other 4 also. So you have negated all the 8 ārya-pudgalas. Then you have negated the whole idea of Saṅgha.

Verse 4

Saṅghaḥ na-asti na cet santi te āhau puruṣapudgalaḥ /
abhīvīt ca āryasatyān saddharmā api na vidyate //
若無八賢聖 則無有僧寶
以無四諦故 亦無有法寶

Lit : There is no saṅgha. If these 8 puruṣa-pudgala do not exist, because of the non-existence of the noble truth, the true-dharma also does not exist.

Note: when you negate these 4, you have negated the whole of saddharma.

Verse 5

Dharma ca asati saṅgha ca kathaḥ buddhaḥ bhāvyate /
evā trīḍi api ratṇāni bruvīrī pratiḥdhase //
以無法僧寶 亦無有佛寶
如是說空者 是則破三寶

[ūvādh – to harm, to destroy]
[bruvādi : pr.p. – who are speaking]

Lit : When the dharma is not existing, and the Sangha [also does not exist,] how will there be Buddha? In this way, you destroyed 3 ratna.

Verse 6

śīnyatā [bruvādí] phala-sadhāvam-adharmaḥ dharmam eva ca /
sarva-sāvyavahāṁ ca laukikān pratiḥdhase //
空法壞因果 亦壞於罪福
亦復悉毀壞 一切世俗法

Lit. [You who are talking about (bruvādi)] śīnyatā, you destroyed the reality of phala (4 phala), and also evil and virtue, and all the worldly conventionality.

Note : Not only you have destroyed 3 ratna, you have destroyed also the idea of dharma and adharma (virtue and evil). Thus you are
negating the virtue and evil. You also negated the conventional way of speaking in the world.

Now Nāgārjuna says all these problems don’t belong to him, it is belonged to them. Because they don’t understand the meaning of nyatā.

Verse 7
Atra brāhmaṇyaḥ nyatā yā na tvāṃ vasti prayojanaḥ /
nyatāḥ nyatāḥ arthaḥ ca tatā evaḥ vihanyase //

汝今實不能 知空空因緣
及知於空義 是故自生惱

Lit : Herein, we [Nāgārjuna] say, you do not understand the purpose / usefulness with regard to nyatā, you do not understand the meaning of nyatā. Therefore, you are thus troubled [/ perturbed in your mind].

Nāgārjuna says, 'you are so worried telling me so many things that I destroyed 3 ratna, the whole of spiritual life, etc’ all these come about because you don’t understand nyatā, the meaning of nyatā and its usefulness.

Next, Nāgārjuna is going to explain what he really meant by nyatā.

**QUESTION:** EXAMINE WHETHER IT IS POSSIBLE TO COMPARE TATHĀGATA-GARBHA CONCEPT IN MAHĀYĀNA WHICH EVOLVES CONSCIOUSNESS SAMVATTINIKĀ IN EARLY BUDDHIST TEXTS. (TATHĀGATA-GARBHA OR ALAYA VIÑÑĀNA) (ORIGINAL BY VEN. ANIK CHAKMA)

The cittamātrin(?) of Buddhist philosophy is unique in its fundamental negation.(?) Existence of external objects, meaning object external to mental projection, and its assertion of the inherent existence of subjective consciousness. This basic tenant constitutes the fundamental criteria for identifying an adherent of the school. Further more, this school postulates self-awareness, and different concept of Buddha nature than that present in the Madhyamika school. This later concept and several concepts are share with the other school of Buddhist philosophy.

Within the Cittamātrin school a division is drawn between what are referred to as the traditional group and the speculative group. The distinguishing facotr between the two is that the former accepted three different ultimate attainments for a fractional(?) of any of the three vehicles within this division prostitute(?) to eight categories of consciousness. The former group asserts the existence of eight consciousnesses, namely Alaya Viññāṇa, translated as the foundation of consciousness which plays a critical role in the philosophy. It is better to focus attention on the rationality behind such a position as introduction of Alaya Viññāṇa concept. Anyway, various Mahāyāna schools define such a concept as a psychic factor to prove rebirth concept. When compared with early Buddhist texts, the Buddha has given some hint(?) connection with such a concept but He did not emphasize it as a metaphysical speculation as explained in the text. Alaya Viññāṇa is a mind with only the five all accompany mental factor surrounding it.(?) Focusing on the five sensual objects it is stable mind mentioning continuity in a stream all the way through the final attainment of omniscience. It has a store of all energies.(?)

In Abhidhamma Samuccaya this conscious or Tathāgata-garbha appeared in Mahāyāna has been described. According to this text in the absence of a stable mind like the Alaya Viññāṇa migration from one life-time to another would not be tenable. Likewise in the absence of such consciousness other mental process would also not be possible such as the simultaneous emergence of two different consciousness, the greater clarity of the particular consciousness, the forming of imprints of wholesome and unwholesome mental states and experience during the death process. Of these eight reasons in support of Alaya Viññāṇa the one concerning the impossibility of mental states leading their imprints has been dealt with in great detail with five additional reasons to support it. These five reasons constitute what is called 'the five lines of reasoning' presented in the Mahāyāna Samgraha. It appeared that such a philosophical position has been dealt necessary mainly to support the interpretation of the universal concept of kamma and rebirth. In first case, the fundamental method basis for storing the imprints of action engages in each
pustules/postulates(?) to satisfactory account for different resultant, different situation. (?) In the second case a stable stream of consciousness maintaining its continuity through the ongoing process of life after it seems as indispensable for upholding the theory of rebirth. (?) It would be of value to exchange views on the position of the other school as they contrast with the tenets of this school what philosophical or doctrinal nuances deter this school from taking any attentive stand.

According to adherents of the Cittamatin school it is on the basis of Alaya Viññāna that every instance of consciousness leaves its imprints in the nature of an abstract energy capable of eventual matured(?) into a manifest tangible phenomenon.(?) To be specific the latencies of a prior moment of consciousness serve as the substantial cause both of a later moment of a subjective consciousness and equal its object. Among the different mode of classification of latencies the most popular is the three-fold division by way of their substantial effect.(?)

**The Mahasangika**

There are two groups of Mahasangika School at the two different periods, therefore there is confusion regarding this school. Pali source reveal that Mahasangika and Vajjiputtika branch off from Theravadin and gave right to the Saravastivadin. Bikkhu Purana doubted about the compilation of Buddhist discourse cause the emergent of Mahasangika School. This school appears also to spread to Srilanka, like the Theravadin the earlier Mahasangika believe in the simultaneous comprehension to the truth. According to their view, past and future do not exist while present and nine fold Asanskruta dhamma do not exist.

(1) Pretisanganiradha(cessation through knowledge)
(2) Aprasanganirodha(cessation without knowledge)
(3) Akasa(space)
(4) Anancata(immovability)
(5) Kusadalhampa Tathata
(6) Akusaladhamma Tathata
(7) Abheyakata dhamma Tathata
That is such as of dhamma that are moratorium unmeritorious and neither the one no the other.
(8)Maragama
(9)Pratiyasa Mutpatha katthata of the factor of the part of the law of dependent, like Theravadin Mahasangika also believe that Arahant are not subjected to retrogression.

**The Mahasangika School**

We find a remarkable division in Buddhist order a century after the Buddha’s demise between conservative and liberal thinkers it is in division that gems are treasure of the Mahayana doctrine which the later history of Buddhism influenced much in the field of Theravada’s school. Pali, Sankrit and historical, chronicle and Chinese, Tibetan source reveal the reason for this schism occurred in the Buddhist order or dispensation. The ten folds, who presented ten points pertaining to discipline caused for the establishment of new school under the name of Mahasangika we learn further from Kathavathupakarana or Mogaliputtasesa theraphra and the Samavadhoprajacakra of Vashumittra about the ten point presented by Mahasangika which caused conflict between Theravadin and Mahasangika.

They are accordingly:

(1) singelokapa, the practice of carrying salt in the horn for use when needed.
(2) Dvanmulikapa: the practice of taking food after midday.
(3) Gamantara, the practice going to the neighboring village and taking second milk there the same day.
(4) Avasagapa: observance of uposatha in different place within the same parish.
(5) Anumikapa: doing an act on obtaining sanction for eat afternoon.
(6) Ajinakapa: the use of president as authority
(7) Amitikapa: drinking of milkweed= after milk.
Galopipata kopa: drinking of palm juice which as not yet today

Adaskanitisisna; the use of borderless sheet to seat on.

Jataruparajata; the acceptance of gold and silver.

The Mahasangika presented this idea of Vinaya rule because they happen to face with some social problem and their life became uneasy.

In addition to these ten fold rules connected with Vinaya Chinese and Tibetan source reveal the origin of this school is because of Mahadeva five articles of face.

According to bhava vashumitra and Vinindeva and Theranatha, these five articles connected with Arahant are as follow:

1. An Arahant may commit the sin under unconscious temptation
2. One may be an Arahant and not know it
3. An Arahant may not doubt on doctrinal matter
4. One can not attain arahanship without the aid of the teacher
5. The noble way may be sin with the shout that is one meditating seriously on religion may make such exclamation as how sad and by showing doing attain process toward perfection.

Mahasangika School divides into two divisions as pubbaseliya and abbaseliya. According to the above mention five fold articles according to Yuan Chang Mahadeva enunciate these five dogmas which subjected a bitter controversy among Bhikkhus in the contemporary society various opinions in connection with the Mahadeva idea erupted and it lets for the formation various dogmas at the same time. Some scholars pointed out that the idea of Masangika on discipline was not reasoned for the schism. According to them some doctrinal matter connected with the life of Buddha pave the way to emerge various school anyway orthodox Theravadin completely opposed the Mahasangika idea because they may corrupt the basic Buddha’s teaching of Mahasangika about the supernatural quality of the Buddha also lead to later Mahayana development it is known as Buddhology which teaching the super human quality of the Buddha which cause the practice of variety of ritual and religious performance.

The principle objective of the Mahasangika in succeeding from the main body of orthodox Buddhist became appearance to us by a glance at the subject matter of the disciplinary rule presented by orthodox monks who also known as Theravadin but it seems that the separation of the Mahasangika from Theravadin seem to be as the result of the doctrinal matter they believe it appears from what has been stated previous that though germ of Mahayana Buddhism are treasurable in the doctrine of Mahasangika school it was afflicted to Hinayana and possessed a Pitaka similar to these of the prominent Hinayan school the Mahasangika claimed for themselves more orthodoxy than Theravadin and believe to have preserved more accurately Pitaka settled by Mahakassapa in the first Buddhist council.

The little that we know about their doctrine from the Kathavathupakarana, the Mahavastu. Vashumitra pointed to two facts that they subscribe to the cardinal principle of Hinayana school. A comparative study of the Mahavastu of the Mahasankika with the Pali Vinaya of Theravadin show the great doctrinal affinity between two schools one of the object commend to both schools the discourse of the Buddha relating to soul theory, Karmic cause and other basic teaching seem to be equivalent the discourse regarding four fold Aryan truth, eight fold path leading to emancipation Padiccasamupada etc. are similar to their interpretation. However the school known as Theravada and Mahasangika differ in their Buddhological speculation and sculleries issuing their form. Profesor Takakusa has shown in his article encyclopedia religious and ethic (vol 4). The way in which the idealisms was carried by the Buddhist giving right to believe of the Mahasangika that Buddha was lokutara(super human) and know worldly attribute(Sarvas dhamma) and moral being popularly known as Sakya gotama was required only for lokutaravada conforming to worldly way) for the benefit fo the world.
The corollary=similarly based on this belief are that Buddha is omnipotent ,speech truth and nothing but truth his Rupakaya(physical body) life, energy and power are limitless he is always self-possess and in Samadhi he has developed various higher version which are helpful to work for the benefit of well-fare of other the Mahavastu reveal much about the potentiality of the Buddha further(Mahavastu vol 1 p.169) the most important doctrine that resulted in this way lays in the theory of the Bodhisatva. The Mahasangika by idealism Buddha had to make room for a class of being called the Bodhisatva who by passing true various trial and by making eminent self sacrifice rose to higher state of Bodhisatvahood . this act as sacrifice as the four fold Cariya(practices) which are known as (1) Prakutacariya, (2)pronithanacariya.(3) Anuloma cariya(4)Anivanacaruya vol1 p.46) in addition to this practice the ten Bhumis and six Paramita were presented by Mahasangika which pave the way was for Mahayana Buddhism.

11.06.07 continue

It was the Bodhisatva who would attain Buddhahood in course of time the Bodhisatva in the various births were believed to be born without passing through the embryonic stage they would not entertain feeling of enmity and hatred (Vihimsa sanna and vyapada sanna) and were about sensual desire (kamasanna). In conformity with the believe they suppose that prince Rahula was self born (uppatika) spontaneous as Bodhisatva could not be subjected to Karma sensual pleasure and thus no sensual intercourse. The attainment of Sakayagotama were regarded them the ideal to be cap in view. According to them it was for the enlightenment of worldly being that Lokutara Buddha adopted the human form to enable people to imitate his e.g. on ultimately attain buddhahood it was the schism between the Mahasangika and Theravadin.

According to the later the final goal of a Buddhist should be Arahanhood and not Buddhahood as it is exceeding rare that Buddha appears in the world ( buddhuppado sutulabho. It is possible for the Buddhist to become Arahan in large number but it is exceedingly difficult to them to attain Buddhahood the plurality of Buddha as well as evident for the first time of the Mahavastu. According to them the final goal of Buddha should be Buddhahood but not Arahanhood in accordance with this principle as also for other reason stated that previously they did not look upon the position of an Arahan as the higher states of sanctification Mahavastu p (232).

It was the Mahasagika who originated the worship of Ceiteya and favor that great religious merit could be acquired by even single circumambulation of a stupa trace of stupa worship are also found in the pali word but as such worship is not in consonance with principle of Theravadin it seem that in later time the former borrow in front the Mahasangika

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**HISTORY AND THE DOCTRINE OF THE MAHASANGHIKA**

The Mahasanghika is one of who early schools of Buddhism. The Dipavamsa says that after the 2nd Buddhist Council, held 100 years after the Buddha’s Parinibbana the Sangha divided into two, one Group, the orthodox group that rejected the dasvatthu coming to be known as Theravadins and those who broke away from them coming to be called Mahasanghkas. The dipavamsa also says that this new breakaway group held a separate Council and formed their own Tripitaka. However, the northern tradition says that this real schism took place sometime after the 2nd Council and that not only vinaya problem but also Dhamma problem may have been the cause. The five to points raised by Mahadeva are considered as an important cause for this schism.

Tradition says that Mahasangika say that Ven .Mahakasyapa is their founder. They had their own Canon and its language is mixed Sanskrit. Subsequently the Mahasanghika broke into 7 other schools such as Lokuttaravada, Kaukutika, Bahusrutiya etc. Among which Lokuttaravadins are the best known. They spread into many parts in
Magadha, and took places in Northern, Southern and Eastern India. The different schools seem to have held slightly different views. The major difference between the Mahasanghika and the Theravadin is in their conception of Arahant, the Buddha and the Bodhisattava.

They seem to have considered there was no distinction between the Arahants and the non-Arahants. They also held that Arahant have raga and moha. That Arahant needed other help to attain emancipation. In brief they were of the view that Arahant State is not real emancipation and that Arahants can fall to lower spiritual states.

According to them the Buddha is supra-mandane; his body is also supramandane (lokuttara), and it is the result of part exist; I his created body (rupa kaya) the buddy could appear anywhere, at any time. They held that he has unique power, his life is unlimited, that his mind is always in mediation, he has no impurities.

Their conception of the Bodhisattava too was different from that of the Theravadin. In accordance with the develop of their Buddha’s concept the Bodhisattava considered as a unique being, who has practiced al perfection from innumerable past and that he is destined to Buddha hood. He is no ordinary human being. His conception is the mother’s womb, his birth is all considered as unique and miraculous events. They believed that Bodhisattava takes any form of lower existence to help beings. He entered the mother’s womb in the shape of a white body elephant. And this is his created body. Further more it is said that this is his mind is totally pure from al defilement. This idea generally influenced the rich of Mahasanghika.

**The Mahasanghikas and Lokottaravadins:**

The history of Mahasanghikas School goes back to period of 2nd Buddhist council. The origin of this school is said to have been the ten point raised by the Vajjiputras. The orthodox elder rejected the ten points on the authority of the Vinaya rules. Then the vajjiputtra held a separate council, with a large participation. Therefore, they were called Mahasanghika on the school thus the Dipavamsa informs us that the Mahasanghikas School proposed drastic changes to the Canon that existed during the time of its origins.

We give below the detail of the changes that they introduced to the Canon:

1. The opinion that the Mahasanghikas held was that the Abhidhamma was not preached by the Buddha.
2. The Mahasanghikas also rejected the Niddesa and the Patisambhidamagga which are in the K.N. of the Pali tradition.
3. The Mhasanghikas rejected the Parivara, the 5th text of the Pali Viniya Pitaka.
4. The Mahasanghikas rejected some of the Jatakas.

The actual position is that while rejecting the six texts of Abhidhamma Pitaka of Theravadins, they composed their own texts and cooperate them in the Abhidhamma pitaka. According to the information available in the sources of Northern Buddhism, the Mahasanghikas accepted not three but five Pitakas. They are Sutra, Vinaya, Abhidhamma, Misra and Dharani. The sources of the modern Buddhism indicate that the reason for convening the 2nd Buddhist Council was the five points raised by one of the learned monk lived at that time, Vinitadeva.

The five points that he raised are as follows:

1. An Arahant can be seduced by others.
2. An Arahant may be ignorant of various matters.
3. An Arahanta has doubt.
4. An Arahant can take instruction from others.
5. One can enter the Buddhist path as the result of words.
The Mahasamghikas are known as the Lokuttaravada on the basis of their effort to elevate the Buddha to supra mundane level. The Theravada tradition believes that the Buddha’s too was an Arahant. As reported in the Gopadakamoggla Sutta of M.N. the difference between the Buddha and Arahant is that the former realizes the path first and the later followed by. Accordingly both followed the same path.

In Mhayana Buddhism, the Buddha was elevated to the position of the Supreme Being, supramandance level. Similarly Mahayana Buddhism introduced a new path, full of rites and rituals. It is quite obvious, according to the conical evidence thus the Arahant is not a perfect knowledge. The Arahant are different from one another as far as their spiritual attainment is concerned. For example the Arahants who have developed super knowledge have not experience the absorption of attainment. Similarly arhant who have achieved absorption attainment could not have experience super natural knowledge.

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Although Mahayana refers all Buddhist schools as Hinayana, many of its concepts were influenced or even developed out from their teachings. Of all these schools, the most influential was Mahasanghika. Most of the Mahayana important concepts (about 65%) are derived from this school, e.g.

1. **Supramundane nature of the Buddha.**
   According to Mahasanghika, the Buddha was not simply a historical person. The real Buddha was transcendental, supramundane, eternal and infinite. The historical Buddha was only a fictitious person sent by Him to appear in the world, to assume a human body, to live like an ordinary human being and to teach the Dhamma to the world.

   The real Buddha is the Reality or the Dharmakaya and the fictitious Buddha is his Nirmanakaya. Though as Nirmanakaya, his material body was unlimited, pure and extremely beautiful with 32 great marks. He never sleeps nor dreams but is always in Jhanic state. His power is limitless and can comprehend everything and answer all questions in one moment. He preached only the Ultimate Truth. All these concepts became the main doctrines in the Saddharmapandarikasutra, Svarnaprabhasasutra, Avatamsakasutra and many other sutras of the Mahayana.

2. **Defects of Arahants and superiority of Bodhisatta.**
   Mahasanghikas maintain that Arahants are not perfect; they are troubled by doubts and are ignorant of many things. They can be tempted and may even fall away from their attainment. On the other hand, Bodhisattvas are more perfect than Arahants, they are not selfish but altruistic. They are the real sons of the Buddha, so only Bodhisattva is the true ideal to Nibbana. According to Mahavastu, one should perfect oneself with 10 paramitas in a gradual course of Dasabhumi to attain Buddhahood. This was fully accepted in the Dasabhumikasutra and the Bodhisattvabhumi of the Mahayana.

   According to Mahasanghika, Bodhisattva on the Acala-bhumi are transcendental, as in the case of Siddhartha, he was self-born. He sat cross-legged in the womb and preached to the devas. He was untouched by the phlegm and such other impurities. He came out from the right side of his mother’s body without piercing it. This is the theme in Buddhacarita Mahakavya of Asvaghosa.

3. **The dignity of Prajba.**
   Mahasanghika held that empirical knowledge obtains through sense perception cannot give us an insight into Reality. Only Wunyata which transcends all worldly knowledge can give us a vision of the Real. All verbal statements give only false views, they are mere thought-constructs. This becomes the main concept in the Prajgaparamitasutra and the Madhyamika texts.

4. **Unsubstantial nature of the Dhamma**
   Theravada maintained that puggala was unsubstantial, but the 3 dhammas of rupa, citta and cetasika were regarded as real (paramatha). The Mahasanghika maintained that not only puggala but also the dhamma are also unsubstantial, Pudgala-nairatmya and Dharma-nairatmya. This is the central doctrine in Mahayana.

5. **The theory of pure mind.**
   Mahasanghika maintain that the original nature of the mind is pure, it becomes contaminated when it is stained by upaklewa (passions) and agantukarajas (adventitious defilements). This is the prototype of Yogacara.

Historically, the defeats of Arahant advocated by Mahadeva of the Mahasanghika were further developed by the Mahayana. These 5 dogmas which are rejected by the Theravadins in the Kathavatthu became the fundamental doctrines of the Mahayana.

Despite the great influence of Mahasanghika, other schools also contributed for the origin of Mahayana. The Lalitavistara of the Sarvastivada largely influenced the Bodhisattva concept of Mahayana. The ‘svabhava’ of Sarvastivada and the ‘asatkaryavada’ of Sautrantika also contributed much for the emergence of
Madhyamika. Furthermore, Sautrantika’s conception of ‘Bahyarthanumeyavada’ also led to the development of Yogacara.

The liberal attitude towards Vinaya, the free interpretation of the Dhamma, speculation of the nature of the Buddha, degrading the status of Arahants, Bodhisatva ideal, practicing of paramita along the Dasabhumi and the using of Sanskrit, which were the characteristics of the Mahasanghikas, were totally followed by the Mahayanists. And since about 65% of the Mahayana doctrines are derived from Mahasanghika, we can say that Mahasanghika had contributed most for the origination of Mahayana.

666Examine the Philosophical Trends in the Mahayana Sutra Literature, (1358)

Traditionally there are 9 main texts from which the philosophical teachings of the Mahayana derived. They are called navadharma or Vaipulya sutras, which, are venerated in Nepal. All these texts are not of the same period and they do not belong to one tradition.

1. Ashtasahasrika prajba paramita

Prajba means transcendental knowledge, paramita means perfection and wunyata, voidness. In this text, there are 8,000 verses and it is the most ancient prajba paramita text. This is the only text which gives the philosophical conception while other Vaipulya texts devote a lot to describe Buddhhas and Bodhisattvas. Here, prajba is not only a means of knowledge about absolute truth, it describes prajba with regard to Bodhi and Dharmakaya. Prajba is often personified as a goddess. It stresses the doctrine of wunyata and the non-existence of the world of experience. It also describes prajba which, is one of the 6 Perfections in Mahayana.

2. Saddharmapundarika

This is one of the best known Mahayana sutras highly esteem in China and Japan. It is delivered by the Buddha on the Vulture’s peak to the Bodhisattvas. Here, prominent place is given to describe the beauty (physical), purity, and supra human status of the Buddha. The lotus stands without any contact with the mud which, is compared to the Buddha who does not touch by any defilement in the world. This text consists of 2 sections. The first section while describing the status of the Buddha explains various ways of teaching the law and the eternity of the Buddha. The second part containing spells and many mythological narratives, including a story of a Bodhisatta who burnt himself alive in honour of a former Buddha. There are also mantras which lead to the driving away of spirits. This text contains details of how bhakti-magga was developed. In this text, a Buddha is respected in the same way as Hindu respecting their god Krishna.

3. Lativistara

This describes the life of the Buddha (Sakyamuni) up to the commencement of his mission. There are numerous Buddhhas and Bodhisattvas with lot of miracles. This book is supposed to have influenced Christian in writing the life about their Christ. According to Rev. Sasanaratna of Moratuwa, the word Lalita is defined as a “game”. Prince Siddhartha was born in the miraculous ways e.g. he was coming out from the mother’s womb after a white elephant had entered the womb. This book is suppose to have been one of the Sarvastivadins texts and it was later accepted by Mahayanists. Its main characteristic is the expression of Bodhicitta with exaggeration.

4. Lavkavatara

It gives an account of Sakyamuni coming to mountain Malaya in Sri Lanka. King Ravana came to pay his respect and asked for the definition of virtue and vice. This text criticizes Hindu schools as Sankhya pasupata. There are descriptions of Vijbanavada, with special reference to alayavijbana. In the 8th chapter, there is a description regarding drawbacks in eating flesh. This book maintains that monks should not eat flesh even under Trikoti parisuddhi. This book also contains description about various mantras to drive away evil spirits. There are also facts about Wunyatavada and we can say that this text belongs to both Wunyatavada and Vijbanavada.

5. Svarna-prabhisa

It means a glitter gold. In many ways, this book resembles the lotus. They are many commentaries written in various traditions both in Chinese and Tibet. From the 1st up to the 5th chapters, Mahayana principles are included, in the last chapter it describes that by making offering to the Buddha one can obtained good results. The 6th chapter is devoted entirely to describe wunyatavada. It is just the same as the Prajbaparamita and Saddharmapundarika, so it is clear that it has been influenced by these two texts. Moreover there are Tantric teachings also, some facts are knotty (unclear), they are in the form of hidden meanings. Goddess
Sarasvati is mentioned here as one who gives a mantra to protect people from evil spirits. This text also stresses the supernatural features of the Buddha.

6. Gandavyuha

The title means ‘the structure of the world’, which is compared to a bubble. It is also called Avatajsaka sutta in the Chinese. In Tibet Tripitaka, there is a category of books which are also under the name of Avatajsaka. Gandavyuha is only a portion of the larger work of Avatajsaka. In this text we observed that it preaches in a fully developed Mahayana manner. Wunyata and dharmakaya of the Buddha are also mentioned, the Bodhicitta and the doctrine of momentary (kshana sampatti) too are included. Here it explains how prince Sudharna went from village to village to obtain Buddhahood, but was unsuccessful. At the end he met Bodhisatta Mahjusri and got advice from Bodhisatta Samamtabhadra and attained Buddhahood. This text is honour greatly in Nepal also.

7. Tathagataguhuyuka

Also known as Tathagata-Guna-bana, a Tantra text of the worst category. There is a description about concentration (samadhi) suitable for monks. It also describes with pictures how to worship the Buddha in secret ways and methods and about food that should be taken when doing meditation. There are dharanis, mudra and sadhana. It also states that one who wishes to develop concentration (bhavana) should eat flesh of elephant, corpses and dogs. It stresses the importance of the words ‘oj huj’. It considered low grade activities as a symbol of worshipping the Buddha e.g., offering make to the Buddha should be done with urine. It also said that those who do bhavana should take food mixed with urine, this text exhibit the influence of Tantrayana.

8. Samadhiraya

This is a narrative describing different methods of meditation of which Samadhiraja is the greatest and best. At the very beginning it says ‘Namo ratnatrayana’ (Triple gems). There is a dialogue between Sakyamuni and Candraprabha who is a rich man. This text explains the chief principles of Mahayanism, e.g. khanti prajbaparamita (compassion). It says khanti is the best while dana and sila-prajbaparamitas are not so great as khanti. To cross sajsara one should practice khanti. It gives a prominent place to wunyata. Just like the Lavkavatara, it shows the draw back of eating flesh but saying that there is no harm eating flesh for the protection of life as in case of disease.

9. Dawabhumiwvara

This text is also included in the Avatajsaka group. It describes the ten stages in the career of the Bodhisatta before he can obtain Buddhahood. In this text, Sakyamuni is temporary wandering and meet Bodhisatta Vajragrabha. The ten stages are described by the Vajragrabha at a great assembly of gods after the Buddha attained enlightenment in the second week. They are as follows: Pramudita, Vimala, Prabhakari, Arcismati, Sudurjaya, Abhimukhi, Duraigama, Acala, Sadhumati and Dharmamegha.

Various scholars wrote books based on Dawabhumi, Chandrakriti wrote Madhyamikavatara, Shantideva wrote Shikshasamucchaya, Nagarjuna wrote Dawabhumika vibhasha wastra. Thus this texts became the foundation of various Mahayana writing. There are some ideas bent toward Tantrayana. It was translated into Chinese during the year 300 A.D.

There was an intermediate school between Wunyata and Vijbanavada known as ‘Tathagata-garbha’. The earliest Tathagata-garbha text was the Tathagata-garbhasutra. It was composed between 200 and 250 AD. The most important one, however, is the Wrimala-devi Simhanadasutra, composed some time between 250 and 350 AD. These texts advocate that one is ‘the embryonic Perfected One’ in which the term Tathagata-garbha implies. This ‘embryo’ is seen as existing within all living beings, indicating that, however deluded or defiled they are, they can mature into Buddhas. This is the most important concept in Mahayana Buddhism.

Mahayana Buddhism can be called the religion of Pure Land as most of its followers aspire to be reborn in the Western Paradise. The teaching of Pure Land as the Buddha-land of Amitabha Buddha are chiefly based on the Smaller Sukhavativyuhasutra, the Greater Sukhavativyuhasutra and the Amitayurdhyanasutra. The Smaller Sukhavativyuhasutra is the oldest one, composed around the 1st century BC. These texts teach that by merely chanting the ‘Holy Name’ of Amitabha Buddha, one will be able to reborn into the Sukhavati, the Pure Land of Amitabha Buddha. There, in the Pure Land, one practices Noble Eightfold Path and all the 37 Bhojjhangas till attain Buddhahood.

666EXAMINE THE PHILOSOPHICAL TREND IN MAHAYANA SUTRA LITERATURE.

There are 9 main texts from which the teachings of Mahayana derived. They are called Nava-dharma or Vaipulya sutras which are highly venerated in Nepal.
1. Ashtasahasrika prajna paramita
   It comprises 32 chapters with 8,000 syllabic units in prose. It is the oldest of all prajna paramita texts. Subhuti enumerates 18 aspects of wunyata which forms the main theme of the text. Here, prajna is not only a means to Absolute Truth, it is related to Bodhi and Dharmakaya.

2. Saddharmapundarika
   This text describes the physical beauty, purity, and supra human qualities of the Buddha who is compared to a lotus. There are 27 chapters. The first few chapters describe the Trikaya of the Buddha. The last few chapters containing spells and many mythological narratives, including a story of a Bodhisatta who burnt himself alive in honour of a former Buddha. Bhakti cult is the main feature of the text.

3. Lalitavistara—concept of Bodhicitta
   Buddhacarita is the main theme. Numerous Buddhas and Bodhisattas with lot of miracles are mentioned. Prince Siddhartha was born in miraculous ways e.g. he came out from the right side of his mother’s body. It belonged to Sarvastivada and was later accepted by Mahayanists. Its main characteristic is the expression of Bodhicitta with exaggeration.

4. Lavkavatara
   It gives an account of Sakyamuni coming to mountain Malaya in Sri Lanka. King Ravana came to pay his respect and asked for the definition of virtue and vice. It maintains that monks should not eat flesh even under Trikoti parisuddhi. Various mantras and concept of wunyata are found. Descriptions of Vijbanavada with special reference to alayavijbana is the main topic.

5. Svarna-prabhassa
   From the 1st up to the 5th chapters, Mahayana principles are included. In the last chapter it describes that by making offering to the Buddha one can obtained good results. The 6th chapter is devoted entirely to describe wunyatavada. It is just the same as the Prajaparamita and Saddharmapundarika. Tantric teachings are found and Goddess Sarasvati is also mentioned. This text makes a transitory stage to Tantrism.

6. Gandavyuha
   It is a portion of the larger work of Avatajsaka. The most developed Mahayana concepts are found. Wunyata and dharmakaya are mentioned, Bodhicitta and the doctrine of momentary (kshana sampatti) too are included. It describes how Prince Sudharna went from village to village to obtain Buddhahood, but was unsuccessful. At the end he met Mabjusri and got advice from Samantabhadra and attained Buddhahood.

7. Tathagataguhya
   Also known as Tathagata-Guna-bana. It describes with pictures how to worship the Buddha in secret ways. Methods of meditation are introduced. Dharani, mudra and sadhana are included. It stated that one who wishes to develop concentration should eat flesh of elephant, corpses, dogs and food mixed with urine. It stresses the importance of the words ‘oj huj’. Low grade activities are used to worship the Buddha.

8. Samadhiraya
   It explains the chief principles of Paramita. Khanti is the best while dana and sila are not so great as khanti. To cross sajsara one should practice khanti. Different methods of meditation are mentioned, of which Samadhiraja is the best. It gives a prominent place to wunyata. Just like the Lavkavatara, it shows the draw back of eating flesh.

9. Dawabhumiwvara
   This text also belonged to the Avatajsaka group. It describes the ten Bhumis. Sakyamuni while wandering met Bodhisatta Vajragrabha. The ten stages are described by Vajragrabha at a great assembly of gods. Various scholars wrote books based on this text e.g., Chandrakrithi wrote Madhyamikavatara, Santideva wrote Siksasamucayya and Nagarjuna wrote Dawabhumika vibhasa wastra.
The theory of Sunyata is especially associated with name of Nagarjuna and Madhyamaka school of Buddhism, it is intimately connected with the teaching on patīcasaṃuppāda, is really development of logical implications of the latter. The Theravada also deals with Sunyata but this subject has hardly been taken into serious consideration by scholars of the present day.

The following are some interesting views that have been expressed by noted scholars: Dr.N. Aiyaswamy writes, “sūyata is not quite unfamiliar with early Buddhists. Sunyata as an equivalent for dependent origination is quite an innovation of Nagarjuna Dr. Stecherbatsky writes: “term sunyata is an innovation of Mahāyāna, an innovation made necessary by the course of philosophic development.

Its germs are found in Hinayana, but Mahāyāna has given it quite a new interpretation, an interpretation in which the two main schools of Mahāyāna radically diverged”.

Three point should be noted: (1) that Sunnata is used in Theravada as an equivalent for (Paticca Samuppada), (2) that sunnata is used in Theravada not only as an equivalent for nature of phenomenal world but also as an equivalent for Nibbana and the absolute, and (3) that conception of sunyata far from being quite a new interpretation, on part of Nagarjuna or of Mahāyāna, represents more accurately only a more detailed statement of logical consequences of Theravada theory of causality and Sunnata.

Mogharajamonavapucchasutta of S.N shows this Theravada usage “It is the contention of the Madhyamikas that the final release is possible only through Sunyata-by giving up of all views, standpoints and predicaments. Majjhimanikaya devotes two suttas for specific consideration of Sunnata, the first of these (called Cula-sunnata-sutta) describes Sunnata as highest attainment that brings about reaches. Sunnata is reality as it is (yathābhūtata) the purest (Parisuddha), the highest incomparable (Paramanuttara)

It is noted that “look upon the world as being non-substantial, O Mogharaja, being ever so mindful. One surpasses that by uprooting belief in substantiality. Death does not get hold of him who regard world in this way.” Sn. Verse 1119.

In this regards we can see Madhyamika School emphasizes Sunyata as an equivalent for ultimate reality.

*Eastern thought started from beyond the concept of Sunyata. Nasadiya Hymn Rg veda. Started by saying that ultimate reality god beyond being and nonbeing (sat and asat). Udalaka was the first thinker to put forward an empirical argument to prove and explain nature of Sunya he takes a bunion seed and break it and shows that there is nothing inside

It is interesting to see that early Buddhism did not have an explicit idea about notion of Sunyata though it has a concept of Sunnyata. Once the Buddha advises Mogaraja Sunyato lokam avekassu sunna, it always equal to the absent a soul or anything belong to a soul sunnam atena atattiyenava. 442

**Question: Examine briefly the evolution of Mahāyāna Buddhist philosophy up to the theory of emptiness (śūnyatā).**

One century after the demise of the Buddha there arose many Buddhist schools and they had their own teaching. Many great teachers and great books came into existence as the result of religious, social, philosophical etc. Therefore, now it is accepted that Mahāyāna Buddhism came into existence either in the 1st century BC or AD and some scholars who studied origin of Mahāyāna cite many reasons why Mahāyāna developed from Mahāsāṅghika schools which were founded by Nāgarjuna.

However, there are some teachings in the Mahāsāṅghika schools, especially in the Lokuttaravāda branch of Mahāsāṅghika which later developed in Mahāyāna. It seems that there are two distinct features in Mahāyāna:

1. Development of Buddhology raising the Buddha to a superhuman level and making Him the savior of mankind
2. Bodhisattva idea

Similarly, the stūpa worship which became popular after the Buddha's passing away also is considered as a concept of Mahāyāna.

Further, Madhyamika which was founded by Nāgarjuna is the one of the most important philosophical school of Mahāyāna. The main teaching in Madhyamika is Śūnyatā. Therefore, here we pay attention about the doctrine of Śūnyatā that should be understood. Śūnyatā is interpreted in various ways. Generally it is rendered into English as 'emptiness', 'voidness' and 'nothingness'. Such a rendering made Śūnyatā to be nihilistic or annihilationist doctrine and such this interpretation have been made during the time of Nāgarjuna. In fact, this point is seen from Mūlamadhyamika Kārika.

38 It is quite evident that teacher is not aware of his words. From these sentences it seems, that during the time of Nāgarjuna Śūnyatā was rendered to English as 'nothingness' etc. and thus during the time of Nāgarjuna, because of this English translation, Madhyamika school was considered to be nihilistic. I am sure that even the teacher himself would not approve such a joke.
itself so Nāgarjuna had to clearly say that his doctrine of Śūnyatā is not Uccheda or Sassatavāda teaching.

The doctrine of Śūnyatā has been so much misunderstood that Nāgarjuna warns those who mistake his teaching that would fall into great harm just as one holds a serpent gets destroyed by the serpent itself and Śūnyatā is not another view but reality and true nature of all things. According to this he rejected the svabhāva (own nature) teaching put forward by Sarvāstivāda. So, Nāgarjuna point out that the view of svabhāva is totally against the Buddha’s basic teaching of paṭiccasamuppāda.

According to Sarvāstivādins everything is a dharma. This dharma has two aspects:
1. Svabhāva, a metaphysical aspect which persists during all three periods of time
2. Karitra, the activity aspect of dharma that is the appearance of the dharma in the present time

This svabhāva is always present (sarvaṃ asti), so Nāgarjuna pointed out this svabhāva is going against the aniccātā teaching of the Buddha.

Besideśs that Nāgarjuna denied the teaching of the Abhidhamma schools that accepted the existence of dhamma and attempted to show that their teaching is not in accordance with the Dependent Origination. For explanation, Sarve dhammah – Śūnyatā laksana (all the dhammā have the character of emptiness). Thus he taught the emptiness of dhammā as well as of puggala (individual) and Madhyamika advocated all dhammā as dependent on each other and devoid of their own nature, and such to be emptiness. In this sense Nāgarjuna identified Śūnyatā with the doctrine of paṭiccasamuppāda. In fact this is the real significance of the teaching of Śūnyatā.

QUESTION: DISCUSS HOW THE DHAMMA THEORY OF ABHIDHAMMA INFLUENCED THE ORIGIN OF ŚŪNYATĀ PHILOSOPHY?

Śūnyatā is the fundamental teaching taught by Nāgarjuna through his Madhyamika philosophy. The main work dealing with Madhyamika teaching is the Mūlamadhyamika Kārika of Nāgarjuna. As the concept of Śūnya or Śūnyatā is clearly presented by Nāgarjuna, this term is generally interpreted as ‘void’ or ‘empty’.

Nāgarjuna presented this theory and it is clearly seen by the way he presented it through his Mūlamadhyamika Kārika. He has shown the main teachings of Buddhism at that time as wrong. These main teachings were about the existence of something, an entity or a substance, some kind of metaphysical entity. It was mainly Sarvāstivādins who presented such concept.

The Sarvāstivādins put forward the view that all factors constitute the individual and universe that is all dharmās have an unseen aspect. This they called ‘svabhāva’, the ‘own nature’. This ‘own nature’ or ‘svabhāva’ of dhammā, Sarvāstivādins said to be existing in all three periods of time. This in other words means that svabhāva of dharmās exists in the past, present and future, that it exists always. Hence, their teaching came to be called Sarvāstivāda (that ‘all exists’). The Sautrāntikas, the other famous Buddhist school, also put forward this kind of substantiality view.

Nāgarjuna wanted to point out that these views were against the true teachings of the Buddha, who explained that everything is anicca (impermanent). This position was that if everything is anicca, how can these be svabhāva or any such thing that persists in all three periods of time. He used the Mūlamadhyamika Kārika to show that this interpretation of the Buddha’s teaching is wrong.

In order to do that he used a method called ‘dialectics’. This is a kind of logic through which he showed the internal contradictions of the views put forward by Sarvāstivādins and other such schools and demonstrated that those views were wrong, that they contradicted themselves and were merely absurd statements. Hence, this method of argument is referred to in western philosophy as reduction of absurdum, reduction of the opponents view to mere absurdity.

His position is that everything should be viewed as being void, devoid or empty (śūnya) of an own nature (svabhāva). This means that everything is impermanent and interrelated and therefore without
independent existence and hence without any permanency. He used his dialectical method very effectively to present this theory of Śūnyatā.

**Question:** Enunciate the mode of definition on the concept of Nirvāṇa in Mahāyāna Buddhism

In Mahāvibhāsa Sūtra the etymological meaning of Nirvāṇa – Nī + va - ‘extinction’, ‘blowing’, ‘moving out’ and the literal meaning is ‘free from craving, pasions, attachment etc.’. But it is also called ‘Tanhakkhaya’ - the extinction of thirst; ‘Asankhāta’ - unconditioned; ‘Virāga’ - absence of desire; ‘Nirodha’ - cessation. It is impossible to describe Nirvāṇa by words. Nirvāṇa is the admission of all qualities that is no more stirring of passion. When ‘vanna’ means ‘forest’, then Nirvāṇa is getting out of the forest of the aggregates.

But Nāgarjuna stated Nirvāṇa to be without any designation. It is only in conventional or relative terms. Thus, it is not eliminated, attained, annihilate, eternal, disappeared and originated. Further Nirvāṇa is stated as follows:

1. It is Aprapradṛṣṭya – it cannot be imported by one to another. One has to realize the truth within oneself and not understand it by listening to the instruction of the Ārya (or by listening and speaking).
2. It is Sanda, because it has nature, cessation. (?) It is undisturbed by origination or destruction (Mādhyavatara Sūtra). It is shown while Śūnyatā is taken in the sense of sabhāva rahitaṃ (without natural characteristic). The point is that anything having real existence cannot be subject to the causal law so whatever is subject to causal law has no real existence like seed and shroud, then both of them can be described as Sanda or Sabhāvavirahita or quiescent.
3. It is Prapañcābhātrapaṇcitam. It is inexpressible (avecha), the first prapañca is taken as a synonym of speaking. The sense of Śūnyatā is not utterable by word.
4. It is Nirviriya or unrealizable in concept. Verbal is thought construction, so Śūnyatā is beyond thought construction.
5. It is Ananaratha, devoid of different meaning. Thus he points out that Śūnyatā is not to be taken in the sense of nasvabhāva (annihilationism) or abhāva as wrongly supported by Hinayāna.

Besides that according to Mahāyāna the Buddha propounded two truths. One was conventional truth which is ultimately unreal and the other is absolute truth which is ultimately real. Nāgarjuna said that without relying on the conventional truth, the absolute truth is not taught, without understanding the absolute truth Nirvāṇa is not attained.

According to Madhyamika philosophy it is impossible to speak about the absolute truth, to say something about the truth means to determine it, to make the absolute relational(?). Further, ‘the unconditioned’ is not different from ‘the conditioned world’, both fall under ‘the Dependent Origination' understood as emptiness.

The another point, the term emptiness is used from two points:

1. Empirically it means relativity which is phenomena

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39 The problem is that there is no Hinayāna and those who use this term are outmoded people (according to book Zen and the Taming of the Bull p. 77-78).
2. Absolutely it means reality which is release from pularility (Nirvāṇa)

Further Nāgarjuna holds that there is no difference between Nirvāṇa and Samsāra, from the absolute truth point of view, both are emptiness. The difference lies only in conventional truth. The same thing, when it is viewed through the glasses of causality is Samsāra and when causality is stopped it is Nirvāṇa.

In this way the concept of Nirvāṇa is clearly understood in Mahāyāna Buddhism.

**Question:** Define the term Madhyamika and explain the emptiness according to the Mūla Madhyamika Kārika

According to the historical evidence there were eighteen Buddhist schools as the result of four Buddhist councils and previous situations. Basically there were four main Buddhist schools – one of them was Madhyamika school. Madhyamika originated based on different reasons, such as religious, historical, sociological and philosophical. It was developed within a long period. These reasons are roots of Mahāyāna school teaching among the contemporary religions and philosophical background. Later the Madhyamika school joined Mahāyana school.

This school was named Madhyamika because Madhyamika philosophy originated as depending on the Middle Way. They have introduced this name for their tradition by themselves. Madhyamika school was the most famous school in the Mahāyāna tradition and it has very deep logical system. The Madhyamika school’s founder was ven. Nāgarjuna and he was the great philosopher in that school. He was born in a Brāhmaṇa family. He had different views and knowledge then others. He was respected by the scholars of East and West countries.

Later he became a Buddhist monk and he was very famous scholar among the Eastern and Western countries. Most of the scholars accepted that Nāgarjuna has written more than fourteen books, most concerning Madhyamika philosophy. Among these books Madhyamika Kārika was the main book in Madhyamika school. It has mentioned basic concepts of the school. Nāgarjuna expected to fulfill the virtues, which can be seen in the interpretation of Buddha’s teaching. Especially he wanted to reply to Sarvastivāda, Sautrāntika and Yogācāra – to their interpretations. The theories of Sarvastivāda, Sautrāntika and Yogācāra were rejected by Madhyamikas. Madhyamika theory is śūnyatā.

According to the Madhyamika philosophy, śūnyatā ‘emptiness’. It is non-existence. They indicated that there is nothing dependent on the world and truth in the ultimate sense. In the Madhyamika texts it is explained that there is no difference between the dependent origination, emptiness and evidence-way. Nāgarjuna has further mentioned that there is nothing without cause and effect in the world, and in the same way there is nothing in the world without emptiness. Madhyamika philosophy includes paṭiccasamuppāda or Dependent Origination in origin of itself. There were contemporary religious societies, where four kinds of theory were based on cause and effect.

The Buddha has rejected these four kinds of theories in the Acelakassapa Sutta (Samyutta Nikāya):

>>Paṭiccasamuppādāṁ passati so dhammāṁ passati. Yo dhammāṁ passati, so paṭiccasamuppādāṁ passati. «

Here the paṭiccasamuppāda is explained to realize the Dhamma without understanding paṭiccasamuppāda is not possible by anyone – therefore, the Buddha rejected all those views. The Madhyamika school had concept of emptiness in relation with theory of dependent origination in early Buddhism, but in a different way. Consequently they have given a new interpretation to the early Buddhist teachings.
The theory of Śūnyatā is especially associated with name of Nāgarjuna and Madhyamika school of Buddhism. Śūnyatā is intimately connected with the teaching on the Paṭiccasamuppāda and is really the development of the logical implications of the latter. The Theravāda also deals with Śūnyatā, but this subject has hardly been taken into serious consideration by scholars of the present day. The following are some interesting views that have been expressed by three noted scholars:

Dr. N. Aiyyasvami writes: „The Śūnyatā doctrine is not quite unfamiliar with the early Buddhists.“ „They take it from Nairatmya. Śūnyatā as an equivalent for Dependent Origination is quite an innovation of Nāgarjuna.“ (Karatalaratna, P.i)

Dr. Stcherbatsky writes: „The term śūnyatā is an innovation of the Mahāyāna, an innovation made necessary by the course of philosophic development. Its germs are found in the Hinayāna, but the Mahāyāna has given it quite a new interpretation, an interpretation in which the two main schools of the Mahāyāna radically diverged.“ (Madhyamanta, Vibhaṅga P.V.)

Dr. N. Dutt writes: „The Sarvāstivādins are also responsible for the addition of the fourth term, śūnya to the usual trio viz. dukkha, anitya and anātma, though the word conveyed no Mahāyānic meaning as it connoted no other sense than anātma.“ (Aspects of Mahāyāna Buddhism, p. 26)

To be more precise to prove

1. That suññatā is used in Theravāda as an equivalent for Dependent Origination (Paṭiccasamuppāda)
2. That suññatā is used in the Theravāda not only as an equivalent for the nature of the phenomenal world but also as an equivalent for Nibbāna and the absolute
3. That the conception of the suññatā is far from being quite a new interpretation

on the part of Nāgarjuna or of the Mahāyāna represents more accurately only a more detailed statement of the logical consequences of the Theravāda theory of causality and Suññatā.

„It is the contention of the Madhyamikas that the final release is possible only through Śūnyatā – by the giving up of all views, standpoints and predicaments.“ (T.R.V. Mūrti, p. 269)

The Majjhima Nikāya devotes two suttas for the specific consideration of suññatā. The first of these (called the Cūlasuññatā Sutta) describes suññatā as the highest attainment that brings about reaches(?). Suññatā is reality as it is (yathā bhūta), the purest (pārisuddha), the highest incomparable (paramanuttara) and above change (avipallatha).

It is noted: „Look upon the world as being non-substantial, O Mogharāja, being ever so mindful. One surpasses that by uprooting belief in substantiality. Death does not get hold of him who regards the world in this way.“ (Sānyutta Nikāya, verse 1119) In this regards we can see Madhyamika school emphasizing the Śūnyatā as an equivalent for the ultimate reality.

QUESTION: How did the Madhyamika school emphasize Śūnyatā as the ultimate reality?

Śūnyatā is the fundamental teaching of Madhyamikas. There was a school of thought that considered Śūnyatā purely as a Mahāyāna teaching, not found in early Buddhism. They even went to the extent of saying that „Śūnyatā emphasises revaluation of early Buddhist teaching.“ There is another new school of thought, where it is said, that Śūnyatā is nothing new, it is found in early Buddhism – this is not a Mahāyāna teaching. According to them Nāgarjuna presented Śūnyatā to take back Buddhism to the original teaching of the Buddha. A.K. Warder, David J. Kalupahana, Asanga Tilekeratna and many others are of this view.

There are twenty modes of Śūnyatā. They are:
1. The unreality of ‘internal elements of existence’ (adhyatmaśūnyatā)
2. The unreality of the ‘external objects’ (bāhirdhaśūnyatā)
3. The unreality of both together as in the sense-organs (adhyatmabāhirdhaśūnyatā)
4. The unreality of unreality (śūnyatāśūnyatā)
5. The unreality of the ‘great’ (mahāśūnyatā)
6. The unreality of the ‘ultimate reality’, Nirvāṇa (paramarthaśūnyatā)
7. The unreality of the ‘conditioned’ (saṅskrtaśūnyatā)
8. The unreality of the ‘unconditioned’ (asaṅskrtaśūnyatā)
9. The unreality of the limitless (atyantaśūnyatā)
10. The unreality of that which is beginningless and endless (anāvaragraśūnyatā)
11. The unreality of the ‘undeniable’ (anāvakaraśūnyatā)
12. The unreality of the ‘ultimate essences’ (prākrtiśūnyatā)
13. The unreality of ‘all elements of existence’ (sarvadharmaśūnyatā)
14. The unreality of all determination (lakṣaṇaśūnyatā)
15. The unreality of past, the present and the future (anupālambhaśūnyatā)
16. The unreality of ‘relation or combination conceived as a non-ends’ (abhavasvabhavaśūnyatā)
17. The unreality of the ‘positive constituents of empirical existence’ (bhavaśūnyatā)
18. The unreality of the ‘non-empirical’ (abhavaśūnyatā)
19. The unreality of ‘self-being’ (svabhāvaśūnyatā)
20. The unreality of ‘dependent being’ (parabhavaśūnyatā)

Some teachings are in the Mahāsaṅghika schools especially in the Lokuttaravāda branch of Mahāsaṅghika which are later developed in Mahāyāna. The main teaching in it is śūnyatā. Generally it is rendered into English as ‘emptiness’, ‘voidness’ and ‘nothingness’. Such renderings made this to be a nihilistic doctrine. Such interpretations have been made during the time of Nāgarjuna. In fact, this is seen from Mūlamadhyamika Kārika itself. Nāgarjuna had to clearly say, that his doctrine of śūnyatā is not uccheda (nihilistic) teaching.

The doctrine of śūnyatā has been so much misunderstood, that Nāgarjuna against(?) those who have mistaken his teaching that fell into a great harm just as one who holds a serpent gets destroyed by the serpent itself.(?) Nāgarjuna says: Śūnyatā is not another view and it has the reality and true nature of all things.” According to this, he rejected the svabhāva – ‘own nature’ teaching put forward by the Sarvāstivāda. So, Nāgarjuna pointed out the view of svabhāva as totally against the Buddha’s basic teaching of impermanence.

Similarly, it contradicts the patīcchasamuppāda doctrine, which is another way of explaining aniccatā. Patīcchasamuppāda clearly shows the relativity of everything, that there is nothing independent and hence everything void (sunya) of anything permanent.(?) In this sense Nāgarjuna identified Śūnyatā with the doctrine of patīcchasamuppāda. In fact this is the real significance of the teaching of śūnyatā. It shows that everything is relative and therefore devoid of any svabhāva. Hence, śūnyatā means that everything is svabhāva-sunya.

How did the Madhyamaka School emphasize Sunyata as the ultimate reality?

The theory of Sunyata is especially associated with name of Nagarjuna and Madhyamaka school of Buddhism. Sunyata is intimately connected with the teaching on the Paticcasamuppada and is really the development of the logical implications of the latter. The Theravada also deals with Sunyata but this subject has hardly been taken into serious consideration by scholars of the present day. The following are some interesting views that have been expressed by three noted scholars: Dr. N Aiyyaswamy writes, “The Sunyata doctrine is not quite unfamiliar with the early Buddhists. They take it for Nairatnya, Sunyata as an equivalent for dependent origination is quite and innovation of Nagarjuna”. (karatalaratna, P.i). Dr. Stcherbatsky writes: “the term Sunyata is and innovation of the Mahāyāna,
an innovation made necessary by the course of philosophic development. Its germ are found in the Hinayâna, but the Mahayana has given it quite a new interpretation, an interpretation in which the two main schools of the Mahayana radically diverged”. (Madhynanta. Vibhanga P. V.). Dr. N. Dutt writes; “the Sarvastivadins are also responsible for the addition of a fourth term, sunya, to the usual trio, Viz, Dukkha, anitya and anatma, though the word conveyed no Mahayanic meaning as it connoted no other sense than anatma” (Aspects of Mahayana Buddhism, P.26).

To be more precise to prove (1) that Sunnata is used in Theravada as an equivalent for dependent origination (Paticca Samuppada), (2) that sunnata is used in the Theravada not only as an equivalent for the nature of the phenomenal world but also as an equivalent for Nibbana and the absolute, and (3) that the conception of the Sunyata far from being quite a new interpretation, on the part of Nagarjuna or of the Mahayana, represents more accurately only a more detailed statement of the logical consequences of the Theravada theory of causality and Sunnata.

“It is the contention of the Madhyamikas that the final release is possible only through Sunyata by the giving up of all views, standpoints and predicaments. (T. R. V.Murti, P.269). The Majjhima Nikaya devotes two suttas for the specific consideration of Sunnata. The first of these (called the Cula Sunnata Sutta) describes Sunnata as the highest attainment that brings about reaches. Sunnata is reality as it is (Yathabhucca) the purest (Parisuddha), the highest incomparable (Paramanuttara) and above change (avipallatha).

It is noted that “look upon the world as being non-substantial, O Magharaja, being ever so mindful. One surpasses that by uprooting belief in substantiality. Death does not get hold of him who regards the world in this way.” Sn. Verse 1119. In this regards we can see Madhyamika. School emphasizes the Sunyata as an equivalent for the ultimate reality.

THE CONCEPT OF EMPTINESS (ŚŪNYAM AND ŚŪNYATĀ)

This term 'sūṇyam' can be translated as 'empty', 'devoid', 'nothing' and 'non-existent'.

Emptiness, openness, nothingness, non-substantiality and inexhaustibility have been used to translate Śūnyatā. These two terms of nature important in Buddhism have been used to express a philosophical idea of later developed Buddhist scholastic philosophy. As general religious (?) Sūnyaṃ and Śūnyatā are used as an attempt to indicate and incite an awareness of the way things really are (yathābhūtaṃ).

The complexity of the concept expressed as emptiness derives from the recognition in Buddhism, that teachings of the truth about life is an agent for alleviating suffering, but that implicit in thinking and speaking resides a tendency to create an illusion. (?) The teaching of the emptiness of things is a medicine for spiritual illness. It is a respond to a universal problematic condition that is found in ordinary life. Different Buddhist schools have recognized the value of different interpretations of śūnyatā. There is a clear recognition that the notion of emptiness is closely tied to the practice of non-existence of things.

Madhyamika school held that all things are empty because they originated and still exist according to the theory of causality. Nagarjuna is often regarded as the founder of the Madhyamika school. His major writing Mālamadhyamika Kārika includes a summary of eight negations that have epitomized the emptiness teaching:

1. No origination
2. No dissipation
3. No permanence
4. No ending
5. No differentiation
6. No identity
7. No coming
8. No going

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Throughout this world Nāgarjuna analyses basic philosophical notions, for example causal condition, time, self, Tathāgata and Nirvāṇa.

1. The Tathāgata exists after death.
2. The Tathāgata does not exist after death.
3. The Tathāgata exists and does not exist after death.
4. The Tathāgata neither exists nor non-exists after death.

Nāgarjuna claimed that none of these statements are successful to explain the nature of fully Enlightened One. So, the language that we use is relative. Therefore, everything is empty. He shows that non-existence is the sense of self-sufficient existence (svabhāva) and that it is empty.

At the same time he demonstrates that all things exist, because emptiness is the same as dependent co-origination (paṭiccasamuppāda). Conventional experience divides the world into likes and dislikes, desires and fears, and you and me are separate emptinesses. This type of fact that this perception can exist only in interrelationship. To perceive through the deep avoidances of emptiness people must avian of how they construct attachment and fears while perceiving, conceptualizing and judging.

**QUESTION: EXPLAIN THE ANALYSIS OF ŚŪNYATĀ ACCORDING TO PAṬICCASAMUPPĀDA**

Śūnyatā is generally translated to English as 'emptiness'. Many scholars consider this emptiness to mean 'nothingness'. This gives the idea that this concept denotes nihilism. The term is used by the Buddha himself in suttas in the Suttanipāta. The Buddha used the term to mean the absence of any substance, any entity or soul. So, as the Buddah used suñña, means without or devoid of any soul or substance.

Nāgarjuna, the founder of Madhyamika philosophy, which puts forward the Śūnyatā idea says his teaching is not a kind of nihilism. Some modern scholars point out that nāgarjuna was also using the term in the same sense as the Buddha did.

If so, sūnya means something like anattā. This means in other words it means that everything is impermanent (anityā/aniccā). So, what is impermanent is explained in Buddhism as Dependently Arising. That is arising due to the presence of certain causes and conditions. Similarly, when these causes and conditions are not there, they too disappear. This shows that everything is without an underlying substance that persists and prevails throughout without changing. Therefore, everything is related to other things.

This relativity is called Paṭiccasamuppāda. All things according to Buddhism are dependently arising (Paṭiccasamuppāda). The core of Paṭiccasamuppāda teaching is that there is no abiding 'thing' that lies underneath or behind phenomena. There is 'no soul' behind the five aggregates. The five aggregates rise and fall depending on each other. The whole universe is 'empty' (suñña) of an entity or a substance that exists permanently without being subject to changes.

Then, it is seen that the theory of Śūnyatā and Paṭiccasamuppāda are not different from each other. In ignorance they bring the same idea, but is too different perspective. Both these are not nihilistic views. They merely bring out the relative nature of phenomena.

**QUESTION: WITH REFERENCE TO THE INTERPRETATION OF THE CONNECTION BETWEEN THE CAUSE AND EFFECT, EXPLAIN HOW THE MADHYAMIKĀ TRADITION AND YOGĀCĀRA TRADITION DIFFER FROM EACH OTHER?**

Madhyamika school, which is Mahāyāna, is said to have originated in the second century AD. The founder of this school was Nāgarjuna.

The Buddha gave all His explanations about the world and man on basis of Dependent Origination. Madhyamikas also did the same contribution to Buddhism, but their teaching in explaining ideological and philosophical problem arose among Buddhists themselves.

Thus, they taught emptiness of dhammā as well as of puggala (individual). Madhyamikas advocated the relative existence of
things. According to them, dharmā are dependent on each other. Dharmā are devoid of their own nature, therefore, they are empty and dependent on each other. So, Madhyamika philosophy is based on concept of Śūnyatā, which is the characteristic of phenomena denying the Viśīvaśvāvāda (idealistic concept) and Sarvāstivāda (realistic concept) and teaching the relative existence of things. He (Nāgarjuna) says, that emptiness is the characteristic of all the phenomena. There are 3 main sources contributing to the doctrine of Yogācāra:

1. Tradition of meditators
2. Even Madhyamika up to some extend, the doctrine of unreality of external world
3. Abhidhamma doctrines, particulary Sarvāstivāda, Sautrāntika, Vātsīputriya and Sāmmītiya.

Historically Yogācāra came about as party in reaction to version of Śūnyatā and Middle Way preached by Madhyamika school. Therefore, for Yogācāra, Śūnyatā is not emptiness. It is an absolute, ontological entity. That Śūnyatā is absolute is revealed by removing illusion.

In Yogācāra, there had been always a perception error. AlayaVijñāna is the constructor. It is responsible for all our phenomenal, empirical experience. It manifests into division of subject and object, that is due to our conditioning forces that bifurcate into subject and object.

For Yogācāra school, situation is peculiar. All three Vijñānas are momentary. Alaya is not one unchanging consciousness persisting throughout duration of evolutionary process. It is a stream of discrete moments' flow on like a current of a river with perpetual succession of vassanas of different karmas and further effects of them.

In Yogācāra nature of consciousness is understood in an entirely new light. The subjective is not a passive spectator of what goes on before it, but it is the dynamic will which creates its contents.

**Paṭiccasamuppāda (Dependent Co-origination) (Original by Ven. Sūmitra) (February 2006)**

According to the Pāli-English Dictionary the word Paṭiccasamuppāda is:

1. Arising on the ground of a preceding cause happening by way of cause.
2. Working of cause and effects
3. Causal chain of causation
4. Causal genesis, dependent origination
5. Theory of the twelve causes

This term is a unique word in Buddhism which arised from the Buddhist critique of Indian theories of causality. It states that events are not predetermined nor are they random and it rejects notions of direct causation. The common formula of Paṭiccasamuppāda is as follows:

„This being, that becomes,
From the arising of this, that arises,
This not being, that does not become,
From the ceasing of this, that seases.” (Saṃyutta Nikāya)

In early Buddhism we find another formula which expresses the whole process of human being:

1. With ignorance as condition mental formation arises (avijjā)
2. With mental formation as condition consciousness arises (sankhārā)
3. With consciousness as condition name and form arise (viññāṇa)
4. With name and form as condition sense gates arise (nāma-rūpa)
5. With sense gate as condition contact arises (salāyatana)
6. With contact as condition feeling arises (phassa)
7. With feeling as condition arises craving (vedanā)
8. With craving as condition arises clinging (taṇhā)
9. With clinging as condition becoming arises (upādāna)
10. With becoming as condition birth arises (bhava)
11. With birth as condition aging and death arises (jāti, jarā-maṇaṇa, sokaparideva dukkhadomanassa) etc.

**Paṭiccasamuppāda (February 2006)**

**Paṭiccasamuppāda:**

1. Ignorance (avijjā)
2. Mental formations (saṅkhārā)
3. Consciousness (viññāṇa)
4. Name and form (nāma-rūpa)
5. Six sense gates (salāyatana)
6. Contact (phassa)
7. Feeling (vedanā)
8. Craving (taṇhā)
9. Clinging (upādāna)
10. Becoming (bhava)
11. Birth (jāti)
12. Aging and death (jarā maranaṃ)

The Paṭiccasamuppāda with its twelve links starting with ignorance and ending in aging and death shows how man being fettered wanders in saṃsāra birth after birth but by getting rid of these twelve factors man can liberate himself from suffering and rebirth. **The Buddha** has taught the way to put an end to this repeated wandering. The arising of the dukkha is taught by anuloma (regular) way of Paṭiccasamuppāda. The other way to the ceasing of suffering is formulated to paṭiloma formula - „Through this entire cessation of ignorance ceases, mental formation ceases... through the cessation of birth cease aging and death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief and despair. Thus this whole mass of suffering ceases.“

The general formulation has two very well known applications. The first application to suffering is known as the Four Noble Truths:

1. *Dukkha* – There is suffering. Suffering is an intrinsic part of life and also experience as dissatisfaction thus contains unhappiness, impermanence etc.
2. *Samudaya* – There is a main cause of suffering which is attachment or desire
3. *Nirodha* – There is a way out of suffering which is to eliminate attachment and desire.
4. *Magga* – The path that leads out of suffering is called the Noble Eightfold Path.

The other application is to the (?) river (?) process and it is known as the twelve nidānas or the twelve links of conditioned existence. In this application of Paṭiccasamuppāda is linked as condition preceding one, and itself ???
According to the Abhidhamma existence is a process of mental and physical states which arise and perish momentarily as causes conditions and effect. The world which appears as a unity is a plurality of constituents in reality. These are real elements of existence because they are results of analyzing the things in the world. They are real as they can not be further analyzes into any other reality. In the Theravada Abhidhamma this real elements as existence are classified into three and with the final goal of Buddhism it becomes four those are four realities.

1-Citta
2-Cetasika
3-Rupa
4-Nibbana

Citta, Cetasika and Rupa never exist independently. They are depending on each other. Mind and mental concomitance (Citta and Cetasika) have four kinds of relationships. They are:

1-Arise together
2-They perish together
3-They take same objects
4-They arises the same sense-organ.

Mind and mental concomitance always arise in connecting with physical senses of the body. Therefore mind and form never exist separately.

* Citta:

The term Citta explains with different words as Vinnana, Citta, Mana. According to the Atthasalini it has explained the Citta as “consciousness (Citta) is so called because of its variegated nature. Mind (Mano) is so called because it knows the measure of the objects. Mental action (Manasika) is just mind”.

Consciousness, explains in various based above, has been classified into 69/121 types in almost all the Theravada Abhidhamic texts. One moment of consciousness comprises three moments’ four stages namely nascent (Uppada) static (Thiti) cession (Bhanga) The time living has been given according to a statement in the discourses, the non-material disappears quicker than the material.

Cetasika

The form Cetasika is used fin the sense of a originating in consciousness accompanied with consciousness. Cetasika is not something different from consciousness that comprises characteristic of it. Cetasika arise and perishes with consciousness, they have the same object and basis as consciousness. In the analyses of the aggregates, Vinnana (Consciousness) represents ‘Citta’ in Abhidhammic specification. Vedana, Sanna and Samkhara represent the Cetasikas.

Rupa- (Matter)

The Abhidhamma concept of Rupa represents the physical aspect of the person or individuals and the world of experience. The common definition of Rupa, as stated in the canon as well as in the commentary is “Matter” (Rupa) means that which is subjected to molestation. Here molesting means becoming transformed with the effect of cold, heat, etc that means arising in another form when
opposite condition such as cold and heat are present. Rupa, comprising two groups, primary (Bhuta) and secondary (Upadana). Rupas are twenty eight (28) in numbers. Among the 28 Rupas only the first 18 can be considered as real Rupa_Dhammas.

1- Essential material qualities – Patavi, Apo, Tejo, Vayo.

2- Sensitive material qualities – Ckkhu, Sota, Shana, Jivha, Kaya.

3- Material qualities of sense – Field _Rupa, Sadda, Ganda, Rasa.

4- Material qualities of sex – Purisatta, Ittatta.

5- Material qualities of bases – Itadaya vatttu.


7- Material qualities of nutrition – Kabalinkahara.

8- Material qualities of Limitation – Akasa.

9- Material qualities of communication – Kayavinnafi.

10- Material qualities of plasticity – Lahuta, Muduta, Kammanuta.


Nibbana (Arupa)

The Abhidhammic interpretation of Nibbana the final goal of Buddhism, somewhat differs from the descriptions of the early discourses. In the early discourses, Nibbana is described as complete detachments from defilements words of negation are mostly used. In Abhidhammic interpretation, the commentators have made an attempt to describe it in a positive way thereby cauterizing it as a real Dhamma.

According to the passage the first characteristics of Nibbana is to be realized by wisdom of four paths. The second is, it becomes an object to the path and fruits. The two divisions of Nibbana are **Sopadisesa and Nirupadisesa**

**Question:** As a result of interpreting the five aggregates, Abhidhamma were compiled, discuss.

material disappears quicker than the material.
texts they have proved that there is nothing which can be available as permanent (ātma). And also they wanted to prove that nothing can exist alone. All those are existing dependent on each other. In another words, the existence of the individual is a psycho-physical combination. To prove these tasks they made the Pakarana four (?) Paṭṭhāna. In Paṭṭhāna, followint the cause end effect theory they synthesized the individual. Because of that theory it is highly accepted that nothing can exist alone. All the things are dependent on each other.

Even though through analyses and syntheses, the Ahidhammikas showed the real nature of the individual. Some of the schools were not satisfied with that theory given by Abhidhammikas. Those schools were:
1. Sammītiyas (Puggalavādins)
2. Sarvastivāda
3. Sautrāntika
4. Vibhajjavāda

Sammītiya school mentioned the existence of the puggala. This puggala would transmigrate from life and life until the individual attains the Nibbāna. Sarvāstivādins mention that the five aggregates as a whole are transmigrating from life to life. And it ceases with the attainment of Nibbāna. Sautrāntika (those who were dependent on suttas, the discourses delivered by the Buddha himself) mentioned that what the Buddha taught was correct while the other things were wrong.

Vibhajjavādins also followed the same method used by the Buddha for the classification of individual. Therefore these schools have gone against the interpretation given on individual.

These controversies pointed were discussed in Kathāvathu Pakarana which was composed by ven. Moggaliputtatissa Thera. In the text the controversy points made by the other schools were defeated.

666 Buddhist mysticism in Meditation

Meditation is one of the dominant mysticism in Buddhism, leading to a complete concentration of mind, ‘one-pointedness’ or absorption (Samadhi). Attention is progressively withdrawn from outer things, so that a man may become entirely unconscious of them, and may thus enter into a state of trance. It is said that the Buddha was once so absorbed while walking in the open air that he was altogether unconscious of a thunderstorm, in which two farmers were struck by lightning. In Samadhi at its highest point the consciousness of self disappears along with that of the outer world. It is the culmination of the eightfold path which leads to Nirvana.

The scriptures speak of different spheres of being. There are three great spheres of cosmic existence. The first and lowest is Kama-loka, the world of desire or sense. Above this is Rupa-loka, the world of form, in which there is a subtle residue of matter, so that its occupants possess the powers of sight and hearing but not the senses of touch, taste and smell. Beyond this is Arupa-loka, the formless world, in which there is no residue of matter, although its inhabitants are still subject to the limitations of cosmic existence and yet free from the Samsara.

To rise above the level of the sense-world and to enter the world of form, it is necessary to pass through four stages of meditation and trance and to overcome what are known as the five ‘hindrances’. The Rupa jhanas have been described as ‘mystic raptures’. The distinctive feature of mystical experience is the consciousness of the transcendent – the immediate awareness of supreme Reality. The four trances may, indeed, lead to a higher plane of being, but their characteristic quality is subjective.

The four Rupa jhanas are succeeded by certain exceedingly subtle states of consciousness corresponding to the planes of the formless world. In formless world, through the practice of trance they are said to attain certain supernormal faculties – for instance, of creating a mind formed body, the power of hearing distant sounds and of reading the minds of others, the memory of one’s own past lives, the power to read the history of other beings – to see their passing away and rebirth. They are regarded as a by-product of meditation.
The formless world is not ultimate. Craving for life in that world is a fetter from which man must seek release. In the Udana, Nirvana is described as a plane not only beyond the level of physical experience, but beyond the place of infinite space, of infinite consciousness, of nothingness and of neither consciousness nor non-consciousness. It is said that on the last night of his life the Buddha himself, having passed through the four Rupa jhanas and the four Arupa jhanas, entered this plane of being. He says himself, referring, no doubt, to his own experience of enlightenment, under the Bo-tree: “I reached in experience the Nirvana which is unborn, unrivalled, secure form attachment, undecaying and unstained. This condition is indeed reached by me whom am deep, difficult to see, difficult to understand, tranquil, excellent, beyond the reach of mere logic, subtle and to be realized only by the wise.”

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TANTRAYĀNA (TANTRISM, MEDITATIONS) (2009)

1) Yoga
2) Sense pleasure

Ūśmata yoga

Introduction to Tantrayāna

Tantrayāna developed by following Mahāyāna and Hinayāna traditions. The tradition emerged in India. Because of that, Hinduism was followed by the Tantric monks. As a result of that, they have added some deities and mysterious deeds to the Tantrayāna. According to the Theravāda tradition there are three bodies, such as:
a) Sammā Sambuddha
b) Pacceka Buddha
c) Arahats

The fully enlightened Buddha can attain it only individually. But he can explain the Dhamma to the others. Pacceka Buddha also attained the enlightenment individually, but he cannot preach the Dhamma to the others.40 Therefore, both Sammā Sambuddha and Pacceka Buddha were kept aside. Those, who wanted to attain Nibbāna, can easily follow the practical part of an Arahat. Thus one is able to attain Nibbāna by eradication of fetters (dasa sañyojana).

In Mahāyāna tradition, Mahāyānists believed that becoming an Arahant is an easier task. But to become a Sammā Sambuddha is a very difficult task, but it is very beneficial for most of the people. They thus introduced a part for the attainment of enlightenment, that is the part of the Bodhisatta. Here the matter is, that the enlightenment cannot be attained in the present life itself. As a Bodhisatta they have to take several lifetimes41 until they attain enlightenment.

Having considered all those matters Tantrayāna introduced a new practices, part by following this part, the Bodhisatta can attain the enlightenment in this life itself. Therefore, he must perform all the perfections (pāramitā) in this life itself. On the other hand, he must perform whatever was performed by the Buddha. With the attainment of enlightenment, he should behave as a Buddha, he should rescue other fellow beings from this world of suffering.

According to Tantrism the practice of the Bodhisatta is a very difficult process, because he should be skillful both in Theravāda and Mahāyāna.

Tantrayāna emerged in India and spread to Tibet, China and Japan. In Tibet it developed and it is still alive. They have

40 Here would be good to mention, that Pacceka Buddha as well as Arahat can preach Dhamma and explain it to others. The only disadvantage is, that they cannot explain it so perfectly, thoroughly and faultlessly, which is the great skill of the Sammā Sambuddha.
41 Several? Several??! No! Thousands! Millions! Billions! Trillions! Quadrillions of lives, hundreds of thousands aeons! Long, very long time!!!
different branches and among those branches Kargupta is a prominent branch. According to the branch, the teacher and the student should have a great relationship. Here the teacher does not say anything to his student. The student should be very close to the teacher. When the student associates the teacher, he learns much more. In this process, sometimes the student has to stay for a long time till his mind becomes pure. Then the teacher, having realized that the student's mind is pure and calm, will transform(?) his view.

Kargupta Nikāya emerged from a divine teacher. He was Vajrāsatva. Then it was handed over to the human teacher named Tilopa. From Tilopa it was handed over to his student Nāropa. From Nāropa to Maropā. From Maropā to Milarepā. Milarepa is an erudite teacher in Tibet.

The teacher Nāropa has introduced six kinds of yoga practices. They are:

1) Īśmata Yoga
2) Māya Sarīra Yoga
3) Svapna Yoga
4) Shuddhāloka Yoga
5) Bardo Yoga
6) Viññāṇa Saṃkramanā Yoga

Any Bodhisatta cannot follow these yoga practices without practicing Mahāmudra meditation. Therefore, the Mahāmudra meditation should be practiced first. According to the nature of this meditation, it takes no Mahāyāna or Tantrayāna tradition. It is between them. Through their meditation, the Bodhisatta would realize the real nature of the human mind. After that he can easily control his own mind. Now he has built up a mentality through which he may see the Nibbāna anywhere. And also he sees all the Bodhisattas as Buddhas. As a result of that he is able to realize the mundane life as the supra-mundane life. Therefore, this meditation gives new vision, because of that he feels thesaṃsāra as itself as Nibbāna.

1) Īśmata Yoga

This is a meditation on breathing. The meditator practises different methods of breathing. Those methods are not easy to follow. All the individual usually have the spiritual power of the mind. According to the Tantrayāna, the spiritual power is hidden as the base of the backbone and under the navel. The aspirant should have taken out the spiritual power from the top of the head. Usually the spiritual power of the man is not alive. It should be awaken with this meditation. When this meditation is well trained, one can do anything with the complete strength of the mind. It is called „psychic-power.” As Tantric people believed, we use only one tenth (1/10) of the power of mind. The remaining nine tenths (9/10) of the mind call(?) also také as a result of this meditation. The following psychic-power could be obtained as a result of this meditation:

1) Reading other's mind (see what others see)
2) The power of going through the air
3) Making one's own body bigger or smaller.

All those powers are accepted as mundane powers – a special feature of another meditation accepted in Īśmata Yoga is by following one of the meditations belonging to the Īśmata Yoga one can imagine different kinds of matter (rūpa). Then he is able to imagine even the image of the God. Finally, he is able to give life to all those forms. The final essence of this meditation is making small the matter until it becomes empty. That is called Sūññatā. This is a very difficult task to be performed. Therefore mind should be very calm and it should be a well trained mind. Having realized the difficulty of this meditation they are to practice Mahāmudra meditation.

2) Māya Sarīra Yoga

In this meditation one would train to see his material body as it is in the mirror. At the same time he should have to think about a form of a god also. The figure which was in the mirror and the imagination of the form of the god are not real. They are mysterious.

3) Svapna Yoga

With this meditation one is able to understand true nature of the dreams. This time the person is dreaming, knowing that „I am dreaming.” Just like one watches a film, he sees the dream consciously. Through this practice of meditation he is able to change his draems. Usually this is a dream with defilements (pleasure). With this meditation one is able to watch the dreams which are free from defilements (no pleasure).
4) **Shuddhā Loka Yoga**

By following this meditation one can see the purity of mind while he is living. Usually one cannot see the purity of mind when he lives, but also because of this meditation, one would be able to see the purity of mind that should be experienced at the death. As a result of this meditation one can face the death without any difficulties. Not only that, but also he can easily combine with *Shuddhā Loka* and can attain *Nibbāna* as well.

5) **Bārdo Yoga**

The purpose of this meditation is to examine the following:

a) The way one reaches to the death
b) The way of one's life that is moving in the intermediate life after the death
c) The way of attaining *Shuddhā Loka* and *Nibbāna*
d) The way of conception in the next life or existence
e) The way of having next birth if it is possible

6) **Viññāṇa Saṅkramana Yoga**

The purpose of this meditation is to take out the life (*viññāṇa*) from the top of the head of the person at the time of death. When one's *viññāṇa* gets out from the top of the head, he would reborn in the heavenly world.

In Tibet this meditation is called 'Pova'. Those who practice this meditation have a hole on the top of the head. To show the hole they used to put a grass leaves. As a result of this hole, for the *viññāṇa* it is easy to get out during the dat. When one practises all these six kinds of meditation he is able to win the life by defeating the death.

The aspirant in *Theravāda* should eradicate the defilements (*kilesa*) for the attainment of final bliss. In Tantrism the aspirant does not try to eradicate the defilements, but he tries to understand the real nature of the defilements by living with them. As they believe if someone is able to practise in such a manner he can completely eradicate all the defilements. This is not a suppression of defilements. Then defilements would never arise. It is similar to a man who gave up all the toys with which he played in his childhood. Thus the Tantric yogin would have a sexual life with a woman, and he would please the whole body. This time he had only the feelings of lust. When he had the sexual life in such a manner, he pleased all his senses as possible as he could. After that he could easily eradicate his lust.

According to Tantrism one should do whatever consciously, because of that he realizes the real nature of what he experienced. Usually people engage in different activities unconsciously. Because of that they cannot experience them well. When one does something applying the consciousness from the beginning until the end, he can realize the real nature of that what he did. By following this method one can get rid of anything what he used to do, such as consumption of liquor, 5 kinds of pleasure etc.

In Tantrism the yogins accepted the defilements as *Bodhisatta*. Therefore, they respect the defilements concerning that they are the *Buddhas*. Accordingly five *Buddhas* are mentioned:

1) The lust (*rāga*) – *Akśabha*
2) Hatred (*dosa*) – *Vyrocana*
3) Ignorance (*moha*) – *Ratana sambhava*
4) Maliciousness (*pisuna*) – *Amitabha*
5) Jealousy (*issā*) – *Amogha siddhi*

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**The Principle Sects and Teaching of Tantrayana**

1. **Introduction**

The beginning of Tantrayana seem to be inseparable from the beginning of the Mahayana; indeed the Tibetans never made any different between Mahayana and Vajrayana, another name of Tantrayana. What are known as sutras (mdo) in Sanskrit are classed by
Vajrayana Buddhism in India.
Origins.
Vajrayana or Mantrayana, also known as Tantric Buddhism, first gained prominence in various parts of India and Sri Lanka. Scholars infer that, because of the esoteric nature of Tantric practice and doctrine, this school might have been developing quietly from the 2nd or 4th century AD, when Buddhist tradition associates Nagarjuna or Asanga with its origins. Most scholars associate the Vajrayana tradition primarily with India and Tibet.

Vajrayana maintains that nirvana as sunyata is one side of a polarity that must be complemented by karuna. Sunyata is seen as passive wisdom (prajna) that possesses an absolutely indestructible or diamondlike (vajra) nature beyond all duality, whereas karuna is the means (upaya) or dynamic aspect of the world. Enlightenment arises when these seeming opposites are realized to be in truth one. This realization, which is known experientially and not through a purely cognitive process, is portrayed in some types of Vajrayana imagery and practice as the union of the passive female deity, which signifies wisdom or voidness, with the dynamic male, signifying compassion without attachment. Such a union, called yab-yum (“father-mother”) in Tibetan, is not a satisfaction of physical impulses but a symbol of the unity of opposites that brings the “great bliss,” or enlightenment.

Adherents of the Vajrayana tradition believe that as all things are in truth of one nature, the void, and the physical-mental processes can be used as a vehicle for enlightenment. In the Kalacakra Tantra it is written that the Buddha taught that in this age of degeneration enlightenment must be achieved through one’s own body, which contains the whole cosmos. This doctrine is taught in all the tantras. Vajrayana specialists warn, however, that in order to use correctly the body’s processes to achieve an identification of the void with compassion, the aspirant must follow absolutely the instructions of a master or teacher who has been initiated into the mysteries. Such a master alone can direct every step so that the pupil learns to control mental and physical processes instead of being dominated by them. Therefore, the first step toward enlightenment in Vajrayana practice is the undergoing of initiation by a master.

The master first endeavours to direct the student to compassion through meditation on the transitoriness of life, the relation of cause and effect of one’s actions, and the general suffering of humanity. After this sympathy for the suffering of humanity is aroused, the master guides his pupil in yogie, or contemplative, exercises that help to produce inner experiences corresponding to the various stages of spiritual growth. This process of advancement toward enlightenment involves the identification of the initiate with gods or goddesses that represent various cosmic forces. These gods are first visualized with the help of mudras (meditative gestures and postures), mantras (sacred syllables and phrases), and icons, all of which are believed to possess the essence of the divinities to be invoked. The icons are portrayed in a mandala, a sacred design that represents the universe as an aid to meditation. After this visualization, the initiate identifies with the divinities and finds that each in turn is sunyata, or voidness.

The culmination of this process, called vajrasattva yoga, gives the initiate a diamondlike body beyond all duality. Four stages in the process are described in four different groups of tantras, the Kriya-tantra, Carya-tantra, Yoga-tantra, and Anuttarayoga-tantra. These four stages are likened to the fourfold phases of courtship: the exchange of glances, a pleasing or encouraging smile, the holding of hands, and consummation in the sexual act. The first stage involves external ritual acts, whereas the second combines these outward acts with contemplation. The third stage involves only contemplation, and the fourth is the unification of all dualities in the sexual act, symbolically or effectively. This last stage, however, is divided into two phases. The first involves the use by the initiate of controlled imagination, which allows him to experience the union on an ideational level. The second phase is the maithuna, or sexual coupling. This act, however, cannot be construed as an ordinary physical mating, because the initiate has already realized the voidness of all things, allowing him to act with perfect control over his emotions and without attachment. Whereas the ordinary sexual act gives rise to only momentary pleasure, this maithuna is considered to be an appropriate technique for attaining enlightenment and eternal bliss.

These Vajrayana practices have been unjustly condemned as a degeneration of Buddhism by those who do not look beyond the surface. It is quite easy to misinterpret the Guhyasamaja-tantra when it states that adultery and eating of human flesh are actions of the bodhisattva if one does not realize that this imagery points to the belief that voidness alone exists, beyond good or evil, or that the initiate must act only with compassion for the benefit of the salvation of the world. Once the true depths of Vajrayana doctrines and practices are perceived, this school can be designated as a development of Buddhist thought that emphasizes the attainment of enlightenment through a graduated process of meditation under the direction of an initiated teacher.

Vajrayana literature.
While the sutras can be said to represent the theoretical and speculative aspect of Buddhism, the tantras, written in a highly figurative language, express Buddhism as individually lived. The tantras are essentially individually oriented works that apply to larger groups of persons because of the similarity of the experiences described in them. The individual spiritual development occurs through symbols that must not be reduced to signs; a symbol always points beyond itself. Because of this symbolic character, the tantras have usually been kept secret, and a literalist interpretation of such texts has usually failed to make any sense out of them.

The Guhyasamaja-tantra (“Treatise on the Sum Total of Mysteries”), also known as the Tathagataguhyaika (“The Mystery of Tathagatahood [Buddhahood]”), is the earliest known written tantra. It is by tradition ascribed to the renowned Indian scholar Asanga (c. 4th century AD), the propounder of the Yogacara philosophy. Usually the tantras do not give an explanation of the technical or symbolic terms, as this explanation is left to the teacher, but the Guhyasamaja-tantra devotes a very long chapter to the elucidation of these terms.

An important feature of all tantras is a polarity symbolism, which on the physical level appears as the union of male and female; on the ethical level it appears as the union of beneficial activity and an appreciation of what there is as it is; and on the philosophical level it appears as the synthesis of absolute reality and absolute compassion. The richness of this symbolism is already indicated in
the opening of the Guhyasamaja, where the absolute, which is depicted as a polarity, manifests itself in various mandalas (circular diagrams that have both a psychological and cosmic reference), each related to one of the celestial, meditational buddhas--Aksobhya, Vairocana, Ratnasambhava and Amitabha, and Amoghasiddhi--each of whom again represents a polarity, portrayed in iconographic works through their union with their female consorts.

The ideas and symbols presented in the Guhyasamaja-tantra became in the course of time more and more clearly elaborated. Because the tantras reflect an individual process of growth, the centre toward which this process gravitates, and from which it is also fed, appears in various symbols given various designations. Thus, there is the Hevajra-tantra, in which the sustaining life force is called Hevajra, and the Mahavairocana-tantra, in which it is called Mahavairocana ("The Great Resplendent One").

In view of the fact that the tantras may emphasize either "beneficial activity" or "appreciative awareness" or their "unity," the Tantric literature has been divided into the so-called Father Tantra (emphasizing activity), the Mother Tantra (emphasizing appreciation), and the Nondual Tantra (dealing with both aspects univitely). Almost all these works have been lost in their original Sanskrit versions, but their influence is noticeable in such works as Jinasiddhi ("Attainment of Knowledge") by the great Vajrayana teacher Indrabhuti (c. 687-717), Prajñopayavinishcayasiddhi ("The Realization of the Certitude of Appreciative Awareness and Ethical Action") by the 8th-century writer Anangavajra, and the songs of the 84 mahasiddhas ("masters of miraculous powers," who were considered to have attained the Vajrayana goal). One of the last Sanskrit works to have been written in Central Asia was the Kalacakra-tantra. Its penetration into India may be dated AD 966. The central theme is the Adi-Buddha--primeval buddhahood--manifesting itself as a continuum of time (kala) and space (cakra).

The Origin and Development of the Plurality of the Path to Liberation

In the first sermon (Dhammacakkapavattana sutta) of the Buddha he advised the monks to avoid two extremes and to follow the middle path. What is this Majjhima Patipada? This is the Noble Eightfold Path. (Ayameva ariyo athangiko maggo De me bhikkhave anta pabbajitena na sevitabba; yocayam kamesu kamasukhallikanuyo hino, gammo, pothujjaniko, anariyo, anatthasanhito, yo cayam attakilamathanuyo dukkho anariyo anattha samhito-monks, there are two extremes that monks should not have to follow: what are those “Attachment to worldly pleasures. These are low (hino), common to the villages (gammo), common to the ordinary people (pothujjaniko), innoble (anariyo), useless (anatthasanhito), yo cayam attakilamathanuyo dukkho anariyo anattha samhito-monks, there are two extremes that monks should not have to follow: what are those “Attachment to worldly pleasures. These are low (hino), common to the villages (gammo), common to the ordinary people (pothujjaniko), innoble (anariyo), useless (anatthasanhito), disadvantageous” and following the path of self-mortification or severe penance, unpleasant (dukkho), innoble (anariyo) disadvantageous (anatthasanhito).

Ete te bhikkhave ubho ante anupagama majjhima patipada tathagatena abhisambuddha cakkhukarani, nanakarani, upasamaya abhinayay sambodhaya nibbanaya samvattati- no having following these two extremes the Buddha through the middle path which is produced knowledge (nanakarani), tranquillising (upasamaya) for the realization (sambodhaya) for Nibbana (Nibbanaya).

In the Satipatthana sutta it is mentioned that four kinds of Mindfulness is the only path for the realization of Nibbana.

Many other ways also mentioned in another places in various suttas in the Nikayas.

Yamhijjhananca pannaca sa ve nibbane santike- if anyone attains to trances and wisdom, he is near to Nibbana.

In the Dhammapada:
Sabbe sankhara anicca yadapannaya passati, attha nibbindati dukkhe esamaggo visuddhiya- all conditional things are impermanent. If anyone sees this by wisdom, then he will be disgusted with the dukkha. That will be the path to liberation.

The same thing will apply to Sabbe sankhara dukkha and Sabbe dhamma anatta.
In the Samyutta Nikaya:
Sile patitthaya naro sapanno, cittam pannanca bhavayam, atapinipako bhikkhu so imam vijataye jatama- a wise man who is established in Sila if develop the mind and the wisdom. This clever monk who is exert himself will remove all his confusion.

Later on in almost every suttas we can read Sila, Samadhi and Panna three kinds of discipline (Tividha sikkha) have been mentioned.

In the first sermon, there is no mention about Tividha sikkha separately. But we can say that thee three kinds of discipline is included in the Eightfold Path. This has been mentioned in the Cullvedall sutta
1. Sammaditthi
2. Sammasankappa (Panna)
3. Sammavaca
4. Sammakammanda
5. Sammaajiva (Sila)
6. Sammavayama
7. Sammasati
8. Sammasamadhi (Samadhi)

“Tihi ca kho visakha khandhehi attangiko maggo sangahito”-The eightfold path can be comprised in the three aggregates. As the sutta mentions three aggregates are Sila, Samadhi and Panna.

We can see clearly the division of these three kinds of discipline in the D.N specially in the Silakkhandha vagga. In the suttas of Brahmajala, Samannaphala, Ambattha, Sonadanda, we can see that how Sila, Samadhi and Panna explained in the gradual level and the way Sila itself have been explained in great length dividing into Culasila, Majjhimasila, and Mahasila. That shows how the path of liberation has been developed from the very beginning.

We know that the emphasis on Sila came on after the pathama bodhi period (Early period of the life of the Buddha). Because of the formation of precepts or enactment of precepts, for monks came on (20) years after the enlightenment.

Sequence or methodology of liberation (vimutti) has been mentioned in the Mahaparinibbana sutt in the manner of gradual development (Iti silam iti samadhi ito panna silaparabhavito samadhi mahapphalo hoti mahanisanso. Samadhi paribhavoti panna mahapphala hoti mahanisansa panna paribhavitam cittam sammadeva asavehi vimucati seyya thidam kamasava bhausava ditthasava avijjasaya- such and such is morality, such and such is contemplation, such and such is wisdom. Great because of the fruit, great the advantage of contemplation when it is set round with morality. Great because the fruit, great the advantage of wisdom when it is set round with contemplation. The mind set round with wisdom is set quite free from the intoxications (asavas) what is to say intoxication of sensuality of becoming, of wrong vies; from delusion).

[Without Sila, Samadhi and Panna no one can see Anicca, Duddha and Anatta clearly].

The methodology of liberation is Sila, Samadhi, Panna and Vimutti.

One has to start with Sila then come to Samadhi and Panna. Then only he will be liberated.
Therefore, it is a gradual development, gradual practice and as mentioned in the Paharada sutta (A.IV-200-201).

This gradual development is similar to the gradual slope of the ocean.

Seyyathapi paharadha mahasamuddo--------anna pativedho (A.N)
“Paharadha just as the mighty ocean slopes away gradually, falls away gradual, she lies away gradually with son abruptness like a precipice. Even so in this discipline of dhamma there is a graduated training a graduated practice, a graduated mode of progress with no abruptness such as a penetration of Niravana.

We can see that even (10) perfections (dasaparamita), which is the path of the Bodhisattva, has been developed through this Sila, Samadhi and Panna.

(10) Perfections
  1. Dana-sila
  2. Sila-sila
  3. Nekkhama-sila
  4. Panna-panna
  5. Viriya-samadhi
  6. Khanti-sila
  7. Sacca-sila
  8. Aditthana-samadhi
  9. Metta-samadhi
  10. Upekkha-samadhi

Bodhi:
The term Bodhi applies to the knowledge of Arahattamagga and to the all knowledge. (Bodhiti sammasambodhi arahattamaggananassa ca etam adhivacanam).

In the Alagaddupama sutta mentioned that “if the three fetters are destroyed in any monk they all are ending in enlightenment (Yosam bhikkhave tini samyojanani pahinani sabbe te sotapanna sambodhi parayana).

The Bodhi has been divided into three:
  1. Sammasambodhi
  2. Pacceka bodhi
  3. Savaka bodhi

In the Anguttara Nikaya there are two Buddhas (A.I. 77) (Dve me bhikkhave Buddha katame dve? Tathagata ca araham sammasambuddho pacceka buddho ca. Ime kho bhikkhave dve Buddha ).

Theragatha Atthakatha: the term “Savaka paramippatto” has been mentioned for the fulfilment of paramitas of Savakas.

“Mahamoggallana theragatha Atthakatha: “Sambodhi pana tividha sammasambodhi, pacceka bodhi, savaka bodhi”

That shows there are three bodhis as paths or realizations through which become three Buddhas.
Sammasam bodhi- sammasam Buddha
Pacceka bodhi- pacceka Buddha
Savaka bodhi- savaka Buddha

But we have to make a note here that we cannot find the word “Savaka Buddha” at the beginning in the athakathas. First of all we come across the term “Catusacca Buddha” in Samyutta Athakatha (S.A.I. P-20)-Hevavitharana) cattaro Buddha, sabbannu Buddha, pacceka Buddha, catusacca Buddha, suta Buddha. Tatha samatimsa paramiyo puretva sammasambodhim patto sabbannu buddho nama. Kappasatasahassadhikani dve asamkheyyani paramiyo pure tva sayambhutam patto pacekabudha nama. Avasesa khinasava catusacca, Buddha nama, bahussuta suta Buddha.

Then in the Theragatha Athakatha we came across the term “Savaka Buddha” as well as the Bodhisatta term has been used from three kinds of bodhisattas Mahabodhisatta, Pacceka bodhisatta and Savaka bodhisatta. That show the Authors of Atthakathas logically realized if the word bodhi refers to the realization of Four Noble Truths they all could be named buddhisattas and Buddhas.

The word “Savaka bodhi” has been mentioned not only in Theragatha Athakatha but also in the Sumangalavilasini (D.N) Saratthappakasini (S.A) and in the Samantapasadika (V.A). That means Buddhaghosa referred to this term “Savakabodhi” in the sense of Arahatta magga nana but Dhammapala in his commentary on Theragatha Athakatha even went further and mentioned the word “Savaka Buddha”.

Here he has been mentioned about if a Savaka who has the intention to attain into Aggasavaka or Mahasavaka or even the Arhantship will be named as Savaka-Buddha

Savaka pana satthu sabrahmacarino va catu-sacca-kamma-atthana-kathan sutva, tasmim yeva khane ete-

This is a very bold step that has been taken up by Dhammapala Thera to mention as Savaka-Buddha which has been reluctant to mention all these time but all possible avenues has been set for such development during the Buddhaghosa’s time. As mentioned by Dr.T.Endo in his book “Buddha in Theravada Buddhism” (P-236-37).

If there are three Buddhas that means there should be three bodhisattas also. The same thing has been mentioned in the Theragatha Athakatha. The word Tinnam bodhisattanam has been mentioned to indicate three kinds of bodhisattas. These are:

1. Maha bodhisatta
2. Pacceka bodhisatta
3. Savaka bodhisatta

Savaka Bodhisattas also have to fulfil paramitas but the time factor will be different for their resolutions (Abhiniharana).

If anyone wants to become Aggasavakas they have to fulfil Paramitas one incalculable and one hundred thousand Kappas. If anyone puts the resolution to become Mahasavaka, The Mother of the Buddha, The Father of the Buddha, The Attendant of the Buddha, The Son of the Buddha, they have to fulfil only one hundred thousand Kappas.

Regarding the Wravaka Buddha, the two passages in the Theragatha Athakatha and the Upasaka Janalankara are almost identical. That means Upasaka Janalankara following the Theragatha Athakatha that passage has been copied. However, Ven Walpola Rahula was quite unaware of the Theragatha Athakatha said
in his article “The Bodhisatta ideal in Theravada and Mahayana” (Zen and the Taming of the Bull 6th article) Ananda Thera of Mahavihara tradition lived in 12th in his Upasaka Janalankara mentioned there are three Bodhis and when the Savakas realized the Savaka bodhi becomes a Savaka Buddha. Ven. W. Rahula thought the title of Savaka Buddha has given to the Savaka by Ven. Ananda in the 12th century.

It seems that in some Atthakathas the positon of Arahant and the Savaka Bodhi has been divided into two. Mainly Savaka Bodhi means the position of two main disciples. In order to achieve that position of Aggassavaka one has to follow paramitas the period of one incalculable and one hundred thousand kappas. To become Mahasavaka and Aggupatthayaka, Buddha Mata should be fulfilled paramitas only one hundred thousand kappas. (Two main disciples are Sariputta and Magallana).

Taking this methods into consideration by Mahayanists also followed this as two separate positions and mentioned:
- Arahanta
- Wravaka Bodhi
- Pratyeka Bodhi
- Samyaksambodhi as separate position

Astrasahasrika prajbaparamita mentions the ‘Bhumis’ instead of ‘Bodhi’. Therefore, it has been mentioned:
1. Wravaka Bhumi
2. Pratyeka Buddha Bhumi
3. Bodhisattva Bhumi

Saddharmapundarika sutra mentions ‘Yana’ instead of ‘Bhumi’:
- Wravaka Yana
- Pratyeka Buddha Yana
- Buddha Yana or Bodhisattva Yana

Aupamaya parivarta (3rd chapter) of the Saddharmapundarika sutra mentions that:
‘traidhatukat satvanam niskasanahetostrini yananyupadarwayanti yaduta wravata yanan pratyekabuddhayanam Bodhisattvayananmiti’ (In order to drive away from the three kinds of worlds (the Buddha) admonished three yana such as wravaka yana, prakyeabuddha yana and the Buddhissatva yana)

**EXPLAIN THE CONCEPT OF NIBBĀNA IN EARLY BUDDHISM**

The etymological meaning of Nibbāna – ‘ni + vana’ is ‘freedom from craving’ or ‘ni + va’ as ‘extinction’. Nibbāna is also called taṇhakkhaya which means ‘the extinction of thirst’; ‘asankhāta’ – ‘unconditioned’; ‘virāga’ – ‘absence of desire’; ‘nīrodha’ – cessation.

According to Pāli texts, there are many more terms expressing Nibbāna, e.g., rājakkhaya (extinction of desire), dosakkhaya (extinction of hatred), mohakkhaya (extinction of illusion), bhavonirodho (cessation of becoming).

Since Nibbāna is expressed in negative terms, there are many having a wrong notion that it is negative, and that it expresses self-annihilation. Nibbāna is definitely no annihilation of self, because there is no self to annihilate. If at all, it is the annihilation of the false idea of self.

There are also positive terms expressing Nibbāna. Khema means ‘security’, suddhi (purity), panītam (sublime), santi (peace), vimattī (release). Though it is expressed in positive terms, Nibbāna is also not something positive. The ideas of ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ are relative and are within the realm of duality. These terms cannot apply to Nibbāna, which is beyond duality and relativity. Nibbāna is beyond words, logic and reasoning i.e., attakkavacara.

Nibbāna is not a natural result of the extinction of craving. It is not the result of anything. If it is a result, then it should be produced by a cause. Nibbāna is neither a cause nor an effect. It is the Ultimate Truth (Suttanipāta 758) beyond cause and effect.

One must see Nibbāna to realize it. There is a path leading to a mountain, but the mountain is not the result of the path.
Supposing, even if there is a path leading to a mountain, the mountain is not the result of the path.42

People tend to say „Buddha entered Parinibbāna after death.“ But Parinibbāna does not mean a place, it simply means ‘fully passed away’, ‘fully blown out’ or ‘fully extinct’,43 because the Buddha has no re-existence after death. The Ratana Sutta says: „Their past is extinct with no new arising, their mind is not drawn to future birth; their old seeds are destroyed, desires no more growing, the wise goes out just like a lamp.“ - verse 14.

In Buddhism it is the wisdom that realizes Nibbāna within the 5 aggregates. The Buddha says: „Within this fathom long sentient body itself, I proclaim the world, the arising of the world, the cessation of the world and the path leading to the cessation of the world.“ This means that if the Four Noble Truths are found within the 5 aggregates. This also means that there is no external power that grants the realization of Nibbāna. So, the wise realise Nibbāna within themselves (paccattaṃ veditabbo viññūhīti).

He who attains Nibbāna is the happiest person in the world, he does not repent over the past, nor does he brood(?) over the future. He lives fully in the present, gains nothing, accumulates nothing, not even anything spiritual, because he is free from the thirst for becoming.

The meaning of happiness as refered to Nibbāna is not of sensation, it is the happiness obtained without sensation. When there is no experience through senses, there comes happiness which is supreme.

There are two Nibbāna elements, one is sotapadisesa (physical remaining) and the other is anupadisesa (physical without remaining). Though Nibbāna is deep, subtle, hard to understand, difficult to realize (Majjhima Nikāya), stil it is attainable as the Buddha said thus:

„There is the unborn, ungrown and unconditioned, were there are not unborn, ungrown and unconditioned, there would be no escape for the born, grown and conditioned. Since there is unborn, ungrown, unconditioned, so there is an escape for the born, grown and the conditioned.“ (Udānapāḷi)

Although Nibbāna is compared to a great ocean where the amount of water and the number of fish and sea-animals are immeasurable (Milindapañhā), Nibbāna in early Buddhism is not a metaphysical proposition. Nibbāna can be attained by spiritual purification. The following stanza explains how one attained Nibbāna step by step through repeated failure to final success:

„Mindful of the yogis of the past, and recollecting their way of life, even though it is the last hour, one may attain the undying state.“

(Theragāthā, verse 947)

Nibbāna is the fourth ultimate realities in the Abhidhamma, the other three being the citta, cetasika and rupa. The term nibbana is defined in the Abhidhammatthasagathavagahadipanipali as follows:

- (e) Ni + ṭvi (to weave) - absence of weaving
- (f) Ni + ṭva (relieve) - fire of craving is extinguished.

In the Abhidhammatavatara nibbana is defined as Ni + vana (craving) - absence of craving.

The Abhidhamma interpretation of nibbana is somewhat differs from the descriptions of the early discourses. Generally, nibbana is defined in negative terms in the Nikayas, while the commentators of Abhidhamma try to describe it in a positive way thereby categorizing it as a real dhamma.

There are several attempts have been made by the commentators in the explanation of nibbana in the Abhidhamma. For instances:

(6) The characteristic of nibbana

While mentioning that nibbana means to be free from craving, the Abhidhammatthasagathavagaha presents 2 characteristics of it as follows:

42 This is the common interpretation of the unconditionality (asankhāta) of Nibbāna – one goes by path (Eightfold Path) to a mountain (as Nibbāna), but that does not mean that the mountain would be conditioned by the path.

43 The word ‘extinct’ might be misleading, as extinction is another word for annihilation. I don't believe that the teacher thinks that Parinibbāna would be annihilation.
10. Nibbana however is termed supramundane, and is to be realized by the wisdom of the four paths. It becomes an object to the paths and fruits, and is called Nibbana because it is departure (ni) from craving (vana).

11. Nibbana is onefold according to its intrinsic nature. According to the way it is twofold namely, the element of nibbana with and without the substrate remaining. It is threefold according to its different aspects namely, void, signless and longing-free.

(7) The division of nibbana
The Vibhavinitika gives two divisions of nibbana:

(a) Saupadhisesanibbanadhatu – the realization of nibbana with the five aggregates left.
(b) Nirupadhisesanibbanadhatu – the five aggregates disappear at the death of an arahant.

3 divisions of nibbana is given in Abhidhammasavgaha:

25. Subba – devoid of attachment, hatred and delusion either by way of object or of accompaniment.
26. Animitta – free of the signs such as attachment and hatred.
27. Appanihita – free from longings such as attachment and hatred.

(8) Nibbana is obtainable
According to Abhidhammavatara, to say that ‘there is no one nature called nibbana in reality as it cannot be obtained as soul or soul the hare’s horn’ is not reasonable, because nibbana can be obtained by the persons who follow the relevant practices and investigate it through the eye of wisdom. Something should not be denied merely because untrained person (puthujjana) do not obtain it.

(9) Nibbana can be produced by two ways
In the Abhidhamma works, we find nibbana is explained as a state or a dhamma. Vibhavinitika gives two methods by which nibbana can be proved, i.e., by direct perception and inference:

(a) nibbana is so called as it is to be realized by the wisdom of the four paths. This statement shows the verifiability by the noble ones. Therefore it is a form of direct perception.

(b) Nibbana becomes an object to the paths and fruits, shows that it can be proved through the inference by the good worldlings. (kalyanaputhujjana).

(10) Nibbana has its own nature
The commentators have made an attempt to describe nibbana as having its own nature like the other dhammas as being either mental or material. Thus, by explaining nibbana as a dhamma possessing its own nature they wanted to prove it as a real state and disprove the theory that it is mere voidness. For this reason, nibbana has also been explained according to the 4 ways of definition:

(1) Characteristic – pacification
(2) Function – deathlessness or happiness
(3) Manifestation – signlessness
(4) Proximate cause – renunciation
On the contrary, that there is no proximate cause for nibbana according to the Abhidhammasavagahadipanipali.

(11) **Nibbana as a reality (dhamma)**

The Abhidhammavatara presents a catechism in order to prove nibbana as a reality which can be obtained in reality.

1. If nibbana is mere absence of defilements, all untrained people will be realizing nibbana as they could moments free from defilements.

2. If it is mere eradication of defilements, nibbana becomes manifold and in many ways it has eradicated what is conditioned, impermanent and unsatisfactory.

Therefore, nibbana is not merely the absence of defilements. By realizing whatever dhamma, if there is eradication of defilements, that state or dhamma is called nibbana because it becomes the foundation for the destruction of defilements, nibbana being itself endless.

Hence according to Abhidhamma, nibbana is not a mere concept but it is a real state which becomes the objects of the paths and their fruits, which is permanent as it has no arising, formless as it has no nature of rupa, and which is devoid of obsession. Thus, a keen interest was taken by the commentators to prove nibbana as a real state having a nature of its own.

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**666 EXPLAIN THE MAHAYANA VIEWS ON THE CONCEPT OF SOUL AND SOULLESSNESS. (665)**

There are several views regarding the concept of soul and soullessness in different texts of Mahayana Buddhism. Most of the later schools of Mahayana advocate the metaphysical entity of Dhammadhatu or Tathata as the Principle of universe. This metaphysical entity is considered as the origin and the final Truth of all phenomena. It is sometimes known as Subbata. Though it is considered as the universal Entity, it is never consider as a soul, it is more like an unlimited Space in unlimited Time.

With regard to the concept of soul, Mahayana accept the doctrine of Anatta i.e., non-substantiality. And there are two main Mahayana schools, which are excellent in repudiating the concept of permanent soul. One is Madhyamika and the other is the Yogacara. Following are the basic argument presented by these two Mahayana schools in rejecting the concept of soul.

28. **Madhyamika**

This school advocates the teaching of Subbata (Emptiness). According to the concept of Emptiness, all things are of the nature of impermanent and non-self, their arising and falling are the result of paticcasamuppada. Emptiness in this sense is “not having its own-ness”, every thing is inter-related and inter-dependent. Since nothing can exist independently, the concept of unchanging, permanent and self-existing soul is thus rejected. The following statement of the Madhyamika texts clarify the point;

1. The Mahapabba paramitta sutra says: “sarvadharmanaj subbata”—all elements of existence have the characteristic of emptiness.

2. The Vajjarchedika prabaparamittasutra gives several similes to explain the impermanent nature of all phenomena i.e., the similes of star, darkness, light, white snow, dream, lighting and bubble.

3. The Mula Madhyamika karika says :
   - atmetypi pragbapti—self is conventional
   - manatmetypa desita—preached is the non-self
   - buddhairnata na canatma—Buddha doesn’t speak of self or non-self
   - kascidithyapi desita—such an idea is not seen, therefore it is not preached

29. **Yogacara**
This school advocates the doctrine of ‘Thought Only’ (citta-matra) i.e., all Phenomena are only the projections of mind. The most characteristic of this doctrine is the so-called ‘Idealism’, which is ‘subjective’ with regard to the empirical and ‘absolute’ with regard to the transcendental subject. As to the first, it denies the independent reality of an external object. Since the object does not exist, so also the consciousness which grasps it i.e., in the absent of a cognizable object there can also be no cognizer. The intention is therefore to effect a withdrawal from both the empirical object and the empirical subject. As the empirical subject is rejected, the concept of subjective soul is therefore also totally denial.

The following statements of the Yogacara tell how the Yogacarins reject the concept of permanent, unchanging soul:
1. ‘attamatra midam sarvam’ i.e., all are the creation of mind.
2. ‘tribhava cittamatra’ i.e., all existence is nothing but mind.
3. ‘cittatram lokam’ i.e., the world is nothing but mind.

One of the most important works of Vasubandhu, the ‘Abhidharmakosa’, also gives a very detailed argument to disprove the soul concept of the Pudgalavada i.e., the Vatsiputriyas. The 9th Kowasthana of the Abhidharma, which is named as ‘Atmavada-pratisedha’ by Vasubandhu himself, is a special appendix devoted to the much controverted question about the Buddhist denial of the existence of soul. In support of his argument, Vasubandhu quotes scriptural passages. In the Manusyaka-sutta, it is declared that a human being is nothing but a combination of five sets of elements. Different names are being given to these combinations, such as sentient being (sattva), a man (nara), a person (purusa) or a Manu’s progeny (manusya) etc. In all these designation, nothing is permanent, all are subject to change. In the Bimbisara-sutra, therefore the Buddha declared: ‘O monks ! the notion of ‘myself’ and of ‘mine’ is a childish notion of simple uneducated and ignorance people, who are misled by current expresions. There is no Self, nothing mine, nothing except the separate elements of suffering of life in their ever changing apparitions’. The later Mahayanists regard this Abhidharmakosa as the authority in refusing the concept of Soul.

666 THE CONCEPT OF SOUL AND SOULLESSNESS IN MAHAYANA BUDDHISM.

Mahayana accepts the doctrine of Anatta or soullessness. There are two main Mahayana schools which are excellent in repudiating the concept of permanent soul. One is Madhyamika and the other is Yogacara or Vibbanavada. However, these two schools neither use the ‘Analytical Method’ (analysis of 5 aggregates, 12 bases and 18 elements) nor the ‘Synthetical Method’ (12 factors of paticcasa-muppada) to reject the concept of soul which are commonly used in early Buddhism. They employed their distinctive doctrine of ‘Wunyata’ and ‘Citta-matra’ to repudiate the soul theory. Following are their basic arguments:

1. Madhyamika

This school advocates the teaching of Wunyata (Voidness). According to the concept of Voidness, all things are of the nature of impermanent and non-self, their arising and falling are due to the result of causality (paticcasa-muppada). Voidness in this sense is “not having its own-ness” (nis-svabhavatva or svabhava-wunya). As everything is inter-related and inter-dependent, there is nothing having its permanent or unchanging own-ness. Since nothing is having its permanent own-ness, the concept of unchanging, permanent and ever-existing soul is thus rejected. This is further explained by the concept of ‘Pudgala-nairatmya’ (Voidness of Self) and ‘Dharma-nairatmya’ (Voidness of the element of existence). The following statements of the Madhyamika texts clarify the point:

(1) The Mahaprajba paramitta sutra says: “sarvadharmanaj subbata”—all elements of existence have the characteristic of emptiness.
(2) The Vajracchedikaprabaparamittasutra says that all phenomena are like star, darkness, light, white snow, dream, lighting and bubble which are impermanent and without self.
(3) The Mulamadhyamikakarakika says:
   Atmety api prajbapitam anatmety api dewitaj
   buddhair natma na canatma kawcid ity api dewitaj—chapter 8 verse 6
   The Buddhas have make known the conception of self and taught the doctrine of non-self. At the same time, they have not spoken of something as the self or as the non-self (i.e., both self and non-self are wunya)

2. Yogacara
This school advocates the doctrine of ‘Thought Only’ (citta-matra), all phenomena are only the projections of mind. The most characteristic of this doctrine is the so-called ‘Idealism’, which is ‘subjective’ with regard to the empirical and ‘absolute’ with regard to the transcendental subject. As to the first, it denies the independent reality of an external object. Since the object does not exist, so also the consciousness which grasps it. That is to say, in the absent of a cognizable object there can also be no cognizer. The intention is therefore is to effect a withdrawal from both the empirical object and the empirical subject. As the empirical subject is rejected, the concept of subjective soul is therefore also totally denial.

The following statements of the Yogacara tell how the Yogacarins reject the concept of permanent, unchanging soul:
1. ‘attamatra-midam sarvam’ i.e., all are the creation of mind.
2. ‘tribhava cittamatra’ i.e., all three existence is nothing but mind.
3. ‘cittamatra lokam’ i.e., the world is nothing but mind.

Perhaps one may say that the A layavibbana of the Yogacara is another name of ‘soul’ in its idealistic manner. But since the Alayavibbana itself is nothing than a stream of flux containing seeds which are impermanent, it does not possess the nature and the characteristic of soul which is eternal and unchangeable.

In conclusion, Mahayana is similar to Theravada in maintaining the theory of ‘Anatta’. They used to refer everything in the world as empty or mind-made. However, Theravada’s theories of ‘Analysis’ and ‘Synthesis’ are empirical, but the theories of ‘Wunyata’ and ‘Citta-matra’ of the Mahayana are dialectical (prasavgika) and metaphysical in nature.

**QUESTION:** EXAMINE THE MAHĀYĀNA THEORY THAT THERE IS NO DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SAMŚĀRA AND NIRVĀṆA. (ORIGINAL BY VEN. HUNNY)

In Buddhism Nibbāna (from nir + vaṇa) means 'freedom from desire'. There are two aspects of Nibbāna:
1. The full extinction of defilements (kilesa parinibbāna) – Nibbāna with the groups of existence still remaining.
2. The full extinction of groups (khandha parinibbāna) – Nibbāna without the groups of this physical-mental process of existence.

In the 25th chapter of Mūlamadhyamika Kārika it is said that „Samsāra has no special thing that distinguishes it from saṃsāra.“

According to Madhyamika philosophy Nirvāṇa means ‘elimination’. Nirvāṇa and saṃsāra are not different, therefore they are identical. But this cannot be explained in this simple way. If this is taken in this literal sense, the whole aim of Madhyamika philosophy lead followers by true teaching of the Buddha facts. On emay ask, if saṃsāra and Nirvāṇa are identical, why to practice Buddhism, why not be in saṃsāra. If these two are the same, then just as in saṃsāra there is dukkha in Nirvāṇa, and if so, there’s no need to strive to realize Nirvāṇa.

this shows what is meant by this stanza, that it is not simple to identify samsāra with Nirvāṇa. In interpretation, just as when understanding the whole of Madhyamika philosophy, it is important to remember that the main purpose of its teaching is Śūnyatā, which means emptiness of everything (dharmā). This emptiness means they are devoid of anything called svabhāva, a sort of a ‘thing’, some entity that is specific to a dharma that is its own-nature.

For Sarvāstivādins everything is dharma and every dharma has a svabhāva. This svabhāva has the specific characteristic of its own nature and it prevails into three periods of time – in past, present and future; and gives this particular dharma a speciality. Nāgarjuna rejected the existence of svabhāva in dharmās. This
he did by showing that everything is relative to each other, therefore, nothing has independent existence. If nothing exists independently, there is nothing that could be called permanent, and having characteristics specific to it.

So, samsāra and Nirvāṇa both are devoid of svabhāva, anything special that makes them distinct from each other. As they are devoid of such svabhāva, they are not distinct. It does not mean that samsāra and Nirvāṇa would be the same. This is made clear as to what is the extremity of Nirvāṇa and what is the extremity of samsāra, between them not even a subtle something(?) is to be seen.

According to Theravāda Buddhist school of thought, Nirvāṇa and samsāra are regarded as two different factors. One attains Nirvāṇa by crossing over the ocean of samsāra. So, on this statement written above, which we can find in early Buddhism, Madhyamikas have built up their philosophy.

**Question:** Explain the Trikāya concept and examine Nikāya teaching connected with that concept.

During the time of various Buddhist schools, especially Lokuttaravādins, raised the Buddha to status of a god or even to a metaphysical entity. However, even more obvious (?) glorification is seen in Mahāyāna. In Pāli texts there was an opportunity for Mahāyānists to put forth doctrine of Trikāya, specific concept of Buddha in Mahāyāna. In Āṅguttara Nikāya the Buddha says, that he is neither a god nor a gandhabba nor a man. In Itivuttaka he says to Vakkali that he who sees Dhamma, sees the Buddha. All these statements led to development of Trikāya concept in Mahāyāna.

Nirmānakāya (body of transformation). There are numerous Nirmānakāyas created by Dharmakāya in countless worlds to preach to the beings of lower range. As Sākyamuni, He adopts Himself to earthly conditions, possessing an earthly body, but yet maintaining purity. He does not sleep nor dream and preaches only the ultimate Truth.

Sambhogakāya (body of enjoyment), the body that partakes enjoyment and as the Buddha ideal, it is that which preaches to Bodhisatvas of higher range. It is accomplished with all the Mahāpurisa Lakṣaṇa, which is said by most of Mahāyāna Sūtras.

The Dharmakāya (body of law) is His highest body, comprising all essence of knowledge and compassion in absolute state. It is sometimes called ‘Svabhāvakāya’, which is immeasurable and unlimited. It fills all space and is the basic of both Nirmānakāya and Sambhogakāya. It is also called Tathata, Dharmadhātu or Tathāgatagarbha.

In the beginning, Trikāya doctrine was very vague, the number of kāyas was uncertain. In Chinese sources, Nāgarjuna in his commentary on Prajñāpāramitā spoke only about 2 kāyas: Rūpakāya and Dharmakāya. According to N. Dutt, up to the time of Nāgarjuna the concept of Sambhogakāya was not distinguished from Rūpakāya or Nirmānakāya.

According to Abhisamayalankāra Kārika there are 4 kāyas of which Svabhāvikakāya is real and Dharmakāya, Sambhogakāya and Nirmānakāya are unreal. In Śūtralankāra, Svabhāvikakāya is identified with Dharmakāya.

The most developed form of Trikāya concept is found in Saddharmapuṇḍarikā Sūtra and Suvarnaprabhasa Sūtra. It is stated that Tathāgata has no origin, there is only Dharmakāya. Gotama Buddha attained Buddhahood long time ago. It is only His Nirmānakāya which is visible to people. There are numeral such Nirmānakāya Buddhas in this world. Therefore, Gotama Buddha was only a shadow and image of Dharmakāya which follows the ways of the world.

In Pāli commentary it is said that the Buddha duplicated him and sent one copy to Tāvatiṣṇa heaven to
preach Abhidhamma to the gods, while he remained on earth to preach to Sāriputta. Perhaps this is the influence of Mahāyāna's concept of Nirmānakāya.

**Importance of Pāramitā**

1. Because paññā (Skt. prajñā) pāramī is the realization of suññatā (Skt. śūnyatā) (emptiness) in all paññā pāramitā literature paññā pāramitā means the understanding of suññatā. It says that staying in the suññatā a Bodhisatta should establish himself in paññā pāramī.

2. How Bodhisatta fulfils or realizes this suññatā? The Bodhisatta should not fix himself on rūpa and viññāṇa. He should not fix himself in cakkhu... paṭhavī... dhātu... Arahantship, Paccekabuddha (Skt. Pratyakabuddha) and even Buddha. In short he should not grasp anything.


4. According to paññā pāramitā literature the term Mahāyāna also means the knowledge of suññatā. Why suññatā is explained as the way to enlightenment? Because a Bodhisatta in order to gain enlightenment should realize suññatā. The possible answers quoted from Saṃyutta Nikāya (IV. 360) - „What is the path fo Nibbāṇa … suññatā … asankhata-gami magga Nibbāṇa.“ There are three goals to liberation, namely:

   1. Suññatā
   2. Animitta
   3. Appanimitta (tevidha vimukkha mukha)

   According to Theravāda if someone follows these three he will attain the Arahantship (enlightenment). According to Mahāyānists a Bodhisatta should concentrate on these but he is not supposed to realize until his wholesome roots mature. (Here we can see the different views between Mahāyāna and Theravāda.) Because if one realized any of them one will either become an Arahant or a Paccekabuddha. Bodhisatta has to stay insamsāra to fulfill the pāramitā and to mature his wholesome roots. According to astasahaśrīkaprajñā pāramitā a Bodhisatta can concentrate on these things but without entering the Nibbāṇa (Skt. Nirvāṇa). He does that with Upayakauvalya (skilful means). Two similes are given:

   1. It is just like a bird flying in the air with its 2wings, it neither falls to the ground nor it stands anywhere on any support. Therefore, Bodhisatta dwells in way of emancipation, thus in the relics of emptiness achieves complete confess(?) over emptiness. Just so he dwells in the relics of the sign-ness and wisdom, but he does not fall into emptiness or sign-ness of wisdom. In the same manner the Bodhisatta concentrates these things without falling into a particular one. At that time he uses his skill in means in order not to fall into Nirvāṇa.

   2. It is just like a skilful archer, shooting the arrows up to the sky succeeding without letting the arrows drop to the ground. In the same way the Bodhisatta can as long as He wishes stay there concentrating on these things without realizing them.

   Bodhisatta has special duty – He is responsible for a large number of beings to elevate them from Nibbāṇa.

   It is said that the Bodhisatta is not realizing the Bhūtakoti i.e., the ultimate truth when concentrating on the tevida, vimukkha, mukha. This Bhūtakoti is similar to tathata, dhammatā, dhammadhātu and śūnyatā. Mahāyāna also explains śūnyatā on the basis of anattā (not-self). In the Suttanipāta it is said: »Sabbato lokam avekkhassu.« - „One should look at the world's emptiness.“ (Moghariyamanavapuccha Sutta, Saṃyutta Nikāya)

   The Buddha asked Mogharaja(?) to look at the world as non-self and asked him to be mindful all the time to see the things as empty. However, according to Thearvāda, the khandha-vibhanga, āyatana vibhanga and dhātu

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vibhaṅga are the methods to get rid of the view of self. Hence, with the methods of visualizing the emptiness of all things, the Mahāyānists are said to have got rid of not only the view of self but also the view of dharmās.

**Question: Describe the characteristic of perfections appearing in Mahāyāna scripture which lead to full enlightenment.**

The first conception of Mahāyāna is the Bodhisattva idea and the ybelieved that we all are Bodhisattvas and finally become Buddhas. This thought gives a great impetus to lead the Enlightenment. There are two views of Bodhisattva:

1. Those who take the vows to realize their idea on the way to Buddhahood
2. Those who are striving for enlightenment through the practice of four great vows and perfections. They are:
   a) To save all beings
   b) To destroy all evil passions
   c) To learn the truth and teach it
   d) To lead all beings towards Buddhahood

Sākyamuni was a Bodhisattva who fulfilled perfection and in the Jātaka stories tells us about His previous lives such as reborn as an animal, man, working with His compassion for welfare of others. Therefore, the difference between Bodhisattva and Arahant is that the Arahant intends upon his own enlightenment and liberation, while the Bodhisattva wishes to help all beings and bring them to full enlightenment. In order to do this although qualified for Nibbāna he renounced it and remained in the world to help all beings. He is making effort to become a Buddha so many years. In Theravāda is mentioned in certain period but in Mahāyāna it is unlimited period.

In Mahāyāna there is also the important characteristic of perfection which some(?) different from ten pāramitā in Theravāda, but it seems to be an elaboration of the four stages of spiritual progress of Sotāpatti in early Buddhism. Gradually the idea of the pāramitā related with bhumi by making the Bodhisattva cultivate one of the pāramitā in each bhumi. As the Bhodhisattva passes from one stage to another, his power also increases until the tenth stage and He becomes almost equal to the Buddha and possesses various supernatural powers. Thus the ten bhūmis are:

1. Parmuditā – joyfulness because of the fruit of His action. He is born in the Buddhist family, wishes good will for all beings with his vow that he made, devoted himself to equal the Budha to help and preach the Dhamma for all beings and His chief thought is not only „May I become a Buddha to attain Nibbāna“ but „May I become a Buddha to help all beings and so on.
2. Vimala – Immaculate – he attained this quality by the moral practice. Here ordinary beings may strive to imitate the Bodhisattva by moral practice and as best as we could, we have to free ourselves from the conception of ego.
3. Prabhākārī – Luminous
4. Acismati – Radiant
5. Sudurijaya – Invincible
6. Abhimukti – Being in front
7. Duraṅgama – Forgoing
8. Acala – Immovable
9. Sadhumati – With holy wisdom
10. Dharmamegha – Cloud of Dharma

These ten bhūmis are similar with ten pāramitās in Theravāda.44

In Saddhammapundarīka Sūtra there are three terms - Sāvakayāna, Pratyekabuddhayāna and Bodhisattayāna or Buddhayāna. Of them, first two are named as 'Hinayāna’ – lower path for one who follows these two paths can be only an Arahant or Pratyeka Buddha, who are lower than the Buddha. Sāvaka is just a Buddha’s disciple who knows the true Dhamma because of the Buddha's teaching. Pratyekabuddha is the one who knows the true Dhamma by himself but he does not preach it to any other and only the Buddha who knows the true Dhamma by Himself preaches it to all beings. So, Buddhayāna is the highest path and it is named as Mahāyāna. These three yānas are also mentioned in Theravāda by the 'Bodhi', namely Sāvakabodhi, Paccekabodhi and Sammasambodhi.

Further, Mahāyāna said that these three, Šrāvaka, Pratyeka and Buddha are equal such as regarding to their purification from defilement. That means that Nirvāṇa is not different from them. But according to Theravāda practicing Pāramitā is quite different from them.

**Question:** Describe the characteristic of perfections (pāramitā) as appearing in Mahāyāna

According to scripture which is leading to full enlightenment a Bodhisatta must practise the six or ten

44 I do not see any considerable similarity between Theravāda pāramitās and these ten bhūmis. The only similarity is that they are ten achievements, but it is quite evident that they are completely different.
pāramī (perfections). This important word 'pāramī' has been also translated as 'transcendental virtue', 'perfect virtue', 'highest perfection', 'complete attainment'. The term pāramī is also found in Divy 637.5, Mantrānāṃ pāramiṃ galāh. In Pāli the term pāramī and pāramitā occur in the Suttanipāta, Jātaka, Nettippakarana and other treatises; and T. W. Rhys Davids and W. Stede translated it as 'completeness', 'perfection', 'highest state' (Pāli Dictionary). The six pāramitās are really the chief factors in Bodhisatta's discipline and the four additional pāramitās are merely supplement in character. The six pāramitās are mentioned and discussed in many passages of Buddhist Sanskrit literature, while the seventh, eighth, ninth and tenth are mentioned only in a few paragraphs and are not explained at a great length. Thus Bo.(?) bhū.(?) classifies each of the six chief pāramitās under nine separate headings, but it dismisses the other four pāramitās in a few sentences in another chapter. The Da.(?) Bhū.(?) definitely increases the number of the pāramitās to ten, as it teaches that a Bodhisatta practices one of the pāramitās in each of the ten bhūmis (stages) of his career. The six chief pāramitās are given as follows:45

1. Dāna (giving, generosity, liberty)
2. Śīla (virtuous conduct, morality, righteousness)
3. Śanti (forbearance, patience)
4. Vīrya (energy)
5. Dhyāna (rapture, musing)
6. Prajñā (wisdom)

The four supplementary pāramitās are the following:

7. Upāya or Upāya-kauśalya - skillfulness in the choice or adaptation of means for conversion of succour.(?)
8. Pravidhana – this stage is called 'the steadfastness' or 'immovability'. Its characteristic is the possession of supreme knowledge. It is well in action, the state of a divine mind, the state of consciousness of which we can have no conception. By now the Bodhisatta has lost the idea of duality. His sub-conscious intelligence is constantly acting in all kinds of merciful ways, but his conscious mind is quiet and serene.
9. Bala (power, strength)
10. Jñāna (wisdom)

The last four were lately added. Each of the pāramitās corresponds with ten bhūmis (ten stages) of spiritual progress. Bodhisatta is expected to teach his pupils each stage up to the time when all beings in this Universe have attained enlightenment at the last moment.

In the Kathāvatthu Theravāda maintains that the Bodhisatta cannot be born into various states at his own, free will.

**QUESTION:** **Describe the effort of Mahāyānists to validate rebirth through 'the Tathāgata-garbha' concept.**

The first word of the term Tathāgata-garbha means 'Perfect One' or 'Buddha', while the second basically means either an embryo or a womb or other container. Tathāgata-garbha thus means something like 'embryonic Perfect One'. The Tathāgata-garbha then represents the 'Buddha-potential' within all beings. In the Tathāgata-garbha Sūtra it is to be equivalent to the 'Buddha-nature' and is affirmed by the Buddha to be 'complete with virtues and not different from oneself'. It is an emptiness which is itself full of possibilities, it is resplendent with the qualities of Buddhahood, beginningless, unchanging and permanent. It is beyond duality, having the nature of thought. Beings are seen as ignorant of this great inner treasure, but the Buddha reveals it to them so as to encourage them in spiritual development. Moreover,

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45 Terms are given in Sanskrit.
it is the *Tathāgata-garbha* which responds to spiritual teachings and aspires for *Nirvāṇa*.

In the *Tathāgata-garbha Sūtra* and *Ratnagotra-vibhanga* a number of metaphors are used to illustrate the relationship between the intrinsically pure *Tathāgata-garbha* and the 'stains of adventitious defilements' – greed, hatred, delusion etc. - which are said to obscure it. It is both like a *Buddha*-image wrapped in tattered rags, which suggests an unchanging perfection which has simply to be uncovered and also like the schools of a great tree piercing through the fruit from which it grows, suggesting that it is a potential in need of cultivation. Yet it has to be separated from accompanying impurities, just as gold-ore has to be refined so as to bring out and manifest the intrinsic purity of gold. In *Bodhisattvas* it is partly purified and in *Buddhas* it is wholly purified.

If the *Tathāgata-garbha* is the pure basis of successful spiritual striving, it is necessary to account for the existence of the alien defilements which hold living beings back from enlightenment. How do they co-exist in a being? The *Ratnagotra-vibhanga* sees the defilements as a 'shell' as beginningless as the 'stainless nature of mind' that it covers. The *Śrimala-devī Sīhanāda Sūtra* says that defilements are ultimately rooted in beginningless ignorance but that only a *Buddha* can comprehend how the mind, whose inner nature is the intrinsically pure *Tathāgata-garbha* can be in any way associated with defilements. This is because the *Tathāgata-garbha* is seen as the eternal foundation and support of both the unconditioned, including 'inconceivable' *Buddha* qualities and the conditioned world of *Samsāra*. Quoting from the *Mahāyāna-Abhidhama Sūtra* the *Ratnagotra-vibhanga* equates the *Tathāgata-garbha* with the 'realm' (*dhātu*), or *Dhamma*-realm which is described thus:

„This realm is without beginning in time,
It is the common basis of all dharmās,
Because it exists, there also exist
All places of rebirth and full attainment of *Nirvāṇa.*“

Making the *Tathāgata-garbha* the basis of all, clearly implies that it is also the basis of the defilements and ignorance. The *Ratnagotra-vibhanga* supports this implication by saying that *karma* and the defilements are based on unsystematic attention, that this is based on 'the mind's purity', but that this 'true nature of mind' is itself without any further basis. The *Lankaśatarā Sūtra* actually says that the *Tathāgata-garbha* „holds within the cause for both good and evil and by it all forms of existence are produced. Like an actor it takes on a variety of forms...“ In the final analysis, though?) the *Tathāgata-garbha* texts seek to avoid any notion that genuine evil comes from the pure *Tathāgata-garbha*. (?) Thus is seen by the fact that the true *Nirvāṇa, Buddhahood*, is not regarded as the extinction of anything but as the 'Dhamma-body' or *Tathāgata*. This already exists, for?) 'covered' by destroying real defilements but simply by not originating illusory ones and the illusory suffering to which they lead. Why these illusions should be imagined is still not explained, however, only a *Buddha* can know.

### **(Bodhisatta and Pāramī in *Theravāda* and *Mahāyāna*)**

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In *Theravāda* Buddhism there is no *Bodhisatta* but 'Avihinihara'. In order to become *Bodhisatta* one has to make up his mind and has to make determination. (This is something similar to *Nāgarjuna* Buddhism.)

In *Sattabhūmi* concepts (some Sanskrit texts) we find ten stages of development. each of these stages corresponds to one *pāramitā*. In *Mahāyāna* Buddhism basically there are six *pāramitās*. Later on these six *pāramitā* are very different from what we have in *Theravāda* Buddhism. They are:

1. Dāna (charity)
2. Śīla (morality)
3. Kṣanti (patience)
4. Viśyā (industriousness, effort)
5. **Dhyāna** (rapture, musing)
6. **Pragñā** (wisdom)

Later texts like *Lāṅkāvatāra* and so on added four more:

7. **Upāya**
8. **Prarvīdhāna**
9. **Bala** (power, strength)
10. **Gñāna** (knowledge)

Each of *pāramitā* corresponds to ten *bhūmi* (ten stages) of spiritual progress. *Bodhisatta* is expected to keep his vow each stages up to the time when all beings in this Universe have attained enlightenment at the last moment.

The important doctrine which made *Mahāyāna* Buddhism spread are:

1. **Nirmāna kāya** (human body)
2. **Sambhoga kāya** (body of enjoyment)
3. **Dharma kāya** (universal principle, universal truth)

In these, according to *Mahāyāna*, *Dharma kāya* is very important. *Dharma kāya* is which can be seen, can be experienced. In fact, the essence of universe of everything is *Dharma kāya*. Buddha is rather the appearance of *Dharma kāya*. According to *Theravāda*, tehre are only two kāyas. They are *Rūpa kāya* (refers to the body of the Buddha) and *Dhamma kāya* (refers to the teaching of the Buddha).

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**666Compare the concept of paramita of Mahayana and that of the Theravada.**

The concept of Paramita (Perfection) appears both in Mahayana and Theravada texts. Buddhavajsa, Cariyapitaka and Apadana-pali of Theravada; Mahayanasutralavkara, Bodhisattvabhumī, Dawabhumikasutra and other texts of Mahayana, give accounts on paramita concept.

In Pali Nikayas, paramita is not important, the 10 paramitas first appear in Buddhavajsa, and 7 are elucidated in Cariyapitaka. They are also known as ‘Buddhakara Dhamma’ in Buddhavamsa. It was only during the sub-commentary period that Dhammapala paid much attention on this doctrine.


According to Dhammapala, these 10 qualities are called parami only when they are:
1. not spoiled by craving e.g., this is my dana
2. not spoiled by pride e.g., this dana is mine
3. not spoiled by wrong view e.g., this dana is myself
4. grounded on mahakaruna or great compassion and,
5. grounded on upaya-kosalla-bana or wisdom of skill in seeking merits

The number of paramita in Mahayana is generally accepted as 6 i.e., dana, sila, ksanti, vīrya, dhyana and prajba. List of 10 paramitas (in addition to 6 plus upaya-kausalas, pranidhana, bala and jhana) are also found in Buddhist Sanskrit literature. The *Abhidharma*-mahavibhasastra records the 6 paramitas, which, according to the Sarvastivadin, is erroneous, and the number must be 4 since ksanti is included in sila, and dhyana in prajba. This position was also taken by the Kashmirian Vaibhasikas. Further, the Tibetan literature has a

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46 In the original there was 'text his pupils'. I substituted it according to my knowledge. What was the original idea, that is a mystery.
treatise on 5 paramitas. Various authorities speak of different numbers may suggest that the doctrine of paramitas was the result of a gradual growth.

E.J. Thomas believes that the first 6 paramitas are original, as it ends with the attainment of wisdom (prajña). Har Dayal also says that the first 6 are the chief factors in a bodhisattva’s discipline, and the additional 4 are merely supplementary in character. He surmises that the number was raised to 10 as a result of the decimal system of computation in the science of arithmetic in the 3rd or 4th century AD.

Since the concept of paramita is difficult to trace in the Pali Nikayas, some scholars infer that it was most probably introduced from other schools. They believe that there existed a Sanskrit form of the Buddhavamsa. Ven. H. Banavasa has in fact attempted to show some parallel passages between the Pali Buddhavamsa and the Sanskrit Mahavastu.

Paramitas like nekkhamma, sacca, adhitthana, metta and upekkha are mentioned only in the Pali list. Har Dayal believes that paramita doctrine was developed out of the three fundamental training in early Buddhism; viz, sila, samadhi and pabbha. Vasubandhu in his Mahayanasutralavkara commentary also explains that the 6 paramitas are fundamental related to adhisila, adhicitta and adhiprajba. Though, the Pali list lacks samadhi, Dharmapala took metta and upekkha as forms of samadhi.

3 degrees of paramitas are mentioned in both traditions: paramita, upaparamita and paramattha-paramita, hence the number of 10 was raised to 30. In Cariyapitakaathakatha, Dharmapala, on the other hand, reduced the 10 paramita to 6: nekkhamma and sacca are included in silaparamita, metta and upekkha in jhanaparamita, and adhitthanaramita is included in all the 6.

With regard to the order of paramita, Mahayana list based on the 10 stages of Bhumi concept. Theravada, according to Dharmapala, explained the order with ‘desanakkama’ (order of preaching). Sumedha discovered them in this particular sequence

- giving is the great support of virtue and easy to practice, therefore giving comes first. Giving possessed of morality is of greater fruit and advantage, therefore after giving should come morality…’.

Each perfection must be fortified by the following one. From here, it is clear that, why pabbaparamita is not placed at the final list of the Theravada though it is considered the ultimate attainment of a Bodhisattva.

Both Theravada and Mahayana agree that the practice of paramita require an immeasurable period of time. And both of them also maintain that, only by fulfilling all these paramitas, a bodhisatta can only become a Sammasambodhi Buddha.

**BODHISATTA IDEAL AND WAY OF LIVING (LECTURED BY VEN. SĪLAVAMSA)**

The first conception of Mahāyāna is that of Bodhisatta. The Bodhisatta is the 'future Buddha' and we all have already taken Bodhisatta vows and are already on the first rung of the ladder of Bodhisattaship. This thought gives a great impetus to lead the Buddhist life.

There are two views of the Bodhisatta. First in its broader and more popular sense and as the name for those who take the vows to realize their ideals on the way to Buddhahood and secondly as the name for those who are very striving for enlightenment of the sentient beings (human beings) thought he practice of the four great vows and the pāramitā. These four vows are:

1. To save all beings
2. To destroy all evil passions
3. To learn the truth and teach it
4. To lead all beings towards Buddhahood
Sakyamuni was himself a Bodhisatta and in the Jātaka tales we are given the stories which tell us of His previous lives as animals and as man in each of which he practiced compassion and worked for the welfare of others.

In Hinayāna Buddhism the followers of the Buddha were taught to become not Bodhisattas but Arahants. But Mahāyānists wanted to make every being like Sākyamuni, they wanted lavishly distribute the bliss of enlightenment and they wanted to remove all the barriers that were supposed to lie between the Buddhahood and common humanity.

The great difference between the Bodhisatta and Arahant is that the Arahant intends upon his own enlightenment and liberation while the Bodhisatta wishes to help all creatures and bring them to full enlightenment in order to do this, although qualified for Nibbāna. He voluntarily renounces it in order to remain in the world to help all creatures, man and animals.

1. The sins accumulated connected in my former existences, accumulated in all features are infinite and omnipotent. By what power can we be conquered? It is not by the desire of Bodhis, by the desire to become Buddha or salvation of man? This totally disinterested desire is infinitely sacred. It covers a multitude of sins.

2. I worship the Buddha and Bodhisatta with a view to understand the vow of Bodhi. Processing nothing by reason of my sins, how can I render unto them the worship? This is their due but I am wrong.

According to Mahāyāna Buddhism it may be interesting to consider that ten stages of the Bodhisatta are somewhat different from the pāramitā taught in Theravāda Buddhism. The first is that of 'joy' (pramudita), as the cause by the fruit of His actions and meditation. He is born in the family of Buddha. he feels joy in his affection for the Buddha to enjoy, in the fact, that he is devoting himself to the work of Bodhisatta. He also takes joy in his feeling of goodwill to all creatures and to the vows which He has made. Fears disappear and he devotes himself to honor the Buddha helping all creatures and preaching the law. His chief thought is not "may I become a Buddha and attain Nibbāna" but "may I become a Buddha in order to help every creature who may have recourse in me. Here we are reminded of Amita and vows or Bhagavāt. If those beings who have directed their thoughts towards the higher perfect knowledge, in other words, and who having heard my name when I have obtained 'knowledge', have meditated on me having thought if at the moment of their death, having approached them surrounded by an assembly of bhikkhus I should not stand before them, worshiped by them that is to show that their thought should not be troubled, then may I not attain the higher perfect knowledge."

In our own lives we can cultivate this expect/expectation to joy, we can make an imitation of Bodhisatta, even though we cannot practice it as yet perfectly. The religious life should be joyful. The very thought of belonging to the family of Buddha ought to bring the greatest happiness and as many sūtras say perfume our lives with their thoughts or actions.

2. The second stage of Bodhisatta is that of the immaculate (vimala) which is attained by the practice of morality or sīla. Here again, we, ordinary beings may strive to imitate the Bodhisatta practicing morality as best we can, do this as we free ourselves from the limited conception of ego. The Bodhisatta not only lives according to the precepts but urges others to do so, both by teaching and example. Here he is walking in the Noble Eightfold Path.

3. The third stage is called the illuminating (prabhakari). Here he reflects upon the nature of things and

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47 In the original there was 'tails'...
48 There is no Hinayāna Buddhism in this world. This is an outmoded term and no good scholar uses it. Correct term is Theravāda.
practices patience, which really means furtherance towards people and things as they are. Patience or forbearance is one of the chief Mahāyāna Buddhist virtues. To be tolerant and patient with the sin, frailties, vanities and oddities of others are important virtues. Most of us can imitate the Buddha here with great advantage to ourselves and others.

(4) The fourth stage is called radiant (achismati). It is the stage in which the greatest energy must be practiced. There the Bodhisatta practices most strenuously good word as well as meditation.

(5) but in the fifth stage sudurjaya meditation predominates. Without meditation how it is possible to attain knowledge. Further Bodhisatta is viewed of example of the emphasis desirability of meditation. Through meditation, we can grow the truth which leads to the reign of prajñā (transcendental knowledge).

(6) And the sixth stage called 'the turned towards' (adhimukti), there is he now an Arahant and Bodhisatta. His mind is open and clear and he shines as it were by the light of prajñā. The Bodhisatta is now very high being indeed, so high that our ordinary relative minds cannot follow him. To understand Him now we must ourselves stand where He is. The Hinayāna does not mention any further stages but the mahāyāna conceives of three more.

(7) The seventh is the 'far going' (duraṅgama). He is now skilled in all means of sending others to Bodhi. This stage includes all the fruits of the previous six and gives the full development of intelligence of the Bodhisatta. Although He has no longer a worldly thought, He can through His great compassion assist others in their troubles in this world. He turns over His merits to assist them. The conception of magical body (miracle) in Mahāyāna is interesting. In order to help beings, the Bodhisatta may assume any form He wishes. He may become any kind of man or woman. He may assume the form of deity in which to appear to devotee. He may take any form, high or low if thereby He can carry out His benevolence and mercy not nearly to human beings but to animals and plants and the very dust on which he treats. (?) This is a noble teaching of Mahāyāna Buddhism that all life is one and that the dharma kāya is manifested in all forms. This is why we should treat animals with kindness and care for plants rather than think that lower forms of life only exists for the benefit of higher forms and have no significance of their own. In Mahāyāna Buddhism, all are of value for all are expressions of dharmakāya.

(8) The eighth stage is called the 'steadfast' or 'immovable'. Its characteristic is the position of supreme knowledge. It is well in action, the state of a divine mind, the state of consciousness of which we can have no conception. By now, the Bodhisatta has lost the idea of duality. His sub-consciousness, intelligence is constantly acting in all kinds of merciful ways but his conscious mind is quiet and serene.

(9) This stage gives way to ninth that is of 'the good' (sādhumati) and the preacher of the law.

(10) In the tenth 'cloud of the law' (dharmamegha) is the arrival at the end. The Bodhisatta realizes the last of the samādhi and the Buddha consecrates him. He has now all the powers and characteristics of a Buddha. He is the personification of love and sympathy. He has reached the higher principle next to the Buddha. He is now enshrined in the heart of the dharmakāya. The goal is reached, but he is still a Bodhisatta in the sense that He is manifested as Dharmakāya who helps creatures and prepare them in turn for Buddhahood and Buddhahood.49

Dāna pāramitā which means 'generosity', 'charity', 'giving', materially in the forms of calm and mental spiritual, giving to is appeared emphatically. In Mahāyāna Buddhist text writing a book, educating a child, delivering a sermon, preparing a meal, washing dishes, living once own life as well as possible are regarded as dāna because they are beneficial for all living beings. Dāna expresses itself not only in liberality and alms giving but in being amicable and sympathetic for others in their joys and sorrows. It also includes a willingness

49 What is the difference between Buddhahood and Buddhahood? That's a question...
to give all one’s acquired merits for the salvation of others.

The second pāramitā is kṣanti (patience) which, as mentioned before, is a kind of forbearance. The aspirant to Buddhahood never grows angry, in patience or excitement over that is done by ignorant person for he must ever keep in mind that all trouble is due to causes.

Enerby (vīriya) is fourth pāramitā. In order to treat the path, it is necessary to be energetic and strenuous not to give way to weakness or discouragement, not to become attached to worldly pleasure and to keep one’s resolution straw(?)

The fifth pāramitā is dhyāna, contemplation or meditation. Buddhism has many systems of meditation and Mahāyāna is specially rich in this field. Whatever is chosen it is purpose for acquiring pure knowledge that will help us on our path and prepare us for the realization of the truth.

The sixth pāramitā is knowledge or wisdom (prajñā) which is supreme virtue, although to attend is all the pāramitā should be practiced equally. (?) Its complete position is same like Nirvāṇa. We, ordinary beings, can only try ot have glimpse of the full splendor of prajñā which the Bodhisatta reflects.

**QUESTION: DISCUSS THE BODHISATTA CONCEPT IN THERAVĀDA**

There are broadly two types of Bodhisatta in the nikāyas. One is the Bodhisatta referring to the state before the attainment of enlightenment in the life of Gotama Buddha and the other is Bodhisatta used as a generic term referring to the previous existences of any Buddha in the past.

In Khuddaka Nikāya the word ‘Bodhisatta’ does not occur as often as in the other four nikāyas. However, it is in this nikāya, particularly in those texts which are said to be of a late origin in the chronology of the Pāli canonical texts (like the Cariyāpiṭaka and Buddhavamsa). Thus we find a further development in the concept of Bodhisatta in Theravāda Buddhism.

The Buddhavamsa is entirely based on the history of Gotama Buddha’s career as Bodhisattva from the time that He made His resolution before Dipankara Buddha to become a Buddha in the future. He was then known as Sumedha and had to spend an incalculable length of time (asankheyya) before finally becoming the Buddha. Under each and every past Buddha Gotama Bodhisattva received a prediction that He would be the Buddha named Gotama in a distant future. Eight conditions (atthadhamma) are mentioned as preconditions for anyone to aspire to be a Bodhisattva. Further then perfection (pāramī) have to be practiced and fulfilled. The Jātaka stories illustrate as far as 547 accounts of the pāramī the Buddha practiced in his previous existences.

In the Kathāvatthu, Theravāda maintains that the Bodhisattva cannot be born into various states at his own free will. The argument put forward by them is based on the contention that if the proposition of the Andhakas were accepted the very basis of the kamma theory would be at stake. While the Andhakas emphasize the compassionate nature of the Bodhisattva, the Theravādins maintain that even the Bodhisattva is not exception to the law of kamma. Subsequently, in the Āṭṭhakathā literature, the Theravāda in order to glorify and apotheosize(?) the Buddha or the Buddhas had to give way to the emphasis on the altruistic nature of the Bodhisattva advocated especially by Dhammapāla in his exegesis on karunā or compassion of the Buddha. Hence, expressions like »karunāya dukkham sampaticchatti« - „by compassion [the Bodhisatta] accepts suffering“ - is a testimony to the direction into which even the Theravādins were drawn regarding the doctrine of Bodhisattva.

The position taken by the Theravādins in the Kathāvatthu suggests that the Bodhisattva is treated as a being not different from the other mendicants, whose attainments are not yet perfect. The Theravādins did not want to make any distinction between the disciples (sāvaka) and the Buddha-to-be (Bodhisattva) as N. Dutt puts it. This fact is in direct contrast to what we find in Āṭṭhakathā texts. But this interpretation of a quality between the mendicants and Bodhisatta is not a special feature of Theravāda Buddhism alone. In early Mahāyāna texts the same idea is also expressed though the Bodhisatta is at the same time depicted as being superior to the Arahants.
The position taken by the Theravādins in the Kathāvatthu testifies that it was sort of reaction and reassertion against various new developments taken place in the Buddhist community at that time. The main feature discernable in the proposition advocated by the different schools is directed towards drawing a line of demarcation between the Bodhisatta and the ordinary disciples. The Kathāvatthu however does not go beyond the boundary of descriptions and explanations about the Bodhisatta found in the Pāli Canon. Therefore, the Bodhisatta is described and conceptualized always with Gotama Buddha in mind. In short, Gotama Bodhisattva is the model for all Bodhisattvas, which fact continues also in the later texts and forms the nucleus of the concept of Bodhisattva in Theravāda tradition.

**Question: Discuss the Bodhisatta concept in Theravāda**

There are broadly two types of Bodhisatta in the nikāyas. One is the Bodhisatta referring to the state before the attainment of enlightenment in the life of Gotama Buddha and the other is Bodhisatta used as a generic term referring to the previous existences of any Buddha in the past.

In Khuddaka Nikāya the word 'Bodhisatta' does not occur as often as in the other four nikāyas. However, it is in this nikāya, particularly in those texts which are said to be of a late origin in the chronology of the Pāli canonical texts (like the Cariyāpiṭaka and Buddhavaṃsa). Thus we find a further development in the concept of Bodhisatta in Theravāda Buddhism.

While in the commentary Ācariya Dhammapāla classified the Bodhisattas into three classes as

1. Mahā-Bodhisatata
2. Pacceka-Bodhisatta
3. Sāvaka-Bodhisatta

(Thag. A.1.92), this suggests three kinds of enlightenment or sambodhi, namely:

1. The full enlightenment (samma sambodhi)
2. The enlightenment of a private (pacceka) Buddha (pacceka sambodhi)
3. The enlightenment of a disciple (sāvaka-sambodhi).

The first one is defined to be the realization and causing the realization of all dhammās rightly and by oneself while the second is the realization of truth not known before, through self-awakened knowledge. The last is the realization of the truth by the disciples, who became enlightened after hearing the Buddha’s preaching. This implies an ideal interpretation of the distinction among Buddhas, Paccekabuddhas and Sāvakas regarding the mode of attaining the final goal. This development is no doubt the result of a clear distinction the Theravādins tried to make among the enlightened. Emphasis is laid on the supremacy of Buddhahood.

Eight conditions (atthadhammā) are reckoned as preconditions for anyone to aspire to be a Bodhisatta. Further, ten perfections (pārami) have to be practiced and fulfilled. The Jātaka stories illustrate as far as 547 accounts of the pāramis that Gotama Buddha practiced in his previous existences.

Although the basic perfection s are ten in number, the commentarial texts (the Petavatthu Atthakathā and the Aṅguttara Nikāya Āṭṭhakathā) reckon 30. To the ten basic perfections (pārami) are added the degrees of the 'higher' ten perfections (upa-pārami) plus the degrees of the 'ultimate' ten perfections (paramattha-pārami). Thus these are the adaptation of the ten basic perfection into three levels of intensity.

Furthermore, the ten basic perfections are sometimes specified as sāvaka-pārami (VvA.2) when implying to those fulfilled by the sāvaka-bodhisatta or the disciples. Though it is generally noticed that the term
'Bodhisatta' in early Buddhism is to designate either the previous existence of Gotama Buddha, or of those of the past and future, which are of theoretical outcome, the disciples too came to be recognized as Bodhisattas. This may have been derived of the influence and interaction among new overall elaboration of the Buddha concept and the Bodhisatta doctrine, particularly of the commentarial tradition.

THE CONCEPT OF BODHISATTA IN CANON AND COMMENTARIES

In the Pāli scriptures, the designation Bodhisatta is given to prince Siddhāta before His enlightenment and during His former lives. Thus the concept of Bodhisatta in Theravāda normally regards an unenlightened being or Buddha-to-be, whereas Mahāyānists maintained that there are enlightened as well as unenlightened Bodhisattas.

In many places of the suttas when narrating his quest for the truth, the Buddha always repeats the statement: "Pubbeva sambodha anabhisambodha bodhisatto'va samano." - "Before enlightenment and yet to be enlightened, as a Bodhisatta." This shows that the Buddha named himself as a Bodhisatta when he was searching for enlightenment.

In early suttas, two types of Bodhi are mentioned, i.e., Sammā-sambodhi and Paccekabuddhabodhi. However, in the Madhuratthavilāsinī, the commentary of Buddhavaṃsa, two different types of Bodhi are mentioned, i.e., Arahantabodhi and Sabbabbubodhi. Another type of Bodhi called Sāvakabodhi is also found in the Therāgāthā Aṭṭhakathā. Thus there are five types of Bodhi in Theravāda, viz.

1. Sammā-sambodhi
2. Paccekabuddhabodhi
3. Arahantabodhi
4. Sabbabbubodhi
5. Sāvakabodhi.

Sammāsambodhi and Sabbabbubodhi are similar, both refer to the Buddha, whereas Arahantabodhi and Sāvakabodhi are similar referring to Arahant.

Some scholars have translated the term 'Bodhisatta' as 'enlightened being'. Such translation implies that Bodhisatta is equal to Buddha. Although literary such translation has no fault, but doctrinally, Bodhisattva still has not attained enlightenment. There are textual evidences to prove that Bodhisatta is not an enlightened being:

(1) Nikāyas

In nikāyas when narrating his quest for the Truth, the Buddha always repeated the statement "Pubbeva sambodha anabhisambodha bodhisatto'va samano." - "Before enlightenment and yet to be enlightened as a Bodhisatta." This statement suggests that Bodhisatta is not an enlightened being but still on the way of struggling for enlightenment. Such statement occurs in the Ariyapariyesana Sutta.

(2) Buddhavaṃsa and Mahāvatthu

In Mahāvaṃsa/Buddhavaṃsa(?) as well as in Mahāvatthu it is said that due to the compassion towards worldly beings, although having the capability and qualities to attain enlightenment, ascetic Sumedha postponed such attainment and made a resolution before Dīpankara Buddha that he would become a Buddha. This shows that Bodhisatta Sumedha had not attained enlightenment.

Therefore, the commentary on Dīgha Nikāya defines the term 'Bodhisatta' as ???

… page no. 2 is missing …

??? Dhamma in Buddhavaṃsa. It was only during the sub-commentary period that Dhammapāla paid much attention on this doctrine. The 10 pāramiṭas according to Buddhavaṃsa are:50

1. Dāna (generosity)
2. Sīla (morality)
3. Nekkhamma (renunciation)

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50 71. ‘Dānaṃ sīlaṃca nekkhammaṃ, paññāvīriyaṇca kīdisam;
Khantisaccamadhiṭṭhānaṃ, mettupekkhā ca kīdisā.
77. ‘Dasa pārami tayā dhīra, kīdisi lokanāyaka;
Kathāṃ upapārami punaḥ, paramatthapārami katham’.

(Khuddaka Nikāya – Buddhavaṃsapāli - Ratanacanakamanakaṉḍam)
4. Paññā<sup>51</sup> (wisdom)
5. Vīrya (effort)
6. Khanti (patience)
7. Sacca (truth)
8. Adhiṭṭhāna (determination)
9. Mettā (loving kindness)
10. Upekkhā (equanimity)

According to Dhammapāla in his Paramatthadīpanī these 10 qualities are called pāramī only when they are:

1. Not spoiled by craving - e.g., „This is my dāna.“
2. Not spoiled by pried – e.g. „This dāna is mine.“
3. Not spoiled by wrong view – e.g. „This dāna is myself.“
4. Grounded on Mahākarunā or great compassion
5. Grounded on upāya-kosalla-bana or wisdom of skill in seeking merits.

In Paramatthajotikā, commentary composed on the Suttanipāta there are mentioned 3 kinds of Bodhisattas and different length of their careers:

1. Paññādhika – who is developed better in paññā faculty, but less in saddhā and even less in vīrya. The period is 4 asaṅkhayyāni and 100 000 kappas.
2. Vīryadhika – who is developed better in vīrya faculty but less in paññā and even less in saddhā. The period is 8 asaṅkhayyāni and 100 000 kappas.
3. Saddhādhika – who is developed better his saddhā faculty but less in vīrya and even less in paññā. The period is 16 asaṅkhayyāni and 100 000 kappas.

… page no. 4 is missing …

???, which results in the immediately following

(11) Kuthi (leprosy)
(12) Smaller than a quail or larger than an elephant in size, if born as an animal.
(13) Among the khuppi pasikanijjhamatanka petas
(14) Among the kālākabījakas or in Āvīci or lokantarika nirayas
(15) If born in kāma vacara, as a Māra
(16) If born in the rūpāvacara among those lacking in consciousness (asabbibhava) or in the pure abode (suddhāvāsā)
(17) In the arūpa world
(18) In another world-system (abba-cakkavāla)

3. The Saṃyutta Nikāya mentions that a Bodhisatta should develop 6 kinds of intentions (ajjhasa ya):
a) Nekkhammajjhasa ya – renunciation or giving up 5 kinds of sensual pleasure
b) Pavivekajjhasa ya – solitude or non-delightedness in company. In the Khaggavisana Sutta of Saṃyutta Nikāya solitude is very much appreciated by the Buddha. According to some scholars, the Khaggavisana is referring to Paccekabuddha.
c) Alobhajjhasa ya – generosity or having the intention to give even if the Bodhisatta has nothing to give.
d) Adosajjhasa ya – intention of non-hatred. Here adosa can mean mettā.
e) Amohajjhasa ya – intention of improving one's own wisdom. This is the most important part of a Bodhisatta. He has to know what is puñña<sup>52</sup> and what is pāpa.
f) Nissaranajjhasa ya – intention to free oneself from saṃsāra. The Bodhisatta has realized the fault of all kinds of existences.

With these 6 intentions a Bodhisatta is said to be able to perfect the pāramitās easily.

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51 In the original there instead of paññā there is pabba. This kind of substitution is throughout whole the original comprising of 5 pages (but page 2 and 4 are missing...). I couldn't find the word pabba in my Pāli-Englsh dictionary, therefore I present it as paññā, which is, however, correct.
52 In the original there was 'pubba'.
Bodhisatta is a person who aspires to become a Buddha. The word Bodhisatta can be found in the Majjhima Nikāya as well as in Dīgha Nikāya. This word became very important because it contains the relevant sources for the development of Bodhisatta doctrine in the later period.

We can see the sources of Bodhisatta doctrine which are in Theravāda pīṭakas and commentaries. As we know, the Tipiṭaka contains three major baskets, in which Sutta Pīṭaka and Vinaya Pīṭaka contain the earliest records. We can see in detail from the following chart:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sutta Pīṭaka</th>
<th>Vinaya Pīṭaka</th>
<th>Abhidhamma Pīṭaka</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dīgha Nikāya</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Majjhima Nikāya</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sanyutta Nikāya</td>
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<tr>
<td>Anguttara Nikāya</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khuddaka Nikāya*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Some portions of it contain early sources, i.e. Chp 1 & 2 of Suttanipāta, Thera- and Therīgāthā.

Common consensus that it was later than the above mentioned. We can find out the sources of Bodhisatta doctrine in the following suttas of Majjhima Nikāya:

1. Mahāsīthānāda Sutta (S° no. 12) – Greater Discourse on the Lion's Roar
2. Bhayabherava Sutta (S no. 4) – Discourse on the Fear and Dread
3. Ariyapariyesana Sutta (S no. 26) – Discourse on the Noble Search
4. Dvedhavatikka Sutta (S no. 19) – Discourse on the Twofold Thought
5. Acchariya Abhūta Dhamma (S no. 123) – Discourse on Strange and Wonderful Things

These discourses contain birth story of Siddhatta (Skt. Siddhārtha) Bodhisatta before his enlightenment, hence it starts from his birth till the age of 35 when he attained enlightenment. This period was considered as an important period for the further development of Bodhisatta’s doctrine in later time.

Brief account on the above mentioned suttas:

1. Mahāsīthānāda Sutta

In this sutta Siddhātta Bodhisatta mentions how He spent His time to undergo much suffering which He was following asceticism to become a Buddha. Here we can gather the general idea during 6th century BC that anyone who wanted to get higher achievement had to undergo the austere ascetic practice. The Buddha without exception when He had underwent these practices He was the forerunner of these ascetic practices. In His own statement He said: „Sāriputta, I recall having lived a holy life possessing four factors. I have practiced asceticism – the extreme of asceticism; I have practiced coarseness – the extreme of coarseness; I have practiced scrupulousness – the extreme of scrupulousness; I have practiced seclusion – the extreme of seclusion."

During that time the four kinds of asceticism were:

1. Tāpassi – (p. 78) „Such was my asceticism, Sāriputta, that I went naked, rejecting inventions, licking my hands, not coming when asked, not stopping when asked; I did not accept food brought or food specially made or an invitation to a meal. … Thus in such a variety of ways I dwelt pursuing the practice of tormenting and mortifying the body. Such was my asceticism.

The Yana doctrine is another diverging point Mahayana from the Hinayana. The word ‘Yana’ cannot be

53 Many parts of Tipiṭaka were 'constructed' after the Buddha's death. Today it is hard to say what was said by the Buddha and what were the fabrications made by 'theras'. If we like the particular sutta, we say: it was said by Buddha. If we don't like, we say: „this was of a later production.“ You can see that behavior on yourself when you are confronted with a Muslim explaining you mistakes in Tipiṭaka.
54 I did not discover what is ‘S’.
traced in the Pali canon, but R. Kimura in his book ‘A Historical Study of the terms Hinayana and Mahayana and the origin of Mahayana Buddhism’ says that the word ‘Ekayana’ is in the Pali canon. Though he says that we can find in the Pali canon only the word Ekayana. (M.N. & D.N. Satipatthana sutta can find the word Ekayana)

As he says we can find in the Prajnaparamita sutras, Saddharmapundarika sutras and in the Avatamsaka sutra how the Doctrine of Yana had been developed. In those sutras the words ‘Ekayana, Agrayana, Anuttarayana, Paramayana, Uttamayana, Bodhisattvayana and Buddhayana have been used which are similar to the word ‘Mahayana’.

In the early Mahayana sutras the words Wravakayana, Pratyekabuddhayana and Bodhisattvayana are appeared. Pratyekabuddhayana and the Wravakayana the two have been denoted by the word ‘Hinayana’.

In the Saddharmapundarika sutra more often the word ‘Buddhayana’ has been mentioned to indicate Bodhisattvayana. The word Buddhayana has been mentioned because of the fact that Bodhisattva’s aim is to attain the enlightenment by following this Yana.

It is the intention of Saddharmapundarika to unite three Yanas together. That is why the word Ekayana has been used.

At the very beginning of the sutra, Ven. Sariputra requested to the Buddha to preach the sutra. But the Buddha mentioned that ‘It is no use of preaching this sutra because the people including Devas in this world will be frightened to listen to this sutra’. (Alam waruputra anenarthena prakasitena, utrasisyati wariputra ayam sadevako lokasminnarthe vyakriyamane). This is true in the sense that Saddharmapundarika sutra mentions that the two yanas Wravakayana and Pratyekabuddhayana are false yanas. The problem lies here if the above mentioned two yanas are false what will be the position of Wravaka and Pratyekabuddhas. The answer is given in the Saddharmapundarika sutra that they will attain into enlightenment by the Buddhayana. In this manner the Saddharmapundarika sutra mentions that only one yana exists. That is Ekayana and there is no second yana or the third yana. (Ekamhi yanam dvitiyam na vidyate tritiyam hi naivasti kadaci loke).

It is further added that even to achieve the position of Wravaka or Pratyekabuddha they have to accept that there is only one yana exists and no second. However may as to Saddharmapundarika sutra if one wants to get the knowledge of Buddha (Buddhajbana) he needs the Bodhisattvayana. In the Mahayana sutra the concept of the Bodhisattva has been specially developed.

According to Keith ‘Buddhist Philosophy’ p.288, the Mahayanists get the credit of developing the Bodhisattva ideal. But E.J. Thomas does not agree with this idea in his ‘The History of Buddhist Thought’ p.200. He thinks that Theravada and Mahayana both the traditions were influenced by some early texts which do not exit any more. But it is very difficult to give a primary text which were influenced by the both traditions but rather possible to think that these traditions were influenced by each other for the development of these concepts.

According to the available sources the Mahavastu can be considered as the primary text to develop the concept of the Bodhisattva. But it is not a Mahayana text. This is a text of Mahasanghika but the explanation given in this text is similar to Theravada tradition.

Nalinaksha Dutt in his “Aspects of Mahayana and it relation to Hinayana” mentions that Mahasanghikas are Hinayanists and mentions:

(1) Theravada Prakarana
(2) Mahasanghika are Hinayanists.
(3) Sarvastivada

But in the Mahavastu there is no mention with regard to that everybody will be Bodhisattvas. But explain the Bodhisattva career of Sakyamuni Buddha.

In the Saddharmapundarika sutra mentioned that if anyone worships the relics of the Buddha he will be qualified to be a Bodhisattva. In the Book of Hirakawa Akira (Tr. Paul Groner) “A History of Modern Buddhism – from Sakyamuni to Early Mahayana in a separate chapter called ‘Relics worship and Mahayana
Buddhism’. It is mentioned that because of the relics worship (stupa worship) Mahayana was originated.

Importance of Relics worship has been mentioned in the Saddharmapundarika sutra and Culasukhavatvyuha sutra.

Lay devotees were more engaged in Stupa worship who could not practise the Vinaya and enter to the Order of Sangha. Those worshippers lived near by Stupas and they meditated on Buddha. And there have been groups (Bodhisattvagana). These people were called Bodhisattvas.

8/8/2002
In the Mahavastu it is mentioned that there are four kinds of Bodhisattva careers:

“catvarimani bodhisattvanam
bodhisattva caryani katamani
catvari? Prakrti carya, Pranidhana carya, anuloma carya, anivartana carya.”
These four stages are the careers of Bodhisattvas. What are the four? They are the natural career, the resolving career, the conforming career and the perserving career.

1. Prakrti Carva
When he lives as an ordinary natural life as home. It is the nature of Bodhisattvas in the world to respect mother and father, to be well disposed to recluse and Brahmanas, to honour their elders, to practice ten right ways of behaviour (dawakuwala karmapattham) to exhort others to give alms and acquire merit, and to honour contemporary Buddhas and their disciples. But as yet they do not conceive the thought of winning the unsurpassed perfect enlightenment.

(Iha mahamandgalyayana bodhisattva prakrtirevam Bhavanti matrjbah pitrjba sramaynya brahmanyah kulajyestapacayakah dawakuwalam karmacathan samadaya vartante paresam dewayanti danani detha karotha punyaniti, tistantanca Buddham)

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pujayanti Wravakanca no ca tavadanuttaraya. Samyak sambodhayce cittamutapadenti (Mahavastu, p.46)

The important factor here is the prior to become a Proper Bodhisattva the intended person should be a pious and devoted person who is spending his life according to dharma. Another important factor here is that he should not generate a thought of becoming a Bodhisattva yet. (Bodhicittopada).

2. Pranidhana Carva
Means that in which he ‘vows’ to win enlightenment. When (the Bodhisattva) laid up an abundant store of merit, and have body and mind well developed, they approach the beautiful Buddhas and turn their thoughts to enlightenment and vowed.

‘Te yada vipula punyasamcaya; Bhonti bhavita sariramanasa; Te upetya varjnupadharino; Bodhayce upajanenti manasaj’ and vowed. (Mahavastu)

Three vows:
(1) By the power of merit I laid up in a store, may I have insight into all things. May not my vow come to naught.
(2) May my store of the root of merit be great enough for all living beings. Whatever evil deed has been done for me, may I alone reap its bitter fruit.
(3) May I be like the other Buddhas and may I set rolling the wheel of Dharma that has no equal.

While explaining this resolving career (pranidhana carya) the Buddha revealed that when he met the Buddha Sakyamuni (in his previous life) in the city named Kapilavatthu, he was being a merchant at that time offered milk rice to Buddha and he made first vow.

After that incalculable kalpa afterwards, there was a Buddha called Samitavin. At that time as a universal monarch he made a vow to be a Buddha like that Buddha Samitavin. He (the Buddha) checked it when he becomes a Buddha.

At the time of the Buddha Parvata as King Arka the Bodhisattva offered eighty thousand caves adorned with seven precious substances and vowed.

In that way, Siddhartha Gautama Buddha in his previous lives made vows infront of 300 kotis of Buddhas, in the name of Sakyamuni. Eight hundred thousand of Buddhas is the name of Dipankara. 500 Buddhas in the name of Pradyota, 3 kotis Puspa, 18 thousand in the name of Maradhvaja. All these Buddhas made their proclamations of Siddhartha Buddha.

3. Anuloma Carya

This is the career of the Bodhisattva when he fulfils the Ten Bhumis.

4. Anivartana Carya

In this career the Bodhisattva permanently set on the attainment of enlightenment without possibility of falling or turning back.

As it is mentioned in the Prakrti Carya the original concept of thought of enlightenment could be traced here. Therefore it is worth mentioning that the Mahayana concept of the production of thought of enlightenment was probably came from Mahasanghikas.

Bodhicittopada

Production of thought of enlightenment. This special concept of Bhodhicittopada is very important as it has been mentioned in the Buddhist Sanskrit texts. in a later text called 'Bodhicaryavatara’ written by Santideva in the 7th century AD, his first chapter mentioned as Bodhicittanusanisa (profit of the Bodhicitta). Though it seems that in the Pali tradition there is no mention (about Bodhicitta). But we can trace such indication to this Bodhicitta in Pali tradition though there is no mention about actual word of Bodhicitta. For example we can find the similar determination of Sumedha Tapasa in the Buddhavajsa though there is no mention about the word Bodhicitta.

‘Kimme abbata vasena; Dhammam sacchikatenidha; Sabbabbutam papunitva; Buddhohessim sadevake.’

why I realize Dhamma alone as an unknown person, I shall attain into sabbabbuta and become a Buddha in the world including devas’

In these very words we can see the intention of generating Bodhicitta. Bodhicittopada means to generate the Bodhicitta, producing the Bodhicitta, and a thought of becoming a Buddha for the welfare and liberation of all creatures. This is the meaning of Bodhicitta.

According to Buddhist Sanskrit texts (specially Mahayana texts) one has to have a Bodhicitta to become Bodhisattva.
To think to become a Buddha for welfare of others.
After resolution he should fulfil paramitas to achieve the Buddhahood.
He must have a prediction (vyakarana) from a living Buddha.

But according to the later Mahayana texts necessarily one has to have a Bodhicitta to become a Bodhisattva.

Further, Mahayana texts have mentioned same special features of a person who wanted to generate the Bodhicitta and the preliminary preparations of the Bodhisattva who wanted to generate the Bodhicitta.

5/9/2002 continue….
In the Mahavastu it has been mentioned a period of Prakrti Carya (natural career). in that he becomes a kind of novitiate to be a Bodhisattva. But it was mentioned during that period he should not generate the Bodhicitta.

In the Mahayana Sutralavkara and in the Bodhisattva-Bhumi it has been mentioned that not a person who intends to become a Bodhisattva should enter to the ‘Gotra’ (family or caste). This particular concept of Gotra makes an ordinary person to be a suitable person to achieve the states of a Bodhisattva. In the Dawabhumika-sutra, it has mentioned as ‘Buddhagotra’ (family of Buddha) and eligible to attain to the position of Noble (ariya) and he is considered as worthy of offer worthy of respect.

Gotra

This concept of Gotra has been borrowed by Mahayanists from the Theravadins. In the Nikayas it has been mentioned that there is a Gotrabhu person who are eligible to be a Sotapanna. In the A.N. it has been mentioned that (A. IV. 373) there are nine persons who are worthy of worship, worthy of respects, worthy of offer, worthy to salute and will be fields of merits. Who are these 9 persons? Arahant and the person who has entered to the path of arahantship; Never returner and who has entered to the path of never returns; once returner and who has entered the path of once returner; stream winner and who has entered to the stream winning; and Gotrabhu.

Navayime bhikkhave puggata; ahuneyya pahuneyya dakkhineyya abjalikaraniya anuttaram pubbakketam lokassa, katame nava? Arah, arahattaya, patipanno anagami anagami phala sacchikiriyyaya patipanno; sakadagami, sakadagami phala sacchikiriyyaya patipanno; sotapanno, sottapattiphala sacchikiriyyaya patipanno; Gotrabhu.

The nine persons are, arahanta phala, arahanta magga, anagami phala, anagami magga, sakadagami phala, sakadagami magga, sotapatti phala, sotapatti magga, gotrabhu. Among the nine persons referred here who has gone beyong puthujjana and eligible to attain to the position of Noble (ariya) and he is considered as worthy of offer, worthy of respect.

In the Puggala-pabbatti identifies a Gotrabhu as follows:
‘katamo ca puggala gotrabhu? Yesam dhammanaj samanantara ariyadhammassa avakkhanti hoti. Tehi dhammadhammata puggalo ayam vacatti gotrabhu’ (if the person has particular of dhammas, he can be called gotrabhu).

The Bodhisattva enters to the Buddhagotra to identify himself from other Wravakas and Pratyeka Buddhas. Wravakas and Pratyeka Buddhas have different Gotras (Mahavyutpatti).

The Bodhisattva achieves Buddhagotra on the grounds of the collection of punyas (punyasambhava). The Bodhisattva’s gotra is distinguished by certain marks, which indicates his fitness for the practice of the 6 paramitas.

He develops virtues. He is critically evaluates his own actions and he is not engaged in a slightest
wrong because of fear of sins. He helps others. He advises others to abstain from improper actions. He sympathizes others. He is virtuous. He loves the truth. He has lovely words even for animals. He appreciates and accepts the others’ merits. He has patience even towards the people injuring him. He is more energetic and courageous. He has pleasure in renunciation. He is silent. He likes to live in forests. Naturally he is less defiled, his hindrances are less effective. His mind is not disturbed by evil thought. (prakṛtya mandaklewo manda nivarano manda dausutulyah) (Bo. Bhu.) He is pure. He has all the

666Explain how generosity and mankind are reflected in Bhodhisatta ideal Mahāyāna Buddhism

Compare the Mahayana conception of Bodhisatva with that of the Theravada.

The Bodhisatva is indeed the characteristic feature of the Mahāyāna, the ideal which distinguishes it from the Hinayāna which its conception of the Ārhant intent on his own salvation in the attainment of Nirvana. The bodhisatva is the future Buddha who is searching for the enlightenment to save all being without discrimination. The Bodhisattva should be fulfilled the six pāramitas (perfection). In those are: 1 Dāna (giving, charity, generosity), 2 Śīla (virtuous conduct, morality, righteousness), 3 Ksānti (forbearance, patience), 4 Virya (energy), 5 Dhyāna (rapt musing, contemplation), 6 Prājñā (wisdom).

Of these chief six pāramitas generosity is one of the most importance that the Bodhisatva should be done. That is Dāna pāramita which means generosity, charity, giving materially in the forms of calms and mental spiritual giving to is appeared emphatically in Mahāyāna Buddhist text writing a book, educating a child, delivering a sermon, preparing a meals, washing dishes, living once own life as well as possible are regarded as Dāna because they are beneficial for all living beings. Dāna expresses itself not only in liberality and alms giving, but also in being amiable and sympathetic for others in their joy and sorrows. It also includes a willingness to give all its acquired merits for the salvation of others.

The practical effect of the doctrine is to encourage the ideal of compassion for all being, the tacking of the vow not to attain Buddhahood until all creatures have been delivered is the logical outcome of the spirit of this reasoning; the true Bodhisatva cannot be delivered until creatures are delivered, and egoism is thus entirely annihilated (forts its terms cf. cit, in C, PP.14, 228, sukhāvatīvyuha).

Such general compassion demands great energy in giving, for which even study should be sacrificed. (BCA. V101), but generosity has its own reword; the Crāvaka claims that, his meditation is the more rapid way of gaining release, but in truth the Mahāyānist attains enlightenment (Bodhi) and Buddhahood more rapidly by his practice of generosity; when he takes the resolve to become a Buddha for the good of other, all his thoughts are dominated by the thought of enlightenment (Bodhicitta), all in him become meritorious, and the car of the Mahāyāna bears him inevitably to the enlightenment which he does not desire foe himself but seeks to attain solely for others (BCA. VII. 29). Form physical suffering he exempt, since he sins not, from moral suffering because he has knowledge; while other strive vainly for unsatisfying ends, he has pure delight in his own action of compassion. (BCAP. IX. 76; BCA. I. 19F; VII.27F)

I apply to the acquisition of the quality of the 4perfect Buddha the merit of my confession of my taking refuge in the three, Jewels, Buddha, the law and the order, and of my production of the thought of enlightenment. May in this universe of creatures, at the time when no Buddha appear be the refuge, the shelter, the safely, the island of creatures, may I make them cross the ocean of existences. I adopt as mother, father, brothers, sisters, sons all creatures. Henceforth for the happiness of creatures I will practice with all my power generosity, morality, patience, energy, meditation; knowledge, skill in the means of salvation.
The concept of Bodhisatta is the fundamental doctrine in all Mahayana traditions, whether it is in India, China, Tibet, Korea or Japan. However, this Bodhisatta concept has undergone certain changes as it spread from India to China then to Korea and Japan, and even it is different among the different Mahayana schools.

‘Bodhisattva’ is a Sanskrit term which derived from ‘Bodhi’, means ‘enlighten’, and ‘sattva’, ‘beings’ or ‘essence’. A Bodhisattva is thus a person who in his essence being is motivated by the desire to win full enlightenment i.e. to become a Buddha. Destine to become a Buddha, he nevertheless, in order to help suffering beings, selflessly postpones his entrance into the bliss of Nirvana.

The common feature of the Bodhisattva concept in all Mahayana traditions which marks it different from the Theravada is that, the Bodhisattva in Mahayana can be an ordinary being, whereas in Theravada, he should be the one who possesses the 8 conditions (i.e, he should be a human being, a male, has the spiritual ability to become an Arahant in that very life, a recluse, possess jhanas, has made a firm determination in front of a living Buddha and prepared to sacrifice even his life). According to the Saddharmapundarika, all the 8 conditions are not necessary and even a female can also resolve to make a vow to be a Bodhisatta. Once the determination is made, even an ordinary Bodhisatta is much more respectable than an Arahant and the offering make to him can obtain much more merit than to any Arahant.

The essential premise of the bodhisattva ideal is to generate in one's own self the thought of enlightenment (Bodhicitta) and to fulfill the vow to become a Buddha, foregoing entrance into Nirvana in order to remain in the world as long as there are creatures to be saved from suffering. With that vow the aspirant begins the career of a Bodhisattva, which traverses 10 stages or spiritual levels (Bhumi) and achieves purification through the practice of the 10 Perfections (Paramitas). These levels, which become progressively higher, elevate the Bodhisattva to the condition of a Buddha. The first six levels are preliminary, representing the true practice of the six Perfections (generosity, morality, patience, vigour, concentration, and wisdom). Irreversibility occurs as soon as the seventh stage is reached. From this moment the Bodhisattva assumes the true Buddha nature, even though further purification and fortification must be achieved in the stages that follow. This is the moment when, having performed his duty, he engages in activity aimed at completely fulfilling the obligations of a Bodhisattva. The difference between this and the preceding six stages is that now the activity is explained as an innate and spontaneous impulse manifested unconstrainedly and therefore not subjected to doubts. Everything is now uncreated, ungenerated; thus, the body of the Bodhisattva becomes identified more and more completely with the Essential body (Dharma-kaya), with Buddhahood, and with omniscience.

According to the Lankavatara, a Bodhisatta is prohibited to eat any kind of meat and if he does so, he breaks the Bodhisatta percepts and the Bodhicitta faded away, and at time of death he will definitely go to hell. However, the Tibetan tradition regarding eating meat as a form of ‘skill’(upaya) to save the animal whose meat is being eaten by a Bodhisatta. A Bodhisatta can be a monk or a layman, but in some traditions of Tibetan Mahayana, a Bodhisatta monk can even marry, because he has gone beyond good and bad!

The Great Bodhisattas in Mahayana are the saviours of the countless worlds in the universe, e.g. Avslokitesvara, Mahasthamaapartha and Smanntabhadra ect. This is the result of the evolution of the altruistic concept in later Mahayana Buddhism which, the Mahayanists have greatly emphasized. These great Bodhisattas are not in the operation of kammic force and thus they can practice the Paramitas in anywhere and at any time, even in hells. They are sometimes considered being reborn in the states which they seem fit to benefit other, but later they are being considered to transform (or reincarnate) themselves in guise of saving the suffering beings.

The Bodhisattva ideal, with its more practical attitude to life, emphasises the value of family life. The godly and efficient layman so envisaged in Mahayana Buddhism is exemplified in the figure of Vimalakirti, described in the Vimalakirtinirdesa. Here, the layman Bodhisattva, who, is more look like a god than a human being, is much more respectable and venerable than any Arahant. A Bodhisatta is said to be dominated by two forces—compassion and wisdom. Here, compassion means the selfless desire to make others happy and to get rid the suffering of all beings. Wisdom of the Bodhisattvas refers to the highest knowledge of ‘Emptiness’. Apart from these two wheels of a Bodhisattava carrier (Bodhisattvacarita), ‘skillful means’(upaya) is also very essence for any Bodhisattva to treat the Bodhisattva Path. This skillful means is borne out from the Wisdom of Emptiness. In this regard of skilful means, a Bodhisattva may employ art or even sex to enlighten other. Asvaghosa was such a great Mahayanist poet as well as a Bodhisattva who composed the Buddhistcarita and sang it in the public for propagating the Dharma.

The carrier of a Bodhisattva starts with ten Paramitas through an uncountable lives, and the perfection of each Paramita is designated as a fulfillment of each Bhumi. This gradual process is depicted in the Mahayana texts such as the Bodhisattavabhumi, Dasabhumi ksetra and Mahavastu etc. The length of a Bodhisattva’s career varies—some practice the Paramitas for at least four asankheyyas and one hundred thousand kappas, others for at least eight asankheyyas and one hundred thousand kappas. The first of these period is the very least that is required and is intended for those who excel in wisdom (pabbata), the middle period is for those who excel in faith (saddha), and the last and the longest period for those whose chief feature is perseverance (viriya).

With the development of Bodhisattva concept in much later time, the number of Bodhisattvas becomes endless. Important
Mahayana texts such as the Saddharmapundarika and the Avatamsaka sūtra, have a long list of the names of such Bodhisattvas and when names cannot be given the writers merely refer to them in millions. In addition to Avalokitesvara and Mabjusuri, Samantabhadra, Mahasthamaprapta and Ksitigarbha have become important in the Far East. These six Bodhisattvas, along with Akasagarbha and Vajrapiṇi, make a group of eight who have become more famous than the others. These and many others e.g. Taras are worshipped both iconographically and in sadhanas, specially by the Mahayana Buddhists in Tibet.

**QUESTION: EXPLAIN HOW GENEROSITY AND MANKIND ARE REFLECTED IN **BODHISATTVA **IDEAL IN MAHĀYĀNA BUDDHISM**

The Bodhisattva ideal is the central doctrine of the Mahāyāna tradition of Buddhism. In the view of Mahāyānists a Bodhisattva is a sentient being whose essence is perfect wisdom and great compassion. Out of great compassion for the world, a Bodhisattva renounces Nirvāṇa and goes on suffering in saṃsāra for the sake of others, perfecting himself during an incalculable period of time. He discovers the truth and declares it to the world. His capacity for service to others is unlimited. The great mind of loving kindness and compassion is indeed the heart of the Bodhisattva's personality and performance of altruistic acts. Perfect wisdom and great compassion are thus conceived as inseparable properties constituting the Bodhisattva's ideal as the highest and the noblest above the Arahant and Pratyekabuddha.

A Bodhisattva is thus defined as a sentient being whose essence is enlightenment. Enlightenment consists of wisdom and compassion. Compassion indicates the Bodhisattva's relationship towards beings suffering in saṃsāra. This compassion is endless or boundless. Wisdom governs His relationship with reality or the true nature of things as they really are. Thus compassion and wisdom complement each other. The personality consisting perfect wisdom and great compassion of the Bodhisattva places the Bodhisattva as the highest and the noblest above the Arahant and the Pratyekabuddha.

One who has undertaken this spiritual task on oneself is called a Bodhisattva. A Bodhisattva's ideal as the highest and the noblest above the Arahant and the Pratyekabuddha.

One who has undertaken this spiritual task on oneself is called a Bodhisattva. A Bodhisattva's spiritual venture is not individualistic, rather His concern is the attainment of Buddhahood to every being and he assiduously works on it.

The Bodhisattva ideals are recognized in all schools of Buddhism. All agree that Bodhisattva is a being who vows to become a Buddha, whose very essence is that of enlightenment. In early Buddhism a Bodhisattva practices certain perfections or pāramītā. There are ten perfections:

1. Dāna (generosity) 5. Vīriya (strength) 9. Mettā (loving kindness)
2. Śīla (virtues) 6. Khanti (patience and forbearance) 10. Upekkhā (equanimity)
3. Nekkhamma (renunciation) 7. Sacca (truth)
4. Paññā (wisdom) 8. Adhisthāna (resolution, determination)

In the case of the Mahāyāna Buddhism, six perfections are mentioned. They are:

1. Dāna (generosity)
2. Śīla (virtue)
3. Ksānti (patience)
4. Vīriya (strength)
5. Dhyāna (meditative contemplation)
6. Prajñā (wisdom)55

The pāramītā contain the essence of practical ethics that a Bodhisattva should possess. They represent the highest virtues without which it is impossible to attain Buddhahood. Practically, the methods of Bodhisattva's practice are purification of one's mind and performance of altruistic acts. Perfect wisdom and great compassion are thus conceived as inseparable properties constituting the personality of a Bodhisattva. A Bodhisattva views the liberation of others as the primary goal of his spiritual exertion.

All the practices of the Bodhisattva begin with the mind of loving kindness and compassion. The mind of loving kindness and compassion is always first and foremost. Thus the great mind of loving kindness and compassion is indeed the heart of the Bodhisattva's practice. The Bodhisattva's path leading to Buddhahood is thus closely related to cultivation merits, helping other sentient beings. It will take a tremendously long time and require the accumulation of boundless merits. However, with his noble objective ahead of Him it helps Him to uplift Himself towards the path of performing wholesome acts progressively.

In the view of Mahāyānists all sentient beings are endowed with Buddha-nature and all may become Buddhas. If we realize it and vow to become Buddh we are all Bodhisattvas. But Buddhahood is secured only through practice.

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55 Mr. Bogoda, teacher of Religious Studies from Buddhist and Pali University of Sri Lanka claims that Mahāyāna's sixth pāramī is upāya (skill of strategy).
The Bodhisatta is indeed the characteristic feature of Mahāyāna, the ideal which distinguishes it from the Hinayāna where the conception of Arahant intends on one's own salvation in the attainment of Nibbāna. The Bodhisatta is the future Buddha who is searching for the enlightenment to save all beings without discrimination. The Bodhisatta should fulfill the six pāramitās (perfections). In those are:

1. Dāna (giving, charity, generosity)
2. Śīla (virtuous conduct, morality, righteousness)
3. Kṣānti (forbearance, patience)
4. Vīrya (energy)
5. Dhyāna (rapture musing, contemplation)
6. Prajñā (wisdom)

Of these chief six pāramitā charity is one of the most important that Bodhisatta should accomplish. That is dāna pāramitā which means generosity, charity, giving materially in the form of calms/almns(?) and mental spiritual giving appeared emphatically in Mahāyāna Buddhist texts – writing books, educating a child, delivering a sermon, preparing a meal, washing dishes, living one's own life as well as possible – all those are regarded as dāna because they are beneficial for all living beings. Dāna expresses itself not only in liberality and alms giving, but also in being amiable and sympathetic for others in their joy and sorrow. It also includes a willingness to give all its acquired merits for the salvation of others.

The practical effect of the doctrine is to encourage the ideal of compassion of all being, the taking of the vow not to attain Buddhahood until all creatures have been liberated – that is the logical outcome of the spirit of this reasoning. The true Bodhisatta cannot be liberated until creatures are liberated, an egoism is thus entirely annihilated (forts(?)) its terms cf. Cit. In C(?) pp. 14,228, Sukhāvativyuha)

Such general compassion demands great energy in giving, for which even study should be sacrificed (BCA. V101). But generosity has its own reward. The śrāvaka claims that his meditation is a more rapid way of gaining release, but in truth the Mahāyānists attain enlightenment (bodhi) and Buddhahood more rapidly by one's practice of generosity. When one takes the resolution to become a Buddha for the good of others, all his thoughts are dominated by the thought of enlightenment (bodhicitta). All in him become meritorious, and the car(?) of the Mahāyāna bears him inevitably to the enlightenment which he does not desire for himself but seeks to attain solely for others (BCA VII.29). From physical suffering he is exempt, since he sins(?) not from moral suffering because he has knowledge, while others strive vainly for unsatisfying ends. He has pure delight in his own action of compassion (BCAP ix 76; BCA.i. 19F; vii. 27F).

“...I apply to the acquisition of the quality of the perfect Buddha, the merit of my confession of my taking refuge in the three Jewels, Buddha, the Law and the Order and of my production of the thought of enlightenment. May I in this universe of creatures at a time when no Buddha appears the refuge, the shelter, the safety, the island for creatures, may I make them cross the ocean of existence. I adopt all creatures as my mothers, fathers, brothers, sisters and sons. Henceforth for the happiness of creatures I will practice with all my power of generosity, morality, patience, energy, meditation, knowledge, skills in the means of salvation."

666The concept of Buddha in Theravada and Mahayana. (678)
Early Pali sources depict Gotama Buddha as an ideal human being. He was a lover of silent (muni) who led a simple life. He was respected by all who followed him not only he was the teacher, but because he was a human being par excellence. In Suttas, he is called isissattama, sabbasattanaj uttama, appatipuggala and devamanussa settha etc. He is equal to the arahants in terms of attainment. Their sole difference is that he is the discoverer and the shower of the ancient path (maggakkaya), while the disciples are the followers of him as his students.

Early suttas also depict the Buddha as having ordinary human nature. In Mahaparinibbana sutta, he says that he is old like an old cart is decaying, he becomes sick, tired and needs rest. He is thirsty and has to drink water. He is delighted with beautiful cetiyas and looks at Vesali with the last sight. In Mahavaggapali, he condemned his disciples foolish, noisy, fond of quarrelling and left them staying in the forest.

There are also later development in the Pali texts on the concept of Buddha. In Lakkhanasutta, he is said to have 32 great marks. He is the Ominiscient One (sabbabba) possessing Dasabala and attharasabuddhadhamma. In Acchariya-abhuta sutta, even as a Bodhisatta, he is characterized with various marvelous features. He descended from the Tusita heaven and entered his mother’s womb with immeasurable marvelous lights, the ten-thousand world systems shook and quaked and trembled. And in Mahavamsa, besides Gotama Buddha, other 27 Buddhas are also mentioned. The practise of paramitas too, is emphasized.

During the time of various Buddhist schools, the Buddha was raised to the status of a god or even to a metaphysical entity, especially by the Lokuttaravadinis. However, the more obvious glorification is seen in Mahayana. Certain passages in Pali texts gave an opportunity for the Mahayanists to put forth the doctrine of Trikaya, the specific concept of Buddha in Mahayana. In Anguttara Nikaya, the Buddha says that he is neither a god nor a gandhabba nor a man. And in the Itivuttka, he says to Vakkali that: ‘he who sees the Dhamma sees me’. All these statements lead to the development of Trikaya concept in Mahayana.

The Nirmanakaya—Body of Transformation
There are numeral Nirmanakayas created by Dharmakaya in countless worlds to preach to the beings of lower range. As Sakyamuni, it adopts himself to earthly conditions, possessing an earthly body but yet maintaining purity. He does not sleep nor dream and preached only ultimate Truth.

The Sambhogakaya—Body of Enjoyment
The body that partakes the enjoyment and as the Buddha ideal who preached to the Bodhisatvas of higher range. It is accomplished with all the Mahapurisa lakkhanas who preaches most of the Mahayana sutras.

The Dhammakaya—Body of the Law
This is the highest body, comprising all the essence of knowledge and compassion in the absolute state. It is sometimes called ‘Svabhavakaya’ which is immeasurable and unlimited. It fills all space and is the basic of both the Nirmanakaya and the Sambhogakaya. It is also called Tathata, Dharmadhatus or tathagata-garbha.

In the beginning, the Trikaya doctrine was very vague, the number of kayas was uncertain. In Chinese sources, Nagarjuna in his commentary on the Prajaparamita spoke only of 2 kayas: Rupakaya and Dharmakaya. According to N. Dutt, up to the time of Nagarjuna, the concept of Sambhogakaya was not distinguished from that of Rupakaya or Nirmanakaya.

According to Abhisamayalankara-karika, there are 4 kayas of which Svabhavika-kaya is real and the Dharmakaya, Sambhogakaya and Nirmanakaya are unreal. In Sutralankara, Svabhavika-kaya is identified with Dharmakaya.

The most developed form of Trikaya concept is found in Saddharmapundarikasutra and Suvarnaprabhasasutra. It is stated that the Tathagata has no origin, there is only the Dharmakaya. The
Gotama Buddha attained Buddhahood long long ago. It is only his Nirmanakaya that is visible to the people. There are numeral such Nirmanakayas residing over countless worlds and Gotama is the Nirmanakaya Buddha of this world. Therefore, Gautama Buddha was only a shadow, an image of the Dharmakaya which follows the ways of the world.

In Pali commentary, in order to explain the problem of the duration of time, it is said that the Buddha duplicated himself and sent it to the Tavatimsa heaven to preached the Abhidhamma to the gods while he himself remained on earth to preach to Sariputta. Perhaps, this is the influence of the Mahayana’s concept of Nirmanakaya. (57)

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(1). Vajrayana

Tantric Buddhism assumed several forms and produced several schools. Its earliest stage is called Mantrayana which concerned itself with mantras, yantras and dharanis etc. However, the most developed school is Vajrayana.

According to one of the Tantric texts, the Guhyasamaja, the phenomenal world is said to have emanated from the original Tathagata or the Reality. The 5 skandhas and the impurities like raga, dvesa and moha, are personified as so many buddhas, issuing out of the original Tathagata, called ‘bodhicitta-vajrasthagata’. Hence, the source of all Buddhas is the Vajra, which is identical with Wuyata.

In Vajrayana, Wunyata is something positive which, Indrabhuti takes as Mahasukha while Anavagavajra defines it as Prajopaya. Being characteristicless, Vajra is incapable of leading people to the Truth; therefore from time to time it converts itself into kaya-vak-citta-vajra and teaches the way that is Vajrayana. Thus Vajrayana accepts the Yogacara view about the 3 kayas and like the Madhyamikas, identify Wunyata or Vajra with samsara. The Vajrayana sadhakas taught that excreta, urine, etc. are not different from any good food; nor any woman, whether mother or a sister or other’s wife or a girl of low caste, from any other enjoyable woman.

Though hideous in many respects, the Vajrayana made many contributions to Buddhism. Some Hindus were also impressed by its doctrines, deities, mantras, sadhanas and exquisite art etc. Varjayana later gave rise to Sahajayana and Kalacakrayana.

In Tibet, Vajrayana has developed into several schools, among them are: Rnying-ma-pa of Padmasambhava (8th century), Sa-skya-pa of Virupa (9th century), Bka'-brgyud-pa of Tilopa (11th century), Bka'-gdams-pa of Atissa (11th century) and finally the reformed sect, Gelugpa the “Virtuous” of Tsong-kha-pa in the 14th century whose members are commonly known as Yellow Hats from the colour of their head-covers.

(2). Ashtasahasrika Prabha Paramita

Prajba paramita means transcendental knowledge, this is a name given to the whole literature consisting of treatises on the doctrine of wunyata. In Astasahasrika-paramita-sutra, there are 8,000 verses, and it is the most ancient prajba paramita text, perhaps was written around 50 century AD. All the other prajba paramita texts were written later.

The antiquity of this text is also attested by internal evidences, e.g., the concept of Sambhogakaya and the ten stages of a Bodhisattva are mentioned. The special feature of this book is, it gives the philosophical conception while other Vaipulya texts devote a lot to describe Buddhas and Bodhisattas.

This text comprises 32 chapters, denoted by the term ‘parivarta’. A peculiar feature of its composition is the salutatory verses found at the commencement of the text. Instead of the usual formula of salutation to the Triple Gems, or to the Buddha, the author pays adoration to the subject of the work, viz., Prabhaparamita. Thus
Prajñāparamita as Wûnyâta, is personified, and is treated as the ‘mother’ of all Buddhas, since all the Buddhas are enlightened because of Prajñāparamita, which is a famine noun.

The scene is set on the Grâdrakûta, ‘Vulture Peak’ in the vicinity of Râjarâha. When the Sâkyamuni was once sojourning there in the company of a large number of disciples and followers, Harîputra opened the discourse by asking Subhûti for information on the principles of the prajñāparamita, and the replies and discussions which followed form the principal subject-matter of the text. Subhûti enumerates 18 aspects of Wûnyâta which in later texts are explained in detailed by Nagarjuna and Harîbhadrâ.

There are a large number of prajñāparamita texts, when philosophically and religiously concerned, of all these texts, the Astasahasrika-prajñāparamita is the utmost importance as it contains all the essential ideas of Mahâyâna.

The process of sense-perception, according to the Madhupindika sutta (M.N.), has the following stages:

“Visual-consciousness arises, monk, arises because of eye and forms; the meeting of the three is contact, because of contact arises feeling, what one feels one perceives, what one perceives one reasons about, what one reasons about, one turns into papâca, what one turns into papâca, due to that papâca-sabba-savkha assail him in regard to forms belonged to the past, future and present”

The stages can be simplified into a diagram below:

1. eye + form + vision-consciousness (contact)
2. phassa (feeling)
3. vedana (perceiving)
4. sabba (thinking)
5. vittaka (mental proliferation)
6. papâca

Phassa brings about the collision between sense organ, object and its corresponding consciousness. There are two kinds of phassa, i.e. patigha samphassa and adhivacana samphassa. The former refers to our impression which comes through the five senses whereas the latter comes through mental contact.

Phasssa further gives rise to vedana, a reaction to contact. There are five types of feeling i.e. bodily and mentally agreeable and disagreeable feeling and of neutral.

What one feels one perceives. With what one perceives there also arise together vitakka and vicara i.e. thinking and investigation. Vitakka is the reasoning of the original data whereas vicara is its advanced stage of examination.

The final stage is the papâca i.e. mental proliferation, expansion or manifoldness. This refers to the consequent prolificity of ideation which has the tendency of worlding’s imagination to break loose and run riot. In Abhidhamma, it is called ‘kappana’ or ‘parikappana’ which means ‘synthetic function of the mind’. According to the Cullavâdalla sutta, papâca presupposes language; the initial and discursive thought is the activity of speech. Hence papavâca-sabba-savkha means concepts, designations or linguistic conventions characterized by the prolific conceptualizing of the mind.

In Mahanîd esa, tanha, mana and ditthi are defined in terms of papâca, actually, these 3 evil roots are papâca itself rather than the results of papâca. Since this papâca is built on sabba and vitakka, therefore in the Suttanipata (847) and the Anguttara Nikâya (vol. II.p.162), it is said that proliferation is stopped and calmed by complete losing interest in the 6 modes of contact and putting them out of function. This is by the method of Samadhi, however it is not a permanent result. If one does not entertain tanha, mana and ditthi with regard to the conditioned phenomena involved in the process of cognition, by resorting to the fiction of an ego, one is free from the yoke of proliferating concepts and has thereby eradicated the proclivities to all evil mental states which breed conflict both in the individual and in society.

The function of sabba i.e. perception in Buddhist philosophy is recognition (samyanana) of object both physical and mental. Perception in Buddhism is sixfold: perception of forms, sound, smell, taste, bodily contact and mental objects. According to Buddhism, perceptions often deceive us, they become known as illusion or perversity of perceptions (sabbavipallasa). Because of our preconceived notions, our attachment and carving, likes and dislikes, we fail to see the sense organs and the sense objects in their
respective and objective nature, and thus we go after illusions and deceptions. As sabba delude and mislead us, we fail to see thing in their true perspective, therefore the way we see things becomes perverted (viparitadassana). There are four perversions (vipallasa) that distort perceptions:--
1. What is impermanent (anicca) as permanent (nicca)
2. What is unsatisfactory (dukkha) as pleasant (sukha)
3. What is with self (anatta) as self (atta)
4. What is impure (asubha) as pure (subha)

666EXAMINE THE PLACE OCCUPIED BY JHANIC INSIGHT IN INDIAN ASCETIC LIVES. (629)

Jhanic insight was the most important aspect of ascetic tradition in ancient India. And for the Upanisadic tradition, as the jbanamarga had turned from the knowledge of the external world to an understanding of the individual, Jhanic insight had also became a specific method for the Upanisads to see the atman. As such, there were three religious traditions in ancient India that practiced Jhanic intuition i.e.,

1. Late Upanisadic tradition
   The Ultimate Goal of the Vedic thinkers of all periods is to realize the atman and to be unified with it (jagadatman). The seeing of this atman changed from the ‘ritual-way’ (karmamarga) of the Brahmanas to the ‘knowledge-way’ (jbanamarga) of the Upanisads. This so called ‘jbanamarga’ of the Early Upanisad is by ‘reasoning and speculating’ (takka and vimamsa) and that of the Middle and the Late Upanisad is through ‘intuition’ (dhyana). The atman which is hidden within all things and does not shine forth is seen by the subtle seers with their subtle awakened intuition. One sees (pawyet) while in Jhanic rapture (dhyayamanah). As the Wvetasvatara puts it, one would see (pawyet) God hidden as it were by practicing the drill of dhyana. This was a different way of knowing acquired by means of Jhana, though the vision or revelation itself was said to be due to the grace of God.

2. Wramana tradition.
   For some early ascetics like Alara Kalama and Uddaka Ramaputta, the aims of practicing Jhana were different from that of the Upanisadic sages. They took the stages of Jhanic trance as the final goal in life e.g., Alara Kalama regarded the base of nonthingness (akibci) as ultimate freedom whereas Uddaka Ramaputta took nevasabbanasabba as highest emancipation. For other Wramana traditions, the attainment of Abhivatha through Jhana was the only aim e.g., Purana Kassapa and Niganta Nataputra. They were said to have attained omniscience knowledge by means of Jhana. Even, Abba Kondabba was said to have vision of the future through Jhanic intuition. For the empirical materialists who had attained Jhana, observed the deceased of beings but not their survival with their Jhanic insight (Dibbacakkh), maintained annihilationist theory. And the Ajivikas, on the other hand, due to an externalization of experiences had in trance-states, believed the size and colour of soul.

   The method to verify the Ultimate Truth in Buddhism is stated in detailed in many passages throughout the Nikayas. Briefly, it consists in the practice of the virtuous life (ariyena silakkhandhena samannagato) followed by the restraint of the senses (indriyasajvara), the development of mindfulness (satisampajabba) and the elimination of the 5 impediments (pacanivarane pahaya). This results in the attainment of 4 jhanas, in which there is ‘a perfection of equanimity and mindfulness’ (upekkhasatiparisuddhi). In this state there manifest the 6 abhibba. Of the 6 only 3 are necessary for the attainment of Ultimate Truth i.e., pubbenivasanussatibana (verifies rebirth), cutupapatabana (verifies karma) and asavakkhayabana (verifies the Four Noble Truths).
   These stages are often described as the stages of sila, samadhi, pabba, vimutti and vimuttibanadassana. It is clear that the practice of Jhana in Buddhism is only one of the stages to attain the Ultimate Truth. It is with this motivation to attain Emancipation that the Buddha and his disciples practiced Jhana.

According to K.N. Jayatilleke, the different results of Jhanic experience is not due to any defect in Jhanic insight as such; it is due mostly to the manner in which the yogi has been conditioned to interpret what he sees in Jhanic states. In other words, it is the subjective bias and the habit of mind that condition the personal Jhanic perception. Despite of the differences in experience, the place occupied by Jhanic insight in India ascetic lives was very high, it was the method or way to their specific aims.
Examined the validity and significance of Abhibba as a higher attainment in Buddhism. (623)

In Buddhism, apart from normal perception, extrasensory perception is recognized as a valid means to knowledge. In Pali it is called ‘abhibba’ which means ‘higher knowledge’.

It is mentioned in the Samyutta Nikaya (III.p.232) that, one is able to direct one’s mind in the exercise of higher knowledge after attaining the fourth jhana. The 6 kinds of abhibba mentioned in early Buddhism are:

1. Iddhidhivida (psychokinesis), which is not a form of knowledge but a power i.e. the ability of walking on water and levitation etc. According to Visuddhimagga (405), it consists in the various manifestations of the ‘power of will’ (adhitthana iddhi) in the jhanas.
2. Dibbasota (clairaudience), the faculty of perceiving sounds even at a distance, far beyond the range of ordinary auditory faculties. It is an extension of sensory auditory perception both in extent and in depth.
3. Cetopariyabana (telepathy), which enables one to comprehend the general state as well as the functioning of another’s mind. With the help of this vision, one can know another person’s mind whether it is lustful or free of lust, hateful or free of hatred.
4. Pubbenivasanussatibana (retrocognition), the ability to perceive one’s own past history. This capacity is connected with satanussati vibbana.
5. Dibbacakkhu or cut’upapatabana (clairvoyance), the knowledge of the decease and survival of other beings who wander in the cycle of existences in accordance with their karma. According to Itthivutthaka, the present of the physical eyes is necessary for the operation of dibbacakkhu (Itt. P.52)
6. Asavakkjayabanaa (knowledge of the destruction of defiling impulses) which provides an insight into the four Noble Truths. It has been described in Pali texts as a self-transforming knowledge associates with the understanding of the three characteristics (tilakkhana) and the law of causation.

These six came to be known as chalabhippa in the Pali Nikaya, but since the first is not a form of knowledge, it came to be dissociated from the rest and these latter were known as pabcabhippa. In the same way, Dibbasotadhatu is not considered a specific form of knowledge (bana) since it does not connected with the investigation of Ultimate Truth in Buddhism. The other 4 are called ‘bana’ as they have the characteristics of knowledge. Cetopariyabana corresponds to Manahparyayabana in Jainism. With this super-cognitive power in jhanic condition, the Buddha knows the states of mind of another, thus helped him in the preaching of Dhamma. However, this Cetopariyabana has too, little to do with the attainment of Emancipating Knowledge.

The other three kinds of higher knowledge are of special concern in Buddhism, which are known as the ‘three-fold knowledge’ (tisso vijja). It is said in the Samabphalassutta that, the main functions of Pubbenivasanussatibana, Cutupapatabana and Asavakkhayabana are to verify rebirth, karma and the Four Noble Truths as well as the origin and cessation of suffering (paticcasaumuppada) respectively. And among the three, Asavakkhayabana is the most important as far as emancipation is concerned. Some ascetics of other traditions were also said to possess Pubbenivasanussatibana and Cutupapatabana, but not Asavakkhayabana. Therefore, Asavakkhayabana is the unique knowledge in Buddhism.

According to the M.N., Buddha also possesses the 7th knowledge of anagatansabana i.e. the knowing of the future conditions of people according to their present behaviour. However, this type of abhibba is also not related for the attainment of Emancipation.

In conclusion, we can say that, three out of the six Abbibba, only the ‘Tevijja’ are helpful in the attainment of emancipating knowledge. However, not all the Arhabuts were capable to verifying the Dhamma in this manner. Among all of them, only 60 out of 500 were capable of attaining the ‘higher knowledge’. The rest are said to be ‘emancipated by knowledge alone’ (pabbavimutta). This is mainly due to the difference in their faculties (tesam..indriyavemattataj).
According to the analysis of the five aggregates, for a consciousness to arise it must have an object. The object may be a color, sound, smell, taste, touch or a mental object, these are the six external objects. Corresponding to these six external objects are the six internal sense faculties, called ‘doors’ since they are the portals through which the objects enter the field of cognition, these are the eye, ear, nose, tongue, body and mind. When a door receives its object, there arises a corresponding state of consciousness, such as eye-consciousness, ear-consciousness, etc. the union of the object, the door or sense faculty, and the consciousness is called ‘contact’.

The life-span of a citta is termed, in the Abhidhamma, a mind-moment (cittakkhana). This is a temporal unit of such brief duration that, according to the commentators, in the time that it takes for lightning to flash or the eyes to blink, billions of mind-moments can elapse. Nevertheless, though seemingly infinitesimal, each mind-moment in turn consists of three sub-moments – arising (uppada), presence (thiti), and dissolution (bhanga). Within the breadth of a mind-moment, a citta arises, performs its momentary function, and then dissolves, conditioning the next citta in immediate succession. Thus, through the sequence of mind-moments, the flow of consciousness continues uninterrupted like the waters in a stream.

Material phenomena as well pass through the three stages of arising, presence and dissolution, but for them required for these three stages to elapse is equal to the time it takes for seventeen cittas to arise and perish.

According to the analysis of the mental state, the entire process takes place within the period of 17 moments, i.e., one thought process was accordingly divided into 17 moments. The process of perception in the Abhidhammasangaha begins with the vibration of the unconscious for two moments, in the second moment of which unconscious mind is cut off. The succeeding moments are those of attention (pabcadvavajjana), sensation (cakkhuviṭṭha), assimilation (sampaticchana), discrimination (santiranā), determination (votthapana), seven moments of cognition (javana) and two registration (tadārāmmāna). The number is made up to 17 by adding one moment of thought at the beginning of the perceptive process. This thought moment occurs before the material object makes an impression on the sense organs, and is technically termed past unconscious (atitabhavanga).

The 17 thought moments are given a simile that a man sleeps with his head covered under a mango tree the fruits of which are ripe (bhavavga); a ripe fruit falls (bhavavgacalaṇa); he awakes (bhavavgupaccheda); he removes the covering of his head (pabcadvaravajjana) and looks at the fruit (cakkhuviṭṭha); he takes the fruit (sampaticchana), squeezes it (santiranā), smells it (votthapana), and eats it (javana); what remains in the mouth he swallows with the saliva (tadārāmmāna).

The three kinds of bhavavga consciousness are vipāka. Pabcadvaravajjana is a kiriya citta. Pabca-viṭṭha is one of the ten moral or immoral vipāka cittas. Sampaticchana and santiranā are also vipāka cittas. The mind-door consciousness, a kiriya citta, function as the votthapana citta, and one can use one’s freewill at this stage. The seven javana thought-moments constitute kamma, it is at this stage that an action is judge whether moral or immoral. In the case of an Arahant, this javana is neither moral nor immoral but kiriya. The tadārāmmāna is a vipāka citta.

Thus, in a particular thought-process there arise various thought-moments which may be kamma, vipāka or kiriya.

It should be noted that the entire cognitive process occurs without any self or subject behind it as an enduring experiencer or inner controller, a ‘knower’ outside the scope of the process itself. The momentary cittas themselves exercise all the functions necessary to cognition, and the unity of the cognitive act derives from their coordination through laws of conditional connectedness.
Within the cognitive process each citta comes into being in accordance with the lawful order of consciousness (cittaniyama). It arises in dependence on a variety of conditions, including the preceding citta, the object, a door, and a physical base. Having arisen, it performs its own unique function within the process, and then it dissolves, becoming a condition for the next citta.

**BONUS: RISE OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL SCHOOLS**

The schools in Indian philosophy have sprung from two or rather three original sources or traditions. The Brāhmaṇical systems based on the ātman doctrine of the Upaniṣads and the Buddhist schools on the nairātmya doctrine of Buddha conceive reality on two distinct and exclusive patterns. The Upaniṣads and the systems drawing their inspiration from them conceive reality on the pattern of an inner core or soul (ātman), immutable and identical amidst an outer region of impermanence and change to which it is unrelated or but loosely related. This may be termed the substance view of reality (ātmanavāda). In its radical form, as in the Advaita Vedānta, it denies the reality of the apparent, the impermanent, and the many, and equates them with the false. The Sāṅkhya does not go so far; still it inclines more towards the substantial, the permanent, and the universal. The Nyāya with its empirical and pluralistic bias accords equal status to both substance and modes. Not only do these systems accept the ātman, but what is more, they conceive all other things too on the substance pattern. The ātman is the very pivot of their metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics. In epistemology, substance makes for unity and integration of experience; it explains perception, memory, and personal identity better than other assumptions. Bondage is ignorance of the self or the wrong identification of the self with the non-self (ātmanyantmādhyāsā). Freedom is the discrimination between the two.

The other tradition is represented by the Buddhist denial of substance (ātman) and all that it implies. There is no inner and immutable core in things; everything is in flux. Existence for the Buddhist is momentary (ksanika), unique (svaikaśaṇa), and unitary (dharmamātra). It is discontinuous, discrete, and devoid of complexity. Substance (the universal and identical) is rejected as illusory; it is but a thought-construction made under the influence of wrong belief (avidyā). This may be taken as the modal view of reality. The Buddhists brought their epistemology and ethics into full accord with their nairātmya metaphysics. Their peculiar conception of perception and inference and the complementary doctrine of mental construction (vikalpa) are necessary consequences of their denial of substance. Heroic attempts have been made to fit in this theory with the doctrine of Karma and rebirth. Avidyā, which is the root-cause of pain, is the wrong belief in the ātman (satkāya-dṛṣṭiprabhavāh sarve kleśah); and prajñā (wisdom) is the eradication of this belief and its attendant evils.

The terminology employed above is after the best Jaina epistemological treatises. Philosophical views, they say, are principally two – the dravyārthika-naya (substance view) and paryārthika-naya (modal view). Each view, carried to the extreme, denies the reality of the other. One emphasizes the universal and the continuous to the exclusion of the changing and the different, and the other holds the opposite view. The Vedānta is cited as the exponent of the extreme form of the substance view; and Buddhism (tathāgatamata) represents the exclusive modal view.

The Jaina system ostensibly reconciles these two opposed views by according equal reality to substance and its modes. There is no substance without modes, nor are there modes without substance. Reality is manifold (anekāntāmaka); it is not of one nature; it is unity and difference, universal and particular, and permanent and changing. The Jaina philosophy shaped its epistemology on this pattern and formulated the logic of the disjunction of the real (syādvāda). This view may be said to constitute the third stream of Indian philosophy, lying midway between the two extremes of the ātmanavāda and the anātmanavāda. Seemingly partaking of the nature of both, it was essentially un-Brāhmaṇical and un-Buddhistic. It was un-Brāhmaṇical in that it accepted a changing Ātman and even ascribed different sizes to it; no Brāhmaṇical sytem could ever accept that. It was un-Buddhistic in that it accepted a permanent entity, ātman, besides change. As a result, the Jaina found favour with neither. The synthesis of two views is a third view, and is no substitute for either. The Jaina system had comparatively little influence on the course of Indian philosophy, and was

58 I didn’t copywrite the footnotes.
little affected by other systems. Jainism has remained practically stationary down the ages. (Indian philosophy must therefore be interpreted as the flow of two vital streams — one having its source in the Ātman doctrine of the *Upaniṣads* and the other in the anātmavāda of Buddha. Each branched off into several sub-streams.) There were lively sallies and skirmishes, but no commingling of the two streams. Throughout the course of their development they have remained true to their original inspirations. The Brāhmaṇical systems are wedded to Bing, Buddhism to Becoming; the former espouse the existential and static view of reality, the latter the sequential and dynamic; for the one space, for the other time is the archetype. (The Brāhmaṇical systems are relatively more categorical and positive in their attitude (vidhimukhena), while the Buddhists are more negative (nisedhamukhena). Again, the former are more dogmatic and speculative, the latter empirical and critical. Subjectively minded, Buddhism is little interested in cosmological speculations and constructive explanations of the universe. The Brāhmaṇical systems are bound to an original tradition; they all accept the authoritarian character of the *Vedas*. Buddhism derives its inspiration from a criticism of experience itself. The tempo of development is quicker and intenser in Buddhism than in the *Upaniṣadic* tradition.

An opposite view has been advocated by a not inconsiderable section of the schools of Indian thought. They interpret Indian philosophy as having developed out of one tradition, the *Upaniṣadic*. Buddhism and Jainism are treated as deviations, rather than radical departures, from the ātmavāda of the *Upaniṣads*. This, however, ignores the sharp differences and exclusive attitudes inherent in these systems. Similarly it overlooks the internal differences withing the fold of Buddhism, and considers it one unitary system instead of a matrix of many systems. Nairmyāvada is the genus of which the different Buddhist systems — the Vaibhāṣika, the Sautrāntika, the Madhyamika and the Yogācāra — are the species; they are the various attempts to express the same denial of substance.

The entire course of the development of Indian philosophy is proof of our contention. No Buddhist system did ever accept the reality of the Ātman, the permanent and the unchanging. No non-Buddhist system except the Cārvaka, on the contrary, could ever reject it as unreal.

It may be said that this state of affairs is true of the later scholastic phase of Buddhism, and not of the original teachings of its Master. Reliance may be placed on certain texts affirming the Ātman. But we have to consider, as qagainst this, more numerous passages which deny the self in unmistakable terms. It will not do therefore to select those texts that favour a pre-conceived interpretation and to ignore the others. A systematic exegesis of the texts and a synthesis of the doctrines can alone prove fruitful. Such syntheses have been made by the Buddhist systems from time to time, notably by the Ābhidharmika, the Madhyamika and the Vijñānavāda systems. The modern exponent has to take these into account, as prima facie they claim to embody and express the original teachings. In the case of Buddhism too, we must accept the law of evolution that the later phases are potentially contained in the earlier. The theory of a primitive soul-affirming Buddhism followed by a soul-denying scholasticism does not solve any problem; it adds one more. ‘In the attempt of bridging the difference between the *Upaniṣads* and *Buddha* we would have immeasurably increased the distance between *Buddha* and Buddhism. Nor can we find any adequate reason for such a gross misunderstanding of *Buddha* by his followers.’

It may be said that the denial of the self is beset with such insuperable difficulties that it could not have been seriously maintained by any philosopher. The answer is that the doctrine of an entity, immutable and impervious to change (ātmavāda) is also beset with equally insuperable difficulties, though of an opposite kind. The Buddhist schools have made very consistent and commendable efforts to explain phenomena on their own hypothesis, as the Brāhmaṇical systems have on theirs, though in the opposite direction. The deep opposition between these radical standpoints stimulated the systems on either side; they gained in depth and maturity. It also helped the emergence of the dialectical consciousness, which we find in a systematic form in the Madhyamika philosophy. Dialectic is the consciousness of the total and interminable conflict of the ideas of reason, of philosophical views. It presses towards their resolution in the Absolute, which is the negation of the opposites (advaita, advaya). The Advaitic turn in the Buddhistic and Brāhmaṇical systems is a necessary outcome of this.

**BONUS: CAUSALITY (BOOK: EARLY BUDDHISM, CHAPTER 3: CAUSALITY)**

The Buddha claimed that his search for the nature of things led him to the discovery of the uniformity of the causal process
It was the knowledge of the causal pattern that enabled him to put an end to all defiling tendencies and thereby attain freedom (vimutti). This claim of the Buddha has to be evaluated in the light of the background in which various metaphysical theories, such as that of eternal 'soul' or 'self' (ātman), 'inherent nature' (svabhāva), or creator God (iśvara), were posited in order to explain the functioning of phenomena. One of the most important of the discourses addressed to the monks is the „Discourse on Causal Relations“ (Paccaya-sutta), in which he speaks of (1) causality (paticcasamuppāda) and (2) causally conditioned phenomena (paticcasamuppanna dhamma).

These concepts, according to the Buddha, explain everything in this world, the individual things and the relations existing among them. In this chapter the causal relations will be examined, leaving until later a discussion of causally conditioned phenomena, although the two are inseparably connected.

Before and during the time of the Buddha the philosophical atmosphere in India was clouded with many metaphysical theories, and this was so even with regard to the concept of causation. There were three major theories of causality: (1) self-causation (sayaṃ katan) (2) external causation (paraṃ katan) (3) a combination of self and external causation (sayaṃ kataṇ ca paraṃ kataṇ ca).

This first was propounded by the Substantialist school, which accepted the reality of the 'self' (ātman) and considered causation as being due to the activity of this principle immanent in everything (sarvātman). Because the immanent 'self' is found in man as well as in the things of the outer world, it was looked upon as the agent in terms of which all the activities of man, as well as the functioning of the things of the world, should be explained. This school, by implication, denied the causal efficacy of any factor outside the 'self'.

The second theory was put forward by the Naturalists, who, as a reaction against the idealist metaphysics of the Substantialist school, believed that the functioning of phenomena ways due to their 'inherent nature' (svabhāva). According to the Naturalist theory, 'inherent nature' (svabhāva) is a principle governing physical nature and man himself is determined by this physical principle, his psychic personality playing no effective part in his behavior. In contrast, the Substantialist theory held that a 'self' is recognized even in physical phenomena and is ultimately identified with the psychic principle (cit) considered to be the reality in man. Thus, the Naturalist conception of causation through 'inherent nature' (svabhāva) came to be recognized as a form of 'external causation' (paraṃ katan) because, as far as anthropocentric philosophies are concerned, it denied man's moral responsibility.

The third theory is an attempt to combine the first two theories and was put forward by the Jainas. Although it recognizes both aspects of causation, self-causation as well as external causation, it carries with it all the metaphysical assumptions of the two.

The Buddhist theory of causality seems to have been influenced by the Naturalist theory of 'inherent nature' (svabhāva). Yet it differs from the Naturalist theory in two important ways. First, the Buddhist theory is not confined to physical causation alone, as is the Naturalist theory. In Buddhism, the causal pattern is recognized even in the psychic, moral, social, and spiritual realms, whereas in Naturalism everything is subordinate to physical causation. Second, unlike the Naturalists who believed that the principle of 'inherent nature' is strictly determined and that nothing can change the course of nature, Buddhists accepted a causal principle that was more or less a theory of conditionality. An examination of some features of the causal nexus as presented in the early texts will help in understanding the nature of the Buddhist theory of causality.

In the „Discourse on Causal Relations.“ the Buddha mentions four characteristics of causation: (1) objectivity (tathatā) (2) necessity (avīthyatā) (3) invariability (anāṇihaṭhatā) (4) conditionality (iddhappaccayatā).

These four characteristics are said to be found in the causal relations obtaining among phenomena.

The first emphasizes the objectivity of the causal relation. It was, in fact, intended to refute the claim of some idealist philosophers who belonged to the Upaniṣadic tradition and who maintained that change, and therefore causation, are mere matters of words, nothing but names (vāccārambhanaṃ ... nāmadheyañ). In other words, they are mental fabrications having no objective reality. For the Buddha, causation was as real as anything else. In fact, in one of the discourses preserved in the Chinese Agamas, the problem of the status of causation is brought up when the question is raised as to who fabricated (literally, 'made') the theory of causation. Buddha's reply is: „It is made neither by me nor by another. Whether the Tathāgatas were to arise in this world or not, this constitution of things [ = dhammadhātu] is eternally existent. Concerning this [the constitution of things] the Tathāgata has insight, is fully enlightened.“ The objectivity of causation is further emphasized when its discovery is compared to the discovery of a bygone kingdom (purāṇaṃ rājadhānīn).

The second and third characteristics, 'necessity' (avīthatā) and 'invariability' (anāṇihaṭhatā), stress the lack of exception or the existence of regularity. The fact that a certain set of conditions gives rise to a certain effect and not to something completely different, is one of the basic assumptions of the causal principle. If this feature is not recognized,
basic pattern of events perceived in this phenomenal world cannot be explained satisfactorily. Events that appear to follow no causal pattern, events that are generally called accidental occurrences, are not really so. It is merely our ignorance of the causal pattern that prompts us to consider them accidental.  

The fourth characteristic of causation, ‘conditionality’ (idappaccayatā), is by far the most significant in that it steers clear of the two extremes – the unconditional necessity implied in strict determinism and the unconditional arbitrariness assumed by accidentalism. Hence it was used as a synonym for causation. It was emphasized at the time when the determinism (niyatāvāda) of Makkhali Gosāla (the leader of the Ajīvika sect) and indeterminism (adhiccasamuppāda or adhiccasamuppanna-vāda) were dominant theories.

On the basis of these characteristics of causation, the Buddha formulated the general formula that is set out in the early discourses as follows:

„When this is present, that comes to be;  
from the arising of this, that arises.  
When this is absent, that does not come to be;  
on the cessation of this, that ceases.“

(Imasmiṃ sati idam hoti;  
imassa uppādā idam uppanajjati.  
Imasmiṃ asati idam na hoti;  
imassa nirodhā idam nirajjhati.)

This statement found in many places in the early texts, explains the conception of causality or causal uniformity which the Buddha arrived at after a perusal of the various instances of causal happening, and which came to be known as the golden mean between the two extremes, eternalism and annihilationism. It is, indeed, the truth about the world which the Buddha claimed the discovered and which became the „central“ doctrine of Buddhism. It was the Buddha’s answer to both the eternalist theory of the Substantialists, who posited an unchanging immutable ‘self’ (ātman), and the annihilationist theory of the non-Substantialists, who denied continuity altogether. Thus the Buddha is said to have remarked: „To him who perceives through proper insight the arising of the things of the world, the belief in nonexistence [= annihilation] does not occur. to him who perceives through proper insight the ceasing of the things of the world, the belief in existence [= immutability] does not arise.‟

One of the significant features to be noted in this conception of causation is the lack of metaphysical assumptions which are generally found in the rationalist theories of causality met with in the later schools of Indian philosophy. The metaphysical theory of the Sāṅkhyā and the Sarvāstivāda schools, which emphasized the identity of cause and effect (satkārya-vāda), may be similar to the theory of self-causation upheld by the Upaniṣadic thinkers, and the Vaiśeṣika and Sautrāntika theories, which insisted on the difference between cause and effect (asatkārya-vāda), may, in a way, be realted to the theory of external causation accepted by the Naturalist tradition. But because of the epistemological standpoint he adopted, the Buddha was able to formulate an empiricist theory of causality without getting involved in either of these metaphysical doctrines.

While individual instances of causal happening were verified on the basis of experience, both sensory and extrasensory, the uniformity of the causal law was reached through inducting inference based on these experiences. While causation itself is a phenomenon experienced, causal uniformity is considered an inductive inference. On the basis of the present experiences of causal happening, inductive inferences are made with regard to the past and the future. While some past incidents may be brought back through reminiscences, one cannot rely on memory completely, for it tends to fade. Hence, even knowledge of the past is based on inductive inference. Because it is possible to remember past incidents through extrasensory perception, knowledge of the past may be partly experiential. But knowledge with regard to the future may be had only through inductive generalization. This may be one of the reasons why none of the extrasensory perceptions refer to the future. Thus experiential knowledge (dhamme ṇāna) consists of knowledge of causally conditioned phenomena (paṭiccasamuppanna-dhamma) as well as the causal relations (paṭiccasamuppāda) of the present and partly of the past. Inferential knowledge (anvaye ṇāna) is primarily of the future and partly of the past. The uniformity of the causal principle, which involves prediction into the future, is therefore an inductive generalization.

The universal applicability of the causal law is recognized in early Buddhism when it uses this causal principle to explain every phenomenon. We come across many instances in which the causal principle is applied to explain the functioning of physical, both organic and inorganic, phenomena. Among events that receive causal explanations are the evolution and dissolution of the world-process, natural occurrences like drought and earthquakes, and also plant life. A special application of the causal principle is made with reference to the human personality, a problem of prime importance to the Buddha as well as to the pre-Buddhist thinkers. This twelvefold formula of causation, which became very popular in the early
Buddhist texts, will be discussed in detail below. Psychological processes are also explained in terms of the causal principle. Furthermore, moral and social, as well as spiritual, behavior find causal explanations (chapters 5, 6, 7). As later scholiasts grouped them, there are five main spheres or realms in which causality predominates:

1. physical (inorganic) order (atu-niyama)
2. physical (organic) order (bijā-niyama)
3. psychological order (citta-niyama)
4. moral order (kamma-niyama)
5. ideal spiritual order (dhamma-niyama).17

These five groups appear to be so all-inclusive that nothing in experience is excluded. In short, everything in this universe comes within the framework of causality. Hence, to know causation is to know the truth. This explains the Buddha's statement, "He who perceives causation (paṭiccasamuppāda) perceives the Dhamma."18

Of the various applications of the causal principle, the most prominent in the early Buddhist texts is, for obvious reasons, the formula of the twelve factors, which describes the causation of the human personality. The prominence given to the twelfeold formula seems to have led some scholars to think that this is all that Buddhism has to say about causation. Even the few facts regarding the Buddhist theory of causality just presented should be sufficient to show that such a view is untenable.

The need for a rational and factual description of the life-process and how the so-called individual comes to experience happiness as well as suffering was felt by the Buddha from the very beginning of his career. In this task he was faced with insuperable difficulties created by some of the pre-Buddhist thinkers. On the one hand, when speaking of the life-process, some scholars were accustomed to thinking in terms of an immutable reality called the 'self' (ātman); on the other hand, there were some who denied a self and as a result denied the continuity of the life-process and along with it whatever comes under the category of morality and spirituality. In addition, there were those who believed in an omniscient being who was responsible for the creation and preservation of the world-process and hence of the life-process. The necessity of explaining the life-process without contributing to any one of these theories, with which he did not agree, led the Buddha to devise the twelfeold formula.

Since the question of the absolute beginning of the world-process was considered a metaphysical one (see appendix I), the twelfeold formula was presented in the form of a cycle or circle (vaṭṭa). The formula is generally stated in the following manner:

When this is present, that comes to be; on the arising of this, that arises. When this is absent, that does not come to be; on the cessation of this, that ceases. That is to say, on ignorance depend dispositions; on dispositions depends consciousness; on consciousness depends the psychophysical personality; on the psychophysical personality depend the six „gateways” [of sensual perception]; on the six „gateways” depends contact; on contact depends feeling; on feeling depends craving; on craving depends grasping; on grasping depends becoming; on becoming depends birth; on birth depend aging and death, sorrow and lamentation, suffering, dejection and vexation. In this manner there arises this mass of suffering.

In this special application of the causal principle, ignorance (avijjā) heads the list of twelve factors. It is not the beginning of the cycle of existence, but is one of the most important factors that contribute to evil or unwholesome behavior, and that when completely eliminated lead to enlightenment and hence to the cessation of suffering. Ignorance is said to condition the dispositions (sankhāra) which play a significant role in determining the nature of man's behavior (kamma). The nature of one's consciousness (viññāṇa) also depends on the nature of the dispositions. Consciousness being the factor that determines the nature of the new psychophysical personality (nāmarūpa), the part played by the dispositions in determining life after death is emphasized. Dispositions therefore account for the nature of one's behavior (kamma) as well as one's future birth or rebirth (punabbhava).

The process of rebirth is explained as the combining of the two factors, consciousness (viññāṇa) and the psychophysical personality (nāmarūpa). The psychophysical personality referred to here is the foetus formed in the mother's womb (gabbha) and which represents the beginning of a new life span. Consciousness surviving from the past is said to become infused in this new personality, and thus a continuity is maintained between the two lives. The latent dispositions in this surviving consciousness therefore determine to a great extent the nature of the new personality.

When the individual is born, his senses, if they are not impaired, will start functioning, and through them he is fed new impressions which also will be instrumental in determining the nature of his personality. Hence the relationship between the psychophysical personality and the six „gateways” of sense perception (saḷāyatana). Depending on the nature of the six gateways of sense perception, there arises contact (phassa). Contact leads to feeling (vedanā), pleasurable, painful, or neutral. Depending on the nature of the feelings, there arises craving (tanhā) which is generally considered to be threefold: desire for
sense pleasures (kāma), for existence (bhava) and for nonexistence (vibhava). Craving is the cause of grasping (upādāna), as a result of which the process of becoming (bhava) is set in motion. This stage represents again the end of a life span and the beginning of a fresh one. The factors that earlier were said to be operative at the beginning of a new life process, namely, consciousness (viññāna) and the psychophysical personality (nāmarūpa), are also operative here, in the same way that grasping (upādāna) and becoming (bhava) are operative there. The difference is that, since the early Buddhists were interested in accounting for at least three life terms when presenting the causal process in this manner, they seem to have taken only those prominent factors which they wanted to emphasize and associated them with the beginnings of the two life processes. Thus birth (jāti) in the third hase is given as the result of becoming (bhava). Birth, then, is considered the cause of the entire mass of suffering that one is faced within this life.

Since rebirth is the cause of suffering and is invariably associated with decay and death (jarā-maraṇa), avoiding future birth or becoming (punabhava) is the goal of the religious life. How is one able to put an end to future rebirth? According to the causal process it would seem that development of right understanding (sammā diṭṭhi), which would replace ignorance (avijjā), and the elimination of craving (tanha), which results in nongrasping (anupādāna), would put a halt to this process of becoming. Deathlessness of immortality (amata, Sk. anmṛta) is therefore nothing more than rebirthlessness or 'becoming-less-ness' (apunabhava). But in later Mahāyāna, deathlessness seems to have been interpreted as the absence of death even at the end of the present life span, and hence the Buddha’s Parinibbāna is looked upon as being unreal or as a fiction. (This will be discussed in Chapter 10.)

Deathlessness is the ultimate consequence of the attainment of enlightenment and the elimination of craving. But the immediate result of enlightenment is the attainment of perfect happiness (parama sukha) arising from the absence of craving or attachment (virāga). Viewed in this light, we can understand the paeans of joy expressed by the monks and nuns, as recorded in the Thera-gāthās and Therī-gāthās.

Notes:

1. Ud I ff.
2. S 2.2 ff.; TD 2.85 b.
3. S 2. 18; TD 2.81 a.
4. Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6.1.4-6
5. TD 2.85 b.
6. S 2.165-106
8. M 1.262 ff.; TD 1.562c; S 2.28; TD 2.85b.
10. S 2.17; TD 2.85c.
11. S 2.58; TD 2.99c.
12. D 3.80 ff.; TD 1.36b ff.; A 4.100-103; TD 2.736b-c.
14. A 4.312; TD 2.753c.
15. A 1.223-224; S 3.45; TD 2.8c; S 4.315; TD 2.231a.
17. DA 2.432; DhsA 272.
18. M 1.190-191; TD 1.467a
20. S 2.28; TD 2.98a.

Selected Readings:
- Primary sources:
  1. Mahā-nidāna-suttanta (D 2.55 ff.); 'The Great Discourse on Causation' (SBB 3.50 ff.); TD 1.60 ff.
  2. Nidāna-Samyyutta (S 2.1-133) including 93 discourses; 'The Kindred Sayings on Cause' (KS 2.1-94); roughly corresponding to TD 2.79-86
However, sceptical questions appear to have been raised about the absolute origin of things even at this early age as evidenced by the world, an attempt to reconstruct in terms of the religious consciousness of the Israelite people the legendary history of the origin of the first principles. In Chinese cosmogony the origin of everything is traced to the male and female principles legends primal spirit and primal matter coexist in all eternity in indissoluble union and the diversity in the origin and development of the universe on a more naturalistic and speculative basis. According to one of the Egyptian cosmogonic Hesiod multiplicity of the phenomenal world. According to of ancient cultures are a mixture of primitive animistic beliefs and beliefs about supernatural forces thought to underlie the variegated nature of the man-woman relationship and the nature of morality and the source of sin. In the Judeo Christian tradition God is the maker of both heaven and earth, the sea and all that is in them. The Biblical myth of Genesis is an attempt to reconstruct in terms of the religious consciousness of the Israelite people the legendary history of the origin of the world, the beginning of human existence, the nature of the man-woman relationship and the nature of morality and the source of sin.

In Aggañña sutta the story of genesis meant creation, generation or production. It has also been used as the title of the first book of the Christian Bible. Seeing the relation between the purpose of the book of Genesis in the Bible and the Buddhist canonical discourse entitled Aggañña sutta (q.v.) in the Dīgha Nikāya of the Sutta Piṭaka, scholars have described the Aggañña sutta as the Buddhist book of Genesis. In accordance with this description the discussion of the concept of Genesis in relation to Buddhism will in the sequel pay special attention to the religious, ethical and philosophical significance of the ideas contained in the Aggañña sutta. As a general theory of creation, generation or production Buddhism propounded the theory of Conditioned Genesis or Dependent Origination; the theory of Paṭiccasamuppāda (Skt. Pratītyasamutpāda), which though variously interpreted, is a cardinal doctrinal tenet common to all systems of Buddhism. It was presented as the Buddha's theoretical Middle Way which avoided a number of extreme views such as eternalism, nihilism, a variety of deterministic theories as well as forms of indeterminism which held that there is no casual order whatsoever in the universe. The Aggañña sutta narrative is evidently an early Buddhist attempt to construct a legendary history of the origin of the world, the evolution of man and social institutions which is consistent with the general theory of conditioned genesis.

A student of the development of human ideas in the numerous cultures of the world is bound to be struck by the universality of the presence of cosmogonical myths to account for the beginnings of the universe and all existence. It may be said that the presence of a cosmogony indicates a higher level of development in abstract thinking. In the Indian context the Buddhist account of the origin and development of the world and society was preceded by numerous cosmogonical myths belonging to the Vedic tradition. Indian thought had already reached a high level of development in abstract thinking and attained considerable philosophical maturity by the time the Buddha began his mission as a strikingly innovative teacher. The story of genesis found in the Aggañña sutta is illustrative of some of the uniquely innovative aspects of the Buddhist world view. Compared to the degree of attention that the Biblical story of Genesis has received in the history of religious ideas it should be remarked that considering the richness of imagination and the philosophical vision implicit in the Buddhist story, it has received far less attention than it deserves.

Most cosmogonies attempt to postulate a primordial element from which the universe came into being. The cosmogonical myths of ancient cultures are a mixture of primitive animistic beliefs and beliefs about supernatural forces thought to underlie the variegated multiplicity of the phenomenal world. According to Homer the prime component of the universe is the ocean and according to Hesiod it is earth. In later Milesian thought an attempt was made by the more philosophically minded to present theories about the origin and development of the universe on a more naturalistic and speculative basis. According to one of the Egyptian cosmogonic legends primal spirit and primal matter coexist in all eternity in indissoluble union and the diversity in the universe emerges from these first principles. In Chinese cosmogony the origin of everything is traced to the male and female principles Yang and Yin. In the Judeo Christian tradition God is the maker of both heaven and earth, the sea and all that is in them. The Biblical myth of Genesis is an attempt to reconstruct in terms of the religious consciousness of the Israelite people the legendary history of the origin of the world, the beginning of human existence, the nature of the man-woman relationship and the nature of morality and the source of sin.

In Rigveda which contains the earliest religious literature of the Indians, the dominant characteristic is found to be an explanation of natural phenomena by a process of deification involving the positing of wills behind the dynamic forces of nature. However, sceptical questions appear to have been raised about the absolute origin of things even at this early age as evidenced by the

- Secondary sources
7. Smart, Ninian. *Doctrine and Argument in Indian Philosophy*.

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**BONUS: GENESIS**

The term genesis means creation, generation or production. It has also been used as the title of the first book of the Christian Bible. Seeing the relation between the purpose of the book of Genesis in the Bible and the Buddhist canonical discourse entitled Aggañña sutta (q.v.) in the Dīgha Nikāya of the Sutta Piṭaka, scholars have described the Aggañña sutta as the Buddhist book of Genesis. In accordance with this description the discussion of the concept of Genesis in relation to Buddhism will in the sequel pay special attention to the religious, ethical and philosophical significance of the ideas contained in the Aggañña sutta. As a general theory of creation, generation or production Buddhism propounded the theory of Conditioned Genesis or Dependent Origination; the theory of Paṭiccasamuppāda (Skt. Pratītyasamutpāda), which though variously interpreted, is a cardinal doctrinal tenet common to all systems of Buddhism. It was presented as the Buddha's theoretical Middle Way which avoided a number of extreme views such as eternalism, nihilism, a variety of deterministic theories as well as forms of indeterminism which held that there is no casual order whatsoever in the universe. The Aggañña sutta narrative is evidently an early Buddhist attempt to construct a legendary history of the origin of the world, the evolution of man and social institutions which is consistent with the general theory of conditioned genesis.

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In Rigveda which contains the earliest religious literature of the Indians, the dominant characteristic is found to be an explanation of natural phenomena by a process of deification involving the positing of wills behind the dynamic forces of nature. However, sceptical questions appear to have been raised about the absolute origin of things even at this early age as evidenced by the
existence and do not feed on any material food but on joy. The Buddhist theory of survival that until a living being eradicates craving it has to wander in the cycle of saṃsāra

The Pātika sutta claims to know the beginning of things (aggāniha ca ... pajānami). Here, he rejects the view that one could account for the beginnings in terms of creation by God or Brahma (issarakuttham brahmakuttham). In the Buddhist view it is possible to speak only of the originating or production (samudaya) of the unsatisfactory process of dukkha but not of any metaphysical soul or ego entity like in religious systems which have the concept of an immortal self. This process is to be accounted for by discovering the immediately perceivable conditions related to it. The canonical suttas contain a number of formulations stating the causal dependencies which explain the genesis of dukkha and the saṃsāric process. No particular causal factor is to be taken as the unconditioned first cause. Buddhism holds the same view about the evolution of the physical universe. It does not postulate an absolute beginning. It explicitly rejects the theory of divine creation. In the Patīka sutta the Buddha claims to know the beginning of things (aggāniha ca ... pajānami). Here, he rejects the view that one could account for the beginnings in terms of creation by God or Brahma (issarakuttham brahmakuttham). In the Buddhist view it is possible to speak only of relative beginnings. The Buddhist story of Genesis in the Aggaṇīha sutta may be said to be purported to state in form of legendary history the relative beginnings and the gradual evolution of the physical world, sentient existence and man and his social institutions. Its significance ought to be judged not for the historical accuracy of what it states, but for the underlying philosophical conceptions of the nature of man and the universe and the laws governing evolutionary processes of nature in the physical, social and psychological spheres. In this account may be found some of the deepest philosophical intuitions of Buddhist thought including the most noteworthy aspects of its social and political philosophy.

According to early Buddhist cosmology, the physical universe consists of innumerable world systems extending in the form of galactic clusters. The Buddhist conception of the universe does not accord with a narrow geocentric view which was common to most prescientific cultures. The world systems are said to be in a continuous process of evolution and involution over incalculable aeons going through periods of „opening out“ (vivattamāna) and „closing in“ (saṇvatamāna). The recognition of the fact that despite the immensity and the apparent order and stability of our physical world, it is subject to the law of universal change is a reaffirmation of the Buddhist doctrine of transience (aniccā). The Aggaṇīha sutta states that during e period of involution, the larger part of sentient beings survives in the abode of luminous existence (ebhuyeyena sattā athasaara-saṇvattanikā honti). This view is in accordance with the Buddhist theory of survival that until a living being eradicates craving it has to wander in the cycle of saṃsāra. It is said that when after a long period of time the world begins to evolve the beings from the luminous abode pass away and are reborn in this world.

According to the description given in the sutta these beings possess no gross physical bodies, have a kind of astral or spiritual existence and do not feed on any material food but on joy. The Sutta says:

„Now at that time, all had become one world of water, dark and of darkness that maketh blind. No moon or sun appeared, no constellations, neither was night manifest nor day, neither months nor half months, neither years nor seasons, female nor male. Beings were reckoned just as beings only.“

It says that after a time just as scum forms on the surface of boiled milky rice that is cooling, the earth begins to form on the

Nāsadiya hymn of the Rgveda. An attempt to trace even certain conventional divisions of society to divine origins is marked in the Rgveda, itself. According to the Puruṣa Sākta of the Rgveda, the four castes, Brāhmaṇa (priests), Rājanya (rulers), Vaisya (common people) and Ćaudra (menials) were created respectively out of the mouth, the arms, the thighs and the feet of the Primeval Person. This idea is repeated in the Atharvaveda and came to be fully established in the period of the Yajur Sanhitās and the Brāhmaṇas. There is an attempt in the Brāhmaṇas to give a monotheistic explanation for the origin of the universe. In the Brāhmaṇas are found many legends about Prajāpati creating the universe. In the beginning was Prajāpati and nothing but Prajāpati; he through the performance of austerities, created the worlds. In some legends waters seem to have been believed to be coeval with Prajāpati. The Upanisads turn to be more philosophical in tracing the beginnings of existence to the abstract principles of Ātman and Brahmān. In the Upanisaad creation is attributed to Ātman in the sahpe of man (puruṣa). Puruṣa finds delight in multiplying Himself. Thereupon He becomes husband and wife and created all beings that exist in pairs. In the taittiriya Upaniṣad the sequence is given as Brahma, space, wind, fire, water, earth, food, seed, men and all creatures. The Sāṅkhya system is also an attempt to give an evolutionary account of man and the physical universe in terms of two primordial realities called prakṛti (matter) and puruṣa (spirit).
expanse of water. Here Buddhism is putting forward a naturalistic notion of physical evolution in place of the current *Brahmanical* theories of divine origins of the natural world. However, as the description proceeds, the peculiarly Buddhist world view comes into focus in its assertion that even the physical and physiological changes are to be accounted for in terms of the motives and desires of sentient beings. The interaction between the psychical aspects of sentient existence and the physical environment is brought out in the legendary story that follows. The sensory qualities of colour, odour and taste are said to appear in the evolving earth-matter, giving rise to the psychological response of craving for the savoury earth. Thus the Buddhist story about the beginnings suggests that moral evil in the world is not due to the intervention of any supernatural agency benign or malign, but it is part of the process of dependent origination. Elsewhere in the suttas where deeper psychological analysis occurs, the origin of moral evil is traced to the process of sense perception beginning with the contact of the senses with the external world.

The *Aggañña sutta* further says that the self-lumiance of the first beings in the period of evolution disappears as a consequence of their craving for the savoury earth. When the self-lumiance disappears the sun and the moon and stars and constellations become manifest giving rise to changes of season and the conventional distinctions between months, half months and years. When living beings feed on material food of the earth, they are said to have gradually undergone change in their physical constitution and appearance. This brings about distinction in the physical appearance of living beings. There comes a stage when the savoury earth also disappears and beings live on the vegetative outgrowths which appear subsequently on the surface of the earth. After a long process of evolution in which varieties of vegetation serve as the food for living beings, one being replaced by another, finally rice becomes their staple food.

Of special significance is the view presented in the *sutta* about the appearance of sexual distinction. The *sutta* says:

„And in measure as they, thus feeding, went on existing, so did the bodies of those beings become even more solid, and the divergence in their comeliness more pronounced. In the female appeared the distinctive features of the female, in the male those of the male. Then truly did woman contemplate man too closely and man, woman. In them contemplating over much the one the other, passion arose and burning entered their body. They in consequence thereof followed their lust” (ibid. p. 85).

Buddhism explains the emergence of sex distinction as a consequence of an evolutionary process involving psychophysical interaction. This is in marked contrast to the biblical view that it is an original distinction attributable to God, the supreme Creator. In the narrative itself the Buddhist attitude towards sex is expressed by saying that in the first occurrence of the sexual act it met with common disapproval. This is a reaffirmation of the early Buddhist position that sexual pleasures have to be transcended in order to attain the higher levels of spiritual maturity. The *Aggañña sutta* account is in accord with the early Buddhist position that the higher religious life (*brahmacariya*) requires the transcendence of the vulgar pleasures of sexual union (*virato methuna gāmadhammā*).

The Buddhist story goes on in gradual stages to account for the evolution of the economic and social life of man from which some of the most important principles of Buddhist social and political philosophy can be derived. A crucial stage in the process of social evolution is the beginning of private property. The *sutta* says that the practice of common consumption of the produce of the earth is later replaced by a system of private property. People erect fences and demarcate the boundaries of their own property. This marks the beginning of the evil practices of theft. Human greed leads to the evil practice of stealing the property of another person. This in turn marks the beginnings of a political order to regulate harmonious social and economic relationships. The first ruler, according to this Buddhist legend, is one elected by the people (*mahājanasammato*). By this story Buddhism appears to be challenging the predominant view about the nature of the authority of a ruler implicitly suggesting that the ruler's authority is derived from the people themselves, in the form of a social contract, decided on a political order headed by a king. Buddhism presents through this legend a radically different account of the source of political authority. The Buddhist legend gives strength to a democratic conception of the origin of political authority whereas the well known *Brahmanical* suttas seek to derive the authority of kings from a divine source. A peculiarly Buddhist etymology is suggested for the term *rājā* (king) saying „one is called *rājā* because he delights people by his adherence to justice“ (*dhammena janaṃ rañjettī rājā*).

It is at this point that the main intention of the *sutta* is thrown into clearer focus. In the introductory section of the *sutta* which briefly states the circumstances under which the Buddha preached it, the Buddha asks one of his disciples named *Vāseṭṭha*, who had entered the Buddhist Order from a *Brahmin* family, about the common *Brahmin* reaction to his decision to lead a religious life under the *Buddha* who was a non-*Brahmin* teacher. *Vāseṭṭha*'s answer suggests that it was definitely hostile reaction coloured by notions of the caste superiority of the *Brahmins* who claimed to be the direct progeny of *Brahma*, the creator God himself. (ibid. p. 78). It is at this point that the *Buddha* remarks that the *Brahmins* display such an attitude because they are ignorant of the past (*porāṇaṃ asarantā*) and proceeds to speak of the origins of things. The Buddhist story rejects with subtle irony that *Brahmanical* view of a static, divinely ordained social order along with the social inequalities consisting of the privileges and immunities for the upper classes justified by the *Brahmanical* view of the nature and origin of society established on the authority of the sacred scriptures. The most striking feature of the Buddhist story is its explanation of the four caste groups then recognized in Indian society as a product of natural social processes. The story suggests that conventional social stratifications are not static features of the natural
order of events, but depend on social conventions and socio-economic contingencies. In this connection, too, the Buddhist story introduces new etymologies with more concern for a moral purpose that their factual correctness. Rejecting the Brahmancial view about the nature of society, the Aggañña sutta quite emphatically declares that the different castes arise out of beings who were originally equal and like unto each other (tesaññeva sattānaṃ sadisānaññeva no asadiśānaṅ). As against the Brahmancial view Buddhism maintains that human beings belong to one species. The Buddhist account ends with emphasis on the supremacy of moral values insisting that the person who is endowed with right knowledge and good conduct is the highest among gods and men (vijjācaraṇa sampanno so seṭṭho devamānuse).

It may be said that the Buddhist story of Genesis illustrates clearly the contrasting paradigm of a non-theistic religious system like Buddhism when viewed in relation to theistic cosmogonies. The story gives expression to the non-authoritarian and humanistic character of Buddhism as a religious system. The view it presents about the nature of the cosmos and the processes of cosmic evolution may not have been intended to be based on historical facts. It represents an account of origins in keeping with the fundamental doctrinal tenets of Buddhism. It reaffirms the Buddhist positions that the question of absolute origins of things is unanswerable, that explanations in terms of creation by a supreme being are unsatisfactory, that change is a universal feature of all existence and that reference to material factors alone is incomplete as an explanation of changes in the sphere of sentient existence as well as its material and social environment. The role of the will and desire of beings in the processes of evolution is emphasized. A humanistic account of the nature of political authority as well as social institutions is presented with a view to affirming the overriding nature and the primacy of moral values in all human activities and relationships.

P. D. Premasiri

BONUS: Nirvāṇa (written by W. L. Hare, extract written by Ven. Czech Sarana)

Nirvāṇa cannot be confined within the limits of our intellect. The precise truth may not yet have been stated.

Nirvāṇa is derived from Sanskrit roots, which mean „outblown“ or „extinguished“ in relation to a flame. This particular fire symbology was adopted by the Buddha to refer to a spiritual state.

At the time of the Blessed One's enlightenment India was held fast by four ancient ideas. Each of these doctrines was modified by the Buddha.

Ancient ideas:
1. The belief in the ātman, the soul
2. The belief in Samsāra, „together wandering,“ i.e.,
3. The belief in Karma, or a doctrine as to the
the transmigration of the soul.
significance of deeds.
4. The belief in *Moksha*, the liberation of the soul by its rebirth according to deeds.

3. *Karma* was very much strengthened, and in certain ways adapted to the denial of the existence of the soul.

Buddha's modification:
1. The existence of the soul was ignored or denied.
2. Transmigration was replaced by the doctrine of

   According to the sermon preached by the Buddha in Gayā - „Fire Sermon“ (*Agni sutta*) the whole of sentient existence is explained as „a burning.“ Everything burns, everything is a flame-like in-force, a form of energy, claimant, affirmative, in a state of perpetual change and combustion, a fire kept alight by fuel being continually added to it. Life and death are fire, out of fire comes misery and suffering. *Nirvāṇa* is the dying down of the flames, the assuagement of the misery.

   According to Introduction to *Jāṭākas I. 58* there are five fires and they lead us to believe, that there are many others. But later on the fires were reduced to three in number:
   1. That which refers to all degrees of craving or attachment – just, infatuation and greed (*lobha*)
   2. That which refers to all degrees of antipathy – hatred, anger, vexation or repugnance (*dosa*)
   3. That which refers to all degrees of ignorance – delusion, dulness and stupidity (*moha* or *avijjā*)

   - The first and second fires relate to the emotions and the third fire relates to all ideas that are removed from the truth.

   In other passages of *Tipiṭaka* the symbol „fire“ has been replaced by others - „excited,“, „furious,“ „blinded,“, „overwhelmed,“ „enslaved“ - but their antithesis „done away“ is expressed by *Nirvāṇa* the opposite of „fire.“ Deeds of a certain kind add fuel and keep the furnace raging, the cessation of those deeds and the performance of others facilitate the extinction of the fire, or let it die out. Thus bad *karma* makes for fire, good *karma* makes for *Nirvāṇa*. Lust is thirst for sensual indulgence, Hatred is annoyance sprung because of one's actions, actions of someone else or groundlessly. Ignorance is the lack of knowledge about the four great truths. The removal of any of these mental states will be a step towards *vidya*, and the making of good *karma*.

   Inasmuch one does not cleave for sense pleasures in him Craving (*tanha*) ceases, and by the cessation of Craving Grasping (*upādāna*) ceases and by the cessation of Grasping Becoming (*bhava*) ceases and when Becoming has ceased, birth ceases, and with its cessation old age, death, sorrow and despair cease to exist. Cessation is *Nirvāṇa*. Thus *Nirvāṇa* is much more than moral *Nirvāṇa*.

   The Buddha never told us of a cause out of which *Nirvāṇa* could be said to be produced. *Nirvāṇa* is unproductive, and no cause for its origin has been declared. It is uncompounded, not made of anything. *Nirvāṇa* is not past, present or future and it is not perceptible to any of five senses.

   The Buddha was teaching in one of his sermons: »I teach annihilation, the annihilation namely, of greed, the annihilation of anger, the annihilation of delusion as well as the annihilation of the manifold evil, unwholesome conditions of the mind.«

   The Buddha described the *Nirvāṇa* thus: »Verily, Brothers, there is a condition, where there is neither the solid (*pathavī*), nor the fluid (*Āpo*), neither heat (*Tejo*) nor motion (*Vāyo*), neither this world nor any other world, neither sun nor moon. .... There is neither substance nor development nor any basis. This is the End of Suffering.« »If, Brothers, there were not this unborn, this unoriginated, that has not become, that has not been formed, escape from the world of the born, the originated, the become, the formed, would not be possible.«

   Other synonyms for *Nirvāṇa* are:
1. The land of bliss
2. The other shore
3. The untrodden country
4. The place, where having gone one does not grieve
5. The immortal peace
6. Salvation
7. The imperishable
8. Eternally perfect state
9. The perfect world

The earlier Hinayana directs most of its attention to „moral Nirvana,“ whereas Mahayana texts speak more about the „ultimate Nirvana,“ and its remoteness.

Some Buddhist schools teach about two or three kinds of Nirvana (that for Arahats, another for Pacceka Buddhas and another for Sammā Sambuddhas) but according to the Buddhas teaching, there is only one kind of Nirvana.

„We were contented with a little of Nirvana, we required nothing higher, nor even cared for it. But the Friend of the world has taught us better: „This is no blessed Rest at all, the full knowledge of the highest men, that is blessed Rest, that is supreme beatitude.“

BONUS: PUDGALAVĀDA

Like the Sarvāstivādins, the Sammātiyas also differed on many doctrinal points from the Theravādins and other sects. These have been discussed in the Kathāvāthu and mentioned in treatises on sects written by Bhavya, Vasumitra and Vinitadeva. The pudgala gives a rude shock to the other sectarian teachers, who regarded it as almost heretical and a negation of the anātma-vāda of Buddha, and was bitterly criticized by many writers like Vasubandhu and Śāntarakṣita.99 We have to make out from the criticisms what the exact position taken up by the Sammātiya-Vātīpatīyas was regarding the conception of soul and its transmigration from one existence to another. The publication of Prof. Venkataraman’s translation of the Sāmmitīya-nikāya-sāstra in Chinese has been very helpful.

The Sammātiyas Vātīpatīyas stated that Buddha admitted the existence of an impermanent soul quite different from the Upaniṣadic conception of an eternal and changeless soul, which continued unchanged through all the existences of a being unless and until it attained full emancipation and merged in the paramātman or Brahman. The Sammātiyas therefore preferred to name their changing soul as pudgala, distinguishing it from the Anattā doctrine of Buddha.

In the Kathavatthu the view of Sammātiyas is given thus:

The Pudgalavādins rely on the following words of Buddha: ❚atthi puggalo attahitāya patipanno» (there is a person who exerts for his own good); ❚ekapuggalo loke uppaṭṭhamāno uppaṭṭhati bahujanahitāya bahujanasukhāya lokānukampāya» etc. (there appears a person who is reborn for the good and happiness of many, for showing compassion to the world of beings). Basing on such words of Buddha, the Sammātiyas (henceforth abbreviated as the S.) state ‘puggala’ of the above-mentioned passages is something positive; it is neither a mirage nor a hearsay: it is neither the unconstituted reality like Nibbāna or Ākāśa nor a constituent material element (rūpa), feeling (vedanā) etc. The ‘puggala’ is not real in the highest sense (parmaṭhā). On the one hand, it is not something apart from the constituents (khandhas) of a being, and as such it is not possible to establish a relation between the puggala and the khandhas like that between the container and the contained. On the other hand, though it possesses all the characteristics of the khandhas, it is neither like them caused and conditioned (saḥetu sappaccaya), nor is it like Nibbāna uncaused and unconditioned (ahetu appaccaya). Again, it is neither constituted (samskṛta) nor unconstituted (asamskṛta). Though it is different (aḥīno) from the constituents it possesses certain characteristics of a constituted being such as happiness and unhappiness. It has certain aspects of the unconstituted inasmuch as it is not subject to birth, old age and death. It ceases only when the individual attains final emancipation (Nirvāṇa).

In the Abhidharmakośa and its commentary, the relation between pudgala and skandhas is explained by the simile of fire and fuel. Fire exists as long as its fuel lasts, so the pudgala exists as long as there are the constituents, but fire is different from fuel inasmuch as it has the power of burning an object or producing light, which the fuel by itself does not possess. Fire and fuel are co-

99 Moggaliputta Tissa is the celebrated compiler of the Kathavatthu, while Vasubandhu is the author of the Abhidharmakośa and its Bhāṣya, and its Vyākhya by Yaśomitra. Šāntarakṣita is the author of Tattva-samgraha and its commentator is Kamalaśīla.
exist, and the latter is a support for the orner, and just as one is not wholly different from the other because fuel is not wholly devoid of fiery element (tejas), in the same way stands 'pudgala' in relation to the constituents of a being. The S. quote the Bhārahārasūtra and explain that burden (bhāra) refers to the constituents (skandha) while their carrier (hāra) is the pudgala. Unloading of the burden is effected by the cessation of desires, attachment and hatred. This 'pudgala' bears a name, belongs to a family and is the enjer of happiness and unhappiness.  

In discussing the Bhārahārasūtra, Śantaraksīta and Kamalaśīla state that Buddha used the word 'pudgala' as a mere concept (prajñapti). He did not state expressly that it was non-existent as nobody enquired of its real nature. He had in mind the aggregation of five constituents and to these collectively he referred as 'pudgala'. It is not subject to origin and decay, hence it has no past, present and future. It is neither eternal (nitya) nor non-eternal (anitya). It is inexplicable and indeterminable. It is not included in the constituents but appears only when all the constituents are present.

In the Kathāvattu it is stated that the S. point out that their 'pudgala' has a material form in the world of men and gods, who have got material bodies (rūpa), and it is without any material form in the world of higher gods, who are without material bodies (arūpī). They state that the 'pudgala' corresponds to the entity called a being (sattva) and also to the vital force (jīva) of a living being, but at the same time it is neither identical with, nor different from, the body (klāya), for Buddha rejected both the views of identity, and difference of vital force (jīva) and body (sarīra) »tāṃ jīvām tāṃ sarīram aṭṭham jīvām aṭṭham sarīram.« They rely on another statement made frequently by Buddha that a monk while practising mindfulness (smṛtyupasthāna) remains always aware of what is passing within his body »so kāya kāyānupassī viharati«. In this statement Buddha uses the word 'so' meaning „he“, i.e. 'pudgala', which watches the contents and movements of his body. This 'so' is not a mere concept (prajñapti), it refers to actual 'pudgala'.

The S. now take up the problem of transmigration. They hold that 'puggala' passes from one existence to another, but the 'puggala' of two existences is neither the same nor different. The reason adduced by them is that person, who has attained the sotāpannahood in his future existences, whether in this mortal world or in heaven (rūpadhLtu). A sotāpanna man may be reborn as a sotāpanna god, i.e. sotāpannahood remains unchanged from those of a man to those of a god. The transition of sotāpannahood from one existence to another cannot take place unless the existence and continuity of 'puggala' are admitted.

In support of this contention the S. rely on the following utterances of Buddha:

(i) There are four pairs of (saintly) persons or eight (saintly) persons »santi cattāro purisayugā aṭṭha purisapuggalā«. This statement refers to Buddha's Sangha, which consists of disciples who have attained the preparatory stage and fruits (magga, phala) of sanctification.

(ii) A sotāpanna has to be reborn seven times at the most to attain full emancipation »so sattakkhattuparamo sandhāvitvāna puggalo dukkhasamantakaro hoti«. The S. lay stress on the words sandhāvitvāna puggala, i.e., the transmigration of soul (puggala).

(iii) The cycle of existence (samsāra) of a being is without a beginning, which is not apparent to beings immersed in desires »anamataggo ayam sansāro pubbhā koṭi na paññāyati sattānaṃ taṇhā-saṃyojanām.« The S. pick up the words 'sansāro' and 'satta' and deduce therefrom that Buddha admitted the transmigration of soul of beings.

(iv) Lastly, Buddha very often spoke of the acquisition of higher powers of knowledge (abhijñā), one of which was the power of remembering one's previous existences (pubbe-nivāsaṇāna). He himself referred to his previous existences and often said, „When I was Sunetra, etc.“ This also established their contention that there must be a soul (puggala), continuing through several existences and Buddha is able to remember his past births. Memory of past existences is not possible for the constituents (skandhas), which change every moment, not to speak of the drastic change that the beings undergo when passing from death to rebirth. The S. add that admission of memory (smṛti) also implies the existence of 'puggala'.

The S. state that their 'puggala' is the percipient but it is different from mind (citta, Vijñāna), one of the constituents of a being. It is also not momentary (khaṇika) like mind but is perceivable in every momentary thought. It is the 'seer' whether the eyes are

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In the Tattvasaṅgraha (p. 130, I. 349) Kamalaśīla quotes: »Bhārahārah katamah pudgalal? Yo'svāsūṃmaṇevaṃ nāma, evam jāti, evam gotra, evamāhāra, evam sukhadukkhāma pratisamvedi, evam ārghaduyi ityādinā pudgalo vyākyātat.«
functioning or not, because Buddha said, «I see by my divine eyes beings appearing and disappearing.» Here ‘I’ is ‘puggala’ of the S.

Then S. take up the problem of capacity for effective action (arthakriyākritva) of the soul. In conformity with Buddha’s teaching that the world is not a creation of God (Īśvaranirmāṇa) they do not want to attribute to ‘puggala’ any function of a doer or a creator. They, however, point out that the ‘puggala’ of a parent or a teacher is in a sense the doer or creator (kārtā, kāṛētā) of a being. The ‘puggala’ has no independent function like that of mental properties. It is not an enjoyer of fruits. ‘Puggala’ and ‘fruits’ are not two distinct entities, though ‘puggala’ is said to be feeling happy or unhappy, because the conglomeration of diverse elements, which make a being, cannot have the feeling of happiness or unhappiness. There may be a doer (kāraka) or feeler (vedaka), but it is not to be distinguished from deed or feeling. The doer and the deed are neither identical nor different. The S. mention this stance of theirs in refutation of the opponent’s argument that a semi-permanent soul like the eternal soul cannot have any activity. It is only the impermanent, momentary (anitya, kṣanika) soul that can have any activity (arthakriyākritva).

Śāntarakṣita in his Tattvasantagraha (pp. 336-349) writes that the ‘puggala’ of the Vātsiputrīyas is neither identical with, nor different from, the constituents (skandhas). In his comments, Kamalaśīla states that the ‘puggala’ of the Vātsiputrīyas is the doer of deeds and enjoyer of their fruits. During transmigration it leaves one group of constituents to take up another. It is not separate from the constituents, for, in that case, it would be eternal. Again, it cannot be the same as the constituents, for in that case, it would be not one but many. It is therefore for in that case, it would be not one but many. It is therefore inexplicable. The exposition of Kamalaśīla is supported by Prajinākaramati in his commentary on the Bodhicaryavatāra.

In this connection Kamalaśīla has discussed also the criticism of Uddyotakara in his Nyāyavārttika (III. 1. 1) that a soul must be postulated if it is not identified with one of the constituents. Candrakīrti, however, does not dismiss the pudgalavāda of the Saṃmītiyās as wholly untenable. He even admits that Buddha as an expoundt taught the pudgalavāda as he later propounded the idealistic doctrine of Viññānavāda.

The Sammitīyānīkāyaśāstra (Venatarama’s translation) mentions and discusses all possible views thus (p. 21):

(i) There is no real self.
(ii) The self is indeterminate (avyākṛta).
(iii) Five constituents and the self are identical.
(iv) Five constituents and the self are different.
(v) Self is eternal (sāsvata).
(vi) Self is not eternal (aśāsvata) and impermanent (anitya).
(vii) Self is actually existent though not eternal.

Of these views the last is held by the S. In this text, the non-Sammitīya views have been briefly stated without any comment or criticism while its own view has been fully dealt with thus:

(i) The ‘puggala’ is the product of five constituents, and it is neither eternal nor wholly impermanent.
(ii) Buddha’s denial of self was enunciated to counteract the wrong views that the self was based on mental impressions (samkhārās) or that it was identical with the body or five constituents.

He admonished his disciples to remove the notion of ‘I-ness’ and ‘Mine-ness,” which was based on the notion of a false self, to which worldly beings bore a strong attachment, but he did not refer to that self (puggala) which, strictly speaking, could not be the object of passionate seeking.

Then, again, in Buddha’s sayings, the term ‘non-existence’ was used in a different context, e.g., he said that some were absolutely non-existent like sky-flower and horns of a hare, and again some were really non-existent but existent relatively like long and short, seed and sprout. So Buddha’s denial of soul does not necessarily refer to the absolute non-existence of ‘puggala’. It is sometimes referred to as inexplicable because of the fact that it can neither be identified with, nor differentiated from, the constituents, which only are apparent to the unenlightened. Again, if ‘puggala’ is regarded as permanent or impermanent, constituted or unconstituted, it would be adhering to one of the two extreme views of existence and non-existence, both of which were discarded by Buddha. Hence, ‘puggala’ as relatively existent was admitted by Buddha.

The S. contend that if self be wholly non-existent there would be neither killing of beings nor a killer, neither the attainment of fruits of sanctification nor a saint, consequently, neither a Buddha nor his teachings.

In this treatise the Bhārahāra-sutta has been mentioned and discussed and emphasis has been laid on the word ‘puggala’ used in it. On the basis of the Sūtra, the S. contend that a distinction has been made by Buddha between burden (bhāra) and its carrier (hāra), the ‘puggala’ carrying the burden. This sūtra clearly establishes that the carrier of ‘puggala’ is not identical with the burden of the constituents (skandhas). Again, the carrier and the burden are inseparable; they are interdependent and hence ‘puggala’ is not distinguished or separated from the skandhas.

It has been further pointed out that the acquisition or removal of impurities like attachment (rāga) or thirst (tṛṣṇā) is effected not by the ‘puggala’ alone to the exclusion of the constituents. But at the same time it should be admitted that the ‘puggala’ and the ‘skandhas’ are identical or different, for Buddha denied the identity and difference of the vital force (jīva) and body (sarīra).

The treatise now takes up for discussion the conception of ‘puggala’ from three standpoints:

(i) The Self is designated by its support (āśraya-prajñapta-pudgala), i.e., the self is sometimes given an appellation or description on the basis of its āśraya or ālambana, as fire is named and described by its fuel, e.g., forest-fire, coal-fire. In a living

61 Mādhyanikāvṛtti, p. 276, see also pp. 148, 192.
being, the impressions (samskāras) are fuel and the 'puggala' is the fire, which derives its attributes and appellation in accordance with the impressions. A being is called a man, nāga or a god in accordance with the type of body possessed by him. The self is the receiver of the material form (rūpa) but the 'self' and 'rūpa', being interdependent and inseparable, exist together and at the same time. It is not clear why Candrakīrti stated in the Mādhyanimikārti (p. 192) that the Sammītīyas held that the receiver of the constituents appeared prior to the constituents to receive them.

(ii) The Self in transmigration (sankramana-prājñāptapudgala) implies that the self passes from one existence to another. The 'pudgala', whose mind (citā or Viśālā) carries with it the effects of his moral observances (śīla) and meditational practices (samādhi), is reborn in a higher sphere. On his death his five constituents after disintegration accompany the self to a sphere of excellence. His meritorious deeds and spiritual acquisition are his treasures, which follow him in his next existence. Thus his self does not go alone. If the self be different from the constituents, it would have nothing to stand by in his future existences. Likewise, if the self be real and eternal or unreal and evanescent, the self can take nothing with it when it passes from one existence to another.

The transmigration of self is expressed in many statements of Buddha, e.g., he said, «In this world one performs good deeds and as a result enjoys happiness in the next world,« «one who controls his sense-organs gains a happy sati in his next life,« «a dying person arises again», etc. Buddha himself often spoke of his past existences, in which he perfected himself in many pāramitās. He foretold Ajita that in future he (Ajita) would become the Maitreya Buddha. He referred also occasionally to miserly persons possessing wealth, but when death approaches them, they have to part with everything and go alone all by themselves. It is clear from such statements of Buddha that he had in mind a 'pudgala' which transmigrated from one existence to another, accompanied by the resultant impressions (samskāras) of the past life, i.e., karmic effects.

(iii) The self in extinction (nirodha-prājñāptapudgala), i.e., when it ceases and has no more rebirth. This happens in the case of an Arhat the perfect, who has removed all his impurities (kṣīnāsrava) and has attained Nirvāṇa, and therefore, cannot have any more rebirth.

In the same treatise has been discussed another statement of Buddha, in which he said that the cycle of existences has no beginning «anamataggo yam samsāra» and deduced therefrom that it had a beginning, which was unknowable to the unenlightened, and so also, Buddha's declaration of the non-existence of ātman implied that the self (pudgala) was unknowable to the imperfect. It has been argued by the S. exponents that the reality or unreality of an object should not be questioned because of the fat that it is unknowable by men of average intelligence. It indicates only lack of knowledge on the part of the imperfect and not existence or non-existence of the real, or even of an unreal object. It is true that the Ārūpa sphere is unknowable by beings of the Rūpa sphere, and so it is not proper to infer from that unknowability that Ārūpaloka does not exist. Similarly, self (pudgala) is unknowable by the unwise, but that does not establish that 'pudgala' is non-existent. Then, again, a minute speck of dust, tip of a hair, mines within the earth, shores of ocean, a handful of salt dissolved in water, a jewel hidden behind a wall, bodies of spirits or ghosts, even the eye-lids which are so close to the eyes are not seen by the common physical eyes, but that does not prove their nonexistences. They are seen by those who possess divine eyes (ādivyacaksu). Likewise, the beginning of the cycle of existence is unknowable by the unwise but is knowable by the fully enlightened Buddha. Buddha said that the world has no beginning, mainly with a view to seeing that his disciples did not take to the beliefs of eternalism and negativism and to seeing that they might not harbor any notion like „I was, I am and I shall be.“ If the beginning of the world had been non-existent like the sky-flower or horns of a hare, Buddha would not have cared to state that the world had no beginning, as one does not say that there is no sky-flower or horns of a hare. A spherical object has no beginning but no one says it does not exist, so also with the world of existence (samsāra). Lastly, if the cycle of existences has no beginning or end, it would be identical with Nirvāṇa, which is also without a beginning or end. From all these arguments, the author of the Sammītīya-nikāya sāstra established that Buddha did not fully explain many of his deeper ideas, and the existence of self 'pudgala' is one of them. Buddha's reticence, therefore, should not be taken as the denial of the existence of a 'pudgala' as conceived by the Sammītīyas.

Profs. Stcherbatsky and La Vallée Poussin have furnished the materials of the Abhidharmakośa in English and French translations, and at present we have also the original Sanskrit text of its Vyākhyā, edited by Prof. Wogihara. On the basis of these three texts, a gist of the arguments of this school for establishing the existence of pudgala is presented here. This will be followed up by a summary of the arguments and counter-arguments given in the Kathāvatthu, which has not so far received any attention. The Kośa opens the controversy with the question, whether the Vātsiputriyās can be regarded as Buddhists and whether they are entitled to emancipation (mokṣa)? As has been pointed out above, they were regarded by some as Buddhists while by others as non-Buddhists.

The Buddhists believe that since there is no mokṣa outside the pale of Buddhism, the non-Buddhists cannot have emancipation, and that is mainly because the non-Buddhist teachers like Kapila and Uluka believe in the existence of a permanent soul, which, according to them, is different from the constituents of a being and is not a term indicating the flux of elements (skandhasantāna). The soul, the Buddhists assert, can neither be established by direct perception (pratyākṣa) nor by inference (anumāna).

Vasubandhu (henceforth abbreviated as V.) first defines the contention of the Vātsiputriyās (henceforth abbreviated as Vā.) thus: „Is the pudgala of the Vā. real (dravya) or nominal (prajñāpti)?“ By real (dravya) existence he meant existence like that of

63 Vyākhyā (Jap. ed.), p. 697 quotes a stotra.
rūpa and such other elements, and by nominal (prajñāpatti) he meant existence like that of milk, house or army, which has no separate existence of its own apart from its constituents.

If the soul of Vā. be of the former category (dravya), it would be different from the skandhas, as vedānā is from rūpa, and is not also all the skandhas taken together. Now, in that case, it should be either sanskṛta (constituted), or asamskṛta (unconstituted). It cannot be the latter, for it would make the Vā. hold the sāśvata view, which is heretical.

If the soul of Vā. be of the latter category (prajñāpatti), its existence is dependent on the skandhas, and so it cannot have any independent existence of its own, i.e., it does not exist »pudgala iti prajñāpārī atat-pudgalah prāṇamati). The Vā. contend that their soul is real (dravya), but it is neither identical with, nor different from, the skandhas as fire is from the fuel. Fire exists as long as the fuel lasts, so also the soul (pudgala) exists as long as there are skandhas, otherwise, pudgala would be either asamskṛta (constituted), or asāśvata (= uccheda = annihilating).64 Fire is different from the fuel inasmuch as it has the power of burning an object to ashes or to produce light, which the fuel does not possess.

Vasubandhu argues that, fuel and fire appear at different times (bhinmakāla) like seed and sprout. Hence fire is impermanent, and the difference between fuel and fire is one of time and characteristic (lakṣaṇa), and again one is the cause of the other.

He then states that according to the Vā., fuel is constituted of three mahābhūtās, while fire is of the fourth (tejas) only: then it follows that fire is different from fuel.

The Vā. reply that fire and fuel are co-existent and the latter is a support of the former (upādāya: āśritya), and that one is not wholly different from the other, for fuel is not totally devoid of the fiery element; in the same way, pudgala should be distinguished from skandhas. Vasubandhu challenges the Vā. by citing the instance of a burning log of wood and saying that it represents both fuel and fire. That is why they are identical (ananya).

According to the Vā., pudgala is neither to be described as anitya, which is sub-divided into past, present and future nor nitya, eternal. It is avakṛta, indeterminable, inexplicable. It is not included in the list of the constituents of a being, but is perceived when only all the constituents are present.

The question next raised is, can the pudgala of the Vā. be cognized by any sens-organ (indriya)? If so, by which? The Vā. reply that it is perceived by all the six sens-organisms. They contend that eyes do not care to see rūpa (object) or recognize it unless the mind (mana-indriya) is there. Eyes act as the dominating factor when the visual action takes place, hence it is not correct to say that eyes alone see rūpa, or for the matter of that each of the five sense-organs cannot function in their respective spheres independent of the mind.65 For cognition of pudgala, the Vā. state that all the sense-organs point to the mind indirectly that there is a pudgala; e.g., eyes discern the rūpa (colour-figure) of a body and thereby induce the mind to cognize the presence of an individual (i.e. pudgala which is neither identical with, nor different from rūpa).66 V. argues that if rūpa be the cause of cognition of pudgala »rūpānāṃ kāranaatvam adhikriyate«, one should not say that rūpa and pudgala are different (anyam).67 Again, if cognition of rūpa leads at once to the cognition of pudgala »rūpāyaupādāya pudgalopabadhir iti«, one should also say that rūpa and pudgala are identical (ananya).68 In other words, one is only a modification of the other (rūpāntaratvāt). The Vā., however, would neither identify rūpa (color-figure) with pudgala nor look at them as different; in the same way, they would neither regard the perception of rūpa (color-figure) as identical with the perception of pudgala nor look upon them as different.

V. asserts that if pudgala be an entity, it should be either material (rūpa) or non-material (nāma), but Buddha says rūpa or vedānā or saṃjñā or saṃskāra or Vījñāna is not self – all dharmas are without self – there is no pudgala. He further states that sattva, jīva, pudgala is a prajñāpāti (designation) applied to the false notion of a self cherished by the unenlightened.

The Vā. in reply state that they were not prepared to accept the statements attributed to Buddha as authentic69 as these were not to be found in their Pitaka. They referred to statements, in which Buddha spoke of a person's past existence or recognized pubbenivāsānātha70 as one of the higher acquisitions of an adept, and asked, who is it that remembers? Is it pudgala or the skandhas? They further argue that if Buddha be regarded as omniscient, i.e., he knows everything past or present, of every place, of every being etc. it also implies a continuity of something. In other words, it implies the existence of a pudgala. The Vā. further state that unless there were some form of pudgala, why the disciples should be instructed to avoid thinking of »rūpavān aham babhāvātite dhvani«

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64 Cf. the quotation in the Kīv, p. 34: 
| Khandhesu bhījamānesu so ce bhījjati puggalo |
| Ucched bhavati diṭṭhi vā Buddhaṇa vivajjīta |
| Khandhesu bhījamānesu no ce bhījjati puggalo |
| Puggalo sassato hoti nibbānena sasamamo.« |

65 See above; Cf. Masuda, p. 23n.

66 See Kośa (Fr. transl.) ix, p. 231 fn.

67 Just as light, eyes and mind, which cause the visualisation of an object, are not different from the object. Ibid., p. 238n. See Vyākyāya, p. 701.

68 Ibid., p. 239 n. See Vyākyāya, pp. 701-2.

69 Cf. Vyākyāya: mālasaṅgītibhramāṇa.

70 Cf. Majjhima, I, p. 22 : »so evam samāhite citte parisuddhe pariyođāte anāngane... pubbenivāsānussaratī-ñānāya cittāṃ abhinnanāmeti.«
(in the past I possessed a body) and so forth.\textsuperscript{71} V. refutes this contention by saying that pudgala here refers only to skandha-santāna (continuity of skandhas), not to anything else. The Vā. then cite the Bhārahārasūtra, and assert that by bhāra is meant the constituents (skandhas) of a being and by hāra the individual (pudgala), who is known by a name, gotra etc.\textsuperscript{72} If bhāra (= skandhas) included bhāra-hāra (= pudgala), there was no need of distinguishing the two, and so pudgala exists apart from skandhas; it is neither identical with, nor different from, skandhas.

The Vā. admit the existence of aupapādikā beinga and antarābhava,\textsuperscript{73} and prove thereby the existence of pudgala. They also cite the passage "ekapuggalo bhikkhave loke uppajjamāno uppañjati bahujanahātāya" (Anguttara, i. 22) and lay stress on the word 'puggala', saying this 'puggala' is born (uppañjati) and hence there is besides the skandhas something, which may be designated as 'puggala'. V. refutes all these by appropriate quotations and arguments.

The Vā. further state that if pudgala be only a word meant to designate the five skandhas, then why Bhagavān did not identify jīva with sārīra. V. cites the discussion on the topic from the Milindapañha. The Vā. further argue that why 'pudgala' has been declared by Buddha as indeterminable (avyākṛta), if it does not exist at all. V. in reply comments on the Vatsagotrasūtra (= Pāli: Vaccha-gotta sutta) and other sūtras dealing with the indeterminable problems.

The Vā. point out that the statement ātmā does not exist in reality (satyatah sthitatāh)\textsuperscript{74} is a wrong view, it indirectly implies the admission of the existence of pudgala.

The Vā. next raise the question, if 'pudgala' does not exist, who is it that transmigrates from one existence to another? If the elements only exist, how do you explain when Buddha says, »I was at that time the master Sunetra"? In that statement why is the 'T' of the past identified with the 'I' of the present? Does it indicate that the elements of the past are the elements of the present? V. refutes it by saying that just as fire passes from one wood to another, though it never remains the same, so the elements pass from one existence to another, nothing remaining identical. If, according to the Vā., Buddha admitted the existence of 'pudgala', they would be subject to the wrong belief of satkāyadrṣṭi.

The Vā. now ask, how can memory be explained without the conception of 'pudgala'? Who is it that remembers? V. answers that it is saṃjñā that remembers – saṃjñā with attention directed to the object, an idea etc. is similar to, or connected with it, provided there is no corporal pain to impair its capacity.

The Vā. are of the opinion that there must be an agent, a doer, a proprietor of memory. There must be a cognizing agent, an action must have a doer. „Devadatta walks,” implies the existence of an individuality. V. replies that it is not so. He states that just as when a fire traverses from one forest to another, no question of individuality arises, similarly Devadatta is a praṭīnaśīla (like fire) applied to a conglomeration of elements passing from one existence to another and has no individuality.\textsuperscript{75}

Now, we shall pass on to the arguments of the Vā. and the counter-arguments of the Theravādins as presented in the Kathāvatthu (1. i), which is of a much earlier date than that of the medieval and modern dialectical works.

The first question put by the Theravādins to the Vāsūtrāyas known in the Pāli texts as Sammītīyas, is as follows: „Can the puggala be known in the same way as that which is real and ultimate, e.g., Nibbāna (or Rūpa) is known? (para 1).\textsuperscript{76} In other words, the Theravādins want to ascertain whether the Sammītīyas (henceforth abbreviated a Sam.) admit the existence of puggala either as the unchangeable, ever-existing reality like Nibbāna, or as a constituted (sappaccaya, sankhāta) object like rūpa, or regard it as false like a mirage (māyāmarīci viya), or look upon it simply as a hearsay. The Sam. deny practically all the four possibilities, though they assert that the puggala is known as a real and ultimate fact (saccikaṭṭha-paramaṭṭhena).

The Sam. now assail the Th. with the counter-question whether they would admit that puggala is not known in the same way as that which is real and ultimate. The Th. answered in the affirmative, as, according to them, puggala is not even an object like rūpa; it is a mere paṭīnāti (concept), a sammutisacca (conventional truth).

But when the same question is repeated by the Sam. (as in paras 2 and 6),\textsuperscript{77} the Th. reply in the negative by saying „na h’evam,”\textsuperscript{78} because the answer is to be given to a question, which included both sammutisacca (conventional truth) and paramatthasacca (the highest truth). The questions and answers which follow next have mixture of both sammuti and paramatthra truths, and so they appear contradictory to a superficial reader.

Now the Th. give up the logical tricks and put the question straightforward (para 11) thus: „whether puggala is a paramatthasacca" or not, i.e. whether or not puggala is known in the same way as the real and ultimate everywhere (sabbathā) in and outside rūpa (material of the body), always (sabbadā) in this and the following existences, and in everything (sabbesu),

\textsuperscript{71} Cf. Majjhima, I, p. 8: »ahosin nu kho aham attāna adhdhānaṃ ... kim huvā kim ahoṣin nu kho attam adhdhāna, etc. etc.

\textsuperscript{72} Cf. Vâkkhâya (Jap. ed.), p. 706, »bhârahat katham. pañcoppadãna skandhâ ... bhahûrahârah katham. pudgala iti syād vacanîyam yo sav ñeyaman evamnâma evajjatā evamgotra« etc.

\textsuperscript{73} Cf. Kosâ, iii, 10, 12, 18-19, quoting Sapta-sat-puruṣa-gati-sītram.

\textsuperscript{74} Cf. Majjhima, i, p. 8: »Atthi me attā ti vā'ssa saccato thetato diṭṭhi uppañjati, natti me attā ti vā'ssa saccato thetato diṭṭhi uppañjati« etc.

\textsuperscript{75} Kosâ-vaikkhâya (Jap. ed.), p. 710: yathā tu kṣaṇiko 'gnir iti, etc.

\textsuperscript{76} „Para" refers to the paragraphs marked in the P. T. S. edition of the Kathāvatthu.

\textsuperscript{77} The remaining paras 3-5 and 7-10 are mere logical rounding up of the questions and answers put in paras 1 & 2.

\textsuperscript{78} The question is, - Yo saccikaṭṭha paraṃtha tato so puggalo n’upalabbhati saccikaṭṭha paraṃṭhaṇītittī? «

\textsuperscript{79} Perhaps like the jivātman of the Vedānta school of philosophy.
i.e., in all khandhas, āyatana, dhātu, etc. The answer of the Sam. is also definitely in the negative, i.e., they do not consider 'puggala' as real in the highest sense, and as existing everywhere, always and in everything as pointed out by the Th.

The next attempt of the Th. is to find out whether the Sam. regard puggala as something existing like any of the 57 elements,80 and in support of their contention they quote from the Nikāyas (Diāgha, iii, 232; Majjhima, i. 341; Anguttara, ii, 95) the passage »atthi puggalo attahitāya patipanno«, which indicates that puggala exists but not apart from the elements. The Th. also do not clearly state that puggala (as a paññatti) is different from the elements, the reason assigned by Buddhaghosa81 is that the questions of the opponents have a mixture of sammuti and paramattha truths, and as such the Th. have no other alternative but to leave them unanswered (ṭhapāṇya).82

The next attempt of the Th. is to show that the Sam. should advocate either Ucchedavāda or Sassatavāda. With this end in view, the Th. put the questions whether puggala is identical with or different from rūpa, or puggala is in rūpa (like the container and the contained) or vice versa. The Sam. reject all the four propositions as, otherwise, they would become either an Ucchedavādin or a Sassatavādin. Though, according to the Sam., puggala is of the same nature (ekadharmam) as rūpa and other elements,83 they would not treat it as an element separate from, and independent of, the 57 elements.

The Th. now assail their opponents by questioning on lakkhana of puggala, and ask whether puggala is sappaccaya (caused) or appaccaya (uncaused) like Nibbāna. The Sam. deny both and ask how the Th. would explain the 'puggala' in the statement of Buddha: »Atthi puggalo attahitāya patipanno ti.« Is the 'puggala' referred to in this passage sappaccaya, samkhata or appaccaya, asaṁkhata? The Th. deny both, as in their opinion the term puggala is only a sammatisacca, and as such it is non-existent.

The next argument put forward by the Th. is, whether the statement „puggala perceives“ is the same as the statement „that which perceives is puggala“84 i.e. whether the two statements are identical as citta is with mano or different as rūpa is from vedanā. Buddhaghosa interprets the position of the opponents thus: the Sam. hold that puggala perceives, but not everything that perceives is puggala; e.g., rūpa, vedanā, etc. are not puggala, but puggala perceives and that which perceives refers only to the percipient (puggala), and not to rūpādi.85 The opponents, however, rely on the statement »atthi puggalo attahitāya patipanno ti« which again is countered by the Th. by saying that the Sam. should equally rely on the statement »suññato lokam avakkhasu«, etc. and admit that there is no puggala.

The Th. now proceed to examine the paññatti (description) of puggala. In answer to the question, whether the puggala of the Rūpadhātu is rūpī and likewise of the Kāmadhātu is kāmi and of the Ariyadhātu, arūpī, the Sam. affirm the first and the third but not the second. The Sam. argue that puggala = satta = jīva and kāya = sarīra. Though they do not admit either the identity of, or difference between, jīva and sarīra, they hold, though not logically tenable, that kāya must be different from puggala as there are such statements as »so kāye kāyānupassī viharati« and so forth, in which so cannot but refer to puggala.

The next discussion relating to upādā-paññatti (rebirth) of puggala raises the question of transmigration. The Sam. affirm that puggala passes from this existence to next but it is neither the self-same puggala nor a different puggala – a statement similar to what the Th. would say about the passing of the khandhas – avoiding the two heretical opinions of sassatavāda and ucchedavāda as also the ekaccasassatikavāda and amarāvikkhepiṇḍikadīṭhi.86 In support of their contention the Sam. quote the passages in which a 'puggala' is said to pass from one existence to another (sandhāvati samarāti).

According to the opinion of the opponents that the self-same, of a different, puggala does not pass from one existence to another, the Th. point out that they admit that some form of puggala referred to in the above-mentioned passages, does pass from one existence to another. This puggala can then have no death, it once becomes a man and then a god and so forth, which is absurd.87 In reply, the Sam. point out that a sotāpanna manussa is known to take rebirth as a sotāpanna-deva and question how can this sotāpannohood pass from one existence to another unless there exists some form of puggala to carry the qualities. In order to show the unsoundness of the statements, the Th. ask whether the passing puggala remains identical in every respect88 and does not lose any of its qualities.89 The opponents first negative it on the ground that a man does not continue to be a man in the devaloka; but on second thought they affirm it in view of the fact that the carrier of certain qualities from one existence to another is a puggala, an

80 »Samayasuttavirodham disvā pañikkhepo paravādiissa«, Aṭṭhakathā, p. 16
81 See his Aṭṭhakathā, p. 16.
82 Kvu., pp. 14-17, paras 130-137 dilate on the above question, comparing 'puggala' with each of the 57 elements.
83 Aṭṭhakathā, p. 18.
84 »Puggalo upalabbbhathi (yo yo) upalabbbhathi (so so) puggalo ti ? Kvu, p. 24
86 See my Early Monastic Buddhism (1941), I, pp. 63 ff.
87 See my Early Monastic Buddhism (1941), I, p. 63 f.
88 Anañño= sabbākārena ekasādiso.
89 Avigato=ekena pi ākāreno avigato.
antarābhava-puggala. The Sam. take care to keep clear of the two extreme views; "tām jīvam tam sarīram" and "aṁñāṁ jīvam aṁñāṁ sarīram". They affirm that the transformed khandhas and puggala, and not the identical khandhas and puggala, pass from one existence to another. The khandhas are, however, impermanent and constituted, while the puggala is not so, but it is not permanent and unconstituted either. Without khandha, āyatana, dhātu, indriya and citta, puggala cannot remain alone but for that reason, the color and other qualities of the khandha āyatana, etc. do not affect the puggala. Again the puggala is not a shadow (chāyā) of the khandhas.

In reply to the question, whether the puggala is perceivable in every momentary thought, the Sam. answer in the affirmative, but they would not accept the inference drawn by the Th. that the puggala in that case would have momentary existence (kaniṁkha-bhāvam), i.e., would disappear and re-appear every moment like cetasikas (thoughts).

The Sam. now ask the Th. whether they would admit that one (yo) who sees something (yam) by means of an organ of sense (yena) is the puggala or not. The Th., after assenting to it as a conventional truth (sammuti-sacca), put the same question in the negative form thus: One (yo), who does not see anything (yam) by means of an organ of sense (yena), is not a puggala. The Sam., however without arguing further, quote a few passages, in which Buddha said: I (i.e. the puggala, according to the Sam.) see by means of my divine eyes (dibbena cakkhuṇā) beings appearing and disappearing. and so forth, and infer therefrom that the seer is puggala.

Their next discussions related to purusakāra. The Th. do not admit the existence of any doer, so they asked the Sam. whether the latter would subscribe to the same opinion. On their denial the Th. ask whether the Sam. would admit the existence of the doer, and a creator of the doer, which is negatived by the Sam. on account of the heretical doctrine of issaranimmāna (God the creator of the world) but which on second thought is affirmed by them in view of the fact that the parents, teachers etc. are also in a sense the makers (kattā, kāretā) of a person. The Th. without going into the implied sense of the replies, say that such a state of things (i.e., a doer having a doer and a deed which implies not just a deed but also a doer) would lead to the conclusion that so long as there is deed (kammo), there is its conclusion that so long as there is deed (kammo), there is its deed (kāraka puggalo), and hence there can be no end to puggala-paramparā and that would falsify the fact that by the stoppage of the wheel of actions, dukkha can be brought to an end. Then again Nibbāna, Mahāpathavī, etc. must also have a doer. All the inferences drawn by the Th. are rejected by the Sam. In conclusion, the Sam. deny that the deed and the doer can be distinct, just to avoid admitting that the puggala has mental properties.

While in the above discussion, the doer of a deed is enquired into in the following discussion it is the identity of the doer of a deed with the enjoyer of its fruit that is enquired into.

The Th. deny the existence of a feeler or enjoyer apart form vipāka-pavatti (that which is realized, that fructification of an effect). The Sam. hold that patisamveditabba is vipāka (result) but the puggala is not vipāka. They further state that Nibbāna or Mahāpathavī etc. is not vipāka like divine happiness (dibbasukha) or human happiness (manussasukha) so none of them is an object of enjoyment of the puggala but again the Sam. do not admit that sukha is distinct from the sukha-enjoyer. The Th. logically wanted to make their opponents admit that there must not only be an enjoyer of a fruit but also an enjoyer of the enjoyer of the fruit and so on like an endless chain; in other words, according to them, as shown above, dukkha can have no end.

The Th. now put the crucial question thus: whether the doer of a deed is identical with, or different from, the enjoyer of its fruit. The opponents first deny both to avoid contradiction in Buddha's saying: sayam katam param katam sukhadukkham etc. but on second thought, in view of their theory that there is a common element keeping the link between the present and the future life, they admit it. In short, the Sam. affirm that there is a kāraka (doer) and vedaka (feeler or enjoyer) of a deed, but the two are neither identical nor different, neither both identical and different, nor not both identical and different.

The Sam. next apply the test of abhiññā (supernormal powers), ṇāṭī (relatives) and phala (attainments) and put the arguments thus:

(i) How can a person perform certain miracles keeping his organs of sense, etc. inert and inactive, unless there is something else a puggala.

(ii) How can one recognize the existence of parents, castes, etc. without positing that there is a puggala, and

(iii) How can a phalastha continue to be the same in more than one life, unless the existence of a puggala is admitted.

The Th. avoid the issues by submitting the counter-argument to the effect that one who cannot perform miracles is not a pudgala. In this way they refute the other two arguments.

The next question of the Th. is whether the puggala is constituted (samkhato) or unconstituted or neither constituted nor unconstituted (n'eva samkhhat nāsamkhato). The Th. affirm the last alternative but would not treat the puggala as something apart (aniṁho) from the samkhhat khandhas. They state that the puggala has certain aspects of samkhata, e.g. it is subject to sukha, dukkha, and so forth; again it has certain aspects of asamkhata, e.g., it is not subject to birth, old age and death (jāti, jāra and maraṇa).

In reply to the Th.'s question whether a parinibbuto puggalo exists in Nibbāna or not, the Sam. negative both, as the affirmation of either would make them either a Sassaṭavādin or an Ucchedavādin.

90 The self which exists between death and rebirth. See above pp. 114, 125.
91 E.g., a blind man, an asaṁhiṁsatta
92 But it may happen that puggala, who is in the enjoyment of his fruits (i.e. merits), may be again an object of enjoyment of another puggala, e.g. a son enjoying the fruits of his actions may be the object of affection of his mother, and so forth. This explanation of Buddhaghosa should be compared with the above like the kāretā or kattā.
Now the Sam. put the counter-question: Does not a person say that he is feeling happy or unhappy and so forth? How can a person say so unless he is a pudgala and not a mere conglomeration of separate khandhas? In refuting this contention, the Th. put the same question in a negative form thus: Well, if a person does not feel happiness or unhappiness, then there is no pudgala. The Th. further ask whether Sam. would treat sukha and pudgala as something separate and distinct. The Sam. evade a direct answer and ask: Well, when a pudgala (koci or so) is said to be kāye kāyānupass viharati, does it not affirm the existence of a pudgala?

The controversy is then closed by citation of passages from the Nikāyas, the Th. quoting only those which clearly express anattā of all things, while the Sam. quote those passages in which the word pudgala or attahito or so appear.

Through these controversies, it is apparent that the Sam. are seeking to establish that the five khandhas which are distinct from one another cannot give rise to the consciousness of I-ness, a unity. The facts that a person acts or thinks as one and not as five separate objects, that in many passages Buddha does actually use the words so, attā and pudgala, that a person's attainments like sotāpannahood continue to be the same in different existences, and that one speaks of his past existences, and so forth, do lead to the conclusion that, besides the five khandhas, there exists some mental property which forms the basis of I-ness, and maintains the continuity of karma from one existence to another. That mental property, however, is changing khandhas but in view of the fact that one can think of his past, even of the events of his past existences, the changing khandhas alone cannot be made responsible for the memory. The Sam. therefore affirm the existence of a sixth (mental) property and call it pudgala, which can remain only along with khandhas and so must disappear when the khandhas disappear in Nibbāna. As this mental property or pudgala is not kṣani (constituted, momentary object) and again, as it is not also unchanging and ever existing like Nibbāna, so it is not asamkhata. Therefore the pudgala must be admitted to be neither saṃkhata nor asamkhata.

Referring to the pudgala-vāda of the Sam., Śantaraksīta in his Tattvasaṅgraha, ch. vii (f) remarks jokingly that the Saugatas (i.e. the Buddhists) as the upholders of the anattā doctrine should bother their head with identity and difference of the deed of a deed and the enjoyer of its fruit. Śantaraksīta, of course, dismisses both anattāvāda and pudgala-vāda from the standpoint of the Vedānta school of philosophy, according to which the eternality of ātman is maintained.

Vasumitra summarizes the doctrines of the Sammitīyas or the Vātsiputrayas thus:

1. The pudgala is neither the same as the skandhas nor different from the skandhas. The name pudgala is provisionally given to an aggregate or skandhas, āyatanas and dhātus.
2. Dharmas cannot transmigrate from one existence to another apart from the pudgala. These can be said to transmigrate along with the pudgala.

**BONUS: The Bodhisatta ideal in Theravāda and Mahāyāna (Book: Zen and the Taming of the Bull pp. 71-77)**

There is a widespread belief, particularly in the West, that the ideal of Theravāda, which is conveniently identified with Hinayāna, is to become an Arhat, while that of Mahāyāna is to become a Bodhisattva and finally to attain the state of a Buddha. It must be categorically stated that this is incorrect. This idea was spread by some early Orientalists at a time when Buddhist studies were beginning in the Wst, and others who followed them accepted it without troubling to go into the problem by examining the texts and living traditions in Buddhist countries. The fact is that both Theravāda and Mahāyāna unanimously accept the Bodhisattva ideal as the highest.

The terms Hinayāna (Small Vehicle) and Mahāyāna (Great Vehicle) are not known to the Theravāda Pāli literature. They are not found in the Pāli canon (Tipiṭaka) or in the Commentaries on the Tipiṭaka, not even in the Pāli Chronicles of Ceylon, the Dipavamsa and the Mahāvamsa. The Dipavamsa (about the fourth century AC) and some Pāli Commentaries mention Vītaṇḍavādins, evidently a sect of dissenting Buddhists holding some unorthodox views regarding some points in the teaching of the Buddha. The Vītaṇḍavādin and the Theravādin both quote the same authorities and name the sūtras of the Tripiṭaka in order to support their positions, the difference being only in the mode of their interpretations. The Mahāvamsa (fifth century AC) and a Commentary on the Abhidhamma refer to Vettūla- or Vettulya-vādins (Sanskrit: Vaitulyavādins) instead of Vītaṇḍavādins. From the evidence of the texts, it may not be wrong to consider that these two terms – Vītanda and Vettula – represented the same school or sect.

We learn from the Abhidharma-samuccaya, an authoritative Mahāyāna philosophical text (fourth century AC), that the terms Vaitulya and Vaiśpyāsa are synonyms, and that Vaiśpyāsa is the Bodhisattvāpiṭaka. Now, the Bodhisattvāpiṭaka is definitely Mahāyāna. Hence Vaitulya undoubtedly denotes Mahāyāna.

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93 Cf. Obermiller's Analysis of the Abhisamayālaṃkāra, III, p. 380, referring to Tarkajvālā and Schayer, Kamalaśīlā's Kritik des Pudgalavāda. Obermiller writes 'the Vātsiputryāsa, Bhadravānyas, Sāṃpiṇiyas. Dharmaśāntas and Samkṛantivādins are those that admit the reality of the 'individual.' They say that the 'individual' is something inexpressible, being neither identical with the five groups of elements nor different from them. It is to be cognised by the six forms of Vījītaṇas, and is subject to saṃsāra (phenomenal existence).
94 I have omitted footnotes.
So, we can be certain that the terms *Vītattā* and *Vetulya* used in the Pāli Chronicles and Commentaries refer to *Mahāyāna*. But the terms *Hinayāna* and *Mahāyāna* were not known or ignored or unrecognized by them.

It is universally accepted by scholars that the terms *Hinayāna* and *Mahāyāna* are later inventions. Historically speaking, *Theravāda* already existed long before these terms came into being. This same *Theravāda* considered to be the original teaching of the *Buddha*, was introduced to Ceylon and established there in the third century BC, during the time of Emperor *Asoka* of India. At that time there was nothing called *Mahāyāna*, which appeared much later, about the beginning of the Christian Era. Without *Mahāyāna* there could be no *Hinayāna*. Buddhism, that went to Ceylon, with its *Tipiṭaka* and Commentaries, in the third century BC, remained there intact as *Theravāda* and did not enter the scene of the *Hinayāna-Mahāyāna* dispute that developed later in India. It seems therefore illegitimate to include *Theravāda* in either of these two categories. However, after the inauguration of the World Fellowship of Buddhists in Ceylon in 1950, well-informed people, both in the East and in the West, use the term *Theravāda* and not the term *Hinayāna* with reference to the Buddhism prevalent in South-east Asian countries like Ceylon, Burma, Thailand and Cambodia. (There are still some outmoded people who use the term *Hinayāna*.)

*Mahāyāna* deals mainly with the *Bodhisattvayāna* or the Vehicle of the *Bodhisattva*. But it does not ignore the other two, *Śrāvakayāna* and *Pratyekabuddha-yāna*. For example, *Asaṅga*, the founder of the Yoshācāra system, in his *magnum opus*, the *Yoshācārabhumiśāstra*, devotes two sections to *Śrāvaka-bhumi* and *Pratyekabuddha-bhumi* just as he devotes one section to *Bodhisattvabhumi*, which shows that all three *yānas* are given due consideration in *Mahāyāna*. But the state of a *Śrāvaka* or a *Pratyekabuddha* is inferior to that of a *Bodhisattva*. This is quite in keeping with the *Theravāda* tradition which, too, holds that one may become a *Bodhisattva* and attain the state of a Fully Enlightened Buddha; but if one cannot, one may attain the state of a *Pratyekabuddha* or of a *Śrāvaka* according to one's capacity. These three states may be considered as three attainments on the same Path. In fact, the *Sandhinirvocanasūtra* (a *Mahāyāna sūtra*) clearly says that *Śrāvakayāna* and *Mahāyāna* constitute one *yāna* (*ekayaṇa*) and that they are not two different and distinct 'vehicles'.

What are these three terms *Śrāvaka*, *Pratyekabuddha* and *Bodhisattva*? Very briefly:

A *Śrāvaka* is a disciple of a *Buddha*. A disciple may be a monk or a nun, a layman or a laywoman. But for his liberation, a *Śrāvaka* follows and practises the teaching of the *Buddha* and finally attains *Nirvāṇa*. He also serves others, but his capacity to do so is limited.

A *Pratyekabuddha* (individual *Buddha*) is a person who realizes *Nirvāṇa* alone by himself at a time when there is no *Samyaksambuddha*, a Fully Enlightened Buddha, in the world. He, too, renders service to others, but in a limited way. He is not capable of revealing the Truth to others as an *Samyaksambuddha* does.

A *Bodhisattva* is a person (monk or layman) who is in a position to attain *Nirvāṇa* as a *Śrāvaka* or as a *Pratyekabuddha*, but out of great compassion (*mahā karuṇā*) for the world, he renounces it and goes on suffering in *saṃsāra* for the sake of others; perfects himself during an incalculable period of time and finally realizes *Nirvāṇa* and becomes an *Arhant*, *Samyaksambuddha*, a Fully Enlightened Buddha. He discovers the Truth and declares it to the world. His capacity for service to others is unlimitted.

The definition of the three *yānikas* (followers of the three *yānas*) given by *Asaṅga* is instructive and clarifies some points. According to him, a *Śrāvakayānika* (one who takes the vehicle of disciples) is a person who, living according to the law of the disciples, having by nature feeble faculties (qualities), bent on his own liberation through the cultivation of detachment, depending on the Canon of the Disciples (*Śrāvaka-piṭaka*), practising major and minor qualities, gradually puts an end to suffering. A *Pratyekabuddha-yānika* (one who takes the vehicle of the Individual *Buddhas*) is a person who living according to the law of the Individual *Buddhas*, by nature having moderate faculties, bent on his liberation through the cultivation of detachment, having the intention of attaining Enlightenment exclusively, through his own mental development, depending on the *Śrāvaka-piṭaka*, practising major and minor qualities, born at a time when there is no *Buddha* in the world, gradually puts an end to suffering. A *Mahāyānika* (one who takes the Great Vehicle) is a person who, living according to the law of the *Bodhisattvas*, by nature having sharp faculties, bent on the liberation of all beings, depending on the *Cana* of the *Bodhisattvas*, matures other beings, cultivates the pure Buddha-domain, receives predictions or declarations (*vyākaraṇa*) from *Buddhas* and finally realizes the perfect and complete Enlightenment (*samyaksambodhi*).

From this it can be seen that anyone who aspires to become a *Buddha* is a *Bodhisattva*, a *mahāyānist*, though he may live in a country or in a community popularly and traditionally regarded as *Theravāda* or *Hinayāna*. Similarly, a person who aspires to attain *Nirvāṇa* as a disciple is a *Śrāvakayānika* or *Hinayānist* though he may belong to a country or a community considered as *Mahāyāna*. Thus it is foolish to believe that there are no *Bodhisattvas* in *Theravāda* countries or that all are *Bodhisattvas* in *Mahāyāna* countries. It is not conceivable that *Śrāvakas* and *Bodhisattvaas* are limited to particular geographical areas.

Further, *Asaṅga* says that when a *Bodhisattva* finally attains Enlightenment (*bodhi*) he becomes an *Arhant*, a *Tathāgata* (i.e. *Buddha*), here it must be clearly understood that not only a *Śrāvaka* (disciple) but also a *Bodhisattva* becomes an *Arhant* when he finally attains *Buddhahood*. The *Theravāda* position is exactly the same: the *Buddha* in an *Arhant* – *arham sammāsambuddho* 'Arhant, Fully and Perfectly Enlightened Buddha'.
The mahāyāna says unequivocally that a Buddha, a Pratyekabuddha and a Śrāvaka (disciple), all three are equal and alike with regard to their Enlightenment (bodhi), with regard to their purification or liberation from defilements or impurities (klesāvaranavāsuddhi). This is also called vimuktiśāya (liberation-body), and in it there is no difference between the three. That means there are not three different Nickvānas or Vimuktiis for these three persons. Nirvāna or Vimukti is the same for all. But only a Buddha (not the Śrāvakas and Pratyeka-buddhas) achieves complete liberation from all the obstructions to knowledge (jñeya-varanavāsuddhi). This is also called dharmakāya (Dharma-body). It is in this and many other innumerable qualities, capacities and abilities that the Buddha becomes incomparable and superior to Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas.

This Mahāyāna view is on all fours with the Theravāda Pāli Tipiṭaka. In the Samyutta-nikāya the Buddha says that the Tathāgata (i.e. Buddha) and a bhikkhu (i.e. Śrāvaka, disciple) liberated through wisdom are equal with regard to their vimutti (liberation); but the Tathāgata is different and distinguished from the liberated bhikkhu in that he (Tathāgata) discovers and shows the Path (maggā) that was not known before.

These three states of the Śrāvaka, the Pratyekabuddha and the Buddha are mentioned in the Nidhikāda-sutta of the Khuddaka-pāṭha, the first book of the Khuddaka-nikāya, one of the five Collections of the Theravāda Tipiṭaka. It says that by practising virtues such as charity, morality, self-restraint, etc., one may attain, among other things, 'the perfection of the disciple' (sāvakapārami), 'Enlightenment of the Pratyekabuddha' (paccekabodhi) and 'the Buddha-domain' (buddha-bhāmi). They are not called yānas (vehicles).

In the Theravāda tradition these are known as Bodhis, but not Yānas. The Upāsakajānavāṇkāra, a Pāli treatise dealing with the ethics for the ly Buddhist, written in the twelfth century by a Thera called Ānanda in the Theravāda tradition of the Mahāvihāra at Anurādhapura, says at the end of the book in the colophon that he aspires to become a Sāvaka-Buddha (Skt. Śrāvaka-Buddha). At that time there was a Buddha called Dīpankara whom he met and at whose feet he had the capacity to realize Nirvāna as a disciple (Śrāvaka). But Ānanda renounced it and resolved, out of great compassion for the world, to become a Buddha like Dīpankara to save others. Then Dīpankara Buddha predicted that this great ascetic would one day become a Buddha and offered eight handfuls of flowers to Ānanda and made pradaksinā. Likewise, Dīpankara Buddha's disciples, who were with him and who were themselves Arhants offered flowers to the Bodhisattva and made pradaksinā. This story of Ānanda distinctly shows the position a Bodhisattva occupies in the Theravāda.

Although Theravāda holds that anybody can be a Bodhisattva, it does not stipulate or insist that all must be Bodhisattvas – which is considered not practical. The decision is left to the individual whether to take the Path of the Theravāda or of the Pratyekabuddha or of the Śrāvaka. But it is always clearly explained that the state of a Śrāvakasambuddha is superior and that the other two are inferior. Yet they are not disregarded.

In the twelfth century AC in Burma (a strictly Theravāda country) King Alaungsithu of Pagan, after buiilding the Shwegugyi Temple, set up an inscription in Pāli verse to record this act of piety in which he publicly declared his resolution to become a Buddha and not a Śrāvaka.

In Śrī Lanka, in the tenth century, King mahinda IV (956-972 AC) in an inscription proclaimed that 'none but the Bodhisattvas would become kings of Śrī Lanka (Ceylon). Thus it was believed that kings of Śrī Lanka were Bodhisattva. Earlier, according to two rock inscriptions at Vessagiriya in Śrī Lanka about the fifth or sixth century A.C., two ordinary people, after performing some meritorious act, had expressed their wish to attain Bodhisattva.

A Thera named Mahā-Tipiṭaka Cūlivāhaya who wrote the Mīlinda-Tīkā (about the twelfth century AC) in the Theravāda tradition of the mahāvihāra at Anurādhapura, says at the end of the book in the colophon that he aspires to become a Buddha: Buddho bhāreyyaṃ 'May I become a Buddha,' which means that this author is a Bodhisattva.

At the end of some palm-leaf manuscripts of Buddhist texts in Śrī Lanka there are the names of even a few copyists who have recorded their wish to become Buddhas, and they too are to be considered as Bodhisattvas.

At the end of a religious ceremony or an act of piety, the bhikkhu who gives benedictions, usually admonishes the congregation to make a resolution to attain Nirvāna by realizing one of the three Bodhis – Śrāvakabodhi, Pratyekabodhi or Samyaksambodhi – as they wish according to their capacity.

There are many Buddhists, both bhikkhus and laymen, in Śrī Lanka, Burma, Thailand and Cambodia, which are regarded as Theravāda countries, who take the vow of resolution to become Buddhas to save others. They are indeed Bodhisattvas at different levels of development. Thus one may see that in Theravāda countries all are not Śrāvakas. There are Bodhisattvas as well.

There is a significant difference between Theravāda and Mahāyāna with regard to the Bodhisattva ideal. Theravāda,
although it holds the Bodhisattva ideal as the highest and the noblest, does not provide a separate literature devoted to the subject. The teachings about the Bodhisattva ideal and the Bodhisattva career are to be found scattered in their due places in Pāli literature. Mahāyāna, by definition, dedicated to the Bodhisattva ideal, has not only produced a remarkable literature on the subject, but also created a fascinating class of mythical Bodhisattvas.

**QUESTIONS**

- Explain the function of consciousness in the process of the arising of a sentient being.
- Describe the characteristic of perfections (pāramitā) as appearing in Mahāyāna scriptures which are leading to full enlightenment.
- Examine whether it is possible to compare Tathāgata Garbha in Mahāyāna with evolving consciousness (samvatanika viññāṇa) in early Buddhist texts.
- Enunciate the mode of definition on the concept of Nirvāṇa in Mahāyāna Buddhism.
The basic aim of this study is to unfold the visionary concept existing in contemporary society, Buddhist attitude and response to its philosophical trends.

The following matters are taken into consideration in this regard: Marxist attitude towards religion and sociological analysis; Buddhism and analytical western philosophical traditions; Buddhism, modern science, Buddhist attitude regarding empirialism, para empirialism, scepticism, agnosticism; materialism.

Recommended Reading:

1. *Early Buddhist Jurisprudence*  
   Durga Baghavat, Poona, 1940

2. *Fundamentals of Buddhist Ethics*  
   Gunapala Dharmasiri, Singapore, 1996

3. *Women Under Primitive Buddhism*  
   I. B. Horner, London, 1930

4. *The Principles of International Law in Buddhist Doctrine*  

5. *Dharma, man and Law*  
   K. N. Jayatilake, Singapore, 1992

6. *Buddhism and Race Question*  

7. *Philosophical Implication of Pancasila*  
   G. P. Malalasekara, „Sambhasa” P. 266-273

8. *Crime and Punishment in the Buddhist Tradition*  
   Nandasena Ratnapala, New Delhi, 1992

9. *Buddhist Ethics*  
   Hammakawa Saddhatissa, London, 1970

10. *Ethics of Buddhism*  
    S. Tacibana, London, 1926

11. *Individual and Society in Buddhism*  
    W. G. Weeraratna, Colombo, 1977

12. *Buddhism and Society*  
    Hienz Bechert, Kandy, 1977

13. *Precept and Practice*  
    Richard Gombrich, Oxford, 1971

14. *Ethics in Buddhist Perspective*  
    K. N. Jayatilake, Kandy, 1972

15. *Ethics and Class Conflict in Sri Lanka*  
    Kumari Jayawardhan

16. *Buddhism and Social Action*  
    Ken Jones, Kandy, 1981

17. *Social Problems*  
    Joan Wand Moore, New Jersey, 1982

18. *Buddhism in Life*  
    Martin Southwold, Surrey, 1983

19. *Sociology of Religion*  

20. *Aspects of Buddhist Social Philosophy*  
    K. N. Jayatilake, Kandy

21. *An approach to Buddhist Social Philosophy*  
    Robert and Beck, London, 1979

22. *Buddhism and Sex*  
    M. O. C. Walshe, Kandy

23. *Small is Beautiful*  
    E. F. Schumacher, Harper and Row, 1973

A quite considerable of part of contemporary Indian thought is concerned with Buddhism either in the form of exposition and
specialized study or as inspired by it the revival of interest in Buddhism is not merely historical, a matter of curiosity and national pride thinkers find in Buddhism plentiful, first solving social and religious problem that afflict us today 2500 anniversary of lord Buddha’s Parinibana (great decease) has searched as an additional stimulus to this interest. The abiding valuable of Buddhism lies in its typing certain this norm of thought. These norms are not outmoded, no religious or philosophical norm is. They may not exactly be impatient no. but patient like season and the weather changes quickly and the so-called outmoded forms have a curious and persistent way of coming back philosopher should not succumb to changing passion but has to fix his attention on the abiding norm. There are elements in Buddhism which are capable of being disengaged from they are purely historical and accidental environment and apply to present day condition. The purely moral and humanistic attitude of Buddhism strongly apply to moral man in Buddhism we have a religion without god, without any extraneous appear to revelation and dogma it takes its stand on law as an intrinsic and universal norm of all existence the enthusiastic welcome that it received in 19th century and is still continue to receive is in great measure due to this moral standpoint the egalitarian stand taken by Buddhism, in regard to the cultivation of spiritual life is in closer conformity with the idea of today Mahayana Buddhism is justly celebrated for the ideal of the Bodhisattva and this is an answer to the often repeated but untrue accusation that Hindus religion are more intent on private, salvation and do not concern themselves with the good of fellow beings if anything spiritual ideal is more universal and non-sectarian.

Hypothesis of evolution of Vadanta absolute by a criticism of Sankhya dualism and earlier Vadanta of pre Sankhya commentator can not be ruled out. It happens that Madhyamika and Yogacara absolutism had already been evolved in Buddhism. It is however difficult to conceive how philosopher belonging to Atman doctrine can borrow doctrine from those of opposed Anatma tradition the vadinics state everything on reality of Atma and accept authority of Upanishad Buddhist denied reality of Atma in any form. The barrier was always there besides it is ready assumed that there is no different between absolutism of Nagarjuna, Sankra and Yogacara a closer analysis should bring out their different as much as their generic affinity Madhyamika and Yogacara also had theory of illusion to account for emergency of appearance knowledge of this turn in Buddha must have sent Vadant thing back to his own text and enable him to perceive true meaning of Upanishad in Advadism there has been borrowing of technique and not of tenets.

AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY (LECTURED BY VEN. PAÑÑĀLOKA)

The contemporary thought which has new and complex system of human thought has given birth to many new subjects. These new subjects have made the life of the man complex and military? them ever before. We can see the birth of all these subjects in the age of science called philosophy. Philosophy means ‘love of wisdom’ as it is translated from its original form. In the eastern philosophy the term dassanā (sight) is used for this discipline to promote the human beings as looking at the life in a new way. The thinker who explained the life in a new way like Plato, Cicero, Aristotle in Greece, the Buddha and Mahāvīra in India are called ‘philosophers’. The ancient philosophy in human thought is derived fro three sources or traditions of philosophy. They are:

1. Greek classical philosophy
2. Indian classical philosophy
3. Chinese classical philosophy

Philosophy has five branches of study, which shows the vast subject area that’s covered by this discipline:

1. Ethics – it is the branch of philosophy that studies about human’s behavior. In general sense, human behavior differs from culture to culture and from society to society. This branch studies the system of morality that is applicable around the world.
2. Aesthetics – the second branch of philosophy, that studies the concept of beauty. It has given many new insights to the subjects like music, art, culture and architecture.
3. Epistemology – the third branch of philosophy, that studies knowledge. It discusses the validity of our knowledge and the validity of present way of imparting knowledge.

4. Metaphysics – studies the topic of what is beyond the physical world. Their main topics are god and rebirth, which are very influential on human life, but unverifiable by sensual experience.

5. Logic – the last of the branches of philosophy, which studies the valid ways of obtaining correct knowledge. Mathematics is the most powerful branch under this section.

The philosophical discussion under these five branches have given birth to many subjects. Therefore philosophy is called 'the father of all sciences'.

Notes:
1. Ethics = study of human behavior
2. Aesthetics = study of beauty
3. Epistemology = theory of knowledge
4. Metaphysics = study on topics beyond sensory experience
5. Logic = theory of valid ways of thinking

AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY (February 2006)

In the human history there are three subjects which represent human knowledge and human experience. They are:
1. Religion
2. Philosophy
3. Science

In these three subjects we can see how the human being realized his nature and also the nature of human environment.

Religion was the most ancient way through which human being understood the nature of human life and the world. The origin, nature, aim and distinction fo human life and world are explained by ancient religion. Therefore, human being trusted the religious authority of scriptures or priests for the sake of knowledge.

In an around sixth century BC there were some philosophers from India, China, Middle East and Greece. The main question, the theory and ideas were presented by religion. They wanted to see the world in a new way and they did not want to accept anything without reason. They did not accept belief. Their methodology was based on knowledge and logic.

The philosophers who were in India were Siddhāttha Gotama, Nīghanṭha Nāṭhaputta, Pūraṇa Kassapa, Ajīta Kesakambalī, Pakudha Kaccāyana, Sañjaya Bellaṭṭhiputta and Makkhaḷi Ghosāḷa and others. In China there were Confucius and Lao Tze. In Middle east there was Zarathustra. In Greece there was a line of philosophers beginning from Thāles, Anaximander, Anaximenes, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle. In recent time there were (in Europe) Karl Marx, Sigmund Freud and others. They are called 'individual philosophers' according to their names chuch as 'the philosophy of Socrates', 'Buddhist philosophy', 'Jaina philosophy' etc.
These scientific ideas later came to be developed as different sciences. For example, psychology which studies human mind scientifically was not a separate subject some time ago. With the development of ideas on the subject it separated from philosophy as a science. All the other science subjects also first were included in philosophy and later became separated as different sciences and introduction to the definition and origin of philosophy.(?)

**INTRODUCTION TO THE DEFINITION AND ORIGIN OF PHILOSOPHY (FEBRUARY 2006)**

The term philosophy comes from Greek word 'phileo' (love) and 'sophia' (wisdom). Therefore, philosophy means love, desire or likeness for new knowledge. Philosophers are people who learn new knowledge and who see things in a new way.

The father of western philosophy was Thales and he was lived ancient Greece. He did not believe the explanation given by the religion in his society on the origin of the universe. At that time the religion was saying that the world and all it contained was created by the God. Thales did not believe it and said that God was not the first cause and presented a new idea that the first cause of everything was water. He presented his theory in more logical and scientific way, because he presented a new idea and his arguments were strong and valid. He was considered to be a philosopher.

We have philosophers in the East, in China and India. The Buddha is considered to be a philosopher because he looked at the world in a new way in many aspects. When He was born, the human society was divided into four castes according to the creation of the Brahmā. The members of four castes were considered and treated differently. The Buddha did not agree with what Brāhmanism said and all the people of four castes were equal as human beings (cattāro vanṇā samasamā āhonti)⁹⁵. This was new way of looking at the existing social environment. Those philosophers who discovered new things, those who presented things in a new way are called philosophers and their thinking is called philosophy.

There are five branches of philosophy. They are as follows:

1. Ethics
2. Aesthetics
3. Epistemology
4. Metaphysics
5. Logic

Ethics means the principle of behavior. All the philosophers in the world have given new interpretation to the ethics available in the society in which they lived. Especially different form of ethics coming from the ideas of philosophers is that what we call 'Buddhist ethics' as the Buddha's teaching of ethics. Similarly, we have Hindu ethics, Christian ethics and also there are ethical principles related to different professions like legal ethics, business ethics, political ethics, medical ethics etc. Human ethics is very complex to study because the behavior of fathom(?) of the human being differs from religion to religion, society to society and country to country.

The second main branch in philosophy is aesthetics (the study of beauty). The concept of beauty differs from person to person, country to country and religion to religion. Each ethics in philosophy tries to develop a universal concept of aesthetics. The philosophical ideas on beauty are found in western philosophy as well as in eastern philosophy. Plato, Socrates and Aristotle were

⁹⁵ This utterance appears many times in Tipiṭaka. One of them is Majjhima Nikāya – Majjhimapaññāsapāḷi – 4. Rājavaggo – 4. Madhura Sutta – paragraph 318
three philosophers who presented their ideas on beauty in western philosophy. Bāratamuni and Anadabardhana were two eastern philosophers who enriched the concept of beauty in eastern philosophy. All these new ideas on beauty, its understanding and interpretation in philosophy have come out. Its new ideas tried to build up a common, universal idea of beauty. Such theories were discussed and interpreted in the aesthetics.

The third branch of philosophy is epistemology (theory of knowledge.). Both western and eastern philosophers have discussed the origin, the nature, the function, the validity and the limits of human language. They have culminated as the philosophy of education. Education is a scientific branch emerged from epistemology. Such theories and new ideas related to human knowledge are discussed under epistemology.

The fourth branch of philosophy is metaphysics. 'Meta' means 'beyond'; 'physic' means the things and experience in the physical world. Under these titles the area of philosophy which discusses topics beyond physical experience are rebirth, God, psychology etc. All these are discussed in this area of philosophy.

The fifth and last branch of philosophy is called logic. Logic is the method of reasonable knowledge. Logic has developed the science called 'mathematic' which has been very much helpful in discovering the new knowledge about the world. Logic as a subject developed well in both East and West.

**PHILOSOPHY MEANS „LOVE OF WISDOM“ - PHILOSOPHER IS THE LOVER OF WISDOM**

The word philosophy is more accurately defined in eastern philosophy according to Hindu philosophy. Philosophy should be the correct knowledge. It does not accept tradition as a path to obtain knowledge, like we can see in Kālāma sutta – rejection of paramparāya (tradition) as a mean of getting concept. No one should accept teaching that came from the tradition without verifying it.

Philosophical teaching is opened for criticism, whereas a religious person can not for example inquire about the existence of the god. Religious person has to accept the existence of god through faith, belief and vision, as we can see in Vīmaṅsaka sutta in Majjhima Nikāya, Buddhist teaching of personality.

There are different philosophers and there is no leading philosopher even in Buddhism. The Buddha never wanted to appoint a chief of his teaching. There is no much room for criticism in religion. In religion it is god who helps the man. Here in Buddhism man has to get his salvation. The Buddha is only teacher, not the power.

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96 Here „philosophy“ is from Greek terms „phileo“ (love) and „sophia“ (wisdom)
**QUESTION:** INTRODUCE PHILOSOPHY AND DISCUSS WHETHER BUDDHISM CAN BE CALLED A PHILOSOPHY (LECTURED BY VEN. PAŚÑĀLOKA) (ORIGINAL BY VEN. IM DINA & VEN. H. SOVANNY)

Is Buddhism a religion or philosophy? It is often questioned whether Buddhism is philosophy or religion. In most cases these arguments follow the Buddha’s position as a philosopher and religious teacher. Here we are going to examine whether we can categorize Buddhism into these two systems of thought.

In the previous lessons we came to know that philosophy has five branches. Accordingly we can see Buddhist teaching related to those five areas. Most of the time the Buddha was giving ethical instruction to people. In the Buddha Vagga of the Dhammapada there is a stanza which represents the message of Buddhism in brief: »Sabba pāpāsa akaranām kusalassa upasampadhā sacittapariyodapanam etam buddhāna sāsanām.« (verse 183) - „To refrain from doing evil, to indulge in doing good, to cleanse one’s mind – this is the teaching of all Buddhas.“ We can consider this stanza to represent the entire Buddhist teaching. It is as system of ethics as given here. Regarding aesthetics Buddhism has its own independent view. Buddhist verses contain different views on it as given by the Buddha and His disciples. In the Mahāparinibbāna Sutta the Buddha praises natural beauty of the environment. The Sāgatavagga in Samyutta Nikāya presents the following idea:

»Ramaṇīyāni araṇāni, yathā na ramati jano;
Vitarāgā ramiṣsanti, na te kāmagavesino.«

On epistemology, Buddhism has developed and preached the most developed theory of knowledge in the Indian system of philosophical thought. The fact of knowledge taught by the Buddha never comes to be disproved by the modern advancement of human knowledge. The more science advances, the Buddhism comes to truth. Therefore, in the world now buddhism is conceded to be of the best form of epistemology with presented new and thorough knowledge about human mind, its functions, universe, its evolution etc. To say that the Buddha was a philosopher is not reasonable in complete sense when others became like of the Buddha with the behavior of other philosophers. The Buddha said what He did and what He said he did, therefore we call him yatavadi tathākāri, yathakartha thavadi. (Samyutta Nikāya, Theragāthā)

Another factor which makes the Buddha a great philosopher is that He could produce many like Him while He was living. At the last stage of the Buddha He has produced a great number of good disciples. In this sense Buddhism is not a religion, it believes neither in creator nor in creation. In the Ratthapāla Sutta of Samyutta Nikāya it is clearly said that this world was not created - »Attano lokoanabissara.« The Attavagga of Dhammapada records the following gātha: »Attāhi Attano nātho kohi nītho parasiyā attanavā sudantena nātham labhāti dullabham.« - „Oneself, indeed is one's saviour, for what other savior would there be? With oneself well controlled one obtains a savior difficult to find.“ So, in this sense Buddhism does not believe in creator or creation. Thus in western point it is difficult to say that Buddhism is a religion. The observation of scholars on this problem has produced these conclusions:

1. Buddhism is philosophic
2. Buddhism is a religion
3. Buddhism is a philosophy

The conclusion number one and two are one side’s conclusions, because they can see only a part of Buddhist practice, as it is available today. In modern Buddhism the philosophical and religious characteristic are inter-connected. It is not easy to separate the religious aspects of Buddhism from its philosophy. Although Buddhism does not have main characteristics like that of other theistic

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97 In the original there was 'massage'...
98 In the original there was 'stinger'...
99 (Khuddakanikāya – Dhammapadapāli – Arahantavaggo – paragraph 99) this stanza written in the original was seriously full of mistakes and I even could find it neither in the Sāgatavagga nor even anywhere in Samyutta Nikāya. The reference to the Sāgatavagga is in the original two times – before the quotation and after the quotation. I didn't mention the second reference, as it is same like that one before the quotation and also because the reference is invalid.
religions with the development of Buddhist history, different features of culture developed in relation to Buddhism. Those later developments do not live long, there is no sound philosophy.

**QUESTION: INTRODUCE PHILOSOPHY AND DISCUSS WHETHER BUDDHISM CAN BE CALLED AS A PHILOSOPHY.**

The word philosophy is from the Greek words *phileo + sophia*, which mean ‘love of wisdom’. Perhaps this was first used by Pythagoras. In Indian tradition the commonest word used to denote philosophy is *Dassanā*. That means sight, what comes through perception, though basically it may have meant what is seen with the eyes. Around 6th century BC there were many philosophers appearing in the world. In East and West, the function of philosophy is to investigate for new knowledge. All the new ideas and theories of knowledge are first discussed under the subject of philosophy.

It is often questioned whether Buddhism is a philosophy or religion. In most cases, these arguments follow the Buddha’s position as a philosopher and a religious teacher. Here, we are going to examine whether we can categorize Buddhism into these two systems of thought. Philosophy has five branches:

1. ethics
2. aesthetics
3. epistemology
4. metaphysics
5. logic

Hence we can see Buddhist teachings is related to those five areas. Most of occasions **the Buddha** was giving ethical instructions to people. In *Dhammapada* 183, this stanza states the message of Buddhism in brief: to avoid all evil, to cultivate good and to purify one’s mind. Such teaching is a system of ethics.

Regarding aesthetics, Buddhism has its own independent view. Buddhist verses contain different view on beauty as given by **the Buddha** and his disciples. In *Mahāparinibbāna Sutta*, the **Buddha** praises natural beauty of the environment.

On epistemology, Buddhism has developed theory of knowledge in the Indian system of philosophical thought. The facts of knowledge taught by **Buddha** never came to be disproved by modern advancement of human knowledge. More science discoveries come to be proved by Buddhism. In the world, therefore, Buddhism is now considered to be one of the best forms of epistemology, which presented new and true knowledge about human mind, its functions etc. Metaphysics, logics which are beyond the sense experience are also discussed in buddhist teaching.

In Buddhist teaching we see the system of logic as well. For example, **the Buddha** stated that there isn’t anything permanent in everything; all subjects are changing but Brahmin youth said that there is a soul in the mind which is unchanging. **The Buddha** shows that all these five aggregates ’pañcakkhandha’ are constantly changing. Therefore, there is no entity called ‘soul’ which would be unchanging. That’s why one can assume that Buddhism with method of logic is a philosophy.

Above four characteristics which made the Buddha different from other philosophers mentioned the fact clear that he was much greater than other philosophers. But **the Buddha** is not a normal philosopher. He is the philosopher par-excellence in the human history. Therefore, we can conclude that Buddhism has the characteristics of philosophy in full. Thus, from the above mentioned facts are making it evident that Buddhism can be called as a philosophy.

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100This of course is not true. Many things in *Tipiṭaka* are completely wrong from the point of view of modern science and some of these things are also contrary to each other. Just check *Parinibbāna Sutta* the explanation about earthquake. Then see any scientific book about earthquake. You will find two completely different theories. But please, do not forget that the scientific theory (in this case) is perfectly proved and thus is not a theory, but a scientific explanation of an obvious fact.
categorize Buddhism into these two systems of thought.

In the previous lesson we came to know that philosophy has five branches. Accordingly we can see Buddhist teaching related to those five areas. Most of the time the Buddha was giving ethical instruction to people. In the Buddha vagga of the dhammapada there is a stanza which represent the massage of Buddhism in brief: “Sabba-papassa akaranam-kusalassa upasampada Sacittapariyodapanam- Etam Buddhhan Sasanam” to refrain from doing evil, to indulge in doing good, to cleanse one’s mind- this is the teaching of all Buddhas. We can consider this stinger to represent the entire Buddhist teaching. It is a system of ethics as given here. Regarding aesthetics Buddhism has its own independent view. Buddhist verses contain different views on it as given by the Buddha and his disciples. In the mahaparinibbana Sutta the Buddha praises natural beauty of the environment. The Sagatha vagga samyutta nikaya present the following idea: “Ramniyam arannani, yatthana ramati jino, vitaraga ramissanti; nate kamagavesino.” (Ref-sagatha vagga S.N.).

On epistemology, Buddhism has developed and preached the most developed theory of knowledge in the Indian system of philosophical thought. The fact of knowledge taught by the Buddha never comes to be disproved by the modern advancement of human Knowledge. More science advances Buddhism came to truth. Therefore in the world now Buddhism is conceded to be of the best from of epistemology with presented new and through knowledge about human mind, its function, universes, its evolution etc. To say that the Buddha is a philosopher is not reasonable in complete sense when others became like of the Buddha with the behavior of others philosopher. The Buddha said what he did and what he said we called him yatavadi tathakari, yathakartha thavadi (S.N theragatha).

Another factor, which makes the Buddha, is a great philosopher is that he could produce many like him while he was living. At the last stage of the Buddha he has produced a great number of good disciple. In this sense Buddhism is not a religion it believes neither in creator nor in creation. In the Ratthapala Sutta of M.N. it is clearly said that this world has no created “Attano lokoanabhissara.” The Atta vagga of Dhammapada records the following gatha: “Attahi Attanatho Kohi nitho parasiya Attanava sudantena Natham labhati dullabham” oneself, indeed is one’s saviour, for what other saviour would there be? With oneself well controlled, one obtains a saviour difficult to find”. So in this sense Buddhism does not believe in creator or creation. Thus in western point it is difficult to say Buddhism is a religion.

The observation of scholar on this problem has produce their conclusion:

1. Buddhism is a philosophic
2. Buddhism is a religion
3. Buddhism is a philosophy.

The conclusion number one and two are one side’s conclusion because they can see only a part of Buddhist practice, as it is available today. In modern Buddhism the philosophical and religious characteristic are inter connected. It is not easy to separate the religious aspect of Buddhism from its philosophy. Although Buddhism does not have main characteristic like that of other theistic religious with the development of Buddhist history different feature of culture develop with related to Buddhism. Those later developments do not live long there is no sound philosophy.

**QUESTION: IS BUDDHISM A PHILOSOPHY?**

The word ‘philosophy’ is derived from Greek word phileo + sophia, meaning ‘love of wisdom’. This term was first used by Pythagoras, a Greek philosopher. In India the commonest word used to denote philosophy is Dassanā, which means ‘sight’, which comes from sense-perception. There were many philosophers, who appeared in the world around 6th century BC in the East and West. The function of philosophy is to investigate new knowledge. All the new ideas and theories of knowledge are first discussed under the subject of philosophy.

Often it is asked, whether Buddhism is a philosophy. In this case, this argument follows the Buddha's position as a teacher of philosophy. Here we are going to examine whether we can categorize Buddhism into this system. Philosophy has five branches:

1. Ethics
2. Aesthetics
3. Epistemology
4. Metaphysics
5. Logics

Hence, we can see Buddhist teaching as related to these five areas. On some occasions the Buddha was given ethical instruction to the people, which can be seen in the Dhammapada - »Sabba pāpassa akaranam, kusalassa upasampadā.« - Not to do any evil, to cultivate good and to purify one’s mind. This stanza is stated as ethical message of Buddhism.

Regarding Aesthetics, Buddhism has its own independent view. Buddhist verses contain different view on beauty as given by the Buddha and his disciples. In the Mahāparinibbāna Sutta the Buddha never came to be disproved by modern advancement of human knowledge. Thanks to Science advance Buddhism came to be proved in the world. Therefore, Buddhism is considered to be one of the best forms of epistemology.

Metaphysics, some topics which are beyond the sense, these experiences are discussed in Buddhist teachings.

System of logics, as well for example, the Buddha stated: „there is nothing permanent in anything; all objects are changing“, but a Brahmin youth said that „there is a soul in the mind, which is unchanging.“ The Buddha showed that „all these aggregates (nāmakkhandha) are constantly changing.“ Therefore, there is no entity called soul which would be unchanging. That’s why we can assume that Buddhism is concerned with a system of logics.

Above all characteristics which made the Buddha different from other philosophers is the fact that he was much greater than the other philosophers. The Buddha was not a normal philosopher – he was the philosopher par-excellence in the human history. Therefore, we can conclude that Buddhism has characterized philosophy according to what is mentioned above. Thus, regarding the facts mentioned above it is evident that Buddhism can be called as philosophy.

**QUESTION:** EXAMINE WHETHER BUDDHISM CAN BE CONSIDERED AS A PHILOSOPHY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE WESTERN DEFINITION. (ORIGINAL BY VEN. DHARMEŚVAR)

The term philosophy is made from two words of Greek origin – phileo + sophia which mean ‘love of wisdom’. In western tradition whenever a new form of knowledge occurred or came into existence such ideas first were discussed under philosophy. In western tradition there have been philosophers from that time earlier than six century BC and there were western philosophers even today. All the new subjects before they were developed as independent disciplines were discussed under the subjects of philosophy.

Five aims or branches of philosophy:

1. Ethics – study about good and bad
2. Aesthetics – study about beauty
3. Epistemology – study about knowledge
4. Metaphysics – study about things beyond physical experience
5. Logic – study about reasonable things

The Sanskrit name for philosophy is Darśana which means ‘seeing’. It stands for the idea of seeing new things in new way. In India from the beginning of history of philosophy there were thinkers who presented either new knowledge or a new way of looking at things. Buddhist discourses furnish information about such philosophers who held independent views on man and world and they were contemporary to Gotama Buddha.

The first branch of philosophy ethics study about the behavior of human beings, their activities, their judgment and values differ from society to society, religion to religion and culture to culture. One action which is considered good in one philosophy or
culture might be a vague concept in another culture. For example, Buddhism discourages killing beings and intoxicating but Catholic religious tradition recommends both actions, not that they would be ethically wrong. This shows the difference of ideas prevailing in different cultures. Philosophy in its study on ethics looks for universally acceptable concept of ethics. The criteria of ethical value judgment again differs from one thought to the other. Philosophy tries to identify criteria of ethics to be applicable to whole the world. The second branch of philosophy is the aesthetics try to recognize the ideas of beauty as they are universally applicable because generally available ideologies of beauty differs again from culture to culture. Thirdly under the branch of epistemology, theory of knowledge, an attempt is made to develop broad ideas to get and develop knowledge.

In the eastern philosophy we observe distance from early times. When prince Sidhātta renounced the world, he had two questions to find the answer they were: what is the best truth - ‘kim sacca gavesi’ and what is the highest good ‘kim kasala gavesi’, although there were many available theories on truth and good, he found they were not universal truth. Therefore, he wanted to recognize and find new knowledge of man and universe, highest good that man can perform. He named that research as ‘the noble quest’. The same was done by western philosophers to find new knowledge about man and universe under the fourth branch, namely metaphysics. Some topics which were beyond the same experience for example concept of life, mind, rebirth, God and Nibbāṇa cannot be experienced through the normal sense organs but we have our day-to-day knowledge derived from sensual experience. Metaphysics therefore is the branch of philosophy which studies about supernormal subject and they tried to arrive into conclusion to positive assumption.

The last and the fifth branch of philosophy is logic. It is the art of systematic and reasonable thinking. Mathematics is the practical science produced by logic. It has asked to calculate any amount of things, sizes or proximities on logical basis. For example, we cannot measure the distance from Earth to Jupiter, but we can calculate it on logical basis by using mathematics. With that we can assume almost possible answer which is a production of human thinking. The discussion so far clearly shows that Buddhism is the philosophy where are available all branches of philosophical subjects.

666Examine whether Buddhism can be considered a philosophy in the context of the western definition.

The term philosophy is made from words of Greek origin Philo+Sophia, which means love of wisdom. In western tradition whenever a new form of knowledge occurred or came into existence such ideas first were discussed under philosophy. In western tradition there have been philosophers from earlier than six century B.C. and there are western philosophers even today. All new subjects before they were developed as independent disciplines were discussed under subjects of philosophy.

The five branches of philosophies are:

1 Ethics-study about good and bad, 2 Aesthetics-study about beauty, 3 Epistemology-study about knowledge, 4 Metaphysics-study about things beyond physical experience, 5 Logic-study about reasonable things.

The Sanskrit’s name for philosophy is Darsana, which means seeing. It stands for the idea that seeing new things in new way. In India from the beginning of philosophical history there were thinkers who presented either new knowledge or a new way of looking at things. Buddhist discourses furnish information about such philosophers who held independent view on man and world and they were contemporary to Gotama Buddha.

One action, which is considered good in one philosophy or culture, might be a vague concept in another culture. For example Buddhist discourages killing beings and use of intoxicating drinks, but Catholic religious tradition recommends both actions not to be ethically wrong. The criteria of ethical value judgment again differ from one thought to the other. Philosophy tries to identify criteria of ethics to be applicable to whole world. The second branch of philosophy is aesthetics, when try to recognize the ideas of beauty, as they are universally applicable because generally available ideologies of beauty differ again from culture.

The thirdly under the branch is epistemology, theory of knowledge, an attempt is made to develop broad ideas to get and develop knowledge. Buddha’s aim was find new knowledge of man and universe, highest well that man can perform. He named that research as noble quest the same is done by western

101I bet the teacher is joking. I don’t believe that the teacher was serious when saying such an obvious nonsense. Of course that Catholic religion disproves killing and intoxication. Catholic religion as well as all the other famous Christian sects disprove killing, stealing and all the things that are mentioned in pañca sīla. Regarding the teaching of the Holy Bible, there are some controversies as to the permission for killing (similarly it is in Holy Qur’ān), but generally Catholic Christian is unhappy about killing in the same way as a Theravāda Buddhist.
philosophers to find new knowledge about man and universe. The fourth branch, namely metaphysics, which are beyond the sense experiences. For example concept life, mind rebirth, God and Nibbana, cannot be experienced through normal sense organs but we have our day-to-day knowledge derive from sensual experience and studies about super normal subjects, The fifth branch of philosophy is logic and Buddhism use logic and reasoning when necessary thinking. The discussion so far clearly shows that Buddhism is the philosophy where all branches of philosophical subjects are available.

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The last and the fifth branch of philosophy is logic. It is the art of systematic and reasonable thinking. Mathematics is the practical science produced by logic help us to calculate things, sizes or proximities on logical basics. For example, we cannot measure the distance from mars to the Jupiter but we can calculate it on logical basics by using mathematics. With that we can assume almost possible answers, which is a production of human thinking. The discussion so far clearly shows that Buddhism is the philosophy where all branches of philosophical subjects are available.

Skepticism is very developed form of philosophical thought. A skeptic is a person who normally doubts and questions accepted opinions. A skeptic in the philosophical sense refers to a person philosopher who denies the possibility of knowledge or even rational belief in certain spheres, taken in this the words agnostic and agnosticism, too, denote similar meanings. In its widest sense an agnostic is one who believes that nothing is known or can be known of the existence or nature of God. God is considered the ultimate and absolute truth. It is generally considered the essence, the crux of religion though. This means that both skepticism and agnosticism accepts the unknown ability of the ultimate truth.

The basic premise, on which this philosophy is built, is the belief that human knowledge is limited and therefore it does not have the capacity to know absolutely about anything, especially about subtle metaphysical issues. In India of the Buddha’s time there had been a very famous skeptic. He was Sañjāyā Belatthiputta. He did not make any absolute declaration on any important philosophical issue. This was because he felt that human knowledge is incapable of understanding such matters completely. He held that if he was to make and absolute statement on such matters, and later if he was to be proved wrong, he would be looked upon as a liar.

This is why he came up with indefinite answers when deep philosophical issues are presented. If someone were to ask him whether there is next life, he would not give and absolute answer. He would say, ‘there would be’. Again if one were to ask him whether there is no next world, he would answer saying, ‘there may not be’. Thus, he took no definite and fires position. Because of these undecided attitudes of his the Buddhist texts describe Sañjāyā Belatthiputta as an Amara-Vikkhepika-an Eel-wriggler-a rather derogatory term. Sutta such as the Samaññaphala describes him as a fool, an ignorant person who knows nothing. But this may not be the truth, for he, too, was a respected teacher among the 6 teachers.

Besides, even Jainism in its epistemology presents a method called Sapta-bhangi-naya-a process in which something could be viewed in 7 different perspectives. Buddha himself did not always gibe absolute answers. Some questions he left aside without answering. This is not because the Buddha was a skeptic but because he did not wish to deal with irrelevant issues. From all this, what is clear is that skepticism is not a philosophy of the foolish and ignorant, but an opinion of learned men who considered human knowledge as imperfect to make absolute statements.
According to the scholars and historical evidence there are some different(?!) most similarities between the buddhism and science, because of fundamental purpose. In the Buddhism Nibbanna is the final goal. But in the science there is not such a thing. There is a conventional method into the science. Empiricism is the foundation in the science, basically which we experience through our senses. If they can't prove research or find out any teaching or concept, they don't accept according to the science, but in the Buddhism it has accepted sense perception as well as extra-sensory perception. Science has not developed it to accept extra-sensory perception.

The science will change their method of theories time to time. Hence, they have to change their previous conduction too. Therefore, there is no final decision which regarding any matter in the science. Basically the science points out concerning the data, but Buddhism has given them main intention to the virtuous of the person God conduct of the society. The Buddhism has a main intention to the virtuousness of the person God conduct of the society. The Buddhism has a final goal which is called Nibbanna. The Buddhism has researched the way how person can finish his rebirth insamsāra. Although Buddhism has discussed concerning the Nibbanna, it has not rejected social life as a lay person. Buddhism explained world, society, person, economy, environment, politics, culture, marriage etc.

The Lord Buddha has said to the Kālīma people in the Kālīma Sutta: „Don’t accept anything without research of your own.” That means that Buddhism has given permission to the people to do research, observe but not about the world, social etc. When we investigate there is no final goal or aim in the science, because there is not a final decision in the science. According to the science they want to research everything in the world. Especially regarding the material things. But Buddhism investigated both material things and immaterial things, which was important to attain the Nibbana.

Therefore, Buddhist teaching or concept which was founded by the Buddha can't be changed in the present or in the future. Because Buddha has considered about the real truth. Hence, Dhamma is eternal, so that it is suitable for the past, present and future. The Lord Buddha also has followed some blind is logic system. According to the Buddha, it is said: „Don’t insert anybody because I don’t like that is I don’t like that other also does not like.” Basically Buddhism has originated, developed an experience according to he dependent origination or cause and effect. That was the main theory of Buddhist philosophy. The Lord Buddha has preached Dhamma and practice according to the method of Dhamma.

The Buddhism was not for the past or present or future; it is suitable for all the time in the life or world. Because it was the real truth, but there is no real truth in the science – it may change, or be revealed as false at any moment. In addition, fundamental teachings of the Buddha has been confirmed by the scientists; there is kamma, rebirth, dependent origination, Four Noble Truths etc. Some scholars have considered Buddhism as a science, but actually it cannot be compared to any kind of science, because it is only Buddhist science. It has some kind of research of the real truth in the world. It was found by the Buddha 2500 years ago and its basic purpose is called Nibbana. The science is not moral or immoral, but as moral, Buddhism admired virtuousness, good conduct etc., therefore we can mention fundamental similarities and differences between the science and Buddhism as follows:

1. The science and Buddhism have conventional theories
2. The science has dependence on empiricism, but Buddhism has accepted sense-perception and extra-sensory perception.
3. The science and Buddhism has followed some kinds of logic system that is not some entirely. (?)
4. There is no final goal in the science, but Nibbana or the final goal of the person is in Buddhism.
5. The Buddhism has limited its research, but science has to research even in the future.
6. There is no aim in the science, but Buddhist aim is the Nibbana.
7. The theories and scholars in the science may change their ideas or be revealed as false in the present or in the future, but Dhamma will never be found false forever.

As a theory, both Buddhism and science have followed one way.

**QUESTION: COMPARISON AND CONTRAST RELIGIOUS TEACHING WITH MODERN SCIENCE, PAYING SPECIAL ATTENTION TO BUDDHISM**

There are at least five major world. Religions. These are Hinduism, Buddhism, Judaism, Christianity and Islam. Except Buddhism the other four are theistic religions. In these four religions faith, to be more precise the infallibility of the God's teaching plays a dominant role. The God in these religions is considered to

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102I do not believe that kamma, rebirth, dependent origination or Four Noble Truths have been proved by science. I demand the scientific proofs for those concepts. If those concepts are really proved, all other religions would collapse, which still did not happen.

103This is number 4 in other words.

104In some places in Tipiṭaka the teachings have already been found wrong (check Parinibbāna Sutta, the talk about earthquake).
be omnipotent, omniscient and omnipresent. He is the creator, sustainer and destroyer of everything. He is the Lord, the law-maker, the ruler.

With such a supreme Godhead at the top the man is mere puppet in his hand.\textsuperscript{105} There is no room to exercise his(?) free(?) and it is believed that man has no free will. He is not given freedom of thought and investigation, blind faith is what is encouraged. To question the God, His teaching is considered as blasphemy. Islamism says that free thinking is the greatest hindrance to one’s happiness here and here-after.\textsuperscript{106}

Such religions are, therefore, based on faith and metaphysical teachings. They are not at all scientific. Not open to investigation and inquiry which are the hallmarks of science whatever the Holy Scriptures say whether it is the Gīṭa, the Bible, Qur’ān etc. The faithful has to believe, with no questions. Therefore, they are far away from the scientific approach.

Buddhism is different. The Dhamma is described as \textit{ehi passika}, inviting the followers to come and examine the Buddha, encouraged to freedom of thought as seen from the Kālāma Sutta.\textsuperscript{107} He even encouraged the disciples to investigate the Buddha Himself as seen from the Vīmaṇṣaka Sutta. These are features of the scientific approach adopted by Buddhism.

By rejecting the divine creation theory Buddhism presented a theory of evolution. This theory presented in Aggaṇṇa Sutta is more in accordi with modern scientific findings. Rejecting the divine creations of different castes and thus different species of human. The Buddha using scientific arguments attempted to establish the oneness of mankind.

Buddhism is rationalistic: it is scientific in its approach to problems. It does not encourage blind faith, but asks followers to use rational or reasoned faith (\textit{akāravatī saddhā}). Yet one should not mistake Buddhism to be a science. It is not. It is a spiritual way. Hence, it does not totally depend on scientific and rational approach. It uses experience, intuitive experience which is called Vipassanā.

In this, it differs from science. It employs extra-sensory perception which science does not use. It is through these Abhiṇṇā that it enables one to see and know the real nature of things.

\textbf{Buddhism and modern science (original by Ven. Dharmesvar)}

The evolution of western philosophy resulted in producing a number of scientists who began their discourses with philosophical discussion. In the modern time most of the philosophers are scientists as well. They made a great contribution through scientific enquiries to form new knowledge widening the understanding of man himself and material world around him.

In a comparative study between Buddhism and modern science, we can observe similarities as well as dissimilarities in the two teachings. Buddhism is the thought preached by a great human being and a seer. Modern science on the other hand has been enriched by the intellectual contribution of many thinkers in the West. Buddhism discloses the true nature of existence of the being and teaches the way out of unsatisfactoriness. Science discloses secret of the material world and teaches how the matter would be changed for the benefit to man and to manufacture material goods to satisfy wants and eeds of the man. both systems have given great insight to human knowledge as a whole. The methodology followed by both the systems to discover the truth resembles similarities(?) as well.

In discovering the secret of material world, modern science has employed two systems: 1. analysis 2. synthesis. Analysis

\textsuperscript{105} It is my duty to sharply disagree with the teacher in this matter. Man is not a puppet of God, as the God gave 'free will' to man. God is the great, the mighty, and unlike man he can give his creation 'free will', which is something we, limited beings can't imagine. 'Free will' is the great gift of God and that is also the reason why we should worship Him as the almighty and wise... :-)

\textsuperscript{106} It is interesting that the teacher doesn't mention that in Buddhism free thinking is also not supported. See Cintana Sutta and Vitakka Sutta both in Sacca Sanyutta. Buddha limited man's thinking maybe even more than other religions, especially if we concern thinking of monks. As an example, if a Sāmanera has wrong view (micchā diṭṭhi), he must be expelled from the monks' order. There is no free thinking in Buddhism. But there are freely thinking Buddhists, that is true...

\textsuperscript{107} Kālāma Sutta was preached to Kālāmas and doesn't mention anything like 'free thinking'.

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means to classify the component parts of some objects into various parts in order to see its reality. Synthesis means showing the interrelationship among analyzed data. The scientific laboratory employs both of these matters. Buddhism also uses both these methods to show the reality related to the phenomena. For example, most of the religions at this time believe in some forms of soul. Those who accepted soul as permanent are called 'eternalists' and those who hold it as temporary are called 'nihilists'. To refuse both of these false views which are unreal the Buddha employed analysis (vibhaṅga) and synthesis (saṅghahā).

Both Buddhism and modern science don't depend on mere belief or blind faith. The science verifies everything to discover the truth and it wants the truth to be clear and transparent. The Buddhists teaching schools emphasize open mindedness and enquiry. The teaching of the Buddha is open and all are invited to come and see - »Ehi passiko.« The Buddha did not discourage freedom or thought and enquiry. Instead He promoted free thinking and questioning in the study of his teaching as can be observed from many discourses such as the Mahāparinibbāna Sutta of Dīgha Nikāya, Upāli and Vīmaṇsa Sutta in the Majjhima Nikāya and the Kālāma Sutta in Anguttara Nikāya.

Another similarity between Buddhism and science is accepting the theory of causality. In Buddhism the causality is called the central philosophy. The Buddha said whether the Buddha was born or not, the theory of causality would be there in nature. The Buddhists teaching on rebirth, kammic retribution, morality and liberation becomes meaningful only in the light of the philosophy of causality. Buddhism teaches its theory of synthesis. Through that the teaching of Dependent Co-origination (Paṭiccasamuppāda). In modern science the causality is well established theory. By observing it, scientists are able to change the natural function of many environmental theories.

Another immense contribution made by both science and Buddhism is widening the horizon of human knowledge on himself and the world. It is because of science that we know more about the world today. It has resulted in another way by reducing diseases, expanding the human life-span etc. Also, because of science the human life has become comfortable more than ever before. With the teaching of the Buddha which enormously gave knowledge about human and the world, it came to the experience of humanity when he realized the truth.

In above written data we see some characteristics similar between Buddhism and science. By this some want to come to the conclusion that Buddhism is scientific or that Buddhism is a science. Yet it is not reasonable to come to the theistic(?) conclusion as Buddhism is a science because there are harmful aspects of science continuity(?) of nature that are never shared by Buddhism. There are modern scientists who say that the damage done by scientific and technological manufacturing, to the nature in last two century which more than the consumption of natural resources by the humanity in its entire history. If this is going to be infected without change surely the life will disappear from earth in the next century. Therefore, the present journey of science and technology should be controlled in order to functioning the life on earth without much damage.

Buddhism and modern science (Lected by Ven. Paññāloka) (Original by Ven. Im Dima & Ven. H. Sovanny)

Until the beginning of the last century, Buddhism was confined to countries untouched by modern science. Nevertheless, from its very beginning, the teachings of the Buddha were always open to scientific thinking. One reason why the teaching can easily be embraced by the scientific spirit is that the Buddha never encouraged rigid, dogmatic belief. He did not claim to base His teaching on faith, belief, or divine revelation, but allowed great flexibility and freedom of thought.

The second reason is that the scientific spirit can be found in the Buddha's approach to spiritual truth. The Buddha's method for this covering and testing spiritual truth is very similar to that of the scientist. A scientist observes the external world objectively and would only establish a scientific theory after conducting many successful practical experiments. Using a similar approach 25 centuries ago, the Buddha observed the inner world with detachment and encouraged his disciples not to accept any teaching until they had critically investigated and personally verified its truth. Just as the scientists today would not claim that his experiment cannot be duplicated by others, the Buddha did not claim that his experiment cannot be duplicated by others, the Buddha did not claim that his experience of enlightenment was exclusive to Him. Thus in His approach to truth the Buddha was analytical as the present day scientists. He established a practical, scientifically worked

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108In Buddhism there is no freedom of thought. According to Buddhism if one has micchā ḍīṭṭhi (wrong view/thought) he will reborn in hell or as an animal.
109In Buddhism there is no freedom of thought. According to Buddhism if one has micchā ḍīṭṭhi (wrong view/thought) he will reborn in hell or as an animal.
out method for reaching the ultimate truth and the experience of enlightenment.

While Buddhism is very much in line with the scientific spirit, it is not correct to equate Buddhism with science. It is that the practical application of science has enabled mankind to live more comfortable lives and experience wonderful things never dreamt about before. Science had made it possible for man to swim than the fish, fly higher than birds and walk on the moon. Yet the sphere of knowledge acceptable to conventional, scientific wisdom is confined to empirical evidence. And scientific truth is subject to constant change. Science cannot give man control over his mind and neither does it offer moral control and guidance. Despite its wonders, science has indeed many limitations not shared by Buddhism.

In a comparative study between Buddhism and science we can observe similarities in the two teachings. Buddhism is the thought preached by a great human being and a seer. Modern science on the other hand is enriched by the intellectual contribution of many thinkers in the West. Buddhism discloses the two natures of existence of the being and teaches the out(?) of unsatisfactoriness. Science discloses secret of the material world and teaches how the matter would be changed for the benefit of man and to manufacture material good to satisfy wants and needs of the man. both systems have given great insight to human knowledge as a whole.

In discovering the secret material world science has employed the two systems: (1) Analysis (2) Synthesis. Analysis means to classify the component parts of some objects into various parts in order to see its reality. Snythesis means showing the relationship among analysis data. The scientific laboratory employs both of these matter. Buddhism also uses both of those methods to show the related to the phenomena.(?) For example, most of the religions at the Buddha's time believed in some forms of soul.

Both Buddhism and modern science don't depend on any belief or blind faith. The science verifies everything to discover the truth and it wants the truth to be clear and transparent. The Buddhist teaching schools emphasize one opened mindedness and enquiry. The Buddha's teaching is opened and all are invited to come and see – »Ehi passiko.« The Buddha's didn't discourage freedom of thought and enquiry. Instead he promoted free thinking and questioning in the study of his teachings as can be observed from many discourses such as Mahāparinibbāna Sutta of Dīgha Nikāya, Upālī and Vimāna Sutta in Majjhima Nikāya and Kālāma Sutta in Anguttara Nikāya.110

Another similarity between Buddhism and science is accepting the theory of causality. In Buddhism the causality is called 'the central philosophy'. The Buddha said that whether the Buddha was born or not, the theory of causality is there in nature. Buddhism teaches its theory of synthesis. Through that the teaching of Dependent Coorigination (Paṭiccasamuppāda). Another immense contribuýtion made by both science and buddhism is widening the horizon of human knowledge on himself and the world. It is because of science that we know more about the world today. It has resulted in another way by reducing diseases expanding the human life span etc. Also, because of science that the human has become comfortable more than every before.

In above data we see characteristic similar to Buddhism and science. By this some want to come to the conclusion that Buddhism is a scientific conclusion as Buddhism is a science. Yet it is not reasonable to come to the theistic conclusion, as Buddhism is a science because there are harmful aspects of science on humanity and nature that are never shared by Buddhism. There are modern scientists who say that the damage done by scientific and technological manufacturing to the nature in last two centuries which more than the consumption of natural resources by the humanity in its entire history.(?) If this is going to be infected, it without change surely the life will disappear from earth in the next century.(?) Therefore, the present journey of science and technology should be controlled in order to continue the life on earth without much damage.

110In other religions such as Christianity, Islam and many others the people also asked their religious teachers and they got satisfactory answers.
Until the beginning of the last century, Buddhism was confined to countries untouched by modern science. Nevertheless, from its very beginning, the teachings of the Buddha were always open to scientific thinking. One reason why the teaching can easily be embraced by the scientific spirit is that the Buddha never encouraged rigid, dogmatic belief. He did not claim to base his teaching on faith, belief, or divine revelation, but allowed great flexibility and freedom of thought.

The second reason is that the scientific spirit can be found in the Buddha’s approach to spiritual truth. The Buddha method for covering and testing spiritual truth is very similar to that of the scientist. A scientist observes the external world objectively, and would only establish a scientific theory after conducting many successful practical experiments. Using a similar approach 25 centuries ago, the Buddha observed the inner world with detachment, and encouraged his disciples not to accept any teaching until they had critically investigated and personally verified its truth. Just as the scientist today would not claim that his experiment cannot be duplicated by others, the Buddha did not claim that his experience of enlightenment was exclusive to him. Thus, in his approach to truth, the Buddha was as analytical as the present day scientist. He established a practical, scientifically worked-out method for reaching the ultimate truth and the experience of enlightenment.

While Buddhism is very much in line with the scientific spirit, it is not correct to equate Buddhism with science. It is that the practical application of science has enabled mankind to live more comfortable lives and experience wonderful things undreamed of before. Science had made it possible for man to swim better than the fishes, fly higher than the birds, and walk on the moon. Yet the sphere of knowledge acceptable to conventional, scientific wisdom is confined to empirical evidence. And scientific truth is subject to constant change. Science cannot give man control over his mind and neither does it offer moral control and guidance. Despite its wonders, sciences have indeed many limitations not shared by Buddhism.
In a comparative study between Buddhism and science we can observe similarities in the two teachings. Buddhism is the thought preached by a great human being in a seer. Modern science on the other hand, has enriched by the intellectual contribution of many thinkers in the west. Buddhism discloses the true natures of existence of the being and teaches the way out of unsatisfactoriness. Science discloses secret of the material world and teaches how matter would be change for the benefit of man and to manufacture material goods to satisfy wants and needs of the man. Both systems have given great insight to human knowledge as a whole.

In discovering the secret material world science has employed the two systems. 1, Analysis. 2, Synthesis. Buddhism also uses both these methods to show the interrelated of phenomena. Both Buddhism and modern science don’t depend on blind faith. Science verifies everything to discover the truth and it wants the truth to be clear and transparent. The Buddhist teaching also emphasizes open mindedness and enquiry. The Buddha’s teaching is open and all are invited to come and see “ Ehipassiko” The Buddha didn’t discourage freedom of thought and enquiry. Instead he promoted free-thinking and questioning in the study of his teaching as can be observed from many discourses such as. Mahaparinibbana sutta of D.N, Upali and Vimamsaka Sutta in M.N and Kalama Sutta in A.N.

Another similarity between Buddhism and science is accepting the theory of causality. In Buddhism the causality is called “the central philosophy” The Buddha says whether the Buddha are born or not, the theory of causality is there in nature. Buddhism teaches its theory of synthesis through that the teaching of dependent co-origination (paticcasamudpada). Another immense contribution mad by both science and Buddhism is widening the horizon of human knowledge on himself of the world. It is because of science that we know more about the world today. It has resulted in another way by reducing diseases expanding the human life span etc. although, because of science that the human life has become comfortable more than ever before.

Thus we see characteristic similar to Buddhism and science. By this, some want to come to the conclusion that Buddhism is a scientific conclusion as Buddhism is a science. Yet it is not reasonable conclusion, because there are harmful aspects of science on humanity and nature that are never shared by Buddhism. Buddhism is totally beneficial to man as well as to environment, whereas science is not so Science is concerned only about material well being of people, whereas Buddhism aims at both material and spiritual well being, making a fine balance between them. 445

Until the beginning of the last century, Buddhism was confined to countries untouched by modern science. Nevertheless, from its very beginning, the teachings of the Buddha were always open to scientific thinking. One reason why the teaching can easily be embrace by the scientific spirit is that the Buddha never encouraged rigid, dogmatic belief. He did not claim to base his teaching on faith, belief, or Divine revelation, but allowed great flexibility and freedom of thought.

The second reason is that the scientific spirit can be found in the Buddha’s approach to spiritual truth. The Buddha method for this covering and testing spiritual truth is very similar to that of the scientist. A scientist observes the external world objectively, and would only establish a scientific theory after conducting many successful practical experiments. Using a similar approach 25 centuries ago, the Buddha observed the inner world with detachment, and encouraged his disciples not to accept any teaching until they had critically investigated and personally verified its truth. Just as the scientist today would not claim that his experiment cannot be duplicated by others, the Buddha did not claim that his experience of enlightenment was exclusive to him. Thus, in his approach to truth, the Buddha was as analytical as the present day scientist. He established a practical, scenically worked-out method for reaching the ultimate truth and the experience of enlightenment.

While Buddhism is very much in line with the scientific spirit, it is not correct to equate Buddhism with science. It is that the practical application of science has enabled mankind to live more comfortable lives and experience wonderful things undreamed of before. Science had made it possible for man to swim better than the fishes, fly higher than the birds, and walk on the moon. Yet the sphere of knowledge acceptable to conventional, scientific wisdom is confined to empirical evidence. And scientific truth is subject to constant change. Science cannot give man control over his mind and neither does it offer moral control and guidance. Despite its wonders, sciences have indeed many limitations not shared by Buddhism.
**Question: Introduce the Freedom of Thought in Buddhism**

It is generally believed that in Buddhism there is freedom of thought, which differs from other religions. In the modern world there is a common view that religion is the main obstacle which locked the progress of human knowledge. The believed - thus religions don’t allow people to think in a new way. This idea is mainly developed toward theistic religion like Hinduism, Christianity and Islam.

Islam says that free thinking is the great hindrance to one’s happiness here and hereafter. In these religions they have creators and revealers. But the followers are not allowed to question their creator or revealer. Therefore, in such religions there is no room for free thinking, to look for new knowledge rather than what the religious teacher said.

Buddhism does not belong to theistic religions. The Buddha was only human being who attained enlightenment and saw the things in the world as they are. His teaching is an opened doctrine that can be questioned. In Kālāma Sutta there is evidence that Buddha encourages everyone to come, see and examine his teachings by their eyes. Therefore, Buddhism forms the freedom of thought than any other religions.

Mahāparinibbāṇa Sutta of Dīgha Nikāya records teachings called four great authorities - ‘Cattāro mahāpadesa’. Buddhapadesa, Saṅghapadesa, Sambhulatherapadesa and Ekatherapadesa. In such teachings if one feels the teaching is true, he may accept it. The teachings that should be examined also encourages free thinking. Because of the freedom of thought all the words of the Buddha are opened for individual to examine.

In Upāli Sutta of Majjhima Nikāya there is an episode where Buddha met a householder, Upāli. Having a conversation with the Buddha about soul, Upāli realized that the Buddha's ideas were correct and requested to be Buddha's follower. But the Buddha remained silent up to third time and asked him to examine well. This clearly shows that the buddha's attitude toward free thinking and encouraging people to think well and decide well.

Buddhism rejects blind faith. In Kālāma Sutta of Anguttara Nikāya the Buddha gives ten advices to Kālāma – not to accept anything by hearsay, tradition, report, texts of logic, reason of theory, reason of appearance, own view, suitability and respect for teacher. Having given then principles, the Buddha advises him not to depend on any of these sources but to compare and verify them through personal knowledge. By examining the given knowledge one can verify it for himself. Thereby, it is the correct form of knowledge for oneself.

The above sources given are very clearly showing that Buddha's teaching encourages free thinking, examination and opens path to knowledge. The Buddha didn’t like anybody to accept anything just as blind people. This critical and open attitude of Buddhism is never seen in other world religions.

111Therefore there is no way to accept anything... it seems …
112If we do not believe anything mentioned before, then how can we ever have 'personal knowledge’?
Among the founders of religions the Buddha (if we are permitted to call Him the founder of a religion in the popular sense of the term) was the only teacher who did not claim to be other than a human being, pure and simple. Other teachers were either gods or his incarnations in different forms or they were inspired by Him. The Buddha was not only a human being; He claimed no inspiration from any god or external power either. He attributed all his realization, attainments and achievement to human endeavour and human intelligence. A man and only a man can become a Buddha.

It is on the principle of individual responsibility that the Buddha allows freedom to His disciples. In the Mahāparinibbāna Sutta the Buddha says that He never thought of controlling the Sāṅgha (order of monks) nor did He want the Sāṅgha to depend on Him. The freedom of thought allowed by the Buddha is unheard of elsewhere in the history of religions.¹¹³ This freedom is necessary because according to the Buddha man's emancipation depends on His own realization of any external power as a reward for His obedient good behavior.

The Kālāma Sutta of Anguttara Nikāya recorded then principles by the Buddha given to Kālāmas at the village called Kesaputta. These ten principles of Kālāma Sutta are as follows:¹¹⁴

1. Do not accept hearsay
2. Do not accept tradition
3. Do not accept report
4. Do not accept texts
5. Do not accept reason of logic
6. Do not accept theory
7. Do not accept appearance
8. Do not accept own view
9. Do not accept suitability
10. Do not accept teacher's words

"But, oh, Kālāmas, when you know for yourselves that certain things are unwholesome (akusala) and wrong and bad, then give them up... and when you know for yourselves that certain things are wholesome (kusala) and good, then accept them and follow them."

The Buddha was always eager to dispel doubt. Even just a few minutes before His death He requested His disciples several times to ask Him if they had any doubts about His teaching and not to feel sorry later that they could not clear those doubts. But the disciples were silent. Not only the freedom of thought, but also the tolerance allowed by the Buddha was astonishing to the student of the history of religions. The wealthy householder named Upāli, a well-known lay disciple of Nigantha Nāthaputta (Jaina Mahāvīra) was expressly sent by Mahāvīra himself to meet the Buddha and defeat Him in argument on certain points in the theory of kamma. Upāli at the end of the discussion was convinced that the views of the Buddha were right and those of his master were wrong.

In the Jnānasara Samuccaya states: "As the wise test gold by burning, cutting and rubbing it (on a piece of touchstone), so are you to accept my words after examining them and not merely out of regard for me." The source given above very celarly shows that Buddhism encourages free thinking, critical examination and open path of knowledge. The Buddha didn't like anybody to accept anything just as blind men. He invites everybody to open the eyes and see the things themselves. This critical attitude of Buddhism is never seen in other world religions.¹¹⁵

The Buddhist attitude towards the freedom of thought (original by ven. Dharmeśvar)

The freedom of thought allowed by the Buddha is unheard elsewhere in the history of religions.¹¹⁶ This freedom is

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¹¹³Regarding the teaching of micchā diṭṭhi (wrong view) which is to be leading to rebirth in animal realm or hell I claim that in Buddhism there is no freedom of thought.

¹¹⁴Indeed, if one follows this advice, He would have to be completely without any view, but also without any possibility to acquire any new knowledge...

¹¹⁵Muslims and Christians would argue as they also provide maximum support for enquiry to all those who strive to understand the 'truth'.

¹¹⁶There is no freedom in Buddhism. For example, if a Sāmanera has wrong thought (micchā diṭṭhi), he must disrobe. If a lay person has wrong thought (micchā diṭṭhi) or wrong thinking (micchā sankalpa) he will reborn as an animal or in a hell. There is no freedom of thought in Buddhism.
necessary because according to the Buddha man's emancipation depends on his own realization of truth and not on the benevolent grace of God or any external power as a reward for his obedience and good behavior.

The Buddha said that one is one's own refuge. He taught, encouraged and stimulated each person to develop oneself and to work out one's emancipation, for man has the power to liberate himself from all bondage through his own personal effort and intelligence. In Mahāparinibbāṇa Sutta of Dīgha Nikāya the Buddha says: „You should do your work, for the Tathāgata only teach the way.“ This also provides important evidence to show the special place for freedom of thought in Buddhism.

In the Upāli Sutta of Majjhima Nikāya there is an episode where Buddha met a householder Upāli. Having a conversation with the Buddha about soul, Upāli realized that the Buddha's ideas are correct and then he requested and wanted to be a Buddha's follower. But the Buddha remained silent up to the third time and asked him to examine well. This shows that the Buddha's attitude towards free thinking and that he always encouraged people to think well and decide what they think.

In the Kālāma Sutta of Anguttara Nikāya the Buddha gave ten advices to Kālāmas – 

1. Not to accept anything by hearsay  
2. Not to accept anything by tradition  
3. Not to accept anything by report  
4. Not to accept anything by texts  
5. Not to accept anything by reason of logic  
6. Not to accept anything by reason of theory  
7. Not to accept anything by reason of appearance  
8. Not to accept anything by own views  
9. Not to accept anything by suitability  
10. Not to accept anything by respect for teacher

Having given ten principles the Buddha advised to the Kālāmas not to depend on anything of these sources but to compare and verify it through personal knowledge. Thereby one has the correct form of knowledge for oneself.

The Buddha went even further. He told the bhikkhus that a disciple should examine even the Tathāgata himself, so that he might be fully convinced of the true value of the teacher whom he follows. According to Vimānasaka Sutta the Buddha was always eager to dispel doubt. Even just a few minutes before His death He requested His disciples several times to ask Him if they had any doubts about his teaching.

Buddhism is a unique teaching because it encourages inquiry and grants freedom of thought. The 'ehi passiko' quality, the express of the Dhamma to free investigation and observation bears evidence to the importance attached to freedom of thought in Buddhism. And the emphasis laid on individual realization of the truth - “paccattaṃ veditabbo viññūhīti.”

The sources given above are very clearly showing that Buddhism encourages free thinking, critical examination and open path of knowledge. The Buddha did not like anybody to accept anything just as blind faith. This critical and open attitude of Buddhism is never seen in other world religions.

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666 INTRODUCE THE BUDDHIST ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE FREEDOM OF THOUGHT?

Prepared by Ven. Im Dina

Printed by Ven H sovanny

Among the founders of religions the Buddha (If we are permitted to call him the founder of a religion in the popular sense of the term) was the only teacher who did not claim to be other than a human being, pure and simple. Other teachers were either God, or his incarnation in different forms, or inspired by him. The Buddha was not only a human being; he claimed no inspiration from any god or external power either. He attributed all his realization, attainments and achievement to human Endeavour and human intelligence. A man and only a man can become a Buddha.

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117 In the original there was 'conservation'...
118 Having followed these pieces of advice one has no possibility to get any knowledge or even for saddhā. This is a contradictory Sutta in Tipiṭaka, because it contradicts with other Suttas where the follower is given an information and belief in an information as given by teacher is not proper according to Kālāma Sutta. Therefore I claim, that Kālāma Sutta is very contradictory sutta in Tipiṭaka.
119 How can one get a 'personal knowledge', if he can't accept anything of the ten sources given above? Kālāma Sutta is, indeed, very strange sutta.
120 Muslims would argue strongly against such a statement. Allāh is showing his presence by the world which is around us and giving us the possibility to explore it and discover new and new things. Islam as well as other religions like Christianity etc. are supporting the inquiry and they are ready to answer any kind of question (though sometimes not satisfactorily, like in Buddhism we also don't get some answers for some questions). Inquiry, at least in the world religions is, indeed, supported.
It is on the principle of individual responsibility that the Buddha allows freedom to his disciples. In the Mahaparinibbana Sutta the Buddha says that he never thought of controlling the Sangha (order of monks) nor did he want the Sangha to depend on him. The freedom of thought allowed by the Buddha is unheard of elsewhere in the history of religions. This freedom is necessary because, according to the Buddha, man’s emancipation depends on his own realization.

The Kalama Sutta of A.N. recorded ten principles the Buddha gave to Kalamas at the village called Kesaputta. These ten principles of Kalama Sutta as follows: Don’t accept by hearsay, Tradition, Report of text, reason of logic, theory, appearance own view, suitability and teacher. But, O Kalamas, when you know for yourselves that certain things are unwholesome (akusala), and wrong and bad, then give them up … and when you know for yourselves that certain things are wholesome (kusala) and good, then accept them and follow them.

The Buddha was always eager to dispel doubt. Even just a few minutes before his death, he requested his disciples several times to ask him if they had any doubts about his teaching, and not to feel sorry later that they could not clear those doubts. But the disciples were silent. Not only freedom of thought, but also tolerance allowed by the Buddha is astonishing to the student of the history of religions. The wealthy householder named Upali, a well-known lay disciple of Nigantha Nataputta (Jain Mahavihara), was expressly sent by Mahavira himself to meet the Buddha and defeat him in argument on certain points in the theory of Karma. Upali, at the end of the discussion was convinced that the views of the Buddha were right and those of his master were wrong. But the Buddha cautioned him to think further.

The Jnanasara. Samuccaya states: “as the wise test gold by burning, cutting and rubbing it (on a piece of touchstone), so are you to accept my words after examining them and not merely out of regard for me”. The source given above very clearly shows that Buddhism encourages free thinking, critical examination and open path of knowledge. The Buddha didn’t like anybody to accept anything just as blind men. He invites everybody to open the eyes and see the thing of themselves. This critical attitude of Buddhism is not seen in other world religions.

The freedom of thought allowed by the Buddha is unheard of elsewhere in the history of religions. This freedom is necessary because, according to the Buddha, man’s emancipation depends on his own realization of truth and not on the benevolent grace of a god or any external power as a reward for his obedient good behavior.

The Buddha said that one is one’s own refuge. He taught, encouraged and stimulated each person to develop himself and to work out his own emancipation, for man has the power to liberate himself from all bondage through his own personal effort and intelligence. In Mahaparinibbana Sutta of D.N the Buddha says: ‘You should don your work, for the Tathagatas only teach the way.’ This also provides importance evidence to show the special place to freedom of thought in Buddhism.

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In the Kalama Sutta of A.N the Buddha gave ten advices to Kalama not to accept anything by hearsay, tradition, report, texts, reason of logic, reason of theory, reason of appearance, own views, suitability and respect for teacher. Having given ten principles, the Buddha advised to the Kalamas not to depend on anything of these sources but to compare and verify it through personal knowledge. Thereby, he is the correct form of knowledge for himself.

The Buddha went even further. He told the Bhikkhus that a disciple should examine even the Tathagata himself, so that he might be fully convinced of the true value of the teacher whom he followed, according to the Vimamsaka Sutta. The Buddha was always eager to dispel doubt. Even just a few minutes before his death, he requested his disciples several times to ask him if they had any doubts about his teaching.

Buddhism is a unique teaching because it encourages inquiry and grants freedom of thought. The Ehipassiko quality, the express of the Dhamma to free investigation and observation, bears evidence to the importance attached to freedom of thought in Buddhism.
And the emphasis laid on individual realization of the truth “Paccattam veditabbo Vinnuhiti”

The sources given above are very clearly shown that Buddhism encourages free thinking, critical, examination and open path of knowledge. The Buddha did not like anybody to accept anything just as blind faith. This critical and open attitude of Buddhism is never seen in other world religions.

RELIGION AND INTRODUCTION (MARCH 2006)

Religion is a social phenomenon in any of the societies in the world. Many people follow a religion in practice. Therefore, religion became a very important social factor in the modern world.

The term ‘religion’ which representes the western idea of religious institutions comes from two Greek words – re + ligio. 'Re' means 'again' and 'ligio' means 'to connect'. According to the western understanding of the origin of world the human being was created by God because the man committed sinful deed prohibited by the God and therefore he was condemned to live on earth. Since then heaven and hell became separated. Yet the creator wants to give message to the created one to pray to the God to fulfill the gap (between man and heaven) by the connection of two worlds. They have the institution called religion.

Its function is to reconnect religion and people in order to make a connection between heaven and human world or between the God and man.

Classification of the religion: In the study of the concept of religion the religion has been classified in various ways. Some such classifications were done based on the internal characteristic of the religion. Some others are based on the scriptures and composition of the religion. The others are based on scientific studies on religion.

According to the following classification the religion is classified into three. They are as follows:

1. Theistic religion
2. Atheistic religion
3. Non-theistic religion

This classification is based on theism (belief in the creator God).

The religion in the group no. 1 believes in the God and his Creation. According to them the most important, everlasting and permanent entity in the universe is Him. These religions present their system of ethics based on the concept of God.

The second group of religion neither believes in the God nor in the ethics as taught by the God. Ajita Kesakambali and Pakudha Kaccayana who lived at the time of the Buddha taught belief and practice pertaining to the second group.

The third group does not believe in the God but they present a system of ethics in order to achieve self-realization based on their theory.

the following classification is based on the type of people who believed and practiced the religion:

1. Tribal religion
2. National religion
3. Universal religion

Tribal religion means the religion which is trusted by a particular tribe of people. We can draw example for tribal religion from all the major cultures in the world. Islam is an example for the second group of national religion. They are the religion of particular nation.121 The identity of the nationality of such nation is greatly related to that religion. A universal

121 That long time not a true. Maybe already from eight century Islam is not national religion. Nowadays Islam is in France, England, Germany, America, Sri Lanka, India, Burma. Therefore it is purely evident, that Islam is not a national religion, but the universal religion like Christianity or Buddhism. Hindus, Buddhists (and Buddhist monks), Christians and others become followers of Islam. The aim of Islam is to eradicate all other religion in the world and be the only religion in the world. Let's go and worship
Religion means any religion that goes over the boundaries of tribes, nationalities etc.

**Question:** Define the term religion and describe how can we consider Buddhism as a religion

Religion is a social phenomenon in any of the societies in the world. Many people apply the religion in practice. Therefore, religion became a very important social factor in the modern world. The term religion, which represents the western idea of religious institutions, comes from the Greek words re (again) + ligio (connect). According to the western understanding of the origin of world, human has been created by God. As the man committed a sin, he was condemned to live on the earth. Since then heaven and hell became separated. Yet the creator of man wants to give a message and also he created people to pray to God to fulfill the gap thus by connecting the two worlds.

They have the institution called ‘religion’. Its function is to reconnect religion and people in order to make a connection between heaven and human world or the God and Man. In the study of the concept of religion the religion has been classified in various ways. Some such classifications are done based on the scriptures and composition of the religion. The others are based on scientific studies of the religion. According to the following classification the religion is classified into three. They are as follows:

1. Theistic religion
2. Atheistic religion
3. Non-theistic religion

This classification is based on theism – belief in the creator God.

The religion in group’s number one believes in the God and his creation. According to them He is the most important, everlasting and permanent entity in the universe. These religions present their system of ethics based on the concept of God.

The second group of religion neither believes in the God nor in the ethics as taught by the God. Ajitakesakambali and Pakudhakaccāyana who lived during the life of Buddha, might belong to this group.

The third group does not believe in the God, but they present a system of ethics in order to achieve self-actualization based on their theory. The following classification is based on the type of people who believed and practiced the religion - ‘tribal religion’, ‘national religion’ and ‘universal religion’. Tribal religion means the religion which is trusted by a particular tribe of people. We can draw example for a tribal religion from all the major cultures in the world. Islam is an example for the second group of national religions. A universal religion means any religion that goes over the boundaries of tribe’s nationalities etc. Buddhism as a religion is neither a religion in the sense in which that word is commonly understood, for it is not a system of faith and worship owing to any allegiance to a supernatural being. Buddhism does not demand blind faith from its adherents. Here mere beliefs are dethroned and are substituted by confidence based on knowledge, which, in Pāli is known as saddhā.

In Buddhism there is not, as in most other religions, and almighty God to be obeyed and feared. The Buddha did not believe in a cosmic potentate, omniscient and omnipresent. In Buddhism there are no divine revelations or divine messengers. A Buddhist is therefore, not subservient to any higher supernatural powers which control his destinies, and which arbitrarily rewards and punishes. Since Buddhists do not believe in revelations of divine beings, Buddhism cannot therefore strictly be called a religion, because it is neither a system of faith and worship, nor the outward etc.

**Philosophy of religion (NOT COMPLETED)**

Philosophy of religion means the branch of philosophy in which we study the religion in scientific way.

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122That is not reality in the modern time, 20th and 21st century. Islam developed from ‘national religion’ (religion followed by a particular nation) to ‘universal religion’ either by threatening the people if they wouldn’t accept Islam or simply by various kinds of converting and missionaries.
At the very beginning of the history of every religion they have fostered the human life and society with ethical and spiritual values. Yet in the history of each and every religion there had been influence of changes and modifications and practices paving the way of fanaticism, racism and violence. Any noble tool when it became owned by human came to be subject to change, manipulation and corruption. The same happened in the case of religion – religion became an offensive cultural tool against some sections of humanity.

As a result of the scientific study of the religion, of the questions how it can be meaningful and the value of faith and truth for human life this branch of study which came to existence was called 'the philosophy of religion'. Therefore, it is called an intellectual and logical interpretation of religious experience. It is against dogmatism, irrationalism and in human practices cooperates with theory, interpretations and institutions of the religion. It tries to study the religion with scientific tool and it shows that given data are verifiable and provable with clear data.

The philosophy of religion employs scientific tools in discussing the things related to religion. It emphasizes logic and logical tools, science and scientific tools in order to discover the truth of the religion. Its main aim is identifying the principle of religion in order to prove it as scientifically practicable for human life. According to their theory the religion and ???

CONDITION BETWEEN RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY

There are many conditions between the religion and philosophy. In order to understand what philosophy is, firstly we have to divide three kinds of philosophy. They are as follows:

1. Indian philosophy
2. Chinese philosophy
3. Western philosophy
According to Indian philosophy, the term philosophy is defined as *Darśana* and *Anvikṣiki*. They are equal to Sanskrit words. The surface meaning of *Darśana* is just locking. Its deep meaning is ‘seeing the truth or reality’. The word *Anvikṣiki* is a kind of philosophers who used reasoning. They wholly rejected the hearing or tradition and the *Vedic* scriptures (as a true knowledge) they only recognized logical truth and they accepted the reasoning as a proper knowledge. Philosophy is a subject dealing with knowledge. The word *Darśana* contains deeper meaning than that meaning of *Anvikṣiki*. The western philosophy is derived from two Latin words: *phileo* (loving) and *sofia* (wisdom). So, philosophy is the ‘love of wisdom’ (or love and wisdom). According to Chinese philosophy, it was used to recognize moral philosophy or ethics.

In ancient times religion and philosophy (with each other) couldn’t recognize with each other (two subjects – religion and philosophy). There are many religions in the world. However, the function of religion is also to realize the absolute truth. If we compare above mentioned we can see close affinity between religion and philosophy. Religion can be interpreted as a result of human endeavor (attempt) to establish relationship between universe and man himself (their life is depending on external factors, and external factors are more powerful than one). In this way they started to worship the nature as gods.

We can identify lots of similarities between philosophy and religion in ancient time. In Greek mythology and religious beliefs were mined with traditional believes. But that philosophy was separated from religious texts regarded as father of philosophy due to many reasons, that separating religion and philosophy is the first time. Greek mythology and various types of religious beliefs were separated from philosophy. Independent thinking of human beings were developed during this period. Natural disasters and objects like mountains, rivers, trees, they were recognized as gods by the religion, but philosophers disagreed with these beliefs and started to explore natural happening in a more scientific way. In philosophy scientific and logical attitudes were developed rather tan in religion. This attitude made philosophy and religion (two different subjects) even in India. In India ancient beliefs were mined with philosophical thinking. Even ancient scriptures, *Vedas* and *Upaniṣads* were developed through philosophical period. We can identify their philosophical tendency.

Therefore, even in ancient India, we can see the philosophical religious movement as two subjects, then we go back to Indian tradition and we can identify ancient religion and philosophy (were mined together). But if we study briefly, we can identify, that:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>in religion:</th>
<th>in philosophy:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a) religion is based on god or super-human power</td>
<td>a) philosophy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) worships, sacrifices, offerings</td>
<td>b) critical discussion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) holy scriptures</td>
<td>c) logical reasoning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) expectation</td>
<td>d) clarification of ideas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e) organized institution</td>
<td>e) related to science and logic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f) leader</td>
<td>f) truth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g) special dress, clothes</td>
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There are many different schools, there are many views in philosophy.

**WHAT ARE THE MAIN SUBJECTS INVOLVED IN PHILOSOPHY? NATURE OF PHILOSOPHY**

Nature of Philosophy is a widely discussed topic among Scholar Students. Religion and Philosophy is closely connected with each other but we must know basic nature of Philosophy. Philosophy is the study about knowledge. After many years, following specifications were added to Philosophy.

1) --Philosophy is a subject of clarification of ideas. Clarification means to understand clearly. In the modern period, many scholars define Philosophy as a subject of clarification of idea. If you can’t understand the complex idea, you need to clarify it into simple and logical idea. That’s why object of philosophy is clarification of ideas. Therefore, nowadays, Philosophy means getting more simple ideas.

2) --The modern philosophers argue that Philosophy is a subject connected to analysis of philosophical concept. In Philosophy, analysis plays an important role. If you accept any idea without analyzing it properly, then it is becoming
dogmatic. In religion, there is no analysis. Everything, you accept according to religious leaders’ teaching, has no analysis. If you analyze any statement, you will divide it by part by part and separate it for understanding. Therefore analysis is important function in Philosophy. In modern period, many philosophers took the direction for the analytical philosophy. In modern western thinking, they recently emphasize on philosophical analysis.

(3)--Burden Russel was a prominent British Philosopher. He, in his century, introduced logic and reason as a part of Philosophy. He said “Without applying logic and reason, Philosophy is not valuable, not worth. Due to this argument, logic became important part in Philosophy. Nowadays, many people believe without logic and there is no philosophy. An analysis must base on logic. Success of Science became important because they do logic. Without using logic, there is no rational and logical process of thinking in Philosophy. Therefore, step by step, philosophers have to use logic and reasoning to their abilities. How and why are the two most important questions. Though Philosophy is a subject connected to free thinking, thinking must be done through logical approach. Otherwise, the whole system will collapse. Philosophy needs rational and logical thinking.

(4)--Epitimology Theory of knowledge is a main subject in Philosophy. Epitimology means origin, nature, function and limitation of human knowledge which is a central theme in discussion. Burden Russel wrote a book and argued that in any human knowledge, there is a limit and it is important. Without going into detail about human knowledge, there is no value in Philosophy. Human knowledge is a central theme in Philosophy. In ancient time, love of wisdom became the central teaching. After Greek period, knowledge became central discussion. In medieval period concept of God was important but in modern period the concept of human knowledge became important.

(5)--At the same time, there is another argument that Philosophy has to concentrate on metaphysical thinking. The famous philosophers called W-T Stace and A-C wing argued that most important part of Philosophy is metaphysics. Metaphysics means beyond physics. The medieval philosophers like Thomas Aquians, St-Ansele, St-Augustine and St-Peter Abbey comprise the God in Philosophy. God is beyond our experience and it is regarded as a metaphysical concept. That’s why even today, it is important in Philosophy. Therefore, in Philosophy, there are many important features and natures we can identify.

**RATIONAL NATURAL THEOLOGY**

The knowledge of existence of God derived by process of reasoning. The rational nature theology is a deduction of people's ideas about the god. Vedic religion is rational theology – the concept of god in Vedic thinking evolved as a result of the attempt made by Aryans who tried to understand the nature. In revealed theology there is not much to be discussed. The revealed theology is not opened to inquiring and criticism. (One believes in God, who simply exists.) Revealed theology is more powerful than natural theology, as scriptures of revealed theology are considered as holy and no one can change/discuss(?) the appearance of God in the holy scriptures.

Ideas of natural theology are evident in the philosophy of Plato (4th century BC) since he argues about existence of God and the basis of natural theology and reaches different conclusions. Some of them are as follows: 1. The competence to reason the God's existence is unanswered. 2. In certain cases there is no evidence of God

There is no cassation/occasion(?) to justify that belief on rational rounds there are may be many ways tardier(?) it.(?) Study of religion through philosophical view point is assented, because in the history many people
tried to find answers for philosophical questions through theological belief:
- „What shall I believe?“
- „Is the answer always the word „God?““
- „What shall I do?“
- „Is always answered by the will of God where did the words come from?“ (?)
- „The creator was God. Is there an answer for what will happen with me after I die?“

In these ways the ideas of God entered into human thinking. The God has been always used to answer critical and ultimate questions. The idea of God has functioned as an ultimate principle of explanation of the ultimate principle. Answers given by religion on those ultimate questions can be verified and inquired only by philosophy.

It is the duty of the philosophy to prove, that answers appearing in the religion are correct. Philosophy of religion inquires about the existence of god. It tries to find whether the God exists or not. There are two types of belief in theism – poly- and mono- theism.

The idea of more than one god in polytheism is that there may be large number of gods like in Hindusim, but they are different from their duties and responsibilities. Monotheism then is the belief in one powerful God.

According to monotheism God is the most powerful being, he is supreme and there is no one higher than the god. Supreme God has three major qualities, which no other person or being possesses:
1. Omnipotence (has all the power)
2. omnipresent (exists everywhere)
3. omniscient (knows everything)

The God is powerful enough to do anything in the world. God is the creator of the world, sustainer and detacher of the world.

**Question:** Explain similarities and differences between religion and philosophers

*Deism* - belief in existence of one or many divinities. Deism is the belief that the god exists but he does not interfere with the human life or with the law of the universe.

*Agnosticism* - holds, that the belief of existence of God is unknown as the existence or non-existence cannot be proved.

*Atheism* - That is not believing in any god.

*Aquinus* used his philosophical knowledge to explain the existence of God. He answers the question: „does god exist?“ We cannot prove the existence of God directly. It should be proved by by direct insight. The existence of god can be inferred. With a view to prove the existence of God *Aquinus* introduces five arguments:
1. The argument of change.
2. The argument of cause.
3. The argument of contingency.
4. The argument from degrees of excellence.
5. The argument from design.

1. The argument from change

The change is the undoubted fact in the nature. Anyone can experience the change in the physical world. It is not easy to prove that the present changes are related to the previous changes, but we all may accept the change as an ultimate aspect that doesn't require any explanation.

2. The argument of cause

We may refer every case of change to some prior cause.

3. The argument of contingency
We may assume the basic of reasoning of „unmoved mover“ or „prime mover“ who will be never changed. Among them Aquinus appreciated the third argument.(?)

Aquinus rejects the first two arguments, argument of natural theology which inferences from the same fact about the existence of God from the fact of change. Aquinus argues to conform the existence of God. The second argument for the existence of God is the argument of causation.

According to the argument of causation God is the first cause of everything. He has created the contingency. The argument of contingency begins with the fact that things in nature may appear uncertain, accidental and independent.

While a man is walking on the road he is inquired by someone who inquired because of that man's presence. A man dies due to a gunshot – speaking about his death we say that he had an accident. This might be happened is the Vikings did not come to the sense it the bullet was hot tired.(?)

According to Aquinus contingency is not an ultimate fact about nature neither requiring nor permitting any explanation. The argument of the degrees of excellence, when we examine the nature of things we experience difference even of excellence(? God(?)) better(?) best(?) Usually one thing is excellent than the other, the nation(?) of the degrees of the excellence is related with the idea of perfection. To protect the existence of God Aquinus agrees that nothing is perfect in the universe, only the God is perfect.

The fifth argument is about the harmony in the nature. It's nature exhibits different levels of excellence. Then it must be the case that the nature is also perfect. On the hypothesis that the God created the nature it ought to be perfect, if this God is omnipotent and perfect person of the world. Why the nature has become imperfect? According to Aquinus the perfect God created the imperfect world to give change to his men to prove their working abilities.

Natural theology evolved as a result of people's reasoning about nature. Among those theologies the natural theology is older than the revelation theology. Vedic theism is a natural theology. It evolved as a result of the reasoning about nature. Aryans who migrated to India did not know much about the weather and the climatic changes of the Indian Sindhu Valley. As they were moving from place to place, feeding their sheep and cattle, wherever the green grass grew, they moved there. to feed their animals. Therefore, there was no need for them to study the changes of nature. When they became permanent settlers of the Sindhu Valley, they experienced the changes of climate and the weather. At the beginning those climatic and weather changes were new for them. Those changes influenced their lives heavily, e.g., the drought season and rainy season. So, they were compelled to study the nature. At the first stage they applied their own life style to the forces of nature. that is called „anthropomorphism.“ Later these forces of nature were promoted to the position of gods. the gods were more powerful than human. This thinking developed up to the concept of one supreme god, who was supposed to be the creator of the universe, sustainer of the universe and the destructor of the universe.

Revelation theology

In the revelation theology god reveals himself to the people. Religions such as Judaism, Christianity and Islam are based on revelation theology. According to some scholars the concept of god was established in religion to answer the unsolved questions of human reasoning. The God is capable of answering the questions that man is unable to answer. This proves the incompetency of human beings. The philosophy of religion attempts to safeguard the existence of God through reasoning. Aristotle introduced the argument of „unmoved mover“ to prove the existence of God.

It was St. Thomas Aquinas who introduced many arguments to prove the existence of God. Thomas Aquinas answered the question: „Does the God exist?“ According to him the existing of the existence of the God cannot be known directly.

There are places built for veneration in all religions. Every religion has its center of excellence:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Place</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Judaism</td>
<td>synagogue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christianity</td>
<td>church</td>
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<tr>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>mosque</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hinduism</td>
<td>temple</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Those places are considered as holy and sacred. In some of these holy places there are statues or other emblems for

123Here the „unmoved mover“ or „prime mover“ refers to the creator God, to the one, who was the first cause for emergence of the world.
There are symbols to identify each religion:

- **Judaism** - ✡  (Star of David)
- **Christianity** - ✞  (Christian cross)
- **Islam** - ☪  (Star and Crescent)
- **Hinduism** - ♁  (Trisula)

Most devotees believe that those symbols have a magical power.

Religion always tries to keep its devotees under control by supreme powers. Men always have to seek help from those powers. No man is able to find his freedom without the help of the God.

Religion develops fear among many of its devotees. According to those religions, the God will punish the man's misbehavior and no-one will be able to escape from the punishment.
- all the religions are conservative
- religion protects itself from criticism
- no follower is permitted to question about the teachings of his religion
- religion tries to keep he uneducated under its control, while they try to answer the questions of the educated
- religion fulfills the needs of both educated and uneducated communities.

**THEORY OF SOUL AND MIND (ORIGINAL BY VEN. ANIK CHAKMA)**

Some kind of distinction between physical body and immaterial or symmetrical soul seems to be as old as human culture. The existence of such distinction is indicated by the mineral of burial of the earliest human skeletons yet discovered. Anthropologists of various conjectures about the origin of the distinction. Perhaps it was first suggested by memory to the dead person, by dream of them by the sight of reflection of oneself in water and on other bright surface or by meditation up to the significance of religious rites, which grew up spontaneously in face of the death.

It was **Plato**, the philosopher who has most deeply and lastingly influenced western culture, which systematically developed the body-mind theory and first attempted to prove the immortality of soul. **Plato** argued that although the body belongs to the sensible world and shares it changing an impermanent nature, the intellect is related to the unchanging reality of which we are aware when we think not of a particular good thing but of goodness itself. One who devotes one life to the contemplation of eternal reality rather than to the gratification of the desire of the body will find at death and the soul connected with that position depart from that material body.

The type of reasoning has been criticized on several grounds. **Kant** pointed out that although it is true that a simple substance cannot disintegrate, consciousness might nevertheless cease to exist after death of a person. Modern psychology has also denoted the existence of consciousness as a psychic factor in the function rebirth concept.

The body-soul distinction first formulated as a philosophical doctrine in ancient Greece was baptized into Christianity and entered the modern world as an evident truth and redefine according to various interpretation presented by western philosophers such as **Descartes**.

The doctrine of rebirth can be made with the first time in the Hindu tradition in *Brhadāranyaka Upaniṣad* where three classes of soul are distinguished:

1. Those that ahve faith in the eternity of the āgama
2. Those that perform their Vedic duties of sacrifice
3. Those data devoid of both those ways

The first are liberated from the round of birth and death, the second are reborn in human form and third

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124 This, of course, is not true. In any religion the follower can ask about (usually) any part of its teachings. Especially we can see such phenomenon in Christianity, where a vast and huge philosophy and number of books were written explaining and clarifying literally anything what the follower could ever ask about. Moreover, if the follower still wants to ask, the priests and the clergy are obliged to help him.
are condemned to the life of worms and insect. However, we also find here a description of the various places where the soul has to wander before taking rebirth. The description is as follows: „The first kind of soul purified by the fire that has consumed its gross body passed on into the flame. The day, the world(?) of the God then into the lightened(?). A spiritual person conduct(?) him to the world of Brâhman of him there is no return. (?) The second kind of soul however passes into smoke, the night, and the world of further and finally into the moon. There it becomes the food of the world but when it passed away from space into the air form air into the rain and from rain into the earth. But those who do not any these two ways become worm-biting serpents.(?)“

How far this detail is really significant and true may be a matter of controversy. But a path from any such controversy it may be said safely that here there is a clear idea of rebirth taught in Hinduism.

THE EARLIER GREEK PHILOSOPHY (ORIGINAL BY VEN. DHARMEŚVAR)

Like every other philosophical tradition in the world, Greek philosophy also grew out of religion. The earlier period of Greek philosophy was more scientific where the philosophers were treating the source of the world as water, air, fir, atoms etc.

The earliest important philosophers were:

**Thales**
He was considered to be the father of Greek philosophy. According to Thales, the earth and everything on it originated from water and it has happened in a time before million years.

**Anaximander**
He was the second greatest philosopher in ancient Greece. He agreed with Thales in the fact that universe has come from a material cause other than God. Yet he said it is not only water, but many other elements which he called 'apeiron'.

**Anaximenes**
The third philosopher in Milesian school and he was a pupil of Anaximander. He disagreed with his predecessors on the cause behind existence and according to him the all powerful element of existence is air. From air all the things have come into it.

**Pythagoras** and his Pythagorean school represented the next important movement. They maintained that the origin of the universe is number. Russell things that, according to Pythagoras, these constituents might be atomic. The Pythagorean conception of number was crude and naïve, being that of shapes(?).

**Heraclitus** was the next Greek philosopher. He maintained that change, or becoming, is the source of the world. He believed that thought is universal, common to all. Fire and the world are one and the same. Heraclitus said: „I have searched myself,“ and after the search he must have found the truth. There is another interesting idea in Heraclitus philosophy. According to him, sleep is better than life and death.

**Protagoras** is well known for his enunciation that „Man is the measure of all things, of that which is, that is and that which is not, that is not.” He further expressed: „Truth is a manifestation for consciousness. Nothing is in and for itself one, but everything has a relative truth only.“

**Gorgias** maintained that:

1. There is nothing
2. Even if there is something, we cannot know it
3. Even if it is and can be known, we cannot share that our knowledge with to others

**Socrates** The method he adopted was that of dialectic. He maintained the doctrine that „virtue is knowledge.“ Knowledge is the necessary and sufficient condition of the good.

**Plato** was an enthusiastic disciple of Socrates. He mastered the philosophy of Socrates and after death of his teacher he opened his own place of teaching or Academy. He is known as the first great philosopher in the West. All his new ideas were recorded in two pieces of literature called 'The Dialogue and Thirteen Letters'. He was one of the most influential philosophers in ancient Greece.

125 In the original there was 'mustered'.
Aristotle was a pupil of Plato. He was considered as a scientist, an economist and a logician. The ancient Greek philosophy came to the end of this great philosopher's period and began the succeeding time of the Western philosophy called the 'medieval era'.

**Question: Show the special characteristic in the Greek philosophy in the earliest period (Lectured by Ven. Paśñāloka) (Original by Ven. Im Dima & Ven. H. Sovanny)**

In ancient Greece there were two schools of philosophical thought. The first one was called 'Milesian school of philosophical thought'. They produced something in a new way, being different from contemporary knowledge, which was limited to primitive religious belief.\(^\text{126}\)

**Thales** (624-550 BC) – This philosopher is considered to be the father of Greek's philosophy. He did not want to accept explanation given by the traditional religion on man and his existence. Therefore, he said that he employed his power of thinking and logic to find the answer to the following questions:

1. From what the world originated
2. What is the nature of function of the universe
3. What is the destination of universe in his thinking and logical reasoning

To find the answers to the above questions he said there is one physical factor in material form, which is the cause of all animate and inanimate things. In the world that factor is water. According to Thales, he said that the earth and everything on it originated from water which has happened in a time of million of years. Thales' theory of first cause, which is water, is represented in the following three sentences:

1. Everything has come from water and will go back to water
2. The earth flows as a log on water
3. Everything is full of God

In these sentences Thales did not mean what they reflected as direct meaning. Indirectly, he wanted to say that everything has come from the power of water and everything depends on the power of water.

**Anaximander** (611-547 BC) – He was the second greatest philosopher in ancient Greece. He was influenced by his contemporary Thales. Yet he had his own interpretation. Anaximander agreed with Thales in the fact that universe has come from a material cause other than God. Yet, he said it is not only water but also many other elements. He disagreed with Thales and he asked if everything has come from water, how do we explain the origin of fire. Therefore, Anaximander proposes that there is huge collection of elements, which he called 'apeiron'. The term means 'unlimited elements and sources'. From the idea of this philosopher a new dimension was opened for explaining the material truth behind the existence.

**Anaximenes** (588-524 BC) – This was the third philosopher in Milesian school and he was the pupil of Anaximander, but he disagreed with his teacher on the cause behind existence and according to him the all-powerful element of existence is 'air'. From 'air' all the things have come into being. This philosopher introduced the air as the basic element of first origin of the universe. According to him, everything emerged from the source called 'air'. For example, he said that all the beings concluding human breath without breathing none is able to survive. Therefore, air is the vital force of life. Through these passages we see the characteristic of Greek philosophy and showed the different ideas in which to pave the way of human knowledge.

\(^{126}\) As usually the philosophers found the origin of the Universe as a kind of development of certain element (fire, water, air) we call this kind of philosophy 'elements philosophy.'
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ECLESIAN SCHOOL OF GREEK PHILOSOPHERS (LECTURED BY VEN. PAÑÑĀLOKA) (ORIGINAL BY VEN. IM DIMA & VEN. H. SOVANNY)

There are three major philosophers coming under this school:

1. Xenophanes (576 BC) – This philosopher also greatly disagreed with the traditional idea of religion. His criticism was mainly against the God-central theistic idea recorded in traditional Olympian scriptures. According to Xenophanes the truth cannot be known from the God who does not exist. The reality as is should be known by human mind itself.

2. Parmenides (around 514 BC) – Parmenides was influenced by Xenophanes. This philosopher presented his new thinking in way of a poem. He thought of unchanging reality behind the changing phenomena. Everything changes, then what would be the only unchanging phenomena related to human personality.

3. Anaxigoras (about 500 BC) – This is the third philosopher in idealistic trend of thought in ancient Greek philosophers. He also agreed that consciousness is primary. He talked about two forms of consciousness: 1. universal consciousness, 2. individual consciousness. The universal consciousness, which is called higher consciousness is the creator duty, order; organization... etc.
Individual consciousness is presented in each of us and is produced by the universal consciousness.

Heraclitus (5th century BC) was the next Greek philosopher. He maintained that change or becoming is the source of the world. Yet the essence of the world is everlasting fire, which is the moral judge as well. „Fire coming upon us will judge and convict all things.” He believed that thought is universal, common to all. He propounded the doctrine of the world, or logic, saying that it is one and everlasting. Fire and the world are one and the same. Heraclitus said: „I have searched myself,” and after the search he must have found the truth.

Heraclitus seems to have been a mystic of a peculiar kind. He was a rationalistic mystic, for the ‘ultimate’ is still the logos – reason, word. He seems to have arrived at this conception by searching within himself. Yet by calling the ‘ultimate’ by the name ‘fire’ he retains a kinship with the early cosmoklogists, although fire is not conceived by them as one of the elements. However, it was for him God Himself, like Water and Air for Thales and Anaximenes.

There is another interesting idea in Heraclitus’ philosophy. According to him, sleep is better than life and death. „Night has been called Euphrone, because at that time the soul has rest from the perceptions of senses, turns in upon itself and has a greater share of wisdom (phronesis).” This reminds us of the Mandogya Upaniṣad which says that the soul becomes prajñā in deep sleep, conscious, solid and integrated and is full of bliss (ānanda).


Heraclitus and His Philosophy

Prepared by Ven. Im Dina
Printed by Ven H Sovannya
Eclian School of Greek philosopher

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3. Anaxigoaris (about 500 B.C), this is the third philosopher in the idealistic trend of thought in ancient Greek philosopher. He also agreed that consciousness is primary. He talks of two forms of consciousness. 1, universal consciousness. 2, individual consciousness. The universal consciousness, which is called higher consciousness, is the creator duty, order; organization…etc. individual consciousness that presented in each of us has produced by the universal consciousness.

Sophist

Sophists were one of the most important political, social and intellectual forces in ancient Greek. On the other hand, they are recognized as a group of intellectuals who facilitated ideological necessity of the new democratic ruler. On the other hand, they were representation of new social economical and political changed of the Greek, especially in Athens. The original meaning of the term sophist was: 1, teacher of wisdom. 2, A group of people who thought for money even immoral and unethical things. 3, Group of people who were optimistic and creedy. 4, A group of teachers who teach rich people and powerful politicians. 5, a group of intellectuals hired by rich and powerful people for their purpose. 6, A group of professional teacher who study debating school for money.

Sophist taught only to rich people. Sophist also acted as lawyer in ancient Greek and thereby also they help the rich. The history of this movement is divided into two periods. They are called old sophists and young sophists. Among the well-known old sophists come Proeajros (481-411 B.C), Gorjias (483-375B.C), and young sophists are Alcidamas and Critias.
AGNOSTICISM

(From the Greek *a* (without) and *gnosis* (knowledge).) It is the philosophical view that the truth-value of certain claims – particularly metaphysical claims regarding theology, after-life or the existence of God, gods, deities or even ultimate reality – is unknown or, depending on the form of agnosticism, inherently unknowable due to the nature of subjective experience.

Agnostics claim either that it is not possible to have ‘absolute’ or ‘certain’ knowledge of the existence or non-existence of God or gods; or, alternatively, that while individual certainty ‘may’ be possible, they personally have no knowledge. Agnosticism in both cases involves some form of skepticism. Demographic research services normally list agnostics in the same category as atheists and non-religious people, although this can be misleading depending on the number of agnostic theists who identify themselves first as agnostics and second as followers of a particular religion.

Qualifying agnosticism

Enlightenment(?) philosopher David Hume proved that meaningful statements about the universe are always qualified by some degree of doubt. The fallibility of human beings means that they cannot obtain absolute certainty except in trivial cases where a statement is true by definition (as in „all bachelors are unmarried“ or „all triangles have three angles“). All rational statements that assert a factual claim about the universe that begin „I believe that...“ are simply shorthand for „based on my knowledge, understanding, and interpretation of the prevailing evidence, I tentatively believe that...“.

For instance, when one says: „I believe that Lee Harvey Oswald shot John F. Kennedy,“, - the speaking person is not asserting an absolute truth, but a tentative belief based on interpretation of the assembled evidence. Even though one may set an alarm-clock prior to the following day, believing that the sun will rise the next day, that belief is tentative, tempered by a small but finite degree of doubt (the sun might explode; the earth might be shattered in collision with a rogue asteroid or that person might die and the sun will never rise.)

What sets apart agnosticism from the general skepticism that permeates modern Western philosophy is that the nature of God is the crux of the issue, not whether god merely exists. Thus, the nature and attributes of god are of foremost concern, not whether God is merely „out there.“ Agnosticism maintains that the nature and attriburtes of god are beyond the grasp of man’s finite and limited mind; those divine attributes transcend human comprehension.

The concept of God is just too big a subject for a person to wrap his or her mind around. Humans might apply terms such as those found in the Catholic Encyclopedia, that attempts to characterize God in terms such as ‘infinitely perfect spiritual substance’, ‘omnipotent’, ‘eternal’, ‘incomprehensible’, ‘infinite in intellect and will and in every perfection’ but, the agnostic would assert, these terms only underscore the inadequacy of our mental equipment to understand so vast, ephemeral and elusive concept.

Many mainstream believers in the West embrace an agnostic creed. As noted above, for instance, Roman Catholic dogma about the nature of God contains many strictures(?) of agnosticism. An agnostic who believes in God despairs of ever fully comprehending what it is in which he believes. But some believing agnostics assert that that very absurdity strengthens their belief rather than weakens it.

Agnosticism can be subdivided into several subcategories. Recently suggested variations include:

- Strong agnosticism (also called ‘hard agnosticism’, ‘closed agnosticism’, ‘strict agnosticism’, ‘absolute agnosticism’) - the view that the question of the existence or non-existence of an omnipotent God and the nature of ultimate reality is unknowable by reason of our natural inability to verify any experience with

127 „Ephemeral“ is word that doesn’t fit here, it has completely different meaning than the other two words.
anything but another subjective experience. A strong agnostic would say „I don’t know, and neither do you.‟

- Weak agnosticism (also called ‘mild agnosticism’, ‘soft agnosticism’, ‘open agnosticism’, ‘empirical agnosticism’, ‘temporal agnosticism’) - the view that the existence or non-existence of God or gods is currently unknown but is not necessarily unknowable, therefore one will withhold judgment until/if more evidence is available. A weak agnostic would say „I don’t know, but maybe you do.‟

- Apathetic agnosticism – the view that there is no proof of either the existence or non-existence of God or gods, but since any God or gods that may exist appear unconcerned for the universe or the welfare of its inhabitants, the question is largely academic anyway. An apathetic agnostic would say, „I don’t know, and who cares anyway?‟

- Model agnosticism – the view that philosophical and metaphysical questions are not ultimately verifiable but that a model of malleable assumption should be built upon rational thought. This branch of agnosticism does not focus on a deity‟s existence.

- Agnostic theism (also called ‘religious agnosticism’) - the view of those who do not claim to ‘know’ existence of God or gods, but still ‘believe’ in such an existence. An agnostic theist would say „I don‟t know, but I think so.‟ (See Knowledge vs. Beliefs)

- Agnostic atheism – the view of those who do not know about the existence or non-existence of God or gods and do not believe in them. An agnostic atheist would say: „I don’t know, and I don‟t think so.‟

- Ignosticism – the view that a coherent definition of ‘God’ must be put forward before the question of the existence of God can meaningfully be discussed. If the chosen definition isn’t coherent, the ignostic holds the non-cognitivist view that the existence of God is meaningless or empirically untestable. It should be noted that A.J. Ayer, Theodore Drange and other philosophers see both atheism and agnosticism as incompatible with ignosticism on the grounds that atheism and agnosticism accept - „God exists‟ as a meaningful proposition which can be argued for or against. The ignostic would say: „I don’t know what you’re talking about when you refer to ‘God’. „
According to the historical information during the period of the *vedas*, skepticism has originated due to the ignorance of the philosophers or thinkers who accepted this concept as a good way to solve problems in the society and it was the best way to evade (*maga ha’*) from the questions of the people. There were different views concerning some concept such as after-world, rebirth, *kamma*, *ātman* etc. among the scholars as well as normal people since the time of the *Brāhmaṇas*.

During the time of the **Buddha** as well as *Brāhmaṇa* there were very famous skeptics and different views with regard to the after-world and as a result of that skepticism had originated in the world for the first time. According to the historical evidences they had questioned whether there is something remaining to connect one life with next life without destroying or dying if the person exists after the death. (?)

There was a school where it was believed very deeply in the after-world and similarly there were some thinkers who rejected it. Consequently, both schools tried to establish their view with most powerful evidences. In consequence of that there were skeptics in regard of the truth. Thus, different views originated and as a result of that skepticism too originated.

In the Pāli language skeptics are named as „*amarāvikkhepika*“, because during the time of the **Buddha** there were thinkers who accepted the skepticism. **Prof. Rhys Davids** translated it as ‘eel-wrigglers’. There are two meanings in the commentary about the ‘eel-wrigglers’. According to the first interpretation of the commentary, it has been translated as some special fishes who can swim in the water very quickly. Thus skeptics are mentioned as a group who wriggle out of questions and can’t come to the exact conclusion.

The Buddhist Pāli books have mentioned the different schools with different views, which followed the skepticism and there had been some monks who evaded from the questions like eels.

It has been mentioned in the Buddhist literature as follows:

„There was a monk who could not understand what is good and what is bad, therefore, he thinks: „I don’t know what is right and what is wrong exactly. Hence, if I decide that this is right or this is wrong, it may be a decision which is understood according to my preference and non-preference; consequently it may be wrong according to the real truth, therefore it may be a cause for my repentance (*pasutevilla*). Also it may be not beneficial (*hitakara*) for me according to the good conduct (*sadācāriya*).“ Consequently he feared and didn’t give any answer. But he evades from the questions and he has replied in different ways such as „I don’t say so, I don’t say in another way, I don’t say that not,“ etc.

According to that interpretation, we can get clear meaning about skepticism and skeptics as well as their views. In addition, it has been explained very clearly, why they have given such answers. Apart from that another skeptical school has argued as follows:

„I have to argue with the monks who argue very expertly. If I say that this is correct or this is wrong without knowing the real truth. Then I can’t explain them very correctly. Consequently, it may be wrong according to the real truth. Therefore, it may be a cause for my repentance (*pasutevilla*). Additionally, it may not be beneficial (*hitakara*) for me according to the good conduct (*sadācāriya*).“ Thus he doesn’t like to give any answer, because of fear to debate with others."

According to some *suttas* of the *Tipiṭaka*, skeptics have been given same answers to the questions of the people, such as:

1. *Evampi me no* – I don’t say so

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128 From the original note I got the notion that this note was lectured by **ven. Kogalle Vijita**. But then I found another note, where only the first paragraph was same (other parts were different) and the lecturer there was **ven. Paññāloka**. Not to increase someone's *māna* or not to hurt one's dignity I left the place of lecturer's name empty.
During the time of the Buddha, there was a very famous skeptic named Sanjāya Bellaṭṭhiputta and he has followed the theory of eel-wrigglers or skepticism. He had not any conclusion about some concepts such as divine world, after-world, wholesomeness, merit etc. His teaching was named as ‘amarāvikkhepavāda’ and normally he has given answers to any questions as follows:
1. Existence (asti)
2. Non-existence (nasti)
3. Existence and non-existence (asti nasti)
4. Non-existence and non-non-existence (nivasti na nasti)

He has followed this theory and evaded from any questions without giving any exact reply. When somebody asked a question, he replied:
„Is this wholesome – yes, it may be wholesome,
is this unwholesome – yes, it may be unwholesome,
is this wholesome or unwholesome – yes, it may be wholesome or unwholesome,
is this another thing except wholesome or unwholesome – I don’t have such a belief. “

Skepticism (Lectured by Ven. Paśāloka) (1)

According tot he historical information during the period of the Vedic skepticism it originated due to the ignorance of the philosophers or thinkers who accepted this concept as a good way to solve problems in the society and it was the best way to evade (mage ha) from the questions of the people. There were different views concerning some of the concepts such as after-world, rebirth, kamma, ātman etc. among some of the scholars as well as normal people since during the time of the Brāhmanic period.

In the Pāli language skeptics were named as amarāvikkhepika, because during the time of the Buddha there were thinkers who accepted the skepticism. Prof. Rhys Davids has translated it like ‘eel-wrigglers’. According to the first interpretation of the commentary, it has been transalted as some special fishes who swim
in the water very quickly. Thus skeptics was mentioned as a group who wriggle out of questions and can't come to the exact conclusion.

Apart from that another skeptical school argued as follows:

„I have to argue with the monks who argue very expertly. If I say that this is correct or this is wrong without knowing the real truth, then I can't explain them very correctly. Consequently it may be wrong according to the real truth, therefore it may be a cause for my repentance (sadācariya).“

Thus he doesn't like to give any answer because of fear to debate with others. According to some suttas of Tipiṭaka skeptics gave same answers to the questions of the people such as

1. Evampi me no (I don't say so)
2. Tathapi me no (I don't say thus)
3. Annathapi me no (I don't say in the other way)
4. Notipi me no (I don't say „not“)
5. No notipi me no (I don't say „not not“) etc.

During the time of the Buddha there was a very famous skeptic named Sanjaya Bellaṭṭhiputta and he followed the theory of eel-wrigglers or skepticism. He had no conclusions about some concepts such as divine world, after-world, wholesomeness etc. His teaching was named 'amarāvikkhepaṇāda' and normally he was given answers to any questions as follows:

1. Existence (asti)
2. Non-existence (nasti)
3. Existence and non-existence (asti, nasti)
4. Neither existence nor non-existence (nivasti na nasti)

Buddhist attitude towards the skepticism. According tot he Tipiṭaka Buddha rejected very deeply this philosophy because nobody can solve their problems with the skepticism where is no exact conclusion about any concept.129

**Skepticism (Lectured by Ven. Paṇṇāloka) (2)**

Skepticism is very developed form of philosophical thought. A skeptic is a person who normally doubts and questions accepted opinions. A skeptic in the philosophica sense refers to a person, philosopher who denies the possibility of knowledge or even rational belif in certain spheres, taken in this the words agnostic and agnosticism, too, denote similar meanings. In its widest sense an agnostic is one who believes that nothing is known or can be known of the existence or nature of God.130 God was considered the ultimate and absolute truth. It was generally considered the essence, the crux of religious thought. This means that both skepticism and agnosticism accept the unknowability of the ultimate truth.

The basic premise, on which this philosophy is built, is the belif that human knowledge is limited and therefore it does not have the capacity to know absolutely about anything, especially about subtle metaphysical issues. In India of the Buddha's time there had been a very famous skeptic. He was Sañjaya Bellaṭṭhiputta.

129 Fine, the Buddha rejected skepticism as useless, but if one has wrong view (micchā diṭṭhi) Buddha foretold about such people great suffering in hell or, if they were lucky, rebirth as an animal. It reminds me Islam – „You must follow this religion or you are wrong."
130 Agnostics as well as skeptics belived that our senses are limiting our ability to gain correct knowledge. Therefore, they believed that there is nothing that we can understand perfectly, not only God.
He did not make any absolute declaration on any important philosophical issue. This was because he believed that human knowledge is incapable of understanding such matters completely. He held that if he was to make an absolute statement on such matters and later he was proved wrong he would be looked upon as a liar.

This is why he came up with indefinite answers when deep philosophical issues were presented. If someone were to ask him whether there is next life, he would not give any absolute answer. He would say, "there would be." Again if one were to ask him whether there is no next world, eh woudl answer saying, "there may not be." Thus, he took no definite and fixed position. Because of these undecided attitudes the Buddhist texts describe Sañjaya Bellaṭṭhiputta as an Amarāvikkhepika (an eel-wriggler), which is rather a derogatory term. Suttas such as the Samaññaphala describe him as a fool, an ignorant person who knows nothing. But this may not be the truth for he, too, was a respected teacher among the 6 teachers.

Besides, even Jainism in its epistemology presents a method called Saptabhangi Naya – a process in which something could be viewed in 7 different perspectives. Buddha himself did not always give absolute answers. Some questions he left aside without answering. This is not because the Buddha would be skeptic, but because he did not wish to deal with irrelevant issues. From all this, what is clear is that skepticism is not a philosophy of the foolish and ignorant, but an opinion of learned men who considered human knowledge as imperfect to make absolute statements.

666

Skepticism

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The basic premise, on which this philosophy is built, is the belief that human knowledge is limited and therefore it does not have the capacity to know absolutely about anything, especially about subtle metaphysical issues. In India of the Buddha’s time there had been a very famous skeptic. He was Sañjaya Belatthiputta. He did not make any absolute declaration on any important philosophical issue. This was because he felt that human knowledge is incapable of understanding such matters completely. He held that if he was to make and absolute statement on such matters, and later if he was to be proved wrong, he would be looked upon as a liar.

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131 Here we can see, that even the teachers at Buddhist and Pāli University do not agree with the Buddha. And then they would argue that Buddha was omniscient... Wasn’t he? If he was not omniscient, then how can we ever believe things which are written in Tipiṭaka? So, who is wrong? Buddha or ‘highly educated Professors’ at Buddhist and Pāli University? Or is the Tipiṭaka wrong? Or those who have written Tipiṭaka? Buddha? Professors? Monks? … Are you going to punish me for my free-thought? Or will I reborn in a hell for my opinions? Didn't the Buddha teach the freedom of thought? So... what is the truth???

132 Are you going to think, that this teacher will reborn in hell for his disagreement with Buddha’s opinions? Or am I going to reborn in hell for teasing you? :-)

286
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The basic premise, on which this philosophy is built, is the belief that human knowledge is limited and therefore it does not have the capacity to know absolutely about anything, especially about subtle metaphysical issues. Thus there have been a class of thinkers never gave absolute answers regarding deep and profound philosophical problem. In India of the Buddha’s time there had been a very famous skeptic. He was Sañjaya Belatthiputta. He did not make any absolute declaration on any important philosophical issue. This was because he felt that human knowledge is incapable of understanding such matters completely. He held that if he was to make and absolute statement on such matters, and later if he was to be proved wrong, he would be looked upon as a liar. Thus out of his virtue he did not want to came out with any absolute opinion without fully knowing about it.

This is why he came up with indefinite answers when deep philosophical issues are presented. If someone were to ask him whether there is next life, he would not give and absolute answer. He would say, ‘there would be’. Again if one were to ask him whether there is no next world, he would answer saying, ‘there may not be’. Thus, he took no definite and fires position. Because of these undecided attitudes of his the Buddhist texts describe Sañjaya Belatthiputta as a Amara-vikkhepika- an Eel-wriggler- a rather derogatory term. Suttas such as the Samññaphala describes him as a fool, an ignorant person who knows nothing. But this may not be the truth, for he, too, was a respected teacher among the 6 teachers.

Besides, even Jainism in its epistemology presents a method called Sapta-bhangi-naya- a process in which something could be viewed in 7 different perspectives. Buddha himself did not always give absolute answers (ekamsa vyakarana). Some questions he left aside without answering. This is not because the Buddha was a skeptic but because he did not wish to deal with irrelevant issues. From all this, what is clear is that skepticism is not a philosophy of the foolish and ignorant, but an opinion of learned men who considered human knowledge as imperfect to make absolute statements.

666Skepticism (when you doubt that something is true or useful)

According to the historical information during the period of the Vedic skepticism has been originated due to the ignorance of
the philosophers or thinkers who accepted this concept as a good way to solve problems in the society and is was the best way to evade (mage ha) from the questions of the people. There were different views concerning the some concept such as after world, rebirth, kamma, atman, etc. among the some scholars as well as normal people since during the time of the Brahman.

During the time of the Buddha as well as Brahman there were very famous skeptics (someone who doubt that a belief or an idea is true or useful) and different views with regarding the after world and as a result of that skepticism had originated in the world at the first time according to the historical evidences. They had questioned that is there something remaining to connect to the next life without destroy or die it the person exist after the death.

There was a school who had believed very deeply about the after world and were some thinkers who had rejected in the same way, same concept. Consequently both school tried to establish their view with most powerful evidences in consequence of that there were skeptic with regarding the truth. Thus different views had been originated and as a result of that skepticism too had been originated.

In the Pali language skeptics has named as “amaravikkhepika” because during the time of the Buddha there were thinkers who accepted the skepticism. Professor Rees Kaves has translated it like eel-wrigglers. There are two meanings in the commentary about the eel-wrigglers. According to the first interpretation of the commentary, it has translated as some special fishes whom swimming in the water very quickly. Thus skeptics has mentioned as a group who wriggle out of questions and can’t come to the exact conclusion.

The Buddhism Pali books has been mentioned concerning the different schools with different views who fallowed the skepticism as there had been some monks who evade from the questions like eels. It has been mention in the Buddhist literature as follow: “There was a monk who could not understand that this is good and this is bad therefore he thinks so, I don’t know that what is the right or wrong exactly. Hence it I decide that this is right or this is wrong it may be a decision which understood according to my preference and unreferenced consequently it may be wrong according to the real truth therefore it may be a cause for my repentance (pasutevilla). Also it may not be beneficial (hitakara) for me according to the good conduct. (sadacaraya) consequently he was feared and doesn’t give any answer. But he evades from the question and he has replied in different way such as “I don’t say so, I don’t say in another way, I don’t say that not, not etc.

According to that interpretation, we can get clear meaning about skepticism and skeptics as well as their views. In addition, it has explained very clearly, why they have given such an answers apart from that another skeptical school has been argued as follow: “I have to argue with the monks who argue very expertly if I say that this is correct or this is wrong without knowing the real truth. Then I can’t explain them very correctly. Consequently it may be wrong according to the real truth therefore it may be a cause for my repentance. (sadacaraya) thus he doesn’t like to give any answer because of fear to debate with others”.

According to the some sutras of the Tripitaka skeptics has been given same answers to the questions of the people such as,

1 Evampi me no-I don’t say so.
2 Tathapi me no-I don’t say thus.
3 Annathapi me no-I don’t say in the other way.
4 Notipi me no-I don’t say “not”
5 No notipi me no-I don’t say “not, not”etc.

During the time of the Buddha there was a very famous skeptic named Sanjaya bellatthi putta and he has fallowed the theory of eel-wriggles or skepticism. He had not any conclusions about some concepts such as Divine world, after world, wholesome etc. his teaching has named “amaraviakkhepa vada” and normaly he has given answers to any questions as fallsows:

1 Existence (asti)
2 Non existence (nasti)
3 Existence and non existence (asti, nasti)
4 Non existence and non existence. (nivasti nasti)

He has fallowed this theory and evade from any question without giving a exact reply. When somebody asks a question he has replied as, “is this wholesome-yes it may be wholesome, is this wholesome-yes it may be unwholesome, is this wholesome or unwholesome-yes it may be wholesome or unwholesome, is another thing except wholesome or unwholesome-I don’t have such a belief”.

Buddhist attitudes towards the skepticism. According to the Tripitaka Buddha had rejected very deeply this philosophy
because anybody can’t solve their problems with the skepticism. There is no exact conclusion about any concept. According to the early Buddhist philosophy anybody can say that Buddhism had accepted the skepticism because Buddha has not answered some questions. Therefore there some views about skepticism of the Buddhism. But it can be called skeptical only in similarly specific sense. Strictly speaking, Buddhism is not skeptical about substances (saraya) and essences (avasya kotasa) etc. and it rejects or denies (paratikshepak) them. But when it comes to the problems of limits of human knowledge Buddhism seems to admit a sort of skepticism. The well-known concept of “unthinkable matters” (achetaniya) also supports this.

According to the Pali Sutras Buddha had exacted some question. They are called Avyahrut prama that “is body and soul an one thing or is it different from the body” it has been mentioned by the Buddha as a question which can’t reply exactly. Because at the one stage of higher knowledge anybody can’t create psychological souls out of this body. It has been compound with grass and it’s bud. Because if we want it cam separate, but it exist as a one thing. But it has two have. It has given as the example as fallow:

In addition. Surd and case cam named as a two. Thing and separate thus although surd is in the case.

Scepticism(312)
The Brahmagala Sutta mentions 62 views in which four of them are referred to the schools of sceptics. The Pali term ‘Amaravikkepika’, seems to be a nickname of sceptics and has translated as ‘eel-wrigglers’. However, it meaning is obscure and the commentary offers two explanations of it. It is said that it may means ‘those who are confused by their endless beliefs and words’. The alternative explanation is that amara stands for a species of fish, which are in the habit of running about in the water, constantly emerging and diving down so that it is difficult to get hold of them and that similarly this theory (scepticism) runs hither and thither without arriving at a definite conclusion.

There are four schools of Sceptical thinkers mentioned in the Pali Nikaya who adopted scepticism primarily:
(1) through fear of falsehood (musavadabhaya),
(2) through fear of involvement (upadanabhaya), (3)
(3) through fear of interrogation in debate (anyuyogabhaya), and
(4) the philosophy of Sabjaya.

The first three schools seems to have some conception of good life, their sceptical attitude seems at least regards as psychologically desirable in promoting one’s peace of mind. Sabjaya on the other hand may have been a more thorough-going sceptic, who made no pretence about the desirability of scepticism as a way of life.

The propositions of the Sabjaya’s philosophy are arranged in a four-fold order of expression and the logical alternatives are not confined to simple assertion or denial, but also the combination of both and the deny of denial e.g.,

1. there is (atthi) a next world
2. there is no (nati) next world,
3. there is and is not (atthi ca nati ca) a next world
4. there neither is nor is there no (n’ev’atthi na n’atthi) next world.

This fourfold scheme was not the innovation of Sabjaya but was held in common by all schools of sceptics.

Anvayabana(281)
The term ‘anvayabana’ occurs in both the Nikayas and the Abhidhamma Vibhanga. By this is meant the inferential or inductive knowledge that a causal sequence observed hold good in a number of present instances would have taken place in the (unobserved) past and will take place in the future also.

In Sajjutta Nikaya, knowing the causally correlated phenomena such as the paticcasaamuppadaya of 12 factors is called ‘the knowledge of phenomena’ (dhamme bana SN.II.58). By this dhamme banaj, one draws an inference (nayaj neti) with regard to the past and the future (atitanagate) and this constitutes one’s inductive knowledge (idam assa anvayevanaj).

These inductive inferences are therefore based on a theory of causation, which play a central role in early Buddhism. They are made on the data of perception, both normal and paranormal. All the knowledge that the Buddha and his disciples claim to have in ‘knowing and seeing’, except for the knowledge of Nibbana, appears to be of this nature. Therefore, the doctrines of Buddhism may be considered epistemologically derived from direct inferences based on normal and paranormal perceptions.

In Pali texts, direct inferences based on the data of normal perception include the statements:
1. On account of birth, there is decay and death—SN.II,
2. All conditioned things are impermanent—Dhammapada,
3. Among human beings there aren’t the usual characteristics, which constitute species—Vasetha sutta.

There are also many doctrines of Buddhism claimed to be inductive inferences based on the data of extra-sensory perception e.g., the doctrines of dukkha, anatta, karma etc. However, it is possible to make both valid and erroneous inferences on the data of normal or paranormal perception, this is what has happened in other traditions.

AGNOSTICISM OR SKEPTICISM IN BUDDHISM (ORIGINAL BY VEN. DHARMEŚVARA)

In reality. Buddha's approach to life, which is an actual conflict, is a process of experience. Buddha's aim was not merely the discovery and analysis of this conflict experience, but in analyzing and tracing its origin and cause it was an attempt to prove that this conflict was not real, but based on a delusion. The Buddha on the other hand was not interested in phenomena as such, but only in so far as they affected and constituted the process of life. Such discovery was a system of knowledge which was neither skepticism nor dogmatism, and we find here once more the Middle Path between the two extremes of denial and affirmation.

There are several occasions when the Buddha left a question unanswered. The question whether He knows that the world is eternal or not eternal, or He does not know whether the world is eternal or not eternal, comprehensive as it seems and forcing a solution – a mere 'yes' or 'no' answer would have disposed of the question but not of the problem which gave rise to the question. The question raised about the eternity of the world or the everlasting life has a much deeper root than the superficial enquiry about the presence or absence of a time-limit. The psychological cause of the question is the problem in the mind of the enquirer who is seeking confirmation of the continuation of life. And with the solution of this problem by the Buddha's teaching of soullessness (anattā) the earlier question becomes meaningless and hence does not require an answer.

On another occasion the Buddha was asked: „Is there a self?“ And the Buddha remained silent. Again He was asked, „Is there not a self?“ But the Buddha remained silent. Only when Ānanda pressed(?) for an explanation at least(?) of His silence did the Buddha say that affirmation of self would mean siding with eternalists or dogmatists while the negation of a self would mean siding with the annihilationists or skeptics. Neither reply would have been in accordance with the knowledge that all things are impermanent. In a teaching of which the most fundamental thesis is the process of becoming an impermanency, the question 'to be or not to be' cannot be put and has to remain unanswered (avyākāta).

Questions similar to those about the 'self' were put by Ānuruddha about the existence or otherwise of an accomplished one (Tathāgata) after His death. And here, too, reply is to the effect that the question cannot be answered as the enquiry assumes the real existence as an entity of that which is only a process in actuality: „As a Tathāgata is not met with in reality, it is not proper to pronounce of Him that He exists after death or does not exist after death or that He both does and does not exist after death or that He neither exists nor does not exist after death.“ The question therefore cannot be conceived. The actual origin of such theories does not lie in a sincere desire for higher wisdom (paññā) but in hastily formed opinions (diṭṭhi), opinions based on ignorance and blindness, personal feelings as a result of craving with excitement and skeptical agitation.
A brief history of scepticism

Scepticism (from the Greek – skeptesthai ‘to examine’) is the philosophical view that it is impossible to know anything with absolute certainty, or to know the world as it ‘really’ is. The word can also mean a general reluctance to accept anything on face value without sufficient proof (as in „He heard that Jim had run the 100m in under ten seconds, but he remained sceptical.”)

However, Scepticism (with a capital „S”) began in the 5th century BC in Greece where certain philosophers came to express doubts about how certain we could be about our knowledge. Protagoras of Abdera (480-411 BC), for instance, is reported to have said that „man is the measure of all things” (i.e., that we make the world in our own image) and Gorgias (485-380 BC) that „nothing exists: if anything does exist, it cannot be known; if anything exists and can be known, it cannot be communicated.” Many such thinkers arose from the group known as the Sophists, men who would hire their skills in debate and argument out to anyone for the right fee. From this point of view, this form of scepticism is based on the fact that with enough skill any argument can sound convincing.

Next came the Pyrrhonists, so called after Pyrrho of Elis, founder of that school, who argued that since we can never know true reality we should refrain from making judgments. His pupil, Timon of Phlius, followed this by adding that equally good arguments could be made for either side of any argument (so it was impossible to decide). The New Academy in the 2nd century BC, founded by Carneades (214-129 BC), taught only that some arguments were more probable than others. Later sceptics include Aenesidemus (1st century BC), who put forward ten arguments in support of the sceptical position, and the Greek physician Sextus Empiricus (3rd century AD), who argued the use of common sense over abstract theory.

When we reach the Renaissance we can see the influence of Greek scepticism in such thinkers as the French essayist Michel de Montaigne (1553-159), but the sceptical issues only fully resurfaced with the French philosopher René Descartes (1596-1650). Descartes attempted to use sceptical arguments in order to establish a firm ground for knowledge. So, Descartes reasoned, „if we attempt to subject everything to doubt, we will hopefully discover at some point if there is anything that cannot be doubted.” This he claimed to achieve in his assertion that it is impossible to doubt that we are thinking beings – which proves that we exist (Cogito ergo sum. - which is from Latin, it means „I think, therefore I am”). By employing this ‘method of doubt’, as he called it, Descartes merely used scepticism as a mean to find something certain, and was not therefore actually a skeptic.

The sceptical cause was once again championed by the Scottish empiricist, philosopher David Hume (1711-1776), who argued that certain assumptions – such as the link between cause and effect, natural laws, the existence of God and the soul – were far from certain. What little we know that seems certain, Hume argued, was based on observation and habit as opposed to any logical or scientific necessity. The German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), influenced by Hume set limits to human knowledge by arguing that certain things – such as if there was proof for God, or if the world had a beginning – did not make sense to be asked.

The German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) argued that objective knowledge did not actually exist, and his scepticism influenced in turn that of French existentialists such as Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-1980). The American philosopher George Santayana (1863-1952), argued that all belief – even that in oneself – is irrational (even though it seems the most natural thing).

Modern day philosophy, although it does not generally take extreme sceptical arguments very seriously, still retains the influence of earlier sceptical thinkers.

Buddhist attitude towards the skepticism

According to the Tipitaka, the Buddha had rejected very deeply this philosophy because nobody can solve their problems with the skepticism. There is no exact conclusion about any concept.

According to the early Buddhist philosophy somebody might say that Buddhism accepted the skepticism, because Buddha has not answered some questions. Therefore, there 'some views about skepticism regarding the Buddhism. But it can be called ‘skeptical’ only in a specific sense. Strictly speaking, Buddhism is not skeptical about substances (sārāya) and essences (avaśya kotas) etc. and it rejects or denies (pratikṣeṣa karana) them. But when it comes to the problems of limits of human knowledge, Buddhism seems to admit a sort of skepticism. The well-known concept of „unthinkable answers“ (achetaniya) also supports this.

133 This is a very valuable note. I even dare to say that until now I never encountered such a valuable note about Western philosophy in Sri Lanka.

134 Skepticism is a philosophical school which, we can see, has appeared in Ancient Greece long time before Jesus Christ’s birth. The skepticism means ‘the rejection of possibility to see the truth’. Thus agnostics or skeptics believed that there is no possibility to see or to understand the truth as we, people, have limited powers for that. But in Buddhism there is no such thing like skepticism, as in Buddhism one can attain Nibbāna or even Buddhahood and thus have any kind of knowledge. The conclusion of this topic seems to be completely wrong.
The term ‘Vedic’ as used in scholastic sense, implies the period confined to the time when the 4 Vedas were composed (1200-1000 BC) or includes the latest Atharveda composed around 1000-800 BC. However, when the term ‘Vedic thinkers’ is used, it should include all the Upanisadic thinkers (800-600 BC), as they were the successors of the Vedic tradition. In this regard, Vedic thinkers can be grouped into 3 categories under epistemology grounds:

1. **Traditionalists**—Brahmanas who derived their knowledge wholly from a scriptural tradition (anussava) and interpretations based on it.

2. **Rationalists**—Aranyakas and early Upanisads who derived their knowledge from reasoning (takka), speculating (vimajsa), and inferring (anumana).

3. **Experientialists**—Middle and late Upanisads who depended on extrasensory perception.

All these Vedic thinkers can be further divided into 2 main groups i.e. Karmamarga (the Way of Ritual) and Jnanamarga (the Way of knowledge). All Traditionalists belonged to Karmamarga, the Rationalists and the Experientialists belonged to Jnanamarga. However, Rationalists relied on intellectual knowledge whereas the Experientialists on intuitive knowledge. Followings are the common features of these Vedic thinkers:

1. **Traditionalists**
   The arguments of these traditionalists regarding the authority of Vedic scripture are:
   1. It is eternal, flawless and irrefutable in that it has no personal author or authors, human or divine,
   2. It is revealed by an omniscient and perfect Being,
   3. It is accepted by reliable wise and good person
   From the context of Cakvisutta, it is clear that the Brahmans’ claiming the absolute authority and validity of Vedic scripture were not merely out of faith in a tradition, but out of faith in a sacred, holy or revelational tradition. It is stated in the Chandogya Upanisad that Vedic knowledge comes from Brahma, who disclosed it to Prajapati, who in turn told Manu (the first man), who in his turn passed it down to human beings. This knowledge embodying in the Vedas were handed down from generation to generation through a long and unbroken tradition of sages. Thus the traditionalists derived their knowledge wholly from the scriptural tradition and its interpretation. These were the Brahmans who upheld the sacred authority of the Vedas, one of the most important features of the Aryan tradition.

2. **Rationalists**
   As stated in the Taittiriya Aranyaka and the Chandogya Upanisad, atman can be rationally understood by thinking (e.g. vijaybho). Even Wavkaras’s comment on ‘mantavyo nidhiyasatavyah’ is that it can be known through ‘argument and reasoning’ (tarkopapattaya).
   The common features of reasoning and inference are given below:
   1. Takka—rational argument. According to the Athakavagga of the Suttanipata, there were people who employed takkha (reasoning) to judge the truth or falsity of speculative theories. According to Buddhaghosa, there were 4 types of reasoners:
      (i). Anussutiko—one who reasons on a premise based on traditional authority, report or hearsay
      (ii). Jatisarattakiko—one who reasons on a premise based on retocognition.
      (iii). Labhitakkiko—one who reasons on a premise based on jhanic experience
      (iv). Suddhatakkiko—the pure reasoners.
   2. Anumana—metaphysical inference. This metaphysical inference has the known as its priori. It is through the known to know the unknown. In the Chandogya Upanisad, it is said that atman could be seen if it was a matter of seeing your figure in a pan of water or it could be heard or heard of, if it was a case of hearing from the sound as of a fire blazing on closing one’s ear. From the normal perception, they inferred further that the atman was in all things. Another group of Vedic thinkers are the vimajsa—this refers to the people who were critical and fact-finding. They employed their dialectical skill to speculate the truth or falsity of theories. According to K.N. Jayatilleke, they are not rationalists but investigators who used reasons to find out facts. Thus this term is often used conjointly with takki (takki vimajsi)

3. **Experientialists**
   The Ultimate Goal of the Vedic thinkers of all periods is to realize the atman and to be unified with it (jagadatman). The seeing of this atman by the Middle and the Late Upanisad is through ‘intuition’ (yaga). The atman which is hidden within all things and does not shine forth is seen (dwayate) by the subtle seers with their subtle awakened intuition (Katha, 1.3.12). One sees (pawayate) while in meditative rapture (dhyayamah) by the sense-organs (Mund, 3.1.8). As the Vvetasvatara puts it, one would see (pawyet) God hidden as it were by practicing the drill of meditation (dhyana).
According to the Kalamasutta, there are 10 methods to obtain knowledge during the time of the Buddha i.e.,

1. **Anussava**
   This denotes the authority of the Vedic scriptures. The Canki Sutta states that anussava had become a sacred tradition which was systematized, ceremonially chanted, and authoritatively handed down by a successive line of teachers. The Tevijja sutta, Cavki sutta and Sandaka sutta record how the Buddha criticizes this source of knowledge.

2. **Paramparaya**
   It means ‘unbroken succession of the teaching’. In the Kesaputtiyasutta and the Bhadiyyasutta of the AN, it is criticized as the acceptance of a tradition in general on the ground that it has been successively handed down or the belief in a teacher on the ground that he belongs to a successive line of teachers. In the Suttanipata, it refers to both the lineage of the Wrmana and the Brahmana.

3. **Itikiraya**
   It means ‘hearsay or rumour’. As a means of knowledge, it is a sub-class of itihitiha, an authoritative knowledge. In the Kalama Sutta and the Mahavagga of the AN, the Buddha criticizes it as: ‘not personally realized and directly verified by oneself.’

4. **Pitakasampada**
   This denotes a form of traditional authority associates with the Vedic tradition. It is the acceptance ‘on the authority of the scriptural text’, presumably on the principle that whatever propositions agree with these texts are true and whatever disagree are false.

5. **Takkahetu**
   The Atthakavagga of the Suttanipata states that people come to judgement about the truth or falsity of speculative theories by employing takkha. Buddhaghosa commenting on the term ‘takk’ as four types of reasoner, namely: anussutiko, jatissaratikki, labhitakkiko and suddhatakkiko.

6. **Nayahetu**
   There are two senses of nayahetu with an epistemological import. One is the sense of ‘standpoint’ as found in the school of the Trairasiaka Ajivikas and the Jains, while the other was the sense of ‘inference’. It is also mentioned in the Samyutta Nikaya and in one place in the Jatakas.

7. **Akaraparivitakka**
   This is the accepting of something thinking this is a good reason for accepting it. In the Majjhima Nikaya, ‘akara’ is used to denote the ‘reasons’ which are adequate for one to have a rational belief (saddha), but not amounting to knowledge.

8. **Ditthinijjhanka**
   It explains as: “because it agrees with our theory accepted after consideration and after being convinced of it.” In the Pabcataya sutta, 16 theories listed are said to be accepted on this ground. In the Ccavki Sutta it was said to have a ‘twofold result of true or false.

9. **Bhavyarapataya and Samano garu**
   Bhavyarapataya stands for the acceptance of someone’s words considering him to be a competent person. Samano no garu may be translated as ‘our prestigious teacher’. Both forms of authority can be considered under verbal testimony, which was recognised as a means of knowledge in the late Indian philosophical tradition under aptopadesa or aptavacana.

   Apart from these 10 means to knowledge, the Cavki sutta mention 2 additional sources of knowledge i.e. saddhayya (faith) and like (raciya), along with anussava, akara-parivitakka and Ditthinijjhanka. With regard to the schools of teachers, Savgaravasutta
mentions three classes of thinkers whose means to knowledge in ancient India are all included i.e.,

1. **Traditionalists**—Those who derived their knowledge wholly from a scriptural tradition and interpretations based on it. These were the Vedic thinkers.

2. **Rationalists**—Those who derived their knowledge from reasoning and speculation. These were the Early Upanisadic thinkers, the sceptics, the materialists and most of the Ajivikas.

3. **Experientialists**—Those who depended on direct personal knowledge and experience, both sensory and extra-sensory. These include the Middle and Late Upanisadic thinkers, some Ajivikas, Jains and empirical materialists.

**The Buddhist critique on authority with reference to Pali sources. (487)**

There are 6 ways of claiming knowledge shown in the Kalamasutta under the heading of authority. The Buddha’s attitudes towards these 6 kinds of authorities are explained as follows:

**The authority of tradition**—(1). anussava and (2). paramparaya

Anussava refers to Vedic tradition and paramparaya refer to traditions in general. In the Tevijja Sutta, it is said that none of the teachers of the Vedic tradition have had a direct vision of Brahma. They have not claimed to have ‘seen Brahma face to face’ (Brahma sakkhiditto) and they did not say, ‘we know this, we see this where, in which direction and in which place Brahma is’.

In the Canki Sutta, the Buddha asserting that a belief based on anussava and paramparaya can have twofold result of turning out to be either true or false even if the assertion is from the most reliable revelation or tradition. It is also stated in the Sandaka Sutta that revelation, tradition or report which is handed down may be well-remembered or ill-remembered and this can seriously affected the content of it and thus it was distorted and became false.

**The authority of scriptural texts (3). Pitakasampada**

Pitakasampada which denotes a form of traditional authority is also used in close association with the Vedic tradition. In the Kalama Sutta and the Mahavagga of the Anguttara (vol.II, p.191-193), the Buddha criticized pitakasampada as an invalid means of knowledge. The reason given by the Buddha is that, ‘it is not personally realized and directly verified by oneself (samaj sayaj abhibbatam attapaccakkhadhammadj).

**The Authority of competent persons (4). Bhavyarupata and (5). Samano no garu.**

According to the Avguttara Nikaya Atthakatha (vol.II p.305) bhavyarupata stands for the acceptance of someone’s words considering him to be a competent person. Samano no garu, which may be translated as ‘our prestigious teacher’ is similar to the former. Both forms of authority can be considered under verbal testimony as aptopadesa or aptavacana. Again, they are criticized by the Buddha as having twofold consequences of true and false, therefore they are no guarantee of valid knowledge.

**The authority of common belief (6). Itikiraya**

As a common belief of the masses, Itikiraya means ‘hearsay or rumour’. It is also criticized by the Buddha as ‘not personally realized and directly verified by oneself and having twofold consequences of true or false’.

Apart form the above 6 kinds of authority, Buddhism also denies the authority of an omniscience teacher (sabbabbuta). Nigantha Nataputra is said to have claimed to be such an omniscient one. In the Sandaka Sutta, the Buddha criticizes him as having met with undesired occasions e.g., gets no alms-food, bites by a dog, does not know the names of people and places and the ways to get there. Thus, it is plain that the claim of omniscience is easily rebuked even by the simplest test of common sense by the Buddha.
In the Mahavagga, the Buddha says that his Dhamma is ‘profound, difficult to realise, hard to understand……,subtle and comprehensible only by the wise’. Then what methods did he adopt when he decided to preach to the people?

Traditionally, it is said that the Buddha adopted figurative language and applied method ((pariyāya) with similes and metaphors to make his preaching simple and understandable for the public. For the common people, he employed the ‘anupubbikātha’ to preach gradually, starting with dāna-kathā, then sīla-kathā and finally saggā-kathā. After these gradual-talks, he pointed out the danger, degradation and corruption of sense-desires, then the profit of renunciation. Only after the listener’s mind was ready, free from the hindrances, joyful and calm, he then preached the Dhamma (4 Noble Truths) in brief (samukkajīsaka dhamm-desana).

Regarding the questions raised by the listeners, it is said in the Anguttara Nikāya (p.216) that, the Buddha treated them in 4 ways:

1. Some should be answered directly
2. Others should be answered of analysing them
3. Yet others should be answered by counter-questions
4. Lastly, there are questions which should be put aside.

The Buddha was not a computing machine giving answers to whatever questions were put to him by anyone at all, without any consideration. He was a practical teacher, full of compassion and wisdom. He did not answer questions to show his knowledge and intelligence, but to help the questioner on the way to realization. He always spoke to people bearing in mind their standard of development, their tendencies, their mental make-up, their character, their capacity to understand a particular question. This is what we can observe when we read the Vacchagottasutta of the S.N. (IV. p.400-401) where the Buddha did not answer the question put forward by Vacchagga regarding the existence of Soul. And furthermore, when he asked Kisagotami to search for some mustard seeds which are impossible to obtain to cure her dead son. These are some of the pragmatic approaches adopted by the Buddha to help people to realize the Truth by themselves.

All the doctrines taught by the Buddha only mean to end the suffering and to attain Nibbāna. The simile of raft in the Alagaddupamasutta of the M.N. (sutta No. 22) tells us that, all the teachings of the Buddha is meant to carry man to safety, peace, Happiness, Nibbāna. That is why, in the Simsapasutta of the S.N.(vol.V.p.437-438) , the Buddha told the monks that what he knew was just like the leaves in the Sijsapa forest, but what he taught to them was only a little like the few leaves he held in his hand. Because what he preached are useful, and what he did not preach are not useful, not leading to Nibbāna. This is the pragmatic attitude of the Buddha.

In the Cula-Maluвkyasutta of the MN, the Buddha explained to Maluвkya, who was anxious to know some metaphysical answers that, it is more important to get oneself free from suffering rather than to engage in metaphysical proposition which is useless and meaningless. And of course, he invited everyone to come and to see (ehi passiko) by themselves rather than to believe in him. This is the attitude of the Buddha when he preached.

**EXPLAIN THE FOLLOWING TERMS : SABBHA, VIBBANA, PABBHA AND PARIIBBA.**

The truths of the Buddha are distinguished from other truths by describing them as Noble Truths (ariya-saccana). While using a variety of terms signifying a variety of cognitive activity, Buddhism emphasised emancipating knowledge. It is necessary to understand how this emancipating knowledge is different from other forms of knowledge that Buddhism itself refers to by a variety of cognitive terms.

P.D. Premasiri on his paper “Early Buddhist Analysis of Varieties of Cognition” writes:

“The Pali Nikāya express distinctions in modes of knowing varying the prefix which is attached to the root jīva, each variation indicating that it signifies activity taking place at a particularly distinctive level, or from particularly distinctive perspective.”

Then he lists out the terms:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>sanskrit</th>
<th>pali</th>
<th>meaning</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>saj + jīva = sabbha (noun)</td>
<td>sabjanaṭi (verb)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vi + jīva = vibbana (noun)</td>
<td>vijanaṭi (verb)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>abhi + jīva = abhibba (noun)</td>
<td>abhijanaṭi (verb)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pari + jīva = paribba (noun)</td>
<td>parijanaṭi (verb)</td>
<td></td>
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</table>
prā + jba = pabba (noun), pajanati (verb)

The world of experience can be known through the sabba way, the vibbana way or the abhibba way etc. Sabba and vibbana are not forms of knowing which give emancipating knowledge, but to bondage and suffering. The remaining three are ways to noble truths.

(1) The Sabba way

The Pali Nikayas explain sabba as that mode of cognition which arises on the occasion of the meeting of a particular sense organ with the corresponding sense object. In the Majjhima Nikaya, the process of this cognition is described as follows:

“Cakkhubca paticca rupe ca uppajjati cakkhuvibbanaj. Tinnaj savgati phasso. Phassapaccayya vedana. Yaj vedeti taj sabjanati”

Depending on the eye and material forms there arises visual vibbana. By the coming together of these three arises sense impingement. Depending on sense impingement arises sensation. That which one senses are ‘knows in the sabba way.

Thus it is clear that sabba is a subsequent stage in the process of perceptual activity.

In the Pothapada Sutta, it is said that by training, some types of sabba could emerge and other types could cease to be. The training mentioned in this context refers to a systematic meditative cultivation of the mind. Sabba is altered in accordance with certain mental determinations. From an ethical point of view, sabba has to be transcended, and this can be done at a stage of meditative rapture of the mind where sabba is completely ceased.

In the Madhupinda Sutta, it is said that sabba leads to knowledge and suffering through the process of papabaca, a process which involves a proliferation of concepts in the mind linked to the notion of self and associated with the unwholesome emotions of craving (tanha), conceit (mana) and dogmatic belief (dittii).

Sabba is contrasted with two cognitive perspectives of paribba and abhibba. In the Suttanipata, the disciples are advised by the Buddha to cultivate paribba with respect to sabba in order to attain Ultimate Freedom.

(2) The Vibbana way

Vibbana is usually regarded as the bare sensitivity and awareness which is aroused by the contact of the sense organ with the object. Depending on the eye and the material form arises visual vibbana (cakkhubca paticca rupe ca uppajjati cakkhuvibbanaj). There is no special efforts required for such awareness to arise except an act of attention (samennahara).

Vibbana, like sabba is a causally conditioned cognitive response. This response involves no intelligently trained insight into the nature of things. It is therefore, a much more passive type of cognitive response than pabba or even sabba. Vibbana unlike pabba is not a perspective to be cultivated. The vibbana response is also said to be associated with similar danger as the sabba response. Therefore, vibbana ought to be fully comprehended (paribbeyya) whereas pabba ought to be positively cultivated (bhavetabba).

(3) Higher Form of Cognition - Paribba

In the Mulapariyaya Sutta, it is stated that enlightened persons like the Buddha and the Arahants, who have eradicated the cankers have attained paribba regard to all the data of experience. In the Pali Text Society’s Dictionary, ‘paribba’ is defined as “accurate or exact knowledge, comprehension, full understanding.” Bhikkhu Banamoli translates it as “full knowledge”.

According to Visuddhimagga, it is of three kinds:

i. bataripiba – full knowledge of the known;

ii. tiranaparipiba – full knowledge as judgement;

iii. pahanaparipiba – full knowledge as abandoning.

In the Mahadukkha kkhadha Sutta, these three kinds of full knowledge are clearly explained by the Buddha:

“And what, bhikkhus, is the gratification in the case of material form? Suppose there were a girl of the noble class or the brahmin class or of householder stock, in her fifteenth or sixteenth year, neither too tall nor too short, neither too thin nor too fat, neither too dark nor too fair. Is her beauty and loveliness then at its height?”
“And what, bhikkhus, is the danger in the case of material form? Later on one might see that same woman here at eighty, ninety, or a hundred years, aged, as crooked as a roof bracket, doubled up, supported by a walking stick, tottering, frail, her youth gone, her teeth broken, grey-haired, scanty-haired, bald, wrinkled, with limbs all blotchy. What do you think, bhikkhus? Has her former beauty and loveliness vanished and the danger become evident?”

“Yes, venerable sir.”

“And what, bhikkhus, is the escape in the case of material form? It is the removal of desire and lust, the abandonment of desire and lust for material form. This is the escape in the case of material form.”

In the same Sutta, sensual pleasure (kama) and feeling (vedana) are also fully comprehended. Thus, paribba is a cognitive term frequently used in the Pali Nikaya to signify the comprehended understanding of the nature of thing. And according to Visuddhimagga, this cognition belongs to the mundane level as it is still in the way of purifying the view i.e. Maggamagga-banadassana-visudhi-niddesa (purification by knowledge and vision of what is the path and what is not the path).

(4) Highest Form of Cognition - Pabba

In the Pali Text Society’s Dictionary, the term pabba is defined as ‘intelligence, comprising all the higher faculties of cognition’. The Dictionary further explains the term as:

“As in technical term in Buddhist Psycho-Ethics it comprises the highest and last stage as 3rd division in the standard “Code of religion practice” which leads to Arahattship or Final Emancipation.”

Here, the three divisions in the standard code of Buddhist practice are virtue (sila), concentration (samadhi) and wisdom (pabba).

In the Culasaropamasutta, these three divisions of Buddhist practices are operating in a causal process i.e. one first ‘obtains the attainment of virtue’ (Silasampadaj aradhethi) ; this is followed by ‘the attainment of concentration’ (samadhisampadaj aradhethi), and subsequently by ‘the attainment of knowledge and insight’ (banadissanaj aradhethi). Here ‘knowledge and insight’ refers to pabba.

Since virtue is a prior requirement for the development of concentration, a causal relationship is established between them. In the Avgutha Nikaya, it is said that “wisdom become brighter with conduct” (apadane sobhathi pabba); and the Digha Nikaya also says “wisdom is cleansed by virtue and virtue is cleansed by wisdom --- where there is virtue, there is wisdom and where there is wisdom there is virtue” (silaparidhot…pabba pabbaparidhotaj silaj yattha silaj tattha pabba yattha pabba tattha silaj). While compare to vibbana, it is said in the Mahavedallasutta that: “pabba is to be cultivated and vibbana comprehended, this is the difference” (pabba bhavetabha vibbanj paribbeyya, idaj nesa nanarakanaaj).

In other words, vibbana seems to be general term for ‘cognition’ while pabba is more or less restricted in connotation to the cognition of spiritual truths. In the Mahavedallasutta, the verb ‘pajanati’ is selected to explain the Four Noble Truths. Thus it is clear that, the emancipating knowledge which is insightful and goal-directed, culminating in the destruction of the cankers is invariably described as pabba. Here, one should take note that, the asavakkhayabana which classed among the abhiyana can be synonyms with pabba.

666Clarify the motive of investigation of knowledge in Buddhist thought and examine how it influences the ethical life.

Nibbana is the summom bonum of Buddhism, all teachings taught by the Buddha and all practises formulated by the Buddha are aiming at the attainment of this Ultimate Truth which, is considered as the Total Freedom from all kinds of sufferings. It is also sometimes known as the realization of Ultimate Truth which, in an epistemology term, the attainment of Noble Knowledge (Ariya Knowledge).

Since the only motive for the attainment of such Noble Knowledge is to attain Nibbana, we can say that Buddhist epistemology is Nibbanic-orientated. Under such a Realistic Principle of attaining Nibbana, Buddhist epistemology thus influences the conducts of its followers.

The ethical life of the Buddhists is very different from the followers of other religions who aim at Heavenly Bliss. In order to attain such a Heaven Bliss, what the followers of other religions need to do is to have Faith in their God or in their Sacred Scriptures.
In other words, their ethical life subscribed by God is God-orientated. However, the observance of percepts (sīla) and the practice of mind culture (saṃsādhi) for a Buddhist are not to show the obedience to God in order to gain His Bless to enter Heaven, but to built up the foundation necessary for the realization of Ultimate Truth.

Buddhism regards heaven of any sort is still in the reign of Impermanence, is subject to Unsatisfactoriness. Therefore, a true Buddhist will never aim to born in such a heaven though it is regarded as a happier place to enjoy.

For the common people, the Buddha employed the ‘anupubbikatha’ to preach, starting with dāna-katha, then sīla-katha and finally saṅgga-katha. After these gradual-talks, he pointed out the danger, degradation and corruption of sense-desires, then the profit of renunciation. Only after the listener’s mind was ready, free from the hindrances, joyful and calm, he then preached the Dhamma (4 Noble Truths) in brief (samukkajsika dhamm-desana). Therefore, Buddha preached saṅgka-kataj only meant for the cultivation of mind (bhavana) and it is treated as the foundation of realization of Four Noble Truths. Saṅgka-kataj is not for the purpose of attaining Heavenly Bless.

In order to attain Nibbana, one should have right understanding. In Buddhism, a complete ethical life is denoted by the Noble Eightfold Path, which includes right understanding of Facts and the purification of mind. Right understanding, as in its epistemological sense, the understanding of rebirth, kamma and causality etc. In the Apannaka sutta of the Majhima Nikaya (sutta No.60), the Buddha explains to the Brahmin householders of Sala that holding the views of ‘there is another world, there is kamma, there is causality, there is the cessation of being i.e., Nibbana’ is having right understanding or saṃsādi. With this knowledge one gains through self-effort or through the ‘hearing of the Dhamma’ (suta-maya-pabbata), one’s conducts will definitely adjust in accordance with his understanding. Therefore, Buddhist ethical life is based on the understanding of Fact and the Value of actions, it is not the commandment of any God.

**Sophists (Lected by Ven. Paññāloka)**

Sophists were one of the most important political, social and intellectual forces in ancient Greece. On the other hand, they were recognized as a group of intellectuals who certified ideological necessity of the new democratic ruler. On the other hand they were representation of new social, economical and political change of the Greece, especially in Athens.

The original meaning of the term of this word might be:
1. Teacher of wisdom
2. A group of people who talk about money and even about immoral and unethical things
3. Group of people who are optimistic and greedy
4. A group of intellectuals who are higher in terms of property and power
5. A group of professional teachers who study debating and are skilled in the subject of money

Sophists were supposed to be the rich people, who needed debating skills in order to participate debates in democratic politics. The parliament and senate, they were in function at that time, although traditionally Greece teachers did not charge money. (?) Sophists charged money for what they taught. Sophists also acted as lawyers in ancient period and thus they helped the rich people.

The history of this era is divided into two periods – period of old sophists and period of young sophists. Among the well known old sophists were Protagoras (481-411 BC) and Gorgias (482-375 BC) and among young sophists Alcitamas and Crtias.

**Sutamaya and Cittamaya Paññā (Lected by Ven. Abhayatissa)**

Before going to examine the difference between these two wisdoms, sutamaya paññā and cittamaya paññā firstly the explanation of ‘wisdom’ is necessary to be done. Indeed, we will not get clear definition unless we take an account of the meaning of wisdom herein.

As far as I understand, the wisdom (paññā) is understanding and knowledge. Further more, wisdom (paññā) has much to do with thought, with intelligence and with learning; it is, therefore, a kind of knowledge. Therefore, some eminent scholars consider wisdom as ‘good’, ‘power’, ‘tower’(?), ‘light’, ‘gem’ and so on. Whatever the explanation of wisdom may be, in Buddhism we can divide it into two kinds: sutamaya and cittamaya paññā regarding Petakopadesa.

The meaning of sutamaya paññā is the knowledge, hearsay, knowledge which came directly from other and got by listening, no matter from whom and where. (On one hand)(?) cittamaya paññā is created by thinking knowledge, the knowledge that
is created by our constructive mind. Seeing the definition of paññā, which I have mentioned above, we can consider the sutamaya paññā which relies on others while the knowledge, cittamaya paññā relies on one's own personal thinking. So, we can see the difference between these two kinds of knowledge.

Anyway, this knowledge is radical tool for analysis of the truth, nature of reality, the Dhamma. By this knowledge we can uplift our knowledge, which we wish to get more. Without this knowledge we are like a blind man and like a building without foundation. As we understand, a man without eyes cannot distinguish the way, which he is walking on. Moreover, he does not know the way where lead to him.(?) The building without foundation cannot exist any more. Similarly, a person without these two primary knowledge cannot elevate his additional requirements of knowledge. Therefore, these are essential kinds of knowledge for all.

nevertheless, if one who tried to see with right wisdom (yathā bhūta) and crossed over the doubt, eh who knows, right understanding. Therefore, it is ultimately to the understanding of the Four Noble Truths. This understanding is the highest wisdom, which sees the ultimate reality of Nibbāna.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF PLATO

Plato was born in a prominent and wealthy family in Athens. In his youth he studied common subjects such as justice, garman(?) etc. In his young age he went through teachings of Greek philosophers like Hematite and Talla. Thus he was interested in philosophy and became a student of Socrates. After the death of his master Socrates he also delivered his knowledge and he is known as first great philosopher in the West.135

If I had to mention one thing in his philosophy of education, it would be that Plato emphasized that four subjects should be taught to all children. They are:
1. Mathematics
2. Music
3. Psychical exercises
4. Philosophy

Intellectual human has two factors – the emotional factor and the intellectual factor. To understand the idea is through one’s own intellectual experience.

Plato taught how to analyse problems in scientific way and how to find the best answer out of alternatives. He taught how to apply this methodology to individual and social problems, analyzing in the border contact of historical, critical and comparative perspective.(?)

Plato’s philosophy is not a doctrine or even a method in the modern sense of the world, but a mode of life, a perspective from which to view the world, or at least the search for such perspective. Plato’s philosophy is too wide to study at the glance. His thought is significant not because all what he said is accumulated and valuable today, but because it has given some new inside (?) to look at the human problems for the first time.

PLATO’S PHILOSOPHY

Plato was born in a prominent wealthy family in Athens. In his youthhood he studied common subjects such as gymnastics, grammar, music etc. In his young age he read the thoughts of Greek philosophers like Heraclitus and Thales. Thus he was interested in philosophy and became student of Socrates as young student. He mastered136 the philosophy of Socrates and after death of his teacher he opened his own place of teaching or Academy, he kept on teaching there and form of the discourses he delivered there. he was known as the first great philosopher in the West. All his new ideas were recorded in two pieces of literature called „The Dialogue and Thirteen Letters. “ He was one of the most influential philosophers in ancient Greece.

Socrates explained the truth as a universal concept, Plato expressed his views in a different way. He held the ideal, the reality as something different from concrete individual objects. The reality (according to him) is something psychological and metaphysical.

According to Plato the difficulties and violent edexperience by man comes from two bases. They are inherent human weakness and structure deficiency. He said that Athenian government was like a wrecked ship. It did not bring satisfaction to the people. It also did not develop the society as a whole. Therefore, Plato proposed the political structure to be renewed.137 According to Plato there were three individual categories in a country. They were the philosophers (intellectual people), soldiers and common

135First great philosopher in West is Socrates, but Plato is the first great philosopher, who has written down his philosophy (Socrates didn’t write down his philosophy).
136In the original there was ‘mustered’.
137Though Plato’s plans of state government were not applied by any country or nation, they were applied by Catholich church and are put to practice even today.
people. Philosophers should be given the change to guide the society than the intelligents convert to bring the human society to satisfaction and development.

Plato emphasized the need of entire society to work as a family. According to him the individuality and craving increase conflict among human beings. So, the social structure should be organized in such a way that all the individuals feel entire society as own family. In his philosophy of education Plato emphasized that four subjects should be taught to all children. They are: mathematics, music, physical exercise and philosophy.

Plato's philosophy is too vast to study and only a few aspects of it could be observed at a glance. His thought is significant because it has given some new insights to look at the human problems. For the first time Plato thought how to analyze the problems in scientific ways and how to find the best answer out of alternatives. He taught to apply this methodology to individual and social problems analyzing them in the broader context of historical, critical and comparative perspective.

**QUESTION: EXAMINE THE PLACE OF EMPIRICISM IN BUDDHIST THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE**

Empiricism is a branch of knowledge that believes in sense-perception, meaning the knowledge is gained through sense experience. Empiricists are very critical about ideology and ideological understanding. In their view to accept something, it must be experienced through sense-organs of man for himself.

Buddhism too uses empirical knowledge to verify true factors of existence. In the Aṅguttara Nikāya the Kālāma Sutta gives many instructions not to accept anything because it is just recorded or believed, but verify it for themselves. According to Buddhism, the knowledge that comes from experience is very significant. Therefore, Buddhism teaches to experience and see. In the Nikāya literature we find many examples where the Buddha encourages the empirical knowledge as knowledge of reality. In Samyutta Nikāya the Buddha claims that the knowledge of somebody should be well-known by experience or discussion - »Sākacchāya bhikkhave paññā veditabbo.«

Buddhism does not think that empiricism is always a correct way to gain knowledge as human senses have their own limits. Eye cannot see everything on earth, ear cannot hear all the sounds etc. Therefore, knowing the limit of human sense-organs, Buddhism further recommends developing extra sensory perception (ESP) as a valid way of correct knowledge. Extra sensory perception (atindriyañāna) includes divine eye, divine ear etc., which are the power to see and hear things that cannot be perceived by normal sense-organs.

Buddhism also recognizes the power of developing in internal or spiritual faculty to get the knowledge rather than physical sense-faculty (which is impossible to physical sense faculty). Internally, there are five faculties for the development:

1. Confidential faith (saddhā)
2. Mindfulness (sati)
3. Effort (vīriya)
4. Concentration (samādhi)
5. Wisdom (paññā)

Through the development of these spiritual faculties human can widen the horizon of sense of experience and know more about himself and the world.

With the development of internal faculties, impurities of mind are washed away, thereby human beings are able to bring out the hidden power of the mind.

The two recommendable for purification of mind is mental culture it does purifies the human mind in three steps:

1. Temporary freedom from defilement (tataṅgabbaha)
2. Long-term freedom from defilement (vikmpanabbaha)
3. Permanent giving up of defilement (samuccedabbahana)

In the second and third level, human being experiences extra sensory perception, thus one can get to know the world better.
The word „rationalism“ is derived from the Latin word „ratio,“ which means reasoning. Reasoning or inquiry is very important to understand the truth and to obtain correct knowledge according to the rationalists. The rationalism have existed throughout the ancient philosophy and later developed in the modern era. As it appears in the Oxford English Dictionary, „rationalism is the practice of explaining the supernatural powers.“

Rationalism in the western philosophy is very much related to the field of mathematics.

Rationalists raise their arguments standing upon axioms:

• Rationalism brings knowledge without the help of the outer world
• It is not the knowledge, that comes through sense experience
• The knowledge that one gets through sense organs is not considered as the true knowledge by rationalists
• Man might misunderstand a rope as a snake, therefore, the knowledge one gets through his sense organs can mislead the person.

According to rationalists, the true knowledge and the zeal to understand arises in the mind without the help of the outer world.

1. A priori knowledge

A priori knowledge is one of the theories on which the rationalism is based.

According to the a priori knowledge, some ideas are true without the help of sense experience, that come through sense organs.

While rationalists do not deny that the sense organs might be able to give a significant information about the world, they do not consider them as the sole source of knowledge.

Rationalists think that the knowledge that comes through sense organs might be misleading and wrong.

They argue that the knowledge independent from sense experience could be more trustworthy, because it has to do nothing with the sense organs.

2. Innate ideas

Rationalists believe that some ideas are born in the mind with the birth of a person – e.g., Albert Einstein

Innate ideas are born in the mind of a person without much influence of the physical world.

According to the Descartes, the idea of the existence of God is one of the ideas that is present in the human mind.

3. Logical necessity

Something cannot be conceived as otherwise.

When something is logically necessary, it should have proved its correctness through definitions, for example the statement: „All bachelors are not married.“ It is necessarily true because that is how the world is defined.

This idea of logical necessity is very much influenced by mathematics.
There is no logical necessity if we take this statement: „Work hard to get through your exams.“

4. Metaphysical necessity

This type of necessity is helpful to rationalists, because rationalists deal with concepts, ideas that go beyond the logical certainty. For example, the idea of God is metaphysical.

It is logically possible to say that God exists – the idea of God presupposes perfect being.

Only a perfect being can create a perfect, systematical world.

If the God is imperfect, his creation would also be imperfect.

Therefore, a perfect God should exist.

Rationalism in the western world existed even during the Greek period. There were rationalists during the day of Buddha and before – Takkhe.

Concept of the creator God in the Vedic thought was based on rational argument.

Sages of the Vedic thought argued for the existence of a creator being.

Rationalism became popular in the modern western philosophy with the scientific revolution.

There were three popular rationalists in the West:

1. René Descartes
2. Baruch Spinoza
3. Wilhelm Gottfried Leibniz

Descartes was a rationalist. He attempted to understand the world through rational thinking. There was not much space for rationalism before Descartes (like a medieval philosophers tried to proved their teaching of God through faith and devotion) tried to prove his teachings.

In the Ariyapariyesana Sutta of the Majjhima Nikāya the personal experience gained by the Buddha is recorded in details. Buddha speaks about his knowledge gained through his experience also in Mahā Sīhanāda Sutta and in the Mahā Saccaka Sutta in Majjhima Nikāya.

As described in the Mahā Sīhanāda Sutta, in order to reach a state free from grief (asoka), free from death (amata), free from defilements (asankilitha) person has to practice penence(?) of self mortification. It was on examination and on experimentation that the Buddha emphasized the reality of the world. The theory of impermanence is the result of the higher experience gained by Buddha. Buddhism is neither a kind of metaphysical speculation nor a revelation, but a teaching based on empirical facts and that is to be experienced.

**RATIONALISM**

We haven't seen the God, but we accept that God exists. Aristotle tried to prove the existence of God through rationally. Aristotle introduced the idea of „unmoved mover“ (God does not move but he may moved the world.) The rational ideas of Aristotle were disproved with the emergence of scientific evolution - modern philosophy revised the ideas. There the philosophy helped to scientific thinking.

The three major rationalist philosophers in modern Western philosophy were:

1. René Descartes (1796 – 1850)
2. Wilhelm Leibniz (1646 – 1716)
3. **Baruch Spinoza** (1632 – 1677)

All these three philosophers accepted that the world could be understood through logic arguments. This doesn't mean that they neglected scientific methods such as experiment, aberration(?), mathematics as subject classified under science mathematical knowledge is accepted as asthmatic/basic(?) knowledge. Rationalism argued that mathematics is based on axioms based on rational logical arguments.

According to rationalists knowledge can be gained without the empirical factor. For example: „Bowen(?) women do not give birth is(?) children.“

This type of knowledge is known as „optional knowledge.“ Optional knowledge is independent from experience, which rationalists accept. Knowledge that we receive through our sense organs are not considered as the only way of receiving knowledge.

Rationalists argue that the knowledge a person gains through sense experience might not always be correct. For example:

„---nirape(?)“

There might be watchers(?) in the sense organ. For example:

„color blunduen(?)“

Therefore the knowledge independent from sense experience is much stronger than the knowledge that is gained through experience. For example:

„2 + 2 = 4“ ; „I think, therefore I am."

**Innate Ideas**

According to **Descartes** some ideas exist from the day of the birth of a person. Such ideas do not require any sense experience, they are „inborn ideas.“ **Descartes** argues that the idea of the existence of God is also innate.

Another important idea of rationalists is „necessity.“ Students have to work hard to get through their exams. here passing the exam is the empirical necessity, while the working hard is the rational and logical necessity. The aim of rationalists is to find the logical necessity more than empirical necessity, because logical necessity always helps to find solutions for metaphysical and moral problems.

When something is logically necessary, it should be defined accordingly. For example:

„All lecheries(?) are numerical."

**Logical necessity**

Something cannot be conceived(?) without otherwise(?). When something is logically necessary it will become true through definition. „All sachet(?) are unmarried.“ ; „Barman(?) women do not bare children.“ All mathematical drum(?) are are of the same kind. Through rational arguments man is able to understand the reality behind physical things that are not subject to ever(?) organ(?)

**Descartes** was a modern rationalist who attempted to understand the world through rational thinking. He held the view that the truth can be understood only through rational thinking. He was doubtful about everything that came without rational thinking. He claimed:

1. To accept nothing as true which was not clearly recognized to be so, to accept nothing more than what was presented to one's mind so clearly and distinctly that he would have more occasion to doubt it
2. Divide each problem into as many parts as possible
3. To commence one's reflection to the object
4. To make enumerations

This shows the inference of machination(?) of **Descartes**. His ideas on rationalizing are very close to scientific thinking. **Descartes** was of the view that nothing could be accepted as true in external world. He had doubts about his own sense experience.

He thought that every man's experience might not bring the true knowledge. He determined to doubt everything until the doubt becomes impossible. To being(?) pushed(?) that(? there?) once he said: „I know I exist,
therefore I am.”

**Descartes** believed that body and mind were two different substances, where the mind interacted with the body. The question is who is responsible for that interaction. His reply was – the God. **Spinoza** describes the argument of **Descartes** saying that the mind and body are in fact substances made out of the same substance.

**Philosopher Leibniz**

According to **Leibniz** there are various substances in the world, rather innumerous substances. He called them „monads.“

In Buddhist teaching the word *taleclu* is used to quite clearly for rationalism the sense of reason. In Buddhism metaphysical theories are constructed on reasoning. In this sense the word *taleclu* and *vimans* go together in Buddhist teaching. There are four such theories appearing in *Brahmajāla sutta*:

»Idha ekacca samāno vā brāhmaṇo vā talelca hah vino so talelca paniyāhataṃ vimameśāritatīn sayāṃ brāhmaṇaṃ wan āha sarato āha ca loko ca vamyho lcuhahro santhavandi te ca sotta sansaranti sansaranhi gavanti upijavanti.«

Here in certain recharge of *brāhmaṇa* reasoner and speculator by the exercise of reasoning and speculative inquiry he rises the following self evident conclusion the soul and the world are eternal, independent state food as mortals peaty and turn as pillars. These beings transmigrate and fare on die and reborn and exist for ever and ever.

**RATIONALISM (ORIGINAL BY ĀNANDA)**

The word rationalism is derived from the Latin word ‘*ratio*’, which means „reasoning.“ Reasoning or inquiry is very important for understanding the truth and obtaining correct knowledge. According to rationalists, it has existed through the ancient philosophy and later it developed in the modern era.

Rationalism in the western philosophy is very much related to the field of mathematics. Rationalism brings knowledge with the help of the outer world. The knowledge of rationalism does not come through sense experience. The knowledge that one gets through sense organs is not considered as the true knowledge by rationalism. Man might understand rope as a snake – therefore, the knowledge one gets through his some organs might mislead the man. According to the rationalists the true knowledge and the real understanding arises in the mind with without the help of the outer world.

*A priori* knowledge is one of the theories on which rationalism is based. According to *a priori* knowledge there are some ideas that arose without the help of any experience coming through sense organs. While rationalism does not deny that the sense organs could be able to give significant information about the world, they do not consider that as the sole knowledge. Rationalism supposes that the knowledge coming through sense organs could be false, misleading and wrong.

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138In the original, Latin language, it was: „*Cogito ergo sum.*“ (I think, therefore I am.)

139**Leibniz** believed, that everything is made out of small parts (*monads*), very small parts which together constitute the world.
They argued that the knowledge independent from sense experience could be more trustworthy, because it has to do nothing with the sense organs. Something cannot be conceived of as otherwise. When something is logically necessary it should prove its collecting(?) through by definition.(?) For example: the statement „all bad leaders are unmannered“ is necessarily true, because that is how the world is defined. That idea of logical necessity is very much influenced by mathematics. There is a logical necessity if we take this statement: „work hard to get through your exams.“

This type of necessity is helpful for rationalists because rationalism deals with the ideas that go beyond the logical certainty. Rationalism in the western world existed even during the Greek period. There were rationalists during the day of the Buddha and before Takla. The concept of the creator God in the Vedic thought was based on rational arguments. Sages of the Vedas thought argument(?) for the existence of a creator being. Rationalism became popular in the modern western philosophy with the scientific revolution. There are three popular rationalists in the West:

a) René Descartes
b) Baruch Spinoza
c) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz

However, rationalists attempted to understand the world through the rational thinking. There was not much place for rationalism before Descartes as immaterial philosophers tried to prove their teaching of God through faith and evolution.

666RATIONALISM

Religious people believe in God through faith and devotion they do not inquire whether god exist or not. Rationalism attempt to prove the existence of god using rational argument. Rationalism comes from the lātaṅ word “ratio” which means reason.

In philosophy, reasoning is very much important. It is one of the way that Gods to the connect understanding philosophers shared the idea of rationalism as a way to discuss concepts that cannot be experienced through sense organs.

Aristotle was one of the Greek philosophers who used rationalism to explain his philosophical theories. Aristotle accepted the existence of god through rational argument. Philosophers in the Upanishad also used rationalism to prove the existence of Brahman. They introduced rational arguments to explain the existence of Brahma, thecreator of the universe. Rationalistic arguments appear in the Brhadāranyaka Upanishad with a view to explain the existence of Brahma.

They argued that it was Brahman who keeps the identity of the empirical world. About the mango tree: it has ill own identity, even among mango trees there are number of varieties. Each variety has its own identity. Rationality taught that knowledge exists inside the mind not in the external world. Therefore one person close exist in the external world.

The mathematical arguments are not in the external world. There are based axiom

Established by mathematicians. The rational argument introduced by enter philosophers disprove with the emergence of modern science. For example Galilee took a pound of cotton and climbed up the pick of …and release them at the same time and let them fall to the ground. This disprove the rational argument of Aristotle. There fore, modern rationalistic philosophers approach with the help of modern science are based on experiment, observation and introspection. There are 3 modern rationalists:

1- Rene Descartes (1506-1650)
2- Liebiz (1646-1716)
3- Spinoza (1632-1677).

All these 3 philosophers shared the belief that a person can understand the world through logic and reasoning, his does not mean these 3 philosophers were not interested in sciences and experiments.
On the other hand, these rationalists were interested in modern sciences and discuss done paying attention becomes .... Science had disproved the facts agreement got should .... By the ancient philosophers. Sciences has different the all the idea of God in the Bible and the theory introduced by Aristotle. Once Aristotle preached the theory about the center of the Universe. They said that the center of the Universe is clear and the planets and sun move around the earth.

Modern Rationalities teachings

No one has seen God but “we” accept that God exist. Aristotle endeavored to prove the existence of god through rational equipment. No one has seen the god. We accept that god exist.

1-The rational Andean of Aristotle were disproved with the emergence of scientific revolution as a result of that modern philosopher revised their philosophy with the help of scientific thinking. The major rational philosopher in the modern western philosophy are 1Ren’s Descartes (1596-1650).
2- Willhelm Lieniz (1646-1716)
3- Wilhelm Spinoza (1632-1677)

All these three philosopher accepted that the world could be understood through logic and argument. This does not mean that they neglected scientific methods such as experiment, observation. Mathematic is a subject classified under science mathematical knowledge is accepted as a systematic knowledge. Rationalist knowledge can be given without the empirical factor. For example: Berreu women do not give birth children. This type of knowledge is known as person knowledge. Person knowledge is independent from experience. While rationalist accept the knowledge that we receive through our sense organs they do not consider it as the only way of receiving knowledge. The agued that the knowledge a person gain through sense experience might not always be correct. For example: Mirage. These might be weaknesses in blindness therefore the knowledge that is independent form sense experience is much stronger then the knowledge is given through sense experience. For example: 2+2= 4(I think therefore I am).

Innate Ideas

According to Descartes some ideas exist from the day of the birth of a person such Ideas do not esquire any sense experience. They are informing ideas .so for example argue that the idea of the existence of god is also innate. Another important idea of rationalist is necessity. Students have to work hard to get through their exams. These passing the exam is the empirical while the working hard is the rational necessity and logical. The aim of rationalist is to find the logical necessity then the empirical necessity. Because logical necessity always helps to find solution metaphysical and moral problems when something is logically necessary it should be defined accordingly. For example: all batchers are unmarried.

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3- Logical necessity something cannot be conceived without otherwise when something is logically necessary, it will become true through by definition. For example All bachelors are unmarried, Barren women do not base children. All mathematical truths are also this type. Through rational argument man will be able to understand the reality behind physical things that are not subject to sense organs.

Descartes was a modern rationalist who attempted to understand the world through rational thinking. The hold the view that the truth can only be understood through rational thinking. He was doubtful about every thing that comes without rational thinking.

He says my first rule was to accept nothing as true which did not dearly recognize to be so. To accept nothing more than what was presented to my mind to clearly and distinctly that I could have no occasion to doubt it.

-Second rule: divide each problem into as many parts as possible.

-Third rule: To commence my reflection with the object.

-The 4th rule: To make enumerations so complete this shows the influence of mathematics on Descartes. His ideas on rationalism is very much close to scientific thinking. Descartes was of the view that nothing could be accepted as true in external world. He was doubted about his own sense of9f experience. He thought that everything man experiences might not bring him true knowledge. He determined to doubt everything until the doubt becomes impossible to being pushed farther once he said that “I know
that I exist therefore I am.”

Descartes believed the body and the mind are two different substances. Mind interacts with the body. The question is who is responsible for intention. His reply was the God Spinoza revised the argument of Descartes saying that the mind and the body are in fact substances of the mode of the same substances.

According to Liebniz, there are various substances. The world was composed of an innumerable number of substances instead of one or two. He called them Monads. In Buddhist teaching the word “talk” is used quite clearly for rationalism. The sense of reasoned, according to Buddhism they construct metaphysical theories based on reasoning.

In this sense, the word talcki (reasons) and Vimansi speculator go together. In Buddhist teaching, there are 4 such theories appearing in the brahajāla sutta: “idha ekacco samano vā brahmano vā takke hoti vimansi. So takka pariyaḥataṃ vimamsā nu carītami ayam patībhānem evam aha sasato atta ca lokoca vangho kutotho. Here in a certain Recluse of brahma a reasoner and speculator by the exercise of reasoning and speculative inquiry he arrives at the following self evident (conclusion) the soul and the world are eternal, independent, steadfast as mountain pocks and firm as pillars, these beings transmigrates and fare on die and reborn and exist for ever and ever.

This theory is a product of rational thinking and metaphysical speculation (takka pariyaḥataṃ vimamsānu carītami) and it is also said to be sell evident (sayaampati bhavam). This is similar to with the …reasoning that appears in the western philosophy. “Sato nathī vihase asalo nathī sambhavo” According to the teaching of the Buddha, reasoning (takka). Should not be considered as a way of teaching knowledge of the truth. This idea is classified in the sandaka sutta of the M.N. it is said that one of the 4 types of reasoning could be correct. “sutakkatam tatha - well reasoned true”. “Dutakkitam annaṭha – well reasoned false.” “dutakkitam tatha – ill reasoned true.” “Dutakkitam anīṭha – ill reasoned false.”

According to sandaka sutta, reasoning cannot be considered as a way that leads to the correct knowledge. In the Kalama sutta, the rational approach of testing the teaching are put to be aside the Buddha has often been called a rationalist, but the reason for calling the Buddha as rationalist is different from scholar to scholar. They have called the Buddha a rationalist for different reasons:

1- The Buddha is called a rationalist for being non-dogmatic.
2- According to Bhathacarya the Buddha is a rationalist because the would not like to vive anything as dogmatic truth. But always based this views on the strong ground of reasoning.
3- Radhakrishnan has also described the Buddha as a rationalist. According to him, the Buddha is a rationalist as since the Buddha wished to study reality without any reference to spiritual revelation. None of these descriptions are 100% correct.
4- Another reason to why the Buddha is called rationalist because the refuted all metaphysical views such as: sasato loko, asasato loko, antavā loko anantavā loko” (the 10 unanswered questions, Dasa avyakita prashna). It is difficult to make such significant statement about the Buddha as rationalist or a non rationalist without a proper study. The word rationalism is used in philosophy is opposition to empiricism. Rationalism is defined as a theory in philosophy in which the basis of truth is not sensory but intellectual and deductive. This is usually associates with an attempt to introduce. Mathematical methods to philosophy.

It is clear that we cannot make any significant statement about the Buddha being a rationalist or not unless there is a clear and not consistent use of the term rationalism. In trying to determine whether the Buddha was a rationalist in this sense, we have to think whether the Buddha in any sense considered premises as self evidently true. Rational metaphysics existed during the day of the Buddha, were the systems evolved out of takka.

Thus empathetically concept that were described with the help of logic and rational arguments are mentioned in Buddhist teachings as follows “Takka pariyaḥatam vimamsānu carītami sayam pathīhanam” many to these arguments are best on opinioīn (thinking) reasoning. When we examine the Buddha was thus a traditionalist in this sense it is clear the Buddha rejected such claims. The Buddha was introduced as a rationalist by scholars not because he was a person who preached his dharma though apriat knowledge which he today rejected but because he opened does for inquiry without limitation. (Vimansala sutta M.N).

On the other hand he rejected all traditional method argument that was used to clarify concepts kalama sutta. According to the teachings of the Buddha one should not come to conclusion because it has come from the tradition. Mapanuparāya. According to the words of the Buddha one has to admit concepts that come though the tradition only when he understands himself that those concepts are true and concepts.

It is clear that the Buddha recommends doctrines which are claimed doctrines true is an empirically or experimentally verifiable. The Buddha reject the takka as an intermean explain the reality. But this does not mean takka is totally considered as a useless method to explain ideas. The Buddha advised Ven.Ananda that so far as anything can be ascertained by reasoning you have ascertained (yāvakatam takkaya patīlabbam anuppat tam taya) the culakamma vibhanga sutta of the Majjhima nikāya appear to be used rational argument for rebirth and kamma.
In that Sutta, the Buddha as a question, that as the among human beings despite their belongs human the reply is being inherit there kammas and kamma divides beings in respect of their high and how. This seen to be said following rational and ethical argument consisting of an ethical empirical grounds. According to Buddhism rebirth is not rational concept. It is a personal experience of the Buddha and anyone who attempt to the higher stages of meditation also could be able to experience it. This is explained in the Angutara nikāya Val II as thus:

1-The decease and the survival of beings to be verified by one own (clairocyant visan). With this visamn the Buddha has explained beings who are suffering in the hell as a result of their in is deeds. On the other hand the Buddha is a rational because.

Empiricism

Is a theory of knowledge emplacing the experience specially the sense perception. Empiricism discounts innate knowledge. In the philosophy of science empiricism is a theory of knowledge which emphasizes these aspect of scientific knowledge that are closely related to experience. The term empiricism has duel etymology.

1- It comes from the Greek word “imperia”
2- The Latin word is experimented.
This word is divided from experience .the Greek word experience

666RATIONALISM AND THE BUDDHIST THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. 299

The Rationalists are those who derived their knowledge from reasoning and speculation without any claims to extrasensory perception. They can be identified with some of the metaphysicians of the early Upanisadic period and other independent thinkers who denied the reliability of the orthodox Vedic tradition such as the materialists the sceptics and most of the Ajjivakas.

In the Kalama Sutta, out of the claims to knowledge made on ten grounds rejected by the Buddha, four grounds are claimed to knowledge on the basis of some kind of reasoning. This appears to be in agreement with the Buddha’s contention that he does not belong to the class of teachers who are reasoners (takk) and speculators (vimajsi), who base their knowledge on reasoning and speculation. The four grounds of knowledge rejected are:

(1) takkahetu,
(2) nayahetu
(3) akaraparivitakkena
(4) ditthinijhanakkantiya.

According to Buddhist theory of knowledge, the world of experience can be known through the sabba way, the viibana way or the abhivba way etc. Sabba and viibana are ordinary senses and not the forms of knowing which give emancipating knowledge, but to bondage and suffering.

In Buddhism, apart ordinary perception, there is a recognition of extrasensory perception, as a valid means to knowledge called ‘abhivba’. There are 6 abhivba mention in Buddhism:

(1) Iddhividha
(2) Dibbasota
(3) Cetopariyabana
(4) Pubbenivasqussatibhana
(5) Dibbacakkhu or cutupapatabana
(6) asavakkhayabana

Buddhism appears to have given special importance to the last three of the 6 abhivba classing them under the concept of tevijja. The first two had a special significance to Buddhism because they were believed to be the means of experientially verifying the truths of rebirth and kamma, which in turn was believed to contribute to the attainment of the final knowledge as asavakkhayabana.

The Buddha is described as one who knows and sees (janaj janati passaj passati). Those who follow the holy life prescribed by the Buddha are expected to do so in order that they may know, see, attain, realize or comprehended. He was interested in a special
variety of truth, namely, truth that leads to liberation.

The truths of the Buddha are distinguished from other truths by describing them as Noble Truths. While using a variety of terms signifying a variety of cognitive activity, Buddhism emphasised emancipating knowledge. It is necessary to understand how this emancipating knowledge is different from other forms of knowledge that Buddhism itself refers to by a variety of cognitive terms.

**The Buddha as Rationalist**

This theory is a product of rational thinking and empirical speculation.

»Takka panyahatam vimeno āhu cantamis.«

And it is also said to be self evident (sayam paṭibhanan). This is similar to with(?) the(?) apron(?) reasoning that appears in the Western philosophy.

»Sata natthi vinan asato natthi sambhava.«

According to the teaching of the Buddha reasoning (takka) should not be considered as a way of teaching knowledge of the truth. This idea is classified in Sandaka sutta, reasoning can not be considered as a way to the correct knowledge. In the Kālāma sutta the rational approach of teaching tearing(?). The teaching are put to be states as »mā takka hetu.«

The Buddha has often been called rationalist, but the reason for calling the Buddha as rationalist differs from scholar to scholar. They called the Buddha a rationalist for different reasons:

1. **The Buddha** was called rationalist for being non-dogmatic. According to Bhutto(?) Carry's(?) the Buddha was a rationalist because he would not like to give anything as dogmatic truth, but he always based his view on the strong reasoning queries.

2. Radhakriśnan also described the Buddha as a rationalist. According to him the Buddha was a rationalist since the Buddha tried to think objectively without any reference to religious conventions. His revelations and descriptions were a hundred percent correct.

Another reason why Buddha was called rationalist, because he refuted all metaphysical views, such as sassato loko, asassato loko, anuttaro loko, annuttaro loko.\textsuperscript{140}

It is difficult to make such significant statement about the Buddha as a rationalist or a not-rationalist without a proper study. The word „rationalism“ is used in philosophy in connection with empiricism. Rationalism is defined as a theory in philosophy in which the certain truth is based on truth not sensory but intellectual and deductive.

This is usually associated with an attempt to introduce mathematical methods to philosophy. It is clear that we cannot make any significant statement about the Buddha being a rationalist or not under revisions of the term „rationalism.“

In trying to determine whether the Buddha was a rationalist, in this sense we have to think whether the Buddha in any sense considered premises as sell(?) evidently true. Rational metaphysics existed during the days of the Buddha, where the systems evolved out of takica(?)

\textsuperscript{140}Here I do not agree with the lecturer, because the Buddha actually did not refuse these views. He only did not recommend to think that way - first one should extinguish his or her craving and ignorance.
EXAMINE THE REASONS FOR BUDDHA’S DISLIKE OF FORMATION OF LOGICAL PROPOSITION FOR REALISTIC UNDERSTANDING.

In Pali Nikayas, we can see that though the Buddha sometimes used logical method to explain some Buddhist concepts of impermanence, unsatisfactoriness and non-self, he never formulated any logical proposition. In the Cula-Maluvkyaputta sutta of the MN, he refused to answer the 10 metaphysical questions forwarded by Maluvkyaputta proves that he was never interested in useless logical propositions. To him, logical proposition only hinders the realistic understanding of Truth. Cc

In the Sandaka Sutta and in the Mahavagga of the Anguttara, the Buddha criticized logical proposition as an invalid means of knowledge. The reason given by him is that, ‘it is not personally realized and directly verified by oneself (samaj sayaj abhiibbatam attappacakkhadhammoj)’.

In the Mahavagga, the Buddha says that his Dhamma is ‘profound, difficult to realise, hard to understand……,subtle and comprehensible only by the wise’. Then what methods did he adopt when he decided to make people to realize the truth?

Traditionally, it is said that the Buddha adopted figurative language and applied method ((pariyaya) with similes and metaphors to make his preaching simple and understandable for the public.

In most of the sutta, he employed the ‘anupubbikatha’ to preach, starting with dana-katha, then sila-katha and finally saggakatha. After these gradual-talks, he pointed out the danger, degradation and corruption of sense-desires, then the profit of renunciation. Only after the listener’s mind was ready, free from the hindrances, joyful and calm, he then preached the 4 Noble Truths in brief (samukkajiska dhammadesana).

In the Abhidhamma tradition, it is said that the Buddha adopted both ‘analysis’ and ‘synthesis’ methods to help people to realize the reality. This tradition is considered the tradition of the Buddha which the Theravadins called ‘vibhajjavada’.

Whatever method the Buddha used to make people to understand the reality of the world, some questions were raised by the listeners. Regarding these questions, it is said in the Anguttara Nikaya (p.216) that, the Buddha treated them in 4 ways:

4. Some should be answered directly
5. Others should be answered of analysing them
6. Yet others should be answered by counter-questions
7. Lastly, there are questions which should be put aside.

The Buddha was not a computing machine giving answers to whatever questions were put to him by anyone at all, without any consideration. He was a practical teacher, full of compassion and wisdom. He did not answer questions to show his knowledge and intelligence, but to help the questioner on the way to realization. He always spoke to people bearing in mind their standard of development, their tendencies, their mental make-up, their character, their capacity to understand a particular question. This is what we can observe when we read the Vacchaggottasutta of the S.N. (IV. p.400-401) where the Buddha did not answer the question put forward by Vacchhgotha regarding the existence of Soul. And furthermore, when he asked Kisagotami to search for some mustard seeds which are impossible to obtain to cure her dead son. These are some of the pragmatic approaches adopted by the Buddha to help people to realize the Truth by themselves.

In the Mahapurinibbana sutta of the Digha Nikaya II, the Buddha tells Subhadda that: ‘In whatever Dhamma and discipline the Noble Eight-fold Path is not found, no ascetic is found of the first, the second, the third or the fourth grades. But such ascetic can be found, of the first, second, third and fourth grade in a Dhamma and discipline where the Noble Eight-fold Path is found’. This statement of the Buddha clearly points out the fact that the Noble Eight-fold Path is the ‘Path’ to the Ultimate Truth.

All the doctrines taught by the Buddha only mean to end the suffering and to attain Nibbana. The simile of raft in the Alagaddupamasutta of the M.N. (sutta No. 22) tells us that, all the teachings of the Buddha is meant to carry man to safety, peace, Happiness, Nibbana. That is why, in the Simsapasutta of the S.N.(vol.V.p.437-438) , the Buddha told the monks that what he knew was just like the leaves in the Sijsapa forest, but what he taught to them was only a little like the few leaves he held in his hand. Because what he preached are useful, and what he did not preach are not useful, not leading to Nibbana.

In the Cula-Maluvkyasutta of the MN, the Buddha explained to Maluvkyaputta who was anxious to know some metaphysical answers that, it is more important to get oneself free from suffering rather than to engage in metaphysical proposition which is useless and meaningless. And of course, he invited everyone to come and to see (ehi passiko) by themselves rather than to believe in him.

Buddhist attitude towards empiricism 262

Empiricism has two aspects of meaning:
(1) that all concepts are derived from the experience to which they are applied.
(2) that all knowledge of matters of fact is based on or derived from experience.

In the Savgarava Sutta of Majjhima Nikaya, the Buddha identifies himself as a Experientialist, which obtained knowledge through personal experience. Thus, the Buddha indeed is an empirical teacher, and his empiricist attitude is stated in the Sabbasutta of the Sajjutta Nikaya. This sutta explains that one’s direct perception is based on the spheres of experience and the corresponding objects.

Buddha’s teaching is a form of empiricism, based broadly on both ordinary sense perception and extrasensory perception. With this from of empiricism, Buddhism is in a position to reject some views not based on experience.

Extrasensory perception is considered as a valid means to knowledge in Buddhism, known as ‘abhībba’. Sensory perception as well as extra-ordinary perception both remains perception as they depend on experience. They are not given by some body outside the person. That is why one has to follow a certain course of action and develop these two signs of perception.

The Buddha clearly said in the Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta that he was able to know a certain methods, which were not known by others. This claims the Buddha based on his experience. From the life of the Buddha, we know that he went to different teachers practiced under them but he was not satisfied with their teachings. So he started his own practice and gain enlightenment. Thus he was able to speak his experience.

**Buddhist empiricism**

Empiricism means the branch of knowledge that believes in sense experience. The emphasis of knowing which must be based on seeing or direct perceptive experience makes Buddhism a form of empiricism. We have, however, to modify the use of the term somewhat to mean not only that all our knowledge is derived from sense experience but from extrasensory experience.

The Buddha’s radical non-substantialism (anattavāda) as well as the ‘Middle Path’ He adopted in the explanation of human experience and conception prevented Him from conceiving of sharp dichotomies. For Him there was no mind-body problem, because He did not define mind as non-material or matter as non-mental, that definition was to appear in the Buddhist tradition with the emergence of realist metaphysicians like Sarvīstivādins or the essentialist empiricists like the Sautrāntikas.

In Mathupiṇḍika Sutta the Buddha drew a causal connection between peaceful living and one’s attitude toward perception, namely, not allowing perception to overwhelm oneself. Questioned further, the Buddha explained: „Where obsessions (papañca) relating to perception (saññā) and conception (saṅkha) overwhelm a person, if there were to be nothing that one should be delighting in, extolling and committing oneself to, that itself is the end of a variety of tendencies such as lust, hatred, dogmatic view, perplexity, pride, lust for existence, ignorance and that itself is the end of meting (?) out punishment, taking up arms, quarrel, conflict, debate, strife, slander and falsehood. Herein, such evil and unwholesome things cease without remainder.“

The above passage clarifies the Buddha's view that perception and conception are not themselves reasons for the unfortunate conflicts in the world. On the contrary, it is the manner in which perception and conception are understood and treated that generates such a conflict. When the Buddha left the congregation after making the above remarks, the monks were still not clear as to what he meant. It is at this point, the great expositor, Mahā Kaccāyana comes to their rescue by analyzing in greater detail the very process of perception, conception and showing how it leads to obsessions. This explanation was subsequently approved by the Buddha. It is from the statement of Kaccāyana that one can obtain a clear understanding of how the radical empiricism of the Buddha can avoid the criticism of being an idealism. Kaccāyana’s exposition reads as follows:

„Depending upon eye and visible forms arises visual consciousness. Concomitant of these three is contact. Depending upon contact arises feeling. What one feels, one perceives, what one perceives, one reflects about, what one reflects about, depending upon that, obsessed perceptions and conceptions overwhelm a person in regard to visible objects, past, future and present.“
Kaccāyana’s description focuses upon the sense organ itself which serves the primary role of linking up the object with consciousness. This emphasis upon the sense faculty is a recognition of the centrality of sense experience in human knowledge and understanding.

The radical empiricism was the Buddha’s solution to the problem of human conflict. It is appropriately called the ‘Middle Path’ that avoids the extremes in almost every sphere of philosophical speculation, in epistemology and metaphysics, in normal philosophy or ethics as well as in linguistic philosophy.

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In Madhupindikida Sutta, the Buddha drew a causal connection between peaceful living and one’s attitude toward perception, namely, not allowing perception to overwhelm oneself. Questioned further, the Buddha explained: “where obsessions (Papanca) relating to perception (Sanna) and conception (Sankha) overwhelm a person, if there were to be nothing that one should be delighting in, extolling and committing oneself to, that itself is the end of a variety of tendencies such as lust, hatred, dogmatic view, perplexity, pride, lust for existence, ignorance and that itself is the end of meting out punishment, taking up arms, quarrel, conflict, debate, strife, slander and falsehood. Herein, such evil and unwholesome things cease without remainder.”

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**Epistemology of Immanuel Kant**

Epistemology s the study of the valid form of knowledge. It answers the question „How do we know?”

The origin of the word „epistemology” comes from the Greek word ‘episteme’, which means „knowledge.” Sometimes it is known as the „theory of knowledge.”

Epistemology is a branch of philosophy.

Epistemology always tries to answer the basic question: „How can a person distinguish the truth from the false?”

Right from wrong.

??? ??? unreal.

In the field of philosophy there are two major arguments established by two philosophical schools about gaining knowledge:

1. Rationalism
2. Empiricism

**Plato** who belonged to rationalist school hold the view that the knowledge is nearly an awareness of absolute universal ideas
erusting/entrusting(?) independence of any subject to apprehend them. So, therefore, knowledge of absolute cannot be reached through senses.

In the modern period two main epistemological positions dominate in philosophy:

1. Empiricism – empiricists explain knowledge as a product of a sense perception.
2. Rationalism – rationalists see it as the product of rational reflection

According to empiricism, knowledge results from a kind of reflection of external objects, through sensory organs sometimes with the help of instruments such as microscope, telescope etc.

Empirical knowledge has no *a priori* existence like in Plato’s concept, such as the “concept of ideal state."

It has to be developed by observation. Therefore, the ideal state of Plato becomes a false idea, because no one can understand it through sense experience. Likewise empiricists, Descartes’ rationalism is a valid source of gaining knowledge.

According to rationalists, valid knowledge comes only through the mind. Rationalists hold the view that the mind is able to understand the truth, that was not placed before the sense perception of sense experience.

there are (innate) ideas which a person can know independently from his sense experience.

Mathematics and geometry are examples for abstract truths, which are known with the certainty.

Plato was of the opinion that ideas exist independently from the mind. Ideas, according to him, are not produced as a result of human sense experience.

these independently existing ideas are only the reality of the universe since they are absolute and unchanging. The valid knowledge (the knowledge of reality) comes when the mind grasps these ideas.

According to Plato the knowledge of „ideal state“ cannot be experienced through sense organs, as it does not exist in the external world. It does not exist in the mind also of human beings, but the „ideal state“ exists in the heaven. This can be grasped only through innate knowledge.

**Immanuel Kant**

Immanuel Kant emphasizes very fundamental characteristics of epistemology. He felt that it is worthy to examine the knowledge which the human mind is capable of, before attempting to solve such problems concerning the soul, the God, the origin of the world, the origin of the universe etc.

Any attempt to find a solution for those problems without dealing with the questions raised by epistemology is like attempting to navigate a ship without a compass and without a systematic study of stars to get the proper directions.

Kant tried to solve the problem of empiricism. His solution is a combination of fundamentals of rationalism with the fundamentals of empiricism. He attempted to combine both theories rationalism and empiricism. his new theory is called „form and matter epistemology."

A statue can have a form as such as Abraham Lincoln and a matter such as marble - both these things form a matter needed for the existence of the statue of Abraham Lincoln.

Knowledge is gained by a form which are categories of mind and matter known as the data of sensations. Both mind and form are needed to have knowledge, argues Kant.

Kant agrees with rationalists to some existent, because a person can have an exact and certain knowledge through rationalism. He welcomes empiricism, because such knowledge is very much informative about the structure of thoughts than about the world outside of thoughts.

Kant has distinguished three types of knowledge:
1. *A priori* analytical

2. *Posteriori* synthetical

3. *A priori* synthetical

*A priori* analytical – the knowledge which is exact and certain. It is not informative because it makes clear only what is contained in definitions. For example: „Barren women bear no children.“

*Posteriori* synthetical – *posteriori* knowledge conveys information about the world learned from experience, but those information could be incorrect due to the malfunction of senses.

*A priori* synthetical – the knowledge which is discovered by pure intuition and is both exact and certain, as it expresses the necessary conditions that the mind imposes on all objects of experiences.

*Posteriori* synthetical - „all crows are black.“

*A priori* synthetical - „all men are subject to death.

Philosophers before **Kant** believed that there will be a metaphysical foundation to the physical world. (?) Uniformity and the existence of universe may have compelled them to think about such metaphysical powers. As a result of that they believed in an existence of a supreme divine power who created the world. In Indian philosophy *Upaniṣadic* sages also believed in the existence of a supreme being - „*Brahman.*“ **Kant** also believed in the physical and material world with the knowledge he got through his sense-experience. According to **Kant** knowledge is performed in the mind with the help of sense perception that knowledge uncovers the appearance of objects as we experience them. But we have no power to go beyond that. Therefore the empirical knowledge has no power to explain the reality behind the material objects. Sense organs only connect objects to the mind. Therefore it is meaningless to talk about an ultimate reality of the material world through the empirical knowledge. But the rational thinking always attempts to build an unconditioned reality that runs behind the empirical knowledge we get from the physical world. The empirical knowledge reproduces ideas. With the knowledge we reproduce, we make judgment about unconditional realities. Those judgments are false due to their unstable foundation. Those concepts are not practical in the real world.

Buddhism also does not accept that the external world is based on a metaphysical ground. As it appears in the *Sabba Sutta* of the *Saṃyutta Nikāya*, ‘*Sabba*’ (Skt. *Sarva*) means all, all objects that are perceived by sense organs - in other words, everything that is perceptible in the world. In that *sutta* Buddhist teachings do not attempt to make any transcendental concepts, such as everything is permanent - „*sabbam atthi*“ or „*sabbam natthi*.“ **Kant**’s argument on metaphysical concepts is similar to Buddhist teachings that appear in the *Sabba Sutta*. The *Sabba Sutta* clarifies or explains the meaning of *Sabba*. *Sabba* includes everything in the world. Man makes his world according to his sense experience he gets from the external world. According to the teaching of the **Buddha** and **Kant** it is clear that the objective knowledge could be established in the empirical field.
The rise of natural science, that is, a rational and experimental approach to the things of the world, there was produced an ongoing debate with religion. This started with Galileo and Newton, neither of whom would have entered into the debate as it came to be in the years of the radical enlightenment. Essentially, this debate is about whether the world contains ‘spirit’. A non-material reality that, paradoxically, can interact with the material. In all religious traditions this reality is personal. While ‘the force’ of star war fame has its appeal, it will never be the centre of religious activity. There are two issues here: the materiality of the world and the origin of ideas about spirit that continue to persist. It has become increasingly obvious that the materialist approach has won the day.

The world is composed of matter only. Scientists of all kinds go about their work without the hypothesis of spirit. Certainly there are scientists who try very hard to find evidence of divine agency in the world. These men and women are rarely biologists because the theory of evolution has displaced any idea of purpose. They are often physicists/cosmologists who delve into the origins of the universe, that is, they share a common preoccupation with much religion, the origin of all things. The common concern is aided by the emergence of cosmological theories that postulate a definite beginning in time.

So the quest for divine agency, while being driven from most people’s lives by the experience of senseless suffering and from the scientists theories by the lack of evidence, is driven back to the big-bang. This is truly the end result of ‘God of the gaps’ theology and one wonders what impact this God, who may or may not have been involved in the initial expansion of the universe, has for human lives. We have arrived at a modern ‘deism’. The second issue is raised by the continuation in popular consciousness and the larger part of the church, of ideas about divine agency. One explanation is that of cultural persistence. The Judeo/Christian tradition obviously has, at its heart, the idea of divine agency. But this does not explain its persistence in the culture and that most religions of the world have a similar concern.

Evolutionary psychologists like Pascal, Boyer, Dan Sperber and Justin Barrett are beginning to provide an explanation as to why certain religious ideas, specifically, the personal nature of ‘spirit’ persist in cultures worldwide. These explanations have to do with the evolved structure of the brain and how this translates to the kind of concept that is attractive to the mind. That is, there are certain concepts that our minds easily entertain. Much like language acquisition, the mind automatically receives certain concepts more readily than others.

Since Chomsky’s work in the late 60’s linguists generally acknowledge that the brain has innate structures that aid the acquisition of language. More recent work by evolutionary psychologists indicates that it is not only language that is facilitated by innate brain structures. Indeed it seems that these structures are responsible for all cognition, including the elaboration of religious ideation. This work explains why supernatural realities are always imagined to be personal because the brain is specifically structured to deal with the personality. In other words, evolution has provided us with specific adaptations that are unconscious, mandatory and fast and respond when we are dealing with others. These adaptations are intimately involved in religious ideation: that is why ‘the force’ will never be a key religious concept.

It would seem from the above that the outlook for religious thought is doomed, both on the basis of the materialism of the world and on an increasingly satisfying explanation of its the evolutionary/cognitive origins. I will argue in this column that this is not the end of theology but its liberation from superstitious thought and false foundations and the beginning of a theology that is

141 According to Semitic religions in the far future God will resurrect all souls and judge them whether they go to hell or heaven. Now it is important to believe and worship the God, or we might finish in the hell. This is the importance of believing in God.
recognised as being cultural/literary.

When we critically examine the Judeo/Christian tradition we find pointers that affirm that God is not contained by the concepts of supernatural agency, even though much of the tradition would lead us to believe so. I will further contend that orthodox theology has at its base the concepts that will lead us to a theology that will again capture the minds of men and women. Central to these conceptions is the doctrine of the Trinity, doctrine that subverts both the materialist and the evolutionary/cognitive reduction of theology. I will contend that the Judeo/Christian tradition is critical of what may be termed ‘naivist’ religion, that is, the religion that our minds would automatically produce. This critique may be found in the prophets’ Old Testament narrative and in the ministry of Jesus. It seems that the gospel is not about being saved for the afterlife, but being saved from automatic religious thinking that is so injurious to our lives.

**Religion and Marx (2009)**

Material and economic realities

Economics, then, are what constitute the base of all of human life and history – generating division of labor, class struggle and all the social institutions which are supposed to maintain the status quo. Those social institutions are a superstructure built upon the base of economics. Totally dependent upon material and economic realities but nothing else. All of the institutions which are prominent in our daily lives – marriage, church, government, arts, etc. - can only be truly understood when examined in relation to economic forces.

**Marx** had a special word for all of the work that goes into developing those institutions: ideology. The people working in those systems – developing art, theology, philosophy etc. - imagine that their ideas come from a desire to achieve truth or beauty, but that is not ultimately true. In reality, they are expressions of class interest and class conflict. They are reflections of an underlying need to maintain the status quo and preserve current economic realities. This isn't suprising – those in power have always wished to justify and maintain that power.

How do we account for religion

How do we account for religion – its origin, its development, and even its persistence in modern society? This is a question which has occupied many people in a variety of fields for quite a long time. At one point, the answers were framed in purely theological and religious terms, assuming the truth of Christian revelations and proceeding from there.

But through the 18th and 19th centuries a more 'naturalistic' approach developed. On eperson who attempted to examine religion from an objective, scientific perspective was **Karl Marx**. **Marx's** analysis and critique of religion is perhaps one of the most famous and most quoted by theist and atheist alike. Unfortunately, most of those doing the quoting don't really understand exactly what **Marx** meant.

I think that this in turn is due to not entirely understanding Marx's general theories on economics and society. **Marx** actually said very little about religion directly; in all of his writings he hardly ever addresses religion in a systematic fashion, even though he touches on it frequently in books, speeches and pamphlets. The reason is that his critique of religion forms simply one piece of his overall theory of society – thus, understanding his critique of religion requires some understanding of his critique of society in general.

„The religious world is but the reflex of the real world.“

According to **Karl Marx**, religion is like other social institutions in that it is dependent upon the material and economic realities in a given society. It has no independent history; instead it is the creature of
productive forces. As Marx wrote: „The religious world is but the reflex of the real world.“

According to Marx religion can only be understood in relation to other social systems and the economic structures of society. In fact, religion is only dependent upon economics, nothing else – so much so that the actual religious doctrines are almost irrelevant. This is a functionalist interpretation of religion: understanding religion is dependent upon what social purpose religion itself serves, not the content of its beliefs.

Marx’s opinion is that religion is an illusion that provides reasons and excuses to keep society functioning just as it is. Much as capitalism takes our productive labor and alienates us from its value, religion takes our highest ideals and aspirations and alienates us from them, projecting them into an alien and unknowable being called 'god'.

Three reasons for disliking religion

Marx has three reasons for disliking religion.

1. It is irrational – religion is a delusion and a worship of appearances that avoids recognizing underlying reality.

2. Religion negates all that is dignified in a human being by rendering them servile and more amenable to accepting the status quo. In the preface to his doctoral dissertation Marx adopted as his motto the words of the Greek hero Prometheus who defied the gods to bring fire to humanity: „I hate all gods.“ With addition that they „do not recognize man's self-consciousness as the highest divinity."

3. Religion is hypocritical. Although it might profess valuable principles, it sides with the oppressors. Jesus advocated helping the poor, but the Christian church merged with the oppressive Roman state, taking part in the enslavement of people for centuries. In the Middle Ages the Catholic Church preached about heaven, but acquired as much property and power as possible.

Religious distress is at the same time the expression of real distress and the protest against real distress. „Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature,“ „the heart of a heartless world,“ just as it is the spirit of a spiritless situation. „It is the opium of the people."

The abolition of religion as the illusory happiness of the people is required for their real happiness. The demand to give up the illusion about its condition is the demand to give up a condition which needs illusions.

„Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature...“

„Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature...“ leaves out that it is also the „heart of a heartless world.“ This is more a critique of society that has become heartless and is even a partial validation of religion that it tries to become its heart. In spite of his obvious dislike of and anger towards religion, Marx did not make religion the primary enemy of workers and communists. Had Marx regarded religion as a more serious enemy, he would have devoted more time to it.

Marx is saying that religion is meant to create illusory fantasies for the poor. Economic realities prevent them from finding true happiness in this life, so religion tells them this is OK because they will find true happiness in the next life. Marx is not entirely without sympathy: people are in distress and religion does provide solace, just as people who are physically injured receive relief from opiate-based drugs.

The problem is that opiates fail to fix a physical injury – you only forget your pain and suffering. This can be fine, but only if you are also trying to solve the underlying causes of the pain. Similarly, religion does
not fix the underlying causes of people's pain and suffering – instead, it helps them forget why they are suffering and causes them to look forward to an imaginary future when the pain will cease instead of working to change circumstances now. Even worse, this 'drug' is being administered by the oppressors who are responsible for the pain and suffering.

Here in Marx's eyes religion enters. Capitalism utilises our tendency towards religion as a tool or ideological state apparatus to justify this alienation. Christianity teaches that those who gather up riches and power in this life will almost certainly not be rewarded in the next - „It is harder for a rich man to enter the Kingdom of Heaven than it is for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle...“ While those who suffer oppression and poverty in this life, while cultivating their spiritual wealth, will be rewarded in the Kingdom of God. Thus Marx's famous line - „religion is the opium of the people“ as it soothes them and dulls their senses to the pain of oppression.

It would not be appropriate to accept Marx's ideas uncritically

As interesting and insightful as Marx's analysis and critiques are, they are not without their problems – historical and economic. Because of these problems it would not be appropriate to accept Marx's ideas uncritically. Although he certainly has some important things to say on the nature of religion, he can't be accepted as the last word on the subject.

First, Marx doesn't spend much time looking at religion in general; instead he focuses on the religion with which he is most familiar: Christianity. His comments do hold for other religions with similar doctrines of a powerful god and happy afterlife, they do not apply to radically different religions. In ancient Greece and Rome. For example, a happy afterlife was reserved for heroes while commoners could only look forward to a mere shadow of their earthly existence. Perhaps he was influenced in this matter by Hegel who thought that Christianity was the highest form of religion and that whatever was said about that also automatically applied to 'lesser' religions – but that isn't true.

A second problem is his claim that religion is wholly determined by material and economic realities. Not only is nothing else fundamental enough to influence religion, but influence cannot run in the other direction, from religion to material and economic realities. This is not true. If marx were right, then capitalism would appear in countries propo to Protestantism because Protestantism is the religious system created by capitalism – but we don't find this. The Reformation comes to 16th century Germany which is still feudal in nature; real capitalism doesn't appear until the 19th century. This caused Max Weber to theorize that religious institutions end up creating new economic realities.

Changes in Marxist attitude toward religion and the view taken of Marxist own historical role hav influenced Marxist theorizing as well as the quasi-religious uses made of Marxist doctrine. The topic of Marxism and religion can involve either an analysis of Marxist theories of religion or a study of Marxism as a functional equivalent of religion. The two are difficult to disentangle. Moreover, although marxists have often distinguished between the oppressive role of established churches and the emancipatory possibilities of religious movements, they have his-trically linked their own worldview to both.

The positivist thrust of German social democracy fostered little sympathy for religion, although Eduard Bernstein and Karl Kautsky each wrote books on the role of religion in Reformation and Renaissance in Europe, and Kautsky's Foundations of

142This is a note taken from an Internet website, but in the original paper from which I copied this the website’s address was not mentioned.
Christianity (International Publishers, 1925 [1908]) discussed the influence of Roman socio-economic conditions on early Christianity. The Austro-Marxists were more sympathetic to religion, partly in the hope of attracting the large Roman Catholic working population. Their neo-Kantianism\(^\text{143}\) also encouraged moral theorizing and made greater room for religious speculation.

Lenin wrote little about religion and viewed it primarily as an impediment to political action. However, his book Materialism and Empirio-Criticism (Foreign Languages Publishing 1920 [1908]) attacked current ‘subjectivist’ epistemologies and the cover that they provided for the reintroduction of religion. Trotsky approvingly analyzed the parallel, now commonly made, between the disciplined Puritan and Jesuit ‘parties’ and the contemporary Bolsheviks, while other Soviet Marxists either saw a more positive role for religious ideals as a road to Socialism or elevated Scientific Socialism itself into a new ‘religion’.

The Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci developed a suggestive treatment of religion in his Prison Notebooks (Lawrence & Wishart 1971 [1948-1951]). His broad definition of ideological hegemony frequently included reference to religious ideas and elites The distinction between traditional and organic intellectuals, in his theory of intellectuals, allowed him to discuss both the conservative and the revolutionary roles of religious elites. He analyzed early Medieval and Reformation Christianity, as well as modern Roman Catholicism, especially in their relationships to current Italian conditions. His discussion of the ways in which disaffected members of established religious elites (e.g., Savonarola and Luther) attack hegemonic institutions in the name of new ideals and organizations is particularly interesting.

By contrast, the Frankfurt School produced no sustained analysis of religion. Its members demonstrated a sympathy for religion as a repository of unfulfilled ideals (e.g., Horkheimer) and a source of theological motifs for their writings (e.g., Adorno and Benjamin). Only marginal members, such as Erich Fromm (in The Dogma of Christ, Routledge 1963 [1930]) and Franz Borkenau (in his study of feudal and capitalist worldviews), wrote works systematically linking religion to changing societal circumstances.

Among later Marxists, Lucien Goldmann (The Hidden God, Routledge 1964) offered a valuable analysis of Pascal’s life and thought, one influenced by Lukács’s Marxism and modified by categories drawn from Piaget. He established structural homologies between social classes and styles of thought and saw the “tragic vision” of Pascal and the Jansenists as the worldview of an administrative class yoked, yet historically opposed, to the monarchy’s increasing power. Goldman’s work stands out among Marxist accounts of religion for its theoretical innovations and its thorough and sensitive treatment of historical texts.

Other Marxian-inspired efforts in the study of religion include those of Houtart and Lemercinier, two Catholic thinkers, who have adapted Marxian ideas effectively to the study of Asian religious traditions, and Bryan Turner, who has offered a ‘materialist’ theory of religion.

The rapprochement of Marxism and Christianity among eastern European intellectuals in the postwar era (e.g., Leszek Kolakowski) and the amalgam of Marxism and Christianity in the social reform efforts of Liberation Theology in Latin America since the 1960s (e.g., Gutiérrez) are only two examples of the continuing mutual fertilization of Marxism and religion. With the demise of world communism, Marxism’s new, yet not unfamiliar, situation is likely to allow its proponents once again to forge links with religion.

Foundations of Marxism

We are here to give you a starting point, a grounding in what Marxism is about. A Marxists have a certain kind of practice, a way of living and working, that we call being a ‘communist’. A Marxist’s thought is based on this daily practice, a philosophy called ‘dialectics’. Thus, Marxism is both a ‘theory’ and ‘practice’. The theories of Marxism are based on a method of thought called ‘dialectical materialism’; to be clear there is no one answer to a question – theory is based on a particular set of conditions that are always finite, and thus, any theory is necessarily limited. To test the validity of theory, Marxists rely on empirical evidence as the criteria of ‘truth’. Using such a methodology Marx and Engels examined history, which lead them to explain theories on the class struggle, the basis of social relations through economics, and the form of society that would follow capitalism. These theories are not immutable truths, they follow something similar to the scientific method: a hypothesis that explains observable events; a hypothesis which remains valid only so long as it does not conflict with reality. Naturally, there are countless examples of Marxist theories, that have been modified, revised, or all together changed: starting with Marx’s own changes! In this sense, in reading the classics of marxism your most important task is to comprehensively understand the method; having accomplished that, you’ll begin to see relevant and up-to-date answers for modern times on your own.

\(^{143}\) A modern school based on the teachings of Immanuel Kant.
The philosopher Étienne Balibar wrote in 1993 that "there is no Marxist philosophy and there never will be; on the other hand, Marx is more important for philosophy than ever before." So, even the existence of Marxist philosophy is debatable (the answer may depend on what is meant by "philosophy," a complicated question in itself.) Balibar's remark is intended to explain the significance of the final line of Karl Marx's Eleven Theses on Feuerbach (1845), which can be read as an epotaph for philosophy: "The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it."

If this claim (which Marx originally intended as a criticism of German Idealism and the more moderate Young Hegelians), is still more or less the case in the twenty-first century, as many Marxists would claim, then Marxist theory is in fact the practical continuation of the philosophical tradition, while much of philosophy is still politically irrelevant. Many critics, both philosophers outside(?), Marxism and some Marxist philosophers, feel that this is too quick a dismissal of the post-Marxist philosophical tradition. Much sophisticated and important thoughts have taken place after the writing of Marx and Engels; much or perhaps even all of it has been influenced, subtly or overtly, by Marxism. Simply dismissing all philosophy as sophistry might condemn Marxism to a simplistic empiricism or economism, crippling it in practice and making it comically simplistic on the level of theory.

Nonetheless, the force of Marx's opposition to Hegelian Idealism and to any "philosophy" divorced from political practice remains powerful even to a contemporary reader. Twentieth-century Marxists and Marx-influenced theory, such as (to name a few examples at random) the critical theory of the Frankfurt School, the political writing of Antonio Gramsci, and the neo-Marxism of Frederic Jameson, must take Marx's condemnation of philosophy into account, but many such thinkers also feel a strong need to remedy the perceived theoretical problems with orthodox Marxism. Such problems might include a too-simple economic determinism, an untenable theory of ideology as 'false consciousness' or a simplistic model of state power rather than hegemony. So, Marxist philosophy must continue to take account of advances in the theory of politics developed after Mrx, but it must also be aware of a descent into theoreticism or the temptations of idealism.

Étienne Balibar claimed that if one philosopher could be called a 'Marxist philosopher', that one would be doubtlessly Louis Althusser. Althusser proposed a 'new definition' of philosophy as 'class struggle in theory' … Marxism had proper
signification (and original „problematic“) only in so far as it was the theory of the tendency towards communism, and in view of its realization. The criteria of acceptance or rejection of ‘Marxist’ proposition was always the same, whether it was presented as ‘epistemological’ or as ‘philosophical’: it was in the act of rendering intelligible a ‘communit policy’ or not.” (Ecrits pour Althusser, 1991, p.98). However, „Althusser never ceased to put in question the ‘images of communism’ that Marxist theory and ideology carried on: but he did it in the name of communism itself.” Althusser thus criticized the evolutionist image which made of communism an ultimate stage of history, as well as the apocalyptic images which made it a „society of transparency,“ „without contradiction“ nor ideology. Balibar observes that, in the end, Althusser joined the most sober definition of communism, exposed by Marx in The German Ideology: „Communism is not a state of the future, but the real movement which destroys the existing state of being.”

Marxist philosophy or Marxist theory are terms which cover work in philosophy, which is strongly influenced by Karl Marx’s materialist approach to theory which is written by Marxists. It may be broadly divided into Western Marxism, which drew out of various sources, and the official ‘philosophy in the Soviet Union’, which enforced a rigid reading of Marx called ‘Diamant’ (for ‘DIAlektical MAterialism’), in particular during the 1930’s. The phrase ‘Marxist philosophy’ itself does not indicate a strictly defined sub-field of philosophy, because the diverse influence of Marxist theory has extended into fields as diverse as aesthetics, ethics, ontology, epistemology and philosophy of science, as well as its obvious influence on political philosophy and the philosophy of history. The key characteristics of Marxism in philosophy are its materialism and its commitment to political practice as the end goal of all thought. Louis Althusser, for example, defined philosophy as ‘class struggle in theory’, thus radically disjoining himself from those who claimed that philosophers could adopt a ‘God’s eye view’ as a purely neutral judge. Just as the young Marx had left university and German Idealism to encounter the proletariat, which permitted him to modify his perspective on practice and theory, ‘intellectuals’ couldn’t content themselves with instructing masses from their chairs (as the ‘organic intellectual’ conception denounced by Antonio Gramsci), but had themselves to take part in the social struggles of their times.

**Marxist attitude toward the religion (1)**

Marxist attitude towards religion was directly aimed at the theistic religion that maintained the ideas of the human world including human being as created by the God. It functions according to the will of the God. Human beings are therefore incapable in challenging the God or changing the world that is made by the God. Marx maintained that minority (rich) is using various tools to oppress the majority (the poor). One such tool that was used by the rich was religion, in Europe.

The religion says „poor is the blessed.“ Therefore, he understood European religions as forces to mislead common, poor people. So, Karl Marx wrote „Religion is opium to poor (oppressed) men.“ Marx has mentioned that religion is a net for the people and they see everything through this net. Therefore they cannot understand the real truth, because people normally see everything according to their religious teachings.

That is why religion has compared with the net. There is not any religion without human beings and it cannot be originated automatically. Therefore, religion has been originated by the man, not by any God. The God also is created by the man. Although man is founder of the religion, later man has become a laborer of the religion. And Marx has discussed about those things critically. However, religion has developed to unite the people and it against the man. (?) As a result of that man is helpless due to the religion.

According to the above information Marxists have rejected basically the concept of God as a creator etc. and exploiting activities of the rulers and capitalists in the society. (?) In addition religion has protested higher conditions of the highest caste such as Brāhmaṇa, Christianity etc. (?) The responsibilities, powers, autonomy has been given to the God or another extra power. Therefore, Marxists have given the deepest criticism against religion. The criticism of Marx on religion was not directed at religions such as Buddhism.

According to Buddhism, the belief that God has created the world is a wrong view (micchā diṭṭhi). Therefore, Buddhism does not believe that world functions according to the will of God. According to the Buddhist theory human society could be changed and it can be only done by the human beings – they can think and change and become better. The Buddha’s coming to the world among human beings to remind them that they can change themselves and even they can change the society in which they live. Therefore Marx could not reject Buddhism.
There are many different views concerning with the religion which was presented by sociologist scholars and humanity scholars. According to the Marxists’ attitude toward the religion, it is quite different from the scholars’ attitude, who presented their interpretations in regard to the religion. Most of the scholars accepted that Marxism was an influence to politics, economy, culture, education and religion. There is very deep concern between religion and human beings regarding the beginning of the world. Therefore, it cannot be spread religion and man because man has connected with the heart and religion. Religion can be considered as the most powerful in life of society. Rulers’ and capitalists’ religion is used as an instrument to protect their power. Religion is justified exploiting activities of the labourers by capitalists. Marxists have discussed those things very deeply.

Therefore, Marxists have given their critical interpretations with regard to the religion exactly. There is not any religion without human beings. Religion has been originated by the people, not by the God. God is also created by man. Although man is founder of the religion, later man has become a labourer of religion. Religion has developed as an oppression to the people and it was made as well as against the man. As a result of that man is helpless due to the religion. According to teaching of the religions, there is a cast system, ruler, capitalists and labourers in the society as a result of their good or bad actions.

Marxists have mentioned religion as a net for the people and that all the fear depends on that net. They cannot understand the real truth, because people can’t see everything normally because of their religious teaching. That is why Marx has compared the religion to a net. Some religious people have to accept the God as a creator or savior of the world. People cannot understand the real world or how human being was born or living in the world and how they become rich etc., because religion has taught that everything exists with the God. Basically Marxists rejected the concept of God, ruler, capitalists in the society and highest cast Brāhmaṇa, Christianity etc.

According to above mentioned matter it is evident that Marxists have criticized religion very deeply. But Buddhism does not belong to religion, because the Buddha did not teach such a thing. Therefore Marxists do not reject Buddhism as a guide for the world. Marxists wanted to confer personal responsibility, leadership and power to the man or human, not to the God or not any other powerful thing. That has been done by Buddhism very clearly at the beginning. Therefore, many scholars have mentioned that Buddhism is not belonging to Marxist interpretation in regard to the religion.

Marxists accepted basic teaching of the Buddhism thus: „The man should attain his development and

144 As a result of their good or bad actions? If it is taken from the objective point of view, it is not true, because usually the cast system and the position in society is acquired by birth – viz. cast system in India, but also any other system even in West, Europe, USA etc. But if we take it from the Buddhist point of view, then of course the position in society is according to one’s deeds committed in one’s previous life.
welfare by himself, not by the god. There is no eternal soul in the body or outside, there is no creator in the
world, there is no any sacred things, there is no castes system. Finally, we can examine that Marxists wanted to
explain the freedom of thought individually in the world. Marx wanted to give messages as the Buddha said
that „one must rely on oneself, how can he rely on others“ - »Attāhi attano nātho, kohi nātho parosiyā.«

MARXIST ATTITUDE TOWARD RELIGIONS AND SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS

There are different views concerning the religion which were presented by sociology scholars and
humanity scholars. According to their interpretation it shoul complete or fulfill four kinds of parts or one of
them:
1. There should be a holy place and sacred things
2. There should be a kind of belief regarding the holy place and sacred things
3. There should be practice and duties according to the belief concerning the holy place and sacred things
4. There should be an origination of the followers to follow the religious activities.

According to the marxist attitude toward the religion it is more different when we investigate it with the
scholars who presented their interpretation regarding the religion. Apart from that it is different from the
sociological analysis among the Marxist and other scholars. Most of the modern scholars accept that the
Marxism had an influence in politics, economy, culture, education and religion etc., that is without any
discussion. There is a very deep connection between the religion and human beings since in the beginning of
the world and beginning of the human beings.

Therefore, it can’t be separated from the man, because man is connected by heart with the religion.
Consequently religion can be considered as the most powerful part in the life of society as well as in the world.
So, Marxists have discussed those things very deeply. According to the Marxists ruler and capitalist religion is
used as an instrument to protect their power and continue it further. In addition religion has conformed
differences among the casts. The Marxists have indicated further, that religion justifies exploiting activities of
the laborers by the capitalists. Consequently, religion has been considered as a unit, which conforms
dependence of a person. Therefore, as it is evident, Marxists have given their critical interpretations regarding
the religion.

There is no religion without human beings and it can’t origin automatically. It can’t exist without man.
Therefore, religion has originated by the people, not by any of gods. The gods are also created by man.
Although man is the founder of the religion, later man became a laborer of the religion and marxists discussed
those things critically.

However, religion has developed as an oppressive unit to the people and it works as well as exists
against the man. As a result of that man is helpless due to the religion, according to Marxists. The religion is an
appearance of the highest evidence to conform differences among the casts. According to the teaching of the
religion there is a cast system, rulers, capitalists and laborers in the society as a result of the God or because
their bad action in the past (kamma). If any bad person becomes rich, religion will explain that he has actually
been good, therefore he deserves it. If somebody became poor, it shows that he had been a bad person.

Therefore, Marxists have indicated that religion has investigated (?) their differences. Consequently
people have to tolerate them due to their religion, because it has conformed them, because of the kamma.
Therefore, religion was named ‘opium’ by Marx. In addition Marxists have shown that anybody can attain
only un-eternal wealth from the religion, so there is no practical value in the religion. The Marxists have
proved these views with evidences.
Marxists mentioned religion as a net for the people who see everything through this net. Therefore they can’t understand the real truth because normally people everything sees according to their religious teachings, that is why religion has compared with the nate. According to some religions people have to accept God as creator, leader in the world. So, people can’t understand real world or how human beings are born, living in the world and how they become rich etc. because religion has taught that everything exists according to the God.

Therefore, to the above information, Marxists have rejected basically the concept of God as a creator etc. and exploiting activities by the rulers and capitalists in the society. In addition religion has protected higher conditions of the highest cast such as Brāhmaṇa; Christianity etc., the responsibilities, powers, autonomy, all that have been given by the God or any other extra power.

The marxists indicated further that both priests and politicians together have conformed their powers in the society, except basic teachings of the religion. Therefore, Marxists have given their most deep criticism against religion. But Buddhists do not belong to that religion, because Buddha has not taught such a teching. Therefore, Marxists can’t reject the Buddhism, rather they can get some guide from the Buddhism. The marxists wanted to glue personal responsibility, leadership and autonomy, power to the man or human being, not for the God or any other power or thing. It has been by the Buddhism very clearly since the beginning. Therefore, so many scholars have mentioned that Buddhism does not belong to the marxist interpretation regarding the religion. Ven. Kamburupitiya Ariyasena has indicated that Marx did not have enough knowledge regarding Buddhist philosophy. The marxists have accepted basic teachings of the Buddhism as follows:
1. The man should attain his development, progress and welfare by himself, not by the God or any such power
2. There is no eternal soul in the body or outside
3. There is no creator in the world
4. There is no sacred thing
5. There is no caste system

Most important matter is the food for the people. Most important thing is frugality; living in peace should develop instead of war. Everybody should have a respect to each other and everybody should think about others as his own brothers and sisters. Everybody should try to prepare welfare for other people. The democracy and freedom is very important.

**Question:** Compare main teaching of Marxism with Buddhism? Marxist criticism on religion and Buddhism and respond on that. (Lectured by Ven. Paṇṇāloka) (Original by Ven. Im Dīna & Ven. H. Sovanny)

With the advancement of science and knowledge in recent century new theories of political and economic interest emerge in the world. Karl Marx in his publication Das Capital presents the new theory of
the evolution of political and economic history of the world. Together with his disciple Friedrich Engels he made the second publication – Communist Manifesto. It outlines the economic history of the world. His main theory was called ‘the labor theory of production’.

Philosophy of Karl Marx

He observed in history that there were three main streams of thought influences. Karl Marx generated his philosophy following three bases of thought that were predominantly functioning in Germany, England and France at that time:
1. Classical German philosophy
2. Classical politico-economic system of Great Britain
3. French communism and the trends of revolution

These three ideologies shaped the way of thinking of Karl Marx and he produced the new politico-economic theory named Marxism.

One of the basic principles in his philosophy was that he said: „Human economic history is nothing but combat between 'have' and 'have not'.“ To clarify this ide he classified the entire history of humanity in five stages, namely:
1. Proto-communist era
2. Slave era
3. Landlord era
4. Capitalist era
5. Communist era

Marx maintained that in the eras number 2, 3 and 4 the minority of rich and powerful people exploited labor of majority of poor to seek profit and happiness. Marx maintained that rich minority is using different tools to oppress the majority of the poor. One such tool that was used by the rich in Europe was religion. The religion says „poor is the blessed, therefore he understands European religion as force to mislead common poor people.“ So, Karl Marx wrote: „Religion is opium to poor (= oppressed).“ Therefore, he said that religious criticism should begin in order to achieve social change.

The criticism of Marx on religion was not directed at a religion like Buddhism. According to Buddhism the belief that God created the world is a wrong view (micchā diṭṭhi). Therefore, Buddhism does not believe that world functions according to the will of the God. The Buddhist understanding is that natural world and human society as they are today are results of the long process of causes and conditions. According to the Buddhist theory human society can be changed and it can be done only by the human being. God cannot do that, human beings can think. They can think to change and become better. The Buddha is coming to the world among human beings to remind them that they can change the society in which they live.

In examining the buddhist response towards Marx's idea on religion first we have to contrast and compare the main principles of Marx's theory against Buddhism. The main theory of Marxism is the inequality between social classes. According to Buddhism this again has physical as well as psychological reasons. They could be factors like economic, social status etc. Its psychological reasons are māna (pride) and micchā diṭṭhi (wrong view). The Buddha says in Anguttara Nikāyat that there are two reasons for micchā diṭṭhi:
1. Wrong information received from others (parato gocha)
2. Non-examination of information received from others (ayoniso manasikāra)
Even Buddhism understands property as a problem in human society. Therefore, *Anguttara Nikāya* says: „Oh monks, poverty is the suffering in the world.“ - »*Dalliddhayan bhikkhave dukkham lokasmiṃ.*« the *Kudhadanta Sutta* of *Dīgha Nikāya* records an incident where Buddhist advise is enumerated as how to overcome poverty. Their three steps are shown to overcome poverty and to establish economic testability in human society.

To rich people **Buddha** advised to practice one good moral quality for the benefit of oneself and society (*dāna*). *Rāṭṭhapāḷa Sutta* of *Majjhima Nikāya* claims that no one can take his wealth after his death, therefore the best use of money should be made while living: »*Na mīyāmaṃ dhanamanveti kiñci, Puttā ca dārā ca dhanaṅca raṭṭham.*« Chandaika Sutta of *Majjhima Nikāya* classified contemporary religions of the **Buddha** into two groups as follows. In this life Buddhism will not evaluate any view that is extremely materialistic and which is taught against ethics in the society. Bare materialism and absence of ethical values will come(?) human spiritual life and society in a great deal.)?) Therefore, ethics in human mind has been encouraged by Buddhist teaching. The **Buddha** himself is a culmination of ethics and wisdom. From the very beginning of Buddhist way of life the development of ethic and wisdom became an essential part.

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**666 Compare main teaching of Marxism with Buddhism? Marxist criticism on religion and Buddhism respond toward that.**

With the advancement of science and knowledge in recent century’s new theories of politico economic interest emerge in the world. Karl Marx in his Das Capital presents the new theory of the evolution of political economic history of the world. Together with his disciple Fredic Engels he made the second publication Communist Manifesto. It outlines the economic history of the world. His main theory was called “the labour theory of production”. Karl-Marx to generate his philosophy at that time the following three bases of thought were predominantly functioning in Germany, England and France. 1, classical German philosophy. 2, classical politico economic system of Great Britain. 3, France communism and the trends of revolution. This three ideologist shaped the way of thinking of Karl Marx and he produces the new politico economic theory named Marxism.

One of the basic principles in his philosophy was that human economic history is nothing but combat between have and have not. To clarifies this idea he classified the entire history of humanity in five stages namely: 1, proto-communist era. 2, slave era. 3, land lord era. 4, capitalist era. 5, new communist era. Marx maintains that in the era’s number two, three and four the minority of rich and powerful people exploited labour of majority poor for sake of profit and happiness. Marx maintains that rich minority is using different tools to oppress the majority poorest. One such tool that was used by the rich was the religion in Europe. The religion says “poor is the blessed therefore he understands European religion as force to mislead common poor people. So Karl Marx wrote religion is opium to poor (oppressed). Therefore, he said religious criticism to should begin in order to achieve social change.

The criticism of Marx on religion was not directed at a religion like Buddhism. According to Buddhism God is create as of the world is a wrong view (Micchaditthi). Therefore Buddhism does not belief that world function according to the will of the God.

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The Buddhist understanding is that natural world and human society as they are today are results of the long process of causes and conditions. According to the Buddhist theory human society could be changed and it can be only done by the human being. God cannot do that, human beings can think.

In examining the Buddhist response to Marx idea on religion first we have to contrast and compare the main principle of Marx theory against Buddhism. The main theory of Marxism is the in quality between social classes. According to Buddhism this again has physical as well as psychological reason like economic social status etc. Its psychological reasons are Mana (pride) and Micchadithi (wrong view). The Buddha says in Anguttara nikaya that there are two reasons for Micchadithi: 1, wrong information receives form others (Parato gocha). Non –examination of information received from others (Ayoniso manasikara). Anguttara Nikaya says “O monks poverty is the suffering in the world” (Dalliddhayam bhikkhave dukkham lokasmin). The Kuthadanta Sutta of D. Nikaya record an incident where Buddhist advice is enumerated as a remedy to overcome poverty. establish economic testability in human society.

To rich people Buddha advised to practice one good moral quality for the benefit of oneself and society (Dana) Rattapala Sutta of M. Nikaya said no one can take his wealth after his death, therefore the best use of money should be made while living (na miyamanam danam annuathi). Chandaka Sutta of Majjhima Nikaya classified contemporary religion of the Buddha into two groups as follows. In this life Buddhism will not evaluate any view that is extremely materialistic is which taught against ethics in the society. Bare materialism and absent of ethical values will cause have spiritual life and society in a great deal. Therefore ethics in human mind has been encouraged by Buddhist teaching. The Buddha himself is the culmination of ethic and wisdom. From very beginning of Buddhist way of life the development of ethics and wisdom become an essential part.

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**PHILOSOPHY OF MARX AND THE BUDDHIST RESPONSE TOWARDS IT (ORIGINAL BY VEN. DHARMEŚVAR)**

**Karl Marx** was a political philosopher who was born in Germany. He presented his politico-economic theory in his book named *Das Capital*. On eof his followers, **Friedrich Engels** who developed the theory of Karl Marx to be a political strategy presented it in 1848 in his book named *Communist Manifesto*.

It is believed that three streams of European thought were influential in developing the theory of Karl Marx. They were:

1. Classical German philosophy
2. Classical British politico-economic system
3. France socialism and social change trends

The main thesis of his philosophy was that the history of every human society is the history of prevalence of rich upon the poor. According to Marx in every human society there are two social races, they are: the rich and the poor. Generally there is an inequality in distribution of wealth among the people. As a result one who has a lot of wealth and is in the rich minority, enjoys the comfort and rules over the majority of poor. Subsequently, the majority of poor is put into disregard, to do hard work, suffer and to all problems of life. To present this philosophy in a more and wider context, Karl Marx classified the human history into five eras:

1. Pre-communist era – classless society
2. Era of slavery – slave owners and slaves
3. Feudal era – landlords and workers
4. Capitalist era – rich businessmen and factory workers
5. New communist era – the new classless society where is no difference between poor and rich

According to the theory of Marx always the wealthy men change the era into new one, as a result of the struggle of poor majority against the rich minority. Therefore, Karl Marx suggested the poor people to organize wealth and fight against the capitalism. In his process of explanation of the struggle he said that the religiona nd the ethics are useless. What religion

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146 *Das Capital* is the German name of the book. The English name would be *The Capital*. 
has done always is intoxicating people according to the need of the rich. Therefore, Karl Marx said that the religion is an institution which will disappear in new communist era in face of trend-less society. The critique of Marx is better given in his statement „Religion is opium. “

Karl Marx recognized the last distinction based on economy as one of the malpractices in all the historical societies. According to Marx, the ruling social classes who have and those who haven't were created by economic reasons. He proposed to change the existing economic systems in order to change social structure based on economic classes. In his philosophy Karl Marx observed only the physical causes of the creation of social classes.

Buddhism has, on the other hand, observed that there are causes other than economics which created social classes among human beings in the history. According to Buddhism pride (māna) is one of sub-psychological causes which causes distinction among human beings. Due to pride human beings tend to think high of themselves and condemn others. This psychological process cannot be reduced or eradicated only by changing the economical or political structure of the human society. Instead pride in human mind should be eradicated by spiritual advancement and mental purity essence, then the aim of the classless human society can be achieved. The society of nobles (ariya) was furnished as a good example for this fact.

Another social weakness observed by Karl Marx was the exploitation of the poor by the rich. In this fact Buddhism agreed with Marx because Buddhism also did not agree with the exploitation of the poor in the society. In the Indian society in 6th century BC the minority of upper class utilized the lower classes like the Śūdras or Pañcānas for their comfort and easiness. The social group of both sects were employed to make life comfortable of the males of upper classes. To establish a good social environment for the people who suffered, the Buddha theoretically exchanged ideas with the people at that society to prove the fact that the social distinction that are inflicted on society as baseless. In the Vāsetṭha Sutta in Majjhima Nikāya the Buddha makes clear statement that by birth none becomes a noble or outcaste - »‘Na jaccā brāhmaṇo [vasalo (syā. kam. ka.)] hoti, na jaccā hoti abhrāmaṇo [brāhmaṇo (syā. kam. ka.)]; Kammunā brāhmaṇo [vasalo (syā. kam. ka.)] hoti, kammunā hoti abhrāmaṇo [brāhmaṇo (syā. kam. ka.)].”

In the Ambuttāta Sutta of Dīgha Nikāya the Buddha says that all the four classes are equal - »(cattāro vaṅṇa samasamā honti)“ Again practically the Buddha rejected class and caste distinction by granting equal status in the Buddhist Order to the members of all the four classes. In the light of Buddhist teaching the woman in ancient India achieved higher social positions – bhikkhunīs, upāsikās, mothers, wives and daughters. This information shows that the Buddha was a social reformist like Marx who rendered a great service against the exploitation of the poor and the innocent.

Surplus value was understood by Karl Marx as an evil in the economic of pre-communist society. The minority of rich people earns wealth by exploiting the poor and heaps an extra-income with them. Therefore, Karl Marx proposed that to earn all the private own enterprises to be government or common wealth by which surplus value could be abolished and extra-income could be used for the welfare of society. This philosophy of Marx influenced the political thinking of the world very much to emerge a system of government called ‘welfare’ or ‘new liberal government’.149

When we examine the issue of surplus value in the light of Buddhist teaching two principles can be derived out:
1. According to the Kudadanta Sutta of Dīgha Nikāya it is the responsibility of the government to organize the economy of the country in the way that each member of society takes part in economic mechanism and thereby all live a satisfactory life.
2. It is the ethical responsibility of the wealthy person to use his extra money for welfare services.

All the second reason the Buddha encouraged an ethical principle in this society, that is generosity. Generosity works out with two results – one is for the individual and the other is for the society. greed is an inherent weakness of human mind that can be overcome only by its counter principle generosity. The Buddha’s philosophy, therefore, came to be practiced in buddhist societies in many ways.

There are two other aspects of Marx’s philosophy in which Buddhism is a vital understanding in different perspective. There are social ethics and moral ethics. With the rejection of the social system in pre-communist societies Marx also rejects

148 This utterance appearce many times in Tipiṭaka. One of them is Majjhima Nikāya – Majjhima paṇṇāsapāli – 4. Rājavaggo – 4. Madhura Sutta – paragraph 318
149 Marx’s economical philosophy cannot be applied in the nowadays society. It is a philosophy which is applicable in society of people, who have no or at least very low greed. Why? Because according to Marx rich must give to poor and have nothing for it. According to Marx all people should have everything what they need, but not more. But that, of course, is not applicable in reality. As we can see, Buddhism is also not applicable in reality, viz. morality of Buddhist countries like Sri Lanka (drinking alcohol is on a high level); Thailand (market with women and human organs); Burma (‘Buddhist’ government which does not mind to shoot monks). Buddhism as well as Marxism are not philosophies applicable in nowadays society.
any system of ethics prevailing in those societies. Therefore, he rejects religionists. Buddhist thought looks at social problem in another way. While it recognizes the value of life of all beings, it emphasizes that human being’s weaknesses should be overcome through internal transformation.

The other factor of marxism whith which Buddhism could not agree with its materialistic views, as Buddhism analyses human personality is a combination of material and mental factors and says that material factors alone cannot be(?) made(?) the existence of man and to change the man. Therefore, structural and internal transformation are fundamental and essential part.

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**Discuss the Buddhist response to the Marxist criticism of religion.**

Philosophy of Karl-Marx: history observed that three main streams of thought influences: Karl-Marx to generate his philosophy at that time the following three bases of thought were predominantly functioning in Germany, England and France. 1. Classical German philosophy. 2. Classical politico economic system of Great Britain. 3. France communism and the trends of revolution. These three ideologists shaped the way of thinking of Karl Marc and he produces the new politico economic theory name Marxism.

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In examining the Buddhist response to Marx idea on religion first we have to contrast and compare the main principle of Marx theory against Buddhism. The main theory of Marxism is the in quality between social classes. According to Buddhism this again has physical as well as psychological reason like economic, social status etc. The Kudhadanta Sutta of D. Nikaya record an incident where Buddhist advice is enumerated as a remedy to overcome poverty establishes economic stability in human society. Hence Marx’s objection was to this kind of religious brain wash, which helped to continue the status quo that enabled the rich to live in Luxury at the expense and suffering of masses.

**Existencialism (August 2009)**

Existencialism is philosophical movement that developed during the 19th and 20th century.

- Existencialism is a result of the combination of two words – existence and essence.
- Existencialism can be considered as a turning point of the western philosophy.
- According to the tradition all philosophers preferred to emphasize the essence than the existence. Every person has to strive to achieve the essence without paying attention to the existence.
- Existentialists held this idea because they experienced that human beings die without reaching to any essence because of the world war.(?)
Existentialists did not agree with essentialists. They were of the opinion that the essence would be different from person to person. Among them there were theists and atheists. Most of them denied that the reality could be neatly summarized to a system. Therefore, a precise definition of an essence is impossible according to them.

- Existencialism emphasizes existence of an individual and the subsequent development of the essence of the person.
- Existentialists tried to direct our attention to ourselves as individuals as they understood that man should exist first. Individuals are free to select their own path.
- Existentialists argued that man must take the risk and responsibility of their actions. In the basic existentialist teaching man is the only animal who defines about himself through the life.(?) Without life there will be no meaning.
- Existentialists believed in life and fighting for life. While fighting for the life each man has to face difficulties which are limited knowledge and time to make decision.

  Human life is seen as a series of incidents and decisions which he has made without knowing what is correct, what is to be accepted or what is to be rejected. Individuals must make their own choice without any help from external standards. Human beings are completely free and responsible for the choices made by them. If thus freedom is limited, their responsibility for their beliefs, actions, decisions made by them causes anxiety.
- Existentialists accept that man is free to plan his goals. Every man has his own goal.
- In this attempt to reach the goal it is difficult – many are unable to achieve their accepted goals. This leads them to sorrow, disgust and boredom.
- Individual is unable to fulfill his needs as he wishes due to the finite and the infinite nature of the human kind.
- If man with finite abilities will not be able to reach any goal which is beyond his strength, it will leads the man to boredom.
- According to existentialism every person dies with an unsatisfied mind.

Existentialism and Buddhism (August 2009)

- Man suffers.
- There is an end of suffering.
- Suffering cannot be stopped.
- Suffering was created by God who is supreme and no one will be able to eradicate suffering.
- Man dies without satisfaction.

Buddhism
- Buddhism also accepts that man suffers in the physical world (dukkha)
- But it goes further than existentialism, because according to Buddhism not only because of the physical world, but also due to the conditional physical body of the person.
- The cause of suffering is well explained in Buddhism. The cause of suffering is attachment (upādāna).

»Pañca upādānakhandhā dukkhā.« - This is mentioned in Anattalakkhana Sutta in Samyutta Nikāya. It was the second discourse delivered by the Buddha to his first mendicants.

- According to Buddhism everything is impermanent and subject to change. Therefore, there is nothing static in the world.

- Those who endeavor to reach static goals in the conditioned, unstatic world end up with an unsatisfied mind which leads to suffering.

- As existentialist understands man as miserable, unlucky, he is powerless to eradicate suffering. Buddhism does not agree with existentialists. Man is free to think about goals which are finite. But he would not be able to reach them. This is the nature of the human kind.

According to existentialists Soren Kierkegard and Albert Camus – those who believe in the divine creation and the existence of God are of the opinion that the strength and the power of man is restricted by the God. Boredom and anxiety is also a work of the God. Those who deny the existence of the God, Jean Paul Sartre, said that such a thing happens due to the competition in the society.

- Even if the individual has already reached his goal, he is not satisfied with what he has got and looks forward to reach a higher goal. According to Raṭṭhapāla Sutta of Majjhima Nikāya man dies with an unsatisfied mind:

»‘Rājā ca a aññe ca bahū manussā, Avītaṇṭhā [atitattaṇṭhā (ka.)] maraṇaṃ upenti;
Ūnāva huvāna jahanti dehaṃ,
Kāmehi lokamhi na hatthi titti.«150

The king and other many people go to death with unabated lust. Reaching goals aggravate the competition in the society. This causes unrest among people. Winning person will be a victim of losers and will bring sorrow to them:

»‘Jayaṃ veraṃ pasavati, dukkhaṃ seti parājito;
Upasanto sukhaṃ seti, hitvā jayaparājaya’nti.«151

To read: Alagaddūpama Sutta; Mahādukkhakkhandha Sutta of Majjhima Nikāya

Buddhism accepts the superiority of the man - »Attāhi attano nātho.«152 Man is his own master. According this statement man has the power to end suffering. In addition to that he can make a living in this world a peaceful life with the understanding of the nature of the world.

- Buddhism is not a bad-word teaching. It teaches man to live in the world with the awareness of impermanence of it.

- Not only that Buddhism emphasizes the total eradication of suffering, Nibbāna. According to Buddhism mind is unblemished, but it has became blemished as a result of the influx of defilements:

50. ‘Pabhassaramidam, bhikkhave, cittaṃ. Tañca kho āgantukehi upakkilesehi vippamutta’nti. Dasamaṃ.«153

150(Majjhima Nikāya – Majjhimapaññāsapāli – 4. Rājavaggo)
151This stanza appears also in several places. One of them is Samyutta Nikāya – Sagāthāvaggapāli - 3. Kosalasamyuttaṃ
- 2. Dutiyavaggo - 4. Paṭhamasāgāmasuttam
152This stanza doesn't tell much about superiority of man.
153(Aṅguttara Nikāya – Ekakanipātapāli - 5. Paṇihitaacchavaggo)
- The path to purification is the Noble Eightfold Path, which leads to Nibbāna.

**Buddhist Mysticism in Meditation (Original by Ven. Dharmeśvar)**

Meditation is one of the dominant mysticism in Buddhism, leading to complete concentration of mind, 'one-pointedness' or absorption (samādhi). Attention is progressively withdrawn from outer things, so that a man may become entirely unconscious of them and may thus enter into a state of trance. It is said that the Buddha was once so absorbed while walking in the open air that He was altogether unconscious of a thunderstorm, in which two farmers were struck by lightning. In samādhi at its highest point the consciousness of self disappears along with that of the outer world. It is the culmination of the Eightfold Path which leads to Nibbāna. 154

The scriptures speak of different spheres of being. There are three great spheres of cosmic existence. The first and lowest is kāma-loka, the world of desire or senses. Above it is rūpa-loka, the world of form in which there is a subtle residue of matter, so that its occupants possess the power of sight and hearing but not the senses of touch, taste and smell. Beyond this is arūpa-loka, the formless world, in which there is no residue of matter, although its inhabitants are still subject to the limitations of cosmic existence and yet free from thesaṃsāra.

To rise above the level of the sense-world and to enter the world of form it is necessary to pass through four stages of meditation and trance and to overcome what are known as the five 'hindrances'. The rūpa jhānas have been described as 'mystic rapture'. The distinctive feature of mystical experience is the consciousness of the transcendent – the immediate awareness of supreme reality. The four trances may, indeed, lead to a higher plane of being, but their characteristic quality is subjective.

the four rūpa jhānas are succeeded by certain exceedingly subtle states of consciousness corresponding to the planes of the formless world. In formless world, through the practice of trance they are said to attain certain supernatural faculties – for instance, of creating a mind formed body, the power of hearing distant sounds and of reading the minds of others, the memory of one's own past lives, the power to read the history of

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154 The Buddha learnt the higher stages of samādhi from Ālāra Kālāma and Uddaka Rāmaputta who did not know Noble Eightfold path. Therefore samādhi is not culmination of Noble Eightfold Path. Samādhi is a common attainment even among Christians, Muslims and in other religions, especially in religions of India.
other beings – to see their passing away and rebirth. They are regarded as a by-product of meditation.

The formless world is not ultimate. Craving for life in that world is a fetter from which man must seek release. In the Udāna, Nibbāna is described as a plane not only beyond the level of physical experience, but beyond the plane of infinite space, of infinite consciousness, of nothingness and of neither consciousness nor non-consciousness. It is said that on the last night of His life the Buddha himself, having passed through the four rūpa jhānas and the four arūpa jhānas entered this plane of being. He said himself, referring no doubt to his own experience of enlightenment under the Bodhi tree: „I reached experience of the Nibbāna which is unborn, unrivalled, secure from attachment, undecaying and unstained. This condition is indeed reached by me which is deep, difficult to see, difficult to understand, tranquil, excellent, beyond the reach of mere logic, subtle and to be realized only by the wise. “

**QUESTION: DISCUSS THE PLACE OF MENTAL DEVELOPMENT IN BUDDHIST RELIGIOUS PRACTICE**

In Dhammapada 35 there is: „It is good to control the mind and the controlled mind brings happiness.“ The mind is difficult to be controlled. It travels far and wide all by itself, unrealized, unrecognized and changing rapidly from one thing to another. The mind gets defiled easily by unwholesome qualities like greed, jealousy, hate etc.

In order to purify the mind, there is only one way in Buddhism – to practice meditation. Vipassanā – meditation of insight is very essential for those who want to get great peace in their minds and to be super-human beings. The word ‘meditation’ is a very poor substitute for the original term bhāvanā, which comes from the word ‘bhāveti’ that means ‘mental culture’ or ‘mental development’.

In Buddhism there are two forms of meditation. One is the development of mental concentration (samatha bhāvanā). This form of meditation existed before the Buddha. The second is vipassanā bhāvanā, which means ‘insight meditation’. That meditation only can be leading to the complete liberation of mind and to realization of ultimate truth, Nibbāna. This is essentially Buddhist meditation. It is an analytical method based on mindfulness, awareness, vigilance, observation.

The method of meditation is mentioned in Mahāsatipaṭṭhāna Sutta of Dīgha Nikāya and Abhidhammasaṅgaha. Before one begins to meditate, one must have to develop morality (sīla), wish to do (chanda), effort (vīriya), mind or thought (citta) and intellect (vīmaṅsa). There are many types of meditation described in Buddhist texts. According to Abhidhammasaṅgaha, there are 40 types of method to practice meditation. They are:

(a) ten kasinas
(b) ten impurities
(c) ten reflections
(d) four illimitable
(e) one perception
(f) the analysis
(g) four arūpa-jhānas.

In all of them we can choose one which is suitable for us. But ānāpānasati (mindfulness of breathing in and breathing out) is the best subject of meditation, which applies equally to all. The Buddha also practiced ānāpānasati before His enlightenment.

Modern scientific discoveries have proven that deep concentration helps to lower the heart and metabolic rates, reducing stress and help with psychiatric conditions. Through mental purification or mental healthiness one can ease stress and tension and overcome psychosomatic problems. One who practices meditation does not get as flustered, shocked or surprised as ordinary people by unpredictable sounds, even those as loud as gunshots.

According to Buddhism the man naturally is feelingless, uncontent and a slave of craving. Craving will always work in

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155 These are meditation-objects of samatha bhāvanā (meditation of concentration, meditation leading to jhānas), not vipassanā.
human mind to fulfill different aspirations of human thinking. They will have no end, a barrier to that process of thinking could be made only through proper understanding of reality for observing the formation of human mind.

The aim of Buddhist meditation is to calm and purify the mind so that one may gain release, freedom, from saṃsāra and get happiness. The Buddha says that there is only one way to get happiness and free from attachment. That is bhāvanā: »Ekāyano bhikkhave ayaṃ maggo...« (Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta, Dīgha Nikāya). Thus one must follow this method if one wants to reach enlightenment, Nibbāna.

THE BUDDHIST CONCEPT OF FIVE PRECEPTS AND THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (ORIGINAL BY VEN. DHARMEŚVAR)

With the welfare of 'all beings' (sabbe sattā) Buddhism is certainly concerned with human rights and with much more. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights as adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 10th December 1948 are enshrined in the teachings of the Buddha.

In fact, the Buddhist pañca sila could be looked upon as the earliest pronouncement on human rights in the history of mankind. In that the pañca sila embodies a recognition of:

(a) the right to live
(b) the right to have property
- two broad divisions within which all human rights could be reckoned. In fact, in the process of securing the wealth of mankind, as may be noted from the Cakkavattisīhanāda Sutta, the Cakkavatti monarch is said to recommend the practice of the pañcasīla, which means the observance of human rights. He is also said to provide ward and protection not only to man but also 'to beasts and birds'. Rights are not only for human, but for other living creatures too.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights comprises of 30 articles. Here we will discuss only articles 1, 2, 6 and 23, because they are basic to the rest of the Declaration.

**Article 1**

„All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.“

This article is basic to all human rights and is in complete accord with Buddhist thought. Buddhism upholds that every human being is born with complete freedom and responsibility. This freedom of human beings is commencing with their birth itself, and the recognition of their equality in dignity and rights by Buddhism are reflected clearly in the Buddha's emphasis on self-reliance. Thus the Buddha's approach to human rights is more humanistic than legalistic.

**Article 2**

„Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.“

In the observations of article 1 it was stated how and on what grounds Buddhism considers all human beings equal. Such a conception of equality requires that rights and freedom should remain untrammeled by considerations such as race, color, sex etc.
Article 6

„Everyone has the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law.“

Article 6 is quite meaningful from the point of view of Buddhist ethics and Buddhist notion of justice. What matters here is the 'human-ness' (manussattam) of the individual concerned. The Buddhist attitude towards the law stems two conceptions:

1. The rule of righteousness
2. The happiness and well-being of mankind (bahujanahita, bahujanasukha)
   which is unique to Buddhists thought.

Article 23

„1. Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favourable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment.
2. Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to equal pay for equal work.
3. Everyone who works has the right to just and favourable remuneration ensuring for himself and his family an existence worthy of human dignity and supplemented, if necessary, by other means of social protection.
4. Everyone has the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests.“

In the time of the Buddha people were largely self-employed, each in an activity very much determined by his or her caste, thereby participating in a sort of economic organization of society and providing for themselves as well as contributing to the well-being of the community.

As for the caste system of the day, it is well known how the Buddha disapproved of it. As a matter of fact it contradicted the very basic principle of Buddhism that all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and have the same rights, with no reservation at all, to strive along the Noble Eightfold Path to the ultimate attainment of Nibbāna.
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protected and nurtured by the environment. Man's highest legacy is the physical environment reflecting naturalness and is not contaminated by air-pollution, water-pollution, sound-pollution and soil-pollution. There is no dispute about its attitude to preservation in all respects. A number of examples for protecting the environment can be seen in the discourses of the Buddha.

For example, when one day a deity asked the Buddha the following questions: „Whose merit grows by day and night, who is the righteous, virtuous person that goes to the realm of bliss?“ The reply of the Buddha helps us understand the importance of preservation and nurture of the environment. According to the reply of the Buddha, the merit of those people who plant groves, parks, build bridges, make ponds, dwelling places, troughs etc. grows by day and night, such religious people go to heaven. The Upasampadā monks (monks who have higher ordination) are prohibited to commit destruction of trees and creepers. The reason for this was that Buddha loved the environment.

According to Sutta Piṭaka, the destruction of the organic environment is not appropriate (Dīgha Nikāya, Sāmaññaphala Sutta, p. 112). The Milinda Pañhā that belongs to the post-Pāli canonical literature of Buddhists describes how trees and creepers help man. According to it:

1. It is called a tree because it bears flowers and fruits. Flowers generate beauty, and shows the reality and transitoriness of life. Fruits supply savour and energy, similarly they carry on the continuity of trees.
2. Trees provide shade to those who approach them. The shade of a tree is a natural comfort.
3. The tree provide their shadow equally to everybody. The tree that gives its shadow to both friend and foe, teaches a lesson of true loving-kindness.

According to this, protection and nurture of trees and creepers would be of great benefit to man. Therefore, Buddhism points out a path of devotion and preservation of trees and creepers. Just as a mother takes special care of her child, just so the rain nourishes both the active person and indolent person. A good understanding of the significance of the environment and its influence on human life, influences the society to conserve it. Similarly, men should have devotion towards the environment. It is clear from the Dhammapada that one should live in the environment without causing any harm to it.

According to the Raṭṭhapāla sutta, such a person, being freed from craving, considers that his life is subjected to decay and death. He further thinks that everything is impermanent, and so lives having little desires, and being contented (Majjhima Nikāya II, Raṭṭhapāla Sutta, p. 420). Buddhist thought expects man to get used to such thinking. A person who has the least desires, uses the available resources moderately, eats moderately, uses only required clothes, uses dwelling places just to protect himself from flies and mosquitoes and takes medicine just to cure his diseases (VSM. pp. 23-27). Environmental resources are well protected in such a society.

**What is the Buddhist attitude towards environmental preservation**

Here, it is intended to deal with the Buddhist attitude towards environmental preservation. Man is protected and nurtured by the environment. Man’s highest legacy is the physical environment reflecting naturalness in contaminated by air-pollution, water-pollution, sound-pollution and soil-pollution. There is no dispute about its attitude to preservation in all respects. A number of examples for protecting the environment can be seen in the discourses of the Buddha.

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156 Religious people? Do people need to be religious to build all those things? In Europe many non-religious people build bridges, ponds etc. I am quite sure that religious conviction does not play a serious role in acquiring merit.

157 I believe that loving-kindness should be intentional...
preservation and nurture of the environment. According to the reply of the Buddha, the merit of those people who plant groves, parks, build bridges, make ponds, dwelling places, troughs, etc. grow by day and night; such religious people go to heaven. The upasampanna monks (monks who have higher ordination) are prohibited from the destruction of trees and creepers. The reason for this was that Buddha loved the environment.

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Buddhism teaches that a person, who has the least desires, uses the available resources moderately, eats moderately, uses only required clothes, uses dwelling places just to protect himself from flies and mosquitoes and takes medicine just to cure his diseases. (VSM.PP.23-27) Environmental resources are well protected in such a society. In fact the protection and preservation of environment is mentioned as a duty of a Cakkavatti-king. 466

666The Buddhist concept of environmental preservation

Living in a suitable environment (Patirupadesavasa) is reckoned as one to the auspicious things in Buddhism. The commentary explains Patirupdesa as a place where the fourfold people live, namely where the monks, nuns, lay male devotees and female devotees live, where meritorious activities such as liberality prevail and where the teachings of the master are taught and studied. Such a place is called auspicious (Mangala) because people living in such areas are in a position to acquire merit.

People gather experience and knowledge from the environment in which they live and the temperaments and inclinations are developed in them in accordance with the knowledge and experience they gather from their particular environment. So in an environment where educational facilities, moral guidance, suitable means of livelihood are not found, people grow up, ignorant of what is good and what is bad, ignorant of duties and obligations to one another and they indulge in diverse corrupt practices. But in a society where these facilities are properly provide and where means of righteous livelihood are assured to all, people grow up quite well-informed of what is happening in the world, conscious of their moral obligations to one another and efficient in their handling of all work in that society. And in the Chakkavatti Sihanada Sutta is the best example.

The episode of Angulimala too, helps us to understand how the environments can fully change the nature of a being. Angulimala, who was in his early days called Ahimsaka, because a dangerous criminal, not through any fault of his own but due to the viciousness of his immediate environment. The criminal Angulimala once again became a virtuous man by his association with the Buddha; that is with the change of the environment.

Buddhism emphasized the importance of the environment factor in the spiritual development of the people, at the very outset. The Buddha set up the organization (Bhikkhusangha) in order to provide the adherents with the proper environment for spiritual culture. The environment of the house-holder’s life is not one that encourages the cultivation of higher virtues. In the environment of the monastery the conditions are very favorable to the cultivation of the mind, because it is free from bonds of lay life, no distractions to wean one away from meditations to wean one away from meditation and the conditions there don not arouse one’s greed and hatred.

Meditation is not possible unless the proper environment is there. A person who is keen on cultivating higher virtues to develop the mind has to withdraw to a place where the suitable environmental conditions are found.

Even in the resent day it is the custom of lay Buddhists to withdraw to the quiet atmosphere of the village monasteries to observe
the Poya day precepts (Sīla). The environment in the monastery is quite favorable to that purpose, as it is devoid of various distractions found in the environment of the ordinary lay society.

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Living in a suitable environment (patirūpadesavāsa) is reckoned as one of the auspicious things in Buddhism. The commentary explains patirūpadesa as a place where the fourfold people live, namely where the monks, nuns, lay male devotees and female devotees live, where meritotious activities such as liberality prevail and where the teachings of the Master are taught and studied. Such a place is called auspicious (maṅgala) because people living in such areas are in a position to acquire merit.

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Even in the present day it is the custom of lay Buddhists to withdraw to the quiet atmosphere of the village monasteries to observe the Poya day precepts (sīla). The environment in the monastery is quite favourable to that purpose, as it is devoid of various distractions found in the environment of the ordinary lay society.
Aesthetics is a branch of philosophy that examines the nature of art and the character of our experience of art and of natural environment. It emerged as a separate field of philosophical inquiry during the eighteenth century in England and on the United States. Recognition of aesthetics as a separate branch of philosophy coincided with the development of theories of art that grouped together painting, poetry, sculpture, music, and dance (and often landscape gardening) as the same kind of thing, *les beaux arts*, or the fine arts. Baumgarten coined the term ‘aesthetics’ in his *Reflections of Poetry* (1735) as the name for one of the two branches of the study of knowledge, i.e., for the study of sensoy experience coupled with feeling, which he argued provided a different type of knowledge from the distinct, abstract ideas studies by “logic.” He derived it from the ancient Greek *aisthanomai* (to perceive), and “the aesthetics” has always been intimately connected with sensory experience and the kinds of feelings it arouses.

According to the pleasure theory (one of the theories of Arts), an artist is a person who is delighted in beauty and spends his time in the creation of beautiful objects. He finds pleasure in his work and tries to please others with his production. Those who admit or accept this theory say that the proper function of art is to give pleasure and they maintain that it is on this basis that the standard of art must be judged.

The ultimate goal of Buddhism is to get oneself deliberate from suffering. According to Buddhism, the main cause of suffering is tanha or desire, the instrument of enjoyment of the senses which leads to attachment. Thus in order to obtain emancipation, one has to get rid of all forms of desire.

Since the main function of art is to give pleasure or in other words, to give satisfaction to one’s desire of beauty, therefore it seems that the teaching of the Buddha is in contradiction with the theory of art. However, we should accept the historical fact that Buddhist art has indeed developed and flourished with the spread of Buddhism. If Buddhism held an unfavorable attitude towards art, how can this happen? In order to make clear the fact, a further studies on the Buddhist attitude towards art, and thus toward aesthetics should be attempted.

Siddhartha Gautama renounced the world and attained the ultimate goal of emancipation, and expected his disciples to follow his example in order to achieve the same goal. But this does not mean that the Buddha totally condemned worldly things as useless. He lived among the people until his parinirvana and appreciated art, music and beauty both physical and natural to a certain extent, because they are useful to common man.

In the *Sakka-pabha sutta* of the Digha Nikaya (vol. II, p.263ff), when the divine musician, pabcasikha was singing and playing his lute (vina) in the presence of the Buddha he listened and even commented favourably on it.

In the *Udana* (p.62) and in the *Mahaparinibbana sutta* of the Digha Nikaya (II, p.102), many times the Buddha had gone to see the shrine of the yaksas such as Sarandada, Capala etc, and even stayed in such places for a short while and had described them as beautiful.

In the *Dhammapada* (verse 99) and in the *Theragatha* and *Therigatha*, the beauty of nature was appreciated by the Buddha as well as by Arahants who lived in forests. Thus, Ven. Walpola Rahula says “He, (the Buddha) appreciated both natural and physical beauty.”

On several occasions, the Buddha was moved aesthetically, and he had even told Ananda how delightful certain places were to him at Vesali and had told the bhikkhus that, if they had not seen the devas (gods) of Tavatijsa (heaven) they should look at the handsome Licchavis, who are beautifully and elegantly dressed in different colours (Mahaparinibbana sutta).

In the *Cullavagga* (translation p.213), we have clear evidence to prove that Buddhist monasteries were also decorated with paintings and sculptures. It is mentioned in the text that the Buddha permitted his disciples to have paintings and sculptures other than figures of love making men and women and figures of living creatures.

Immediately after the Buddha had entered parinibbana, his senior disciple Mahakassapa, considering
that Ajathasattu, the king of Magadha might fainted on hearing the news, he thus, got his ministers to inform him by drawing pictures of the life story of the Buddha on a canvas. The king cried out in despair when he saw the last scene i.e. when he learnt of the Great loss.

Though the Buddha as well as his disciples held a positive attitude at a certain extend toward art, there are also some incidents showing the criticism of the Buddha upon arts. In the Anguttara Nikaya, the Buddha exhorts his disciples thus “It is a mere lamentation, a cry, brethren, is music in this Noble Training, it is a mere madness, brethren, is dancing in this Noble Training of the Ariyans.”

At another time an artist of high repute, a dancer named Talaputta, comes to the Buddha having heard from his teachers that those who dance and make people happy by virtue of their entertaining others go to a heaven called Pahasa. But the Buddha disillusionises him by reminding that such people only go to a hell by that name, for they being intoxicated themselves with lust, hatred and ill-will, cause others too to be infatuated and thereby gather evil kamma.

However, the condemnation given by the Buddha as shown above can be compared with the comment made by him to a divine musician “Admirable, Pabcasikha, is your song glorifying the Buddha, Dhamma and Sangha, and, your lovely-ditty. The music of your lute blends harmoniously with the sweetness of your voice.” This shows how far the Buddha sympathized with the material aspirations of all beings whether divine and mythical or human and real.

One can be a musician or an artist and yet be a good Buddhist. But if he is to develop spiritually, he cannot be satisfied with that. He has to train himself further. At the commencement of the good life, good emotion needs to be cultivated and in this attempt art can serve a very useful purpose. But on reaching the state of serene equanimity in the fourth Jhana, all interest in aesthetic pursuits will automatically vanish. According to Dr.O.H.de. A. Wijesekara, art as an aspect of human emotional experience, can be grouped under the Buddhist conception of sila, just as samadhi and pabba denotes very nearly “intuition” and “intellect” respectively.

Art in Buddhism can generate good emotion (saddha) is well exemplified by the status of the Buddha which signifies something serene and noble. It is not even so much the compassion of the Buddha that is symbolized as the depth of his enlightenment. The Buddha image is therefore an important object to inspire common Buddhists. However, for those who have cultivated a higher level of spiritually, Buddha image might not be necessary. A good example can be adduced from a Chinese Jhan (Zen) master who burnt the wooden Buddha image for boiling tea!

It is not the outside object which bounds one in samsara, but it is the inner defilement which obstruct man from freedom. The Buddha lived as an ordinary man, he drinks, eats and senses as other do but with no attachment. He permits art to a certain extent for common people. To grasp or to repulse is not the way to freedom, but it is the Middle Path which, is always the attitude of the Buddhist way of life!

666Describe the concept of Alankara with reference to Subho-alankara and its relevance to the Buddhist Canon, (511)

The Pali term ‘alankara’ is a compound formed from ‘alam’ which means ‘suitable’ and ‘kara’ which means ‘to do’, then collectively alankara means ‘suitable to do’ which, in Pali literature it implies the ‘ornamentation of a poem or a prose’. According to the Subho-alankara, alankara is indeed, used both in the creation of prose as well as in poem, though it is used more obviously in poetic works.

In Indian tradition, a poetic creation is usually compared to a beautiful woman. A beautiful woman has to possess a beautiful figure, good qualities of personality and being decorated with beautiful ornaments as well. In the same way, a good piece of poetic creation should also possess beautiful figure (bandha), good qualities (guna) and beautiful ornaments (alankara). Here, one should also notice that, good qualities also means the absent of bad qualities. However, all beautiful poetic works may have different figures (bandha), just as all the
beautiful women might have different shapes, the judgement of beauty lies not on any particular standard, but on its collectivity as a whole piece of poetic creation or as a woman.

According to the Subha-alankara, there are ten qualities (guna) which any poem should possess, there are;

1. Pasada—pleasant nature that one is attracted to it and has the desire to read it
2. Oja—the quality of having many compounds (in fact oja is considered the life of a prose)
3. Madhurata—the quality of sweetness
4. Samata—the quality of evenness, that is to say without going to any extremes, it maintains a steadiness in its sound and meaning
5. Sukhumalata—the softness of sound
6. Athhabayatti—the clarity of the meaning which are meaningful
7. Udarata—the ways of expression which highlight the qualities
8. Silesa—the expression which has two meanings
9. Kanti—beautiful
10. Samadhi—animation of the unanimated and vice versa, including personification.

According to the Subho-alankara, again, all the 35 ornaments are divided into two main groups, i.e. direct and indirect ornaments. There is only one direct ornament and the rest are indirect. Direct ornament is called 'sobhavavutti' in Pali which, is a direct expression of natural behaviour in a poetic creation. No simile or metaphor is used in direct ornament. However similes or metaphors are used in other direct ornaments.

The main purpose of alankara in the Buddhist Canon is to clarify the doctrinal ideas. Language alone is not enough to express some obscure philosophical ideas, so similes, metaphors and such other methods are employed. People understand with their intellectual but experience with their sensation. In poetic creation, personal experience is transformed into such specific expression that people with such training can experience. According to Baumgarten, poetic creation as a form of art has to be understood through sensory experience coupled with feeling, not through logical interpretation. Thus alankara in the Buddhist Canon plays such an important role of experiencing the subtle beauty of the Buddhist Enlightened world. The Buddha himself also appreciated the creation of poetic works as recorded in the Vangisa Samyutta in the Samyutta Nikaya.

BONUS: Rationalism (extract from internet compiled by Ven. Czech Sarana)

Rationalism - from the Latin „ratio,“ meaning „reason“ - is a point of view that states that reason plays the main role in understanding the world and obtaining knowledge. In epistemology and in its modern sense, rationalism is "any view appealing to reason as a source of knowledge or justification.« In more technical terms it is a method or a theory "in which the criterion of the truth is not sensory but intellectual and deductive.« Whilst rationalism has existed throughout the history of philosophy, it is usually associated specifically with three philosophers during the Renaissance:

1. René Descartes (1596-1650)
2. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716)
3. Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677)

All 3 of these philosophers shared the belief that we can best understand the world through logic and reasoning. Since the Enlightenment, rationalism is usually associated with the introduction of mathematical methods into philosophy, as in Descartes, Leibniz, and Spinoza. This is commonly called continental rationalism, because it was

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158 Epistemology is a science concerned with the right way of explaining terms (words).
predominant in the continental schools of Europe, whereas in Britain empiricism dominated. However, this does not mean that they were uninterested in science and experiment – on the contrary, both rationalists and empiricists were keen on scientific inquiry. This was because they were reacting against centuries-old traditions which tried to base an understanding of the world upon ideas put forward by the 4th century BC Greek philosopher Aristotle and the world view of the Bible.

Actually in the history the first rationalist was Socrates. Socrates firmly believed that, before humans can understand the world, they first need to understand themselves; the only way to accomplish that is with rational thought. The rational soul is beyond our conscious knowledge, but sometimes communicates via images, dreams, and other means. The task of the philosopher is to refine and eventually extract the irrational soul from its bondage, hence the need for moral development, and then to connect with the rational soul, and so become a complete person, manifesting the higher spiritual essence of the person whilst in the physical.

Another very important rationalist in the history was René Descartes. Descartes thought that only knowledge of eternal truths – including the truths of mathematics, and the epistemological and metaphysical foundations of the sciences – could be attained by reason alone; other knowledge, the knowledge of physics, required experience of the world, aided by the scientific method. He also argued that although dreams appear as real as sense experience, these dreams cannot provide persons with knowledge.

Whilst rationalists shared an appreciation for science and empirical inquiry, they also emphasized certain key notions that were not shared by empiricism and became the subject of keen debate between the two camps. The key notions are:

1. A Priori Knowledge
2. Innate Ideas
3. Logical Necessity

1. A Priori Knowledge – “Some ideas are true independent of experience”. Whilst rationalists did not deny that the senses give us important information about the world, they did not consider them to be the sole means of knowledge. In fact, they quite often thought that the senses mislead us. For this reason, they argued that knowledge which is independent of experience must be more trustworthy because it has less to do with the senses. Such ideas they called a priori, which is a Latin phrase meaning “prior to” or “before” – experience, that is. Examples of such knowledge include:
   a. Mathematical propositions (2 + 2 = 4).
   b. Things which are true by definition (all bachelors are unmarried).
   c. Self-evident truths (such as “I think therefore I am” or “God exists”).

2. Innate Ideas – “Some ideas are present from birth”. Amongst those ideas which do not require the proof or suggestion of sense experience are concepts which are present from birth. These ideas – which are called innate – can theoretically be discovered or ‘brought out’ (the original meaning of the word “education”) from within the mind of each individual. So, for example, one of Descartes’ arguments for the existence of God is that the idea is present in the mind from birth, left there almost as if an artist had signed his work or left a trademark.

3. Logical Necessity – “Some things cannot be conceived of as otherwise”. Another important idea for rationalists is that of necessity. Although we may use the word everyday, the rationalists actually meant something very specific by it. So, for instance, we might say something like, “In order to pass your exams you have to study hard”. However, in reality, there are lots of ways you might pass your exams: you may have a natural talent for learning so that you don’t have to work hard; you may be lucky; you may bribe an examiner – or cheat. However, if we were to say something like, “In order to have 3 things you have to have more than 2 things,” then we are approaching more what the rationalists meant by the term. To distinguish between these two uses, philosophers generally call the first sort – passing your exams – “empirical necessity” (it could be otherwise); the latter sort (having 4 things) is called logical necessity. So, if we can prove that something is true because “it could not be otherwise”, then we have achieved logical necessity and an absolute degree of certainty. The goal for rationalists was therefore to find those “logical necessities” which would help us find certainty in the world and answer those difficult moral, religious and metaphysical questions that interest us so much.

Notes from the University of Buddhism and Pāli (extract)
Religious people believe in God and they do not inquire whether God exists or not. Rationalism tries to prove the existence of God using rational argument. Rationalism comes from the Latin word „ratio,“ which means „reason.‖ Reasoning is very important for a philosopher. Aristotle was one of the great philosophers, who used rationalism to explain his philosophical theories. He accepted the existence of God through rational argument. These philosophers used rational arguments to explain the existence the existence of God (Brahma) and that He is greater than the Universe. Rationalism appears also in Upanisad with a view to explain the existence of Brahmin. The argument for the existence of Brahmin is, that there is an empirical world.\(^{163}\)

Modern rational philosophy continues along with modern sciences based on experiment. The three modern rationalists were: Descartes (1596-1650), Leibniz (1646-1716) and Spinoza (1632-1677). All these three philosophers believed, that the reality and the world can be truly understood logically and by reasoning.

**QUESTIONS**

- What are the differences between religion and philosophy?
- Clarify the two subjects presented by the two terms – philosophy and religion.
- Explain the distinguished feature in Islam when compared with the temporary religion.

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162 „Ratio“ is a verb. It means „to reason,“ „to think.“
163 Empirical world is the world, which we cognize by our five senses.